Since the signing of the March 6 Preliminary Agreement more than seven months had passed. Yet over our territory the aggressor’s guns had never ceased to sound. Availing themselves of the political confusion in metropolitan France and supported by financial circles with vested interests in the colonies, the Gaullists in Indochina headed by d’Argenlieu adopted a policy of faits accomplis to further their aggressive designs. D’Argenlieu had grossly violated the clauses of the Agreement. However he had never suffered any reprimands for this from the French Government even after de Gaulle had left the political arena. It was not difficult for the wily defrocked priest to realize that his entire activity in Indochina had never run counter to the political line followed by the new French government. He had received firm support from the inter-ministerial council on Indochina presided over by Bidault.
In North Viet Nam, after the withrawal of the Chiang Kai-shek troops, d’Argenlieu began to carry out a “nibbling” policy — the piecemeal invasion of our territory. He had been devoting his efforts to consolidating and expanding the French footholds and at the same time vigorously recruiting reactionary elements and former lackeys who had been lying low, in preparation for the establishment of “autonomous zones” to encircle the revolutionary forces and create the conditions for overthrowing the revolutionary power. In South Viet Nam, d’Argenlieu continued to extend the war of aggression. He had openly repudiated the articles of the Agreement on South Viet Nam, even going to the length of declaring that South Viet Nam remained legally a French colony. He had given orders to Nyo, commander of the French Expeditionary forces in south Indochina, to use every possible means to undermine the revolutionary power, suppress the people’s resistance and rapidly reestablish the colonial administration as it had been before 1939.
For our part, over the past period we had been conducting a struggle to make our adversary observe the Agreement and check his nibbling tactics while at the same time carrying out resolute retaliatory strikes against his acts of aggression. By combining our efforts to maintain detente with strong military counter-blows, we were able to consolidate and develop our forces in every field and improve our ability to deal with any eventuality.
Our Southern compatriots’ continued and widespread uprisings over the past months had changed the political and military situation in Nam Bo and southern Trung Bo.
Our resistance in the South had continued.
In Nam Bo our armed forces had been developing rapidly. In the months of May, June and July we had formed new regiments. Like their brothers and sisters in the North, our troops in the South were mostly of peasant origin. But, particularly in the eastern zone of Nam Bo where there were many factories and rubber plantations, workers joined our army in large numbers. Officers and men of the 13th Regiment were all workers. Most of the officers were political cadres put in charge of the armed forces by Party committees. A number of them had been politically active since the 1940 Nam Bo uprising.
Nam Bo is a land with few forests and mountains. But our Party had pointed out that, though favourable terrain plays an important role, the essential factor is the support of the people. By firmly relying on the people’s support, our armed forces had been able to hold their ground, build up their organization and obtain more equipment.
Our motto was: “Capture the enemy’s guns and use them against him.” In this way many units had managed to replace almost all the weapons they were originally supplied with.
The Resistance forces had succeeded in establishing large bases embracing several provinces such as War Zone D, the Plain of Reeds and the U Minh Forests. Every province had medium and small-sized bases covering two or three districts or five or six villages. In many regions, these bases were linked up with each other. As for Saigon city it had become a source of supplies providing the resistance bases with weapons, explosives, machines, medicines, medical apparatus and also with technicians, medical workers and doctors. Our armed forces had frequently made their presence felt there. The mass organizations in urban centres had “adopted” various army units: each military zone, each regiment had set up a factory to manufacture military equipment.
In southern Trung Bo we had been able to form some regiments using the reinforcements dispatched down from the Fifth and Sixth Zones in July.
In the Tay Nguyen Highlands our first regular regiment had been formed incorporating one battalion composed wholly of young men of various ethnic minority groups — the M’To-rang-lon Battalion.
Many small guerilla bases had sprung up in the delta and mountain areas of southern Trung Bo.
Our armed forces had everywhere stepped up guerilla activities. The army in coordination with the guerillas and self-defence units attacked and ambushed the enemy, thwarted his mopping-up raids, launched successive campaigns of attrition and annihilation and did their utmost to protect the people and their property and to expand the liberated areas. They controlled many strategic communication links and thrust deep into urban areas and the enemy’s military political and economic centres.
The development of guerilla warfare compelled the enemy to take urgent counter-measures. The enemy forces had to maintain 24-hour patrols around their scattered bases. Their mobile forces, limited in numbers, were thrown into unending and fruitless “pacification” raids.
Our armed forces in the meantime had learned various methods of fighting. Many units had gained experience in surprise assaults on small posts, in ambushes along roads and rivers. Gradually we became able to defeat the enemy’s large-scale raids and check his thrusts into the free zones.
In Nam Bo, on September 22, the enemy committed 2,000 troops covered by aeroplanes, tanks and armoured cars in a big raid on Duc Hoa. Our army and guerilla forces intercepted them there. In the battle, which raged for the whole of that day, we destroyed tens of tanks and other vehicles, killed a large number of troops, captured many weapons and shot down one French plane. (Was this the first enemy plane to be shot down by infantry fire in Viet Nam?) In Vinh Loc the enemy troops were apparently encircling a section of the 12th Regiment when they found themselves being surrounded and shot at. It turned out that our troops, having received in advance information of the enemy plan, had secretly moved out and laid an ambush. The battle ended in heavy losses for the marauders. In southern Trung Bo, our army and people beat back enemy attacks on Deo Ca, An Khe and Kontum. We also launched many attacks on the enemy’s newly-established network of posts, especially against those in the Kimbrai area, the battle of Van Gia. In the Central Highlands, guerilla warfare was beginning to develop.
The resistance in the South could be said to have entered a new stage.
On September 13, our government, by Decree 182, decided to reorganize the Resistance Committee of Nam Bo so that this committee would assume leadership of the resistance movement in Nam Bo and southern Trung Bo. A week later, on September 22, the Provisional Resistance Committee of South Viet Nam was inaugurated, becoming the only legal administration in the South. The Committee declared its readiness to implement the provisions of the Modus Vivendi signed on September 14 between the Governments of the DRVN and France.
Under the Modus Vivendi, the government of France had undertaken to observe the ceasefire, put into effect democratic freedoms in Nam Bo and hold a referendum as soon as favourable conditions had been created. Like the March 6 Preliminary Agreement, the Modus Vivendi in its turn threw the traitors into confusion. The political struggle, which had been strong after March 6, now had new conditions in which to develop. The press launched seething attacks on the puppet ruling clique. Hundreds of intellectuals, many of them well known figures, called for the overthrow of Nguyen Van Thinh. After barely two months the struggle had reached such a pitch that Thinh committed suicide by hanging. The French and their agents, frightened by the upsurge of the political struggle in urban centres hurriedly banned all marches, meetings and demonstrations.
The political struggle was accompanied by extensive attacks launched by our armed forces. As a result, large sectors of the puppet administration were smashed while more and more of its civilian agents and soldiers surrendered to the Revolution. Our propaganda work among the enemy ranks achieved good results. We were able to organize a full company of European and African deserters in the Thu Duc-Gia Dinh area and once a full squad of European soldiers surrendered in Hoc Mon.
At his meeting with President Ho Chi Minh in Cam Ranh Bay, d’Argenlieu did not touch on the frenzied acts of sabotage committed against the March 6 Preliminary Agreement and the September 14 Modus Vivendi by the French troops. Instead he complained that “Terror has assumed formidable proportions in Cochinchina since the conclusion of the Modus Vivendi” (by terror, he meant our activities against the traitors). In so doing the French High Commissioner was, in effect, simply admitting his anxiety over the new attacks of our Southern compatriots.
In spite of the French acts of sabotage, our Ministry of National Defence, on October 30, acting on the agreement reached between the two sides on a ceasefire, gave orders to our army and people in the South to stop fighting. The order was strictly carried out throughout Nam Bo and southern Trung Bo. Once again the enemy was surprised and embarrassed to find that we were in full control of South Viet Nam. His claim that “Hanoi controlled no one and nothing in Cochinchina” had turned out to be either a blindfold on his own eyes or a bluff.