On 9 Thermidor the rule of the common people in France had been overthrown. The Conspiracy of the Equals was a desperate and unsuccessful attempt to restore it. After the brief transitional period of the Dictatorship, the bourgeois capitalist state was consolidated under the dictatorship of Napoleon. But if Bonapartism marked the end of the French Revolution, it still embodied in relation to feudal-absolutist Europe the ideas of that revolution. True, there was no longer under the French Empire any question of sovereignty of the people. But the main achievements of the bourgeois revolution were preserved. The domination by the aristocracy and Church had been abolished; the property of the peasants freed from feudal obligations; trial by jury and the equality of all citizens before the law were maintained. And wherever the popular armies of France, themselves the products of revolution, overran foreign territories, feudalism was destroyed and the bourgeois legal system of the Code Napoléon replaced the old laws of feudal absolutism.
While in France itself every trace of democracy had already been eradicated, the movement towards democracy received a new and powerful impetus in the countries subjugated by French imperialism. With the entry of French troops and prefects there also entered the spirit of the French Revolution and the springs of revolt against native absolutism. French rule in its turn stimulated the spirit of nationalism. But nationalism was at its inception a revolutionary idea, with the concept of national unity and democratic rule.
In 1792 the conservative powers had formed an alliance to destroy the French Revolution. Yet on the morrow of their victory over Napoleon in 1814 they still felt themselves threatened by revolution. They had indeed overthrown Napoleon, the heir of the Revolution. But in the meantime, the germs of the Revolution had spread to their own countries.
The princes of Europe, assembling at the Congress of Vienna after the fall of Napoleon, were determined to restore once again the old 'legitimate' order as it had existed before the Revolution of 1789.
On the face of it, the Congress of Vienna was able to restore the old 'legitimate' dynastic order and to reinstate the royal families which had succumbed to the Revolution or, later, to Napoleon. It was not so easy, however, to restore absolutism, after the idea of democracy had spread outwards from France and engulfed half of Europe. As early as 1812 a parliament had met in the Spanish city of Cadiz and established a democratic constitution with a constitutional monarchy. Giving way before the democratic movements in the German states, their princes responded to the threat from Napoleon by pledging themselves to institute, after the war, constitutions based on popular representation. Louis XVIII, who returned to Paris with the victors' baggage in 1814, had also, under the pressure of public opinion in France, undertaken in the Declaration of Cambrai to rule on the basis of a parliamentary constitution. In the northern Italian cities, which, after the collapse of the French Empire, were given back once more to the hated rule of the Habsburgs, and in Poland, which had been placed once again under the dreaded rule of the Tsar, a passionate feeling of nationalism had developed.
Metternich, by far the cleverest of the statesmen assembled in Vienna, recognized with perfect clarity that even the most modest advance of democracy must develop through its own inherent laws into a deadly threat to the existing political and social system and, in particular, to the newly restored dynasties. Once the principle of popular sovereignty had been acknowledged, democracy would make continuing encroachments until the rule of the propertyless majority finally threatened the existing distribution of property and state power. In nationally divided countries such as Italy, he explained, democracy would overthrow the newly restored rule of the Habsburgs and Bourbons and create a united Italian republic. The German princes faced the same threat, as Metternich made very clear to Frederick William IV of Prussia when the latter was considering whether or not to keep his promise and grant a constitution. The introduction of a parliamentary system based on popular representation, Metternich insisted, would mean the end of Prussia and the triumph of the 'revolution'.[1]
The Congress of Vienna had based the political systems of Europe on a 'counter-revolutionary principle', as Metternich expressed it. The revolutionary principle of democracy, the concept of popular sovereignty, was the threat, and it was in the common interests of all conservative powers to repel the danger. But this would only be possible if they all acted together. It was not enough for governments to repress liberal and democratic movements and resist all democratic forms in their own countries alone. They must, as Tsar Nicholas suggested, guarantee each others' sovereignty and pledge themselves to forcible action against states in which absolute sovereigns felt themselves threatened by 'revolutionary inroads'. The Congress of Vienna, in fact, saw the establishment of a counter-revolutionary International, committed to the task of 'saving Europe from democracy'.[2]
The three feudal powers of Russia, Austria and Prussia linked themselves together in the Holy Alliance, which served as the executive power of the counter-revolutionary International. Metternich was at once its architect and general secretary. Its object was to secure joint action by the conservative powers in the fight against democracy. Its method was to intervene by diplomatic pressure or by armed force against European states whose governments introduced, voluntarily or under popular pressure, democratic institutions. Whenever the danger threatened, the leading powers of Europe assembled in conference and discussed ways and means of intervening in the interests of the counter-revolution.
From 1815 to 1849 the history of Europe records the triumph of the Holy Alliance in its fight against democracy. The German princes who had solemnly undertaken, in Article 13 of the Act which constituted their Confederation in 1815, to grant their peoples democratic constitutions, were prevented from doing so by diplomatic pressure. The Holy Alliance compelled the German Bundestag in September 1819 to pass the Karlsbad Act, denounced as a disgrace by Wilhelm von Humboldt, which suppressed throughout the states of Germany all freedom of thought, publication and teaching. It secured the addition of further decrees to the Karlsbad Act, pledging the German princes to maintain absolutist forms of government. The Federal authority was empowered to intervene forcibly against any German states which might nevertheless institute popular representation.
Additional decrees were embodied in the Karlsbad Act, making explicit the principle of armed intervention in the interests of the counter-revolution. It was put into practice for the first time in the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily. A rising of the Carbonari, a revolutionary democratic secret society, had compelled Ferdinand IV to carry out his pledge and grant a constitution. He duly promulgated one at the opening session of Parliament. At the same time he wrote to Metternich, asking him to restore him 'once again to absolute power with the help of the Austrian army'. The members of the Holy Alliance consequently met in conference at Troppau in October 1820 and authorized Austria to intervene. The Austrian army entered Naples, annihilated the revolutionary forces in the battle of Rieti on 7 March 1821, and restored the absolute monarchy once more.
The revolution in Naples touched off an uprising in Piedmont. There also a constitution was proclaimed by the Prince Regent, and cancelled five days later, in March 1821. Once again Austria was authorized at a conference of the Holy Alliance in Laibach in May 1821 to intervene, this time in Piedmont. At the same time, Russia was asked to have ready an army of 100,000, to march into the states of Germany in the event of a revolutionary uprising.
The classic case of armed counter-revolutionary intervention was in Spain. That country had had a constitution since 1812. When Ferdinand VII returned to Spain in the band-wagon of the allies—like his cousin Louis XVIII somewhat earlier—he declared the constitution 'null and void'. A nation-wide movement, however, forced him to recognize it again. Then he begged the members of the Holy Alliance to send forces against his own people. At a conference in Verona in August 1822, the governments of Russia, France, Austria and Prussia met to organize a crusade against democracy in Spain. Tsar Alexander offered to march into the country with an army of 150,000. As, however, he was already holding an army of 100,000 in readiness against a possible revolution in Germany, whilst Austria was still occupied in suppressing the revolution in Naples and Piedmont, France was instructed to intervene in Spain. The four powers signed a joint ultimatum in January 1823, demanding that the Spanish government should abolish the Constitution of 1812.
A few days later, Louis XVIII announced in a speech from the throne the impending invasion of Spain by an army of 100,000. The constitutional government of Spain was overthrown by the French troops and the old, undiluted absolutism reinstated. It behaved with a cruelty born of terror. Even Louis XVIII was moved to request that by joint diplomatic actions his Austrian, Russian and Prussian associates should stop the barbaric slaughter of the constitutionalists. But the three powers of the Holy Alliance refused. On the contrary, they urged Ferdinand to wipe out every trace of democracy in his country with fire and sword.
Acting entirely in the spirit of the Holy Alliance, with its dedication to the cause of counter-revolution, Metternich supported the Sultan of Turkey against the efforts of the Greeks to free themselves from his despotic rule between 1821 and 1827. The Sultan had his Christian subjects murdered in tens of thousands. Nevertheless, he was undoubtedly the legitimate sovereign, while his Greek subjects were revolutionaries. Like all revolutions, this one had to be quelled. About the exterminations of Greeks by the Sultan, Metternich casually remarked that it was of no great significance if, over the eastern border, 300,000 or 400,000 people were being hanged, slaughtered or cut to pieces. He rejected protests from the British government against his pro-Turkish policy on the grounds that 'His Royal Majesty regards it as not only his right, but his duty, to give what help he can to every legitimate authority under attack by the common enemy'. And in the Treaty of Berlin in 1833 the members of the Holy Alliance pledged themselves yet again to recognize 'the right of every independent sovereign to summon to his assistance, whether in the internal or external difficulties of his country, any other independent sovereign whom he shall deem best able to assist him.[3]
The Holy Alliance, however, found itself unable to intervene against the revolution in Paris of July 1830, when the rule of the Bourbons collapsed like a house of cards. Armed intervention in the internal affairs of a major power such as France would have unleashed a European war. The full power of the Alliance was nevertheless employed to suppress the revolution of 1848. When news of the February uprising in Paris reached St Petersburg, Tsar Nicholas sent a note to the other powers on 5 March asking them to resist by force 'the spread of anarchy which threatens the whole of Europe', and to have ready for this purpose strong military forces which could be employed wherever they were required. When, a few days later, revolutions broke out in Italy, Austria, Hungary and Germany, he concentrated a strong force on the German frontier and told Count Thun, the Austrian Emperor's special emissary in St Petersburg, that the granting of constitutions to Galicia and Hungary would be intolerable for Russia. 'I could not allow a centre of insurrection on my doorstep, so close to my Polish "friends". If constitutions are granted in those areas, or if revolution begins in Galicia and is not vigorously suppressed, I shall be forced against my will to intervene. In that event I should not hesitate for a moment to cross the Austrian frontier and restore order in the name of the Emperor Ferdinand.'[4]
In the event the absolute monarchy in Austria proved capable of suppressing the revolution first in Lombardy and Venetia, then in Prague and Vienna, without help from the Tsar. But resistance in Hungary was prolonged, and it was then that the counter-revolutionary International went into action. In June 1849 a Russian army of 140,000, at whose disposal the Prussian government had very readily placed the railway network of Posen and Silesia, entered Hungary and put down the revolution. At the same time a French army attacked and destroyed the Roman republic, which was being defended by Garibaldi.
Conservative Britain was not a member of the Holy Alliance. No British government, however reactionary, could openly approve the 'anti-revolutionary principles' of legitimacy on which the Holy Alliance was founded and from which it derived its right of armed intervention against democratic movements and governments. As Castlereagh, English Foreign Minister and himself a deadly enemy of democracy, explained: 'If the King were to sanction them he would be on the road to his own abdication.…The House of Hanover cannot recognize principles contrary to those in the name of which the House of Stuart forfeited its throne.'[5] And in memorandum to the European powers on 5 May 1820, he declared that 'no country with a representative system of government could act on the principle of intervention by one state in the internal affairs of another'.
In spit of this, the counter-revolutionary International enjoyed the full moral support of Castlereagh, as well as of most British Conservatives, including 'the Tory ministers of Great Britain, who even secretly encouraged attacks on the constitutions which had been set up with the direct connivance of British representatives'. While Castlereagh protested officially against the Karlsbad Act as an infringement of the Acts of Federation, also guaranteed by Britain, he congratulated Metternich on his success. 'The monster [i.e. the democratic revolution] is still alive, and shows itself in a new form,' he wrote in a confidential letter to Metternich, 'but we do not despair; we shall be able to destroy it with patience.' Castlereagh 'showed complete indifference to the brutality and deceit of the Kings of Spain and Naples, when they suppressed those movements for freedom in their countries which it was in English interests to strengthen. Indeed, he stands convicted of a conspiracy with Metternich.'[6]
Even when, under Castlereagh's successor Canning, British foreign policy embarked on a more liberal course, it was thwarted by the intrigues of George IV and his advisers. England's most powerful figure, the Duke of Wellington, officially protested against Louis XVIII's openly expressed intention of armed intervention in Spain; but privately he urged the Bourbons to set their armies in motion. With Metternich and with the great majority of British Conservatives, Wellington was convinced that any concession to democracy 'would lead sooner or later to anarchy, and that it was necessary for some kind of despotism to restore order'. For this reason he opposed every democratic reform not only in England but anywhere in the world. Like Metternich he supported the Sultan in the Greek War of Independence. He protested against the recognition of the South American republics, which had freed themselves from Spanish rule. He pressed the Tsar to intervene against the Hungarian revolution. 'March! But with sufficient power,' he told the Russian ambassador, Baron Brumov. Even Palmerston, who encouraged liberal movements in Europe, failed to recognize the revolutionary government of Hungary and allowed without protest Russia's military intervention against the Hungarians, which energetic action from England could probably have prevented.[7]
The counter-revolutionary International was a tremendous power. Its nucleus consisted of the feudal monarchies of Russia, Austria and Prussia. Around this core were grouped the feudal dynasties of Germany, Italy and Spain, with powerful allies in all European countries, above all the Catholic Church, the conservative, property-owning bourgeoisie of England and the financial aristocracy which had come to power in France after the July revolution of 1830.
The counter-revolutionary International was based on the solidarity of the various ruling classes in defence of the existing political and social system. It took the form of internationally co-ordinated actions by conservative governments against movements for democracy and national independence wherever they appeared. From these experiences the subject classes and nations drew some weighty conclusions. They must confront the counter-revolutionary International with one of their own, in which they would co-operate to secure the defeat of reaction and the furtherance of revolution. This feeling gave rise to the international revolutionary organizations which developed in France, England, Italy and Germany after the overthrow of the Bourbons in July 1830. This feeling of revolutionary solidarity inspired the heroic rising of the Viennese workers in October 1848 against the dispatch of the forces which would crush the Hungarian revolution. The same feeling of international solidarity was behind the revolt of the Paris workers in May of the same year, when they stormed the Chamber of Deputies to demand war against Russia in support of the Polish revolution. The counter-revolutionary International had stimulated the birth of a revolutionary International.
1. Aus Metternichs nachgelassenen Papieren, edited by Richard Metternich-Winneburg and Alfons von Klinkowström (Vienna, 1880-9), vol. III, pp. 171–81.
2. cf. the remarks of the Russian Ambassador to Vienna, in Alfred Stern, Geschichte Europas von 1815–71 (Stuttgart, 1894–1925), vol. I, p. 460, and Castlereagh's Cabinet papers in Memoirs and Correspondence (London, 1848–53), vol. III, p. 62.
3. Metternich, op. cit., vol. III, p. 483, quoted in A. F. Pollard, 'The German Federation', in Cambridge Modern History, vol. X, p. 376.
4. Vicomte de Guichen, Les Grandes Questions européennes et la diplomatie des puissances sous la Seconde République (Paris, 1925). Quoted in L. B. Namier, 1848: The Revolution of the Intellectuals (London, 1946), p. 94.
5. Quoted in C. K. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815–22 (London, 1925), pp. 301–2.
6. C. K. Webster, The Congress of Vienna (London, 1923), p. 147; Castlereagh, correspondences, op. cit., vol. XII, p. 259; R. S. Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe, 1789–1914 (Cambridge, 1937), pp. 49–50.
7. Kingsley Martin, The Triumph of Lord Palmerston (London, 1924), p. 51.