

Interview with Comrade Habash

In anticipation of the PFLP's 16th anniversary, we had the opportunity to interview Comrade George Habash, General Secretary, in late November. We focused on issues that are of principle and historical importance for the PFLP's political line and course of struggle.

Comrade Habash, in PFLP Bulletin no. 69, we printed your speech on the crisis in the Palestinian revolution, where you touched on the relation between this crisis and that of the Arab national liberation movement. Today, we ask you to concentrate on the crisis of the Arab national liberation movement - its roots and solutions.

It is impossible to evaluate the present Palestinian crisis, or to foresee the future of the Palestinian revolution without seeing the real interrelationship between the Palestinian revolution and the Arab national liberation movement. To illustrate this, suppose that Egypt at present was ruled by the party of the working class. Suppose Egypt had a strong alliance with the Soviet Union. Suppose this was the case in other Arab countries surrounding Palestine. Then the situation of the Palestinian revolution would be completely different.

Concerning the Arab national liberation movement, we must distinguish between two features of its crisis: One is the class structure and leadership of that branch of the movement which assumed state power in a number of Arab countries; in this case, with the exception of Democratic Yemen, the crisis is structural. The second feature is the relative weakness of the working class and its parties; concerning this branch of the movement, the question is a different one.

To explain the roots of the structural crisis, we must go back in history and see which class forces were leading the Arab national liberation movement at each stage, and what they achieved.

Anti-colonial struggle

Historically, we can trace the roots of the Arab national liberation movement back to the last quarter of the 19th century. At that time, the aim was freedom from the Ottoman Empire and having a united Arab state, especially in this part of the Arab world, the Mashraq (east). No social demands were raised at that time. The slogans were those of dignity, freedom, unity, Arabism, etc. By the way, certain Lebanese figures, including Maronites, played a positive role in the cultural movement that was a prelude to the political movement.

During World War I, the leaders of the movement decided to cooperate with the Allies, hoping that after the French and British defeated the Ottoman Empire, they (the Arabs) would have freedom and unity. Of course, before the end of the war, the Sykes-Picot agreement (to divide the area between Britain and France) was exposed by the Bolsheviks. When the war was over, the Arab national liberation movement found that the French and British had replaced the Ottomans. The traditional leaders of the movement, Hussein, Sharif of Mecca, and his sons, Abdullah and Feisal (the Hashemites), decided to cooperate with the plans of the colonial powers, but the mainstream of the movement rejected this. The victory of the October Revolution in Russia, and the new incentive it gave to the oppressed peoples, increased the Arab people's motivation for struggle.

From 1918 and through the twenties, the movement tried to fight for the previous slogans, but as you know, the reality was that the area was divided. The leaders raised the same

slogans - freedom and Arab unity. In practice, they began fighting the new form of imperialism in each country: Fighting the British Mandate in Palestine, the French in Syria, and the British in Iraq. There was armed struggle: In Syria, the revolt led by Sultan al Atrash in 1925, and another revolt in the Alawite area in the north; in Palestine, the 1936-39 revolt; the 1919 revolt in Iraq, etc. Until the second world war, the struggle continued mainly against French and British colonialism.

The outcome of World War II changed many things: Britain and France became secondary powers in relation to the US. There was the victory of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the socialist camp. There was a general change on the international level as seen in the United Nations Charter and the slogans of freedom, peace, self-determination for the peoples, etc. On this basis, the Arab national liberation movement was able to attain some victories. Of course, we must evaluate the character of these in relation to the slogans that had been raised. These victories were limited to gaining independence in Syria and Lebanon, their joining the UN, having a flag and national anthem, etc. This was formal political independence without unity.

We can relate the nature of these victories to the class leadership of the movement at that time. From the last quarter of the 19th century until World War II, the leadership of the national movement was in the hands of the feudalists and the emerging bourgeoisie. During World War II, the bourgeoisie had expanded, especially in Palestine and Lebanon, and in Syria to some extent, because it was in the interests of French and British imperialism to facilitate the growth of a local bourgeoisie; they needed more local production to supply the needs of their soldiers. Thus, in the late thirties, we saw a new phenomenon in the area - the growth of a bourgeoisie, which was, however, subordinate to the imperialist powers.

The demise of the feudal leadership

1948 was a turning point in the history of the Arab national liberation movement. At this time, it became apparent to the Arab masses that these feudal and bourgeois classes, which had received formal political independence, were not at all able to defend the people's real interests. What happened in Palestine in 1948, exposed the meaning of this independence: that it was superficial; it meant nothing in terms of the people's interests or ability to face the Zionist attack.

I experienced this time; even without a class analysis, it was very easy for me and the masses to see that there was no independence, no dignity. One could see that these newly formed states must disappear in order to have a truly independent Arab state and the unity required to face Zionism in Palestine. At this time we said, "Traitors, traitors, they only want to keep their thrones". There was broad popular rage against the rulers. The class leadership of the Arab national liberation movement, represented by the feudal lords, and this type of bourgeoisie, had failed. If the movement was to fulfill its aims, it would have to be reconstituted. It is thus not a coincidence that in the following period we witnessed the formation of the Baath Party and the Arab Nationalist

Movement, and the July 23rd revolution in Egypt (1952). These movements grew at this particular time to fill the vacancy created by the demise of the former leadership.

In terms of class structure, the former leadership of the Arab national liberation movement was replaced by the leadership of the petit bourgeoisie, which was more related to the masses and their motives than the feudal lords and the bourgeoisie. The fifties and sixties marked a new era in the history of the Arab national liberation movement. Prior to the crisis it is now suffering, it achieved many positive things.

The rise of the petit bourgeoisie

Concerning the crisis in the Palestinian revolution, when we say that the Palestinian bourgeoisie has failed and can no longer lead, we must at the same time remember that in the previous stage, the Palestinian revolution made real achievements under its leadership. The same applies to the new stage of the Arab national liberation movement, which was led by the July 23rd revolution in particular. Before exhausting its role, the new leadership achieved many things. Why were our masses so enthusiastic in their support of Nasser's leadership? Because many aims were fulfilled. In Egypt, the slogans were no longer only independence and dignity; they acquired a social touch. There was the law on land reform, distribution of land to the peasants, the start of cooperatives, nationalization of banks and foreign trade, the national battle to liberate Egypt from British colonialism, nationalization of the Suez Canal, the beginning of links with the socialist countries. There was Nasser's role in the nonaligned movement, which at that time was clearly anti-imperialist.

Moreover, the atmosphere generated by Nasserism affected all the Arab world. We saw the start of armed liberation struggles in Algeria, Yemen and Oman, all supported by Nasser's Egypt. There was Egypt's unity with Syria, which was fully supported by the Arab masses. There was the downfall of the monarchy in Iraq and later Libya, and the defeat of the feudalist-subordinate capitalist coalition in Syria, etc.

Class Roots of the Crisis

Now, let us follow this petit bourgeoisie after its rise to power, remembering that things are dynamic; nothing is static. When it came to power, the petit bourgeoisie wanted to achieve the aims of the masses that were related to its own. Then, after a few years of struggle against imperialism, when this petit bourgeoisie started to acquire its own national market, a change occurred in its class interests. Through the public sector, the interests of this class grew. It obtained facilities and many privileges, and was able to accumulate capital. At the same time, the old system was not completely destroyed. Sectors of agriculture and manufacture were still based on private ownership. So this capital, that came into the hands of the bureaucratic petit bourgeoisie, was invested in partnership with the bourgeois and feudal classes that had been removed from power. Thus a link was forged between the petit bourgeoisie and the classes it had removed from power. This led to suppression of the masses, hesitancy in continuing the national democratic revolution, and diminishing the anti-imperialist trend.

This is what paved the way for the crisis that became apparent in 1967. Instead of the Arab regimes winning the war in 1967, or making it a prolonged war which could uproot imperialism and Zionism, the war and its aftermath deepened the trend to the right. After 1967, at the time when the masses demanded that Nasser remain in his position, he had the chance to radicalize the Arab national liberation movement. However, the class and economic structure of the regime was

stronger than Nasser's wishes. What happened in Sadat's era signified that the Arab national liberation movement, as led by the petit bourgeoisie, will come to an end. It will eventually reconcile its interests with those of Arab reaction, imperialism and even Zionism. The results of the 1967 war were a much deeper set-back for the Arab national liberation movement than that of 1948. In 1948, the Arab rulers were not able to liberate Palestine, but at least they refused to grant Zionism the legal right to occupy Palestine. Sadat, on the other hand, initiated cooperation not only with Arab reaction and imperialism, but also with Zionism.

Of course, other branches of the petit bourgeois Arab national liberation movement remained anti-imperialist to a certain extent. Yet what happened to the Egyptian regime is



The October Revolution gave a new incentive....

very likely to happen to the other national regimes which have the same class and ideological structure. What happened with the petit bourgeoisie which gained power in Iraq? It began as anti-imperialist in 1968, and did many things for the national and popular interests. Now it is taking the same path.

There is only one exception to this rule, and that is Democratic Yemen. Here there was also a nationalist revolution led by a petit bourgeoisie. The experience of Democratic Yemen shows that if there are a certain set of conditions, this class can achieve the aims of the national democratic revolution and embark on socialist construction. The required conditions include: developing a party based on Marxism-Leninism and democratic centralism, having real

democracy for the masses, being open to form a genuine popular front, and having strategic relations with the socialist community. Under these conditions, certain strata of the petit bourgeoisie can fulfill the tasks of the national democratic revolution in alliance with the working class, the peasants and other oppressed strata.

However, Democratic Yemen is not the main feature; the main feature is what happened in Egypt and Iraq. The crisis of the main branch of the Arab national liberation movement, led by the petit bourgeoisie from 1952 until today, is a structural one; it is rooted in the class nature of the leadership. Though this petit bourgeoisie assumed the position of a bourgeoisie, such a bourgeoisie cannot achieve real liberation or a national democratic revolution. It is not like the bourgeoisie in Europe or Japan. Rather, it is fated to remain as a parasitic bourgeoisie, linked and subordinated to the international imperialist bourgeoisie. Moreover, the ethnic and sectarian conflicts in more than one Arab country show that this class cannot preserve national unity in its own state.

The working class parties

The crisis of the other section of the Arab national liberation movement - the working class and its organizations - is a qualitatively different matter. It is not structural, because the working class and its parties can achieve the aims of the Arab national liberation movement. It is in their class interests to achieve the national democratic revolution headed towards socialism. Moreover, the international situation is conducive to this in view of the growing capacity of the socialist community and the structural crisis of imperialism. This has already occurred in other countries, a prime example being Vietnam, which also suffered partition. The Vietnamese revolution achieved liberation and unity, and began socialist construction.

The crisis of the Arab communist parties, as reflected in their limited growth and achievements, is not structural, but related to certain significant mistakes in their political line. We dealt with this in the Political Report of the PFLP's 4th National Congress. For example, many communist parties regarded this stage as not being theirs. They thought that a national democratic revolution is usually the revolution of the bourgeoisie. They did not take into consideration that things changed radically after the October Revolution. They overlooked Lenin's theory on the link between the national democratic and the socialist revolution, and the importance of the working class's leading role. When certain communist parties have this view, of course it has consequences. They took part in the Arab national liberation movement, but due to their theoretical assumptions, they did not aim to play a leading role. This complicated their situation.

In the fifties, when Nasser's leadership achieved successes, certain communist parties began to speak of the non-capitalist path of development, and the possibility of achieving socialism in this way. This means that the bourgeoisie can achieve socialism, which is a contradiction in itself. This was a very grave theoretical mistake. In Egypt, the Communist Party dissolved itself, because they said that Nasser could achieve socialism.

There were also mistakes concerning the Arab national question, specifically on the questions of Palestine and Arab unity. Despite the clear theoretical position adopted by the international communist movement against Zionism, as a racist, colonial movement tied to imperialism, a change occurred in the Arab communist parties' position on the question of Palestine after 1948. This had negative effects on the national and mass level. Moreover, for a long period, the Arab communist parties failed to recognize the concept of an Arab nation, without taking into consideration the importance of this concept as a weapon in confronting the imperialist, Zionist and reactionary plots.

This should give an idea not only of the roots of the crisis, but also of how we should try to find solutions. Briefly, it is our duty to emphasize that the bourgeois leadership of the Arab national liberation movement is on the way to an end. Accordingly, the working class and its parties must prepare themselves to achieve the tasks that have been put on the agenda, but not achieved, by the feudal, bourgeois and petit bourgeois classes. These tasks can only be achieved by the working class - its party, ideology, strategy and international alliances.

Based on the battle of Beirut, some concluded that allying with the Arabs was useless. Why does the Front reject this narrow, Palestinian-only approach?

It would be a fatal mistake to adopt a narrow Palestinian line; this would mean that Palestine will not be liberated. On the contrary, the experience of Beirut confirms the PFLP's view that the Palestinian revolution is part of the Arab national liberation movement and the Arab revolution.

There are many facts that support our view. The first is the simple fact that the Palestinian people are part of the Arab nation. The Arab liberation movement did not intend to have Syria, Palestine or Lebanon as separate states. It aimed at a united Arab state, for the simple reason that the Arab nation has most, though not all, of the factors that constitute a nation. The division of the Mashraq was the work of the colonial powers, as seen in the Sykes-Picot treaty. Are we to remain victims of what was proposed in this agreement?

Of course, many years have passed since the partition of the area, and this has led some people to think that this idea of the unity of the Arab nation is no longer essential. Let us put this argument aside and concentrate on the practical reasons for the PFLP's rejection of any narrow Palestinian trend:

First: The Zionist colonization and Israeli institutions have developed far beyond what we faced in 1948. In 1948, despite all their efforts, the Zionists were only able to gather 600,000-700,000 settlers in Palestine; this was also despite the evacuation of Jews from Europe due to fascism. Today, Zionism boasts of more than three million settlers in Palestine.

Second: More than half the Palestinian people are living outside of Palestine, mainly in the surrounding Arab countries. In Jordan, there are over one million; in Lebanon, about ½ million; in Syria, about 300,000; in Egypt, 50,000-100,000.

In this situation, how must we fight to liberate Palestine? Of course, our people in Palestine fight directly against the Israeli authorities and settlements. Close to two million Palestinians inside confronting the Israeli army can create immense problems for 'Israel'. This says to the world that we exist and have our rights; we will not accept Israeli control, imperialism, etc. However, we are up against the Likud's line, insisting that all of Palestine is 'Israel'. Even the Labor Party concedes only part of Palestine, to be connected with Jordan. We are up against the enormously equipped Israeli army and militarized society. In view of these facts, if we direct our struggle against 'Israel' solely through the Palestinians inside, will we obtain our objectives? No! This explains the fact that in spite of 18 years of struggle, we have not liberated one inch of Palestinian soil.

In order to liberate Palestine, Palestinians in the occupied land must fight, but there must also be a role for the Palestinians outside. Now we get to the essential point. Whenever we, as Palestinians, fight from outside, we have been overwhelmed by the following experience, both in Jordan and in Lebanon: 'Israel' begins to threaten the regimes of these countries, saying, "We don't want the Palestinians operating from your soil. Either you take care of them, or we will do so ourselves, by conquering your land". In Jordan, the result was that the regime made a direct attack to finish off the Palestinian revolution. In Lebanon, the reactionary regime tried many times to finish off the Palestinian revolution prior

to the 1982 Israeli invasion. I think that the Palestinian revolution will face this same situation in any of the countries surrounding Palestine, unless we can rely on genuinely national democratic regimes that will say to 'Israel': "The Palestinians have every right to struggle against you, and we have every right to support them. We will not curtail them for the sake of Zionism". Thus, the Palestinian revolution should have very close relations with the masses and nationalist forces in Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Lebanon. Only in this way can we continue our struggle.

Third: Today, it is clearer than ever that Zionism aims not only at Palestine; it is aiming to establish a Zionist empire that would include all of Palestine, the Golan Heights, South Lebanon. These areas would be within the borders of 'Greater Israel'. In addition to its territorial ambitions, 'Israel' wants to be an imperialist force in the whole Middle East. Therefore, any Arab people seeking true independence must fight these expansionist and aggressive aims. What is happening in Lebanon is the prime example of this.

If this point can be made very clear to the masses through active propaganda and organizational work, things will change in the years to come. 'Israel' will not retain its present position. We must clarify to the Lebanese people that 'Israel' has specific interests in occupying the South and dominating all of Lebanon. We must convince the Jordanian people that it is impossible to have dignity or freedom alongside the presence of Zionism and 'Israel'. We must work to have the Egyptian people see things as they are; we must ask them if they have real freedom and dignity. We must make it clear to all the Arab people that 'Israel' is a tool in the hands of imperialism, ready to attack anyone that resists imperialism. If these things were apparent to all, there would not be a solely Palestinian revolution, which will fail totally. Instead, there would be a Palestinian-Arab revolution against Zionism and imperialism. This is the correct path.

Objectively, things are moving in this direction. Today it is clear to the Lebanese people that 'Israel' is not occupying the South to safeguard its borders from Palestinian guerrillas. The Lebanese are now fighting 'Israel' directly. This must take place in all the surrounding countries, whereby the aggressive Israeli policies would be confronted by the millions of the Arab masses. Then 'Israel' would have no way to escape.

We will not be able to liberate one inch of Palestine until we have secured a base from which to fight, in an Arab country bordering Palestine. This joint Palestinian-Arab struggle is the key to liberating Palestine. It is equally in the interests of the Arab masses, for it is the only path to justice and genuine peace in this part of the world.

Jewish-Palestinian struggle vs. Zionism

I would like to go beyond the question to mention another important force that we must deal with when speaking of how to liberate Palestine. This is the Jews themselves, the democratic Jews, those Jews who are suffering the effects of Zionism. To be honest, we have not done very well on this point. If we knew how to work, this could be a very important weapon in the hands of the progressive forces in this region. In fact, there are many Jews who are suffering, but the problem is that their leaders were successful in convincing them that the main contradiction is between the forces of Arab national liberation and all the Jews in 'Israel'. If we make it clear to Palestinians and Jews that the real enemy is Zionism, Arab reaction and imperialism, the struggle to liberate Palestine would gain a new dimension. Let us join forces and fight for peace, democracy, freedom and self-determination, for the Palestinians, for everybody. This would be the path for defeating Zionism and its plans.

The correctness of the stand taken by the PFLP and DFLP, as seen especially in the Program for Unity and Democratic Reform in the PLO, was not enough to prevent the inter-Palestinian battle in Tripoli. How will we now work to resolve the Palestinian crisis?

We admit that when the sound of canons rose, the voice of our program was almost inaudible. However, we do not believe that the roar of canons will be the loudest indefinitely. Sooner or later, even the quarreling parties will come to the conclusion that internal fighting does drastic damage to the revolution. Moreover, the weight of our people's opinion, and that of our Arab and international allies, will bring the fighting to a stop. In this case, we can really look into the reasons for this crisis. Knowing the reasons, we can struggle politically for the reforms needed in our revolution, especially since the departure from Beirut.

The PFLP-DFLP program presented a clear analysis of this crisis, its roots and manifestations, and the methods of treatment: the needed political and organizational corrections. However, the question which we now face is whether or not it is a matter of a program. We cannot say that we did our duty by presenting this program and the matter is finished. Some might think that since the fighting has stopped, everything is O.K. This is not the case for us. When the fighting stops, the political struggle must be escalated. Not only we, but our people in general, have come to the conclusion that things cannot continue as they were before we left Beirut. There should be amendments in the political and organizational line, in every field.

Of course, we presented this program because we think it is correct, but we do not regard it as sacred or immune to changes. Let all the Palestinian organizations and people take part in discussing this program. We are ready to listen to all points of view.

The task facing us now is how to apply a mechanism to activate this program, so that it can be implemented. After we and the DFLP agreed on the program, we sent a copy to all Palestinian organizations with a message demanding their opinion. So far, two organizations, the Palestinian Communist Party and the Palestinian Liberation Front, have responded, saying that in general, not in every point, they regard the program as a good basis for unity in the PLO. We are still waiting for an answer and resulting discussion with all organizations, without exception. Yasir Arafat and Abu Jihad gave a general answer, saying that this program could be acceptable. Frankly speaking, we will not accept such answers; we have a long experience with such answers. We will ask Fatah's Central Committee what they really mean: Do they accept this point and that? Are they ready to implement each point? On the political level, the program is very clear: The revolution must fight imperialism, Zionism, reactionary forces. They must say if they really accept this,



Palestinians rally at Bir Zeit, Nov. 7th, to condemn the fighting around Tripoli.

and if their previous practice was on this line. We want to know if they are prepared for self-criticism. On the organizational level, we want to know if they are ready to change the individualist way of leading the revolution. We will not accept general or non-committal responses.

We are also working to get the opinion of the mass and professional unions. There are ten main unions within the framework of the PLO, and we want their view. After this, we want the opinion of prominent Palestinians in Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, etc. Especially, we want the opinion of the independent members of the PLO's Central Council and the Palestinian National Council. Perhaps we will try to forge a front within the PLO for unity and democratic reform, that will work politically and organizationally to give the program real force.

Most important, our party branches everywhere are working to see that this program reaches every Palestinian home, because this is the only program for saving the PLO's unity and ensuring reform. From the response we have received, we feel that a great majority of our people are with this program, because they want unity and reform. We will struggle until we have unity on the basis of reform, and we will succeed.

Now, after the Syrian-Saudi agreement, which ended the fighting, some may say, let's take a rest. On the contrary, our political struggle will escalate. What has happened, in particular the fighting, constitutes a burden on the conscience of all Palestinian leaders. Why did it take place? Aside from external factors, there are two main reasons: First, certain leaders do not recognize the law for how to solve internal contradictions at this stage of our liberation struggle. Second, there was an urgent need for reform. The ceasefire is a temporary treatment, but we want a radical, thorough, permanent treatment.

There is disagreement among those Palestinian forces who want reform, concerning the nature of the Palestinian bourgeoisie and how to face the right wing. How do you view this issue?

At present, the term 'Palestinian right' is being used without an accurate definition. The protest phenomenon that began in Fatah and their Palestinian allies are using this term in an infantile leftist fashion. What is the right-wing at this stage of the Palestinian struggle, which is that of national liberation, not building socialism? In a class sense, the right is the bourgeoisie. At this stage, scientifically speaking, it is in the interests of Palestinian workers, peasants and the bourgeoisie to struggle against the Zionist occupation. Thus, the Palestinian bourgeoisie is a nationalist class.

When the Palestinian bourgeoisie embarked on armed struggle in 1965, it was sincere in wanting to liberate all of Palestine. Even now, if it were a question of wishes, they would like to have a fully liberated Palestine, including its coastal waters, for this would be in their political and economic interests. However, they faced difficulties, because this slogan is hard to fulfill. After the experience in Jordan 1970-71, leaders of Fatah were asking how they could continue. They had seen that liberation is difficult and began to lean towards what they thought were more realistic goals, for example, liberating only the West Bank and Gaza. Still, after the defeat in Jordan, it was easy for the Palestinian revolution to reinforce its presence in Lebanon, where the army was weak. The atmosphere of discouragement vanished, and the bourgeois forces again began to speak of total liberation. This was evidenced in the positive decisions of the 11th Palestinian National Council for full liberation of Palestine, etc.

After the October 1973 war, the PLO gained broad international recognition. Certain western states began to talk to the Palestinian right, saying, we supported you not in

liberating all Palestine, but to have self-determination in the West Bank and Gaza. After the October war, a state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip seemed to be possible, and the bourgeoisie was ready to consider this. PFLP and other radical forces disagreed with this course.

Notice the difference between the bourgeoisie's stand in 1973-74, when it was ready for a US-Soviet compromise proposal as represented by the Vance-Gromyko statement, and its stand after we left Beirut. Only then was the Palestinian bourgeoisie ready to hop on the US line, and for goals even less than a state.

The current division in Fatah has class significance; the protest phenomenon is a petit bourgeois reaction to the right-wing policies of the Fatah leadership, especially after the way the opposition in Fatah was treated by the leadership. Still, the Palestinian bourgeoisie is a nationalist class. Accordingly, Fatah is among the nationalist forces.

Recently two trends have become highly visible on the international scene: US imperialism's renewed willingness to intervene directly, and the growth of the peace movement. What are the reasons for the first, and how do you evaluate the second?

Without going into the whole question of imperialism's increasingly aggressive policy, we can state three reasons why US imperialism is now intervening directly with its own forces:

One: Imperialism feels that its local tools, its class allies and their armed forces, are unable to resist radical or revolutionary change. The formation of the Rapid Deployment Force was a response to the victory of the Iranian revolution. This meant that the US was preparing for direct intervention. Due to the developments of the last ten years - the popular uprisings and victories, the US feels the need for using its own forces.

Two: US imperialism is not satisfied with merely stopping new victories for the people. It wants to roll back the victories that are already achieved, and this is difficult without direct intervention.

Three: Certain points are particularly strategic for US imperialism's global policies and thus require direct US military presence. The US is actually taking all the preparatory measures for a global confrontation. In an area like the Middle East, with its resources and proximity to the Soviet Union, the US deems it necessary to have its own military bases and forces. The same applies to Central America. In this way, one can see why Lebanon and Grenada became the sites of direct US military intervention.

Four: Military intervention is part of Reagan's policy for solving the crisis of capitalism. The Reagan Administration wants to have credit for the fact that no revolution in the three continents has been victorious during its term in office. As internal problems worsen in the capitalist countries, US imperialism tries to divert the people by directing their discontent against an external enemy.

Concerning the peace movement: I am very pleased that it is becoming a real force and a real nuisance to imperialism. This is clear just from reading imperialist propaganda. Demonstrations continue and broaden against the stationing of the cruise and Pershing II missiles in western Europe. When it became clear to people in the US and Europe that we are on the verge of a nuclear war, the common man asked where the policies of imperialism are leading. Now Reagan can't say that it's the communists only opposing his policies. It is broad sectors of his own people demonstrating against these policies. We look forward to the continued growth and development of these forces. This will be a major obstacle for the Reagan-Thatcher-Kohl policies. We salute these forces and feel the importance of their work at this stage for the sake of all humanity.