

# committee for a FREE MOZAMBIQUE



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Dear Friends of Mozambique:

The Massacre of Mueda took place on June 16th eleven years ago. To commemorate that tragic date and to protest the selling of Bell helicopters to the Cabora-Bassa project, CFM sponsored a demonstration this last June 16th, in front of the United States Mission to the United Nations. About 50 people participated, and the action included a guerrilla theater skit telling of the Massacre and the continuing involvement of the United States in Portuguese colonialism. The demonstration and a statement by FRELIMO's representative, Sharfudine M. Khan, were fully covered on Channel 5's Black News program.

We will not be as active in New York during July and August. However, some CFM people are traveling (on their own) to East Africa this summer. They will carry with them a donation of \$1000 from the Committee to FRELIMO. They also hope to meet and talk with FRELIMO leaders. We are looking forward to our September newsletter as being based on that meeting.

And now that the year of our formation has nearly ended, we in New York are talking of ways we can more effectively use the people we have brought together toward aiding the independence of Mozambique.

Our next News and Notes will be mailed in September.

a luta continua

Committee for a Free Mozambique

SOMEONE SENT A  
CHECK FOR \$2.81  
FOR LITERATURE -  
WAS IT YOU?

THE NATO MEETING IN LISBON -- THE TIP OF AN ICEBURG

The age is past when the United States can set up grand alliances around the world - the NATO's, SEATO's, and CENTO's - for "free world security" with great publicity about military assistance to client states. This is the era of the "low profile", the "secret war" in Laos, the vast deceptions proved by the Pentagon Papers. Thus "stability" in Southern Africa and support for continued South African/Portuguese hegemony in the face of growing liberation movement action must be pursued as quietly as possible. This pursuit seldom hits the headlines and there is no formal "South Atlantic Treaty Organization" on paper, but its form and some of its content already exist as an extension of NATO. Masked by vague talk of the "Soviet threat" in the Indian Ocean or "saving the Cape route" or the need to "maintain Portugal's defense capability", it is still increasingly clear that NATO countries, which in fact have been arming and aiding both Portugal and South Africa for a decade, are now moving further in stretching the capabilities of the military alliance, sometimes covertly - sometimes overtly, to include the region of Southern Africa. In general these developments are quietly constructed, except now and then when a more conservative NATO member blurts out militant cries of support for S.A. and Portugal or visa versa, but occasionally the tip of the iceberg appears. Such was the case when the NATO MINISTERIAL COUNCIL meeting was held June 3-4 in the capital of the Portuguese empire, Lisbon, the first such venue in 19 years!

This meeting was condemned by the United Nations' Committee of 24 on Decolonization which affirmed that it "cannot but afford political and moral encouragement to Portugal in pursuit of its colonialist policies . . . .", while the Organization of African Unity called the gathering in Lisbon a deliberate affront to Africa. The PAIGC of Guinea called for international protest, and FRELIMO in a press release said: "All indications are that Portugal will receive a much more sympathetic hearing than in the past. The growing successes of the liberation wars, the failure of the much publicised Portuguese offensives in Mozambique have demonstrated that Portugal cannot maintain her presence in the colonies without a massive increase in assistance from her allies. As many of Nato's more vocal spokesmen are constantly pointing out, Portugal is defending their interests as well as her own."

The analysis put forth by FRELIMO and others is based on developments within the last several years which go beyond the normal, day by day fact of military coordination between Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia. With the persistence and expansion of the liberation struggle and the ultimate effects victory will have on the West's power status in the rest of Africa, there is emerging in a more apparent way a continental strategy to include greater Western/NATO involvement in the affairs of the Indian Ocean, South Atlantic, and Southern Africa. These developments are in the interest of the great powers, particularly those like Great Britain, France, Germany and the U.S., which have growing economic concerns in Southern Africa. These powers are trying, each in its own manner, to implement policies which defuse the liberation struggle and lure certain African states into their corner through "dialogue" and material goodies. Add to this the U.S. stake in Latin America, the growing Luso-Brazilian political friendship, and South Africa's links with some Latin countries, and the picture expands.

In order to fill in the picture, it is necessary to examine certain occurrences in the last few years which show a widening concern of NATO. Most symbolic was the choice of Joseph Luns, former Dutch Foreign Minister, as the new Secretary of the alliance. Luns is the proud recipient of the Portuguese Grand Cross in the Order of Jesus Christ, who closely identifies the Portuguese war effort in Africa with his own salvation. ("Portugal sacrifices its blood for our freedom," said Luns this year.) In NATO circles other facts appear. Early in 1970 Portugal's Minister of Defense, Rebelo, informed NATO's defense chiefs that "South of the Tropic of Cancer, Portugal possesses naval and air bases stretching from the islands of Cape Verde to Guinea and Angola which, by the use of modern equipment, could help control the vast area of the whole Atlantic", and he placed the bases "at the disposal of the objectives of the alliance." (Daily Telegraph, London, January 12, 1970).

Details of a "South Atlantic Treaty Organization" (S.A.T.O.) vary as to what it might be like, but it is obvious that South Africa, the dominant power in Southern Africa, would be key. In late 1970, the former head of the Dutch Chiefs of Staff visited South Africa and reported that NATO's General Council was considering South Africa's

membership, a report quickly denied in Europe. Others, such as Dutch Liberal leader van Riel, have said that South Africa is essential for NATO's maritime defense linking the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. The journal Nato's Fifteen Nations has commented that although formal extension of NATO is "unrealistic", a regional maritime alliance consisting of the U.S., U.K., Portugal, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina and Brazil was more feasible. Other elements in the picture fall into place particularly vis-a-vis the accelerated anti-Soviet British policy of defending the Cape Route through the sale of WASP helicopters to South Africa. Britain even raised this subject at a NATO meeting, which ties in with the fact that a British Conservative Party memo drawn up before Heath's election emphasized the significance of the Cape Route in the context of the threat posed to the Cape Verde Islands by the forces of the PAIGC. It has been suggested that one rationale for Portugal's offer of bases to NATO was to encourage more financing from the West. South Africa has already helped build air facilities in the Cape Verde, while it is reported that LISNAVE, the huge Portuguese firm, plans to pump a lot of funds into expanding ports there and in Mozambique. A U.S. firm was said to have signed a contract with the Portuguese Government to study the construction of a huge ship repair yard in Cape Verde, and the Mozambican port of Nacala has been mentioned in the S.A. press as a potential military base for the U.S. (Mobil Oil may establish a refinery there also.) Meanwhile, France, which has played a central role in "dialogue" so prominent in African politics, is said to be expanding interest in the Indian Ocean/Mozambique Channel area.

Of course some NATO members, notably Canada, Sweden, Denmark, Italy and Turkey, are said to be wary of more pro-Portuguese acts, but it was reported that when Italy tried to set up an inquiry into Portugal's use of NATO weaponry, it was squashed by the United States with Dutch backing. Raising Portugal's colonial policies at the Lisbon meeting was also discouraged by the U.S., on the pretext of wanting to concentrate on the NATO-Soviet problem. But the realities of NATO aid to Portugal are clear, even if they seldom appear at the tip of the iceberg. A list of weapons used by Portugal in Africa was put out by the Zambian Information Office and included NATO and member state rifles, machine guns, mortars, rocket launchers, mines, grenades, etc.; recently 50 Portuguese officers attended a training course at the Institute for Advanced Military Study in Lisbon sponsored by NATO (with U.S. Defense Department lecturers); PUMA helicopters built by Britain, Italy, Belgium and France are being sold to Portugal; of 3 warships built by the West Germans theoretically not for use in Africa, one at least has been cited in Angola. And so on.

As for the United States, we know that on the books military aid to Portugal looks slim, but the revelations, not only in the recent Pentagon Papers turmoil but in Congressional hearings over the past year, show that accounting figures do not tell half the story. For example, an Assistant Secretary for Defense speaking at a Systems Management Meeting in Lisbon revealed that Portuguese officers were trained at the University of Monterey in California last year (Diario de Noticias, March 27, 1971); a U.S. military attache with other experts from Europe and Brazil visited northern Mozambique at the invitation of former U.S. State Dept. guest General de Arriaga; the Iberlant NATO post in Lisbon is being expanded and the U.S. Admiral will also have the role of cooperating with Portuguese officials in the defense of Portugal; the U.S. Ambassador to Portugal recently decorated a Portuguese Brigadier who is retiring from a post in the Azores; two U.S. naval destroyers docked in Mozambique to deliver relief goods to victims of the Zambezi flood; and there have been more reports by deserters from the Portuguese army of training by U.S. figures. Add these relations to the more publicized sale of Boeing jets to Portugal explicitly for troop transport to Africa, and the sale of Bell helicopters to Cabora Bassa (see below), and the pattern is clear.

The U.S. claims to be aiding Portugal's NATO role only and primarily in anti-submarine and air defense, trying to disclaim any relevance to the African wars. But we know that the Portuguese are fighting more and more of an air war, witness the massive use of herbicides in Angola, the use of napalm in Mozambique and Angola, and the statements by men such as Gen. de Arriaga that it is necessary to make the Portuguese more mobile. With more and more ground being seized by the guerrilla forces, an air war, not dissimilar to the U.S. strategy in Indo-China, with accelerated economic aid and psychological warfare are the elements of Portugal's plan.

Finally there are the Azores bases of the U.S. In March it was reported that P.M. Caetano planned to up the price for continued American occupation of the islands, and even the threat, if it can be called that, of transferring them to NATO. A Lisbon paper mentioned discussions also at the time of the NATO meeting. As yet how the U.S. will play this part of the game is unknown. What is important is understanding the variations which are leading up to giving Portugal and South Africa more immediate power. Thus, there is little doubt that the June NATO meeting discussed Southern Africa. But this meeting was only a hint at the existing nature of military and strategic aid to colonial and racist powers and a clue to developments in the future.

MORE ON THE BELL HELICOPTER SALE

The Bell Helicopter Company of Fort Worth, Texas, a massive subsidiary of the Textron Corporation of Delaware, was reported in an Agence France press clip (1/12/71) to have sold five helicopters to the Zambezi Valley Authority. This sale, in January, 1971 was worth \$616,400, and more helicopters are due to be sold in the near future. The French news agency asserted that the helicopters were sold in knocked down condition and were assembled by Portuguese technicians in Beira, Mozambique.

The Zambezi Valley Authority, officially titled the Zambezi Development Corporation, is the Portuguese Government agency created in early 1970 to supervise the entire development master plan for the river valley area. The first major task of the corporation is of course the Cabora Bassa Dam Project (U.N. A/8148/Add 1 30 Nov '70). Thus the Bell helicopters, presumably sold with the OK of the United States Export Control Division of the Department of Commerce are destined to aid Cabora Bassa! This in spite of the much hailed withdrawal of General Electric from selling "current conversion" equipment after failure of the U.S. Export-Import Bank financing.

Helicopters, we know, are an "indispensable and revolutionary element in conventional and guerrilla war" (New York Times, 3/10/71). Called the "muttering death" by the struggling people of Viet Nam, helicopters are similarly perceived by the peoples of Southern Africa. Although French Alouettes and Pumas are the most common enemy, Bell, which has an outlet in South Africa, seems to be mounting its own offensive in sales to Portugal also. As yet the precise type of helicopter which Bell sold to the Zambezi Development Corporation is unknown. It may well have been a commercial variety, but even then, the significance of the sale is obvious. Helicopters carry men and supplies; are used for reconnaissance, command posts, logistics. The rising success of FRELIMO is forcing Portugal into more and more of an air war, and the line between civilian and military is non-existent. The Bell helicopters hopped from Beira to Tete may well be used for anything. Perhaps they even carried the recent expedition of western military advisors up to Cabora Bassa, experts including men from England, France, Spain, Brazil, and the U.S. All there on the invitation of General de Arriaga (Agence France Presse, 5/25/71).

THE FOURTH FRONT: RESISTANCE IN PORTUGAL

With the failure of Portugal's series of offensives in Mozambique last year and the growing strength of FRELIMO, as well as MPLA and the PAIGC, increasingly clear, the contradictions in Portugal's attempt to maintain a colonial empire and impoverished fascism at home have reached the breaking point. In the past year resistance in Portugal against the regime and the African wars has reached a new level with the successful attacks of the Armed Revolutionary Action Group, A.R.A.:

June 3, 1971: All of Portugal's international telecommunications were cut off for 12 hours by a blast at the Portuguese telecommunications network which coincided with the opening session of the NATO meeting in Lisbon.

March 14, 1971: 12 Alouette-3 helicopters, one Alouette-2 and one giant SA-330 helicopter plus three Dornier training planes, together worth nearly \$1½ million, were all destroyed by explosives at the Tancos air base, 95 miles from Lisbon.

November 20, 1970: Three early morning blasts in Lisbon destroyed the U.S. Cultural Center, damaged the Security Police building, and blew up a pile of baggage on a dock, which, except for a weather delay, would have been on board the troop and supply ship "Niassa" headed for Africa.

October 26, 1970: The troop and supply ship "Cunene", berthed in Lisbon, was badly damaged by an explosion, and two days later a smaller blast damaged the liner "Vera Cruz", used as a troop and munitions carrier.

ARA representatives in London and the communiques issued by ARA after the attacks have stressed that the offensive is aimed not at the Portuguese people, but at the installations which directly involve the government and its military machine in Africa. A communique issued after the destruction of the helicopters and planes said that it was an action "against the shameful colonial war, contrary to the interests of the Portuguese people, waged by the Portuguese fascists and colonialists against the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea who are fighting for their independence" (The Times, U.K., 5/11/71).

The new level of resistance reached by the ARA must be seen in light of the years of struggle against the Salazar and now the Caetano regimes. Student opposition to the wars is now such that in December Portuguese Defense Minister Rebello called the universities and technical schools "centers of subversion" against the military. Students have always been counted among the victims of the PIDE (now the DSG), the political

police, but this spring students fought openly against the repression. When student meetings were broken up by the police in January, students went on strike, which is outlawed. In Lisbon, 150 students gathered to see the Minister of Education, but were refused. They attacked the U.S. Embassy. Finally, the police occupied assembly rooms for three days to prevent mass meetings. The trial of Father Andrade and nine others, including several students, set off protest meetings in February at Coimbra. Eight students were arrested and the meeting broken up, but 9,000 students at Coimbra went on a two day strike and 300 riot police ended it when they attacked an anti-war demonstration, arrested at least five more students, and occupied the campus.

The Caetano government has also attacked the Catholic Church calling some of its hierarchy subversives as well. There were two widely publicized cases this spring: the trial of Father Andrade, former chancellor of the Archdiocese of Luanda, who has been imprisoned without trial six times over the past 11 years, spending a total of six years in prison. He has been hounded by the FIDE because his brother was an important figure in MPLA and because he himself worked to help the victims of Portuguese oppression in Angola. Now he and eight others have been convicted of aiding MPLA, and his sentence of three years "with security measures" can result in indefinite detention by the police. The other priest on trial is Father Mario de Oliveira, a village priest in northern Portugal who has said, "I am against war and in favor of self-determination of peoples." It is said that the persecution of Father de Oliveira is aimed at the whole liberal wing of the church, lead by Bishop Gomes. In the colonies, Protestant missionaries have been harrassed, but now even the Catholics are considered dangerous, witness the decision of the Society of the White Fathers to leave mission work in Mozambique last month.

The labor opposition to repression and inflation intensified by the war has also grown in the past year. "Strikes, slowdowns and protest demonstrations, still banned by law in Portugal, still happen anyway," says a New York Times story of April 5. The first show of new force came two years ago in the "legislative elections" when in spite of legal and police obstacles to political activity, a new labor/university oriented group, the CDE, did much better than the more moderate CEUD party (though neither, of course, actually won any seats.) Last fall, the regime banned a mass meeting called for 12,000 metalurgical union members and passed new laws to suspend the union leaders for "trying to provoke an atmosphere of indiscipline and revolt". Other unions responded with unpublicized strikes and slowdowns that even hit a GM plant. In March, 3,000 shop workers at a silent demonstration in front of Caetano's office to ask for Saturday afternoons off, were attacked by police with dogs. But the unions are not backing down; an inter-union group representing nearly 200,000 workers have vowed to win trade union freedom in Portugal.

Opposition to the regime has even spread to elements in Portugal's elite. This spring a group of 64 lawyers and other professionals which formed as the National Commission to Aid Political Prisoners, issued a statement which correctly pointed out "the continuation, if not the worsening, of all the attacks against human dignity that characterize our system of political repression; including the alarming problem of police torture, which is now becoming a general rule in the interrogation of prisoners." (NY Times, May 6, 1971).

Of course resistance that Caetano fears the most, along with the ARA, is the opposition within the Portuguese Army. Portugal's version of ROTC is filled with university graduates who are against the war. Six Portuguese officers who deserted last summer to Sweden said that Portugal will never win in Africa and that not even within the officer corps is there belief in victory any more, and that the Portuguese people are now realizing that the colonial wars against the liberation movements are unjust. General Arriaga, ever claiming new successes against FRELIMO in Mozambique, was asked in March if "he believed the Mozambique war could be lost in Metropolitan Portugal . . . /He/ gave a worried grimace and said simply 'I hope not.'" (NY Times, March 15, 1971). And in April a Caetano speech showed how things are crumbling at home for the regime. He said, "In this war there is no front or rearguard. It is everywhere where the adversary tries to implant his ideas of defeat, favoring the abandonment of the overseas territories, inciting the soldiers and the young people to emigrate or desert from military service, undermining the morale of the youth." (Financial Times, UK, April 5, 1971).

FRELIMO has always said that its struggle is not against the Portuguese people as their salute to the ARA and the Fourth Front makes clear:

We express our appreciation for these concrete expressions of solidarity by Portuguese anti-colonialist militants . . . These recent . . . initiatives will enable our people to understand more fully our orientation; that the enemy cannot be defined by their colour or origin, but by their activities.

(Mozambique Revolution 4-6/71)