The Philosophy of Spirit (Jena Lectures 1805-6)
PART II. Actual Spirit
i. Immediate Recognition Being-recognized (Anerkanntseyn) is immediate actuality. And in this element [there is] the person, at first as being-for-himself in general, working and enjoying [the fruits of labor]. Only here does desire have the right to make its appearance – for [here] it is actual; i.e., desire itself has universal, spiritual being. Labor is of all and for all, and the enjoyment [of its fruits] is enjoyment by all. Each [one] serves the other and provides help. Only here does the individual have existence, as individual. Prior to this, the individual is merely something abstract, untrue [as a concept]. Spirit can indeed posit itself in an abstraction, analyze itself and give an existence to it (as the animal cannot), where the Self, placing itself in a system, becomes disease. But [then the self] has a merely momentary, evanescent existence. Here [in contrast] desire is. Over against the I as abstract being-for-itself, there stands likewise its inorganic nature, as being (seyend). The I relates itself negatively to it [its inorganic nature], and annuls it as the unity of both – but in such a way that the I first shapes that abstract being-for-itself as its Self, sees its own form [in it] and thus consumes itself as well.
In the element of being as such, the existence and range of natural needs is a multitude of needs. The things serving to satisfy those needs are worked up (verarbeitet), their universal inner possibility posited [expressed] as outer possibility, as form. This processing (Verarbeiten) of things is itself manysided, however; it is consciousness making itself into a thing. But in the element of universality, it is such that it becomes an abstract labor. The needs are many. The incorporation of their multiplicity in the I, i.e., labor, is an abstraction of universal models (Bilder), yet [it is] a self-propelling process of formation (Bilden). The I, which is for-itself, is abstract I; but it does labor, hence its labor is abstract as well. The need in general is analyzed into its many aspects – what is abstract in its movement is the being-for-itself, activity, labor.
Since work is performed only [to satisfy] the need as abstract being-for-itself, the working becomes abstract as well. This is the concept, the truth of the desire existing here. Each individual, because he is an individual here, thus labors for a need. [Yet] the content of his labor goes beyond his need; he labors for the needs of many, and so does everyone. Each satisfies the needs of many, and the satisfaction of one’s own many particular needs is the labor of many others. Since his labor is abstract in this way, he behaves as an abstract I – according to the mode of thinghood – not as an all-encompassing Spirit, rich in content, ruling a broad range and being master of it; but rather, having no concrete labor, his power consists in analyzing, in abstracting, dissecting the concrete world into its many abstract aspects.
Man’s labor itself becomes entirely mechanical, belonging to a many-sided determinacy. But the more abstract [his labor] becomes, the more he himself is mere abstract activity. And consequently he is in a position to withdraw himself from labor and to substitute for his own activity that of external nature. He needs mere motion, and this he finds in external nature. In other words, pure motion is precisely the relation of the abstract forms of space and time – the abstract external activity, the machine.
Among these diverse, abstract, processed needs, a certain movement must now take place, whereby they once again become concrete need[s], i.e., become the needs of an individual, who in turn becomes a subject comprising many needs. The judgment which analyzed them, placed them against itself as determinate abstractions. Their universality to which this judgment rises is [that of] the equality of these needs, or value. In this they are the same. This value itself, as a thing, is money. The return to concretion, to possession, is exchange.
In exchange, the abstract thing presents itself [as] what it is, namely, as being this transformation, returning to thinghood in the I, and indeed in such a way that its thinghood consists in being the possession of another. Each one gives his own possession, negating (hebt auf) its existence [as his] and in such a way that that existence is recognized therein; the other receives it with the consent of the first. Both parties are recognized; each receives from the other the possession of the other, in such a way that he receives it only insofar as the other is himself this negative of himself, [consents to this negation of what is his, i.e., receives it] as property, through mediation. Each is the negating (das negirende) of his own being, his property – and this is mediated through the negating of the other. Only because the other releases his possession do I do the same; and this equality in the thing, as its inner aspect, constitutes its value, in regard to which I concur entirely with the opinion of the other – [a concurrence of] that which is positively mine and likewise his, the unity of my will and his.
And my will counts as actual, existing, [for] to be recognized is to exist (das Anerkanntseyn ist das Daseyn). Thereby my will counts, I possess, the possession is transformed into property. In the possession, being has the unspiritual significance of my having, as this individual having. Here, however, the being-recognized [enters] – the being of the possession, such that the thing is and I am, and the thing is grasped as in the Self. Here, being is the universal Self, and the having is the mediation through another, i.e., it is universal. Value is what is universal [here]; the movement, as perceptible, is the exchange. This same universality is mediation as conscious movement. Property is thus an immediate having, mediated through being-recognized. That is, its existence is [shaping, recollection, value] – it is the spiritual essence.
Here the contingency in taking possession is overcome (aufgehoben). All that I have, I have through work and exchange, i.e., in being recognized. (By the same token, I am a universal person, not this particular person, but at the same time family. That is to say, property is the movement of a thing in exchange. Afterward, inheritance [involves] the change of individuals, wherein the family is constant – but this does not yet come up here.)
The source, the origin of property here is that of labor, my activity itself – immediate Self and being recognized [is the] basis. I am the cause, equally because I have willed [the] purpose in the exchange: the cause, the ground, is the universal. I have willed in the exchange, have posited my thing as a value, i.e., internal movement, internal activity, just as [is] labor, sunk in being – the same externalization (Entäusserung).
(a) In laboring, I make myself immediately into the thing, a form which is Being.
(b) At the same time I externalize this existence of mine, making it something alien to myself, and preserve myself therein. In the very same thing I see my being-recognized, being as knowing. In the former I see my immediate Self, in the latter my being-for-myself, my personhood. I therefore see my being-recognized as [my] existence, and my will is this counting-for-something (diss Gelten).
ii. Contract In the exchange, this being-recognized has become object; my will is [recognized as] an existence, as is the will of the other party. The immediacy of being-recognized has [now] come apart. My will is presented as more valid (geltender), not only for myself but also for the other – and it amounts to as much as existence itself. The value is my opinion of the thing. This opinion of mine, and my will, has counted (hat gegolten) in the eyes of the other person (mediated through his opinion and will). I have accomplished something, [and] have [thereby] alienated it from myself (habe mich dessen entäussert). This negative [element] is positive; this alienation is an acquiring.
My opinion of a thing’s value counted (galt) for the other person, and my wanting something he has. The two parties regard one another as [individuals] whose opinion and will have actuality. There is a consciousness, a distinction of the concept of being-recognized: the will of the individual is a shared will (or statement or judgement), and his will is his actuality as [the] externalization of himself which is my will.
This knowing is expressed in the contract. It is the same as exchange, but it is an ideal exchange (an offer).
(a) [In it] I give nothing away, I externalize nothing, I give nothing but my word, language, [to the effect that] I wish to externalize myself.
(b) The other party does the same. This externalizing/alienating (Entäussern) of mine is at the same time his will. He is satisfied that I grant him this.
(c) It is also his externalizing, it is [our] will in common – my externalization (Entäusserung) is mediated through his. I want to externalize myself only because he (for his part) wants to externalize himself also, and because his negating is my positing. It is an exchange of declarations, no longer an exchange of objects – but it counts as much as the object itself. For both parties, the will of the other counts as such. Will has [thus] gone back into its concept (Willen ist in seinen Begriff zurückgegangen).
Here, however, this division appears, that can as readily change into its opposite: the going back into itself [as individual will opposed to the will that is shared]. The will as such has validity; it is set free of actuality. But in that very fact there is the opposite: individual and shared wills are separated; the individual will [appears] as the negative of the universal will. [Thus] there is crime only insofar as I am recognized [as an individual, and] my will is taken as universal, counting as will in itself. Prior to recognition there is no insult, no injury.
In other words, in the contract the shared will has only a positive significance for my will, just as my will has for the other: they are in agreement. But it is also possible for them not to agree. I can unilaterally break the contract, since my individual will counts as such – not merely insofar as it is shared, but rather the shared will is shared only insofar as my individual will counts. They are equally essential: my individual will is as essential as is the equality [of wills]. My individual will is [the] cause, and the individual and universal here appear so far apart that my will counts insofar as it is mere will, before I have performed anything. But the performance is [something] existent, i.e., it is the existing universal will. Thus the division appears in the presentation of the wills as counting for universal will [as shared] and yet as existing [as individual]. The universal counts for the individual will, yet it is not the same.
In order really to assert the difference, I break the contract. The other party recognized my nonexistent will and was satisfied with it. The fact that it did not exist, that nothing was done [by me], should indeed have been overcome (aufgehoben) – an ought, but he recognized the ought as such. Precisely in the fact that the will counts as such, there lies the indifference to existence and to time. This is one sense [of the autonomy of the will], but the opposite sense is the essentiality of what exists, as existing, and indeed [as existing] against the essentiality of the will as such – i.e., against the individual will, there exists the entity that has the significance of the shared will, against the individuality of the will; and this [individual will] is rather to be asserted as prior to [the shared or universal will].
This assertion [of the will as individual] is the overcoming of that existence [i.e., of the will as shared, as universal – and with it the overcoming of the] compulsion [that says:] the other must perform; his will (even though it is indeed will) is not [to be] respected, because [in his participation in a] shared will he is opposed to himself. My individual will is essential, but at the same time it is only an element; and in that I have already posited my individual will as a shared will, I have posited myself in the same terms. My word must count – not on the moral grounds that I ought to be at one with myself, and not change my inner sentiment or conviction (for I can change these) – but [that] my will exists only as recognized. [In going back on my word] I not only contradict myself, but also the fact that my will is recognized; my word cannot be relied upon, i.e., my will is merely mine (mein), mere opinion (Meinung). The person, the pure being-for-himself, thus is not respected as an individual will separating itself from the shared will, but only as that shared will. I become compelled to be a person.
(a) The contract comprises the determinate particular will as a universal will; (b) hence its content – the thing, which is the medium of the relation – is a particular thing, a particular existence from which I can abstract. My contingent will concerns contingent things, as in exchange. The existent thing, which belongs to the medium [of the relation], is something particular. And I appear as a particular will against the other particular will – not as person against person. My will is not [directed] to the person, nor is it the person, the universal as such, that makes its appearance. Rather, the universal will is hidden under the determinate thing. The universal will, as shared – and as my pure will or personhood – is presented in the particular [will]. And my pure will as such is in the language of my declaration. My pure will has therein taken itself back, out of the immediacy of the exchange. But it merely signifies the particular performance; and the shared will [signifies] merely the dissolution, not of the person as such, but of the person as particular existent. The [element of] compulsion [in the contract] does not touch personhood but only its determinacy, its existence [in its particularity].
But according to the concept, the [particular] existence is dissolved in [the concept of] the person, and in the universal will. in other words, that existence is only as pure person and as pure universal will, as pure negativity. This is the force of the contract. just as, in performing [in fulfillment of the contract], I placed my will in a particular existent, but could do this only as a person (i.e., because the will counts as being in general), so in the same way I was compelled as person – for in this negation of my [particular] existence, my [universal] being in general was negated (negirt) as well, since these are indivisible.
I am reflected in myself. In compulsion, too, this comes to light. [In the contract, it is] not this particularity that is compelled; rather, it is I. The concept is therefore posited, set up, that the universal will absorbs the individual I into itself – as an existent which is juxtaposed to it – [absorbs] the entire individual I, and that I am [eo ipso] recognized for myself as person. Not merely my possession and my property are posited here, but also my personhood – i.e., this insofar as my existence includes my all, my honor and life.
iii. Crime and Punishment Concerning my honor and life there can be no contract: such a contract is nullified in its very conception, not [merely] as an individual case. The contract placed my will in a separable particularity. This I have given away, as in an exchange, and what has emerged is my existence as pure person. And this is as I now appear, as recognized for my pure will. In the contract [the element of] existence has receded to a mere effect. But in the contract as such the matter is settled. Here the necessary movement appears to be nullified – the injury to my honor and life appears as something fortuitous, contingent.
Yet this injury is necessary. I was compelled – not merely in regard to [the particulars of] my existence, but also in regard to my ego, as reflected in me in my existence. The recognition of my personhood, in the contract, allows me to count as existing, my word to count for the performance. That is: I, my bare will, is not separated from my existence; they are equal. This very will is contradicted by compulsion and force, for these injure me in my existence. I am insulted, as in the movement of recognition (Anerkennen). The other person has damaged my property, not merely in the form which is immediate to me. Rather, he has injured my recognized will as such, which he recognized as existing and as inseparably bound up with my existence.
I consider myself injured – and indeed as a person, according to that concept. There is an oscillation between my existence as external and as internal (into which I placed my I). The contradiction strikes me as an inequality between my first and second word – but it is the same contradiction as that between the I as universal and as particular. In other words: inasmuch as the other party concluded a determinate deal with me he took my pure will as something unequal to itself, as the universal will which has a determinate existence.
Against coercion I therefore present my being-for-myself – not (as in the movement of recognition) my generally injured self, but rather my injured self [as] recognized. I wish to show the other party that he ought not to be able to compel me; i.e., that my ego, bound to a determinate performance (along with the compulsion which I suffered therein), was an injury to my pure Self. I find my honor aggrieved, my will negated (aufgehoben) only in the respect of this determinate existence, but through this my putative pure will [as well]. I appear as a person against the person of another; I negate his being as universal, the security of his personhood. I show him that in this existence, this determinacy, he has injured me as universal, and thus has conducted himself inequitably, since the matter at issue was only concerning a particular thing.
Thus I, in turn, stand up against him. In his performance toward me, his will was not injured; rather, he has had his way and has only alienated [i.e., divested himself of, given up] a specific thing. His compulsion [of me], however, is an alienation of my will. I overcome this inequality, [I regard] him as will, just as he does me. I avenge myself on him – not as in the state of nature [where I direct myself] merely as toward self-conscious activity for itself, but as toward a will, i.e., a will that here is likewise intelligence, that thinks of itself, knows itself as universal, a universal knowing, which is my knowing as well – in other words, [I avenge myself on him] as on someone who is recognized.
In coercion, the other party produced the shared will as something existent – and overcame my individual will, which I alone recognize. My will as such is for me the equal of the universal will. And since it is injured, deprived of existence, I now produce it [i.e., re-assert it] – so that I negate the other’s being which had posited his will as universal, opposed to my will which did not prevail.
I thereby commit crime, acts of violence, theft, injury, etc. The verbal injury transcends all this as a universal crime. [In committing it,] I do not say [about someone] that he has done me this or another evil, but that he is this. The verbal insult places him in the universal, as negated. A judgment posits [e.g.] the tree to be green, [that] it is green – i.e., the judgment is not [intended as] subjective but [as] universal. Similarly, the verbal insult transforms the victim’s totality into something that is in itself a nullity. [On the other hand,] the real injury negates him as a will – whether it be that I steal from him [by stealth or] rob him [in a hold-up]: in the former, attacking his unknowing existence, and altogether ignoring his being and will, but acting against it; in the latter, openly acting against his existing self-expressive will. The one works underhandedly, the other [is openly] injurious. Open murder (not through deception) is finite, is generally the least underhanded, yet is the greatest injury. For underhandedness consists in relating to another person as nonexistent, [while] I retain the form of inwardness, so that my deed does not come to light, cannot be grasped for what it truly is, but remains cunningly reflected in itself.
The inner [subjective] source of crime is the coercive force of the law. Exigency and so forth are [merely] external causes, belonging to [one’s] animal needs. But crime as such is directed at the person as such and his knowing of it, for the criminal is intelligence: his inner justification is this coercion, the reinstatement of his individual will to power, [his wish] to count for something, to be recognized. He wants to be something (like Herostratus), not necessarily to be famous but only to have his will prevail, in opposition to the universal will.
The consummated crime is [a function of] the will that knows itself as individual, as being-for-itself, having come into existence despite the power of the other will that knows itself as universal will. But this crime is the animation, the activation, the arousal (to activity) of the universal will. The universal will is active. The recognized activity is universal, not individual – that is to say, it is a transcendence (Aufheben) of the individual will.
Punishment is this overturn, it is retribution as [that] of the universal will. The essence of punishment does not rest on a contract [that has presumably been broken], nor [on the aim of] deterring others, nor [on] rehabilitating the criminal. Rather, the essence of punishment, its concept, is this transition, the inversion of the injured universal recognition (Anerkanntseyn). It is revenge, but as justice. That is to say, the recognition which is in itself and was damaged externally is to be restored.
The criminal is done by as he has done, inasmuch as he had constituted himself as a power against another, [taking] the universal as his power, and indeed the universal as such – not the individual, as in [personal] vengeance. Revenge can be just, but here it is justice.
(a) The injured party is recognized in himself; everything proceeds in the element of recognition, of Right. Dolus, the crime, has this significance: that the one doing the injury has previously recognized the injured; that the criminal (usually the thief) knew what he did, not [necessarily] its determinate scope, but its general determinacy; that he knew it to be prohibited, and knew that in this act he does injury to a person, such as is recognized in himself; that he [the criminal] lives in the element of recognition; [and] that whatever exists derives its meaning in such recognition.
(b) It thereby happens that the injured party suffers no injury to his honor. The honor of the one who is robbed or murdered is not aggrieved, for he is recognized in himself. In other words, his being-recognized exists – not as in the state of nature, [where] honor was attacked through injury done to possessions, i.e., a being-recognized that is as yet only in thought. The verbal injury injures one’s honor, but not absolutely; the injured party is not without rights. In himself, the one without honor is also without rights.
Through this movement, the being-recognized has been realized, presented as:
(a) comprising in itself the determinate existence and the particular will; in the surrender of itself to maintain itself in its expression, retaining its will;
(b) this will as such, as the individual will, as the will existing in the contract; return into particularity, crime as though this [individual will] were [the will] as such, crime [as] loss of the particularity of being through the universal will; the reconciled universal will, counting absolutely as such [this is the] deterrent to crime: looking upon the law as the absolute power, not the power of the individual.