Antoine Momoro 1793
Source: Rapport sur l'état politique de la Vendée. [n.p. Paris?] [n.d. 1793?]
Translated: for marxists.org by Mitchell Abidor.
Paris, the 22 of the first month of the second year of the Republic one and indivisible
For three years the seed of rebellion silently extended its deep roots in the department of the Vendée, and when the Executive Council was told during this time of the movements of the rebels it either disdained them or hid them from the nation. Perhaps it even favored them.
The signs of rebellion manifested themselves in several areas of the unfortunate region, and the administrations of departments, districts, and communes took no vigorous measures to repress these first movements. Doubtless they too favored them.
Scoundrel priests, abusing the credulity of the inhabitants of the region succeeded in having them rise up in the name of religion against the national authority. But these priests, the horror of humanity, hid behind the curtains, as did the ci-devant, who rushed to this country from all over France. They waited for the favorable moment to appear and put themselves at the head of the revolting peasants.
During this time a certain Stofflet, game warden of the émigré Maulevrier, had formed a large party which he placed himself at the head of and which made incursions into the country, pillaging the properties and forcing the inhabitants to march with him to support, he said, their rights, their priests and to avenge their slandered religion.
The neighboring departments, of the Maine and Loire, the Deux Sèvres, etc. sent National Guard troops to repel this imposing force of brigands that was spreading on all sides. Several minor combats took place, and the success obtained at the start seemed to announce the imminent destruction of this nascent horde of brigands. They had no weapons; the game wardens alone had rifles and the others were armed with sticks that had pieces of steel attached to their ends, or they were armed with sickles, pitchforks, and other utensils of this kind. At that time the smallest active force that would have been sent out against them would have completely destroyed them for they weren’t numerous. But soon their number was increased by the brigands of the whole of France who were sent there by the nobles and priests, by counter-revolutionaries and the court itself.
There could soon be seen rushing there from all sides former barrier guards, officials without positions, deserters, penniless foreigners, and Austrian prisoners who the nation had granted honest assistance. This horde grew larger with the arrival of other evildoers, monks, priests, and ci-devant: all the friends of the émigrés of Coblenz and idle youth who wanted to re-establish royalty.
All these evil men managed to have the inhabitants of the Vendée rise up and they then spread like a flood in the departments of the Maine and Loire and the Deux Sèvres.
Until then the nobles and priests hadn’t dared declare themselves the leaders of the rebellion and place themselves at the head of the rebels. In the first instance, the inhabitants of the countryside had only risen up to avenge their outraged religion in the person of their good priests. They couldn’t be talked to about the ancien régime or the nobility or feudalism. They were all too happy to be rid of forced labor and levies and the thousand shameful taxes they had been subjected to. And so the noble wretches who fomented rebellion knew that if they had spoken of bringing back these former abuses by demanding the re-establishment of the nobility they wouldn’t have arrived at their goal and that the peasants, enlightened as to their true interests, having sensed the trap would soon have turned their arms against them.
But what did these nobles do? They were wise enough to completely forget themselves, to change their costumes, to put on that of the peasants, to live with them, to eat the same bread, to sleep like them in the woods and like them to defend religion; to regularly attend mass, to wear prayer beads, reliquaries, to pray twice daily, to take communion and confess often. It was through such hypocritical conduct that these nobles managed to earn the confidence of the peasants who, having been fooled, said, “But they want to be the same as us; they share our sufferings and our love for religion. They are acting in good faith.”
The rebellion acted in accordance with the given circumstances, and strove to skillfully profit from all those circumstances that could with any likelihood justify them. By these methods they managed to attract many people to their party. Soon the perfidious tax farmers and administrators lined up along with the brigands. Soon private committees were substituted for them and these brigands soon managed to create a freedom-killing administration.
The district and departmental administrations maintained a culpable silence concerning these movements or opposed weak methods to them. The Executive Council of the time took no serious measures and allowed the nation to remain ignorant that civil war was being fomented in the west of France.
Since the horde of brigands every day took on a new consistency, the nation’s money was being stolen by them from the district cash boxes, taxes were no longer being collected, and the neighboring departments were being threatened by similar rebellious movements the National Assembly had to be informed. It was only then that the Executive Council thought of taking serious measures.
Berruyer was sent to the Vendée at the beginning of 1793. He was given the command of about 3,000 men made up of various battalions from these departments, to which was joined in March by the 35th National Gendarmerie division from Paris.
At that time the brigands were gathered in Chemillé, Saint Pierre de Chemillé, and Chollet. They had two or three cannons which had been found in chateaux.
Berruyer didn’t delay in seeking out the enemy in his lair. He attacked Chemillé with the National Gendarmerie and took the town. But he neglected to pursue the enemy the brigands and they had the time to rally further away and retreated into the woods. The gendarmerie wanted to pursue its conquests but Berruyer opposed this. The brigands were commanded by Stofflet.
Berruyer was soon recalled from the Vendée and was succeeded by Leygonnier. The latter had relatives among the brigands and did nothing to defeat them. He is accused of having betrayed the Republic, either through cowardice or perfidy.
Another individual, named Quétineau, was also accused by the inhabitants of the region of having handed Thouars over to the enemy and of having been the cause of the massacre of the Marseillais. This man sought to justify himself. He’s currently being held in the prisons of Paris and is requesting judgment. If he betrayed may his head fall.
The department of the Hérault was the first to call the attention of the Republic to the rebellion in the Vendée. It gave 5,000 men to fight these brigands and the rich were made to pay for this levy. Soon Paris, imitating the devotion of the department of the Hérault, sent out numerous battalions to exterminate the brigands of the Vendée. Other departments followed the example of the Hérault.
It was then that the picture in the Vendée became more interesting and the movements carried out since this time have taken on a character that is of a nature that fixes the attention of the National Convention and the entire Republic in the most serious way.
It was then that the number of enemies was increased by many bad citizens who had deserted from our battalions, into which they'd infiltrated themselves.
The complete destruction of the brigands looked to be the work of two or three months at most. The battalions of the different departments had already gone to the Vendée. The seacoast, by which the brigands were able to receive the assistance of the English, was soon guarded by our troops and an army occupied Sables d'Olonne. Another division guarded Luçon and the passages that lead to the coast. Another division was posted near Fontenay-le-Peuple.
With these different columns we could guard the seacoast and prevent any communication between the brigands and the enemy. This was the conduct that had to be maintained at that time.
We also had to guard the passages of the Loire in order to prevent the enemy from penetrating into the interior. New divisions were then posted near Saumur, Doué, Puits Notre Dame, Montreuil, Thouars, Pont-de-Cé, Saint Georges, etc.
Nantes being threatened by the brigands also had to be guarded. An army, called the Army of the Coast of Brest, protected that city, Ancenis, and the banks of the Loire.
Such were the dispositions that the generals thought had to be taken to surround the brigands and to guarantee the seacoasts and the interior by blocking the passage of the Loire. These dispositions might have been excellent for the results expected from them, but at the same time the enemy had to be attacked, and there weren’t enough troops to do this advantageously and without compromising the Republic’s safety. This is what the Executive Council of the National Convention was left in darkness about, as well as the true number of the enemy, either because it wasn’t known or because all the measures necessary to learn it weren’t taken.
Deputies from the National Convention had been sent to the Vendée to accelerate the destruction of the brigands.
Several national commissioners had also been sent by the Executive Council to observe everything and make a report. But they were only able to guess at the operations, not having been called to any of the councils held by the people’s representatives and the generals.
The brigands, seeing numerous battalions arriving from all corners to combat them, formed themselves into an army under the name of the Angevine and Poitevine Army, which later became the Christian Army. It was then that the nobles, who had remained behind the scenes, put themselves forward and took command of the army. Lescure, Laroche-Jacquelin, Laugrenière, Beauchamps shared command with Stoffler. Each of them formed an army whose nucleus was composed of deserters, monks, priests, and nobles, the rest being the peasants of the region called by the sound of the tocsin in each commune when there was an expedition to carry out. Charrette was one of their cruelest chiefs.
To this effect provisional committees were established in the different parishes and correspondence bureaus created to coordinate all their operations and to learn of ours by means of spies who were spread about in our camps and battalions.
The brigands then fortified themselves in Mortagne, Cholet, and Chatillon, from which they'd driven all the patriots. The established a powder mill in Mortagne that produced 80 pounds of sulfur charges. The consistency that this army took on with each passing day caused the decision to be taken to attack it at all points.
The brigands were defeated and totally routed May 15 at Fontenay-le-Peuple [1] in the department of the Vendée. Almost all their artillery was seized during this action, most notably their pieces called “Marie Jeannes.” Had they then been pursued without let up it would have been the end of the Vendée; the rebellion would have been extinguished and the war over. But the brigands, seeing that they weren’t being pursued, rallied in the woods and fell back onto the department of the Maine and Loire, pillaging and setting on fire the property of the patriots who didn’t want to march with them.
At the end of May the brigands fell on Fontenay-le-Peuple, which they took due to the failure of the armed gendarmerie to attack the enemy as they should have.
The minister of war had sent his deputy, Citizen Ronsin to visit the entire Vendée and to gather intelligence on the enemy’s position, the situation in the region, and the means to purge it of all the brigands who infested it.
This patriotic voyage was successfully completed, the most precious intelligence gathered, and Ronsin, upon returning from his mission, stopped at Saumur to communicate his observations , the map he'd drawn up of the situation in the Vendée, and the enemy’s position to the people’s representatives.
Biron, at the time commander-in-chief of the Army of the Coast of Rochelle had been awaited for several days in Saumur in order to devise a plan of mass attack on the enemy. He arrived there during the first days of June. This plan was decided upon with the generals in the presence of the people’s representatives and was supposed to be carried out within a short time. Biron returned to Niort a few days later.
But soon the enemy, having learned he was going to be attacked, sought to attack us near Saumur.
On June 5 he appeared at Verchers and after a few hours of combat took the position.
Leygonnier, who commanded the division, was in Doué, showing not the least concern. It was only learned much later that his forward positions at been attacked and driven back and that he hadn’t sent the assistance needed to support them on time.
The enemy, emboldened by this first success, advanced and attacked the army at Doué, from which it dislodged them on June 7 towards Saumur, which it advanced within within a a league of and from which it was driven back from the heights of Bournan. The negligence of Leygonnier was the same, but the soldiers’ indignation increased upon seeing this general make no vigorous move to repel the enemy.
The army was in a complete state of rout and the people’s representatives as well as General Menou did everything possible to rally the army on the heights of Bournan, which they finally managed to do. It is here that one must say that deputies Richard, Choudieu, Bourbotte, Thureau, and Tallien did their duty, did it well, and consistently supported the sans culottes.
The people’s representatives, witnesses to Leygonnier’s conduct, removed him on June 7 and confided the command of the army to Menou on the eighth.
This new success made the enemy more daring and he resolved to move towards Saumur, which he attacked and took on the ninth.
As this was occurring the army of Thouars was ordered to march towards Saumur. It set out but was unable to pass Montreuil, where the enemy army made up of nearly 4,000 men ferociously attacked it on the night of the June 8-9 at 11:30 p.m.
This army of Thouars, made up of nearly 5,000 men, was commanded by Salomon. They fought heroically and killed nearly 1,500 brigands but, unable to hold out against their number, they were forced to fall back on Thouars, from which they went to Niort via Parthenay.
The junction with the army of Saumur not having been able to be carried out the latter city had become more difficult to defend: not enough had been done to protect it from the enemy’s invasion.
Redoubts placed along the main road couldn’t guarantee it against the invasion. Saumur was finally heatedly attacked. The combat was bloody. The battalions from Orleans distinguished themselves, as well as the 36th gendarmerie division, and the new battalions from Paris did all they could to support the enemy’s blows.
Saumur being in the power of the brigands the troops fell back, some to Tours, some to Angers, some to Niort.
The enemy then headed to Angers with only 4,000-5,000 men, and General Barbasan, who was there with 4,000 men, withdrew from the city without defending it.
It was then thought that the horde of brigands would march on Tours. This was feared, but the “Christian” army didn’t dare leave its underbrush and woods. This was when reflection on its conduct should have led the generals to rapidly rally the army and harass the enemy wherever he could be found.
Biron was told of the capture of Saumur two days later and took no measure to put this city, whose possession was extremely important because of its crossing of the Loire, into the hands of the Republic. He only took measure to protect Niort, where there were about 17,000 troops.
During this time the Army of Sables emerged victorious from all its fights: three times it defeated the enemy, preventing it from attempting the passage of the coast.
A short while later Saumur was evacuated by the enemy and the troops of the Republic installed themselves there. A few days before the evacuation we could have seized all the brigand chiefs there, who had been abandoned by the army, which had returned to its homes.
New battalions soon arrived at Saumur. They were camped on the heights of Bournan under the command of General Santerre.
Biron went to Saumur. A new campaign plan was devised and the battalions were to attack Brissac, Vihiers, Coron, Chollet, and Mortagne.
Biron set the army on march and instead of attacking directly via Saumur he had the army pass through Angers and then return to Brissac and attack Vihiers. This operation was carried out July 15, 16, and 17. The first two days the army was successful, and the third it was routed in Vihiers. La Borolière commanded one part of the army, Menou the other.
It was complained that the former didn’t do all he could to defeat the enemy; the second was wounded.
During this time the Army of Niort was inactive.
The Central Commission of the people’s representatives was in Angers. It was soon informed of the army’s rout and went immediately to Tours.
The enemy hadn’t pursued our columns. On the contrary, it had returned to Coron, Chollet, and Mortagne.
With this rout Saumur was once again delivered to the enemy, which could seize it with ease since there were no more forces there and the inhabitants of the region had themselves left their homes.
In these circumstances, resolved to defend the passage of the Loire by all the means in our power, we left Angers to go to Saumur with General Ronsin. Along the way we were told that the enemy was in Saumur, which led us to take precautionary measures. We arrived there the next day. The enemy was nowhere to be seen, but the city was abandoned. There remained no governmental body, no other force than one battalion positioned in the chateau and which was lacking in the food and munitions needed to defend itself.
Rossignol, who had been made a brigadier general and who was returning from Paris, arrived there the same day. We devised a plan with the mayor, who was the sole person who had remained to protect Saumur against enemy invasion. Thanks to us the city was provisioned with both food and munitions. Troops were sent there. Confidence soon being reborn the inhabitants returned to their homes. New redoubts were hastily constructed, the bridges were cut, and mines placed everywhere. This resulted in a return of confience and sheltered Saumur from enemy attack.
During this time the army was reorganized. Biron’s conduct was clarified. New generals were designated to replace the traitorous or suspect generals and all that was being waited for before attacking the enemy was for the reorganization to be perfected and the arrival of the Army of Mainz.
Rossignol replaced Biron. It was only after much insistence that the patriots were able to get him to accept this perilous post. He had persistently refused.
At that time new preparations were being made to attack the enemy and new assistance was arriving from Paris in the form of munitions and weapons.
Rossignol went to visit the different army divisions in order to later be able to determine the general plan of attack.
It was then that the intrigues began, and the friends of the nobles and Biron, astonished to see a sans culotte at the head of the Army of the Coast of Rochelle did everything they could to deprive him of the soldiers’ confidence and to undermine him in the eyes of public opinion. Two people’s representatives, Goupilleau de Fontenay and Bourdon de l'Oise joined his detractors and arbitrarily suspended him from his functions in Chantonnay and ordered him to remove himself to at least twenty leagues from the army. Soon the National Convention, having learned the truth of the facts from Bourbotte, a people’s representative who had witnessed them, returned Rossignol to his functions.
The Army of Mainz arrived at Saumur: a decree had united it with the Army of the Coast of Rochelle and placed it under the command of the general of that army.
The People’s representative Philippeaux had previously gone to Nantes to request assistance in the form of several thousand men to defend Nantes. He couldn’t be granted this assistance since the forces at Saumur were too small and the preparations were in course for a general attack that would protect Nantes from any insult on the part of the enemy, and Nantes had already defeated the brigands.
The people’s representatives who were in Saumur presented these observations in a way that would have persuaded anyone but Citizen Philippeaux who, not having been able to obtain what he wanted, went immediately to Paris to request assistance from the Committee of Public Safety. It seems that he presented his request to the Committee in a way that persuaded it that the security of the Republic and the wiping out of the brigands of the Vendée absolutely depended upon the measures that would be taken to protect Nantes from any invasion.
Consequently, the Committee of Public Safety joined the Army of Mainz to that of the Coast of Brest under the command of General-in-Chief Canclaux.
This new disposition went against the measures proposed for attacking the enemy en masse at Mortagne via Saumur. The people’s representatives with the Army of the Coast of Rochelle and the generals, surprised that the army of Mainz was taken in this way from that of the Coast of Rochelle, resolved to send an extraordinary courier to the Committee of Public Safety in order to present to it its observations. General Joly was charged with this mission.
During this time the Army of Mainz remained in Saumur and waited to be led against the enemy, who it was burning to attack. Its departure was delayed for several hours in order to await the results of the observations presented to the Committee of Public Safety. General Joly carried out his mission with no great alacrity. He remained two extra days and brought back orders confirming the original ones. The Army of Mainz thus left Saumur for Nantes.
With this a war council was held. It was composed of nine generals and eleven representatives.
Serious debates occurred during this council, and the opinions were evenly split, plus one vote.
The eleven representatives, with the exception of one who didn’t want to vote and two others who voted that we march on Mortagne via Saumur, deliberated in that war council, even though a decree prohibited the representatives from interfering in military operations. They carried the day over the opinion of the generals who wanted us to attack Mortagne via Saumur, being distant from it by only fifteen leagues; based on this alone Mortagne was attackable. Consequently, it was decided that we would attack Mortagne via Nantes; that the different divisions of the army would set out at specified periods to go on a specified day to Mortagne. It was agreed that this plan would be executed to the letter.
A copy of this plan was given to every general of a division. Rossignol sent a copy to the Committee of Public Safety with his observations.
Soon preparations were under way everywhere to march on the enemy in accordance with the terms of the decisions of the war council. The columns began to move. The Army of Mainz, united with that of the Coast of Brest, left Nantes, marched on Clisson and Montaigu and met only slight obstacles, which it soon pushed aside. Along the way it took several cannon pieces, freed prisoners, and preceded by victory marched on Mortagne.
General Canclaux, commanding this army, wrote to Rossignol to ask him where the enemy was. Rossignol answered that it having been frightened by the Army of Mainz he had thrown himself on it.
In fact, the brigands fled before this army made up of about 27,000 men.
Previously General Tuncq, who had imprudently ventured too far into enemy territory in the area of Chantonnay leaving his left and right flanks uncovered, had suffered a serious defeat, but which nevertheless did not upset the campaign plans that were to be executed as had been decided.
General Chalbos alone had more precautions to take in order to follow the march laid out in the plan. General Canclaux was informed of this.
A large contingent had joined our battalions from Saumur, Doué, Thouars, Angers, Fontenay-le-Peuple, Niort, Parthenay, etc. Nearly 300,000 men, called by the tocsin, formed this contingent, some armed with rifles, others with sickles, pitchforks, and other utensils of this kind. Everything promised us certain victory, and total defeat of the brigands. It sufficed to want to defeat them and they would be defeated.
Our battalions, reinforced by these contingents, set out and on the first two days defeated the enemy wherever they found him. The Thouars division took his cannons and munitions, that of Doué also took his cannons and burned several villages. That of Angers, which left from the bridge of Cé, also defeated the enemy. That of Fontenay advanced on Chataigneraie without meetings any obstacles when suddenly Chalbos, based on a misunderstood letter, stopped his column’s march despite the insistences of the people’s representatives, and sent General Rossignol a courier to inform him of the uncertainty caused by the letter. Rossignol, surprised, indignant immediately sent a courier to General Chalbos to order him to advance, informing him of his surprise at his conduct given that two preceding letters, as well as the present one, expressly ordered him to execute the plan and march.
Our columns, which had until then been victorious on the banks of the Loire then suffered several defeats.
The Doué column, commanded by General Santerre, after having burned fifteen leagues of the countryside, had advanced on Coron, which it entered and from which it drove out the enemy. But this column was soon to retreat and leave several cannons on the narrow roads which it was unable to drag them down. The contingent attached to this army hadn’t followed the battalions to Coron. The enemy realizing this, it made an about face and attacked our soldiers there and took position of the town. Our battalions panicked and the contingents fled at the first shot fired at them. Only a few brave men remained and joined up with the battalions that occupied the heights of Vihiers, where they rallied on the invitation of the generals and people’s representatives who had been following the operations of the army for three days. The retreat to Doué was then carried out with a semblance of order to the spot where other battalions had taken up arms to stop those who were fleeing and preventing them from spreading alarm in Saumur, which would have absolutely destroyed us.
The Thouars column, commanded by General Rey and which was on the left of Doué defeated the enemy and suffered no defeats. On the contrary, it extended to Montreuil and Puits Notre Dame to reinforce that of Doué and in this way cover Saumur and the crossing of the Loire.
The Angers column, commanded by general Duhoux was not so fortunate. After two days of success at both Saint Lambert and Chemillé it found itself totally annihilated, defeated by the enemy and all of its horses and artillery taken. Only 200 men were saved from the fury of the brigands and cross the bridge of Cé, which was immediately cut so the enemy couldn’t cross it. And in fact the brigands who had wanted to pursue the debris of the column were forced to stop at the hills of Erigné, which in turn had been taken and lost.
These unexpected reverses and the inaction of the Chalbos column prevented the junction with the Army of the Coast of Brest.
General Rossignol immediately informed General Canclaux of these reverses.
The Army of Sables had also suffered: Miekouski had been defeated by the enemy.
Beysser, commanding a division of the Army of the Coast of Brest had also just been defeated; the vanguard of the Army of Mainz had been forced to abandon its artillery and withdraw to the body of the arm, paying for having imprudently advanced and been too sure of itself when it entered the woods and ravines.
By inconceivable fortune both armies had suffered defeats but the enemy hadn’t gained any terrain.
It was then that it was realized how right were the generals who wanted to attack Mortagne via Saumur; it was then that the people’s representatives with the Army of Mainz wrote to Rossignol that they placed all their confidence in him.
Our columns, with the exception of that of Duhoux could have marched again on the enemy and promptly repaired the failures they'd just suffered, but agreement in the carrying out of operations was needed.
It was only learned a few days later that the Army of Brest had returned to Nantes to regroup because we hadn’t received any news from them. Two couriers sent to Canclaux by Rossignol hadn’t returned and this worried us. Nevertheless the rumor of the taking of Mortagne by the Army of Mainz was being spread and no official word came to confirm or deny this rumor.
Amidst this perplexity and solicitude a wager had to be laid and the enemy couldn’t be allowed to enjoy the fruits of his victory for too long. The army was growing bored with its inactivity and despite the perfidious slanders aimed at Rossignol by the representatives themselves this general suffered from Canclaux’s silence and the inaction of our columns.
A new war council was summoned at Saumur. The generals were called there and it took place on October 2. It was decided that all the army’s columns would go to Bressuire the seventh in order to form a mass and if possible to carry out a junction with the Army of Mainz, which was only three leagues from Mortagne.
As this was occurring Canclaux wrote to Rossignol on the October 1 that the army had departed from Nantes and would only return after carrying off a total victory; that he was in a good position; that he had taken all the advantageous posts; that he was establishing his headquarters in Montaigu; and that he was marching on the enemy.
The march decided upon by the war council was well matched with the operations of the army of Mainz, and Canclaux was informed of this via courier. The columns then set out for Bressuire.
Saumur was guarded by a sufficient large garrison. Redoubts surrounded the city; mines placed around it rendered it unapproachable for the enemy. The château, well provisioned in munitions and victuals, in artillery and troops could still prevent the enemy from presenting himself.
Doué as well was in a sufficiently strong defensive position to hold the enemy up for some time.
The bridge at Cé being cut and defended by several cannons placed a formidable dam before the enemy.
The Army of Mainz had swept the Nantes road.
The Army of Fontenay, in marching on Bressuire with all due caution, was able to drive the enemy back.
The Army of Sables, remaining at its post, could prevent the enemy from landing on the seacoast.
The garrison and the inhabitants of the isle of Noirmoutier had just set out in pursuit of 4,000 brigands who had dared to show themselves.
Given all this, the situation in the Vendée was not as hopeless as was publicized. The Army of Mainz, which had just been united with the Army of Brest, obtained new successes: it routed the brigands, from whom they had taken two cannons, two caissons, killed 600 men, and taken many prisoners. The columns from Chataigneraie and Saumur obtained the same successes. All of our armies were victorious.
Nevertheless, it wasn’t possible to hide from ourselves that this was a war of a kind to most seriously fix the attention of the republic. This war in no way resembled that which the coalition powers were waging against us, though it was nourished by them.
It was Frenchmen led astray by fanaticism that we had to fight.
It was Frenchmen seduced by nobles who wanted to reestablish royalty and their privileges that we had to fight.
It was against a whole population that we had to fight.
Our enemies were many: the population of the country occupied by them was about 80,000 men.
We also had to count among our enemies the wives of these same men, who serve as spies for their army.
We had almost eighty leagues of country to surround in order to prevent these brigands from passing.
Our force had much to do to be both active and in a line of circumvallation. Our army was made up of about 50,000 men.
That of the enemy was reinforced by all our deserters, a part of the cuirassiers and the German legion, of several hussars and dragoons, and finally of a large number of shady characters who infiltrated our battalions to disorganize them. These were virtually the elite of their troops, joined with several barrier agents, Austrian and Prussian deserters, émigrés, and other foreigners who threw themselves into the Vendée.
The enemy’s courage grew with each combat. The peasants who at first took our cannons with their rods became more daring with each passing battle. Their various successes increased their daring.
Those lacking in natural courage have the courage born of fanaticism and despair, which are more terrible still.
After this we could no longer hide the fact that the enemy was more numerous and dangerous than we had at first believed.
We only became fully aware of this when the Army of Mainz arrived in the Vendée.
It was then we came to know that the brigands had three armies, each made up of around 30,000 men.
Each of these armies has a nucleus of 5,000-6,000 men who are foreign to the country and continuously active, which nucleus gathers at the first sound of the tocsin, the peasants by commune under the leadership of their chief.
Each of these armies is commanded by the enemy’s higher council.
Beauchamps commands one which continuously harassed the banks of the Loire from Thouars, Montreuil, Puits Notre Dame, Saumur, Doué, and Brissac up to the bridge of Cé.
Charette commands a third, which continuously struck the coast at Nantes and the banks of the Loire, and the coast of Saint Georges and Ancenis.
Laroche-Jacquelin, a young man of 21, is the generalissimo of these armies. He is the most daring man among the brigands.
In this army there are also general officers, like Laugreniere, Pyron, and other like villains.
A certain Maignan of the Germanic Legion, a known villain, commands their cavalry.
In general their artillery is poorly served. They have no good artillerymen, and it is only fair to say of ours that they prefer to be killed at their pieces than to be taken prisoner and they'd rather be executed by the brigands than to serve their pieces when fate has it that they are taken prisoner.
The enemy uses a powder that is manufactured in Mortagne and which is loaded with sulfur.
They currently have much artillery; the number might be as high as around 120 pieces. They can’t use all of them for the terrain is no better for them than it is for our troops. And so they are careful to march only with a few pieces: they ordinarily haul with them two, four, or at most eight.
We could do the same. The bayonet and cold steel are worth far more on such bad roads than the best used artillery, for the brigands use the skillful tactic of never remaining together en masse and instead scatter to right and left to surround our columns. This is what they call “livening up.”
We can thus consider the entire population of the region the enemy, including the women, who serve as spies and, when necessary, soldiers and even as artillerymen, for we have killed many either in the ranks or at the pieces whose disguised sex was later discovered.
Until now we had attacked the enemy separately at several points. It was perhaps difficult to do otherwise with so little agreement and especially when we had to guard the entire banks of the Loire and the seacoast, which forms an extent of nearly eighty leagues. These attacks were very harmful to us and it is through them that we managed to arm our enemies and to increase their ranks with our deserters.
It would have required a neighboring force capable of preventing the enemy from penetrating into the interior and gaining the seacoast and an active force to attack it in its lairs and pursue it everywhere. This could not be done with divided forces, especially after having failed to inform the nation of the silent progress the enemy had made over the years.
The enemy armies aren’t organized like ours and are composed of battalions and regiments. When they are on campaign they receive no pay with the exception of food.
The only brigands who are paid are those who form the nucleus of the army. This nucleus is composed of French companies, German companies, and the cavalry.
The policy of the brigands is to treat well the so called “line” soldiers they take prisoner in order to get them to join their side. They even send them away with no difficulty when they don’t want to stay with them.
On the other hand they mistreat our volunteers. They execute several every week, particularly on holidays. They feed them poorly and hold them in Chatillon, Chollet and Mortagne under the guard of the inhabitants of the region, sometimes guarded only by women or the elderly.
The priests continue to dominate all these peasants and Monsignor the Bishop d'Agra from time to time gives them his holy paternal benediction.
All the brigands carry rosary beads, a reliquary, and a little heart of red or white material.
As soon as they have achieved a victory their priests have them kneel to thank the god of armies.
Before combats begin absolutions inundate the very Christian army.
At this time the enemy has raised several companies of hussars wearing the same uniform as those of the republic, with the exception of a small white cross sewed on the left side of their jacket and rosaries worn wound their neck.
From a distance these signs cannot be made out and they are sometimes confused with our hussars.
The Brigands’ uniform is a jacket of striped material with a green collar and striped trousers. The peasants do not wear this uniform.
Under their round hats the chiefs wear a white kerchief around their heads. Their attire resembles that of hunters. The subalterns wear colored kerchiefs around their heads.
The enemy has pillaged a considerable quantity of grains and forage, with which he has filled storehouses for the winter.
On the state of mind of the country and the neighboring departments
Everywhere the people are the same, that is, they love the revolution and desire liberty.
Everywhere the rich, the selfish, the tax farmers and the merchants are the same, i.e., they profit from the common misery to enrich themselves and make the people suffer.
Everywhere the priests, the former men of the bar are the same, that is, they miss the ancien régime and the abuses upon which their existence depended.
Everywhere the sans culotte people distrusts these people, and as long as they are supported by definite patriots they know how to defeat them.
For some time the public mood in the department of Deux Sevres and in Niort was perverted by the idle youth and those I just spoke of. These people sought to federalize this department. Two federalizing deputies and envoys from Bordeaux were well received there, but we foiled their infamous plot.
It is said that the public mood has improved in this department, but the administration is the same and deceitful administrations everywhere are the sworn enemies of the Republic one and indivisible.
The public mood in the Indre and Loire was good; it has become less good and this is the work of egoists, royalists, federalizers, and bad administrators.
That of the Maine and Loire is the same. This is principally the work of priests, for there are many of them, even in the administrations, where we should tolerate none, at least as a policy. The time has come when the Republic can no longer tolerate priests within it. The artisans of falsehood and deceit cannot exist in a republican state founded on the principles of eternal justice and truth.
The situation is nearly the same in the other departments. Nevertheless, liberty will triumph.
New requisitioned battalions are being organized for the Vendée, which will increase our forces. Some have already been formed and have joined with our army.
Such is the summary of our situation according to the observations I gathered during my five month mission in this country. I believe these observations are in conformity with those made by those men who did not disguise the truth.
The taking of Mortagne and Chollet have been announced. These were the last two lairs left the brigands, and they are destroyed. The Vendée will soon be no more, but the most serious measures must be taken to harass the enemy, who has no retreat left him but the woods. We must prevent him from being able to break out into the interior. I appeal here for the active surveillance of the republicans of the National Convention. This seed is at the point of being stifled. We must close our hearts to pity and set an example if we don’t want to see similar troubles reproduced elsewhere. Since in order to establish the republic a sacrifice must be made of a part of the republic, this sacrifice must be made without hesitating before any considerations, which could only be very dangerous.
In speaking of us it is necessary that an amazed Europe say: “Liberty is a great good since the French, to establish and defend it, smashed the throne, set aflame some of their most beautiful cities, sacrificed a portion of their brothers, and at the same time fought outside its borders against all the leagued powers.”
We have just destroyed the Vendée, freed our prisoners, taken back our cannons, and many subsistence goods. Vive la République!
MOMORO
National Commissioner
1. Originally and now again Fontenay-le-Roi – tr.