The Warsaw Commune: Betrayed by Stalin, Massacred by Hitler. Zygmunt Zaremba 1947
The Warsaw Commune was dominated by three major concerns. Firstly, during the final phase of the war, an armed action by Poland appeared possible and necessary; it was the logical result of five years of resistance and preparatory work. Secondly, the need to liberate the capital was no less real. On the one hand, it was necessary to make haste to create the embryo of an independent Polish state, and, on the other, it was necessary to protect the population, and above all the youth, from certain deportation to Germany, and to prevent the city from becoming a German fortress. Thirdly, another no less important concern consisted in discrediting a slanderous story spread worldwide about the supposed passivity of the Polish nation as regards the occupying power, a story that allowed people to believe that Poland could be carved up and reorganised after the war without consultation, and subjected to the USSR.
The entire nation understood that it was necessary for clandestine activity to culminate in an armed struggle. Popular pressure made it unavoidable, and the burning enthusiasm which appeared at the start of the uprising and even after all the sufferings endured was sufficient proof of this.
It was not out of political calculation that the nation maintained an honourable attitude during the occupation. It was not out of self-advertisement that all the organisations of the Resistance were calling for struggle against the Nazis. This slogan expressed the deep feelings of the Polish community. To betray it by not joining battle at the moment the Red Army arrived at the gates of Warsaw would have been unthinkable for any Pole. This would have both shaken the courage of the entire population, and demoralised them. The Warsaw Uprising was therefore a necessary and unavoidable act.
Judging as to whether the day and hour were well chosen is of no great importance. Doubts can even be entertained as to the preparations for the offensive, or the methods of the High Command. All this is not essential.
If the rebels succeeded in taking three-quarters of the city and holding on to them for 63 days under terrible fire, this means that the time chosen for the uprising was favourable. The battle that was joined had all the chances of success. And it would have succeeded if the USSR had not adopted the dishonourable tactic of passivity with regard to it. This tactic, as stubborn as it was deliberate, no one could have foreseen.
Obviously, in the course of 63 days of insurrection we sustained heavy losses; we did not for all that give in to the enemy. We proved that practically without weapons we could effectively do battle with the Germans. In the history of Poland and of the whole world the battle for Warsaw can testify to our love of freedom, and to our perseverance in a war that had been imposed upon us by the Germans.
The second aim of the uprising – the creation of a free and independent Polish state by our own efforts and sacrifice – was only partially attained, and only for a short period. We were only able to give substance to our ideal of a democratic republic over a very small territory and for a very short time. We did not succeed in holding on to and expanding this embryo of an independent Poland. However, we did show our aspirations for independence.
In the course of the Warsaw Commune, democracy was faithfully carried out. In spite of military operations, the press appeared without any censorship. Freedom of speech, thought and opinion ruled unchecked. All citizens enjoyed complete equality. The press reflected different trends of thought. Everyone had the right to distribute papers wheresoever he wished, including on the front line. Even the publications criticising the leaders of the uprising enjoyed complete freedom to do so. In this way – and it was one of the uprising’s tremendous successes – Poland’s true face was revealed.
Several political groupings took part in the struggle, in proportion to the influence that each exercised in the country. It can thereby be affirmed that the great majority of the population remained faithful to its legal government; and that it had been formed around the parties that had a political basis in the country. The groups or grouplets that claimed to be the opposition represented by the Lublin Committee had only minuscule influence. We may note that the strongest of these groupings, the Communist Party (Polish Workers Party, PPR) hardly managed to mobilise a few companies in its ‘Peoples’ Army’, and played a tiny part. Just to reveal this fact, which up till now has been hidden in the shadow of clandestinity, is of great political significance. It calls a halt to the Jesuitical propaganda that attempts to represent the pro-Bolshevik opposition as an influential political factor in Poland. [1]
We were not able to protect Warsaw and its population from the fate long prepared for them by the Germans. The capital suffered the same fate as Brest Litovsk and all the cities systematically levelled by the Nazis in their retreat from the east.
But we did not leave Warsaw like a flock of sheep; we did not give in to the enemy without standing up to them and attempting to resist aggression.
The third aim of the Commune was completely achieved; we had exposed the slanderers. In spite of the ruse of silence, and in spite of a powerful propaganda machine that attempted to discredit the nature of our struggle, the uprising testified to the vitality of the Polish people. It proved that nothing would break its will to regain complete independence. The Warsaw Commune symbolises the desire for it and for freedom, and constitutes a warning for the imperialists, who after this war, in the same way as the Hitlerites, once more set about their attempt to subject the smaller nations to the greater.
These insights no doubt cost us dear. A million inhabitants of Warsaw were condemned to a wandering life without hearth or home. However, this fate was not unique to the capital, but was shared by hundreds of towns and villages that had not sustained a struggle. History will judge if we have paid too dearly for our love of freedom and our hatred of barbarism.
Our generation must understand that it has accomplished immense sacrifices in the name of a great idea; it must ensure that these sacrifices are not diminished either by self-interested liars or by weaklings broken by misfortune.
1. The People’s Army mobilised around 2000 fighters during the uprising. About 500 were PPR members, and the remainder were drawn from other left-wing forces, most notably the Workers Party of Polish Socialists (whose political base was in Warsaw), whose militias had been incorporated in the Polish People’s Army, which merged with the People’s Army in July 1944. [Editor’s note]