The Warsaw Commune: Betrayed by Stalin, Massacred by Hitler. Zygmunt Zaremba 1947
In this tense and frightening atmosphere we received news from London that the USSR would agree to cooperate with the Allies in support of the Warsaw Uprising. Help would be provided solely in the form of parachute drops of weapons, medicine and supplies. On the other hand, the German centres in the capital would not be bombed, in spite of their great strategic importance. At almost the same time, the Soviet troops left their positions, and opened up hostilities against Praga. The news from London along with the sound of gunfire coming from the right bank of the Vistula caused morale to rise again, and inspired hearts with fresh hope in the approaching end of our isolation. Doesn’t the cooperation of all our Allies mean a turn in Russian policy towards the insurrection?
Help would not be long in coming! We must at all costs hold on for a few more days!
On 14 September the Russians occupied Praga. During the next three days they pushed the Germans several kilometres back towards the north-west. Soviet aircraft, flying over Warsaw, pursued the Stukas. The population breathed again. Russia thus eased the pressure on us by an otherwise minimal effort, for a few patrols of Russian fighters were enough to form an anti-aircraft defence. At the same time, telegrams coming daily from London confirmed that the arrival of a great airborne armada could be expected any minute. In fact, on 18 September, after a delay of a few days due to weather conditions, the Allied flotillas arrived, and parachuted hundreds of crates of weapons, supplies and medicines.
Unfortunately, falling from a great altitude, the parachutes opened in a defective manner, and did not all reach the rebels packed into the centre and on the edges of the Żoliborz, Czerniaków and Mokotów districts. [1] But the very effort of the Allies, 3000 kilometres away, stimulated our energy and our hope. If at this moment the German artillery had been bombed, and if the Red Army had coordinated its efforts with our formations and struck at certain enemy objectives, we would have pushed the Germans out of the city. There can be no doubt that this would have been the result of such a collaboration between the Allies and the USSR, the first evidence of which would have been the raids of the Soviet patrols and the arrival of the great armada.
The Warsaw command therefore studied the plan of operations that had to be conducted along with the Russian troops and transmitted it to Marshal Rokossovsky through the intermediary of the Soviet officers parachuted into Warsaw. [2]
Unfortunately, at the very moment that Allied aviation had brought real help, the Russian operations in Praga stopped suddenly in an incomprehensible manner. Soviet air patrols flew increasingly rarely over the city. On the other hand, the Stukas bombed us more and more intensely. Only the far-off noise of the Russian artillery and some parachute drops of some additional very small quantities of weapons and supplies bore witness to any ‘cooperation’. It was a symbolic cooperation that did not lead to any real results. Under the eyes of the Red Army that was in control of the eastern suburb, where it remained, arms ‘at the order’, Warsaw was once more the joint target of the German artillery and the Stukas.
The fate of Czerniaków became the touchstone of the effectiveness of Soviet aid. This district would have formed an important bridgehead for the Soviet troops. From there they could disembark as they pleased on the left bank of the Vistula. In fact, this bridgehead had been taken by a battalion of soldiers of the Berling formation. Their crossing proved that a division could have crossed in the same way. That would have been enough to take control of the whole of the river as well as opening up the way for the army. This was the hope that the population of the capital lived for at that time. But this landing, like all the rest, was only symbolic. The Berling battalion, however well armed, was nonetheless made up of almost untrained troops, a disadvantage during a battle such as that for Warsaw. The Germans, disquieted at the possibility of a Russian landing, engaged in a combined counter-attack on this position. A large part of the Home Army along with the majority of the Berling soldiers perished in a severe fight. But one item of assistance did materialise. While the Russian High Command could have put part of its troops on the Warsaw bank, it contented itself with sending along a group of Poles to whom it had assured no technical means of withdrawal. We cannot consider as assistance some fishing vessels it sent them, of which each could carry six people... The Red Army witnessed impassively the fall of Czerniaków, from which it was only separated by the River Vistula. Thus the last bridgehead in the Warsaw sector was destroyed...
The plans for military cooperation transmitted by General Monter [3] to Marshal Rokossovsky were not followed up. In the meantime, the Germans were preparing an attack against the Mokotów quarter, where a hurricane of artillery and aerial fire rained down. In spite of the heroic defence of our units, the district fell into enemy hands. As for the Russians, not one of their aircraft flew over the battlefield, and their artillery even cut down its activity.
Fifteen days had passed since the Soviet troops had entered Praga. We understood that their simple presence in the neighbourhood changed nothing in Warsaw’s situation, where every day that the siege went on added to the distress of the inhabitants, and lessened the chances of a final victory.
1. Żoliborz is a northern district of Warsaw, and was one of the more prosperous areas, with over 50 per cent of its inhabitants being white-collar workers. Czerniaków and Mokotów are southern districts, and over 50 per cent of their inhabitants were workers. [Editor’s note]
2. When the Soviet officer asked how the Poles envisaged the activity of the Red Army in Warsaw and our cooperation with it, General Monter sent the following telegram to Marshal Rokossovsky in the name of the High Command of the uprising: ‘Lack of information relating to forces and possibilities does not allow me to examine the operations between Modlin and the Pilica bank, but only those in Warsaw. The latter is surrounded on the west by German emplacements. It is necessary to form a bridgehead in the Warsaw sector. To this end it is necessary (a) to attack the northern sector (Henryków and Jabłonna via Isabelin); (b) the southern sector (Falenica-Otwock through the Kabacki forest)... At the time of the attack upon Warsaw we can assure the cooperation of our units from Żoliborz as well as in the south of the city centre and at Mokotów by a thrust towards the Vistula in the direction of your advance. Signed Monter, Brigadier General.’
3. Antoni Chruściel (1895-1960), pseudonym Monter, was a career officer in the Polish army. He taught tactics at the General Staff College in the interwar period, and was in the łódź Army Group in September 1939. He became the AK commander in Warsaw, and commanded the insurgent forces during the uprising. Taken prisoner upon the defeat of the uprising, he moved to London after his release in 1945. [Editor’s note]