July 10 — In one of his last speeches to the Russian Communist Party, Lenin described the problems of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the following words:
``Well, we have lived through a year, the state is in our hands; but has it operated the New Economic Policy in the way we wanted in this past year? No. But we refuse to admit that it did not operate in the way we wanted. How did it operate? The machine refused to obey the hand that guided it. It was like a car that was going not in the direction the driver desired, but in the direction someone else desired; as if it were being driven by some mysterious, lawless hand, God knows whose, perhaps of a profiteer, or of a private capitalist, or of both.'' (V.I. Lenin, Political Report of the Central Committee to the 11th Congress of the Russian Communist Party, March 27, 1922, Collected Works, Vol. 33, p. 279.)
There is all of Leninism in this remarkable quote. It illustrates the essence of Marxist methodology in relation to strategy and tactics. It is both critical and revolutionary, which is the essence of the Marxist approach.
Compare this to what is happening now in the USSR. Gorbachev's anti-socialist reforms have increased the economic and political problems by tenfold, maybe even a hundredfold. Yet Gorbachev, almost five years into his administration, throws the complete responsibility for the failure of his reforms on the Party, and carefully excludes himself from the process.
Lenin conceived of the NEP, which allowed the capitalist market to function in the USSR for a few years in the early 1920s, as a necessary strategic retreat. Eventually it had to be abandoned. The Gorbachev bourgeois reformist grouping, however, consider their oversized, gargantuan NEP as nothing less than a momentous, revolutionary development.
The hopes raised by it were fantastic; the enthusiasm it generated in the early months of his administration was overwhelming. But this soon began to wane as experience showed the masses that it was not a better, easier life they faced but a more difficult one.
It is not surprising, then, that at the 28th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) now winding up, the overwhelming majority of the delegates have shown they are opposed to the reforms (as virtually all the bourgeois press have admitted). But they have gotten themselves into a straitjacket. In the first place, they voted for the reforms at the 27th Congress. This is an embarrassment, of course, but one which took place more than four and a half years ago.
Let it be said in some defense of the delegates that at that time the reforms appeared to be mild. They were heavily disguised; the greatest emphasis was put on the scientific and technological aspects of Gorbachev's restructuring scheme. Overlooked completely, and perhaps not well understood by the mass of Communists themselves, were references to changes in the social relations. In Marxist terminology, of course, changes in social relations generally mean changes between the classes, between the bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the petit bourgeoisie. But this was not discussed.
Gorbachev and Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov opened a violent attack on so-called "levelers" in the working class movement. That should have been a signal as to where the burden of the reforms would fall. The Levelers in English history were early communists who fought against the rising bourgeoisie and the rich. They were accused of wanting to bring the rich down to the level of the peasantry and the yeomanry, the poor rural population. Actually, their program was understood by the peasants as the expropriation of the landlords.
But accusations against "levelers" in the USSR have always been directed against the workers who are opposed to the privileges of the bureaucracy, especially in the trade union movement. Their struggle is in reality not an attempt to level down higher-paid workers but to raise their own wage rates and cut down the privileges of the bureaucratic apparatus.
When Gorbachev first proposed his restructuring program, the delegates voted for it unanimously. If there was any dissent at that time, it was not revealed.
However, it didn't take long for Gorbachev and his grouping to start full speed ahead with efforts to break up the collective farms by introducing private property conceptions such as 25- and 50-year leaseholds, idealizing family-owned farms, and cutting down on the modernization of agriculture.
In industry, restructuring has meant unemployment. What was called ``greater autonomy'' for the enterprises introduced a form of bourgeois competition, which on the one hand produces the hoarding of vital commodities and on the other hand a superfluity of those goods which are socially unneeded.
The ills in the consumer field have become so enormous that the general population is losing patience altogether with the reforms and the government. Strikes have become frequent. Where workers like the miners have won concessions, the gains are mostly on paper. Their demands have really not been addressed, leaving the leadership a prey to "Solidarity"-type, "independent" trade unions.
This Party congress showed that while most of the delegates are opposed to the reforms as a setback for socialism, they nevertheless have no program of their own to counterpose to the anti-socialist measures. Some, still a minority, believe the process has gone too far, and simply don't know how or whether it is possible to return to the old status quo.
The majority, however, are fearful that an up-and-down opposition to the Gorbachev leadership would create a split and raise the specter of civil war. That's the crux of the matter.
At the same time, perestroika, like the NEP with its privateers and capitalists, is like a car that doesn't go in the direction the driver desires. In fact, it is in a ditch. The question the Party Congress faced was how to get out of it. To date, it has given no answer.
For that reason the progressives have been unable to call upon the mass of the workers and the peasants, who are opposed to the chaos, confusion, and virtual destruction of much of what they have gained in these many years of struggle.
The social composition of the Party must also be kept in mind. Progressive though it may be in its overwhelming majority, it is not the Party of the proletariat as it was in Lenin's time; it is merely a shadow of that. Nevertheless, it has enormous potential significance.
All over the imperialist world, Gorbachev has been portrayed as the peerless proponent of democratization. If he stands for anything, we are told again and again, it is glasnost, openness, and the encouragement of discussion and debate.
How can anyone in this day and age be opposed to that? Encouragement of debate and discussion, above all in the congress of the Communist Party, has been lacking ever since the Leninist period. Hence, a congress of the Party where real discussion takes place is something that should be welcome, and not throttled. One would expect that the general secretary of the Party would be most on guard to see that this is observed.
Here then is the paradox. At this congress, the delegates moved to question each of the leaders responsible for different areas, most of them cabinet members. They wanted a direct accounting from them on all the burning questions of the day. But Gorbachev throttled off the discussion.
The last congress took place in February 1986, more than four years ago. Gorbachev had become general secretary early in 1985. So a considerable period has elapsed, one that is rich in developments of a worldwide character, one that has had the deepest and most profound effects on the working classes and oppressed peoples everywhere, especially in Eastern Europe — the doorstep of the Soviet Union. The general secretary and all the leading members of the Politburo, who hold responsible positions in the government as well, should have given a full report.
The Communist Party is at least nominally the governing party. Not only should the leadership have reported on the operation of the government and the general situation in the country, but also room had to be left open for questioning of the reporters.
It is not only the right of the delegates, but their duty, to subject the principal reporters, including the general secretary, to searching questions — especially if one considers the crisis in the country and the decline in the world position of the USSR.
The congress delegates made a motion to interrogate the leading Politburo members who have held responsible positions in the government. Such leaders in the government as Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Medvedev, Ligachev, Abalkin, and others were submitted to questioning. And what happened?
It became plain — and this is reported in the press everywhere in the world — that at the moment when the questioning became too inconvenient for the general secretary, he ended the process with a brutal threat to split the congress if it was not halted.
The questioning by the progressive opposition (dubbed "conservatives" by the bourgeois press) had aroused the ire of Gorbachev, and especially of the so-called Democratic Platform grouping, which is outlandishly bourgeois and pro-imperialist, and should have no place in a communist, or even socialist, organization.
All the capitalist newspapers of July 8 and 9 reported this. And there is no denial from the Gorbachev leadership.
Since the days of 1848 when the first communist organizations were formed, just raising the question of a split in the party has constituted a threat. Whoever uses this provocative phraseology is in reality attempting to throw the onus on the other side, while at the same time threatening to split. The history of Bolshevism since 1903 is full of discussions of that character.
Anyone who, in the course of a discussion, says what Gorbachev said to the delegates to the congress ("If you continue this course of questioning you will bury the Party, you will split it") in reality is the one threatening to split.
This shouldn't come as a surprise, since on a number of occasions he has hinted to the capitalist press that he may leave the post of general secretary. Nevertheless, it's worth while examining the propriety of the general secretary of the Party attempting to cut off debate at such a crucial time in the history of the Party and of the country. This in itself is a spectacle.
After all, he and his leading Politburo members are what amounts in a bourgeois government to top leaders of the cabinet. They are duty-bound not only to make full reports but to be thoroughly examined by the congress delegates. That would be real socialist democracy! It would be refreshing were it to prevail at this very critical period in Soviet history.
So why did he cut it off? Why should the delegates not question the government?
This right to question the government has a long and ancient tradition. The bourgeoisie in its struggle against the royal power, after having won the concession of a parliament, then demanded that the parliament have the right to submit what were called "interrogatories," that is, written questions, to the king's ministers. And they were required to respond to them. That, you recall, happened several centuries ago.
So here we have the peerless leader of democratization virtually threatening to break up the congress unless they cease interrogating his ministers! Democratization, it seems, is most readily available when it is needed by the new bourgeois stratum in the Soviet Union, represented by the Democratic Platform, but it fades away when those who espouse the resumption of socialist construction want to exercise it.
What is forgotten by the congress leaders is that Gorbachev himself is afraid of leaving the Party, precisely because the bourgeois elements in the Congress of People's Deputies, which predominate in that body, will either make him a complete prisoner of their restorationist positions, or find a way to get rid of him. So under the present circumstances Gorbachev prefers to have a leg in each of the two camps: the camp of the Party and the camp of the Congress of People's Deputies. Such a situation may be tenable for a period of time. That depends not on parliamentary maneuvers, but upon the objective situation in the country — the course of the economy.
It is precisely this factor, the economic factor, which is becoming daily more acute. The economic situation is such that Gorbachev and his lieutenants are virtually begging the imperialist powers to help them economically and financially. It is no wonder, then, that not only the Federal Republic of (West) Germany, but all the imperialist countries (except the U.S.) are now willing to extend loans and credits, provided that the USSR permits the imperialist powers to have the kind of say in Soviet domestic affairs which they generally have in the oppressed, neo-colonialist countries. This becomes plainer every day.
There are many things that could be asked of the Party leadership. For example, what was the substance of Eduard Shevardnadze's conversations with Secretary of State James Baker at the latter's hideout in Wyoming? Were Cuba and Nicaragua discussed? Were Ethiopia and the DPRK topics? Did they discuss the swallowing up of the GDR by imperialist West Germany? The reduction of support for or abandonment of socialist allies, especially in the Third World? What did Baker demand? What in fact has the USSR got as a result of all the peace-loving conversations that have taken place over the years?
One might also ask questions of Leonid Abalkin, Gorbachev's close economic adviser whose constant promotion of all types of capitalist schemes has made him notorious. For instance, why was it necessary to invite to Moscow the chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of the U.S., Alan Greenspan, a far-right exponent of capitalist expansion and imperialist aggression? What was the real substance of these conversations? Did the meeting pertain to loans from the U.S., trade, or so-called aid? The bourgeois press is reporting frantic appeals for loans. Is that what the Greenspan visit was all about?
The questioning by so many delegates made it clear that the overwhelming majority of the progressives are now opposed to the Gorbachev program. What this means, and this has to be stressed, is that Gorbachev has lost his fundamental social and political support in the country. The Communist Party was his principal supporter, even though it is only a shadow of the workers' organization it once was. It nevertheless still retains that significance. The fact that he maneuvered to enlarge the Politburo by adding a representative from each of the 15 republics does not change the overall character of the struggle. It is merely a maneuver, an exercise in state craft. It does not invalidate that he has lost the class support of the only mass organization which at least nominally is for communism.
He has moved further into the camp of the Congress of People's Deputies, where the bourgeois elements predominate. His support there may turn out to be purely ephemeral. Ultimately, the whole situation will reduce itself to what has already been emerging for a considerable period: two class camps. It's a unique form of dual power. On the one hand is the bourgeois Soviet of People's Deputies; on the other the Communist Party, a shadow of its former self but nevertheless potentially an enormous factor depending on its internal evolution in the struggle.
It is very true that the dual form of power is only embryonic at this stage, but it is nevertheless significant. The bourgeoisie at the present time needs Gorbachev in order to hold the CP in line. The CP centrist leadership, on the other hand, is fearful of unleashing a principled attack against Gorbachev's anti-socialist and bourgeois restorationist reforms. It lacks the initiative and boldness to call upon the masses in the struggle against the bourgeois reforms.
The very fact that this congress, unlike the previous one, is opposed to the reforms is testimony to the resistance that is already evident in the mass movement of the working class. At this moment, it doesn't matter very much which leaders exercise influence over the mass organizations of the workers, such as the trade unions, the miners in particular, some of whom have been captured by the political apparatus of the bourgeois elements. It won't last. What the miners really want and badly need is not what the bourgeoisie will offer them. On the contrary.
But the CP leaders do not see the urgency of identifying with the workers' resistance and urging a struggle. They thus remain in a paralyzed position.
The Gorbachev reformers who control the economy are likewise unable to push through their reforms — the dismantling and vandalizing of socialist industry — because they too, even more so, are fearful of provoking a civil war. It's not for nothing that the specter of a military coup has been raised again and again. But as we have pointed out earlier, the Soviet military has no tradition of involving itself politically in a military coup. Many are strong supporters of the progressives at this congress. The imperialist press has had to grudgingly admit this. But at this point the situation remains somewhat of a stalemate.
Hence, the frantic appeals by the anti-socialist reformers to the imperialist bourgeoisie to help them.
The latter, on the other hand, while full of praise and flattery for Gorbachev and his colleagues, are nevertheless extremely cautious when it comes to direct, meaningful assistance to the economy. What Bush wants to do is send more and more personnel, technicians, who in fact will be CIA agents in disguise.
Gorbachev's move to expand the Politburo and add the Party leaders from each of the 15 major republics is a poorly veiled attempt to win back the confidence of the nationalities in Kazakhstan, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Central Asian Republics and elsewhere. In this he will not succeed. The hostility of the nationalities to Gorbachev will in no way be mitigated, since the problems of the nationalities cannot be solved merely by this threadbare maneuver. In form, these additions appear to be a move toward greater democracy. But in essence Gorbachev will retain the leadership through his Presidential Council of cabinet-level appointed administrators.
In his last letters on "autonomization," Lenin stressed not autonomy for the republics, which was Stalin's formulation, but to make each of the republics equal with the others within a socialist union, not just in form but in essence. The neglect of the underdeveloped republics, the gross economic inequality which still exists among them is what had to be addressed when Gorbachev took over. But he has done nothing about this. Rather, his anti-socialist policies have exacerbated the inequalities. This piddling concession of getting the Party heads of each of the republics on the Politburo is long, long overdue, since his Politburo until now has been composed almost entirely of Russians.
Gorbachev's re-election as general secretary does not signify the tremendous victory that the imperialist press claims. It merely demonstrates the paralysis of the congress delegates and their inability to deal adequately with the Gorbachev leadership. They were thoroughly unprepared to present a slate of their own leaders, including a candidate for general secretary.
If the voting for the leadership, as we understand it on the basis of present press reports, was based on the secret ballot, then this was a violation by the delegates of their responsibility toward their constituency. The membership is entitled to know who they supported, and why they didn't present their own slate, since the issues are of a programmatic and principled character, and not a matter of personal qualifications where a secret ballot might be appropriate.
Gorbachev's re-election may be important from the point of view of power politics, but it doesn't change the correlation of class forces; the classes are becoming more polarized. His re-election will prove to be no more than a sleight of hand of political craftsmanship which cannot and will not change the economic situation.
As the economic situation becomes more acute, the resistance from the working class is bound to break out into the open. And this time it will not be in defense of the bourgeois reforms, as it was in the earlier period, but against them and from the viewpoint and interests of the working class, the peasantry, and the progressive intelligentsia.
Last updated: 23 March 2018