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From Survey, International Socialism, No.46, February/March 1971, pp.8-11.
Transcribed & marked up by Einde O’Callaghan for ETOL.
IN SPAIN today, the continued existence of the Franco regime seems to be put seriously in question for the first time since the defeat of the Nazis in 1945. The unrest in the Basque country, the problem of Franco’s succession, the continued resilience of the illegal labour movement, Franco’s discarding of the Falange, and the failure of the Opus Dei technocrats, all contribute to a feeling of crisis and of impending change. The question arises: could the CP prognosis that the regime is on the brink of defeat now be correct?
Sceptics will point out that the CP has been saying this for as long as anyone can remember. Even with the labour movement crushed and the absence of any mass activity the CP pushed the line that the regime could soon be ousted. The workers would rally to the party’s call for a General Strike and the evolution to a democratic Spain could proceed.
But pointing to the wrongness of this prediction in the past does not necessarily contradict it now. In one superficial sense the regime does face a problem Franco is 78 and supposedly in bad health. His death or incapacity will probably determine the timing of changes in the structure of the regime. Using CP language, it could mean the ousting of the Franco clique.
But the problem of the succession to Franco is not crucial for the Spanish ruling class. To understand what the crucial problems are we must look at the history and economy of Spain.
After the defeat of the Republic in 1939 the new regime instituted a system of economic autarchy, necessary because Spain was isolated from Europe. Inefficient industries were protected by high tariffs and the working class was brutally supressed. The regime attained a stability based on fear, poverty and memories of the Civil War. Members of the only political party, the Falange, lived on the fat of cushy bureaucratic jobs.
In 1951 the pact with the USA made Spain part of the ‘Free World’ Alliance and broke her economic isolation. Almost simultaneously, the boom in tourism and remittances from Spanish workers abroad gave the economy a boost. Spain today presents features common to any industrialising country. There is a flight from the countryside either to the cities or abroad. Nearly two million people moved to the cities between 1951 and 1965. Migration to other European countries became significant after the economic crisis and Stabilisation Plan of 1959, reaching its peak in 1961 and 1962 (over 100,000 a year).
The logic of this development would be full integration into the Common Market. But the political mediation of these economic processes is not easy. Full entry into the EEC would mean adopting some of the features of party democracy. Specifically, the Spanish official state-run ‘trade unions’ or Sindicatos would have to be abolished or reformed. There would have to be much more freedom of speech and a relaxation of censorship. The question which has to be answered is whether the Spanish ruling class feels strong enough to move towards this liberalisation.
Franco’s ousting of the old bureaucrats of the Falange in favour of the technocrats of Opus Dei was certainly a kind of liberalisation in the economic sphere (although this has not been accompanied by any relaxation of the laws against freedom of speech and association). But the MATESA scandal where Opus Dei politicians were found embezzling millions of shipping off machinery to a disused warehouse to get export credits, has been a setback for this policy.
Similarly, the move to make a new trade union law has not got very far, despite the publicity given to preliminary plans. To make the Sindicatos even partly legitimate unions would mean a much higher degree of election for trade union posts and in the present situation the left would undoubtedly be able to win a majority of such elections. One of the drawbacks of a dictatorship is that it is unable to build up a stratum of labour bureaucrats who will act as a transmission belt between the bourgeoisie and the workers. So, the move towards a trade union system of the West European type is hesitant and could be reversed.
The real representative of the working class in most parts of Spain are the Workers Commissions (see IS 37). At factory level they are a coalition of various forces, predominantly CP and left catholics. At regional and national level the Commissions suffer from the CP’s predilection for creating bureaucratic superstructures irrespective of the existence or non-existence of a base.
Members of the Commissions have been contesting the elections for Enlaces Syndicales (roughly shop-steward) with great success in large factories. But when disputes arise the militants are fired, imprisoned, or simply deposed from their elected offices and replaced until the next election by stooges appointed by the officials of the Sindicatos.
A return to the policy of the early years of the Franco regime would be economic lunacy, which would benefit no one but the bureaucrats of the Falange. A complex modern economy would be stifled by their archaic fumblings. It seems certain that whether or not Opus Dei falls from grace the Falangists will not be the beneficiaries.
Economic logic seems to lead inevitably to further liberalisation. If politics is concentrated economics, the key question is how this necessary evolution will take place. But the difficulties are enormous. However archaic the Spanish reactionaries are, they have very large support in the bourgeoisie, sections of the petty bourgeoisie, and in the army.
The forces for liberalisation are less well organised. The main respectable opposition is best represented by the Christian Democrat Ruiz-Jimenez, backer of the journal Cuadernos Para El Dialogo, who maintains friendly relations with the CP. The dilemma of the Christian Democrats is that they have no organisation. Basically, they are a few intellectuals supported by a section of the bourgeoisie. Success for them would consist in accomplishing the delicate manoeuvre of enlisting the working class behind them, while not unleashing any movement which would put the question of socialism on the agenda.
Other forces are the social democrats (PSE) and their sympathisers such as Professor Tierno Galvan. It seemed in the past that the Americans were friendly to such forces – for example the formation of the ASO in 1962 grouping the PSE,CNT and ... CIA? But the present mood of American foreign policy would seem to put the PSE out of favour.
Santiago Carrillo, the General Secretary of the Spanish CP has repeatedly made it clear that socialism is not on the agenda. The CP wants a Pact for Liberty which would agree essentially on measures which would bring Spain into line with bourgeois democratic countries such as France and Britain, with the important addition that Spain would opt out of the cold war – American bases will be withdrawn. The Pacto Para La Libertad will, it is postulated, get overwhelming support from everyone, except the ‘Franco Clique’. The pact will be supported by the progressive capitalists and by the progressive elements in the Church, the army, and the professions. The pact will be implemented peacefully by the old syndicalist nostrum: the general strike.
Prospects for the evolution to a normal bourgeois democracy rest in large part on the attitude taken by the army. While the old bureaucrats of the Falange can to a certain extent be ignored, the army cannot. There is a reasonable fear that Franco’s demise will be followed by a Greek-style coup, resulting in a return to the ferocious repression of the early years of the regime. This may be against all economic rationality, but an army such as the Spanish one – large, well-equipped by the Americans, and with no role apart from keeping down domestic unrest – would be very well placed to carry out such a coup. Whether or not they will have the will to, remains something of a mystery. Various army officers have made very different statements ranging from liberal to ultra-repressive. For example, Generals Garcia Valino, ex-Governor of Morocco, and Diaz Alegris, Chief of General Staff, have complained about the army being used to try the ETA militants. But resentment at the army being used to do police work, is not necessarily combined with a liberal position. Ultra-right attitudes are still strong among top army officers, General Perez Vineta, Captain General of Catalonia, said recently:
‘The army is not prepared to allow a return to disorder and indiscipline which once endangered the nation. If necessary, we will start, a new crusade (Falange rhetoric for Civil War) to free our nation from men without God or law.’
The Communist Party and others point to the fact that today many army officers are drawn not from the upper classes but from ‘the people’ i.e. the petty bourgeoise. Besides, in contrast to the old officer caste, the technical demands of their job require that they be educated and therefore potentially open to progressive ideas.
It is true that the Spanish officer corps today is predominantly petty bourgeois. This is shown in the book El Militar de Carrera en Espana, written by J. Busquets, himself an army officer. Busquets’ book has convinced some observers, not only the CP, that the army could inaugurate, or at least assist in the development of a more liberal regime. Busquets himself, however, remarks that the social origin of most present-day Spanish officers has historically been the breeding ground for Fascism.
THE TRIAL of 16 activists of the Basque nationalist organisation ETA by a military tribunal in Burgos, highlights attention on a little-known aspect of the Spanish political scene. Why is there a Basque nationalist movement and what does ETA represent?
The Basque country, in north west Spain, is distinguished chiefly by its unique language, which, unlike Spanish and other European languages, is not derived from Latin. Up till the end of the Civil War, the Basques also had special traditional rights (Gueros) of self-government.
The Basques were historically conservative and intensely catholic – a country of small farmers, very different from the pattern of huge estates and landless labourers of southern Spain. An area hostile not merely to socialism, but to Liberalism.
This began to change in the late 19th century. Industry developed, mainly around Bilbao, based on iron, shipbuilding and engineering. Consequently, workers emigrated from other parts of Spain, and a labour movement developed. Bilbao was a stronghold of the Social Democrats (PSE). The anarchists, who had been so important in other parts of Spain, counted for little here. The PSE, based on immigrant workers, was uninterested in the national question.
The nationalist movement originated at the same time; in Marxist terms it represented the reaction of the Basque petty bourgeoisie to the threat of being swamped by the larger outside society.
The doctrine of the movement in the early days was specifically racist. Sabino Arana, its main theoritician, proposed laws for a future independent Basque Country (Euzkadi) and for the treatment of people of non-Basque race which provide a brilliant anticipation of Hitler’s Nuremberg laws.
When the strike activity of the UGT began in the Basque country, the Basque workers were congratulated for their loyalty to their employers, and urged to attack and drive out the socialistic, unchristian, and racially-inferior ‘foreigners’. The Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) founded their own trade union (Solidadidad Vasca) in opposition to the socialist UGT.
This position changed with the Civil War. The Republic granted autonomy to the Basque country and therefore met the main demands of the PNV. Franco’s rebellion, on the other hand, was against such federal solution to Spain’s national problem. So, the Basque Church and most Basque capitalists supported the Republic, unlike anywhere else in Spain.
The defeat of the Republic meant a ferocious repression of the Basque culture and language. No provision was made in the schools for the fact that village children could not speak Spanish. The lack of any local social base for Franco meant the area was treated like a captured province.
The Basque country has continued to develop industrially. Most of the Basque capitalists who supported the PNV have prospered and become adjusted to life under Franco. The PNV itself has stagnated comfortably in exile. Its inactivity led to discontent in its youth wing, which in. the late ’50s split to form the ETA.
ETA is distinguished from the PNV not for being more ‘left’ (although some of its members are declared ‘marxist-leninists’), but by being more militant.
Its series of arms raids, bank robberies, and now kidnapping, distinguish it sharply from the tired nostalgia of the PNV. ETA sees itself as being more radical socially too. They present the following ‘marxist’ analysis of the Basque situation:
Euzkadi is a colony. The ETA’s struggle is part of the struggle of the colonial peoples for national independence. The Basque struggle is therefore assimilated to the struggle of Cuba, Vietnam, and the Third World. Nationalist anti-imperialism is compatible with internationalism. An independent Euzkadi could have the same radicalising effect on Europe that Cuba has on Latin America.
ETA is not racist. There is no reason why immigrants from other parts of Spain should not adopt the Basque culture, language, etc. and become fully integrated Basques.
There are several objections to ETA’s theory:
1. The Basque country is not a colony in Lenin’s sense of the term. Far from being an impoverished provider of raw materials, the area is one of the most flourishing industrially. Basque capitalists are important outside the Basque country, as well as inside. Far from ‘Spanish’ goods finding a protected market in the Basque country, the reverse is the case. The standard of living in the Basque country is much higher than that of the rest of Spain.
In brief, while with a little ingenuity we could fit Andalucia into the Third World pattern, the attempt to do so for the Basque country is absurd.
2. ETA’s conception that immigrants can adopt the language and culture of the host country ceases to be correct where, as in the Basque country today, immigrants and their descendants constitute half the population, immigrants and their children, and native Basques in the towns, speak Spanish, not Basque.
3. The possibilities of a meaningful national independence are fewer for a developed European country than they are for Vietnam. The prospects for a Basque Cuba in the era of the Common Market are black. (ETA totally reject the PNV fetish of a special relationship with America).
The picture is confused by the contradiction between ETA’s Marxist language and its social base. The real core of the movement consists as before of the rural and small-town petty bourgeoisie. Hostility to immigrants continues to provide much of its basis. Immigrants are still called ‘coreanos’ (Koreans).
ETA expresses no hostility to the immigrants. To show its internationalist socialism it announced that the proceeds of a bank robbery done last summer would go to the strikers of Granada.
However, the reasons for the widespread support enjoyed by the ETA are mixed. In many cases they are reactionary and chauvinistic. At the same time, the lack of a mass basis for the Franco regime and the general repression mean that Basque nationalism is an expression of general hostility to the government.
A year ago it looked as if ETA, which has mass support but no mass organisation would not be able to survive the brutal police offensive against them.
Today, the reaction in Spain and abroad to the trial indicates the weakness of the regime. The wave of strikes, which are not confined to the Basque country, are an example of working class response to political events. If the working class moves into action, the ETA activists will be seen as the spark.
THE SPLIT in the Spanish CP has now assumed serious proportions. Last year’s split, led by Garcia and Gomez has now been joined by several more Central Committee members, including Enrique Lister who, apart from Dolores Ibarriuri – La Pasionaria – is the Party’s best known public figure.
The Lister group has produced its own version of the Party paper Mundo Obrero, proclaiming itself the authentic voice of the Party and condemning the. General Secretary, Santiago Carrillo, for betraying socialism because of his criticism of the Soviet Union over the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Lister accuses Carrillo among other things, of arranging the murder of Party militants and collaborating with the Spanish authorities. In return the September Central Committee meeting of the CP expelled Lister and his associates.
The CP’s cautious criticism of Russia is the basis of the split, not any desire for a more militant policy. The Lister group condemns Carrillo’s faint protests at Russia’s growing friendliness towards Franco. This is seen as an attempt to so discord between the Russian and Spanish people! The Spanish workers’ approval of the Russian line is shown by their attendance at the Moscow Circus recently appearing in Madrid!
The dilemma of the Spanish CP is that it felt forced to condemn the Russian invasion while at the same time professing its undying devotion to the Soviet Union. Its support for Dubcek has been more consistent, than, for example, that of the French CP. July’s Mundo Obrero had an article supporting ‘Comrade Dubcek’ and protesting against his expulsion from the Czech Party. At the same time, they failed to give publicity to any of the Czech positions.
The real interest of the Lister split lies in the Russian reaction. The Spanish CP relies to a large extent on the facilities, notably radio, provided by Eastern Europe. If the Russian leaders are serious about splitting the Party, they have considerable material resources to put at the disposal of a ‘pure’ Stalinist splinter group. They can also take police action against the Carrillistas in Eastern Europe.
Both groups are now trying to establish international support. Lister compares Carrillo’s treachery on Czechoslovakia with the ‘correct’ line of the French CP, while Carrillo publicises his fraternal talks with the Rumanian CP and his Party’s participation in a forthcoming meeting of the CP’s of European capitalist countries in London next January.
It appears that the pro-Moscow split consists essentially of strong contingents in the exile communities of E. Europe, perhaps a few hundred among exiles in W. Europe, and in Spain itself – practically nothing.
The Carrillas Party have published messages of support from Party organisation in Spain, many of them unanimous. Basically, it seems that Carrillo has not only defied the Russians but got away with it. Radio Espania Independente has had to move from Czechoslovakia to Rumania, but there are as yet no reports of persecution of Spanish Communists living in Russia. A meeting of Spanish Communists resident in the USSR held in Moscow on 7 October supported Carrillo’s stand. (Incidentally, this meeting, perhaps unimportant in itself, must be the first open meeting in forty years to voice any criticism of the Russian bureaucracy.)
Carrillo’s recent statements show an attempt to get international support for his position. His speeches in recent tours of W. European countries stress the need for a collective theoretical study by the European CPs capitalist countries. There is also a notable softening in relation to China (see Mundo Obrero, 14 November). At the same time, Mundo Obrero is full of the customary drooling references, to the Russian space programme.
Carrillo has had some success in his international efforts. The Rumanians and North Koreans have sent fraternal messages, while the Italians have explicitly condemned the pro-Moscow split.
It would be ironic if the Spanish CP – historically one of the most subservient to Moscow, built up with the help of the NKVD – should be the first to break fully with Moscow.
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