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From International Socialism, No.44, July/August 1970, pp.6-7.
Transcribed & marked up by Einde O’Callaghan for ETOL.
There could hardly be a more striking comparison than between the present situation in Britain’s two big general unions. The Transport and General has recently celebrated the 1½ million membership mark and is clearly aiming by means of recruitment and amalgamation to become the dominant union in a whole range of industries outside of its traditional strongholds of transport and docks. At the same time the General and Municipal Workers Union seems to be heading for decline and disintegration. At present it is trying to salvage the remnants of its once dominant position at Pilkington’s. In the past year it has lost substantial groups of members in the motor industry, particularly at Ford’s Halewood, and among dustmen and other local government workers.
That these two unions, with very similar origins and until the last decade very similar and reactionary industrial records, should now look as different as chalk from cheese, is strange. The answer seems to lie in the abilities of the union hierarchy to respond to the changed situation of the last few years in which the lower-paid manual and white-collar workers have developed a new-found militancy. In the past the structure and size of these unions enabled right-wing leaders such as Matthews and Bevin to keep a tight rein on the militant sections of the membership. Whenever a group of workers attempted to challenge the leadership over its failures to support them then there were always other sections of the union, not involved and not really informed of the issues, who could be drawn in to give passive support to the leadership. For instance, despite their fight and determination during the Coronation strike of 1937 and in the years immediately before and after the war, the London busmen were never able to threaten seriously the Bevinite leadership of the T&GWU or to resist the victimisation of leading militants in the union.
Today with the awakening of these previously passive sections of membership the ‘big boot’ policy of stamping on militancy and of co-operating with the employers to discipline ‘troublemakers’, has ceased to be productive. The G&MWU has in post-war years pursued these policies further than others. The union is fast becoming the dinosaur of industry, unable to respond to the demands that low-paid militancy, with its officers are so steeped in the traditions and methods of yellow unionism and its democratic processes so atrophied or corrupted as to be incapable of reform. At Pilkington’s the G&MWU officials despite at least seeming to realise the damage being done to their own position by the alienation of the members, could not resist attacking these same men and the ‘irresponsibility’ of the rank and file committee. Whether the G&MWU has any future as an out-and-out scab union is very debatable. Although in recent years a number of employers unable to maintain an outright anti-union stance have tried to give the G&MWU a closed shop in order to keep out more militant unions, these tactics are likely in the long term to lead to even more bitter strife from which neither the employers nor the G&MWU will gain.
The T&GWU has been able to adapt to present conditions in industry mainly because of the lucky coincidence of two factors. The switch from traditional ‘corridors of power’ style leadership of the Bevin/Deakin period to the aggressive left social democratic style of Cousins and his successor Jones was, of course, largely the luck of stepping into (prematurely) dead men’s shoes. The crucial point is, however, that this change-over coincided with growing awareness of the members demanding something more from their union than they had been used to. This enabled the new leadership to consolidate around the present ideology of wage militancy allied to demands for worker participation both in industry and in the union itself. That the facts of life have not so far lived up to the ideology is not at present crucial. It has to be pointed out, however, that Cousin’s members did no better during the wage freeze than did Carron’s. Despite the talk of decisions being taken on the shop floor it is often the union officers themselves who frustrate the demand that the ‘it be taken back to the members’. And of course we have yet to hear of a proposal from Jack Jones that his own period of office should be less than for ‘life’.
The great driving force behind the T&GWU policies is the fight for members. The whole existence of the professional trade union official (and without elections this is clearly the right term for T&GWU officers) depends on the maintenance of existing membership in the face of high turn-over and on the winning of additional members. The growth of trade unionism is of course excellent. The problem is that for the T&GWU this seems to become almost an end in itself and a determining factor in making policy. Thus many members in traditionally organised T&GWU industries with long-standing membership such as dockers and busmen feel that they get neglected in favour of other sectors where big membership gains are possible. This largely explains the commitment of the T&GWU to productivity deals. While to champion the cause of wage-freeze would destroy the union’s credibility as far as lower paid workers are concerned, the promotion of productivity dealing can in fact be used as an added attraction for recruitment. Everyone knows what wage freeze means but few appreciate the long-term effects of productivity measures even in a period of growing unemployment until they have personally experienced them. Although the union is at present trying to make it clear that it opposes elements in productivity deals that lead to a worsening of conditions there is no doubt that its general commitment to productivity as an answer to wage freeze has led many sections of its members along this road. And the productivity road is a dead-end for any real trade unionist.
That the T&GWU is uneasy about the present trends is indicated by a new union guide to productivity and plant bargaining. Discussing this guide the Record (April 1970) has this to say. ‘The union could not tolerate a situation whereby small elite wins big money through high productivity whilst the majority suffer growing unemployment’. The same issue of the Record however reports a speech of Jack Jones to BLMC shop stewards as follows: ‘He made it clear that the unions want to see British Leyland succeed. “We want it to be a model of industrial peace, efficiency – and good wages and conditions”.’ How many did British Leyland sack in 1967?
This is of course the basic contradiction of the left trade union ideology. It is committed on the one hand to a high wage, high efficiency economy which will make Britain competitive in world markets but at the same time stands out against the intensification of work and other steps which this same world market dictates to British employers. What we will in fact experience is that while our co-operation in productivity measures may in part achieve the ‘high efficiency’ economy, the corresponding high wages that the theory promises will be deliberately denied us through price inflation. This traditional dilemma of social democracy is of course not so acute for the left officials as for the Labour Government. Jones and Scanlon can ride both horses, high wages and a competitive economy, because it is not they but Harold Wilson who has to put it into practice (or not as the case may be) in the face of the gnomes of Zurich.
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