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The debate over international questions between supporters of the NC majority and those who agree with the countertheses presented by Nat Weinstein has polarized in a way that is not satisfactory. Both sides have fallen into logical error in their arguments, though the mistake of the NC minority is much more dangerous than that of the majority.
To begin, let's discuss the question of the Nicaraguan revolution, since I believe that with a correct understanding of that process the developments in El Salvador will clarify themselves, and giant strides will be taken in resolving the dispute over the character of the Castro leadership in Cuba.
Supporters of the majority have declared that the FSLN is a consciously revolutionary Marxist current which has consistently carried out a correct program to mobilize the Nicaraguan workers and peasants and lead the revolution forward. Supporters of Weinstein have countered that it is untrue that the FSLN has a revolutionary Marxist program, and that it (or at least a significant portion of its program and policies) stands as an obstacle to the revolutionary process.
In the course of the discussion it becomes clear that for the majority, the revolutionary Marxist character of the FSLN is derived from its correct practical policies since coming to power (and to a lesser extent from its successes in the insurrectionary process itself). The minority, on the other hand, starts from the incomplete theoretical understanding of the FSLN. This leads them to the conclusion that it is, at least to some extent, sidetracking the revolutionary potential of the masses.
Both sides, however, leave out of consideration what is perhaps the central lesson our movement has learned over the last three decades—that a revolutionary insurrection can be successful and a workers' state established, given certain favorable conditions, under a leadership which is less than revolutionary Marxist. I would submit that what is occurring in Nicaragua is simply another example of a “long detour” revolution, where exceptionally propitious circumstances have permitted a victory to take place under a leadership which, although adequate to the particular situation, has only a partial understanding of Marxist theory.
Let's review the circumstances which allowed this development: 1) the complete and utter collapse of the Somoza regime; 2) the total inability of other bourgeois forces to pose a viable alternative; 3) the inability of imperialism to intervene in a decisive way; and 4) the overwhelming spontaneous mobilization of the masses which created the conditions for the victory of the guerrilla army. It was these objective circumstances, and not any revolutionary Marxist understanding of insurrectionary strategy by the FSLN, which led to the creation of a workers' and farmers' government.
The NC minority misses the essential fact that the FSLN has proven adequate (perhaps even more than simply adequate) for the particular conditions in Nicaragua. Adopting the minority's position on this question would mean putting ourselves in opposition to the revolutionary process taking place in that country. The arguments of Nat Weinstein, and other comrades who support his document, substitute formal considerations (and incorrect formal considerations at that) for an assessment of the real relationship of class forces in Nicaragua, an understanding of the direction in which events are leading, and an evaluation of the role of the FSLN in creating and continuing this process. But the argument for the majority position, though fundamentally correct in its analysis of events in Nicaragua, carries logic a step too far in asserting that therefore the FSLN leadership must have a correct and rounded Marxist theoretical framework.
I will spend my time in this article primarily on the error of the majority, even though I believe it to be of a lesser order than that of the minority. This is simply because there have been many contributions to the discussion bulletin so far which have done a generally excellent job of expanding the serious mistakes in the approach of Nat Weinstein.
I am writing as a supporter of the general line of the draft political resolution, which I plan to vote for, but one who believes it to be seriously flawed by its incorrect assessment of the Castroists, Sandinistas, and New Jewel Movement. Indeed, the correction of this aspect of the majority comrades' analysis is essential, in my opinion, to winning over those who may mistakenly reject the resolution and support Nat Weinstein's positions, merely because he makes some correct criticisms in this area.
Decisive for the success of the Nicaraguan revolution was the ability of the FSLN to grasp the opportunity presented by the masses, break with its programmatic support for a coalition dominated by the bourgeoisie, and consolidate power in its hands. That they were able to do this is to their immense credit. But is this really different in any qualitative way from what the Castro leadership accomplished in Cuba in 1959? Under similarly favorable conditions as those occurring in Nicaragua (indeed even under less favorable ones) even Stalinist leaderships have established workers' and farmers' governments which led to workers' states.
On the question of its course since taking power, we must again ask has the FSLN gone significantly beyond what was accomplished in Cuba in the days long before anyone considered Castro to be a revolutionary Marxist? And again the answer can only be no. This, of course, is not to deny conjunctural differences, or the ability of the FSLN to learn from and build on the experiences of Cuba. But if we can make the statement that the FSLN is essentially following a revolutionary course, relying on and mobilizing the workers and peasants against the bourgeoisie, is this any different from what we said about the Castroist leadership in Cuba in the early '60s? (I am inclined here, for the benefit of the minority, to add another “of course,” to the effect that the FSLN has made mistakes. But mistakes in the context of a generally correct line are qualitatively different from an incorrect line which stands as an obstacle to the struggle.)
A characterization of the FSLN and the Castro leadership as revolutionary Marxist implies a great deal more than a simple recognition of their capacities in the context of the Nicaraguan and Cuban revolutions, or even of their willingness to promote the extension of the revolution. Comrades should consider the biggest single problem facing the international working class movement today—the building of revolutionary parties in the imperialist centers capable of leading the working class to power. Do the Castroists or the FSLN have an understanding of this question? Can we really characterize someone as a revolutionary Marxist in 1981 who does not? As much as comrades may talk about the construction of socialism as a more difficult task, and a greater test, than coming to power (a correct point as far as it goes), the fact remains that the problem of achieving proletarian governmental power in the imperialist centers remains the problem of problems for all revolutionists.
The Nicaraguan and Grenadian revolutions have emboldened militant fighters the world over, inspired the masses, and contributed to the shift in the relationship of class forces against imperialism. In this sense, and because of the intrinsic importance of new revolutionary currents like the FSLN and New Jewel Movement, it is correct to say that these victories have contributed significantly to the resolution of the international crisis of proletarian leadership.
But can we say that they have contributed to this in a consistent theoretical sense? Do either of these victories provide a sufficient model for those who wish to learn how to make a revolution? I would hope we can all agree that whatever conclusions Fidel and the FSLN have drawn as a result of the rise of working class struggles in Latin America and the role of the proletariat in the Nicaraguan revolution, their understanding remains limited. I don't think it would be unfair to say that in El Salvador today, while the movement of the working masses is given significant weight by the FMLN, it is still treated as an adjunct to the guerrilla war, rather than the other way around.
The Grenadian revolution was a particularly unique coincidence of favorable circumstances. The experience of Nicaragua is not likely to be repeated outside of a small group of countries in its immediate geographic vicinity which face strikingly similar social conditions. Even here, victories are by no means assured. The strategic approach being followed by revolutionists in these countries still seems to leave a significant gap to be bridged to reach a genuinely Leninist conception.
There are many other questions besides those of party building on which we have major differences with the Castroist current (I will deal here specifically with Castroism, since the FSLN and NJM have not had time to define their attitudes on a broad spectrum of issues): the need for political revolution in the deformed and degenerated workers' states; the connected problem of an analysis of Stalinism; the role of the colonial bourgeoisie in the anti-imperialist struggle; the need for an international revolutionary organization; the importance of real institutionalized forms of workers' democracy; the need for Leninist democratic functioning within the revolutionary party. These are not small passing disagreements. They reach to the very heart of the whole programmatic basis for our historical tendency. They are of a qualitatively different order from any disagreements we may have with other sections or sympathizing groups of the Fourth International.
I personally have no difficulty with a characterization of Castroism, the Sandinistas, and the New Jewel Movement as currents “worthy of the name” revolutionary; nor do I see anything wrong with the statement that they are on a trajectory toward revolutionary Marxism. But it is a significant error for a dialectician to identify a stage in a process with its completion. (If a tadpole which had begun to grow legs is, on that account, identified as a frog before its lungs have developed to the point where it can breathe air, the results can be fatal.)
The unfolding of the international class struggle will force the Castroists, and many others, to grapple with and expand their theoretical foundation. Certainly there is every hope that they will prove capable of understanding new developments in the class struggle as they arise. But we must also recognize that on this road their theoretical weaknesses have the potential of contributing to serious defeats and setbacks as well. It does not seem unlikely, for example, that Castroism will present an obstacle to the attempts of the Polish workers to overthrow the bureaucracy.
It is obvious that the Castroists, and the similar leaderships in Nicaragua and Grenada, are immensely capable, important forces for our Trotskyist current to reach out to, work with, and try to influence. And it is absolutely correct for comrades to view these leaderships as a potential part of a regroupment of revolutionary forces on an international scale. Like Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Trotsky, we must be constantly on the alert for anyone and everyone moving in the right direction, and we must take every possible initiative to reach out to them, or risk being bypassed by historical developments. We cannot encumber ourselves with any organizational fetishes or purely formal considerations.
But also like Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Trotsky, we must be armed with an accurate understanding of the forces we are approaching, what their strengths are, and what their weaknesses are. We cannot under any circumstances minimize essential differences or excuse mistakes. (Please note, there is a big difference between explaining the material and historical basis for mistakes—which we should do—and trying to find excuses for them or explain them away—which we should not do.) Even worse is pretending that errors simply do not exist or that we do not see them. If we are to follow the method of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Trotsky, we must draw out and sharpen the primary political questions as a means to winning those forces we want to unite with to a complete and consistent revolutionary program.
In this connection, some comrades have begun to develop an incomplete, and in that sense incorrect, line of thought on the character of the international movement we are trying to build. It is not our goal to build a heterogeneous international, but rather a mass homogeneous one. We recognize, however, that the historical process makes it extremely likely that the development of this will be an uneven process. Groupings will arise in the course of the class struggle and move in our direction. We may well be able to find sufficient programmatic basis for common organization with them before achieving a rounded theoretical agreement.
A mass heterogeneous international, composed of Trotskyist and non-Trotskyist forces, would be only a particular stage of development, a step toward our strategic goal of a mass homogeneous international. (Though of course since this is a stage we will in all likelihood have to pass through, it is correct to see the creation of such an organization as a goal if it is understood in this tactical sense.)
It is important that we not develop any idealizations of the early days of the Third International as some finished product. The goal of Lenin and Trotsky was to transform this raw material into a cohesive Marxist party on a world scale.
We should be clear here that what is in dispute is not simply, or even primarily, a question of terminology. If comrades wanted to call Castroism “revolutionary Marxism” but at the same time demonstrated an adequate assessment of its strengths and weaknesses, then I think we would have a simple case of poor formulation, and not a serious problem. Likewise, if comrades refrained from such a characterization, but continued to act and write as if we believed we had no serious (even decisive) differences with Castroism, then the dangers would be just as great.
In fact, I personally began to feel that there was something wrong with comrades' assessment on this question before they began to adopt the “revolutionary Marxist” terminology—at the time of the Non-Aligned conference in Havana, shortly after our last convention. The Militant ran a long piece about this which presented an extremely one-sided analysis. Of course, this in and of itself, though irritating, was not decisive. Perhaps it simply represented an even more extreme than usual application of the accentuate-the-positive-by-virtually-excluding-all-else school of journalism which comrades seem to have adopted lately on many questions. (This is a subject for a different discussion.)
But other events indicated that there was more involved. The Brooklyn branch scheduled an educational on the subject which presented an identical analysis as the Militant article. Comrades began to assert that what Castro was doing with the Non-Aligned movement was the same as what the Bolsheviks did at the 1920 Baku Conference of the Peoples of the East—an assertion which could only have been made by comrades who had not bothered to read even the first few pages of the book about the Baku conference. Had they done so they would have discovered that it was a conference of revolutionary fighters and activists; qualitatively different from a conference of governments.
Everything that the SWP leadership has said or written in the last two years about the Non-Aligned movement, both internally and for public consumption, has presented a Castroist analysis, not a Trotskyist one. To be sure, the Cubans are completely correct to participate, on a governmental level, in any development such as the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, and try to push it as far as they can in an anti-imperialist direction. Unfortunately, comrades' explanation of developments stops there. The fact is, however, that Castro does not stop there. He goes beyond the level of governmental maneuvering and attempts to use this formation as a surrogate for an international revolutionary movement. In the process he gives political support to bourgeois regimes which are willing to ally themselves diplomatically with Havana. By failing to discuss this whole side of the question and limiting their comments to praise for Castro's “revolutionary Marxist” orientation to the Non-Aligned movement, comrades do a serious disservice.
It has even reached the point where a distinctly Castroist, and un-Marxist, train of thought on this question has crept into our draft political resolution. Comrades should note the sentence on page 8 in Section 6 which reads “[The Cuban revolutionists] lead the uncompromising anti-imperialist wing in the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.”
What can possibly be meant by this phrase—“uncompromising anti-imperialist wing”? One must assume that it means more than Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada. The bloc, led by Castro, which voted for a number of anti-imperialist positions at the Non-Aligned conference was composed primarily of neocolonial bourgeois governments. A characterization of such regimes as “uncompromisingly anti-imperialist” is a remarkable thing to find in a document of the SWP. Of course, they are quite capable of taking verbally anti-imperialist positions, and they are also capable of participating in, and even on occasion leading, a genuinely anti-imperialist action. But uncompromising anti-imperialism is something which is the historical province of the proletariat. I feel embarrassed to have to mention this elementary point in an SWP discussion bulletin.
Perhaps someone, through a remarkable convolution of language and logic, will be able to defend this formulation as consistent with Trotskyist theory, though how that might be done is beyond me. Even so, comrades must admit that the average person will understand these words at face value. They will conclude that the SWP is expressing political confidence in the anti-imperialist stance of radical bourgeois regimes which bloc with Castro in the Non-Aligned movement.
The SWP leadership has, in the last two years, catered to Castro's illusions in such neocolonial bourgeois regimes and their anti-imperialist capacities. Our own analysis has been put in the closet. One can only conclude that the party leadership is embarrassed by it. In the course of this, the readers of our press have been miseducated, and illusions about Castroism have begun to sprout in the ranks of our own organization.
This last point is, perhaps, the most serious of all. The oral discussion in the Brooklyn branch convinced me that comrades are developing serious idealizations of Castroism on a whole range of questions. These include the degree of its understanding about workers' democracy (the “People's Power” development remains extremely limited and uneven); its understanding of Stalinism (Castro is not making a “diplomatic concession” when he asserts that Brezhnev is his comrade and fellow Marxist—he is being sincere); Poland (this is not simply some isolated mistake, but part of a consistent policy and pattern of theoretical error on the question of political revolution); as well as other points.
Whatever perspectives we develop for united action with non-Trotskyist forces—and especially if comrades take seriously their own talk about possible common organization—the primary requisite is that we proceed with an absolutely clear programmatic understanding, and without any false assessments or illusions. The current course of the party leadership is seriously counterproductive on this score.
I expect that not a few comrades will accuse me of sectarianism as a result of these remarks. But I can only reply that such an accusation is on the same order as the charges of sectarianism frequently made against the Marxist movement as a whole by those who are completely ignorant of its goals and methods. An insistence on accuracy of formulation and clarity of political program has nothing in common with sectarianism. It is an essential aspect of revolutionary Marxism.
As I indicated earlier, if faced with the necessity of simply choosing between the majority and minority positions on these questions, I would vote unhesitatingly for the majority. But, fortunately, the amendments to the draft political resolution proposed by George Breitman (in Discussion Bulletin No. 12) present an opportunity to make the needed distinctions. I would urge comrades to vote for their general line, as well as for that of the majority resolution.
Such a vote is the only way to reaffirm the analysis of Cuba adopted at our 1979 convention. It will register a position for the continuation of our general approach to the Nicaraguan and Grenadian revolutions; for a vigorous defense of and support to the revolutionary struggle of the Salvadoran workers and peasants; for an active attempt to work and discuss with any and every current capable of engaging in revolutionary action; and for the general line of the draft political resolution as it relates to American politics and our work in the unions. At the same time, such a vote is against the unscientific characterization of the Castroists and similar forces as “revolutionary Marxist”; against the subordination of the Trotskyist program in order to achieve a hoped-for regroupment of revolutionary forces; and against any effort, or even any hint of any effort, to downgrade the importance for our party of the Fourth International, which represents the historic continuity and modern expression of revolutionary Marxism.
I would make a special appeal to comrades who may be mistakenly attracted to the minority's position because they see the one-sidedness and dangers in the majority leadership's overadaptation to Castroism. There are many good things about the NC majority's present approach to the Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Grenadian leaderships. What they are trying to do is one hundred times more correct, though they are going about it in a wrong way. The positions propounded by Nat Weinstein do move dangerously away from our historical traditions and goals in a sectarian direction. I suggest that voting for the amendments submitted by Comrade Breitman is the way to reverse the wrong positions which have been taken by the party leadership. It should be kept in mind that a vote for the minority, and against the majority, would also be an endorsement of the mistakes Weinstein makes on questions like our union work, the labor party, etc. Such a vote would not be correct for any comrade unless one agrees with him on these points.
July 6, 1981
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