Meanwhile, in pursuit of further reforms, the second State Council, whose life had been prolonged because of the war, adopted a reforms resolution moved by Mr. S. W. R. D. Bandaranayake, calling for transfer of still greater measure of freedom. In retrospect, it is interesting to note that this resolution called for the replacement of English as a State language by both Sinhalese and Tamil.
The British, however, appointed the Soulbury Commission to inquire into the demands for more reform. D. S. Senanayake officially boycotted the commission, but gave the Commissioners his views in private. The recommendations made by the Soulbury Commission must be viewed in the context of the changed conditions that had come into existence at the end of the second world war, which had so radically changed the history of the world. The defeat of German, Italian and Japanese fascism, and the emergence of the socialist Soviet Union as a great power, had given tremendous encouragement to the national liberation movements in Asia. British imperialism realised that it could no longer continue to rule its colonies in the old way. It decided to arrive at a compromise with the native bourgeoisie in its colonies who had also begun to be alarmed that, if the national liberation movements were to be allowed to develop in too revolutionary a way, it, too, would be swept away along with imperialism. Thus was laid the basis for a compromise between imperialism and the native bourgeoisie for the joint exploitation of the people, with the native bourgeoisie functioning as junior partners of imperialism. British imperialism agreed to transfer the semblance of power in return for the guarantee of its economic investments in the colonies.
The same old colonial exploitation, with slight modifications, continued. In some cases, it was even strengthened. But, now, the imperialists remained in the background. They took the back seat; while the native bourgeoisie was given the front driving seat. The puppets that danced on the local stage were natives, but the invisible strings that manipulated the puppets were pulled from Whitehall or Washington. This is the method that U.S. Imperialism had already perfected in its dealings with the Latin American countries. The latter were nominally independent countries, and were even members of the UNO. But they were all under the firm control of the almighty dollar and obeyed its dictates. This is the classical form of economic domination, which came to be known as neocolonialism. This is the sham commodity that was passed of as independence in 1948 to countries like India, Burma and Ceylon. In 1948, Ceylon passed from colonial to neo-colonial rule.
In order to work the parliamentary system of government granted by the Soulbury Constitution, D. S. Senanayake united all the bourgeois parties–the National Congress, the Sinhala Maha Sabha, the Muslim League (all except the Tamil Congress) – to form a new party, the United National Party, under his leadership, in 1947. The subsequent political history of Ceylon can be likened to a game of musical chairs between the Senanayake and the Bandaranayake families. During the first nine years, from 1947 to 1956, the country was governed by the Senanayake clan (father, son and nephew). For the next nine years, from 1956 to 1965, it was the turn of the Bandaranayake family (husband and wife). From 1965 to 1970, for another five years, the Senanayakes (son) were in the saddle. In 1970, the pendulum had swung back to the Bandaranayakes (wife).
It is not suggested that there was no difference between the Senanayakes and the Bandaranayakes or between the UNP and the SLFP. There was a difference, but it was not fundamental enough to make a difference in the solution of the basic problems of the people. The same fundamental problems remain unsolved, and further aggravated after 23 years of bourgeois parliamentary rule by the Senanayakes and the Bandaranayakes. The same remedies, couched in different words, had been tried by both sides, with the same lack of success, while the lot of the common man has continued to deteriorate.
The UNP represents the comprador bourgeoisie, which is pro-imperialist, pro-western and anti-national. Its leaders imitated the West in language, dress, habits and culture. They stood for the continued imperialist domination of our economy. The SLFP represented Ceylon’s bourgeoisie, which developed in Ceylon as a separate class during the first decade after the second world war, due to the accumulation of capital in Ceylonese hands as a result of business undertaken during and after the war. The national bourgeoisie desired to replace imperialism and develop national capitalism. To that extent, it had a progressive outlook. But, as a class, it, too, was bourgeois and exhibited all the inhibitions that flow from its class character. This is the third time that the national bourgeoisie has tasted power, and the inevitable development has taken place within its ranks. Sections of them have graduated to the status of comprador bourgeoisie, which is no longer to be found exclusively inside the ranks of the UNP. Beside this, there has also grown another group of capitalists as a result of the multiplication of the State Corporations –a class of capitalists, who have become capitalistic without their own capital. These are the new State Corporation bosses, who have made good on their fat salaries, on corruption and graft, by selling trade licences, earning commissions, etc. They all support the government in power, because on that depends their very existence. For this reason, it is completely unscientific to call the SLFP a socialist party in the sense that it stands for the abolition of capitalism. Although both sides keep talking of socialism in order to fool the people, there is a common measure of agreement between the UNP and the SLFP (and now the United Front) about the continuation of the capitalist system. Without such a common understanding on fundamental matters, it is impossible to work the bourgeois parliamentary system.
With this general understanding, let us pause to take a closer look at political developments since the first parliamentary elections in 1947. That was the year of the famous general strike of May-June, led by the C. P. and the LSSP. The Trade Unions that officially led it through a joint committee were the Ceylon Trade Union Federation (led by the C. P.), the Ceylon Federation of Labour (led by the LSSP) and the Government Workers Trade Union Federation (then led jointly by the CP and the LSSP). At its height nearly 50,000 employees took part in the strike. Kandasamy, a government clerk, was shot dead during a demonstration. That strike represented a high water mark in the history of the revolutionary movement, surpassed only by the Hartal of 1953. But it was put down by brute force at the command of the State, ably aided by a lying bourgeois press. Hundreds of workers in all sectors were dismissed from their jobs by a revengeful government and the capitalist class.
This strike was to be used as a bargaining weapon by D. S. Sananayake and Oliver Goonetileke in their negotiations at Whitehall during the same year. They frightened the British imperialists by pointing to the general strike as a portent of the things to come – the red alternative–if the reforms they asked for were not granted, and power transferred to them.
But there was no doubt that the militant feelings aroused by the strike were responsible for electoral victories of a number of anti-UNP candidates. In any event, an important fact that is frequently and conveniently overlooked by most political commentators is that D. S. Senanayrke and his UNP failed to win a majority in the first parliamentary elections held in 1947, despite the vicious anti-Marxist campaign–with posters screaming slogans such as ’’Save religion from the flames of Marxism’’. Out of ICO seats, the UNP won only 46. The three left parties, fighting separately, won 20 seats (LSSP won 10, the BLP 5 and the CP 5), while the Tamil Congress and the Ceylon Indian Congress won 7 seats each. The Independents won 20 seats. It was clear that the Independents held the fate in their hands. Both sides wooed them. The famous “Yamuna” conference of all anti-UNP forces took place at the residence of Mr. H. Sri Nissanka, but failed to agree. The situation was made easy for the UNP, when Colvin R. de Silva, the BLP leader, antagonised the Independents by castigating them as three-headed donkeys. D. S. Senanayake succeeded in luring sufficient number of Independents into his camp in order to enable him to form a Cabinet. But the fact remained that his party had polled only a minority of votes at the elections.
An incidental fact that deserves mention is that the 1947 election is the one in which the left parties fared best. Out of a total of 100 elected seats, the three left parties won 20 seats. In 1952 the figure was reduced to 13, and in 1956 to 17. In I960 and 1965, in a parliament expanded to 150 seats, the number won by the left parties declined percentagewise. Only in 1970, because of the united front agreement with the SLFP did they improve their performance, but not to the total of the one fifth level reached in 1947.
In February 1948 was staged the farce of granting so-called Independence to Ceylon. The basis of this transfer of the semblence of power has already been described. But let it be noted that even this semblence of power was not granted before D. S. Senanayake, acting without prior consultation with parliament, had signed a Defence Agreement with Britain. Incidentally, this agreement has never been subsequently abrogated. Ceylon passed from being a colony to a neo-colony. The outward trappings of independence-the national flag, the national anthem, a brown man in Queen’s House, etc.–were all there. But the essence of imperialist exploitation continued.
D.S. Senanayake was deeply conscious of the fact that he had not been accepted by the majority of the people. All his policies were, therefore, aimed at winning an absolute majority at the general elections. He set about the process of systematically bribing the electorate. He soon ran down Ceylon’s sterling balances held in London through imports of foodstuffs. Had that money been invested in import of industrial machinery, the country’s benefit would have been immense. But Senanayake did not believe in industrialist development.
But that was not to be his worst fault. It was during his regime that the practice of subsidising rice began. Today everybody recognises the intolerable burden that this subsidy, which has surpassed the Rs. 600 million mark annually, imposes on the economy. But now subsidised rice has become politics. If one can point to any single measure taken consciously by a government, which has contributed most to the economic ruin of the country, it is this action to subsidise rice taken by D. S. Senanayake. Future generations will live to curse his name.
Before the end of 1948, D. S. Senanayake won over his hitherto implacable opponent, G. G. Ponnampalam, with the offer of a portfolio. It must be remembered that Ponnampalam had defeated Senanayake’s nominee, A. Mahadaveda (son of Ponnampalam Arunachalam) at the 1947 elections for the Jaffna seat. Therefore, this coming together was an utterly opportunistic move on the part of both. But it broke up the Tamil Congress. S. J. V. Chelvanayagam left to form the Federal Party, which was to continue with communal politics in the North. The Tamil Congress, while not eschewing communalism, ceased to play any effective role in Tamil or Ceylon politics after 1948, although Ponnampalam managed to retain his seat till 1970. He himself gave up his fight for fifty-fifty and went back on his past principles to the extent of supporting D. S. Senanayake’s measures for depriving the Tamil Plantation Workers of Indian origin of their citizenship and right to vote.
In 1951, crisis struck the UNP. It was an event that was to affect the future political development of Ceylon. The leader of the House and the most talented man from among those who surrounded D. S. Senanayake and the scion of one of Ceylon’s pro-imperialist and aristocratic families, and married into a Kandyan feudal family, was S.W.R.D. Bandaranayake, who had received a liberal education at Oxford. He had always fancied himself as the heir-apparent. But now it looked as if “old man” Senanayake had other ideas. Senanayake skillfully promoted the rivalry between S. W. R. D. Bandaranayake and Sir John Kotalawela, his nephew – while all the time he had set his heart on his son succeeding him. Bandaranayake left the UNP in disgust, and crossed over to the Opposition.
In the same year, Bandaranayake formed the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). Whatever the reason that impelled him to leave the UNP, he quickly saw the potentialities in uniting all the anti-UNP forces, and of catering to the nationalistic and cultural aspirations of the common man. He had been a Donough–more Buddhist–the reverse of the rice Christians. He had adopted the national dress. Later, he began to champion the Sinhalese language, although he himself was steeped in Western culture. In doing all these, he showed himself uncommonly responsive to popular feeling, and this was to stand him in good stead. If it was opportunism, it was of a kind that could be excused. But, for the time being, he remained in the wilderness.
Then, on March 22nd, 1952, D. S. Senanayake fell from his horse, while riding at the Galle Face green, and died. There immediately followed the most unseemly wrangle for succession, which has been so inimitably recorded by a supporter of one of the contestants, Sir John Kotalawela, in the widely popular: “The Premier Stakes”. But then the “old man” decided the issue from his grave. It would appear that he had advised the Governor-General, Lord Soulbury (then on leave in England) that, in the event of anything untoward happening to him (D.S.) Soulbury should call his son, Dudley, to form the government. This is precisely what Soulbury did on his hurried return – ignoring the claim of the most senior colleague of D.S., Sir John Kotslawala– who sulked about for a little while, but, finally agreed to serve under Dudley.
That Dudley Senanayake was made to succeed his father in real dynastic fashion, and that Mr. Bandaranayake on his assassination was succeeded by his widow, and the fact that hitherto no one had become the Prime Minister of Ceylon, who was not a Sinhala, Goigama, Buddhist, reveals the depth of the prevalence of feudal ideas in the country. This idea that a father’s political views can best be interpreted only by his son, and that only a widow can best interpret her dead husband’s political legacy, is not a democratic one. It is a feudal idea. In the case of the son, he, at least, had the consolation of having served as a Minister in his father’s cabinet. In the case of the widow, she had not even been in the political confidence of her husband. So much are we enmeshed in feudal traditions and ideas that there is already talk that the one aim of the present Prime Minister is to stick to the reigns of power long enough to manoeuvre the succession to her son!
Victory at the general elections of 1952 was relatively easy for Dudley Senanayake, as he exploited to the full the emotional feelings generated over his father’s death. The elections were held ahead of time, because John Exter, American head of the Central Bank, had warned of the impending economic crisis, and had advised getting a fresh mandate through elections before resorting to harsh measures. The 1953 UNP budget spelt out the measures by which the burdens of the economic crisis were to be transferred on to the shoulders of the people. The rice subsidy was abolished –sending the price of rice from 25 cents to 75 cents per measure. Railway and postal rates were increased, and the mid-day bun was snatched from the school children.
But the people were not willing to accept the burden. The leadership of the left parties had not yet degenerated to the reformism of later years. On the united call of the three left parties, and the trade unions under their leadership, a hartal was called for August 12th, 1953. The response of the people was stupendous. All sections of the working class, except the plantation workers, answered the call. Despite Mr. Bandaranaike’s refusal to join in issuing the call for the Hartal, almost the entirety of the anti-UNP forces joined in the mighty wave of protest. Buses and trains could not run. Shops were closed. All work ceased, and the government was paralysed, while the Cabinet was reported to have met in the safety of a ship in the Harbour of Colombo. It was the highest pitch of revolutionary action so far seen in Ceylon. It was an indication of how far the masses were willing to go, if they were given a united and revolutionary leadership.
Unfortunately, the grand response of the people frightened the reformist leadership of the left parties as much as it did the government. The former called off the movement on the afternoon of the 12th itself, while the latter declared a state of emergency, and resorted to mass scale repression. Twelve people were shot dead, while hundreds were jailed. One outcome of the Hartal was that the Prime Minister got cold feet, and resigned, and faded out of politics till his re-entry in 1960.
Sir John Kotalawala now became Prime Minister, and followed a policy of absolute reaction at home, and complete subservience to the imperialists in foreign affairs. Ever willing to be used as a cat’s paw by the imperialists, he went to the famous Bandung conference, and made a provocative anti-communist speech, which was intended to nettle Chou-En Lai. But the latter ignored him with the remark: “I have not come here to quarrel”. His tenure as Prime Minister was equally notorious for his refusal to permit entry to a Soviet soccer team and a team of Soviet scientists to observe the solar eclipse, as for his open contempt of the religious and cultural susceptibilities of the people as demonstrated by the barbacue incident. His total lack of contact with popular feeling was finally illustrated by his decision to hold elections prematurely on the mistaken ground that the UNP had never had it so good.