First Published: Frontline, Vol. 6, No. 8, October 10, 1988.
Transcription, Editing and Markup: Paul Saba
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Mounting problems of economic mismanagement and widespread worker mistrust have forced the resignation of Poland’s Prime Minister and cabinet and opened the possibility of a new political role for Lech Walesa and Solidarity. The changes do not affect the position of General Woijeich Jaruzelski, leader of the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP).
Before resigning, the government was negotiating with Walesa and seeking a new relationship with Solidarity, perhaps involving official recognition, a measure the government has opposed for the last seven years. Such an accord, if it is reached, would enlist Walesa in the task of winning the backing of a substantial grouping of Polish workers for structural reforms, And it would also give Solidarity, whose influence has waned substantially, a new lease on life.
Jaruzelski was particularly candid in pointing the finger at the government’s role in exacerbating the crisis. He seemed to agree with Alfred Miodwicz, head of the All-Poland Trade Unions Alliance and a Politburo member, who called the government “incompetent” and demanded its resignation.
Contrary to the impression given in the Western press, however, the strikes, and the government crisis, are not due to wholesale opposition to the initiatives taken by the government. They are not, as the Nation put it, “after seven years of darkness, a ray of hope.” Nor are they a sign of Solidarity’s strength.
The current crisis is a direct result of government attempts to keep price increases in line with wage increases so that its new economic reforms can work. Over the last five years, wages have increased faster than prices and now workers have a lot of money but little to spend it on. The demand for higher wages and lower prices can only make things worse.
A substantial portion of the Polish working class does not yet have confidence that in Poland’s socialist economy, government efforts to restructure the economy and increase productivity will benefit the working class as a whole, and themselves individually. Fearful that the structural changes would hit them in their pocketbooks and skeptical of the reforms, these workers – many of them young – went on strike for higher wages and lower prices.
Although many Western commentaries sought to depict their actions as a concerted political action stimulated by Walesa or Solidarity, they were actually a spontaneous response to their own economic concerns. But Walesa moved quickly – as he has on other occasions – to benefit from the political fallout from the strikes.
Bringing Walesa into the national reconciliation process at this time indicates that at least some in the ruling PUWP believe that he and Solidarity can possibly play a role in winning workers to the reforms. And the fact that Solidarity is seriously considering a step it has shunned all these years indicates that it is looking for a formula to keep itself afloat as a political force.
The harsh reality is that Poland’s economic difficulties have apparently not improved since 1981, when Solidarity was banned and the military; under General Jaruzelski, imposed martial law. (Jaruzelski became the head of the PUWP, and martial law was lifted in 1983). There is still a soaring foreign debt, shortages of consumer goods, and enormous waste. This much is not disputed, either by Solidarity or the PUWP.
The real issue has been, how to get Poland out of its mess. For the last several years, the government’s policy has been to radically reorganize the Polish economy so that it is no longer dependent on the old smokestack industries which consume enormous human and other material resources. Attempting to divert investment away from the now-inefficient monster industries, such as the mammoth Nova Huta steel plant in Cracow, the government is now trying to lay a foundation for modem industries and technology. One important aspect of this shift is to promote the use of more efficient forms of energy than coal, which has been a mainstay of the Polish economy. Poland is Europe’s largest coal producer.
But since these shifts will undoubtedly cause some dislocations in the large workforces employed in these areas, worker anxiety has been running high. And the reforms in general seem to have aroused fears in the working class.
For instance, the proposal to decentralize economic decision-making will make individual enterprises responsible for their productivity. As a result, wage increases will no longer be based on sheer increase in the number of products churned out, but will depend on the quality and marketability of those products. Looked at this way, it is no accident that the main industries struck over recent months were the inefficient, heavy industries; like the Nova Huta steel works and the Gdansk shipyards.
Still, the strikes were seen by the PUWP leadership as a warning that there remains a long way to go before the economic reforms gain a consensus, and that the road ahead will not be an easy one. Thus, the need to negotiate with all forces, no matter what their ideology or past role has been, who can contribute to the reform process.
A similar approach has developed in the political realm, where the PUWP has sought to democratize Polish society by involving a broad spectrum of forces in the national reconciliation process. It has tried to mend fences with Catholics, students, small farmers and others who had bought into many of the anti-socialist prejudices promoted by the Western-backed Solidarity opposition and the Catholic hierarchy.
Walesa’s new found interest in possibly cooperating with the government stems from the fact that for several years now Solidarity has been a relatively insignificant player in Polish politics. The new trade unions, which now include over half the work force, are behind the government’s new efforts to decentralize and restructure the economy, democratize society and eliminate the corruption and bureaucracy that contributed to Poland’s crisis. Solidarity refused to support these reforms even when they included some of the very demands its leaders had made. To many, this revealed Lech Walesa and his circle of academic advisors as little more than opportunists who failed to put their real agenda on the table.
Despite substantial support from the West, including financial aid, Solidarity has not been able to sustain a credible opposition. Last year Congress appropriated $2 million for Solidarity, and the American Institute for Free Labor Development has made Solidarity a special project in its Cold War crusade.
While it is not officially recognized, Solidarity’s leaders have been busy trying to organize. If it commanded the loyalty of as much of the working class as it claims, no amount of government repression could hide the fact. But the truth is that Solidarity’s oppositionist stance, when confronted with the PUWP’s concrete proposals for reform, damaged its credibility and only reinforced the impression that its’ ultimate agenda is really removal of Poland from the socialist camp, as the PUWP has maintained all along.
When strikes broke out several months ago, however, Walesa quickly showed up on the scene, introducing recognition of Solidarity as the main political demand of the actions. But as popular support for the strikers fell short of their expectations, Walesa – ever the cool-headed pragmatist – convinced them that for the moment they would get nowhere against the array of trade unionists, government officials and workers opposed to their economic and political demands.
By playing this role, Walesa earned himself a bargaining chip with the government, and gave them something to talk to him about, although at first he overplayed his hand by insisting Solidarity be legalized as a precondition for talks. But it has yet to be demonstrated that Walesa is prepared to play an accommodating role if that means accepting the new system of decentralized management, including workers’ committees and trade union locals, now in place. This is no doubt one reason for the caution within the PUWP about lending Walesa any more legitimacy than he has already earned among workers. And it explains the hostility of many trade union leaders, who are involved in negotiations with Walesa, to reviving Solidarity.