Ultra-leftism has a strong hold over the anti-revisionist movement in the US. Because of the prestige which Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) earned in leading the struggle to uphold revolutionary Marxism in the face of the revisionist degeneracy of much of the international communist movement and the special association of “left” internationalism with Mao Zedong and the CPC, “left” internationalism with Mao Zedong and the CPC, “left” internationalism has an especially strong hold. It was therefore inevitable that, as the impetus to break with ultra-leftism developed within the anti-revisionist movement, there would be a particular resistance to breaking with “left” internationalism.
This special attachment to “left” internationalism has manifested itself in the development of a centrist current alongside of the development of the anti-revisionist anti-“left” tendency. The essence of this current is an attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable–opposition to ultra-leftism and defense of “left” internationalism. Because the initial impetus to the development of the anti-“left” tendency came, in large part, from a recognition of the grievous departures from proletarian internationalism which the international line of the ultra-lefts sanctioned, the centrist current has had to mute its defense of “left” internationalism in order to gain a hearing within the anti-“left” tendency. A section of the centrist current for a long while refrained from an open defense of “left” internationalism. Instead, its defense of “left” internationalism consisted of an effort to deflect the anti-“left” thrust of our tendency away from “left” internationalism. They maintained that our tendency should direct its anti-“leftism” at the so-called “main danger” to party building and that, although they themselves claimed “agnosticism” on the question of the main enemy of the world’s people, “left” internationalism was not the correct focus for an attack on the main danger. A major aspect of the struggle over Principle 18 has been devoted to revealing that the “agnostic” line was, in essence, a defense of “left” internationalism. This was strikingly confirmed during the course of the struggle as most of the “agnostics” revealed their true views and openly declared their support for “left” internationalism.
The special attachment to “left” internationalism also manifested itself within the anti-̶left” tendency. There was a strong sentiment to conciliate centrism. Some comrades within the anti-“left” tendency, while maintaining opposition to “left” internationalism, vacillated on the need for our tendency to clearly demarcate itself from centrism. These comrades, who conciliated centrism, also attempted to reconcile the irreconcilable–the development of a tendency firmly opposed to ultra-leftism and the inclusion within that tendency of defenders of “left” internationalism. Another major aspect of the struggle over Principle 18 has been to reveal the irreconcilable contradiction within the line of the conciliators and to show that, objectively, this line is a defense of “left” internationalism and therefore of ultra-leftism itself.
When the OC was founded in early 1978, centrism exerted a significant influence within the anti-“left” tendency. Because the question had not been clarified, there were significant conciliationist sentiments within the tendency. Some comrades had not grasped the need for our tendency to demarcate itself not only from ultra-leftism but from centrism as well. A more significant number had not grasped the essential unity between the barefaced centrists, who openly supported “left” internationalism, and the shamefaced centrists, who maintained an agnostic cover.
Although a vote to break with the center in both its barefaced and shamefaced varieties, would have carried easily at the founding meeting of the OC, two factors compelled the leading forces in establishing the OC to adopt a different course. In the first place, the interests of the ideological consolidation of the anti-“left” tendency demanded that the essential unity of the shamefaced centrists and the barefaced centrists be exposed before a clean break with the center was made. In the second place, if a clean break with the center was made without a firm grasp of the question throughout the anti-“left” tendency, the real issue could have easily been obscured by the inevitable charges of “sectarianism” which would have been raised by the centrists. The course which was decided upon was to continue to exclude the barefaced centrists from the OC (since there was considerable unity around this) but to allow the shamefaced centrists to participate in the OC pending further discussion of the issue.[1] Concretely, the course of action assumed the form of a resolution stating that opposition to the content of Principle 18 was excluded from the OC but that an agnostic position was not.
The first meeting of the Steering Committee of the OC initiated an organized ideological struggle on the question. It included a written exchange of views (OC Bulletin #1) and culminated in regional OC conferences to debate the question. Under the pressure of this process, BPO and CUO were forced to drop their agnostic masks in the weeks preceding the conferences and openly reveal their “Left” internationalist stance. WUO actually made the “revelation” at the conference itself. Of course, in declaring their support for “left” internationalism, they had to resign from the OC. They did, however, all participate in the conferences as observers along with many other non-OC observers –including representatives of the leading centrist organizations, PUL and RWH, as well as members of the anti-“left” tendency outside of the OC.
Summing up the voting at the conferences we can say that only a tiny minority (mainly forces within the MA) within the OC still maintains the shamefaced centrist position –“agnosticism” on Principle 18 but opposition to that principle as a dividing line with ultra-leftism. And only an equally tiny minority (mainly another small collective in the Midwest) still maintains the conciliationist position–support for Principle 18 but opposition to the exclusion of “Left” internationalism from the OC. The specific resolutions which were introduced are included as an appendix to this paper.
Since the votes which were taken at the regional conferences had only a consultative power, a formal resolution of the question will not be made until the next national meeting of the OC. But the decisive rout at the conferences of the forces which maintained that Principle 18 is not a line of demarcation with ultra-leftism in this period makes it a foregone conclusion that the OC will decide to exclude forces which do not support Principle 18. In fact, it is likely that the OC will conclude that unity with its efforts requires not only unity with the content of Principle 18, but recognition that Principle 18 is a line of demarcation with ultra-leftism in this period and an essential principle of unity for the OC. Although much remains to be done in deepening the criticism of “left” internationalism, a deepening which will no doubt involve our tendency in much further ideological struggle, it is therefore appropriate to sum up some of the important lessons of the struggle at this time in order to provide a foundation for future actions. In addition to the question of Principle 18, much has been learned about the conduct of ideological struggle itself which can be summed up to provide guidance for our future activity.
A major aspect of the centrists’ attempt to deflect the struggle against ultra-leftism away from “left” internationalism was an attempt to down-play the significance of political line in this period of party building and to elevate organizational line over political line. Their main line of argument was that before any specific demarcation with ultra-leftism was made, it was first necessary to unite on the “main danger” to party building and that common efforts should be directed toward forging this unity. Once unity on the main danger was achieved, we could then direct our blows against the specific manifestations of this danger in the anti-revisionist movement. Appealing to the strong reaction within the anti-“left” tendency to the sectarianism of the ultra-lefts, they argued that a failure to do this would result in the sectarian error of “failing to unite all who could be united against the main danger.”
The centrists, needless to say, were not agnostic on the question of the main danger to party building. Their conception of the main danger was designed to deflect our blows against ultra-leftism away from “left” internationalism. It could hardly be otherwise since their analysis of the nature of the ultra-left line started from the premise that “left” internationalism was not one of the errors of the ultra-lefts. The centrists found the main errors of the ultra-lefts not in their political line, but in their approach to party building. They argued that the main danger to party building was sectarianism in organizational line.
The anti-“left” tendency, however, started from the premise that “Left” internationalism was one of the main errors of the ultra-left trend. Although there was considerable unevenness in its level of understanding, the anti-“left” tendency was therefore generally in agreement with the other main view that had been advanced on the main danger to party building. That view identified the main danger to party building as dogmatism, and particularly flunkyism. In effect, the centrists argued that the two-line struggle over the identification of the main danger to party building should take precedence over the two-line struggle over Principle 18 itself, that the question of whether dogmatism as a threat to elaborating correct political line or sectarianism as a threat to working out a correct organizational line was the main danger to party building had to be settled prior to any demarcation with ultra-leftism.
This view received little support within the OC. On the one hand, it was recognized that this conception of how the OC should deepen its unity was merely a cover for preserving “Left” internationalism. How could the OC possibly forge unity on the essence of the ultra-left error while there was such sharp disagreement on what errors in practice the ultra-left line led to? On the other hand, world events dramatically highlighted the significance of “left” internationalism and exposed the depth of the contradiction between the defenders of “left” internationalism and the genuine anti-“lefts.” Deng Xiaoping visited the US and advised Carter to take a firmer stand in Iran and to “teach Cuba a lesson.” Then China demonstrated what it meant by invading Viet Nam in order to “teach it a lesson.”
The centrists had to turn to less devious defenses of “left” internationalism. We will examine these in later sections. But first we want to discuss the methodology which the centrists advocated for building communist unity. Although it received little support within the OC, it bears reexamination because it reveals a great deal about the dogmatist methodology which the centrists are forced to employ in order to provide a theoretical justification for their allegiance to the CPC. It is a methodology which arises in other contexts. It is the same methodology which the centrists employed to try to divert the question of the main enemy of the world’s people into a question of the class character of the USSR. And it is the same methodology which they use to divert the question of the class character of the USSR away from the question of the Soviet economic system. Its basic theme is a retreat from the concrete to the abstract. Under the banner of upholding “analysis” and combatting empiricism, it replaces “concrete analysis of concrete conditions” with “abstract analysis of concrete conditions.”
The dogmatist methodology of the centrists is not simply due to their need for a methodology to defend the CPC. It dovetails with the one-sided critique of revisionism which underlies “left” internationalism. Revisionism adopts an empiricist methodology. The dogmatist methodology of the centrists is a one-sided reaction to the empiricism of revisionism. The empiricist error is to belittle the need to deepen knowledge to approach the essence of phenomena and to one-sidedly exaggerate appearance. The dogmatist error, on the other hand, is to belittle appearance–the concrete– and to one-sidedly elevate “essence” without regard to its links with the concrete. The knowledge which dogmatism produces is not rooted in the concrete, it is false knowledge. The key to the Marxist method is to grasp the unity of the conceptions which Lenin summarized as “truth is always concrete, never abstract,” and “all scientific (correct, scientific, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly and completely.” (Lenin, CW 38, p. 171) The first guards us against dogmatism, the second against empiricism. The Marxist method is the “concrete analysis of concrete conditions.” If we fail to be concrete we inevitably go down the road of dogmatism while a failure to analyze, to go beyond appearance to essence, just as surely leads us down the road of empiricism.
One of the fruits of the struggle over Principle 18 should be a deeper grasp of the Marxist method. The question will no doubt come up again in a particularly sharp form when our tendency proceeds to examine the “thesis of the restoration of capitalism in the USSR.” The ultra-lefts, firmly “anti-empiricist,” have denied the importance of such mere appearances as the absence of wage labor, the absence of a business cycle, the absence of a reserve army of the unemployed, etc. to determining the essence of the Soviet economic system. The influence of this dogmatist approach of the ultra-lefts to this question will have to be swept away if our tendency is to approach the question of the restoration of capitalism in the USSR with a Marxist methodology.
The real substance of political differences between communists is only brought out in relation to the question of common practice. The real substance of disagreements over Principle 18 were only brought out in relation to the practice of the OC. The struggle over Principle 18 was fundamentally a struggle over the level of unity needed to engage in common practice toward building an anti-“left” trend. Much of the confusion around the adoption of Principle 18 as a line of demarcation with “left” opportunism was caused by a confusion over what this practice actually consisted of. Comrades have had considerable experience with practice of some types but the practice of “forging a trend” is something which we are only beginning to consciously grapple with. By exploiting this confusion, the centrists were able to cause some comrades to vacillate and conciliate ultra-leftism in the name of anti-sectarianism. Confusion about the actual substance of our practice led to confusion about the level of unity needed to take up the practice and that in turn left an opening for charges of sectarianism.
In large part, the struggle to assert the necessity of Principle 18 as a necessary line of demarcation with “left” opportunism was a struggle to assert a certain conception of what it means to forge an anti-“left” anti-revisionist trend and, therefore, what the tasks of the OC are. The founding statement of the OC outlines this conception in the form of specifying the central tasks of the center we hope to build.
...we must have a center which concentrates on the ideological reorientation of the communist movement by combining a rectification of past errors with the elaboration of a theoretical foundation for future practice.
Accordingly, the practice of forging a Marxist-Leninist trend has two main aspects. One is directed toward deepening the critique of ultra-leftism and the other directed toward forging the theoretical foundation for common practice. These two aspects of the practice of forging a Marxist-Leninist trend exist in the closest possible interpenetration. A thoroughgoing critique of ultra-leftism is not possible without elaborating an alternative program, strategy, and basic tactical orientation for the US revolution. At the same time, the latter cannot be elaborated outside of the context of a thoroughgoing critique of ultra-leftism. Forming the OC and putting it on a stable basis is the first step in developing this practice. Even at this primitive stage in the development of the trend, it is these questions which come to the fore. What are the key errors of program, strategy, and tactics of the ultra-left line? What is the Marxist-Leninist alternative? The key errors of program, strategy and tactics of the ultra-left line are the indispensible starting point for developing a critique of ultra-leftism. The centrists denied this. The Marxist-Leninist alternative is both a necessary part of the critique of ultra-leftism and of the foundation for future practice. The centrists also denied this and metaphysically separated the question of political line from the critique of ultra-leftism. But Principle 18 is both a necessary part of the critique of the ultra-left line and part of our program for practice.
Against this conception of the practice of forging a Marxist-Leninist trend, the opponents of Principle 18 argued for vague and abstract notions of what the practice of the OC should be. Their defense of “left” internationalism forced them to do this. For any concrete statement of what the practice of forging a Marxist-Leninist trend consisted of would have revealed that those who uphold Principle 18 could not engage in this practice in common with defenders of “left” internationalism. The BPO came forward with two classics of vagueness and evasiveness. First was their compelling formulation that the task of the OC was “to discuss our unities and differences.” More recently, the resolution which they introduced at the conferences contains another powerful formulation:
The task of the OC is to organize the anti-“left” reaction into a definite, conscious, anti-“left” tendency, which will have common aims, a common understanding of the problems of communist work, and common practice. To do this the OC must mobilize all positive factors to overcome negative ones.
In essence, it is a question of the dialectical materialist approach to acquiring knowledge versus the dogmatist approach. Knowledge proceeds from the shallower to the deeper. From the appearance of phenomena to their essence. Deepening the anti-“left” tendency’s grasp of the essence of the ultra-left danger is certainly one of our tendency’s central tasks. But the real question at issue was how we should approach this task and what unity was necessary to proceed with taking up this task. The “main danger to party building” is not a lifeless abstraction. We recognize the danger because it produces effects in the real world which hold back the movement’s efforts to build a viable Marxist-Leninist vanguard. The starting point for uniting around a critique of ultra-leftism and for building genuine Marxist-Leninist unity is a recognition of these concrete effects in the real world. Without a significant level of unity on what these concrete effects of ultra-leftism are in practice, it is a sham to propose that we build unity around the essence of the ultra-left line. It is a dogmatist methodology. Principled unity with forces who uphold a central aspect of the ultra-left line is impossible if that unity is to serve as the basis for common work toward deepening the criticism of ultra-leftism. The Marxist method is to proceed from the shallower to the deeper–from appearance to essence. “Human thought goes endlessly deeper from appearance to essence, from essence of the first order, as it were, to essence of the second order, and so on without end.” (Lenin, CW 38, p. 253)
The centrists advanced this same dogmatist method around the question of the content of Principle 18. They argued that the OC should reach unity on the question of the class character of the USSR before it took up the question of international line. There is no doubt that these questions are intimately related and that a mature international line must be based on an assessment of the class character of the USSR. An international line which remains at the level of an identification of the main enemy of the world’s people does not fully meet the needs of communist work, even in the present period. But it by no means follows from this that the correct approach to building communist unity is to begin with the deeper levels of international line and then proceed to build unity on the features which lie closer to the surface. The anti-“left” tendency now faces the task of deepening its international line and building principled unity around it. Just as it faces the task of deepening its understanding of the ultra-leftism of the present period. The progress which the OC has made toward breaking with “left” internationalism places it in a position where it can take up these tasks. There is no principled basis for forces who hold that US imperialism is the main enemy of the world’s people to pursue common work toward understanding the class character of the USSR with forces who defend China’s international line. Just as there is no principled basis for forces who hold that “left” internationalism is a central component of the ultra-left line to pursue common work toward determining the nature of modern ultra-leftism with forces who unite with ”left” internationalism.
Needless to say, the resolution did not go on to talk about which factors were positive and which were negative. We can presume that they thought such a discussion might be “sectarian” or “split us where our task is to unite.”
Vagueness and evasiveness did not carry the day and the centrists were forced to confront the relevance of disunity on Principle 18 to our tendency’s tasks:
1) deepening the criticism of ultra-leftism; and
2) elaborating a Marxist-Leninist program, strategy, and tactics for the US revolution.
We saw in the previous section that a common effort toward deepening the criticism of ultra-leftism is not possible with defenders of a central component of the ultra-left line. Although the centrists did manage to cause some confusion on this point, their effort to question the importance of Principle 18 for a program for common practice caused very little confusion. The practice which “left” internationalism has generated has shown itself to have little in common with practice based on the view that US imperialism is the main enemy of the world’s people. Two areas in particular stand out because of their special importance to the US revolutionary process.
First, is the practice of US revolutionaries with respect to the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. This has a special importance for two reasons. In the first place, the liberation struggles in Southern Africa are a cutting edge of the worldwide anti-imperialist struggle. In the second place, the liberation of Southern Africa is closely bound up with the struggle for Black liberation in the US. The struggle against racism and white supremacy is an international struggle. The unity of the struggle against racism in the US and the liberation struggles in Southern Africa was highlighted most recently by the campaign in the US to lift economic sanctions against the Muzorewa-Smith regime in Zimbabwe. It was spearheaded by some of the most rabid forces of racist reaction in the U.S. Angola has already demonstrated to us the practice which “left” internationalism leads to. Because the MPLA was supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba the “left” internationalism leads to. Because the MPLA was supported by the Soviet Union and Cuba the “left” internationalists aligned themselves with US imperialism and the racist Vorster regime of South Africa during the Angolan civil war. We can expect that this same “left” logic, which has already reared its ugly head with respect to Zaire, will be repeated again as the struggle in Southern Africa sharpens. It is impossible to speak of principled unity for common practice with forces who uphold, as a central component of their political line, a view which places them directly on the side of US imperialism and white supremacy.
Second, is the practice of US revolutionaries with respect to the revolutionary process in Latin America. Because of the special role which US imperialism plays in Latin America, which has included the forced migration of many of its people to the US, and because of the importance to our ruling class of maintaining imperialist control over Latin America, the practice of US communists with respect to the Latin American revolutionary process is another particularly important test of their ability to practice Marxism-Leninism. What practice has “left” internationalism led to? The “left” internationalists have consistently attacked socialist Cuba and have generally played a very weak role in building the relatively strong Latin American solidarity movement which has developed in the US. The reason is not hard to find. The revolutionary movements in Latin America look to Cuba for inspiration and assistance. In this concrete context, it is impossible to advance the Latin American revolutionary process without advancing the influence of Cuba and therefore, to some extent, the influence of the Soviet Union. But the “left” internationalists regard Cuba as a “lackey of Soviet social-imperialism.” The “left” internationalists failure to recognize that the revisionist danger is secondary has tied their hands and they have virtually abandoned consistent support for the Latin American revolution.
In spite of the massive evidence to the contrary, of which the two examples above are only a small part, the centrists claimed that it was unnecessary to determine the main enemy of the world’s people to order to practice proletarian internationalism. They proposed, as an adequate basis for unity of the practice of proletarian internationalism, the following principle:
The chief responsibility of US revolutionaries is to overthrow US imperialism, while fighting against all imperialism. [OC Bulletin #1, pg. 8]
The arguments refuting this claim are clearly layed out in the first OC Bulletin and are unnecessary to repeat here. Although never explicitly saying so, it seems that even the centrists largely abandoned this position. It was the untenability of this position which eventually forced the bulk of the shamefaced centrists to abandon their “agnosticism” and come out in open opposition to Principle 18 at the conferences.
The centrists conducted a protracted effort in the OC to belittle the relationship between the OC’s tasks and tasks in the mass movements, an effort they were compelled to undertake in order to downplay the significance of differences over international line. It was therefore striking that one of the main arguments which they raised at the conferences against their exclusion from the OC was that our work in this period is primarily work in the trade unions and that differences over Principle 18 do not prevent common trade-union work. This demonstrated that neither their effort to sever the relationship between the unity required for the OC and unity required for tasks in the mass movement, nor their later turn-around which reduced the question of the unity required for the OC to the question of the unity required for joint work in the trade unions was based on principle. Both were opportunist attempts to reconcile defense of “left” internationalism with the objectives of the anti-“left” tendency.
The argument that the centrists should not be excluded from the OC since differences over Principle 18 do not prevent common work in the trade unions has little merit. If we are speaking of genuinely communist work, which certainly includes developing an internationalist perspective among the advanced workers, common work is certainly not possible. Common work is not even possible at the level of a full class-struggle unionist program. Only at the narrow economic level is common work possible. But at this level we can unite with the CPML, the CPUSA, and non-communists! What relevance does this have to forming an organization devoted to forging a Marxist-Leninist trend in the anti-revisionist movement?
Having failed in their attempt to divert the question, the centrists within the OC were forced into a tactical split in the period immediately preceding the conferences. Most of them decided that “agnosticism” and evasion would not carry the day. Some decided to stick it out to the end with the “agnostic” line. The former decided that only an open defense would allow them to play their last card, an appeal to China and Mao Zedong. As it turned out, their last card was not a trump and their blatantly subjective appeals actually did much to convince the conference participants of the real nature of their attachment to “left” internationalism. The turn to an open defense of “left” internationalism, curiously, was both climactic and anti-climactic. It was anti-climatic because the defense of “left” internationalism revealed so little of any substance. But at the same time it was a powerful affirmation of the entire line which the SC of the OC has followed, that the bottom line of “left” internationalism in our movement is flunkyism. That bottom line was reached at the conferences after a protracted period of organized ideological struggle and was clearly revealed for all to see. It was boldfaced flunkyism.
The depth of the flunkyism was most strongly brought out at the East Coast Conference where the centrists were most strongly represented. After hours of intense discussion and struggle, after it had become clear that the bulk of the conference participants had not been at all swayed by their efforts of evasion, the centrists occupied the last half hour of the conference appealing to the OC’s subjective attachment to Mao and the Chinese revolution. That half hour brought the following statements from the centrists (all are paraphrases, no transcription is available):
The OC is overemphasizing an anti-China view...Mao and Chou are among the greatest leaders in the world. [BPO]
Principle 18 is an attack on Marxism-Leninism. It shows the strong revisionist trend of the OC, a strong anti-China attack. The essence of the OC is not Marxism-Leninism; that’s why we oppose Principle 18... When will the OC fall into practicing the kind of anti-China propaganda they practice in Cuba? [CUO]
What’s going on here? We haven’t heard Mao Zedong Thought used once here today. [CUO]
Principle 18 is a cover for an attack on China. That’s the core of Principle 18... It’s a great danger; it isn’t Marxism-Leninism. [PUL]
Before the bottom line of the centrists’ defense of “left” internationalism was reached, however, several other important things were revealed.
First, was that the centrists’ “left” internationalism is quite specifically adherence to the Theory of the Three Worlds. They have consistently tried to obscure this fact by protesting strongly that they “should not be held responsible for everything that China does,” by maintaining that their international line should not be identified with the line of the CPML, and by raising petty differences with China’s policies. But they could no longer maintain this distance from China’s policies at the conferences. Comrade Newlin played an excellent role at the conferences in bringing out their essential unity with the Theory of the Three Worlds. Rather than be drawn into a discussion of the extent of their differences with the CPC, he took the offensive, attacked the centrists for supporting China’s aggression against Viet Nam, and declared outright that they advocated a united front against the Soviet Union. The lack of any response from the centrists to these charges exposed very clearly to the conference participants that, in spite of any tactical differences they might advance in order to put some distance between themselves and China, they do not disagree with China on the essentials. In thoroughly rejecting “left” internationalism, the conferences explicitly rejected the Theory of the Three Worlds.
Comrades throughout the anti-“left” tendency who take up the ideological struggle against the centrists should utilize this experience in deepening the attack on “left” internationalism. The centrists should be put on the defensive and made accountable for the disastrous results in practice which the Theory of the Three Worlds has led to. Inevitably, as the “left” internationalist line reveals more and more clearly its rotten right essence, the centrists will try to play down and hide their adherence to this bankrupt line. While avoiding sectarian errors of letting our differences over international line intrude into areas where unity on international line is not at issue, we should not let the centrists evade responsibility for their international line.
Second, the lack of substance of the centrists’ argument against the content of Principle 18. It consisted of little more than a few isolated statistics aimed at establishing that the USSR was as strong economically and militarily as the US. What was striking about the argument was that in spite of the fundamental dogmatism of the position, the argument was totally empiricist. The main speaker for the centrists merely pointed to the USSR’s “basic industrial strength” – manifested in greater steel, coal, and oil production than that of the US. There was no analysis of the relevance of this in establishing the centrists’ fundamental claim, that the Soviet Union can compete economically in the international arena on a par with US imperialism. There was no analysis because imperialist economic clout does not rest primarily on steel, coal, and oil production. This is the end of the 20th century, not the beginning of it. The dominance of US imperialism rests primarily on advanced technology, not “basic industrial strength.” This same speaker, in attempting to establish the military superiority of the USSR, pointed to the fact that the USSR has more naval vessels than the US. This was perhaps the grossest example of empiricism. Not even bothering to look past the appearance of the numbers of ships to the appearance of the ships themselves, much less the particular role these ships play in maintaining the USSR’s alledged main enemy status. A look at the appearance of the ships would reveal that the numerical superiority of the Soviet navy derives from the fact that it contains a great many small ships.
The speaker appeared to most of the conference participants to be someone who “knew” the Soviet Union was the main enemy of the world’s people and had gone to the World Almanac to find some “concrete facts” to back up the position. It was empiricism in the service of dogmatism. It should not surprise us. The essence of dogmatism is theory which is not linked with reality. When dogmatists are forced to analyze the world, they are unarmed. Their theory is not an explanation of the real world. They are forced to turn to empiricism. The OC will not doubt meet this conjunction of dogmatism and empiricism again as it proceeds to deepen its analysis of ultra-leftism.
The centrists’ final appeal – a break with “left” internationalism is an attack on Mao Zedong Thought – did not deter the conference participants from rejecting any compromise with “left” internationalism. Marxist-Leninists cannot be diverted from seeking truth from facts by appeals to subjectivism. But they also cannot ignore their political content. The rejection of the Theory of the Three Worlds does call for a re-examination of the ultra-left critique of revisionism which underlies that theory and that critique is thoroughly bound up with Mao Zedong Thought.
When an incorrect political line is refuted by the test of practice, Marxists have the responsibility to probe deeper and question the theoretical conceptions which underlie that line. On the one hand, the theoretical conceptions which are necessary in order to elaborate a correct line will partially come out of the critique of the incorrect theoretical conceptions which underlie the incorrect line. On the other, if the incorrect theoretical conceptions which underlie the incorrect political line are not uncovered and rectified, they will only make their negative influence felt in other areas. The latter is particularly significant with respect to Mao Zedong Thought since it has exercised a powerful influence on the anti-revisionist movement. If there are aspects of Mao Zedong Thought that need to be rectified in light of our rejection of the Theory of the Three Worlds, we can be assured that this rectification will be important for our program of rectification of the ultra-left line.
Earlier we pointed out the dogmatist error of not proceeding from the shallower to the deeper, from the concrete to the abstract. But we must not make the empiricist error of failing to deepen the criticism of “left” internationalism and the Theory of the Three Worlds. The concrete must be raised to the level of the abstract. To progress further in deepening the criticism of the ultra-left line we must identify those theoretical conceptions which underlie “left” internationalism and the Theory of the Three Worlds and subject them to a thoroughgoing reexamination. In particular, the exaggeration of the revisionist danger and the thesis of capitalist restoration which the Theory of the Three Worlds is based on must be re-examined. It is noteworthy that, during the course of the struggle over Principle 18, even some comrades in the OC who had previously viewed the thesis of capitalist restoration as generally correct (but who supported Principle 18) became open to the idea that the same ultra-left thinking which underlies “left” internationalism may also underlie the thesis of capitalist restoration.
The exaggeration of the revisionist danger and the thesis of capitalist restoration are in turn bound up with the fundamental features of Mao Zedong Thought – certain definite conceptions of socialist construction, of the possibility of counter-revolution, of the relation of base and superstructure, and of the role of class struggle under socialism. The break with “left” internationalism places a re-examination of this whole complex of ideas on the agenda of the anti-“left” tendency.
One further complex of questions was posed directly by the struggle over Principle 18, particularly as it developed at the conferences. It is clear that ultra-leftism is not simply a phenomenon of the US anti-revisionist movement but that there is an ultra-left trend within the international communist movement. China plays the role of an international center for this ultra-left trend in some ways analogous to the role played by the Soviet Union within the world revisionist movement. An important aspect of deepening the criticism of ultra-leftism will be to deepen our understanding of ultra-leftism as an international trend, the relation of the ultra-left trend in the US anti-revisionist movement to the international ultra-left trend, and the role which China plays as an international center for the ultra-left trend.
Aside from the need to deepen the criticism of “left” internationalism in order to strengthen the theoretical foundations of our tendency, the need to deepen this criticism will arise from another source. We cannot forget that in spite of the progress we have made in putting the anti-“left” tendency on a stable footing, ultra-leftism still maintains its hegemony over the anti-revisionist movement and is a strong influence within our tendency. Our tendency will have to fight for its right to existence. We can expect that the spearhead of the attack will be around our “anti-Maoism.” We will be criticized for making a “broadside attack” on Mao Zedong. Until our understanding of the roots of “left” internationalism is deepened the anti-“left” tendency will be vulnerable to such attacks. It will be impossible for us to make clear the real political substance of our criticism until that criticism is deepened.
The reality is that calling into question aspects of Mao Zedong Thought is far from a “broadside attack” on Mao Zedong. It does not question Mao’s stature as a great revolutionary leader or call into question the enormously progressive character of the Chinese revolution. Neither does it call into question the predominantly positive content of the critique of revisionism which China elaborated in the early 60’s before the turn to ultra-leftism in the middle and late 60’s.
One factor bodes well for our tendency’s ability to make a sound critique of the ultra-left analysis of revisionism which the CPC consolidated in the late 60’s and early 70’s and to elaborate a Marxist-Leninist critique of modern revisionism. In its struggle to break with “left” internationalism, our tendency has begun to grasp that the ultra-left critique of revisionism is a one-sided critique rather than a dialectical critique. Deepening the criticism therefore will itself have much to teach us about the danger of one-sideness in opposing an opportunist line. We can hope that this lesson will not be lost and our criticism of the ultra-left line will be able to avoid such one-sideness. The anti-“left” tendency must extract the positive aspects of China’s analysis of revisionism as it has developed historically since the late 50’s and reject only its ultra-left aspect. We must not throw out the baby with the bathwater.
Summing up the struggle over Principle 18 includes drawing out the lessons which have been gained about the conduct of ideological struggle itself. This section will examine some of the errors which were made. The struggle was too drawn out and with proper handling could have been concluded much more efficiently. It was a serious mistake on the part of the Committee of Five, the organizers of the meeting at which the OC was founded, that the first steps toward organizing the struggle were not taken until several months after the formation of the OC. The Committee of Five failed to grasp the depth of the influence of ultra-leftism and subjective attachment to China that penetrated even that section of the anti-revisionist movement which had come to see that the main opportunist danger with in the party-building movement came from the “left.” As a result they failed to foresee the development of a substantial centrist current standing between the ultra-left trend and the anti-“left” tendency and the strength of the sentiment to conciliate this current that would develop within the anti-“left” tendency. The result was an underestimation of the seriousness of the effort which would be required to resolve the contradiction over Principle 18 among the forces that came together in August 1977 as the precursor to the OC. If the depth of the contradiction had been grasped, the Committee of Five would have initiated the organized struggle over Principle 18 immediately after the August 1977 meeting and concluded it as a necessary precondition to founding the OC.
During this period a discussion of the tasks required to build a Marxist-Leninist trend should have been initiated. This would have avoided another weakness in the way the struggle over Principle 18 developed. The question of Principle 18 as a line of demarcation with ultra-leftism was not sufficiently grounded in a conception of the concrete tasks needed to forge a Marxist-Leninist trend. It was not made clear that there was no possibility of proceeding with the concrete task of depending the criticism of ultra-leftism without breaking with “left” internationalism. This lack of clarity allowed the defenders of “left” internationalism to play upon the anti-sectarian sentiments of some who opposed “left” internationalism but did not have a firm conception of why Principle 18 was necessary in order to carry out the tasks necessary to build a Marxist-Leninist trend. Additionally, it was not made sufficiently clear that a positive Marxist-Leninist alternative is inextricably bound up with elaborating a critique of ultra-leftism and is a necessary component of building a Marxist-Leninist trend. This allowed the defenders of “left” internationalism the opportunity to confuse the issue by artificially separating organizational line from political line.
The OC should have been founded on the basis of a common understanding of the main tasks in building a Marxist-Leninist trend and unity on the need to demarcate with “left” internationalism in order to even begin to take up those tasks in a common effort. The discussion within the OC could have then turned to the steps needed to make the transition to a higher organizational form which could take up in earnest the tasks of building a Marxist-Leninist trend. As it has developed, we have only established the necessary basis of unity for the OC in the present period and put it on a stable foundation. In effect, the OC is only now taking up its proper agenda.
In spite of the errors which were made in the conduct of the struggle, many positive lessons were learned about the value of protracted tendency-wide centralized ideological struggle. The centralization of the struggle meant that the entire OC – and to some extent the entire tendency – was forced to grapple with the same problem at the same time in a relatively uniform way. The organization of the struggle played an important role in keeping it focused on the main points at issue and prevented it from being sidetracked into secondary issues. Because the attention of the entire OC was focused on the question, insights which were gained by particular individuals and local organizations could be readily raised above the local level and integrated into the OC’s collective consolidation. The centralization of the struggle mean that no one in the OC could avoid the issue. OC forces had to take up the question even in those localities where the local situation did not present the question as a burning question of communist unity, ensuring that the OC’s consolidation was thorough. Many valuable lessons were learned through participation in the struggle, even by those comrades who began it with a firm conviction of the necessity of a break with “left” internationalism and might otherwise not have given it their full attention. Lessons about the nature of our tasks in the current period, about the significance of lines of demarcation, about the nature of the ultra-left line, and others. Most importantly, the broad scope and organized conduct of the struggle meant that the advance in ideological consolidation which it produced penetrated deeply into the anti-“left” tendency and was not simply an advance at the leadership level.
The conferences which culminated the struggle were particularly successful. The principle that OC conferences should be comprised of individual OC members and delegations from groups within the OC representing the various points of view within those groups, and that delegates should enter the conferences as individuals without binding instructions of any kind from their particular local group was thoroughly verified by the practice of these conferences. Each individual participant in the conferences had to stand on their own two feet and grapple directly with the problem at hand rather than be represented by their leadership, as had been the norm in debates within the anti-revisionist movement. Since each delegate was directly responsible for their views, the level of involvement and ideological development of the participants was heightened and, therefore, the ideological consolidation which the conferences produced was deepened. The representation of minority viewpoints also deepened the consolidation. Some delegates who had been able to maintain a conciliationist position within a local organization by pursuing a certain line of argument were no longer able to maintain this line in the face of the strength of the views put forward by the assembled delegates.
The participation of observers at the conferences also proved successful as did the specific rules which were developed to govern their participation. A satisfactory balance was struck between the need for the OC to proceed with its own internal process and the desire to serve the interest of the consolidation of the anti-“left” tendency as a whole.
The process of struggle generated around the question of demarcation with “left” internationalism went a long way toward making the OC process a collective process rather than just a process of interaction of various local groups. It was a highly significant first step on the road to developing a real party spirit within the anti-“left” tendency and putting the period of isolated local circles – with their inevitable small circle spirit – behind us.
The defeat of centrism and conciliationism within the OC is a cause for optimism for the anti-“left” tendency. In spite of some vacillation, the anti-“left” tendency has also shown staunchness in rejecting, in both word and deeds, one of the sacred canons of the anti-revisionist movement – the leading role of the CPC. But there should be no grounds for complacency. The demarcation with ultra-leftism, while sharp, remains only at the level of political demarcation and that only on one aspect of the ultra-left line. Before the anti-“left” tendency can be confident of the political alternative to ultra-leftism which it represents in the anti-revisionist movement, its critique of ultra-leftism must be deepened to an all-sided political critique and extended and consolidated on the ideological level. The extension of the critique to an all-sided political critique and the raising of the critique to the ideological level should go hand in hand. The extent to which our rejection of “left” internationalism can be deepened to the ideological level will push forward the general critique of the ultra-left political line. At the same time, the extension of the general political critique of the ultra-left line will push forward the process of laying bare the ideological essence of ultra-leftism.
While there are no indications that our campaign against ultra-leftism has led to any tendency to compromise with revisionism this is a danger we must keep alert to. The demands of the present period make it essential that we focus on deepening the critique of ultra-leftism. The shallowness of our present critique makes it ill-advised to deviate from this path. But in the long run, it will be imperative that our critique of revisionism also be deepened. This task will interpenetrate with rectification if handled properly. Ultra-leftism did not grow up in isolation. Its starting point is a critique of revisionism. Rectifying the ultra-left critique of revisionism is simultaneously part of rectifying the ultra-left line and part of elaborating the anti-“left” tendency’s independent critique of revisionism.
The anti-“left” tendency has already passed through the first period in its life. Already another contradiction has assumed the principal role. The party spirit is contending with the circle spirit for hegemony over the tendency. And again, just as the centrists attacked our rejection of “left” internationalism because it would “lead to revisionism,” the Marxist-Leninist line is being attacked because it “leads to right opportunism.” Ultra-leftism may exert its most powerful influence on the international line of the anti-revisionist movement, but its influence on our movement’s (and our tendency’s) approach to party building should not be underestimated. Rejection of “left” internationalism was an important step forward in rooting out ultra-leftism, but only a first step on a long road. The struggle to root out ultra-leftism and construct a Marxist-Leninist alternative has just begun.
JF, 2 August 1979
Steering Committee
OCIC
[1] The barefaced centrists had been excluded from the OC process from the start. They were excluded from the meeting in August 1977 which was the precursor to the OC by the Committee of Five, the organizers of that meeting. They were excluded from the founding meeting of the OC by the decisions of the August 1977 meeting. At the start, the barefaced centrists were represented by the Proletarian Unity League (PUL) and the Bay Area Communist Union (BACU). BACU renounced its anti-”left” stance and united with the ultra-left trend shortly before the August 1977 meeting. Later, the Revolutionary Workers Headquarters (RWH) united with the centrist current after adopting an anti-”left” stance in the aftermath of the split with the Revolutionary Communist Party.
The shamefaced centrists were represented at the August 1977 meeting by the Boston Party-Building Organization (BPO) and the Worker Unity Organization (WUO). These two groups were joined at the founding meeting of the OC by additional shamefaced centrist forces, the Communist Unity Organization (CUO) and forces within the Milwaukee Alliance (MA). The MA later split, with most of the forces within it who were aligned with the anti-”left” tendency leaving it to form a new organization, the Milwaukee Socialist Union.