Up until August 1977 the Committee of Five (C-5) held that principle 18 was a line of demarcation with “dogmatism.” Since it also held that “dogmatism was the main opportunist danger within the party-building movement, it concluded that unity with principle 18 was required at this time to move party building forward. The Steering Committee (SC), successor to the C-5, continues to demand unity with principle 18; however, it justifies this demand in a different way. In August 1977 the formation that became the Organizing Committee (OC) changed the principle of unity referring to the main danger. The new principle 15 targeted “left” opportunism rather than dogmatism. Therefore, in their Theses on a Line of Demarcation with “Left” Opportunism (the 13 Theses) the SC presents their argument that principle 18 is needed for a decisive break with ultra-leftism. We will present a critique of the 13 Theses in the first part of this paper, where we will argue that principle 18 does not demarcate us from ultra-leftism. Indeed, it may invite opportunist errors of both a “left” and a right nature. We will not discuss principle 18 in terms of the “old” arguments about dogmatism, which the SC itself no longer uses. (We note that the 13 Theses do not contain a single mention of the word dogmatism, and the current Principles of Unity mention it only once.) We shall, however, discuss some of the implications of the shift from identifying dogmatism to identifying ultra-leftism as the main opportunist danger to the party building movement in the second part of this paper.
We think that for many people in the OC a third reason for supporting principle 18 as a point of unity often takes precedence over the two explanations discussed above: Principle 18 is required to demonstrate our anti-imperialism and commitment to proletarian internationalism. That is, the justification for requiring principle 18 is sought in the realm of political line rather than in the realm of party-building line. While we don’t think that principle 18 is the correct way to express our commitment to proletarian internationalism, we agree that some expression of this commitment is required. We agree fully with principle 17 which states that ”the working class must see itself as part of a single worldwide united front against imperialism.” We shall show that the justifications that have been offered for principle 18 involve committing ourselves to lots more than is required to concretize principle 17; things which we have not discussed and probably don’t have unity around. We do think, however, that it is possible to go beyond principle 17 in expressing the requirements of proletarian internationalism. Therefore, we propose adopting the following substitute for principle 18: The chief responsibility of U.S. revolutionaries is to overthrow U.S. imperialism, while fighting against all imperialism. We think that this proposed change would guard against anyone who would make “collaborationism with U.S. imperialism a central component of their international line.” (Thesis 5) If some people think that it would not do this we would be glad to respond to their arguments.[1] We think that our suggestion is more correct than principle 18 in the context of demonstrating proletarian internationalism for a couple of reasons: It is, first of all, a general concretization of the principle of proletarian internationalism, rather than a statement about the balance of forces in the world masquerading as a principle. Second, while guarding against class collaboration it leaves open for study, discussion, and struggle such questions as the nature of the Soviet Union, the balance of forces in the world today, the movement in this balance, etc.
Since the SC now justifies the necessity of requiring principle 18 by its role in the struggle against “left” opportunism, we must first find out exactly what it means by “left” opportunism. This is all the more necessary in view of the newness of their identification of “left” opportunism as the main danger to our task of party building. We shall see that the 13 Theses present a no more substantial and convincing account of ultra-leftism than the C-5 was able to do for the now abandoned concept of dogmatism. Thesis 7 tells us that the ”ultra-left line in the communist movement” has four “fundamental features” or “four main components.”
These are:
(1) “the ’left’ approach to party-building”;
(2) “the ’left’ approach to the reform struggle”;
(3) “the ’left’ approach to the question of democracy”;
(4) “’left’ internationalism”.
This list is presented as if it were, in some sense, an explanation of the “left” line in our movement. But, in fact, it is no more than the observation that ideological deviations have consequences on the various levels of communist activity. We could just as well say that a right opportunist deviation will give rise to right errors in party building, in approaches to the reform struggle, in approaches to the question of democracy, and in proletarian internationalism. Despite an appearance to the contrary, Thesis 7 tells us nothing specific about either the ideological content of ultra-leftism in our movement or its “fundamental features”; it does! not explain why the “left” international line is key.
The SC’s understanding of ultra-leftism is, in fact, found in Thesis 8, which discusses the ideological link connecting the four “fundamental features” of ultra-leftism listed in Thesis 7. According to Thesis 8, this link is found in a “’left’-wing approach to the struggle against opportunism.” (We presume that the SC is referring to right opportunism here.) It goes on to specify that “on the national level, the ’lefts’ have continuously elevated the fight against reformism and revisionism over the struggle against their ’own’ ruling class,... internationally they elevate the fight against revisionism over the struggle against US imperialism.” This formulation of the nature of the ultra-left danger is fundamental to the approach taken by the SC to the question of principle 18. We think it contains serious errors, which have fairly significant consequences.
Thesis 8 draws a parallel between the struggle against reformism and the struggle against revisionism both on the national level and on the international level. This parallel ignores one thing: Modern revisionism is revisionism in power! Modern revisionism is not simply analogous to, for example, the revisionism of the 2nd International following 1914. A closer analogy would be to the post-WW I period in which the SDP was the ruling party in Germany. Do we need to remind the SC of the counter-revolutionary part these revisionists played in suppressing the working class uprising and assassinating Luxemburg and Liebknecht in Berlin in 1919? Holding state power makes a difference! And neither of these cases is, in fact, analogous to modern revisionism in which it is the bourgeoisie itself that rose to power with the consolidation of revisionism.[2] The SC itself acknowledges that revisionism holds state power in the Soviet Union. No doubt they would agree that this would necessarily call forth anti-revisionist activity. Where, then, are the anti-revisionists in the Soviet Union, in the GDR, in Czechoslovakia? Can there be any question that they are in prison, underground, and in all cases suffering the most severe repression? The casual parallel that the SC draws between reformism, revisionism, and modern revisionism is wrong because it ignores the basic Marxist view that the state is the organized power of the ruling class. This error is part of the overall SC position, which downplays the struggle against revisionism to an unacceptable degree.
Let us look more closely at the SC formulation that the ultra-lefts elevate “the fight against...revisionism over the struggle against their ’own’ ruling class.” This formulation tends toward making a certain separation: over here, the struggle against the bourgeoisie, over there, the struggle against revisionism. According to the SC, the struggle against revisionism is not, in essence, a struggle against the bourgeoisie; indeed, they seem rather to counterpose it to the struggle against the bourgeoisie. What then does the SC mean by revisionism? How should we struggle against it? The 15 Theses are mute on the first question. In fact, the C-5 and the SC have paid little attention to discussing revisionism. We can get some idea of their answer, however, by turning to the Principles of Unity. Principle 16 tells us that “modern revisionism (has) a petty-bourgeois essence.” We disagreed with this formulation when it appeared in the principles but did not know whether it played a fundamental part in the line of the C-5, or whether it was a “small’’ error. We now see that this formulation is consistent with the SC line in the 13 Theses; in fact, the analysis of ultra-leftism there depends on it. The SC’s understanding of ultra-leftism requires that they view the struggle against revisionism as essentially separate from the struggle against the bourgeoisie. This, in turn, requires that revisionism does not itself represent the bourgeoisie. And indeed, as we have just seen, for the SC it does not –for them revisionism has a petty-bourgeois essence and so represents the petty-bourgeoisie.
We disagree with this view of revisionism. We distinguish between the ideological essence of a deviation and its social base. Even where revisionism and reformism have a petty-bourgeois social base their ideological essence remains bourgeois. Moreover, the social base of modern revisionism in the Soviet Union is the Soviet bourgeoisie, not some international labor aristocracy. In all cases the struggle against revisionism is part of the struggle against the bourgeoisie. This is precisely what Lenin meant when he said: “The most dangerous of all in this respect are those who do not wish to understand the fight against imperialism is a sham and a humbug unless it is inseparably bound up with the fight against opportunism.” (LCW 22, 302) We may also note how, in the quote cited at the bottom of page 8 of this paper, Lenin links the struggle against the bourgeoisie and the struggle against opportunism.
The SC, apparently, disagrees with this. For them the struggle against imperialism is not indissolubly linked to the struggle against revisionism, for these two struggles have two different strategic targets–in the first case the bourgeoisie, in the second the petty-bourgeoisie. Does this mean that we would hold it is impossible to make “left” errors in the struggle against revisionism? Of course not! For example, in the U.S., the CP (USA) does not hold state power and, in fact, has little influence over the masses and in the working class movement. It is certainly not the main prop of the U.S. bourgeoisie. The struggle against it should not be identified with the struggle against the U.S. bourgeoisie itself. Exaggerating the importance of the CP(USA) and the struggle against it has been a hallmark of the ultra-left line in our movement. The October League’s slogan, “No unity of action with the revisionists!” is a typical and typically destructive example. The SC, however, commits a serious ideological error of its own, when it separates, in essence, the struggle against the bourgeoisie from the struggle against revisionism. On this basis it compounds the error by erecting a fallacious “theory” of the ideological roots of ultra-leftism, which, in turn, guides its conception of how to combat ultra-leftism.
The question we are discussing here is not primarily the correctness of principle 18, but its role as a line of demarcation with “left”-opportunism. The arguments advanced in the 13 Theses, as we have tried to show, rest on a definite conception of modern revisionism and the nature of the struggle against it. The SC’s view is the following: The contradiction between the proletariat and revisionism is a non-antagonistic contradiction. That view, in turn, is based on a definite view of the class nature of the Soviet Union: It is a socialist country, ruled by some sort of petty-bourgeoisie or labor aristocracy, whose interests are not directly opposed to those of the proletariat and the oppressed peoples of the world. The SC concludes that the essence of ultra-leftism is taking up the struggle against this revisionism with too much determination. The adoption of principle 18 as a line of demarcation with “left” opportunism is based on such a position. Are we in the OC prepared to united behind this view? If not, then we should take a long look at principle 18. For by uniting behind the correctness of this line as a line of demarcation with “left”-opportunism we would be effectively uniting behind this analysis of revisionism, like it or not.
We now turn to look at the way in which the 13 Theses present the specific content of the “left”-internationalist line. Theses 3, 4, and part of 10 are addressed to this question. These 3 states that a certain line is held in common by all of the ultra-lefts (who are, however, not named in the thesis): “Aim the main blow at the Soviet Union.” (our emphasis) This thesis contains at least four errors. First, the line of the (unnamed) ultra-lefts is misquoted; second, not all of the ultra-left groups hold this line; third, no attempt is made to explain why this line necessarily leads to class collaborationism, it is simply asserted that this must be so; fourth, as the authors of the 13 Theses know perfectly well, not all groups holding a two superpower position practice it as the thesis describes.
The correct formulation of the line the SC finds so abhorrent is “united front against the two superpowers,” not “aim the main blow against the two superpowers.” Why does the SC misquote this line? Perhaps the answer is sloppiness. More likely, we think, the fact is that in its correct form it is not at all clear that it must lead inevitably to a particular direction for the main blow– “main blow” isn’t even mentioned! Another distortion is that the thesis refers consistently to blows against “U.S. imperialism,” on the one hand, but against “the Soviet Union” on the other hand. We know the SC does not accept the idea of Soviet imperialism (although, for some reason, they don’t want to come right out and say so), but the line they are trying to combat does. Since Thesis 3 is devoted to a discussion of the supposed “left” line on proletarian internationalism, we think some effort should have been made to get that line right. Why the SC distorts the opposing position is a question which, in the long run, only they can answer. We suspect, however, that, on the one hand, they want to strengthen their own position by caricaturing the position of their opponents, and, on the other hand, they will go to any lengths to avoid calling attention to the real issue that is covered up by focusing on principle 18: the existence of Soviet imperialism. This issue is covered up by the false assertion that a direct and inevitable connection exists between recognition that the Soviet Union is an imperialist superpower, on the one hand, and collaboration with. U.S. imperialism, on the other hand.
The second error is that it is not true that all ultra-left groups hold a two superpower position; even if they did, in fact, it wouldn’t prove much. For example, the CLP regards the Soviet Union as a great socialist country.[3] Suppose, however, it were true that all the ultra-left groups held a two superpower position. Could we then infer, as the SC does, that this in itself proves the two superpower thesis to be ultra-left? Of course not! The ultra-left groups all maintain the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Does this make the dictatorship of the proletariat an ultra-left conception? Unless you can independently explain what is meant by “ultra-left group” you cannot show that all of them support a particular position (because you don’t know who they are), and you certainly can’t show that a particular line is ultra-left simply by association with some ultra-left groups. The assertion that the “lefts” universally hold a two superpower position is based on a particular definition of “lefts,” namely, those who hold a two superpower position. This kind of circular reasoning has little relationship with the real world.
Things get worse when we come to the “argument” that the two superpower line inevitably leads to the practice of “left”-collaborationism. First of all, as we mentioned above, the 13 Theses have nothing to say about what it is in that line that inevitably leads to this result. Even if it were the case that every group holding this line wound up collaborating with its own bourgeoisie it would still be necessary to explain how this happened.
But is the assertion itself true? It is not, as all of us (including the SC) know perfectly well. The polemics between the CPC and the PLA, and among many of the anti-revisionist forces in Europe, prove this. Both the CPC and the PLA hold the two superpower position; their polemics concern not the existence of two superpowers, but, among other things, the relative danger posed by Soviet imperialism. The groups that have rallied around the Albanian position, MLOC, RCP, COUSML –all quite genuine representatives of the ultra-left trend in the U.S.–reject any formulation of aiming the main blow at the Soviet Union.
If we examine the 13 Theses carefully, it becomes apparent that they are aimed not against the ultra-left trend, but against the CP(ML). This is a subjective view of the communist movement and an opportunist mode of argument.[4] There is no question that the CP(ML) has made serious errors in its international line and in the practice guided by that line. We agree that its failure to unite with Iranian revolutionaries demanding the cessation of aid to the Shah, and the way it raised the slogan, “Two superpowers out of Puerto Rico!” for example, are errors that lead to collaboration with U.S. imperialism.[5] Not all groups holding the two superpowers position, however, have made these errors, and we do not subjectively evaluate them as being characteristic of the ultra-left trend. In fact, they are not. The SC has incorrectly elevated the CP(ML)’s errors to the status of the example of the so called “left”-international line.
Thus the 13 Theses do no better in analyzing and evaluating ultra-leftism than the C-5 did with “dogmatism.” The attempt in Thesis 8 to establish the roots of ultra-leftism fails because it doesn’t have a clear view of the nature of revisionism, even while anchoring its whole conception of ultra-leftism in its understanding of revisionism. The concrete analysis of the “left”-international line turns out not to be so concrete after all. Rather than look at all of the data, and then try to appropriate reality as a synthesis of many determinations (Marx), the 13 Theses take the errors of one group and treat them in a one-sided and subjective way as the “left” line. From all this, it could not be clearer that the target of the 13 Theses is not ultra-leftism, but the two superpower position itself, and more specifically, the concept of the Soviet Union as an imperialist superpower!
These theses make some other arguments in favor of adopting principle 18 as a line of demarcation with ultra-leftism. These are not as fundamental as those we’ve just dealt with so we’ll treat them in less detail. Theses 7 and 10 maintain that it is correct and necessary to adopt principle 18 at this moment because “the widest reaction to the ’left line in the communist movement has taken the form of rejection of ’left’ inter nationalism.” We have just argued that in fact, the 13 Theses fail to show what is “left” about so-called “left” internationalism, and that they do not demonstrate that this error is characteristic of the ultra-left line. Beyond this, Thesis 10 is a narrow and one-sided summation of the history of the communist movement in the U.S. Is it true that the “widest” reaction to ultra-leftism occurred (or is taking place right now) around international line? This is not obviously the case to us. Many forces reacted against the “leftism” of the RCP’s position on busing (there remains a lot of confusion about the nature of the RCP’s error within the SC), others against various “left” lines in trade union work, still others against “left”-sectarian party-building attempts. The SC (and before it the C-5) confuses its own experience with the experience of the entire communist movement. We think that there is a general anti-“left” reaction in the communist movement, which is growing unevenly and developing differently and in different forms in different parts of the movement. To focus on international line as the place in which the reaction against ultra-leftism has developed narrows and distorts one’s view of the anti-“left” forces, pretty much restricting them to those who come mainly out of the anti-war movement. This sector is, indeed, important, but it is not the only contributor to Marxism-Leninism in the U.S. To act as if it were (which has been the practice of the C-5) is a sectarian step. To restrict the anti-“left” reaction to it is even more sectarian. It takes a part for the whole and fails to put the interests of the movement above the interests of a section of it. Genuine leadership at this point is located in those forces that will be able to consolidate the entire anti-“left” reaction, rather than elevating a part of it above the whole.
The question of multinational unity is related to this. The thinking behind principle 18 puts blinders on our ability to see the reaction against ultra-leftism. Within the OC there is little familiarity with, and even less encouragement to examine, phenomena such as the series of breaks with the RU (beginning with the BWC), the demise of the Revolutionary Wing, and the wrecking through ultra-leftism of the African Liberation Support Committee. Isn’t it likely that many people who experienced these events, very few of whom would agree with principle 18, are open to and have even developed an analysis of ultra-leftism? Can a view that focuses the entire break with ultra-leftism around principle 18 speak to their experiences? This is what we mean when we talk about the “breadth” of the anti-“left” reaction. There is everything to be gained and nothing to be lost by bringing together the different strands of this tendency in order to construct a unified trend. Leadership must have the broadest view of the anti-“left” reaction, not the narrowest.
The line taken by the Theses is that we are the entire anti-“left” reaction. Indeed, according to Thesis 10 the “lefts” are incapable of overcoming their errors and will not be able to play a positive role in party-building. We disagree. We view many of the “left” organizations as Marxist-Leninists who can, over a long period, be engaged in struggle on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principle. We do not doubt this will be a long struggle, and recognize that, as the Vietnamese have said, “a bad line corrupts good cadre.” At the same time, we insist that 90 % of the cadre are good. The C-5 has vacillated in its view of the ultra-left groups. At times it has said they are part of the party-building movement, at other times it has said they are not. Thesis 10 appears to represent their genuine position. We disagree with its basic approach.
When we examine the argument of Thesis 10 we see that it rests on one point only –Angola. The claim is that the “lefts” slandered “the leading force in the Angolan people’s liberation struggle,” attacked “socialist Cuba.” and so read themselves out of the ranks of the genuine Marxist-Leninists. In the first place, to read a huge section out of the Marxist-Leninist movement on the basis of a single issue, without analyzing the social, historical, and ideological roots of the alleged deviation is absolutely incorrect. It is a “lazybones” analysis, and can only reinforce subjectivism and sectarianism within our ranks. In addition, the premises on which the conclusion itself is based are themselves weak.
Some comrades’ approach has been to insist that we not only agree on the identification of the leading force in a national liberation struggle, but that we reserve our exclusive support for that force. If we fail to do this, they say, it is a sign of ultra-leftism and is even cause for expulsion from the ranks of the genuine Marxist-Leninists. There is no justification for this sectarian view. The Marxist-Leninist principle is that the U.S. working class and its vanguard must support the national liberation struggles of oppressed peoples. These struggles proceed on many fronts–we must give support to all of them. If we look at our situation concretely we see that we have a long way to go before we will have won the U.S. working class to take up this responsibility. Apparently this would not be enough; we must win the working class not to support the national liberation struggle itself, but to lend exclusive support for one or another force within this struggle.
It has been wrong of the ultra-left groups to give exclusive support to ZANU in Zimbabwe and to PAC in Azania; it is likewise wrong to support only ZAPU in the Patriotic Front, and to speak only of the ANC as if the PAC didn’t exist at all. Angola is a very complex case. Many of the “left” groups, such as the CP(ML), committed a sectarian error when they denounced the MPLA simply because it received Soviet aid. They further failed to carry out their internationalist responsibilities in neglecting to expose and denounce U.S. imperialism’s intervention in Angola, while effectively giving “exclusive” support to FNLA and UNITA. Finally, they compounded these errors by taking a sectarian stance toward the movement within the U.S. against U.S. intervention when they refused to united with its overwhelming progressive content while struggling within it for their view of the Soviet danger. At the same time, insisting that the only way a Marxist-Leninist can support the Angolan people’s liberation struggle is by supporting the MPLA is equally sectarian.
We should encourage the unity of national liberation struggles, not promote their disunity. Refusal to cheer on a particular organization in smashing two others does not disqualify one from participating in party-building. Some comrades take a sectarian stand, both in the U.S. and abroad. In the U.S. they hold that we are the genuine Marxist-Leninists; no one else can make a positive contribution to party-building. In Africa too they have their favorite organizations; no one else deserves our support. Let’s recall that Marxist-Leninists must be good at uniting, not splitting! (Mao)
As for “attacking socialist Cuba,” we might note that it is Cuba and not the CP (ML) (or the People’s Republic of China) that has its troops in Angola and in Ethiopia. We don’t think that raising questions about this, indeed, criticizing it sharply, makes one ineligible to play a positive role in party-building. There are certain principles of Marxism-Leninism which require extraordinary circumstances to be questioned. The assertion that Cuba is a socialist country and thereby plays a progressive role in the world today is not one of them. We might point out that the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front issues some strong warnings to Cuba. Does the SC hold that this incapacitates them from playing a positive role in Eritrea’s liberation struggle?
We want to make some strong criticism of Thesis 12. Where do all of the phony quotes and assertions in this thesis come from? It would appear from the structure of the argument that they are supposed to be things that one of our organizations (or PUL) has said, ort positions that we hold. We’d like the SCI to produce the documents or notes that verify these alleged statements of ours.I In fact, we never made them, nor do they represent our positions. It seems that, reaching the end of the Theses, the SCI realized the overall weakness of its arguments; in particular, that they do not justify either our exclusion or PUL’s continued exclusion from the OC. It may be inevitable to distort an opponent’s position, although this should be struggled against. Deliberate distortion by making up phony quotes goes beyond this. We can only call it demagogic. Here is an ideal opportunity for the SC to demonstrate its unique commitment to, and ability to practice, self-criticism.
We do unite with one aspect of the Theses, which we think leads in the right direction. This is the identification in Thesis 7 of the “left” approach to party-building as one of the fundamental features of the ultra-left line. In the meetings of the OC up to now, party-building line has generally been treated as being without real content-something more like style. If the SC now rejects this view we think this is a very positive step on its part.
We have shown in this paper that “’left’ collaborationism” makes a poor dividing line with “left”-opportunism. In the first place, not all ultra-left groups hold the line that the Theses identify as the basis of ultra-leftism (that is, the united front against the two superpowers). In the second place, not all who do hold that line call for aiming their main blow against the Soviet Union, nor is there any theoretical reason which would compel them to do this. We see the 13 Theses as Theses in Opposition to the CP(ML), not Theses in Opposition to Ultra-Leftism. This is a subjective and one-sided approach to consolidating a tendency in opposition to “left”-opportunism.
The same is not true of party-building line. The SC would no longer argue that it is a prior absurd to attempt to draw a line with “left” opportunism here since they themselves now identify party-building line as one of the fundamental features of the ultra-left line. In fact, while we find great divergences in the international line and practice of the ultra-left groups, we find a lot of similarity in their party-building line. This is set out in great detail in PUL’s book, Two, Three, Many Parties of a New Type? This in itself is some evidence that struggle over party-building line is the place to begin our steps to consolidate the anti-“left” reaction. Moreover, there are elements within the party-building line of the C-5 and the SC that we have pointed to as being sectarian: putting the interests of part of the movement above the interests of the whole; failure to unite all who can be united against the main danger; taking political line as key in organizing the anti-“left” forces at this stage. BPO argues in its paper On Breaking with the “Left” Opportunist Party-Building Line that it was precisely the failure of the C-5 to correctly analyze ultra-leftism which led to its misperception of the place where the break had to be made now, and which is further leading it down the very sectarian path it claims to be anxious to avoid.
Let us summarize our view of the part principle 18 has played in the activity of the C-4, C-5 and now the SC. The necessity of principle 18 has been justified in several different (and conflicting) ways: as a line of demarcation with “dogmatism”; as a line of demarcation with “left” opportunism; as a general requirement for “building a vanguard party in the US.” (Thesis 5) We have analyzed the first two points in this and other articles and have shown that they do not lead to principle 18. In regard to the last point, we agree that there can be “no question of building a revolutionary vanguard party in the US with forces that make collaborationism with US imperialism a central component of their international line. Our alternative point of unity takes this into account. But we would point out that in the long run there can also be “no question of building a revolutionary vanguard party in the US with forces that make collaborationism” with Soviet or any other imperialism a central component of their international line.[6]
Principle 18 invites this error. That is why we suggest it be replaced by a principle that states the duty of the U.S. working class is to oppose U.S. imperialism while struggling against all imperialism. To explain our point of view we will first show why we think the justifications made for principle 18 cover up the potential danger posed by Soviet imperialism. We will then discuss why we are willing to act in common with forces that take this position in order to carry out some of our current tasks in consolidating the anti-“left” reaction.
Imperialism is that stage of capitalism in which, among other things, the world is divided up among imperialist powers. The uneven development of capitalism makes this division unstable and leads to war to redivide the world. The danger of making principle 18 serve as a summary of international line is that it denies this by implication. At best principle 18 is an “obvious” statement referring to the fact that currently the U.S. is the economically dominant imperial power. Worse, it asserts that this situation is a stable one.
In 1914 there was no doubt that Britain controlled by far the largest part of the colonies and semi-colonies of the world. (In the SC’s language this might be summed up by saying that Britain was the “main enemy of the world’s people.”) In 1914 British colonies contained a population of 393 million and covered an area of 33 million square kilometers. France controlled a population of 393 million and covered an area of 33 million square kilometers. France controlled a population of 55.5 million, Russia 33 million and Japan 19 million. The smallest of the “six great powers” were Germany with a colonial population of 12 million and the U.S. with a colonial population of a mere 10 million! How did Lenin sum up the situation? He wrote[7]
We see three areas of highly developed capitalism, the Central European, the British and the American areas. Among these are three states which dominate the world: Germany, Great Britain, and the United States. Imperialist rivalry and the struggle between these countries have become extremely keen because Germany has only an insignificant area and few colonies; the creation of “Central Europe is still a matter for the future. It is being born in the midst of a desperate struggle.
Thanks to her colonies, Great Britain has increased the length of “her” railways by 100,000 kilometers [between 1890 and 1913], four times as much as Germany. And yet, it is well known that the development of the productive forces in Germany, and especially the development of the coal and iron industries, has been incomparably more rapid during this period...The question is: what means other than war could there by under capitalism to overcome the disparity of the development of the productive forces and the accumulation of capital on the one side, and the division of colonies and spheres of influence for finance capital on the other? Lenin even refers to the “superiority of German imperialism over British imperialism.”
Compare this method of analyzing the international situation with the superficial, static, and ultimately misleading statement that “US imperialism is the main enemy of the world’s people.” If, as some people have claimed, the statement is “obvious” then it would have been equally “obvious” to have claimed in 1914 that “British imperialism was the main enemy of the world’s people.” Yet in fact, in 1914 British imperialism was on the decline, and it was the expansion of the productive forces in Germany which threatened to disrupt the existing “division of the world” through war.
There is more to it today–the Soviet Union is not merely an imperialist power whose productive forces and accumulation of capital are out of balance with its “sphere of influence.” It is an imperialist country which is thought by many oppressed nations and a large proportion of the world proletariat to be a socialist country. In these circumstances, to maintain and repeatedly assert that “US imperialism is the main enemy” deceives people into thinking that the Soviet Union is a friend who has come to help fight the imperialists. In today’s situation, to maintain that “US imperialism is the main enemy” provides a line of demarcation on proletarian internationalism is to argue by implication that the Soviet Union is what many people think it to be–a socialist country. If this is the position of the SC, then they should come out and say so. Then we can get down to the difficult task of struggling over our different views on the actual situation in the Soviet Union, and on the implications of these differences for our task of party-building in the U.S. It appears the SC wants to avoid this struggle by asserting (1) that principle 18 is “obvious,” and (2) that to hold otherwise leads inevitably to ’left’ collaborationism.” In so doing it hampers the struggle against revisionism and holds back the actual development of proletarian internationalism in the current period.
Given these views, why are we interested in working closely with forces that adhere to the SC position? Party -building is a complex process. We will have to employ various tactics in our road to the party, and conduct struggles on many fronts. The construction of a tendency to combat “left”-opportunism is our current task. The principles of unity required to begin this are not those that will be required for the party, nor are they the same as those required for the formation of communist organizations such as ourselves. It is neither possible nor correct to call for unity now around the lines that will be needed for the party as Thesis 5 does. Thesis 5 raises a genuine issue – class collaborationism – which it resolves incorrectly because it is viewed only in the context of constructing the vanguard party. It is not possible to build a tendency to combat “left”-opportunism, which, in the long run, would contain lines that urged collaboration with either US imperialism or Soviet imperialism. We pose our alternative to principle 18 as the expression of a line which is appropriate to the first steps in forming a tendency. It would undoubtedly not be sufficient for the construction of the vanguard party. That, however, is not on our immediate agenda.
The decision to adopt a political line such as principle 18 as a point of unity requires that we answer the following question: Why is this particular point required by the task we are trying to accomplish? We have discussed, in the first part of this paper, why we do not think principle 18 is required in order to begin our current task of building a tendency to combat ultra-leftism, indeed, why it hinders that effort. In the course of this argument we have criticized the justification put forward by the SC in its Theses on a Line of Demarcation with “Left” Opportunism. As we have just indicated, however, we think there may be more to the SC’s insistence on principle 18 than simply an erroneous view of the nature of ultra-leftism. To get at this we have to look at the history of the OC, for we should not forget that it did not always view its task as fighting ultra-leftism. An examination of the changes in the views of the C-4 and the C-5 on the character of the main danger facing the party-building movement, the forces that can be won to overcoming it, the immediate task of these forces, etc., will enable us to further clarify our objections to the course they have pursued, guided as they have been (and still are!) by their commitment to principle 18.
In their initial letter of 9 June 1976, the C-4 proposed calling a conference of Marxist-Leninists who associated themselves with a “trend” the signers of the letter saw developing in opposition to both revisionism and what they called “dogmatism.” This letter did not specify the nature of the conference or its tasks very explicitly. It pointed out, however, that this “trend” was very undeveloped and that a first step would be “defining this trend (and) the unities and differences within it...” Thus the letter set forth the task of the proposed conference implicitly: to take this first step. Unity around the identification of the U.S. as the main enemy of the world’s people was posed as a condition for attending the conference.
The 9 June letter, while not laying things out very precisely, does allude to a concrete analysis, a task, and the forces that can carry out that task. Concrete analysis: An immature trend has arisen in opposition to dogmatism. Task: A conference to discuss the unities and differences within this trend. Forces: A difference over the identification of the main enemy of the world’s people puts one outside of this (as yet undefined) trend.
The Proletarian Unity League raised some objections to this analysis (although uniting with its overall direction) and proposed an alternate set of principles of unity which did not include unity around the identification of the main enemy of the world’s people.[8] Their position was basically the following. Concrete analysis: There is a growing anti-“left” reaction in the communist movement. It is not a trend, even an embryonic one; it is not directed against dogmatism but against ultra-leftism. The difference between this view and that of the C-4 are significant. A “reaction” is not qualitatively the same thing as even an undeveloped trend. Ultra-leftism is a different deviation than dogmatism. Fighting ultra-leftism requires different strategy and tactics than fighting dogmatism. These lead to other differences. Task: To consolidate the anti-“left” reaction and construct an anti-revisionist, anti-“left” opportunist tendency, which can go on to build a real Marxist-Leninist trend. Forces: Various forces break with ultra-leftism differently, depending on their own situation and interests. The task is to bring all of these forces to a conscious realization of the objective connections that make them all part of the anti-“left” reaction, to deepen our critique of ultra-leftism, and to begin drawing out the implications of a Marxist-Leninist anti-“left” position. According to PUL, this struggle should focus first around the ultra-left party-building line –left sectarianism–and not around the so-called “dogmatist” international line. While the signers of this paper do not have complete unity among themselves or with PUL on this, we all agree that principle 18 is incorrect as a line of demarcation precisely because it identifies one area in which a certain part of the movement sees itself breaking with ultra-leftism and the break with ultra-leftism. As such, it is sectarian to pose it as a point of unity for the anti-“left” forces.
The subsequent history of the concept of “anti-dogmatism” is very important for evaluating the line of the SC. “Anti-dogmatism” defined the “trend.” The argument that it was necessary to unite around the “U.S. imperialism is the main enemy...” formulation was based on the theory of the “dogmatist” deviation. This theory was spelled out at some length in the pages of The Organizer. The Guardian also contributed to this discussion, and soon “dogmatist” and “anti-dogmatist” became part of our everyday political language. It was this familiarity that enabled the C-4 to issue its call in the name of the “anti-dogmatist trend.”
Although it contained some serious errors, this was a positive development at the time. The PWOC brought a certain section of the communist movement to a certain level of comprehension of the ultra-left line. This positive development could develop negative features, however, and might even turn into its opposite, if the critique of ultra-leftism was not fully carried out, but remained at the level of the one-sided view that “dogmatism” was the main danger. For this would not permit the “anti-dogmatists” to see that they were objectively part of a much wider anti-“left” reaction. They would, instead, close in on themselves, declare themselves to be the “genuine” ML’s, and fall right into the error of sectarianism. Why? Because they would not have carried out the criticism (and self-criticism) of ultra-leftism at a general level and so had confused their own mode of breaking with ultra-leftism with the break with ultra-leftism. These seeds were planted deeply within the OC by the approach of the C-4.
As time went on, the content of “dogmatism” became murkier and murkier. The C-5 held that dogmatism was an error of method in the relationship of theory to practice. This error involved, they said, the unwillingness (or inability) to make a concrete analysis of a concrete situation. At times, the error was associated with “flunkeyism,” which was either an incorrect method of following leadership (whether bad or good), or following bad leadership. It was never clear exactly which was meant. In any event, the “anti-dogmatists” were not exactly distinguishing themselves by the power of their concrete analyses. For example, the PWOC published a long analysis of the national question as applied to Black people in the U.S. Their theses, while different from those of many ultra-left groups, were not substantially different in conceptual apparatus or methodology. They draw upon Stalin’s definition of a nation and on the 1928 and 1930 Comintern Resolutions, as do most of the ultra-left analyses. They make some attempt to look at the demographic “facts,” again as do most of the ultra-left analyses. What then is the essential difference between the PWOC’s “non-dogmatic” analysis and the ultra-left’s “dogmatic” analyses? The conclusions themselves! But this seems to imply that “anti-dogmatism” is not defined by its method, but by its opposition to certain political lines. This gets the “anti-dogmatist” position in some trouble. For how do we know what constitutes a “dogmatist” political position, beyond the fact that the PWOC and The Guardian tell us? or that it is “obvious”? The Guardian tried to salvage things by relying on the concept of “flunkeyism.” Unless one wants to assert that following leadership is itself an error, the problem reasserts itself. How do you know when following leadership is “flunkeyist”?
During this period the C-5 tried to develop a position that papered over the emerging weaknesses in their analysis. They maintained that while dogmatism was not a question simply of particular political lines, you could identify it only by examining political line. In particular, they claimed, the position that “US imperialism is the main enemy of the world’s people” is the key anti-dogmatist position. Adopting it would begin the work of the OC with a clean break with dogmatism. Failure to adopt it would let half-hearted conciliators of dogmatism into the purity of the “anti-dogmatist” sanctum.
It has become clearer and clearer, however, that the analysis based on “dogmatism” simply cannot be sustained. It has never provided an independent definition of “dogmatism”; it has never explained how to choose which “anti-dogmatist” line is key. (Why not make unity with the PWOC position on the national question a requirement for attending the conference? In some ways this would have made more sense, since, in this case at least, a substantial published analysis was available.) The position that “dogmatism” was the correct characterization of the principle deviation in our movement, and, therefore, that agreement with principle 18 should be made a requirement for the conference, was questioned from inside of the OC by some of the signers of this paper,[9] and from outside of it by PUL. The alternative analysis is that ultra-leftism is the correct general characterization of the error.
Apparently the C-5 recognized that its own position on “dogmatism” as the main danger was weak. For in August 1977, at a meeting of the OC, the C-5 suggested a change in draft principle 15, which completely eliminated all reference to “dogmatism” and specified “left” opportunism as the main danger! (In the whole of the 18 principles, there is now only a single reference to “dogmatism.” It appears in principle 16 where it is linked to Trotskyism!)
What did this rather astonishing shift mean? Not much according to the C-5, who presented it at that time as a sort of “concession” which demonstrated their willingness to “widen” the principle of unity. In the period immediately following August, in fact, it did appear that the shift was only a formal one with little substance. The C-5’s struggle still appeared to be aimed at “dogmatism.” Nevertheless, even this formal change bothered some forces. The Boston Organizing Committee, for example, recognized that the main rationale for principle 18 had been constructed in terms of its role m fighting “dogmatism.” If “dogmatism’ wasn’t the main danger after all, then what was the justification for principle 18?[10] There seemed to be only two possibilities: (1) Keep the new principle 15 but eliminate principle 18; (2) Go back to the old principle 15 and keep principle 18. The BOC favored the second alternative. We disagreed with their choice but recognized that they were trying to maintain a consistent and principled position. They understood that the principles of unity depended on the formulation of the main danger.
In fact, from this point of view, things got worse and worse, because, as it turned out, the shift in principle 15 was not formal at all. Little by little a real shift took place. “Dogmatism” disappeared from the discussion and ultra-leftism took its place. Look at recent copies of The Organizer. Ultra-leftism has completely replaced “dogmatism” in discussions of the main danger. Look at the recent debates between Irwin Silber and Clay Newlin, reported in both The Guardian and The Organizer. When it managed to get off a rather sterile argument about unity vs. fusion and theory vs. practice, their disagreements focused around ultra-leftism, not “dogmatism.” There is not a single mention of “dogmatism” in the 13 Theses, which discuss the need for principle 18 only in terms of its contribution to fighting ultra-leftism. Indeed, the 13 Theses are just what was needed to deal with the problem raised by BOC –a new justification of principle 18 that no longer depends on dogmatism. (Apparently principle 18 is very flexible, or perhaps it is the SC. No matter what the main danger, principle 18 turns out to be just the medicine!)
Why do we go into so much “detail” about past history? In the first place, the grouping that is now the OC was called together under the banner of “anti-dogmatism.” Now, as if by magic, we find ourselves grouped under the banner of anti-ultra-leftism. We think, in fact, that this banner is more correct. But we also think that things like this have to be discussed if they are to mean anything. You can’t just discard “dogmatism” (yesterday’s fashion for the main danger) and call it ultra-leftism. The identification of the main danger is key to unity. How can we agree on strategy and tactics if we don’t agree on the nature of the enemy we’re fighting? Can the identification of the main danger be changed at whim from one day to the next? We don’t think so. In any event, to do so would seem to indicate that we had pretty shaky unity in the past, and without understanding the change have no guarantee of firmer unity in the future.
Of course, these objections don’t matter if the identification of the main danger is not connected to a concrete analysis, but is used only for its value in polemical debate. We are reluctant to conclude that this is the case for the SC. However, we don’t see how to avoid drawing that conclusion in the absence of any analysis or self-criticism. The PWOC’s theoretical contribution to the formation of the OC was the discussion of “dogmatism” that they initiated and have now abandoned without a word of explanation. They have not explained to us what convinced them that ultra-leftism and not “dogmatism” was the main danger to party building, and what difference it made to them. The purpose of self-criticism, which, according to the SC, “is a vital tool in the work of the OC,” (SC minutes, 15 June 1978), is to provide the conditions which allow the rectification of errors.[11] If the identification of dogmatism as the main danger was an error, then a self-criticism should be made. We call upon the SC to demonstrate their commitment to this “vital tool” in practice by taking up our criticism of their shift in position on the nature of the main danger.
While we do not know the reasons the SC will give for their shift in position, we do know who has most consistently developed the analysis that ultra-leftism is the main danger–PUL! Let’s reflect on this. PUL has not been permitted to attend a single OC meeting because principle 18 excluded them, yet the line they have advocated has restructured our discussion of the main danger to party building. We suspect this has something to do with the C-5’s unwillingness to make a self-criticism. For if they acknowledge PUL’s contribution in this matter, then they would have to acknowledge PUL’s “right” to be part of “our effort.” And this would imply that it has been incorrect and unprincipled to keep them out all along. In their letter of 31 January 1977 the C-5 wrote that they were “trying to prescribe a level of unity which is, at once, not so high as to eliminate those that could make a positive contribution at this point, nor so low as to subject the conference to the kind of opportunist influences that would impede its efforts.” We have demonstrated that PUL has made a positive contribution of a most significant nature. If the SC disagrees with our analysis of things, then let them tell us how it came to happen that they called us together under the banner of “anti-dogmatism,” abandoned this banner for the banner of anti-ultra-leftism, all the while maintaining that PUL has had no influence on this shift. If this cannot be done then we suggest there is a substantial piece of empirical evidence for dropping principle 18. Far from keeping us “pure” and free from “inconsistent” fighters against “left” opportunism, in fact, principle 18 deprives us of some of the most consistent anti-“left” forces in the communist movement today.
A concrete analysis encompasses a view of the task and of the forces that can be marshalled to accomplish that task. The C-5 was no more consistent in these areas than in its analysis of the main danger. In June of 1976 the C-4 proposed calling a conference to explore our “unities and differences.” They requested a response within one month “to co-ordinate our collective discussion of the material.”[12] The next letter was dated 31 January 1977. This letter specified the tasks of the conference in very different terms. Now the conference was “to establish an ideological center for the Marxist-Leninist wing of the party-building movement.” Obviously a great deal had happened between June 1976 and January 1977. We had moved from being an undefined trend with many differences and uncertain unity to being “the Marxist-Leninist wing.” We had moved from a proposal to discuss our unities and differences to a proposal that we had developed enough unity to establish an ideological center. This was I truly remarkable since we had engaged in no organized ideological struggle in; the interim. Indeed, it was next to impossible to get the C-4 to event acknowledge receipt of a letter during this period, let alone answer one.
We will not go into the details of the subsequent history of the ideological center proposal. Other organizations have more information about this than we do. Let us recall, however, that there was a great deal of confusion over the question of what it was we were forming: the leading ideological center? a leading ideological center? an ideological center? At some point, El Comite–MINP, one of the signers of the original letters, apparently decided that the shift from a conference to explore “unities and differences” to a conference to build an ideological center was too severe. They picked up and left the OC. We have seen little public discussion of this from either side (none from the C-5 and SC) and no self-criticism. Not much ideological struggle there–hardly an auspicious start for an ideological center! The Guardian, too, has its own idea, and has withheld its full participation from the OC, going so far as advising its Guardian Clubs not to participate.[13] This despite the fact that The Guardian played a most vocal role in OC meetings. Can we build an ideological center with such sectarian methods?
The strategy and tactics for accomplishing our task have not been arrived at on the basis of an explicit concrete analysis. Instead, several different ideas are put forward and in the absence of an overall framework in which they could be struggled out to unity, they are simply adjudicated between the different interests present in whatever room the discussion takes place. This pragmatism is not all that surprising in fact. When we’re fighting “dogmatism” one month and ultra-leftism the next, there can be no stable foundation for strategy and tactics. This is an invitation to lack of purpose and vacillation. If our task is not made the subject of open discussion and debate, if our leadership cannot be held responsible for implementing activity to accomplish that task, then we are issuing an invitation for lack of principle to reign supreme.
We have also seen quite varying estimates of the OC itself from the C-5. At times we are a “tendency,” at other times we are a “trend,” at still other times we are a “wing.” At times we are “undeveloped,” at other times we are “undefined,” at still other times we are “embryonic,” and finally we are the “genuine Marxist-Leninists,” These different descriptions were never backed up by a concrete analysis, but seem to reflect whatever would be necessary for whatever tactic the C-5 or SC is pursuing at the time. The SC does not even have a firm idea of the theoretical, ideological, political, and organizational development of the groups comprising the OC, since only now are they launching an investigation designed to provide this information. Perhaps some of this investigation should have been carried out before estimating that we are on the “threshold of maturity.”[14]
We have gone into these questions because points of unity such as principle 18, comprising particular political lines, must be tied to a task, and to strategy and tactics for accomplishing that task. One reason the debate around principle 18 has been so obscure, at times, is that the C-5 and the SC has been so inconsistent in its views of these matters, which has forced it to put forward different and conflicting justifications for principle 18. This inconsistency has been accompanied by sectarian tactics. We have argued that different forces break with ultra-leftism in different ways. An ideological center oriented only toward one part of the reaction to ultra-leftism will not be able to consolidate the entire tendency. Instead, it will spontaneously tend to pursue yet another narrow party-building strategy. This has always been our principal objection to point 18. It narrows down the forces in the OC in a way that will lead it to a sectarian view of the communist movement and a sectarian party-building line.
If we judged solely by their activities, as we have just outlined them, we would have to say that the C-5 and the SC are mostly committed to building an organization united around principle 18. What else could account for the fact that despite all the vacillation and uncertainty in their view of the main danger to party building, despite all the confusion in their understanding of our task, despite all their varying estimates of “our” strength, and the possible role to be played by the ultra-left, they have remained firm and consistent in one point and one point only–the necessity of principle 18. Indeed, it would appear that only after they consolidate their grouping around principle 18 will they look around for something this organization can do. This won’t work! In fact, as we showed in the first part of this paper, such an organization will tend to act as a cover for modern revisionism. At the same time, it will develop in a sectarian direction that will make it impossible for it to play a leading role in the struggle against ultra-leftism. Our alternative principle of unity avoids both of these errors. We could begin to build an ideological center for the entire anti-“left” reaction. We could begin the crucial struggles over the nature of ultra-leftism and the nature of revisionism before all anti-revisionist, anti-“left” forces. We should, however, struggle over these directly, rather than through the prism of principle 18. We think that comrades in the OC should evaluate whether our proposed alternative to principle 18 satisfies all of the valid reasons that have been put forward for the necessity of a line expressing our anti-imperialist unity. If this is not the case then demonstrate it to us. If it is the case then explain the further reasons that require principle 18, and show that those further reasons do not reflect a desire to exclude forces that seriously take up the struggle against revisionism in the epoch of proletarian revolution and its reversal–that is, the epoch of Marxism-Leninism- Mao Tse-tung Thought.
[1] That this is the correct way to attack social chauvinism is a constant theme of Lenin’s writing in the period following August 1914. He states over and over again that the key test of proletarian internationalism is taking up the struggle against the imperialism of “one’s own” bourgeoisie. The following statement is typical: “Only he is an internationalist who in a really internationalist way combats his own bourgeoisie, his own social-chauvinists, his own Kautskyists.” (LCW 23, 209) Since Lenin, in a period in which social chauvinism was a much more developed trend than it is today, was satisfied with this formulation, it would seem incumbent on those who insist it is not “strong” enough to demarcate our own social chauvinists to explain why such a change in a basic formulation of Marxism-Leninism is required. We are convinced they cannot.
[2] We know that groups in the OC are skeptical about Mao’s thesis that the rise to power of revisionism is the rise to power of the bourgeoisie. We think this skepticism is unfounded. The example of Germany in 1919 does not, however, depend on this thesis.
[3] This fact cannot be dismissed by saying that the international line of the CLP has points in common with Trotskyism. If this were sufficient then we could dismiss principle 18 by pointing out that it would be acceptable to any of the revisionist parties.
[4] For example, Thesis 6 simply asserts without evidence that the CP(ML) has “achieved the dominant position among the ’lefts’.” The SC’s view is a static one; the communist movement is in much greater flux than appears to be the case to them. The split in the RCP leading to the formation of the RWH, and the recent formation of the LRS(ML) are cases in point. These organizations are not subordinate to the CP(ML).
[5] We shall discuss the CP(ML)’s errors around Angola below.
[6] The Milwaukee Alliance fully supports the alternative point 18 and the reasons given for why such a change is necessary. However, we do not have organizational unity on this paper’s characterization of the USSR or its role in world affairs. These topics require further investigation and study by our organization, and, for that matter, by the OC as a whole. We strongly feel, however, that the paper’s positions on these questions must be seriously considered, at least as seriously as the perspective of the present point 18. If the OC –an avowedly anti-revisionist group–were to exclude this perspective at this time –especially given the lack of study and analysis by most OC groups on this question –it would be committing a serious sectarian error.
[7] All quotations are from Imperialism, the Highest State of Capitalism (LCW v. 22). The data on colonial possessions are taken from the table on p. 258. The quotations are found on pp. 273, 275-76, 290.
[8] PUL’s letters to and articles about the OC are collected in the following pamphlets: The Ultra-Left Danger and How to Fight It; Party Building and the Main Danger (published jointly with the C-5); On the “Progressive Role” of the Soviet Union and Other Dogmas (available from ULP, Box 1744, Manhattan-ville PO, NY, NY 10027). We recommend that anyone who wants to pursue the controversy over principle 18 to its roots study these pamphlets.
[9] BPO: Letter dated 2/26/77; ON BREAKING WITH THE “LEFT” OPPORTUNIST PARTY-BUILDING LINE; ON OUR DIFFERENCES OVER PARTY BUILDING: Response to the PWOC. CUO: Letter dated 11/76; NOTES FOR THE FEB. 1978 MEETING; Response dated 1/23/78. The first reference, in each case, were letters written in response to the calls of the C-5. Despite the fact that they contained differences with thh C-5, the latter never saw fit to circulate them to OC members. This was criticized by BPO in VIEWS ON THE PLANNING MEETING. The C-5 changed its policy on circulating papers at the August meeting; it has never acknowledged the influence of BPO’s paper on this shift. Indeed, it has studiously ignored the existence of this paper, even while calling in the SC minutes of 15 June 1978 for further criticisms of the August meeting (p. 3). This history makes the statement that our procedures have been characterized by “extensive debate” (FOUNDING STATEMENT OCIC, p. 1) a bit premature, as far as we are concerned.
[10] See BOC’s paper, “On Forging a Leading Ideological Center,” (esp. p. 91 written in response to the ”Five Questions,” and circulated by the C-S prior to the February Meeting of the OC.
[11] BOC also called for this kind of self-criticism in the paper cited above. Since they are presently a member of the SC, we are sure that this self-criticism, in addition to those we call for elsewhere in this paper, will be forthcoming. In the meantime, some of us have found the article, “An Open Letter on Criticism-Self Criticism,” in the 11 September 1978 issue of The Communist (newspaper of the Workers Congress (ML), to be a very useful discussion of the principles of criticism-self criticism. We mention this for a couple of reasons: (1) Our movement has not studied the question to any great extent, therefore any substantial discussion merits our attention; (2) It is an example of the fact that ultra-left groups do have a “positive” role to play in party building. Indeed, contrary to the self-congratulatory rhetoric of the Draft Resolution for a Leading Ideological Center, that only we have “demonstrated the potential for rigorous self-examination, a forthright confrontation with errors and the unswerving pursuit of their rectification,” it appears to us that The Communist has published a more advanced discussion of these matters than anything we have seen from the C-5 or the SC.
[12] See our footnote 9.
[13] The Guardian’s views have finally been published in their document, “The State of the Party-Building Movement,” The Guardian, October 18, 1978. The in¬structions to The Guardian Clubs appear on page 14.
[14] The estimate that we are on the “threshold of maturity” is contained in the ”Draft Resolution for a Leading Ideological Center. El Comite–MINP did not sign this draft.