...the same centrifugal tendencies which have been GO prevalent in the recent history of the anti-revisionist movement – each small circle striving to establish its organizational hegemony – have been allowed to govern the development of the Marxist-Leninist trend.
The sentence above comes from the “Founding Statement of the Organizing Committee for an Ideological Center (OC)”. The Guardian printed the OC statement recently (October l8, 1978) But this, apparently offending, sentence was edited out.
Frankly, we were not surprised. Along with the OC’s brief statement, the Guardian staff, presented a document entitled, “The State of the Party-Building Movement.” In the main, this declaration is less a summation of the Guardian staff’s view of the party-building movement than it is an exposition of the Guardian’s attitude to the OC. It touches only briefly on the party-building movement as a whole and is devoted mostly to the Guardian’s views on the history of the OC’s development, an assessment of its strengths and weaknesses, the Guardian’s differences with the OC’s l8 points of unity – all assessed from the standpoint of rationalizing the Guardian’s decision to build its following in opposition to the OC. More than any other document published by a major grouping in the Marxist-Leninist trend recently, the general line of the Guardian’s statement represents the regeneration of the same divisive currents that have fragmented the party-building movement historically.
In light of this, it is necessary to devote substantial space to a response to the Guardian statement. Our critique will demonstrate the following: l) the Guardian’s views of the communist movement give priority to organisation instead of politics; 2) their discussion of the anti-dogmatist, anti-revisionist movement overplays the consolidation of its various political currents; 3) their history of the OC is self-serving and their evaluation of it one-sided; k) their discussion of the OC’s l8 points of unity attempts to exaggerate real differences and fabricate others; and 5) their summation of their attitude to the OC provides no principled justification for their decision to remain outside the OC. In short, we will show that each section of the Guardian’s statement is steeped in the splittist mentality of a small circle’s pursuit of organizational hegemony over the communist movement.
Our treatment follows the Guardian statement section by section. Although there are obvious disadvantages to this approach – particularly in terms of organization and clarity, in the present context it has two important advantages. First, it allows the document to speak for itself – that is, to demonstrate that its sectarian spirit becomes more and more pronounced as the argument for Guardian independence unfolds.
Even more importantly, it exposes those who have recently taken to trying to blunt the struggle against the line of this document. For example, Silber and his following have argued that the splittism of the Guardian staff’s view consists only in its identification of a “Guardian trend” and its call for a “Guardian political organization.” Apart from these two points, they maintain, the Guardian statement is not only basically correct but especially strong in its critique of the OC and its political line. In our view, efforts to limit criticism to these two relatively minor points while upholding the rest of the document have much in common with the tactics of the US government. They serve to strengthen our vigilance against sectarianism as much as Andrew Young’s role in the U.N. supports the struggle of the world’s peoples for freedom.
Before turning to the first section, it is important to note that the introduction sets a curious tone to the document. It begins: “This February some 20-odd local Marxist-Leninist groups with the Philadelphia Workers’ Organizing Committee (PWOC) AS THEIR CENTER established an Organizing Committee for an Ideological Center ...” (emphasis added – CN). Two things should be noted here. First, the words “as their center” have implications that go beyond a recognition that the PWOC is perhaps the most prominent group among the “20-odd” or that individuals in the PWOC played a leading role in initiating the formation of the OC. The clear implication is that the PWOC is the focal point of the OC’s development both organizationally and politically – that the OC is nothing but a creature of the PWOC. This conception is an important aspect of the Guardian’s attack on the OC, but we will return to this point later.
Second, it is important to reflect on why the Guardian feels compelled to identify the PWOC as “the center” in the very first sentence. Surely, it cannot be a question of providing a reference point for its readers so that they could connect a new organization with a more established force. If this had been the design, a number of other prominent groups involved in the formation of the OC (PSO, SUB, BOC, DMLO, SOC, etc.) could have been identified along with the PWOC to provide an even firmer basis for recognition. But, to have included these groups would have implied that the OC had a broad character, that it was more the product of a coming together of a number of equals than of one single group. And it would also have lessened the tendency of the Guardian’s readers to place the OC in the context of the competitive Guardian vs. PWOC dynamic which has emerged in the Marxist-Leninist trend. Unfortunately, a lessening of this competition is not something that the Guardian wants to foster.
In the first section (“State of the U.S. Communist Movement”), the Guardian sets out “to locate the independent M-L movement in the present political spectrum. In order to so this it identifies four tendencies which claim to be Marxist-Leninist: the revisionist tendency, the Trotskyists, the Dogmatists and the “independent M-L movement”. A brief description of each tendency is followed by two paragraphs shich state that all four result from “2-line struggles” in the communist movement and attempt to place the so-called fourth tendency in a historical context.
Taken as a whole this section does not even come close to “locating the independent M-L movement in the present political spectrum.” Instead, the discussion of the “four tendencies” is not only isolated from any conception of the class struggle but treated in an empiricist fashion. A real discussion of the class and political significance of revisionism, Trotskyism and dogmatism as bourgeois ideologies in the working class movement is totally absent. Rather, these opportunist trends are only discussed organizationally – i.e. in the forms in which they presently appear on the U.S. left.
Consider, for example, the discussion of the “revisionist tendency.” Here the Guardian focuses on the CPUSA, mentioning its “allegiance to the U.S.S.R.,” and pointing out that it is “the single most influential ’communist’ organization in the U.S.” with “a daily newspaper, ... a large corps of full-time cadre and positions of influence in a range of mass organizations ...” etc. But, they add, the party lacks “organizational vitality”, has a “woefully weak” theoretical level and its members lack “a sense of confidence” and pride in their organization. And, lest anyone would overplay these weaknesses and forget that the CP “remains by far the most dangerous of all the ’communist’ organizations,” the Guardian reminds its readers that ”the party has staying power, material resources and immense organizational experience.”
Is that how a Marxist sums up the danger posed by the CPUSA – mainly in terms of its staying power, resources, and organizational experience? Hardly. Only an idealist would negate such factors and refuse to take them into account. But surely they must be seen as secondary to questions of political line. The real danger posed by the CPUSA has more to do with the fact that it serves as a force for accommodation to the interests of U.S. imperialism, a force fostering the influence of bourgeois ideas in the working class movement.
Moreover, the CP could have half the staying power, resources and organizational experience of the Trotskyists and the dogmatists and still be more dangerous than both put together. Regardless of the current size and influence of the CP, the material basis for revisionist ideology is bound to grow the closer the working class comes to power – and at a much greater rate than the basis for Trotskyism or dogmatism. A portion of the upward strata of the proletariat, and a significant section of the middle strata are likely to see their privileges threatened by the advancing power of the mass of workers united around a revolutionary line. While on the whole they will not be able to embrace reaction openly, the CP will provide them with the basis to maintain a revolutionary posture but adopt a counter–revolutionary stance.
Nor is the treatment of the CPUSA the only place where the Guardian downplays (of all things) political line in favor of organizational questions. Its treatment of the Trotskyist and the dogmatists tendencies make the same errors. In addition, while the Guardian does pay lip service to the emergence of our trend as the continuer of Marxism’s historic battle against opportunism, its actual treatment of the “four tendencies” taken as a whole negates that development. The historic interconnections of the various “tendencies” are not mentioned, the main features of the various opportunist lines ignored, and the “tendencies” themselves are identified primarily by the largest organization in them.
It should also be pointed out that the description of the “four tendencies” presents a static view – as if all were relatively equal in importance and durability. While presently the CP, the SWP and the CPML may all closely approximate each other in actual membership (especially if the CP’s active core and not its paper membership is the basis of comparison), the three trends of which they are a part clearly do not have equivalent historic significance. The revisionist trend has a long and checkered history, which even if one limits an analysis to its history in the U.S. alone, has proven to be of considerable consequence. Trotskyism has more the character of a sect than a trend (in the full sense of the word) and its actual import is minimal, especially in relationship to revisionism. An analysis of the political weight of dogmatism has yet to be developed but there is little historic precedent for the long term survival of an ultra-left trend, particularly in the face of a viable alternative. In any case, while the dogmatist trend is certainly more significant than Trotskyism at this point, it is unclear that it will remain so in the future. Any view which deals primarily with organizations is bound to obscure such important questions.
The underlying “organization is primary” perspective is even further revealed by the original version of the published document. In the original the fact that three of the “tendencies” are deviations from Marxism-Leninism, that they emerged from “historic 2-line struggles” and that the “fourth tendency” has its roots in a movement to resuscitate a vanguard party whose dominant wing went over to dogmatism was not even mentioned. Instead of the last two paragraphs presently in the first section, the Guardian speculated that a fifth and sixth Tendency” were “in the offing,” both characteristically identified by organizations the fifth by the RCP and the sixth by In These Times. After sharp criticism from its Clubs, the Guardian staff apparently decided that this speculation on new “tendencies” emerging from organizations – organizations which found no place in the Guardian’s “political spectrum” – was too revealing. So Jack Smith proposed an amendment to the document that deleted the speculative section and added two paragraphs strengthening the first section “by noting the historic 2-line struggles which gave rise to the 4th tendency and the bankruptcy of the first three tendencies.” Unfortunately however, the section’s bad line could not be corrected through amendment.
Thus, the Guardian does not locate the emerging Marxist-Leninist trend in the “political spectrum” of the battle of Marxism-Leninism against revisionism, Trotskyism and dogmatism but rather in an “organizational spectrum” of the CPUSA, the SWP and the CPML.
The Guardian’s bias towards the organizational side of affairs has an important connection with the history of the party-building movement. The centrifugal tendencies in our movement have been linked with a strong tendency to adopt a “circle spirit” rather than a “party spirit” – i.e., to subordinate the struggle for the political unification of the communist movement to a quest for organizational hegemony. Both the RU and the OL adopted this line as the core of their party-building strategies. Each engaged in a mad scramble to develop the largest organization, the most chapters in the most cities, the biggest circulation for its newspaper. The struggle for unity on the basis of political line was seen as developing solely within the confines of their own immediate following while broader debate was shaped with an eye to whatever best advanced their own caused and consolidated their adherents. Thus instead of organization serving ideology, ideological struggle was bent to the purposes of achieving organizational supremacy.
This approach is not just damaging in the service of a bad line. By perverting ideological struggle in general it tends to nourish opportunist views and exacerbate differences. Instead of allowing the communist movement as a whole to assert its interest in a principled struggle for unity, polemic becomes distorted into a contest to score the most points on one’s opponent. Such competition can only encourage the raising of all differences, no matter how insignificant in real life, to the level of “fundamental differences in principle”; it only reinforces the tendency to make very minor disagreement become a rift. Given this, should there be any surprise that so much of our movement’s debate has been characterized by confusion and unnecessary division, often verging on obfuscation and splittism?
Underlying this narrow circle approach to party-building is a conception which belittles the role of political line in directing the working class to power. As opposed to the excessively “ideological” stance of a Lenin, comrades who adopt this narrow view advance a more “pragmatic” strategy. For them, the impact of any line, regardless of its correctness, is totally decided by the organizational resources it can mobilize. The force that will win the race to the party is the one that has the biggest following, the largest circulation for its publication, the most organizational experience, etc. And naturally, the proponents of this line measure their competitors by the same standards they apply to themselves.
Certainly anyone would be hard-pressed to prove that this type of thinking underlies the Guardian’s party-building views based solely on a reading of their summation of the “U.S. Communist Movement.” It is not reasonable to assume that the Guardian might have suffered just a lapse in judgement, bending towards a conception running counter to its general line. But in any case, it must be noted that the organizational bias of their summation can only serve to foster both the circle mentality and what underlies it.
Two additional points should be made before moving on. The Guardian states that the OC’s failure “to distinguish between the third (the dogmatist) and the fourth tendency (anti-revisionist, anti-dogmatist)” leads it to make an error by “identifying ’left’ dogmatism as the principal danger within the independent M-L tendency.” This is nonsense. In the first place the OC has very clearly distinguished between the “third and fourth tendencies.” The whole history of the development of the OC is based on a sharp demarcation between the two, between the ultra-left trend and the embryonic trend that have emerged in the anti-revisionist movement. (What the Guardian is really trying to raise here are the differences between themselves and the OC over whether a single anti-revisionist movement still exists. These differences we will discuss later on.) Second, the OC has taken no position on the question of the main danger within the Marxist-Leninist trend. (The reason for the Guardian’s compulsion to assign it one will also be discussed in another section of this response.)
Our second point concerns the Guardian’s use of terminology. Now we don’t want to quibble over words, but it is our understanding that the term “tendency” has acquired a rather precise meaning in the Marxist lexicon. A tendency is not yet a systematic viewpoint on the major questions facing the revolution. Instead, it has only elements of such a viewpoint, elements which may reveal the potential to become a “system of politics” (to use Lenin’s words), but only the elements nonetheless. Thus, a tendency is one step below a trend in its development, more or less equivalent to a trend in embryo. In our opinion, while the anti-revisionist, anti-dogmatist forces may be termed a tendency, the revisionists, Trotskyists and dogmatists clearly cannot.
Here we are not just concerned with the proper use of Marxist nomenclature. There are important scientific distinctions between an opportunist tendency and an opportunist trend, distinctions which have significant practical consequences. A set of incorrect views on several questions (a tendency) is a less significant adversary of a correct line than a systematic retrograde outlook (a trend). Opportunist tendencies have often been defeated in the course of ideological struggle. Trends, on the other hand, have considerable staying power, are rarely eliminated entirely, and thus call for a much more systematic and protracted opposition. Given this, it should be clear that for the Guardian to call the Trotskyists, dogmatists and particularly the revisionists tendencies is, objectively, to disarm Marxist-Leninists.
The second section of the Guardian statement (“Independent Marxist-Leninist Movement”) is notable for its advancement of a rather novel idea. The Guardian states that the “publication of the Guardian’s party-building supplement and the establishment of Guardian Clubs has brought forth a TREND around the Guardian and its political line” (emphasis added – CN). This Guardian “trend” is counterposed to “the other trend” within the anti-revisionist, anti-dogmatist movement, a “trend” with the PWOC “as its center”. Thus in the Guardian’s view there are already two distinct and competing trends in the “fourth tendency.”
It is important to unravel this contention. First, it is ridiculous to speak of a “Guardian trend”, particularly if one is to use the word “trend” in a Marxist manner. In an article written in 1911 Lenin summed up a trend as follows:
We call a trend only a definite sum of political ideas which have become well-defined in regard to ALL the most important questions of BOTH the revolution ... AND the counter-revolution; ideas which, moreover, have proved their right to existence as a trend by being widely disseminated among broad strata of the working class. (emphasis in original – CN; Wks., Vol. 17, p. 271)
Now since Lenin recognized that all phenomenon are subject to change and thus never fixed his characterizations in concrete, it would be wrong to uphold these two sentences as the definitive statement of the meaning of the word “trend”. Certainly, the distinguishing features of a trend are not the same in each and every phase of the revolutionary movement; what constitutes a trend in an earlier period of the class struggle would only be a minor group at a later stage – and vice versa.
Nevertheless, the Guardian and its following still do not constitute a real trend. The major difference between the level of class struggle in Russia in 1911 and that of the U.S. in the late 1970’s can clearly be distinguished by the level of fusion (that nasty word!) between communism and the working class movement to the advantage of the former. So accounting for that difference, in our setting a real trend must approach, at least, a “system of politics” which has demonstrated an ability to create a durable following among Marxist-Leninists.
The Guardian has developed some aspects of a political line, but its viewpoint is nowhere near systematic. It has no defined position on the nature of current monopoly capitalism, the woman question, the united front, the trade union question, etc., maintains a contradictory perspective on the international situation (capitalism has not been restored in the Soviet Union but the dictatorship of the proletariat has been liquidated, the U.S.S.R. is a “social-imperialist superpower” but is not an imperialist country, etc.) and openly is of two minds on the Afro-American national question. And by far most striking, was its frank admission that the Guardian has no “concrete conception of party-building strategy.” (This phrase in quotation marks appear in the original version of the SPBM but was deemed not fit to print.) Clearly, the so-called Guardian trend does not approach a “system of politics”.
Moreover, the Guardian shows just how far from a trend it is when it states: “The organizational expression of the Guardian trend is as yet quite primitive in form, consisting of the newspaper itself, six Clubs which are largely untested, and a good number of individuals closely associated with the Guardian in a much less formal way,” The Guardian is an important national newspaper, but by itself – even assuming further political definition – it cannot constitute a trend. It should also be remembered that the Clubs are small, do not even have unity with the paper’s 29 points, and that their primary function is support work for an anti-imperialist newspaper. The organization of some 70 Marxist-Leninists into Clubs over the last year and a half may be a cause for legitimate optimism, but it is hardly the basis for forging a trend from a following composed mostly of “a good number of individuals closely associated with the Guardian in a much less formal way”.
We should also correct another fallacy designed to promote the Guardian’s claims to existence as a trend. The forces grouped around the OC no more constitute a trend than the Guardian’s following does. The 18 points which form the foundation of the OC’s perspective are much too broad to provide the basis for a trend and the OC’s following, while larger and better organized than the Guardian’s, has yet to be really consolidated. And lest anyone be misled by the Guardian’s allegation that the OC “informally calls itself THE ’trend’” (please note that the emphasis is in the original), we should point out that none of its leading forces have ever identified the OC as a trend, much less THE trend. Some have called for the development of a genuine Marxist-Leninist trend but two things should be noted about this. First, the current state of anti-revisionist, anti-dogmatist forces has been characterized as a “trend in embryo”. Second, the Guardian and its adherents have always been seen as an important part of this trend. It is unfortunate that the Guardian refuses to adopt a similar approach.
“To confuse a trend with minor groups,” Lenin wrote, “means condemning oneself to INTRIGUE in Party politics” (emphasis in original; ibid.) He was commenting on Trotsky’s effort to boost the status of his circle, grouped around the newspaper Pravda, in order to increase its claim to a “right” to intervene in the struggles between Russian Social Democrats. Trotsky speculated that in a “unified” Party, the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks would balance each other out, creating the conditions where his circle could emerge as the leadership.
But just as confusing a trend with a minor group can serve an intrigue encouraging false unity, so it can also serve to foster a false division. And is not this the real purpose of the Guardian’s discussion of two “trends” in our “fourth tendency”? Clearly, the Guardian wants to help buttress its sectarian decision to stay outside the OC by creating the impression that there are two distinct “systems of politics” contending for leadership of the anti-“lefts”. To the extent that other Marxist-Leninists perceive this to be the actual state of affairs, they will tend to choose between one side or another and attach themselves either to the OC or the Guardian. And frankly, we have to admit that the Guardian’s purpose will be better served by such a premature division – a division based on allegiance to particular circles on account of their history and prominance and not on fundamental questions of political line.
The element of “political intrigue” lying behind the Guardian’s identification of “trends” becomes even clearer if one studies the closing paragraph of this section of their document. Before stating their intention to “retain independence” from the OC, the Guardian writes, “it is not unreasonable to speculate (precisely! – CN) that four or five or more (25, 50, 100? – CN) trends will exist when the consolidation of this fourth tendency begins in earnest”.
This is an extraordinary statement! In the first place the consolidation of our tendency has already begun in earnest. For the past three years we have been struggling to consolidate an alternative to the ultra-left forces. We have succeeded in defining clear demarcations with “left” opportunism in the party-building movement and are in the process of rallying forces around this view. A number of new formations (the Guardian Clubs and the OC to name just two) have emerged that have clearly stated unity with the “fourth tendency”. And even the struggle between the Guardian and the PWOC over the correct strategy for party-building is part of this consolidation process. At the very least it has led to the clarification of significant unity while sharpening differences that remain. Can anyone really deny that our consolidation has indeed begun “in earnest”?
Second, the Guardian’s comments about the possibility of “four or five trends” emerging from the “fourth tendency” strike us as rather bizarre. Granted, these comrades may be correct that several trends will take shape over the next few years; we admit that it is “not unreasonable”. But surely there is more being said here than this. If the only point is that further division is possible, why make the assertion at all? No sane person, let alone a communist who has participated in the U.S. party-building movement would dispute such an obvious point.
There is something more – much more. The Guardian obviously thinks that there is a distinct possibility that our Party will result from the merger of several pre-party organizations – a scenario made all the more likely by the Guardian’s attempt to consolidate opposing trends. In this eventuality, those comrades at the head of large organizations will be in the best position to vie for Party leadership. Thus, the staff wagers the best course for the Guardian to pursue is to “retain independence”, mobilize some troops and prepare organizationally for the First Congress. After all, those who do not head organizations are likely to be out of luck when seats on the central committee are handed out!
What kind of revolutionary “speculates” on divisions in the ranks of genuine Marxist-Leninists? Obviously not one who is concerned with avoiding any unnecessary and unprincipled splits among communist forces. Obviously not one who is concerned that the narrow circle spirit – each revolutionary identifying primarily with his/her own circle – be supplanted by a Party spirit - primary identification with the interests of the class vanguard. And obviously not one whose prime concern is the principled unity of the anti-revisionist, anti-dogmatist movement on the basis of correct political line. Again, what kind of revolutionary “speculates” on divisions in our ranks? No revolutionary at all!!!
Before moving on, so that there is no misunderstanding, we would like to summarize the rudiments of our view of the party-building movement today. It is divided into two wings, an ultra-left wing and a Marxist-Leninist one. The ultra-left forces are in by far the stronger position, have ideological hegemony and exert significant influence over the movement as a whole. They have a developed set of views on all the major questions and have the additional asset of international ties with many organizations and parties aligned with the Chinese Communist Party. Despite severe internal contradictions, they must be considered a consolidated trend.
The Marxist-Leninist wing, which includes such diverse forces as the Guardian, El Comite-MINP, TMLC, the PWOC and numerous small organizations, study groups and individuals, does not have a systematic politics but only a partial set of views, is weak and disorganized; it is therefore only a trend in embryo – or a tendency. In addition, and quite predictably given the strength of ultra-leftism, a center has emerged which has broken with some aspects of “left-wing” communism but is unwilling to make a thorough separation from the “left” line. These forces (PUL, RWH, etc.) desire to keep one foot in each camp.
In the third section (“Brief History of the ’Trend’”) we need, to address the question of the Guardian’s assertion that is was justified in remaining outside the Committee of Five, the predecessor of the OC. The Guardian provides three reasons for its decision. First, there “were important political differences between the Guardian and the Committee of Five”. Second, “there was a decided tendency ... to view the Guardian as ’less equal’ than the other groups ...”. And third (the paragraph explaining the Guardian’s third reason is repetitive of the previous reasons and thus confusing, but we will attempt to clarify it) the low level of development of the Committee of Five groups.
While the Guardian offers no evidence for any of these points, we must admit that the groups in the Committee of Five did indeed have a “low level” – particularly in relation to the political level necessary to realize a vanguard party. But in their defense a number of points should be made. First, none made any secret of their weaknesses and were quite forthright about their theoretical limitations, circumscribed practice and amateur methods of organization. A document adopted by four of the five summed up their level (and that of the “fourth tendency” as a whole) as follows:
Concretely, the state of the embryonic Marxist-Leninist trend can be characterized as one of theoretical underdevelopment, amateur methods of organization and work, and fragmentation. (Draft Resolution for a Leading Ideological Center, July 1977)
Second, although their inadequacies were quite obvious, they were certainly no more severe than those of the “fourth tendency” as a whole, and in fact tended to be less so. Generally speaking, the forces drawn together in the Committee of Five are among the more developed and better consolidated forces in the anti-revisionist, anti-dogmatist movement. But more importantly, these forces had come together to hold discussions of how to press forward party-building among other like-minded groups. The Guardian was invited to participate in these exchanges but refused. Surely the “low level” could not be the basis for the Guardian’s stand.
In contrast to the Guardian’s point that the groups in the Committee of Five had a “low level”, its contention that it was seen as “less equal” has no basis in fact. There was one occasion where one of the assembled groups’ representatives did question the Guardian’s participation given its status as a newspaper. But the other four organizations argued that any objection on such grounds was politically incorrect, particularly considering the actual leading role in the “fourth tendency” which the Guardian had assumed. After discussion all the groups agreed that the Guardian should participate fully in all discussion and, of course, in any voting that might be necessary. And, at the next meeting, the organization whose representative raised the question advanced a self-criticism for having raised the question in the first place. We challenge the Guardian to point to a single other example in the whole two-year history of the Committee of Five which would even indicate that they were viewed as “less equal”.
In our view, the real basis of the Guardian’s perception that it was seen as “less equal” cannot be found in the practice of the Committee of Five. On the contrary, it lies in the paper’s own self-image. While the Guardian feels that any modesty on the part of others “suggests a degree of political manipulation or the felt necessity to conciliate with strong ultrademocratic and antileadership tendencies,” it is always quite “forthright” in pointing to its own role. For example, consider its comments about its place in the movement to support Angola. It asserts that its research and reporting on the events in Angola and its solidarity with the MELA were “beyond the capacity of a local collective or even a federation of local collectives”.
Now, no one will deny that the Guardian’s role in relationship to Angola was generally excellent. It took a firm stand in the face of considerable criticism. Its coverage of the Angolan struggle demonstrated the best qualities of revolutionary journalism; it was penetrating, concrete and, most important, truthful. And the various Guardian viewpoints summing up developments in the struggle were consistently on target. But, this notwithstanding, is it really correct to say that all this was “beyond” everyone else’s capacity? Could not a “local collective or even a federation of local collectives” have researched Angola, reported on the struggles there and built support for the MPLA? Certainly. Perhaps, the Guardian could achieve these goals more easily, but it was not beyond everyone else’s capacity.
All this brings us to a rather touchy subject – the Guardian’s tendency to blow its own horn. We think that the Guardian’s role in the left is generally quite well understood and deservedly well-respected; it is really quite unnecessary for these comrades to repeatedly remind everyone of their own importance. We see no tendency, particularly among anti-revisionist, anti-dogmatist forces, to belittle or downgrade the Guardian.
The Guardian’s repeated reminders of its prominence, in fact, indicate more about its own self-esteem than about our movement’s real feelings. Apparently the Guardian feels that its contributions make it “more equal” than others and it must struggle to make everyone recognize this fact. Those, of course, who don’t pay proper homage to the “more equal” status are said to actually hold the view that the Guardian is “less equal”. This, we think, best explains the paper’s contention that it was seen as inferior and that therefore its views would not be “given serious consideration”.
Finally, we cannot prove that the Guardian did not feel that its “political differences” with the Committee of Five made it impossible for them to participate Not being party to their internal discussions or documents, we lack firm evidence. On the other hand, however, we can say that “serious political differences” were never advanced as the primary reason for not participating in the Committee until long after that body ceased to exist. And since the Guardian now contends that it has consistently put forward its criticisms of the Five’s “political line and party-building strategy”, we will have to remind them about the actual history of their liaison.
The Guardian was requested to participate in the Committee of Five on two occasions^ The first was right at the beginning. The Guardian attended the initial meeting and then withdrew. The letter sent to the Five (which we will produce if necessary) announcing their decision contained no explanation at all, political or otherwise. The Five decided to take the initiative to explore the Guardian’s reasons for leaving and sent a representative to New York who met with two Guardian Coordinating Committee members. According to the notes of the meeting, the Guardian said that the main reason it was leaving was that the Five other groups “lacked maturity”. Concretely, they felt this immaturity was manifest in three incidents: l) the question concerning the Guardian’s participation mentioned above, 2) a remark by one representative that a speaker from the PWOC would have more impact on developments locally than Irwin Silber would, and 3) the failure of the Five other organizations to take up building the Guardian as a primary task in party-building. (It should not be necessary to sum up the political significance of any of these three points nor to point out their connection with the Guardian’s current claim to be a “trend”.)
The second occasion occurred after the Committee of Five had formulated its 18 points in February of 1976. The Guardian representatives attended a Committee of Five meeting where they said they were “seriously considering” the Five’s invitation to renew their participation. At the meeting the Guardian stated that they were “in general agreement” with the l8 points and offered what they termed “three minor amendments”. (None on points 10 or 15 or on points 11, 12, or l8, a minor change in point 9 to identify the principal sources of modern revisionism and two additional points on the united front.) However, they did say that they had some “reservations” about the PWOC’s position on the international situation and the PSO’s line on party-building. At that time they were told that neither position was a basis of unity for the Committee of Five and that there existed “reservations” about each among other organizations already part of the Five.
In a meeting held later, to hear the Guardian’s decision, these “reservations” were given as part of the basis for its decision. (The other part concerned what a Guardian representative termed its “need to lag behind the movement organizationally.”) But at no time did the Guardian maintain that either of these viewpoints were generalizeable in the Committee nor did it present a single argument as to why these differences prevented an effort to formulate a common approach to the consolidation of our tendency. The Guardian just asked the Five to accept the fact that “it would be better” if they pursued their own plan to build the Guardian Clubs.
One more point on the record of the Guardian-Committee of Five liaison. On both occasions of the Guardian’s refusal to participate, the Five requested that the Guardian put its views in writing. If the Guardian had agreed to do so, we could verify what is presented above. But two facts tend to lend further substantiation to our version. First, a Committee of Five spokesperson put forth the same version at the August 1977 meeting, organized to adopt the 18 points and attended by some 20 representatives. The Guardian’s representative was given the floor immediately following the Five’s report and specifically requested to comment on it; he did not dispute or in any way attempt to alter the balance of the report even though he participated personally in all meetings with representatives of the Committee. Second, this is not the first occasion on which interpretation about the substance of the Guardian-Committee of Five liaison has raised controversy. The Guardian claimed previously that it had raised its criticisms of the perspective of the Five (see the Organizer, March 1978). The PWOC disputed the Guardian’s contention, offered a different version (similar to ours) of the content of the liaison and presented supporting evidence. The Guardian has made no attempt to contradict PWOC’s account or to offer substantiation of its opposing view. Instead, it seems to have resigned itself to merely restating its claim.
To sum up the significance of this history. Again, we cannot prove that “political differences” were not seen by the Guardian to be the basis of its refusal to join the Five even if it choose to conceal those differences. But another rationale is, at least, as consistent (if not more so) with the actual history, especially in light of the Guardian’s recent party-building document. And that is this: The Guardian became convinced that the Five would not be a vehicle for building a “Guardian trend”; clearly, it would have to pursue that objective outside of the Committee just as it now must pursue it outside the OC.
The section of the Guardian’s document (The Establishment of the OC) purports to be an analysis of the OC’s strengths and weaknesses. It recognizes as positive the national framework established by the OC, the unity on the basis of political line of the groups that make up the OC, the break in the 18 points with revisionism and class collaborationism in international line, the OC’s commitment to the development of a “leading political line” and the fact that the OC does not see itself as the only legitimate center for the “fourth tendency”. But, the Guardian states, “these points are markedly offset by a number of other factors and concurrent developments”. Since these offsetting factors are intended to provide a political rationale for the pursuit of the “Guardian trend”, let’s examine them one by one.
“The national structure is essentially a formality” provides the first “offsetting factor”. The Guardian tries to buttress this assertion by arguing that many groups who have joined the OC have the opinion that local work is primary and therefore demand that any national center only take up the questions raised by local work. We will not deny that the “local work is primary” view still has some currency in the OC. But, it should be noted that it is a view that is currently on the defensive. The whole fight to establish the OC was largely a struggle against this tendency. One of the original Committee of Five groups tried to elaborate a theoretical foundation for this localism and opposed the formation of any national center which was not geared primarily to serving local groups. This group proposed a series of local and regional centers with a national center for the purposes of co-ordination only. This narrow perspective received only one vote at the OC’s founding conference.
In addition, to the survivals of localism making the national structure a “formality”, the Guardian adds: “as presently structured, the OC opens the door to a federationist pre-party form in which semi-autonomous ... local groups, each practicing their own democratic centralism, will negotiate over political line and organizational questions.” We would agree that federationist spirit is still a very real danger. At the conference establishing the OC the struggle against federationism was only begun. The issue that sparked the debate was the proposal that individuals or individual members of organizations and not organizational representatives be elected to the OC steering committee. And while substantial progress was made in raising consciousness about the dangers of federationism, this proposal did not win. It is clear that a great deal still must be done to close the door on federationism.
It is ironic, however, that in the concrete struggle waged against federationism, the Guardian representatives sat on their hands. When finally forced to speak to the point, one staff representative stated that while he was with the struggle against a federationist mentality in spirit, he thought it was “premature” to raise the question of whether individuals or organizations should assume leadership. Moreover, since we are on the topic of federationism, we might point out that the Guardian’s speculation on “four or five trends” discussed above expresses precisely the federationist mentality that the OC groups are criticized for; party-building based on the fusion of four trends negotiating for central committee seats is “federationism” with a vengeance. Clearly, inside the OC is not the only place where the Guardian is with the fight against federationism in spirit but regards it as “premature” in practice.
The Guardian’s second “offsetting factor” concerns the so-called failure of the OC to recognize that its establishment contradicted the “fusion line” of party-building. In particular, it failed to see that its own constitution proved that “unity around political line is the indispensible starting point for party-building.” And then the Guardian proceeds to quote a long statement from the Buffalo Workers’ Movement (BWM) about the difference between the attitude of the more developed groups who want to centralize the ideological struggle and the less developed ones who desire guidance on “fusion”.
In the first place, we know of no members of the OC (other than PUL sympathizers) who deny that “unity around political line is the indispensable starting point for party-building”. While the OC does not have a position on the “fusion strategy” for party-building, it seems to us that the Guardian makes no case that this line as advanced by the PWOC and others was contradicted by the formation of our organization. Like so many of its contentions about the OC, the Guardian merely makes the assertion and leaves it to the reader to elaborate the argument.
And it seems that the real purpose of the quotation from the BWM is not to show that the OC’s development contradicted fusion but to lay the foundation for the Guardian’s claim – to be made later in its document – that the OC has adopted the fusion perspective as its guiding line. The BWM’s whole argument rests on the assumption on their part that “agreement on fusion as a key task of this period” is “the linchpin of our (the OC’s) party-building strategy”. We will return to the reasons for the Guardian’s claim later on.
The third offsetting point, according to the Guardian, is the OC’s decision to make agreement with the 18 points “optional” for groups wishing to join it. This, they argue, was done to conciliate the Proletarian Unity League and its adherents who are opposed to seeing the question of U.S. imperialism as the main enemy of the peoples of the world as a dividing line for the anti-dogmatist forces. The Guardian argues that this step was “sheer opportunism”, a concession made for “fear of alienating a handful of groups” who agreed with PUL.
The Guardian distorts the OC1s real stand on the l8 points. Two separate questions are collapsed into one; the first is the OC’s approach to groups with a low level of political unity and the other has to do with the PUL adherents. In neither case did the OC agree to make its points of unity “in effect ... optional”. For those with a low level of political unity, the OC did agree that groups who had no disagreements with the 18 points but did not feel ready to express full consolidation on each point could participate on two conditions. They would have to develop a program to consolidate themselves on the points fully, and they would have to agree to withdraw if that consolidation process proved them to be in disunity with any of the l8 points. We think this kind of flexibility is necessary in the OC’s initial stages given the low level of political consolidation in our trend as a whole. And, if this is a manifestation of “sheer opportunism”, then what is the political significance of the Guardian’s reduction of its 29 points to 10 as the basis for joining its Clubs?
The OC did make a concession to the PUL adherents. But it should be recognized that all the groups in the OC which sympathize with PUL claim not to oppose the substance of point l8 (the U.S. is the main enemy); PUL, on the other hand, which is open about its opposition, has been excluded from the OC and raises a hew and cry about the “sectarianism” of the OC for keeping them out. The PUL adherents argue that while they have no position on point l8 the OC is sectarian to uphold the point as a line of demarcation for building a trend opposed to ultra-leftism. The majority in the OC clearly disagrees. But rather than just expel the PUL sympathizers, it was important to expose the anti-sectarian cover used by PUL and its followers to cloak their “left” internationalism. This exposure would serve as a practical demonstration that point l8 was indeed a dividing line with ultra-leftism. In addition, in our view, the entire tendency could benefit from a centralized and systematically organized discussion of the correct lines of demarcation with “left” opportunism and the proper method to build a genuine Marxist-Leninist trend. Both of these goals may only be of minor concern to forces like the Guardian who approach the movement solely as a recruiting ground and thus do not have to grapple with the ideological problems of communists as a whole and the process for their principled resolution. We, however, feel that steps taken to ensure the political consolidation of our forces as a genuine trend do not constitute “sheer opportunism”[1]:
The fourth offsetting factor on the Guardian list is its contention that the OC has no “guiding strategic concept for ... theoretical work.” In large measure this is true; the OC has not clearly outlined the major theoretical tasks facing the communist movement nor developed a plan of how to take them up. But it has identified what it considers to be the primary theoretical tasks facing party-builders. In order to consolidate our tendency and create a solid foundation for moving forward, we must first develop a firm analysis of the nature of the ultra-left line which presently hegemonizes the communist movement. In particular, we need to identify its material basis, its main features and theoretical foundation. We had hoped that the Guardian would join us in this work.
Beyond that, the OC has committed itself to drafting a plan allowing for a centralized approach to our pressing theoretical tasks. As opposed to the Guardian which favors a decentralized and disunited approach to this work (one based on opposing “trends”), we are convinced that only the common efforts of the anti-revisionist, anti-dogmatist forces as a whole can possibly resolve the thorny questions facing communists in the U.S. And, again, in contrast to the Guardian, we do not feel that the identification of the principle questions facing us or the shaping of a plan to address them should occur in secret, behind closed doors or confined within the narrow parameters of a single “trend”. Our view is that the theoretical struggle is of such central importance that it cannot be reserved for the elite but should engage the tendency as a whole -both leadership and rank and file.
While the Guardian tries to conceal the fact, it seems that the fifth “offsetting factor” is really the Guardian’s primary concern. The Guardian claims that the OC (the use of the PWOC as the nominal target is merely a smokescreen) is trying “to command loyalty to its organizing efforts as the sole road to party-building ...”. It then asks itself the following rhetorical question: should our primary loyalty be “to the interests of (an) emerging trend or ... (should it be) to the task of party-building and, in particular, to a set of political principles which will guide the development of a leading political line in the party building process?” Since the obvious answer is the latter the Guardian smugly adds that therefore no one should be surprised that it has decided to pursue “other forms of organization”.
So here we return to the circle spirit revealed so clearly in the “Guardian trend” discussion. Since the Guardian clearly understands that all communists must see their primary identification as lying not with the “fourth tendency” but with the PARTY, it is justified in pursuing “other forms of organization” – namely the building of its “trend”. The basis for this trend was laid by the Guardian party-building supplement published in 1977 where the paper set forth “a set of political principles (the 29 points, or course – CN) which will guide the development of a leading political line.” Thus, the main line of struggle at this stage is not to unite the tendency as a whole in a single process which would allow a “leading political line” to emerge in open, movement-wide ideological struggle but a fight for a division in the ranks so as to build the “Guardian trend” and defeat the retrograde OC. Every circle for itself, the devil take the hindmost!!
Now we can turn to the fifth section of the Guardian’s statement, (“The 18 Principles of Unite of the OC...”) the section where the Guardian strives mightily to create a political rationale for its decision to build the “Guardian trend”. But before examining the Guardian’s objections to the l8 points, we urge the reader to take note that an attempt to conjure up an identity between the line of the OC and that of the PWOC underlies much of this section. This collapsing of distinctions between the OC’s line and that of PWOC is calculated to serve two purposes. First, it is geared towards strengthening the Guardian’s contention that the OC is not really what it claims to be. While presenting itself as a vehicle for the entire tendency, the OC is really part of the PWOC party-building designs. The PWOC, “suggest(ing) a degree of political manipulation”, is not as honest as the Guardian is and thus conceals its aim. So that while some may believe that the OC is genuinely independent of PWOC, it really bears the same relationship to the PWOC that the Guardian Clubs do to the Guardian – i.e. the vehicle for building a distinct “trend” in the anti-revisionist, anti-dogmatist tendency.
The second purpose is to create the impression that there is no difference between the politics of the OC and those of PWOC. Unity with the OC may seem to be unity with the 18 points but that is really a false picture. Because the line of the OC is the same as that of the PWOC, to join the OC is to unite entirely with PWOC’s political line.
Both purposes lead in the same direction. To the extent that the Guardian succeeds in creating this false impression, its whole line on the OC becomes legitimate. For it is one thing to oppose the attempt of another circle to impose itself on our movement but something altogether different to fight for a split in the ranks of genuine communist forces.
On to the 18 points. The Guardian states that there are “two (points) with which (it) has serious disagreements, two where note must be taken of their implications, and two others where we believe there are disturbing questions as to their inadequacy and application in practice.” Following their lead, our response will adopt these three categories: l)“serious disagreements”, 2) “implications” and 3) “disturbing questions”.
The Guardian’s first serious disagreement is with point 10. It reads as follows:
Thus, the building of a vanguard party remains the central task of all honest Marxist-Leninists. Such a party cannot be built in isolation from the great movements of the working class and the oppressed nationalities. It only becomes possible on the basis of the development of a concrete application of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions in the U.S. and a fusing of the communist movement to the class struggle of the proletariat.
According to the Guardian, this point “is the enunciation of a strategy for bringing a new vanguard party into being”. The OC, it seems, “wants the party to be born full grown, already a mature organization which has been able to fuse communism with the workers’ movement even before the party itself exists.” Such a view just “perpetuates primitiveness of organization in the communist movement and downplays the central role of political line in party-building.” The Guardian proceeds along the same lines for two more paragraphs.
If comrades reread point 10 they will inevitably come to the conclusion that the Guardian has taken leave of its senses. Aside from the question of whether this objective could be achieved in some 50 words, it is ridiculous to maintain that point 10 is the “enunciation of a strategy” for party-building. While the point does identify two main elements (an independent elaboration of Marxism-Leninism and a joining of communists with the class struggle) necessary for a genuine established vanguard, it says nothing about how these two should be achieved, their interrelationships or the order in which they should be taken up. How then is it a strategy for party-building?
Nor does the Guardian actually disagree with anything stated here. Clearly it has never argued that a genuine party can exist which is not fused to the working class. Otherwise it would advocate a bourgeois, non-vanguard party. What the Guardian has maintained is that the “fusion” aspect of party-building can only take shape after Marxist-Leninists unite around correct political line. But this is a different matter and it does not contradict anything in point 10.
Moreover, there is considerable evidence that the Guardian knows it has unity with point 10. This exact same formulation was presented to the Guardian in January of 1976 and they were told that it was intentionally framed so as to create no barriers to their participation. In a meeting in February of the same year, the Guardian expressed “basic unity” with the 18 points; while it did offer amendments to other points, there was no change suggested in point 10. In August of 1976, when the points were being discussed for adoption, the Guardian reiterated its “fundamental agreement”, again offering no amendment to point 10. At the completion of the amendment process, the Guardian representative voted to adopt the 18 points, including point 10 as it is presently worded. Finally, in February 1978 the Guardian once again voted for endorsing the l8 points without a word against point 10. Is this how the Guardian expresses its “serious disagreements”?
Apparently what was not controversial previously has become a question which is not “of a secondary nature”. Apparently a formulation which the Guardian supported on three distinct occasions, each separated by six months, has suddenly become a strategy for party-building “with which the Guardian has serious disagreements”. Clearly it is not point 10 which has changed. Nor has the line of the OC. It is the PWOC that has argued that “fusion is the essence of party-building” and not the OC. It is the PWOC which has maintained that the process of developing political line is inseperable from the process of fusion and not the OC. No, it is not the OC’s line that has changed, it is something else – the prospects for a “Guardian trend”, perhaps?
The second “serious disagreement” has more substance than the first. The Guardian objects to the fact that point 15 fails to recognize that the “new communist movement” no longer exists. According to them it passed from the scene “about a year ago”. No further elaboration. Just a solemn admonishment: “This is a serious matter. It is the failure to recognize that one period ended and another began”.
In our opinion, “serious matters” deserve serious treatment. We have searched the pages of the Guardian for the last year and have found no development whatever of the Guardian’s view on this question. The only additional statement comes from the Guardian Souvenir Journal where it is stated that the “new communist movement” ’officially’ ended when China in effect recognized the Communist Party (M-L) as the leading U.S. party.” While it would also seem that the Guardian staff’s view has only appeared quite recently in the pages of their newspaper (although the movement met its “end” over a year ago), we would hope that there is something more to their analysis than the fact that the CPML has been anointed by the CPC. This type of analysis might suit a newspaper removed from real life, but it can hardly guide those that face the “lefts” everyday and must present their views clearly to the masses.
It is not really appropriate to discuss the OC’s views on this matter here. But let us raise some important considerations that we would think would be implied in the Guardian’s view. First the anti-revisionist, anti-dogmatist forces would have to have consolidated as thorough a break with the ultra-lefts as the anti-revisionist movement’s break with the CPUSA; we would have to have developed a thorough sense of the social basis of ultra-leftism, its ideological roots and some sense of its international significance as a trend. Second, our forces would have to have generated an alternative line to the point where it provided an objective basis for separating the genuine communists under the influence of “left” opportunism from the consolidated opportunists. And finally, we would have to have made a serious effort to win all the honest forces away from the opportunist ranks.
We would be happy to further entertain the Guardian’s views on these questions. If they convince us that the conditions for the passing of the “new communist movement” have been fulfilled, then we will gladly change point 15 accordingly.
In addition to the OC’s failure to change its views on this point, the Guardian is alarmed that “there is growing evidence that the real meaning of point 15 is that “left” opportunism is the principle danger in the ranks of the ’anti-revisionist, anti-dogmatist’” forces. The Guardian asserts that “any real examination” of our forces will prove that the greatest danger comes from the right.
The OC has taken no formal position on the question of the main danger within our tendency, although our perspective on the continued existence of the communist movement has led us to emphasize the danger of the “left”. And, while we have taken note of the various right deviations the Guardian mentions, we are much less sanguine than they about the “left” danger. Partly this comes from our study of the history of the party-building movement as it developed in succession from POC, to PL, to CLP, to RCP and most recently CPML. Each of these organizations began with a critique of the ultra-leftism of its predecessor and some measure of a break with the ultra-left line. But that break was not consolidated because each ended up as permeated by “left-wing” communism as their forerunners. Since one of the earliest signs of their move into the ultra-left camp was always a reassessment of where the main danger came from, we are wary of prematurely renouncing the struggle against “left” opportunism.
The other part of our concern with the Guardian’s present view comes from the concrete experience of building the OC. Like any effort to move communist forces to a higher level, we were presented by obstacles on both the right and the “left”. As we mentioned above, the right line was advanced in opposition to the formation of the OC and tried to provide a theoretical foundation for localism, pragmatism and federationism. At the OC’s founding conference this line was defeated and the organization advancing it has since left the OC.
The “left” danger, however, has proved to be much more difficult to defeat. It has reared its head in two different places. First is the conciliationist tendency grouped around PUL. This bloc is unwilling to carry through on a break with the prevailing “left-wing” communism by separating itself from “left” internationalism. It is trying to maintain that one can genuinely oppose “left” opportunism but fail to recognize that U.S. imperialism is the main force for world reaction. These comrades have a much more substantial following than the right forces mentioned above and they have proved able to create a great deal more confusion among our ranks.
The second manifestation of the “left” danger unfortunately lies most prominently in the Guardian itself. The Guardian has refused to join in any effort (within the OC or outside of it) to create a single national center for the “fourth tendency” but has fought for a premature division in our ranks on the basis of its embryonic political line. Its tactics have not been characterized by unprincipled conciliationism but by unprincipled polarization of our trend. Borrowing heavily from the legacy of “left-wing” communism, it has invested everything in consolidating its own narrow following and little in building the tendency as a whole. It has raised the bogy of right opportunism in order to frighten honest comrades away from the struggle against ultra-leftism and it has now taken to manufacturing “trends” out of thin air. Need we say more!
Again, we would be glad to engage the Guardian (and others) in a discussion of the nature of the main danger within the “fourth tendency”. Hopefully, this discussion can be pursued in a more unitary manner than has been the Guardian’s practice in the past.
To briefly sum up the Guardian’s “serious disagreements”: On the first point the Guardian has no real disunity with the OC. And on the second the Guardian does have potential disagreements, but neither the depth of these disagreements nor their political significance have even begun to be explored. Given this, can the Guardian really argue that the political foundation has been laid for a principled split and the building of competing “trends”?
The two points where the Guardian feels the need to take not of implications are points 9 and 18. On both points the Guardian’s expressed concern is the OC’s attitude to the Soviet Union. It points out that neither point goes beyond opposition to the line of the CPSU and neither provides any assessment of the objective role of the Soviet Union in the world today nor the danger it presents to the world’s peoples. On this basis, the Guardian is worried that there might be a tendency to conciliate revisionism in the OC.
We agree that the OC’s present position on the USSR is inadequate. No communist can claim to have even the basic elements of a world outlook without a firm position on the Soviet Union. The USSR plays a central role in international events. It is involved one way or another (either directly or indirectly, i.e. through the parties under its thumb – or both) in almost every country in the world, presents a major obstacle to U.S. imperialism’s quest for world domination, claims to be the leading force in the world revolutionary movement, etc. Clearly it would be absurd to form a Party – or even a “trend”– without a position on the Soviet’s role.
However, the OC does not represent such a move. The l8 points of unity were framed with the objective of providing a principled basis for gathering the full breadth of the anti-revisionist, anti-dogmatist forces. They are not intended to sum up a full break with every key manifestation of revisionism but rather to provide a sufficiently firm foundation to deepen the critique of revisionism though ideological struggle. In this regard, the question that the Guardian is raising can best be clarified if it is posed as follows.
Suppose an organization (or a study group or even an individual) had full unity with the l8 points, including the entire critique of the CPUSA, but did not have an analysis of the USSR’s role in the world or even tended to think that it was generally a reliable ally of the world’s peoples (or some such view which would be generally in line with those of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea). Should that group be excluded from the OC? We think not.
In any case, we doubt that the real purpose of raising the “implications” of not having an adequate position on the USSR has anything to do with a genuine fear of revisionist influences in the OC. In the first place, the anti-revisionist credentials of the leading forces in the OC are as good as the Guardian’s, especially is one measures substance and not bluster. The force that the Guardian claims to be the OC’s “center” has clearly opposed the USSR’s negative role. The PWOC has argued that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is characterized by great power chauvinism and hegemonism. And, it has opposed Soviet hegemonism consistently – from the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia to its present reactionary role in Ethiopia and support for Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea. We have not polled every organization in the OC, but we imagine that there are many who would share these views.
Secondly, the Guardian advocates a “stronger stand on the USSR now, but has never proposed any amendment to the 18 points which would meet their present criticisms. In essence, this fact is acknowledged when they upbraid the OC for not accepting the following amendment proposed in August 1977:
The principal contradiction in the world at the present time is between US imperialism and its capitalist allies on the one hand and the oppressed peoples and nations on the other.
Would adoption of this amendment have strengthened the OC’s stand on the USSR? Since it does not even mention the Soviets, obviously not.
Furthermore, a recapitulation of the reasons for rejection of this amendment will prove embarrassing to the Guardian. While the Guardian staff states that its amendment was “turned down and .... never seriously discussed,”. their representative was unable to respond to the objections raised to this amendment. In particular, it was pointed out that the Guardian’s amendment would tend to eliminate adherents of the “united front against the two superpowers” strategy. The advocates of this strategy hold that the principal contradiction in the world is not that between the oppressed peoples and U.S. imperialism alone but between the forces of national liberation and both superpowers (the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.). And, to the amusement of many delegates, it was also pointed out that the Guardian itself advocated a united front against two superpowers (in point 21 of its 29 “Principles of Unity for a New Party”) and was therefore contradicting its own line. Given this, there is considerable irony in the charge that the OC’s failure to accept the Guardian’s amendment shows it to be soft on revisionism.
We suspect that the real reason for the Guardian’s raising of the Soviet Union has to do with its desire to be the leadership of a “trend”.. The Guardian realizes that along with a healthy opposition to revisionism in our tendency, many are still afflicted by an irrational exaggeration of the danger of it. It is this kind of irrationality which underlies much of the “anti-revisionism” of such groups as the CPML and the RCP and reached its logical conclusion in PRRWO’s search for “Menshevik fruit flies”. The Guardian tries to manipulate these irrational fears in service of its “trend”. What else can be the reason for raising the bogies of support for a Soviet invasion of China or Czechoslovakia?
The Guardian’s two “disturbing questions” can only reinforce the view that it is searching for a political justification for its anti-OC stand. Having played on the fear of revisionism, it now raises the concern that there may be serious weaknesses in the position of OC organizations around the struggle against racism and sexism. We will leave no doubt on this score; these serious weaknesses do indeed exist. But they are hardly unique to the OC.
The Guardian itself suffers from the same inadequacies. It points to the Committee of Five’s failure to fulfill its commitment to hold a conference on women and maintains that the PWOC’s position on superseniority is incorrect. We, in turn, could point out that the Guardian failed to mobilize for and participate in the ERA march last spring or that in the one concrete struggle against racism at the OC’s founding conference both Guardian representatives remained absolutely silent. But what does such pettiness prove? Can one base the claim to two distinct “trends” on such feeble examples?
Clearly, the Guardian is attempting to find any question whatsoever on which it might, through unusual effort, be able to find some evidence of right opportunism. The analysis is not to be tailored to the facts but the facts to be tailored to the analysis.
Taken as a whole, the “serious disagreements”, “implications” and “disturbing questions” do not make the case that the “political line and party-building strategy now unfolded by the OC is characterized by a serious right opportunist error”. Instead, the fact that of the two “serious disagreements” only one has any real substance as a divergence with the OC and that one has yet to be explored, the fact that the “implications” are really calculated to play upon the fear of revisionism, and the fact that the “disturbing questions” are of such a petty nature – all this tends to support the opposite conclusion. It is not the OC that suffers from opportunism. It is the Guardian whose “political line and party building strategy” are “characterized by a serious ... opportunist error” – namely, the circle spirit.
The final section of the Guardian’s statement (“The Guardian and the OC”) sets out to sum up the Guardian’s reasons for remaining independent from the OC. The present discussion is revised from the original version. According to its reviser, it was necessary “to strengthen the section ... to make it entirely clear that our political differences with the OC are primary”. The initial version listed political disagreements as only one reason out of five and layed stress on two other: 1) the Guardian’s recognition “that it must acquire additional practical experience and CONSOLIDATE ITS ORGANIZATIONAL FORM in order to maximize its efforts” (emphasis added – CN) and 2) the fact that “the Guardian is a unique political phenomenon”. Apparently it was felt that these two points would too clearly reveal the narrow mentality underlying the Guardian’s approach.
Instead, the Guardian offers the following rationale for its decision to build its “independent trend”:
At this stage and in the forseeable future we maintain the Guardian must consolidate its own left trend external to the formation organized by the OC in order to better sharpen the principled struggle against right opportunism within our party-building movement. For our Guardian trend to submerge itself into the OC would be to concede legitimacy to the OC’s incorrect theoretical and political lines and also weaken the Guardian trend’s ability to conduct an all-sided struggle.
Two points need to be made in relation to this argument. First, it would seem that if political differences are really primary, one would adopt an approach which assessed the significance of those differences – not just in an abstract sense but also concretely in relation to the pressing tasks facing the communist movement. In particular, one would go to great pains to demonstrate that those differences prevented the common pursuit of these tasks, that as soon as they were actually taken up the whole process would inevitably come to a halt until the disagreements were resolved. Thus the Guardian should show how its “political differences” bear on the most immediate tasks facing the “fourth tendency” and how the OC’s divergent perspective would contradict a correct orientation. That would be a Marxist – and a principled – approach.
But since the Guardian gives up basing its tactics on an actual assessment of the significance of its political disagreements, it has no choice but to draw on the legacy of sectarianism to justify its course. Consider the appeal to a narrow splittist mentality in the three related reasons given for remaining outside the OC in the quotation above. First, the “Guardian must consolidate its own left trend external to the OC in order to sharpen the principled struggle against right opportunism”. The idea that a Marxist-Leninist line must always retain not only political but organizational independence from an incorrect one has long been a primary feature of a sectarian approach. From this standpoint in order to wage ideological struggle against an incorrect line one has to first organize some troops – or better yet an entire “trend” – so as to have muscle once the battle really begins to rage. Of course, these troops must be organized in total isolation from any forces influenced by the incorrect line otherwise they will be tainted. And this must be done regardless of the degree of consolidation of the incorrect view, regardless of whether it exists at the level of an error, a deviation, a tendency or a mature opportunist trend.
The second reason given by the Guardian for not joining the OC is that to do so “would be to concede legitimacy to the OC’s incorrect theoretical and political lines”. This also has long been a favorite line of sectarians. To join an organization under opportunist leadership is to concede legitimacy to that leadership and the bankrupt line that guides its approach. Since communists should always avoid boosting the stock of an. opportunist line, they should avoid joining any organization that is even remotely tainted by opportunism. Such important considerations as the level of consolidation of the incorrect line, the significance of its deviation from proletarian ideology, the restrictions placed on the struggle against that leadership are all of no consequence. To be consistent with this thesis, to join the AFL-CIO is to “concede legitimacy” to George Meany’s collaborationism, to join an organization with CP. leadership, or to take united action with CP. members, “concedes legitimacy” to revisionism, etc.
And, finally, to join the OC would be “to weaken the Guardian trend’s ability to conduct an all-sided struggle”. Another hallmark of splittism. The joining of an organization with an incorrect line inevitably ties the hands of those who bear the revolutionary line. One can only really conduct “an all-sided struggle” from the outside. Once again no account is to be taken of the degree of consolidation of the deviation and freedom of propaganda and agitation against it. The best way to conduct the struggle against reformism, then, is to remain outside all reform movements.
The sectarianism implicit in these arguments for Guardian independence should be especially clear if one considers the actual reality of the OC. The OC allows for broad freedom of propaganda and organization of its constituents and would place few limitations on the Guardian. Almost the entire critique advanced in the Guardian document could be raised within the OC, including the evaluation of the OC’s strengths and weaknesses and most of the discussion of the 18 points. Even the Guardian’s objections to what it sees as an implicit OC party-building strategy would be proper as long as they were not posed as being in opposition to point 10 (a point with which, as we have shown, the Guardian has no genuine disagreements). Organizationally, as well, the Guardian could exercise broad latitude. It would be free to pursue its objectives of building and deepening the work of its Clubs and, if it choose, to expand those Clubs into a national pre-party organization.
But the real basis of its objections to the OC has nothing to do with restrictions that might be placed on the Guardian’s legitimate political or organizational freedom. Instead, it is rooted in opposition to the essence of what the OC represents. Since its very inception, the OC has stood as a beacon urging all revolutionaries in our tendency to unite in forging a single Marxist-Leninist trend; the OC has called for organizing tendency-wide, ideological struggle, allowing for full equality of propaganda for all its participants regardless of size or prominence, and encouraging a common approach to identifying and then solving the most pressing problems facing the communist movement. In essence, then, adherence to the OC – more than adherence to any other organizational form in the whole tendency – demands commitment to the task of uniting the whole anti-revisionist, anti-dogmatist movement in a common plan for party-building.
It is this call for a common approach to party-building that is at the heart of the Guardian’s opposition to the OC. Unfortunately, the Guardian views the OC process through distorted glasses, glasses that filter out all but one dimension –the dimension of self-interest. It feels that it would not fare well in the OC, that its line would not win out, and that it would not retain its leading position in our movement. Since, for obvious reasons, it could not reveal the basis of its genuine opposition to the OC, it was forced to attempt to cloak its real designs. And, having severed its connection from honesty and principle, the Guardian found that the most convenient cover was provided by the prevailing, unquestioned prejudices of communists generally and, in particular, the legacy of splittism nurtured by so many years of predominance among anti-revisionists.
Thus, it should not be surprising that the Guardian appeals to this legacy in its closing arguments. After all, in earlier sections of the document it has already committed itself to fashioning trends out of minor groups. It has already embraced a party-building strategy based on a negotiation of trends for seats on the Party’s central committee. It has already shown itself willing to exaggerate real differences and manufacture others, and to appeal to exaggerated fears of right opportunism and revisionism in order to buttress splitting tactics. With such a heavy initial investment how could it resist the temptation to borrow from the splittist mentality?
It is unfortunate that the Guardian has come to this. Not so many years ago it assumed a leading role in the battle against the same sectarianism to which it is now falling prey. It was not afraid to speak out on Angola, to tackle and expose the superficial anti-revisionism of those forces advocating aiming the main blow at the U.S.S.R.. It was able to show so clearly how the sectarian line on the struggle against revisionism adopted by the “lefts” led them to opposing a just national liberation struggle, to opposing internationalist aid from socialist Cuba, to aligning themselves with international reaction and, not the least, to collaborating with their own ruling class. As a result of this opposition to ultra-leftism the Guardian won the deserved respect of all genuine Marxist-Leninists.
But the Guardian has turned its back on this history. The process began with its fear of being swallowed up by the Committee of Five. In order to avoid this it first raised the demand that it be accorded a special place, a “more equal” status, among the assembled groups. When this demand was not met, the Guardian then left the Committee in order to safeguard what it perceived to be its independence. As the Five advanced along the path of consolidating the tendency, the Guardian became more alarmed and began to contemplate building its own organizational base so as to not be left out in the cold. At this point it announced its intention to rally its adherents into Clubs with the Guardian as the focal point and center. And when the Committee of Five became the OC, drawing even more organizations and collectives into the process, the Guardian felt the need to make its move, to call for a division in the ranks and a definition of opposing “trends”. Thus, what began with a minor fear of being subsumed by others has developed into a fully mature sectarian line.
This, of course, is not the first time our movement has seen this circle mentality mature into sectarianism. How often have we seen real political differences exaggerated and others trumped up in order to justify the organizational independence of a narrow group? How often have we heard subjective and self-serving analyses of the communist movement that serve only to rationalize hegemonist ambitions? And how often have we seen a small circle insist that its line, and only its line, provides the sole basis for principled communist unity?
It is not too late for the Guardian to turn back from this course. It can reconsider the line of its document, and reappraise its attitude to the OC. It can put aside its narrow concerns and join in the common pursuit of the consolidation of the Marxist-Leninist trend. And it can turn away from the circle spirit and subordinate its considerable energies to the forging of a spirit of unity in the struggle for the Party.
To fail to do so – as the Guardian itself almost admits – is to follow a line which will not be directed to “the objective of forming one Party” out the “fourth tendency” but will inevitably “give birth to several ’vanguard’ parties” of the type which is already so well known.
January 21, 1979
[1] The Guardian’s statement that a PUL supporter holds a place on the OC’s steering committee is false; in fact, as the minutes of the OC’s founding conference demonstrate, the nominations committee specifically agreed that it would be incorrect to include representation for the minority view in the leadership.