We think the error’s in BAWOC’s development and its work are rooted in the fusion line, i.e., our errors are not due to an incorrect implementation of the fusion line, but rooted in the fusion line which we attempted to implement.
If we had made a sober analysis of our conditions and understood the science of M-L and the role of revolutionaries, we would have understood the necessity to deepen our ideological consolidation and theoretical development as our principal tasks in our beginning, formative stages. Instead, we placed as primary two tasks: 1) the building of a local, “functioning” democratic centralist organization and 2) deepening our ties within the working class. A third key task for us was the building of a national organization–the OCIC.
By implementing these tasks, we bowed to idealism, pragmatism, and empiricism/theoreticism. However, the establishment of these tasks flows directly from the fusion line. Because the fusion line downplays the importance of ideological consolidation and theoretical development, we skipped over some necessary developmental stages and we idealistically overestimated our capacity in our zeal to duplicate the PWOC experience here in the Bay Area. Our work, both within the communist movement and within the class, took on a pragmatic nature, placing primary the desire for quick results and political expediency. In our theoretical work, we made both empiricist and theoreticist errors–separating our theoretical and practical work, i.e., having a view which reduced theory principally to the summation of our direct experience in the class and at the same time failing to follow through on summation. What resulted was theoretical stagnation in the organization and a failure to deepen our political unity.
Let us look more closely at some of the particular aspects of BAWOC’s work:
The fusion line did not provide us with a correct understanding of the role of a local d-c organization in the theoretical work of the movement. The fusion line fails to make clear the necessity for theory and political line in order for us to pursue communist work. It’s not that it doesn’t mention it–it just fails to make it perfectly clear that theory is primary. When we in BAWOC did identify the importance of theory, we downplayed BAWOC’s role and saw the work either already having been done (e.g. PWOC’s Trade Union Line) or to be taken up in the OCIC.
Now it would be sheer nonsense for us to argue that little old BAWOC is capable of advanced theoretical work. We do not intend to make such an absurd argument. But the question cannot be posed as black or white–either we do advanced theoretical work or none at all. As a local d-c organization, we must strive to deepen our theoretical capacity and develop political lines, no matter how partial and limited, to guide our work. Such lines must be based on a beginning conjunctural analysis. If not, our work will be aimless and we will reduce our role to that of mass activists, as opposed to conscious revolutionaries.
If we had understood the primacy of theory in this period of the party building movement, we would not have played such a passive role towards theory. Our passive role towards theoretical work also effected our attitude towards the importance of basic political unity as manifested in the superficial process of uniting on the 18 points, PWOC’s fusion line, and PWOC’s trade union line. There was and continues to be an attitude that theoretical work is abstract, “intellectual”, and that we must get on with our work, meaning our work in the class. Such a view glorifies pragmatism.
The belittling of the significance of theory in the fusion line had particular negative consequences for us since so many of us–in fact all of us–are basically new to M-L and a real tendency towards petty-bourgeois impatience has infected BAWOC from its inception. Lenin’s words are shockingly appropos:
Those who have the slightest acquaintance with the actual state of our movement cannot but see that the wide spread of Marxism was accompanied by a certain lowering of the theoretical level. Quite a number of people with very little, and even a total lack of theoretical training joined the movement because of its practical significance and its practical successes. We can judge from that how tactless Rabocheye Dyelo is when, with an air of triumph, it quotes Marx’s statement: “Every step of real movement is more important than a dozen programmes.” To repeat these words in a period of theoretical disorder is like wishing mourners at a funeral many happy returns of the day...
Without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement. This idea cannot be insisted upon too strongly at a time when the fashionable preaching of opportunism goes hand in hand with an infatuation for the narrowest forms of practical activity. (LSW, What Is To Be Done?, p.138;emphasis added)
The fusion line led us into some real problematic situations in our mass practice. Because fusion does not make clear the leading role of theory, we overlooked the necessity of developing theory to guide our mass work. Instead, we tried to build the communist current. This is not to say that one cannot enter into mass practice without a fully developed line, but we did not understand that our work would necessarily be tailest and reactive without a beginning line. This has now become clear to one and all.
We have made some advances in our “integration”, i.e., we have better integrated into working class communities and workplaces. But the tasks of proletarianization and taking up advanced communist work were left behind. Note the fact that as preparation for doing communist work we took up a fairly extensive social investigation in order to get the right kind of job, but what happened to our basic ideological consolidation and theoretical development of line and what it means to do communist mass work as opposed to reformist mass work?
Instead, our mass political practice was geared to implementing “fusion” as opposed to the primacy of theory. If we had understood the leading role of theory, we would have understood the primary task was the development of an independent communist line in order to guide our work consciously. Instead, our work has been unconscious, comrades have been left to themselves to try and develop a beginning line without guidance by leadership, and comrades have basically operated as individuals with each putting out their own lines in the work.
We suffered from a shallow and superficial understanding of PWOC’s trade union line and failed to particularize nun theoretical tasks. Instead, we were content with the line and our superficial unity and objectively placed theoretical work on the trade union question outside the confines of BAWOC. We opted for pragmatism, political expediency, and palpable results, judging our work in terms of caucus building, shop steward positions, etc. This work is important but it is not the sum total of communist work. The on-going political tasks in the work were not addresses, and instead the immediate day-to-day struggle took center stage. Because we failed to understand our theoretical tasks as primary, “fusing” became primary–in our case this translated into pragmatism and spontaneity.
The work we did accomplish in our mass political practice we failed to sum up and draw out the theoretical and political lessons. In this way, we did separate theory and practice, although we made both empiricist and theoreticist errors. On the one hand, we thought our theoretical work was principally a matter of summation of our direct intervention in the class–this is empiricism. At the same time, we failed to sum up our work in the class–this will lead to theoreticism. A correct (and internalized) view towards theory would have seen the necessity to sum-up in order to contribute to our theoretical work. But then a correct view would also have included equipping ourselves with a theoretical understanding of our work in order to consciously guide it. This includes planning, developing strategies, and holding each other accountable.
The PWOC trade union line was a good starting point for us, but we didn’t struggle for unity and higher understanding. Unity was objectively to build through the process of “fusing” with the workers. Our process was essentially expedient–we developed enough unity to build the organization and get on with the work. This expedient attitude we attribute to the fusion line and its muddling of our communist tasks in the pre-party period.
While paying a fair amount of lip service to the importance of cadre development, we failed to understand it’s key importance in this period of party building. What importance we did understand we can attribute to the advice of MINP and not to the fusion line, for it does not address this aspect of communist work in this period as a distinct task of party building.
We think the downplaying of the importance of cadre development is linked to the downplaying of our theoretical tasks. Cadre’s theoretical development is reduced to merely learning the basic principles of M-L and the “line” in order to go out and “fuse” with the working class. Obviously, everyone cannot be expected to become advanced in the sense that each cadre is playing an equal role in the production of theory. But we must demand that all cadre are consciously developed to their greatest potential. All cadre need a basic grasp of M-L which gives them the ability to critique and contribute to the theoretical work of the movement. The fusion line does not directly speak to this.
The organization lacked rigorous standards for the ideological consolidation of cadre–particularly in terms of committment and class stand. The ideological struggle in the fusion line is something that gets taken up primarily in the course of the on-going work, not as a distinct task. While it is correct to see cadre development (an particularly the ideological formation) as something which is not isolated from our other work, unless it is given its own distinct role in the party building process, it tends to get lost in our other work. Cadre must be trained in the course of their mass work but also in the course of their internal practice within the communist movement. Fusion does not directly speak to this, either.
Lastly, the organization did not develop systematic plans to develop cadre as propagandists, agitators, and organizers. These tasks are bound up with the ideological and theoretical formation of cadre, i.e. while distinct aspects in their own right, the ideological and theoretical formation of cadre is the key link in developing ourselves as communist propagandists, agitators, and organizers. We say the key link because the difference between purely reformist work as opposed to communist work is only understood when cadre understand the advanced tasks in our mass work. Such understanding can come about only through a conscious and systematic plan for cadre development. Otherwise, pragmatism and political expediency are more than likely to dominate.
The fusion party building line resulted in a pragmatic and shallow approach in our study. Even though we developed rigorous and thorough study plans, they were never implemented. We attribute this to the fact that we allowed immediate questions and problems to supercede our long term study plans. This attitude of bowing to the immediate we think is linked to the fusion line.
The fusion party building line has also contributed to an anti-theoretical attitude within the organization. Study has often been called abstract or worse–a sort of internalized class baiting. It is one thing to criticize aspects of our study for being abstract but it is quite another to see study itself as being abstract unless it addresses immediate questions.
The organization held two fairly developed lines–fusion and PWOC’s trade union line (not to mention the 18 points)–without a systematic study of these lines. Now it’s one thing to call for unity on some basic lines as an initial starting point in order to begin to work together, but it’s quite another to allow that initial call to stagnate over time. Our unity with the 18 points is essentially the same as it was three years ago and our unity on fusion and the PWOC’s trade union line is less solid as a group than before. We are paying the price for pragmatism in our study plans. We believe if we had implemented some of our initial plans for study, the organization would be on a more solid footing than it is today.
We think the fusion line panders to backward notions of the role of study and theory among many comrades. This is serious because given we come out of the tradition of pragmatism which has infested the US communist movement since its inception, we cannot underestimate the place of indifference to and contempt for study and theory. But more importantly, it shows a weak understanding of the role of communists and the demands which the class places upon us. The importance of study is well put by Engels:
In general, the word “materialistic” serves many of the younger writers in Germany as a mere phrase with which anything and everything is labeled without further study, that is, they stick on this label and then consider the question disposed of. But our conception of history is above all a guide to study, not a lever for construction after the manner of the Hegelian. All history must be studied afresh, the conditions of existence of the different formations of society must be examined individually before the attempt is made to deduce from them the political, civil-law, aesthetic, philosophic, religious, etc. views corresponding to them. Up to now but little has been done here because only a few people have got down to it seriously...(T)oo many of the younger Germans simply make use of the phrase historical materialism (and everything can be turned into a phrase) only in order to get their own relatively scanty historical knowledge–for economic history is still in its swaddling clothes!– constructed into a neat system as quickly as possible and then they deem themselves something very tremendous. ...You, who have really done something, must have noticed yourself how few of the young literary men who fasten themselves on to the Party give themselves the trouble to study economics, the history of economics, the history of trade, of industry, of agriculture, of the formations of society... The self-sufficiency of the journalist must serve for everything here and the result looks like it. It often seems as if these gentlemen think anything is good enough for the workers. If these gentlemen only knew that Marx thought his best things were still not good enough for the workers, how he regarded it as a crime to offer the workers anything but the very best! (MESW, 869-90; emphasis added)–
Because the fusion line does not make clear the primacy of theoretical work in this period, the leadership was not clear on its key tasks. Instead, the leadership never developed a clear plan of priorities–in large part, it responded to situations as they arose. Spontaneity reigned supreme and what was lacking was a clear understanding of the role of a local democratic centralist organization, the primacy of political line, and the need for theory as a guide to action.
The leadership tended to operate more as an administrative body as opposed to the theoretical-political center of the organization. It regulated the functioning of the organization without really leading the process of deepening the political unity, developing political line to guide the internal and external practice of the organization, or advancing the formation of the cadre in a systematic way. Instead, the leadership decentralized the theoretical-political work of the organization, and the political problems posed by our work v/ere more often than not handled structurally.
Because the fusion line emphasizes building a communist current in this period, it falsely gives the impression that each local democratic centralist organization is going to build the communist current in their particular locale–as if we were local Party branches. We think this view was largely responsible for the incredible idealism which infected the leadership, i.e. the constant overestimation of the political capacity of the cadre and the underestimation of the need to pay particular attention to the ideological and theoretical formation of the organization as a whole. Tasks were not completed, the work of the organization disjointed, people were not accountable, and the leadership was busy trying to catch up instead of lead.
Because the fusion line fails to make clear the important task of cadre formation, the leadership did not understand the need for systematic plans for cadre formation. Instead, we dealt with problems on a case by case basis–be it individualism, wavering committment, liberalism, subjectivism, etc. A consistent plan for consolidating a proletarian class stand failed to be developed.
The leadership also failed to push out the struggle against racism. No programmatic approach was implemented. While serious ideological problems exist, a weak theoretical grasp of the question persists. We attribute the paternalistic errors that have been made along the way to this. The leadership did not push out a higher and more concrete unify on this question in order to ensure that it was aggressively pursued in all aspects of our work and that ideological weaknesses were combatted.
Similar problems in leadership existed in regards to the struggle against sexism. The question was not posed politically, but individualistically. Conscious plans were not developed to push out the struggle against sexism. Developing women’s leadership was taken up mechanically, i.e., promoting women cadre in the structure. Conscious plans were not developed to ensure their formation as leaders–“lack of confidence” was combatted simply through encouragement. The problem of internalized sexism was not addressed head on.
We are less clear as to how the fusion line has been responsible for holding back the struggle against racism and sexism. We do think serious ideological weaknesses exist and that comrades must struggle with these weaknesses. At the same time, we are unclear about how the “fusionists” are pursuing this struggle within the communist movement given some of their recent practice in the OC. We question the method being promoted–“popularizing examples of racism” (we would also presume sexism)–as the way to pursue this aspect of our work. We think the questions have to be pursued primarily ideologically and theoretically. By placing the primary emphasis on “popularizing examples”, a tendency towards race-baiting is developing.
The fusion line, as PSO so clearly puts it, has placed as one of its key tasks, the development of local d-c organizations around the country to do “fusion” work and build the communist current. In fact, initially the local d-c organizations were key to the PWOC’s party building process as it saw the party being formed as the result of the merger of the local d-c organizations. The PWOC thought a pre-party would grow out of the OC, as previous pre-parties were initiated from national centers. The PWOC’s original conception followed the dogmatists conception step for step. Now a struggle is being waged to undue this conception. We think forces such as SOC (and others) are disenchanted with the campaign against federationism because the OC is abandoning “fusion”. The role of the OC in an overall party building strategy remains somewhat unclear as a result.
BAWOC was born while the initial view was still operative. As such, we placed the building of a local d-c organization as primary. PWOC was very anxious to get a “fusion” organization going in the Bay Area. Unfortunately, the particularities of our situation were not taken into account–namely, our low level of experience and development. So instead of building the organization with politics in command, organization building came to the fore. Structures, norms, rules, security policies and all the other aspects of an organization were elaborated. The task of building the organization was primary instead of developing the political unity which must embody a communist organization. The book on communist organization by J. Peters was required reading, instead of key works of M-L. Our reputation as the “East Bay PWOC-type group” was not that far off.
The building of an all-sided local democratic centralist organization was undertaken without clarity on our politics. For example, we initially thought point #10 of the 18 points (the point on fusion) meant one had to agree with the fusion party building line to be in the OC. We were later corrected. We initially thought that our local democratic centralism was binding in all situations as exemplified by our participation at the founding OC conference. This was later clarified. Our understanding of how PWOC1s trade union line applied to us was mechanical Other examples could be cited. The point is that organization?! fetishism and deviations stemmed from the fusion line and its call for the building of all-sided local d-c organizations as a primary task.
Once we started out with this organizational fetishism, we continued. Problems in BAWOC more often than not were resolved through structural or administrative maneuvers–new forms, policies, rules, changes in leadership, and of course re-structuring. People can surely remember the amount of time spent on the structural question. By seeking solutions in the structural realm, we never got to the root of the problem–namely, weak ideological development and theoretical unclarity.
In essence, our process of building a local d-c organization was no different than the dogmatists. They built the appearance of communist organizations without the theoretical content and ideological consolidation to go along with it. We did not have a correct view of the limitations of a local d-c organization, and instead tried to be a mini-party. We think this view stems from the fusion line which sees the building of communist influence in the masses as the primary task instead of the development of a workers’ socialism applicable to conditions in the US.
To sum-up: We have been led by the fusion line thus far in our work. It has caused us confusion and held back our development as communists–particularly ideologically and theoretically. It has led us into pragmatism, spontaneity, anti-theoretical attitudes, and organizational fetishism. It has led many to say, “let’s get on with the real work.” And finally, it has led many to see the contradiction between “mass work” and “uniting M-L” as an antagonistic one. For all these reasons and more, we firmly believe (albeit painfully) that we must reject the fusion party building line and embrace an alternative party building line which will point the way forward–primacy of theory.