

## Resolution about : Our Strategy in the Kurdish Movement

[The following resolution, adopted by the Sixth Congress of the Kurdistan Organisation of the Communist Party of Iran - Komala (held in May 1988), has been translated from issue 41 of our central organ.]

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### A: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1-Our activity in the [Iranian] Kurdistan is part of the general activities of the Communist Party of Iran for the organisation and victory of workers' revolution and the establishment of workers' state on a nation-wide scale. From this viewpoint, the general policy and the methods of activity of the Party in the organisation of communist revolution and the mobilization of the working class as the chief motive force and the leader of every revolutionary development, also govern the work of our party organisation in Kurdistan.

2-For various reasons, including, especially, the national oppression in Kurdistan and the resistance and struggle against it, the tradition of armed struggle, and the communists' success in turning into an effective political force, the political situation in Kurdistan after the 1979 revolution has followed a course different from the rest of Iran. Here, against the offensive bourgeois-Islamic reaction, an armed resistance movement was formed which had the backing of broad masses. This armed movement, initially called the resistance movement and at a later stage the revolutionary movement of the Kurdish people, on the one hand prevented the absolute domination of the bourgeois-Islamic reaction in Kurdistan, facilitating the protest actions and democratic struggles of the masses, and on the other hand imparted greater prominence to the demand for the abolition of national oppression, in the form of autonomy, as the common call of the forces of resistance against the Islamic Republic regime.

Thus, whether from the viewpoint of the balance of class forces or the existing political situation and the methods of revolutionary and mass struggle, the working class and communism in Kurdistan is faced with a particular situation, and hence with particular tasks. On top of these tasks lies the

leadership of the revolutionary movement in Kurdistan and the turning of this movement into a lever for the extension and strengthening of the communist struggle of the working class.

3-No doubt, there is an intimate connection between the revolutionary movement in Kurdistan and the struggle in Iran. Particularly with regard to its recent history, this movement has sprung up in the context of a nation-wide revolution. Any advance of this movement and any upsurge on a national scale will have mutually strengthening effects.

Moreover, with regard to the fact that, economically and politically, Kurdistan is an organic part of the Iranian society, the development of a major gap between the progress of the revolution nationally and that in Kurdistan is improbable. The most probable and at the same time the most favourable situation, is the re-union of the revolutionary movement in Kurdistan with a nation-wide political upsurge. Nevertheless, considering the particularities of the revolutionary struggle in Kurdistan and the fact that there is a concrete movement in progress there, the CPI and the Party's Kurdistan organisation, Komala, which has been the major factor in the formation and progress of a broad armed resistance against the Islamic regime, should outline and put forward its strategy for the advance of this movement.

### B: THE BASES OF OUR STRATEGY IN KURDISTAN

Our strategy in Kurdistan is based on the following:

1-The working class and the toilers of towns and villages make up the chief motive force of the revolutionary movement in Kurdistan. The progress and victory of this movement is directly dependent upon the degree of growth of the socialist and independent movement of the working class, the unification of workers through their communist party, and the leadership of the protest and revolutionary movement by this class.

2-Cities form the principal centres of political protest actions by the masses and the axis of the revolutionary movement. The mass

political movement in the rural areas is a corollary of the political movement in the cities.

3-The necessary condition for the advance of the revolutionary movement is the breaking of the workers and toilers from the perspective, ideals and politics of the bourgeois parties in Kurdistan and the strengthening of communism against nationalism on a social scale.

4-The victory of the revolutionary movement is only possible under the conditions of a mass political rising in Kurdistan. Distinguishing between revolutionary and non-revolutionary conditions and the different tasks resulting from each of these situations for the communists and the workers' movement is a main basis for working out the proletarian strategy in this movement.

5-Considering the profound economic and political contradictions of the regime, the hardships arising from the Iran-Iraq war, and the deep resentment felt towards the regime by the people across the country, the development of a political crisis, instability in the regime, and a political upsurge, is a real possibility. Under such conditions, particularly in Kurdistan, where communism and Komala constitute an effective social force, it is quite feasible to accelerate the political upsurge through the Party's conscious and planned practice.

6-Only an all-round economic, political and military struggle can put the Islamic Republic in Kurdistan under pressure and pave the way for a mass rising against the very existence of the regime in Kurdistan. The merging of these forms of struggle in a coherent policy of pressure and protest against the regime is central to our present tasks in Kurdistan.

7-The final form of the victory of the revolutionary movement will be a combination of urban uprising - in the wake of a mass upsurge and protest - the advance of our expanded military forces, the driving out of the oppressive forces of the regime from Kurdistan, and the taking of control by the insurrectionary masses and the toilers' armed forces led by Komala.

8-The collapse and disintegration of the forces and institutions of the central government and their retreat will not mark the end of the matter. Victory will only be complete with the establishment of mass organs of power in towns and villages and the

organisation of a power structure in Kurdistan. This new power will immediately implement the revolutionary demands and programmes of workers. The necessary condition for the realization of this perspective is not only overcoming the forces of the central government, but also preventing the attempts of the bourgeois parties in Kurdistan at replacing the [amalgamated] institutions of power of the central government with the above-people organs of the local bourgeoisie.

9-The final guarantee for a lasting victory is the decisive smashing of the power of the bourgeoisie at a national level. A Kurdistan in which the revolutionary movement has broken the power of the central government, cannot rely but on a nation-wide revolution in Iran for safeguarding her gains. For us, victory in Kurdistan is a link in the realization of the workers' nation-wide strategy in Iran.

### C: THE OUTLINE OF THE DIFFERENT STAGES IN THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

Some of the initial objectives which the communists in every revolutionary movement must achieve, were attained in Kurdistan in the years after the 1979 revolution. As a communist force, Komala already enjoys the support of the majority of the wage-earning workers and a broad section of the toilers in Kurdistan, and has more or less turned into the vanguard party organisation and the leader of the workers. Our agitation and activity has promoted the workers' class awareness of their interests; it has given greater clarity to the democratic demands of the people and has established a much clearer picture of the content and aims of the present movement among them. The armed struggle, despite the set-backs and limitations that have been imposed on it, has been recognized as a valid form of struggle, both for the present and for the foreseeable future. It has played an important role in preventing the total domination of bourgeois-Islamic reaction in Kurdistan. The Kurdish bourgeoisie, whether from the viewpoint of its social influence and perspective, or with regard to its political, practical, and organisational power, has been severely weakened in the face of the socialist alternative of workers and the socialist tradition of struggle for which Komala is the representative in the whole of Kurdistan. Communism and the tradition of struggling through the Communist Party is currently overcoming the bourgeois-nationalist tradition which was the hallmark of the previous struggles.

**WORKERS OF THE WORLD UNITE !**

Proceeding on the basis of the gains achieved so far and the points above concerning our strategy in Kurdistan, a definite policy covering a specific period is placed on our agenda.

In general, three distinct phases may be defined in the activities of the Party in Kurdistan. The first is the period prior to a mass rising, i.e., the present one; the second is the period of the start of the mass protest movement and the eve of a revolutionary escalation; and the third is the period of political upsurge and of the final offensive.

This classification into periods has important implications for the character of our tasks. And in each of these periods particular tasks and orientations are placed on our agenda.

I) Our main tasks in the present period (before a mass upsurge)

1-Strengthening the relation between communism and the class; organising the working class and drawing it to the scene; stepping up the different forms of class protest; turning communists into a social force and the Kurdistan Organisation of the Party into the organisation of the immediate leaders and activists of the workers' movement.

2-Building mass organisations of workers and toilers capable of struggling and keeping and extending the unity of the working masses in the context of the present balance of forces.

3-Combining the main forms of struggle (economic, political and military) in a policy of applying all-sided and coordinated pressure on the central government; turning Komala into the leader of the people's protest actions; turning communist leaders into influential leaders throughout Kurdistan.

4-Maintaining the strength and power of the communist armed force, expanding it as far as it is possible in this period, maintaining and consolidating the ideological and political firmness of this force.

5-Raising our political and military capabilities with regard to the central government; constantly improving our balance of political and military strength with regard to the local bourgeoisie and its parties.

6-Politically isolating the bourgeois parties; weakening the nationalist perspective in favour of the socialist and the revolutionary-democratic perspective.

7-Preparing the mass leaders and communist agitators for the work of educating and leading the toilers under the present condi-

tions, as well as leading the broad mass movement under the conditions of a revolutionary escalation.

8-Promoting working-class and democratic demands and ideals across the society; raising workers' capacity and preparedness for taking the lead of the protest movement and ruling through councils in future.

II) Our main tasks on the eve of the political upsurge

1-Rapidly expanding our armed forces through the creation of mass military organisations linked to Komala.

2-Advancing militarily and creating liberated zones.

3-Organising mass protests in the cities; making preparations for urban insurrection with the support of the revolutionary armed forces.

4-Creating the initial forms of organs of mass power both in the cities and in the rural areas.

5-Making preparations for arming the workers and toilers in the cities.

6-Isolating the compromising bourgeois currents, making them follow the advanced section of the revolutionary struggle (neutralizing coalition, wheeling and dealing, etc).

7-Forsing a popular leadership for the insurrection; (Party leaders going beyond Party responsibilities and turning into elements of mass revolutionary power).

III) Our main tasks in the period of political upsurge, insurrection and the final offensive

1-Disintegrating and repelling the army of the central government by an urban insurrection and by the advance of the Party and mass armed forces; the capture of the cities.

2-Setting up council [soviet] power in the cities and rural areas; preventing the local bourgeoisie from replacing the [dismantled] organs of the central government with its own above-people institutions and functionaries.

3-Formally proclaiming the legitimacy of the rule of the people's councils; ensuring the legality of this rule by the armed people's militia.

4-Universal arming and the organising of a mass militia by the communist armed force;

cont. p.19

## Resolution about :

# The assessment of the situation of the KDP\* and our attitude towards it

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A: THE GENERAL CAUSES OF THE CRISIS OF THE KDP CURRENT

1-Rooted in the position of the Kurdish nation as an oppressed nation and as a bourgeois form of protest against it, nationalism in Kurdistan has for long functioned as a basis for the formation and growth of different political parties and currents in the Kurdish society, in opposition to the central governments. Just as nationalism, historically, has served as the ideological means of the bourgeoisie for securing the interests of the different sections of this class, so Kurdish nationalism, in a more limited dimension, has played the same role.

Since many years ago, the Kurdistan Democratic Party has been the main representative of the nationalist current in Iranian Kurdistan. From the viewpoint of its class character, this party is the party of the bourgeoisie, and from the viewpoint of its social ideal, it is a party seeking autonomy. For the Kurdish bourgeoisie, autonomy implies securing a political and state backing - in the form of participation in local government - for its capital and capital accumulation.

2-The social influence of the KDP and its existence as a political current is the result of the survival of national oppression and of the existence of the traditions of struggle, and of the tendency to struggle, against this oppression.

On the other hand, the disintegration of the old social relations, the domination and expansion of capitalist relations, and the growth of a vast wage-earning working class,

in the past few decades, constituted that immense socio-economic development which inevitably and eventually profoundly influenced the political trends in the society and brought forth new demands.

This situation has created the social possibility of the posing and prevalence of the socialist and democratic ideals of the working class as the banner of mass protest against the central government and against the bourgeoisie in Kurdistan; it has undermined the bases of Kurdish nationalism, and thereby created the material grounds for the decline of this tendency, along with its political party.

3-The above basic reality has, in recent years, with the continuation of the revolutionary struggle in Kurdistan, decisively affected the fate and development of the political forces. While for Komala the ideal of socialism and economic equality has become central to its agitation, to the expansion of its influence and attraction of new forces, the KDP has drawn its inspiration from the remnants of the constantly diminishing illusions of the people towards nationalism and nationalist leaders, from the occasional weaknesses of the central government, and from regional conflicts.

By fighting for welfare and economic demands of workers and the toiling strata of society, by confronting backward traditions and superstitions, by supporting the revolutionary struggles of the rural working masses, by struggling against women's oppression, and by enlightening and awakening the masses, Komala has greatly widened its social influence. The KDP, in contrast, in the face of the growing influence of working-class and socialist ideas and politics, has increasingly tried to deny the domination of capitalism and the existence of the working class in Kurdistan. It has thus tried to safeguard capitalism, which is the cause of all inequalities, including national oppression, from the offensive of the masses. In the course of the acute class struggle going on between these tendencies, the KDP, confronting Komala, has more than ever appealed to the residues of backward traditions, superstitions and reactionary prejudices. But the political consciousness, maturity and expecta-

\*The Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iranian Kurdistan. In early 1988 it suffered a major split, separating into two factions. The faction led by Chasemlou has retained the old name; the second faction calls itself "KDP-Revolutionary Leadership" - Note by BM.

ons of the masses of workers and toilers today is at such a level that such resorts cannot remain effective for long. Thus the KDP, as a current which stubbornly resists the new realities in the Kurdish society, has inevitably sunk into greater isolation, deeper political desperation and greater political hostility towards the communist current.

4-It is in response to this degeneration and political confusion and crisis that the KDP resorts to its final means in confronting Komala, i.e., an all-out military confrontation. The war with Komala was for the KDP the continuation of its permanent policy of hindering the growth of class-consciousness and organisation of workers and preventing the toiling masses from becoming aware of their basic rights. Unable to tapede the growth of the working-class and communist alternative among the masses by political means, the KDP tried to halt it by war and by violent means; it tried to restore its lost status by the force of arms.

The policy of Komala in this war has been to defend the independent proletarian organisation in Kurdistan to secure and consolidate the political and social gains of the communist current. For Komala, victory in this war meant neutralizing the counter-revolutionary policy of the KDP and overcoming the hindrances that the party of the bourgeoisie was placing in the way of the consciousness and organisation of working people and the extension of communist activity.

After three and a half years of war, the KDP was not able to force Komala to retreat from its political and class positions. On the contrary, the KDP itself became politically isolated; it came to realize its impotence and failure in achieving its reactionary goals, and demoralized this in the eyes of everyone, despite its wishes. At present, from the viewpoint of its practical strength, the KDP has reached such a position that it is not able to create any serious disruption and disturbance in the activities of Komala.

#### B: THE PRESENT CRISIS OF THE KDP & OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS IT

1)Rooted in the factors mentioned above, the internal confusion and crisis of the KDP has continuously deepened in the past few years. And, recently, after the Eighth Congress, and in the wake of numerous resignations, purges and minor break-ups, this led to a full-blown split, practically splitting it into two sections. The causes of this recent split may be summed up as follows:

1-The KDP has been driven into a profound political desperation and confusion as a

result of the weakening of its social basis, the growth of a revolutionary socialist current relying on the new driving forces of the revolutionary struggle in Kurdistan, the general weakening of the tradition of nationalist struggle in the face of the socialist tradition, and the KDP's alienation from the social problems and class demands which form the basis of the revolutionary movement in the recent period. The KDP is increasingly losing its influence among the toiling and poor strata in Kurdistan; its practical dimensions are shrinking to the actual level of the class power and capacity of the Kurdish bourgeoisie in present-day Kurdistan.

2-The defeat of the KDP's war policy against Komala and the confirmation of the fact that the KDP is not only unable to prevent the development of the working-class and communist alternative in Kurdistan but is going to be driven, in the face of this alternative, to the fringes of the political struggle, is adding to the crisis and practical desperation of this party.

3-The military advances of the Islamic Republic have restricted the field of military activity for the KDP, i.e., the main form of expression of this party. The prospect of extending its activity or even maintaining its present dimensions, has become bleaker, and it is unable to come up with a clear line to get out of this situation.

4-This situation has gradually made the KDP incapable of maintaining political and practical unity among the various factions of the Kurdish bourgeoisie. These tendencies which differ from one another particularly depending on their closeness to the different international camps (USSR, Social-Democracy, etc.), the degree of their reliance on Kurdish nationalism, and the manner and kind of their alliances with the political forces in Iran, are, in the vacuum created by this political crisis and lack of perspective and the absence of a unifying policy, once again becoming active, along with a heightening of disputes among them.

5-And finally, under such conditions, a section of the cadres and leaders of the KDP find the courage to voice their dissatisfaction in the form of protest to Ghasemlou's leadership who traditionally has had an established authority in the party. Ghasemlou's inflexibility towards the opponents, on the one hand, and the assumption that there exist favourable factors outside the party for a split, on the other, allowed the opposition to make an organised split.

1)The split by the oppositionists was not made on the basis of an essentially distinct

political platform. From the platform of this current it can be seen that:

Firstly, all the existing tendencies in the KDP are, by and large, also present in the new faction; and secondly, this document has been drawn up more for the purpose of attracting new forces and creating a favourable climate for this current among the other political parties, than of raising the banner of defined and distinct political viewpoints. In this sense, the recent split does not as yet signify a programmatic break with the KDP. The emphases in this faction's statement on the necessity of drawing closer to the so-called socialist camp, though pointing to the existence of a pro-Soviet tendency in this current, does not mean that the dispute over this question in any of the two KDP factions has been settled.

1)Komala's policy regarding the various factions of this party must be based on the following principles:

1-The general orientation in the activity of Komala in the past ten years, i.e., isolating the KDP, turning the workers' and communist current in Kurdistan into the main current of struggle and protest, and promoting the nationalist tradition in favour of the socialist tradition in the toiling people's struggles, must be unambiguously continued. The present state of the KDP should be seen as a point in the course of complete dispelling of illusions among workers and toilers regarding this party and its traditions; our activity should be aimed consistently at continuing the political and class struggle for accelerating this process.

2-Class truths regarding the nature of the KDP as a social current should be clearly agitated as before. This split should not soften our class criticism of this current.

3-Concerning the civil war in Kurdistan, our position is the declaration of unilateral cease-fire to both currents and the establishing of defined political relations with any current which accepts cease-fire.

4-At the same time as the unilateral declaration of cease-fire, we should maintain our military preparedness and vigilance, and, in particular, in the event of the Ghasemlou faction explicitly insisting on continuing the war, we should regard the possibility of military actions against our forces as completely serious and probable. The KDP should be steted of any military adventure against Komala, and in the event that such acts are committed, this faction should receive the resolute response we deem appropriate.

5-Our agitations against the KDP should essen-

tially address the toiling masses and be conducted from the standpoint of making them aware of their interests, of clarifying the tasks and the perspective of the movement as held out by Komala, and of showing how parties like the KDP are alienated from the basic ideals and demands of the working people in Kurdistan. Komala should carry out its agitations and act with full knowledge of its position and responsibilities as the representative of workers and toilers and the leader and organiser of the revolution in Kurdistan, including the struggle for the elimination of national oppression.

6-On the question of national oppression and the issue of autonomy - the common objective demanded by both Komala and the KDP - and also regarding the struggle against the Islamic Republic, we may resort to united actions, if such are deemed useful and appropriate.

At the same time, the degree to which any of the KDP factions adopts a more peaceful attitude towards Komala, or recognises the workers' and democratic demands and policies, we may establish closer practical relations with it. □

from p.16  
placing the militia under the authority of people's councils.

5-Declaring the welfare, economic, political and cultural demands and programmes of workers, including the workers' plan for the abolition of national oppression, as the laws in force in Kurdistan; the taking over of executive, judicial and legislative powers by the councils.

6-The organising of social administration by the councils and council rule.

7- . . . from p.1  
your government, if you demand that the embassy of the Islamic Republic in your country be closed, if you do not allow the Islamic regime's hangmen to be received with diplomatic respect in your country, then you have taken important steps for saving the lives of thousands of people. Saving the lives of the Sharpville Six was not an inaccessible dream. Saving the lives of thousands of political prisoners in Evvin prison is no more accessible. Communist Party of Iran-  
the Committee Abroad  
15/12/1988