Regiments
pass by
right by my side.
Brave drums
a-beat,
rat
-a-tat-tat.
Stamp
stern
their feet,
heads up
erect.
For defence
they’re arming
that’s the red-star men.
Marching
in fours
feet
beat
in
time:
My
foe
is
yours.
Your
foe
is
mine.
They’re coming?
Very good.
We’ll stop ’em
For good.
VLADIMIR MAYAKOVSKY
No man ever faced more stupendous problems than Joseph Stalin from the moment the Nazi armies swept across the frontiers of the Soviet Union. There is no test so severe as that of war, and this would be the greatest of all wars, more stupendous in its destructive power, more embracing in its range, and more complex in its issues, than any war since man first wielded his primitive club in the battle for existence.
Already almost all the nations of Europe had gone down like ninepins before the might which now surged into the first Socialist State in its bid for world supremacy. Only Britain, with her Empire, remained fighting her battle on the ocean, wholly unready for war by land or air. How unready is seen in the simple fact that she has required three full years more to prepare for the invasion of the Continent.
The decision of Hitler, so fantastic in the light of the now known unpreparedness of Britain and America in the first months of the war, to turn eastward after the conquest of Europe, will probably go on permanent record as the greatest blunder in military history. Whatever its psychological and political explanation, however, Hitler found himself in a position to concentrate the maximum of his power on the eastern front, with the whole of Europe’s industrial resources unmolested in his rear. Two hundred and sixty divisions from Germany and her allies, Rumania, Italy, Hungary, Spain, and Finland, swept eastward. There is nothing in the history of warfare with which to make comparison of the striking-power of these forces against a single country. In the Great War of 1914-18 the Germans and their allies deployed not more than 127 divisions on the eastern front, while a mere five German divisions of to-day have more machine-gun power than 100 divisions in the last war.
Hitler had also all the advantages of initiative and surprise. Without a word of complaint that might have served for warning, and despite Germany’s long-existing treaties with the Soviet Union from Rapallo to the Pact of 1939, he struck at 4 o’clock in the morning of June 22nd, 1941, confident that within three months the whole of Eastern Russia, including Leningrad and Moscow, together with the Ukraine to the banks of the Volga and the Caucasus, would be in his hands.
He was not the only misguided statesman at the time. Almost all the military “experts” and political leaders in Britain and the U.S.A. suffered from the same delusion. Neither he nor they believed in the stability and power of the régime of the Soviets. They had listened to the Lindbergs and all the falsifications current about the Soviet-Finnish War. Had not Trotsky, the former Commissar for War, told them that “Stalin was afraid of a great war” and declared that “the Kremlin has lost the confidence of the masses both within the country and abroad?” And those conservative-minded gentry who were not so gullible as to believe all this were almost equally ignorant. Even Mr. Churchill, in his memorable broadcast on the day of Hitler’s assault, declaring the alliance of Britain in common struggle with the Soviet Union could do no better than picture Russia as a country of brave peasants who would fight to the last ditch. Here and there in the “democratic” countries were a very few who sounded the note of complete confidence in the invincibility of the Soviet Union—and we were regarded as victims of “wishful thinking.”
Was Stalin taken by surprise by the turn of events? In the broader sense, no. All his actions from the day Hitler rose to power provide a complete proof of this. But there still remained in the situation an element of surprise in the sense that it was not possible to know the precise moment at which the blow would fall. Sir Stafford Cripps, in a speech to the foreign press in Russia in March, 1941, had predicted a date within a week of the correct one. Mr. Churchill had written to Stalin personally a month before, warning him of the coming blow. Nevertheless, despite these warnings and all the other sources of information at Stalin’s disposal, the element of surprise could not be wholly eliminated. But it remains true that when Stalin on the fateful morning of June 22nd called all his leading colleagues in the Government and on the General Staff of the Red Army to the Kremlin, he did not call on them to improvise measures to meet an entirely unanticipated situation. Here were Kalinin and Molotov, Voroshilov and Kaganovitch, Zhdanov and Beria and many more who had won fame and prestige in the Bolshevik fight for power and the wars of intervention. How different the scene from the days when the ragged army that grew out of the Red Guards had fought almost exclusively with weapons seized from the enemy invaders. Everyone in the Assembly was at the head of some mighty organisation which he had helped to build and for which he was responsible. He knew its ramifications from one end of the country to the other, its personnel, its problems, and what was expected of it and of him in the crisis that had befallen.
Stalin himself had not rested on his laurels as a military leader of renown in the days of the intervention war. He it was who had brought Michael Frunze into the leadership of the Red Army. Frunze had proved himself, by his conduct in the early days, to be worthy of the title of military genius. As soon as the war had ended he devoted himself to further study of military theory in the light of the first world struggle and the Russian Revolution. He was one of the first to recognise that revolutionary changes were afoot in the technique of modern warfare, that it would be increasingly totalitarian and three-dimensional and no longer in any sense static. In a lecture in 1922 he said:
The stationary front of the imperialist war will have no place in the next war . . . the powerful development of aviation, of chemical and other means of warfare make an unbroken stationary front impossible for any length of time. . . . This war will involve armies of millions. It will be a war to the death . . . our military organisation to-day, in peace-time, must be such as will make it possible at the moment of mobilisation, at the moment of attack, to place in the field millions which the coming war demands . . . mobilisation must embrace all our economy, our education, everything.
Stalin learned much from Frunze, who died in 1925, and anyone taking the trouble to study the strategic lay-out of the Five Year Plans must have observed that Stalin was in fundamental accord with Frunze and applying his ideas diligently day by day. Frunze’s writings became the military textbooks of the Military Academy of the Red Army.
But there was another leader of the Red Army who is also not unfittingly described as a military genius. His name is Marshal Boris Michhailovitch Shaposhnikov. Formerly a colonel in the Czar’s army, he joined the Red Army at the outset of the Revolution. In 1919 he was one of its outstanding leaders of operations. In 1921 he received the Order of the Red Banner, and in 1929 became Chief of Staff. In addition to his purely military abilities he is also a scientist and mathematician. In 1932 Stalin attended his lectures and studied modern warfare with him. Stalin never “let up” on these studies, but learned to understand thoroughly the theory of “reserves” and “encirclement,” the warfare of movement and the total character of modern war.
This meeting with his chiefs was no assembly for speechifying but for making swift decisions and issuing instructions for the operation of decisions already taken. Stalin, in a crisis, acts with the precision of a steel spring. He has no words to waste, no time for polished phrases. Now he and everyone present were filled with the most bitter hatred and anger against the Nazis. All the cynicism and amused contempt for capitalists in general was gone. Anyone who would fight with Russia against the Nazi was a friend, whosoever expressed reservations was an enemy. Within the heart of every citizen of the Soviet Union, Soviet patriotism mingled with a national patriotism destined to falsify every prediction of internal disruption. The meeting of the leaders reflected the tenseness of the situation. None doubted the people. None doubted their power. Molotov and Kalinin were to make the first declarations to the nation. Kaganovitch and the leaders of war industry had at once to begin the evacuation of factory machinery, plant, and workers from Leningrad, Moscow and all the cities and towns of the Ukraine as far down as Rostov on Don, and roll them eastward to prepared centres in the Urals and the interior republics and provinces. Voroshilov had already set in motion the machinery of mobilisation, and armies were hastening to reinforce the garrisons and deal with the oncoming foe.
At 11 a.m. Molotov broadcast the news of the invasion. At once 200,000,000 people became one in purpose, will, and aspiration, aflame with a patriotic ardour that was to astound the world with its daring and capacity for sacrifice. And in this hour they looked to Joseph Stalin, the embodiment of their confidence, hopes, and will. Out of their age-long backwardness he had led them, relentlessly but with great wisdom, up to the level of the twentieth century. He was the unquestioned leader of their multi-national State, and in him and his picked lieutenants they had infinite confidence.
He did not make a broadcast speech to the people until July 3rd, eleven days after the invasion had begun. During these eleven days a vast change had taken place in the relationship between States and nations, classes and institutions, but nothing could divert him from the practical task of directing the Union’s forces. Day and night he was at his post, snatching only the meagrest hours for sleep. He knew all was well with the spirit of the people. On July 3rd every ear was listening for the voice of this man in whom, above all others, they placed their uttermost confidence.
He did not begin with the formal “Ladies and Gentlemen,” but with “Comrades, citizens, brothers and sisters, men of our Army and Navy! My words are addressed to you, dear friends!” The language of classless human brotherhood. . . . He proceeded:
The perfidious military attack by Hitlerite Germany on our fatherland, begun on June 22nd, is continuing.
In consequence of this war which has been forced upon us, our country has come to death grips with its bitterest and most cunning enemy—German Fascism. Our troops are fighting heroically against an enemy armed to the teeth with tanks and aircraft. Overcoming numerous difficulties, the Red Army and Red Navy are self-sacrificingly fighting for every inch of Soviet soil. The main forces of the Red Army are coming into action equipped with thousands of tanks and planes. . . .
What is required to put an end to the danger imperilling our country and what measures must be taken to smash the enemy?
Above all it is essential that our people, the Soviet People, should appreciate the full immensity of the danger that threatens our country and give up all complacency, casualness and the mentality of peaceful constructive work that was so natural before the war, but which is fatal to-day, when war has radically changed the whole situation. The enemy is cruel and implacable. He is out to seize our lands watered by the sweat of our brows, to seize our grain and oil secured by the labour of our hands. He is out to restore the rule of the landlords, to restore Czarism, to destroy our national culture and the national existence as states of the Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Esthonians, Uzbeks, Tartars, Moldavians, Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanians and the other free peoples of the Soviet Union, to Germanise them, to turn them into the slaves of German princes and barons. Thus the issue is one of life and death for the Soviet State, of life and death for the peoples of the U.S.S.R. . . .
Further, there must be no room in our ranks for whimperers and cowards, for panic-mongers and deserters; our people must know no fear in the fight and must selflessly join our patriotic war of liberation against the Fascist enslavers. Lenin, the great founder of our State, used to say that the chief virtues of Soviet men and women must be courage, valour, fearlessness in struggle, readiness to fight together with the people against the enemies of our country. These splendid virtues of the Bolshevik must become the virtues of millions and millions of the Red Army, of the Red Navy, of all the peoples of the Soviet Union. All our work must be immediately reorganised on a war footing; everything must be subordinated to the interests of the front and the task of organising the destruction of the enemy. . . .
The Red Army, Red Navy and all citizens of the Soviet Union must defend every inch of Soviet soil, must fight to the last drop of blood for towns and villages, must display daring, initiative and mental alertness that are inherent in our people.
We must organise all-round assistance to the Red Army, ensure powerful reinforcements for its ranks and the supply of everything that it requires. . . .
We must strengthen the Red Army’s rear, subordinating all our work to this end. . . .
We must wage a ruthless fight against all disorganisers of the rear, deserters, panic-mongers and rumour-mongers; we must exterminate spies, sabotage agents and enemy parachutists. . . .
In case of a forced retreat of Red Army units, all rolling stock must be evacuated, the enemy must not be left a single engine, a single railway car, not a single pound of grain or gallon of fuel. . . .
In areas occupied by the enemy, guerrilla units, mounted and on foot, must be formed; sabotage groups must be organised to combat enemy units, to foment guerrilla warfare everywhere, blow up bridges and roads, damage telephone and telegraph lines, set fire to forests, stores and transport. . . .
The war with Fascist Germany cannot be considered an ordinary war. It is not only a war between two armies, it is also a great war of the entire Soviet people against the German-Fascist armies. The aim of this national patriotic war in defence of our country against the Fascist oppressors is not only to eliminate the danger hanging over the country, but also to aid all the European peoples groaning under the yoke of German Fascism. In this war of liberation we shall not be alone. In this great war we shall have true allies in the peoples of Europe and America, including the German people which is enslaved by the Hitlerite misrulers. Our war for the freedom of our country will merge with the struggle of the peoples of Europe and America for their independence, for democratic liberties. . . . In this connection the historic utterance of the British Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, regarding aid to the Soviet Union, and the declaration of the United States Government signifying readiness to render aid to our country, which can evoke a feeling of gratitude in the hearts of the peoples of the Soviet Union, are fully comprehensible and symptomatic.
Comrades, our forces are numberless. The overweening enemy will soon learn this to his cost. Side by side with the Red Army many thousands of workers, collective farmers and intellectuals are rising to fight the enemy aggressor. The masses of our people will rise up in their millions. The working people of Moscow and Leningrad have already begun to form huge People’s Guards in support of the Red Army. Such people’s Guards must be raised in every city which is in danger of enemy invasion; all the working people must be roused to defend with their lives their freedom, their honour and their country in the patriotic war against German Fascism. . . .
All our forces for the support of our heroic Red Army and our glorious Red Navy!
All the forces of the people for the destruction of the enemy! Forward to victory!
The next four months were the most difficult and terrible in Stalin’s life as leader of the Soviet Union. In these months everything was put to the test. Only parts of the Red Army were seasoned in battle. The rest, highly trained as they were, had yet to learn the difference between mock warfare and real, when armies fight in desperation and shoot with hate. Could the Soviet Union and the Red Army withstand the full impact of Germany’s armies, hardened by experience, inspired with a sense of invincibility, and spiritually drunk with a series of victories such as the world had never seen?
From the outset the Red Army proved that it would fight with insuperable passion and tenacity, but it was not until the battle for Smolensk that the great test was met—and weathered. Here for the first time since the Nazi Army was formed and its leaders proclaimed to the world their invincible Blitzkrieg, the invincibles were smashed and the Blitzkrieg was countered. Here at Smolensk the German Army was held at bay for thirty days, and when it finally secured the ashes of the city after a fearful carnage, it had won a battle and lost the war. The Blitzkrieg as a theory of war, the myth of Nazi invincibility—both had been shattered by the Red Army.
The losses were enormous on both sides, but the artillery technique of the Red Army had done its work. It took the Nazi leaders six weeks to regroup their forces, and time was flying. The orders issued to the tank corps units at the beginning of the battle for Smolensk, to “march immediately on Moscow,” had passed into the realm of historical documents. Everything was already behind schedule if the German Army was still to take Moscow before the winter. A full six weeks after the fall of Smolensk, Hitler announced, “For the last twenty-four hours operations have been going on which will have a decisive result on the conduct and duration of the war.” Eighty German divisions were engaged in an all-out effort to advance and seize the capital. Ceaselessly the Red Army pounded the oncoming enemy, keeping itself intact as it fought its retreating campaign and accumulated powerful fresh reserves which could be flung in, in overwhelming force, at the moment when the enemy showed exhaustion and the tempo of his advance slackened. The application of this “theory of reserves” demands infinite patience, inexhaustible fighting capacity, and unerring judgement of the decisive moment to launch the counter-offensive.
No leader ever had these qualities in such great supply as he who, day and night, with his general staff, watched and directed the Red Army in this terrific struggle. At the end of November the strength of the German attack began to decline, and throughout the succeeding days continued to fall steadily. On the morning of December 6th, after a night of frost which signalled the approach of winter, Stalin himself gave the order for the great counter-attack, and with dramatic suddenness the huge reserve army he had accumulated behind Moscow, splendidly equipped for winter warfare, swept into battle and hurled the Germans from the gates of Moscow and many other places. The German Army, equipped only for summer warfare, deprived of the warm cover of the cities and the possibility of a spring offensive, was driven back into the wilderness of the Russian winter.
When the history of this second world war is written, the historian will record that, just as the battle for Smolensk shattered the infallibility, of the Blitzkrieg recipe for modern warfare, so the counter-offensive of the Red Army, begun on December 6th, 1941, was the decisive turning point in the war. Try as he might, Hitler would never be able to resume his march on Moscow. He would attempt later on to reach it by enveloping movements of great power through Leningrad and Stalingrad. Twice more the Red Army line would bend, almost to breaking. But the élite of the Nazi army had been defeated, battered, exhausted. The replacements would never again equal the prototypes, and the Nazi General Staff had nothing left in its strategical equipment to match the strategy of the man in the Kremlin.
The Battle of Moscow in 1941 occupies a similar position in the second world war to that of the Battle of the Marne in the first. In 1915 this had registered the peak of the German advance against the west. Here, as the sagging French line held until the force behind it had swollen to greater dimensions than the Germans could ever equal, the ultimate defeat of Germany was sealed. Similarly now, behind the sagging line that ran between Petsamo, Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad, the Kuban, there went on ceaselessly the accumulation of men and steel in preparation for the avalanche which would finish what the Battle of Moscow had begun.
In the midst of this titanic warfare, while the Nazis were approaching ever nearer Moscow, an Anglo-American mission headed by Lord Beaverbrook and Mr. Averil Harriman arrived in Moscow. Whatever its members may have expected they did not find Stalin either nervous or anxious, fearful of impending disaster or waiting for an “intuition.” Mr. Harriman remarked afterwards: “Beaverbrook and I worked principally with Stalin. No man could work more quickly or with greater intensity.” Lord Beaverbrook said: “If I am any judge of mankind and if I have any experience in my long life, I put my faith in that man’s leadership.”
On November 6th, on the eve of the Twenty-fourth Anniversary of the Soviet Revolution, Stalin addressed a celebration meeting of the Moscow Soviet and various Party and public organisations. Once again there was manifest the lucid, unfaltering, scientific analysis which brings the realities to light and gives everyone full understanding of the tasks to be done. He said:
. . . I have already said in one of my public speeches at the beginning of the war that the war had created a dangerous threat to our country. . . . Now after four months of war, I must emphasise that this danger has not only not grown less, but on the contrary, has even increased. . . . The enemy stops at no sacrifice, he does not care one iota for the blood of his soldiers, he throws into action more and more detachments to replace those which have been shattered, and is straining all his efforts to capture Leningrad and Moscow before the advent of winter, for he knows that winter bodes him no good.
In four months of war we have lost 350,000 killed and 378,000 missing, and our wounded number 1,020,000. In the same period the enemy has in killed, wounded, and prisoners, lost more than 4,500,000.
In launching their attack on our country, the German-Fascist invaders thought they would certainly be able to “finish off” the Soviet Union in one and a half or two months, and in this short period would succeed in reaching the Urals. It must be said that the Germans did not conceal this plan of “lightning” victory. . . . Now this mad plan must be regarded as having finally failed.
. . . What did the German-Fascist strategists count on when they asserted that they would finish off the Soviet Union in two months and reach the Urals in this short period?
They seriously calculated in the first place on creating a general coalition against the U.S.S.R., on enlisting Great Britain and the U.S.A. in this coalition, first having frightened the ruling circles of these countries with the spectre of revolution, and thus completely isolating our country from the other Powers. . . . The notorious Hess was in fact sent to England by the German Fascists precisely in order to persuade the English politicians to join in the general crusade against the U.S.S.R. But the Germans gravely miscalculated. . . . The U.S.S.R. not only was not isolated, but, on the contrary, it acquired new allies in the shape of Great Britain, the United States and other countries occupied by the Germans. . . .
The Germans counted, secondly, on the instability of the Soviet system, and the unreliability of the Soviet rear. . . . But here also the Germans gravely miscalculated . . . they converted the family of peoples of the U.S.S.R. into a single unshakable camp, selflessly supporting its Red Army and Red Navy. . . .
Finally, the Germans invaders counted on the weakness of the Red Army and Red Navy. . . . But here, too, the Germans gravely miscalculated, over-rating their own strength and underrating our army and navy. Of course, our army and navy are still young, they have been fighting for four months in all, they have not yet succeeded in becoming thoroughly seasoned, whereas they are confronted by the seasoned army and navy of the Germans, who have been fighting for two years.
. . . There are a number of factors unfavourable to the Red Army, as a result of which our army is suffering temporary reverses. . . . What are these unfavourable factors?
. . . One of the reasons for the reverses of the Red Army is the absence of a second front in Europe against the German-Fascist troops. The fact of the matter is that at the present time there are still no armies of Great Britain or the United States of America on the European continent to wage war against the German-Fascist troops. . . . There is no doubt that the absence of a second front in Europe against the Germans considerably eases the position of the German army. But neither can there be any doubt that the appearance of a second front on the European continent—and it must unquestionably appear in the near future—will essentially ease the situation of our army to the detriment of the German army.
The other reason for the temporary reverses of our army is our lack of an adequate number of tanks and, partly, of aircraft. . . .
There is only one way of nullifying the Germans’ superiority in tanks and thus radically improving the position of our army. This way is, not only to increase the output of tanks in our country several times over but also sharply to increase the production of anti-tank aircraft, anti-tank rifles and guns, and and anti-tank grenades and mortars, and to construct more anti-tank trenches and every other kind of anti-tank obstacle.
Herein lies our present task.
He then proceeded to set out their definite aims.
In contradistinction to Hitlerite Germany, the Soviet Union and its allies are waging a war of liberation, a just war, for the purpose of liberating the enslaved peoples of Europe and the U.S.S.R. from Hitler’s tyranny. That is why all honest people must support the armies of the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the other allies, as armies of liberation.
We have not, and cannot have, such war aims as the seizure of foreign territories of Europe, or the peoples and territories of Asia, including Iran. Our first aim is to liberate our territories and our peoples from the German-Fascist yoke.
We have not, and cannot have, any such war aim as that of imposing our will and our régime upon the Slavonic or other enslaved nations of Europe, who are expecting our help. Our aim is to help these nations in their struggle for liberation against Hitler’s tyranny and then leave it to them quite freely to organise their life on their lands as they think fit. No interference in the internal affairs of other nations! . . .
The references in this speech to the “absence of a second front” were taken by many people less as a simple statement of fact than as an implied criticism of Britain and the U.S.A. I do not think that at this stage it had entered Stalin’s mind to criticise on this point, although in view of the rapidity with which an expeditionary force had been prepared to go to the aid of the Finns, and of the boasting of the Cabinet Minister who had wanted us to “take on Germany and Russia together,” it must have been difficult for him to appreciate the appalling state of Britain’s military unpreparedness.
However, soon the question of the “Second Front in Europe” did become a cause of deterioration in the relations between the Soviet and British Governments, the rift increasing in breadth until Mr. Churchill visited Moscow in the autumn of 1942. This was a memorable meeting. Two warriors, two men of sterling character, each in his own way the embodiment of the social system he represented, each fighting in his own manner for all he held dear, met for the first time at the greatest epoch in the life of either. They had much in common. Both, although they had served in different kinds of army and for widely different ends, are soldiers of rich and varied experience. Both are politicians accustomed to leadership. Both are “practical men,” both have a rich sense of humour. There was irony in their meeting, too. Not so many years had rolled by since they had apostrophised one another with scorching words while they opposed one another with armies. But with the tremendous challenge of the present before them, both men were too big to waste time in fruitless recrimination about the past.
Nevertheless, there was an evening, lengthening into a night, when these giant protagonists had an “off the record” talk, when behind pipe and cigar they livened the shadows of that Kremlin room with sparkling clash of views, with reminiscence and with not a little laughter. Only those who were present can render to the world an account of that conversation in which rival philosophies of life vied with each other and yet brought the two men closer together in common purpose. Did they travel over the history of the Revolution, the war of intervention, Anglo-Soviet relations? Did they discuss military strategy, the war’s potentialities, the outcome of the anti-Nazi struggle, the future of the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and the world at large? We can only guess. But one thing is certain—each learned to know the other better and parted with a deeper respect, confident that they could travel a long way together through this war and beyond it.
In the “official meetings,” and no doubt in the “unofficial,” the “Second Front” was the subject of much discussion. Indeed, one of the purposes of Mr. Churchill’s visit to Moscow was to “explain why there could be no Second Front” for some time to come.
He arrived there at the beginning of the great German battle for Stalingrad, when the Red Army was subject to the greatest pressure since the Battle of Moscow. The 2,000-mile battle-line had been engaging the Soviet forces for over a year, during which they had also had to conduct the greatest evacuation of people and equipment in the history of the nations. Stalin had repeatedly emphasised that the Red Army was bearing the brunt of the war, and had asked for relief action on the part of her ally in the West. Mr. Churchill has repeatedly explained, even as late as in March, 1944, that Stalin and his colleagues found it difficult to appreciate what was involved in massive amphibious operations.
It is quite clear that while having to accept these technical explanations, Stalin never agreed that they were sufficient answers to his appeal. It is said that on receiving Mr. Churchill’s detailed explanation, he remarked composedly, “We carry on. No recriminations.” Mr. Churchill has said that “Stalin is a man without illusions.” If the Russian leader had ever held any illusion about Mr. Churchill’s point of view he now knew it fully. But behind the contrast of Stalin’s demand for a Second Front and the protracted preparation of the Allies, lies also the profound difference of outlook between himself and Mr. Churchill. The request was not made because Stalin feared the Red Army would become exhausted unless it received relief from the tremendous pressure. He wanted it for other reasons—primarily because he knew that once the moment came again for the Red Army’s reserves to launch a mighty counter-offensive against the strained and tired forces of the German armies, a simultaneous attack in the West, strong enough to compel the Germans to withdraw considerable forces from the East precisely when they needed additional strength there, would be disastrous to them.
The alternative could only mean that the Germans would have greater powers of resistance concentrated in the East; and the Red Army would therefore be faced with a correspondingly harder and longer task in wearing them down sufficiently to permit the great counter-offensive which, a year and a half after Mr. Churchill’s visit, was destined, in the Prime Minister’s phrase, “to tear the guts out of the German army” with the Second Front still only in its preliminary “softening up” stage.
The alternative also had another aspect yet more significant. Mr. Churchill and his Government, with our American allies, had based their strategy on Britain and the U.S.A. functioning as auxiliary arsenals for the Soviet Union while they confined their military operations to the defence of their empires on the assumption that the Red Army would keep the Germans fully occupied in eastern Europe until they had accumulated overwhelming might for the kill. This is a fact and not a matter of opinion. It was impossible for Stalin not to see that it imposed tremendous sacrifices on the Soviet people and the Red Army. Their blood would have to flow in greater streams, out of all proportion to that of their allies.
Much more than mere differing appreciation of the tasks involved in “massive amphibious operations” lies behind these two conceptions of the strategy of the war. Behind them lie the separate philosophies of the two men, each with its roots deep in the social system it represents. It is only necessary to consider the now hypothetical question, “What would Britain have done had Germany chosen a two-front war after Dunkirk?” to see these philosophies clearly.
Had such a struggle been thrust upon us there would, unquestionably, have surged throughout the length and breadth of the land a spirit of sacrifice and effort which would have made the sacrificial spirit accompanying Dunkirk a mere curtain-raiser. And in order to defeat the enemy, Mr. Churchill would have answered with a strategic programme based on that sacrificial spirit. What we should have done had we been forced by the enemy to do it, Stalin expected us to do as a part of a greater strategy of victory on our own initiative.
Stalin leads a people whose patriotism is unfettered by millions of private considerations based on financial interest. The private and social interests of the Soviet people are so integrated that those of one are those of all, and the “Dunkirk spirit” which for a moment in our history overwhelmed all thought of personal interests in a sublime spirit of social sacrifice and service, is the spirit of the Soviet people not merely for one great hour of self-forgetfulness, but always.
Mr. Churchill not only leads a people in whose history Dunkirks are rare and episodic, but his actions are for ever impeded and governed by the claims which the Dunkirks sweep aside. He cannot help it. Born of a class which confuses its own interests with those of the nation, believing throughout his life that the interests of private property are paramount, he cannot do other than pledge Parliament to eschew all discussion which touches this fundamental question, he cannot encourage industry to produce with a higher motive than that of private acquisitiveness. How then can he base his strategy on the all-in sacrificial struggle of a united people, when his people form two nations with patriotism and self-seeking everlastingly haggling across the bargain counters?
Stalin does not “blame” Churchill for being Churchill. He is convinced that of all the leaders produced by the British capitalism of this epoch, Churchill is the one most likely to honour his words with deeds. But he knows that both words and deeds are limited by what Mr. Churchill sincerely conceives to be the interests of the imperial system he serves. Each of the two therefore, knowing what he can expect of the other, has thus established a friendship in which the Bolshevik remains a Bolshevik and the conservative imperialist remains a conservative imperialist.
Stalin saw clearly after their meeting that within the limits set by Churchill’s strategy he would receive the maximum of aid, that to those limits he would have to adapt his strategy. But he had not changed his personal attitude to the question, nor did he remain silent about it. On November 6th, 1942, addressing a meeting in celebration of the twenty-fourth anniversary of the Soviet Revolution, he reviewed the situation with that downright thoroughness and clarity which the world has now learned to expect from him, and said:
. . . The activities of our Government and Party organs during the past period proceeded in two directions: in the direction of peaceful construction and the organisation of a strong rear for our front, on the one hand, and in the direction of carrying out defensive and offensive operations by the Red Army, on the other.
The peaceful, constructive work of our directing organs in this period consisted in shifting the base of our industry, both war and civilian, to the eastern regions of our country; in the evacuation and establishment in their new places of the industrial workers and the equipment of the plants; in extending the sown areas and increasing the winter crop area in the east; and lastly in radically improving the work of our industries producing for the front and strengthening labour discipline in the rear, both in the factories and on the collective and state farms.
. . . It must be admitted that never before has our country had such a strong and well-organised rear. . . .
. . . As regards the military activities of our directing organs in the past year, these consisted in providing for offensive and defective operations by the Red Army against the German-Fascist troops. The military operations on the Soviet-German front in the past year can be divided into two periods:
The first period was chiefly the winter period, when the Red Army, having beaten off the Germans’ attack on Moscow, took the initiative into its own hands, passed to the offensive, drove back the German troops and in the space of four months advanced in places, over 250 miles; and the second period was the summer period. . . .
The second period of military operations on the Soviet-German front was marked by a change in favour of the Germans, by the passing of the initiative into the hands of the Germans, by the piercing of our front in the south-western direction, by the advance of the German troops and their reaching the areas of Voronezh, Stalingrad, Novorossisk, Piatigorsk and Mozdok. . . .
How are we to explain the fact that the Germans this year were still able to take the initiative of military operations into their hands and achieve substantial tactical successes on our front? . . . The chief reason . . . is that the absence of a second front in Europe enabled them to hurl on to our front all their available reserves and to create a large superiority of forces in the southwestern direction.
Let us assume that a second front existed in Europe, as it existed in the First World War, and that a second front diverted, let us say, sixty German divisions and twenty divisions of Germany’s allies. What would have been the position of the German troops on our front then?
It is not difficult to guess that their position would have been deplorable. More than that, it would have been the beginning of the end of the GermanFascist troops, for in that case the Red Army would not be where it is now, but somewhere near Pskov, Minsk, Zhitomir and Odessa. . . . If that has not occurred, it is because the Germans were saved by the absence of a second front in Europe. . . .
The German invasion of Europe is often compared to Napoleon’s invasion of Russia. But the comparison will not bear criticism. Of the 600,000 troops which began the campaign against Russia, Napoleon scarcely brought 130,000 or 140,000 as far as Borodino. That was all he had at his disposal at Moscow. Well, we now have over 3,000,000 troops facing the front of the Red Army and armed with all the implements of modern warfare. What comparison can there be here?
The German invasion of our country is also sometimes compared with the German invasion of Russia at the time of the First World War. But neither will this comparison bear criticism. Firstly, in the First World War there was a second front in Europe which rendered the Germans’ position very difficult, whereas in this war there is no second front in Europe.
Secondly, in this war, twice as many troops are facing our front as in the First World War. Obviously the comparison is not appropriate. You can now conceive how serious and extraordinary are the difficulties confronting the Red Army, and how great is the heroism displayed by the Red Army in its war of liberation against the German-Fascist troops.
I think that no other country and no other army could have withstood such an onslaught of the bestial bands of the German-Fascist brigands and their allies. Only our Soviet country and only our Red Army are capable of withstanding such an onslaught. And not only withstanding it but also overpowering it.
It is often asked: But will there be a second front in Europe after all? Yes, there will be; sooner or later, there will be one. And it will be not only because we need it, but above all because our allies need it no less than we do.
Our allies cannot fail to realise that since France has been put out of action, the absence of a second front against Fascist Germany may end badly for all freedom-loving countries, including the allies themselves. . . .
Did Stalin underestimate the importance of the war in North Africa, which Mr. Churchill thought to be the best means of helping the Red Army? In a letter replying to questions put by Mr. Cassidy of the American News Agency, Associated Press, he wrote:
November 13, 1942
Dear Mr. CASSIDY,—
I am answering your questions which reached me on November 12th.
1. Question: What is the Soviet view of the Allied campaign in Africa?
Answer: The Soviet view of the campaign is that it represents an outstanding fact of major importance demonstrating the growing might of the armed forces of the Allies and opening the prospect of the disintegration of the Italo-German coalition in the nearest future. . . .
2. Question How effective has this campaign been in relieving pressure on the Soviet Union, and what further aid does the Soviet Union await?
Answer: It is yet too soon to say to what extent this campaign has been effective in relieving pressure on the Soviet Union, but it may confidently be said that the effect will not be a small one, and that a certain relief in pressure on the Soviet Union will result in the near future.
But that is not the only thing that matters. What matters, first of all, is that, since the campaign in Africa means that the initiative has passed into the hands of our allies, this campaign radically changes the military and political situation in Europe in favour of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition. It undermines the prestige of Hitlerite Germany as the leading force in the system of Axis powers and demoralises Hitler’s allies in Europe. It releases France from her state of lethargy, mobilises the anti-Hitler forces of France and provides a basis for the organisation of an anti-Hitler French army. It creates conditions for putting Italy out of commission and for isolating Hitlerite Germany. Finally, it creates the prerequisites for the organisation of a second front in Europe nearer to Germany’s vital centres, which will be of decisive importance for organising victory over the Hitlerite tyranny.
3. Question: What possibility is there of the Soviet offensive power in the East joining the Allies in the West to hasten final victory?
Answer: There need be no doubt that the Red Army will fulfil its task with honour, as it has been fulfilling it throughout the whole war.
With respects,
J. STALIN
Nearly four months later, on the twenty-fifth Anniversary of the formation of the Red Army, he sounds the triumphant note of victory. It is February 23rd, 1943. He says:
Three months ago the troops of the Red Army began their offensive at the approaches to Stalingrad. Since then the initiative in military operations hay remained in our hands and the pace and the striking power of the offensive operations of the Red Army have not weakened. To-day, in hard winter conditions, the Red Army is advancing over a front of 950 miles and is achieving successes practically everywhere. In the north near Leningrad, on the Central front, at the approaches to Kharkov, in the Donetz Basin, at Rostov, on the shores of the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, the Red Army is striking blow after blow at the Hitlerite troops.
. . . In three months of the Red. Army’s offensive in the winter of 1942-3 alone, the Germans lost over 7,000 tanks, 4,000 planes, 17,000 guns and large quantities of other arms.
In defensive and offensive battles, the Red Army, since the beginning of the war has put out of action about 9,000,000 German-Fascist officers and men, of which no less than 4,000,000 were killed on the battlefield. . . .
The German invaders are resisting furiously, are launching counter-attacks, are striving to cling to their defence lines, and may embark on new adventures, That is why there can be no place for complacency, carelessness or conceit in our ranks.
The whole of the Soviet people rejoices in the Red Army’s victories. But the Red Army men, commanders and political workers should remember the precepts of our teacher Lenin. “The first thing is not to be carried away by victory and not to get conceited; the second thing is to consolidate one’s victory; the third thing is to finish off the enemy. . . .”
From this time forward Stalin’s communiqués record triumph on triumph as the Red Army sweeps the Fascist forces out of the Union. In the midst of the great progress he went to Teheran to again meet Mr. Churchill, and for the first time President Roosevelt. What a gathering! Each man reinforced with a galaxy of military, naval, and political talent such as had never before been assembled together, representative of the greatest military and economic combination known to man.
Some day we may know beyond the tobacco they smoked, the wine they drank, the meals they ate and the clothes they wore, all that transpired there. All have affirmed their satisfaction with the decisions at which they arrived. Co-ordination of strategical plans was agreed on. Principles governing post-war political relations were reaffirmed and discussed in some detail. But as to what the plans, the principles, are, the world must learn piece by piece as they are translated into action.
Stalin emerged from this conference, as from previous conferences, with added prestige in the eyes of the world. It was here that Mr. Churchill gave the toast “Stalin the Great,” and no man to-day quarrels with the title.
Quickly he returned to Moscow, as much too absorbed now in the making of history to bask long in the sunshine of praise and admiration as he had hitherto been too absorbed in his task to worry about the abuse of his enemies. For him the Teheran conference had achieved much if by a week or a month it shortened the period of his people’s sacrifice and lessened the amount of blood they must lose. Of the approaching victory he had never been in doubt since the first blow struck in the war.
Now, as the majestic avalanche of triumph unrolled itself across the fields and cities of the Ukraine until it reached and passed the western frontiers of the Union, and the Red Army seemed able to pummel and shatter the Nazi armies at will, his confidence in the power of the Revolution was reinforced a thousand-fold. The blackest days of 1941 were gone. The hungriest, most difficult days of 1942 had also gone. Not only had 1943 witnessed the military victories but also the rise of Soviet production above the demands of the war machine. Imperceptibly at first, but no less truly, the standards of social life snatched from the people by the war had begun to creep back. And the date for the storm of steel to be let loose on the enemy from the West had been fixed at last. Already the air forces of Britain and the United States were blasting the productive forces of Germany with unceasing diligence and increasing power. Very soon now the enslaved peoples of Europe would be rising from the depths of their agony and Nazi Germany would go down in catastrophic collapse.
But Stalin is no ordinary man. In the hour of triumph he has the habit of recalling Lenin’s dictum, “Don’t get conceited, consolidate victories, finish off the enemy.” Teheran and the sweeping of the Nazi armies from Soviet territory is not enough. The enemy has to be “liquidated” utterly. Until then there can be no resting on victories won. “Hitler has asked for a war of annihilation. We will give him one.” The fulfilinent of that declaration will occupy his attention until the last Nazi surrenders or is dead.
Next: XV. Stalin To-day and To-morrow