Departing from us, Comrade Lenin adjured us to remain faithful to the principles of the Communist International. We vow to you, Comrade Lenin, that we will not spare our lives to strengthen and extend the union of the toilers of the whole world—the Communist International.
J. STALIN, January, 1924
The dissolution of the Communist International is proper and timely because it facilitates the organisation of the common onslaught of all freedom-loving nations against the common enemy—Hitlerism . . .
J. STALIN, May 28, 1943
ALTHOUGH Joseph Stalin had reached the front rank of the Bolshevik Party leaders before 1914, he had, as already stated, written and said little about international matters until released from exile by the March Revolution of 1917; and in fact it was not until 1924 that he first gave considered expression to his views on foreign affairs, in the form of a volume entitled Leninism. Rushed from one front to another during the years of preparation and consolidation, organising and fighting desperately, he had been content to be Lenin’s leading “practitioner.” Now, having put on Lenin’s mantle, he was still content to be Lenin’s “disciple,” faithfully expounding the Master’s teachings. This is how he summed up his views at the time:
. . . the overthrow of the power of the bourgeoisie and the establishment of the power of the proletariat in one country alone, does not per se, mean the complete victory of Socialism. Having consolidated its power and having secured the support of the peasantry, the victorious proletariat can and must proceed to upbuild a socialist society. Does this mean that thereby the victorious proletariat will achieve the final victory of Socialism? Does this mean that the workers in one country alone, unaided, can definitely install socialism, guaranteed against intervention, guaranteed against a restoration of the old régime? No, certainly not. For that the victory of the revolution, if not everywhere, at least in several countries, will be requisite. That is why the fostering of revolution, the support of revolution, in other countries, is incumbent upon the country where the revolution has triumphed. That is why a country in which the revolution has triumphed must not look upon itself as an independent magnitude, but as an auxiliary, as a means of hastening the victory of the proletariat in other lands. . .[1]
What forms the “fostering of revolution, the support of revolution, in other countries” would take, must depend on circumstances. As a Marxist he could not say that at all times and in all circumstances he would call on revolutionary Russia to send her Red Army to aid an insurrection in some other country. But in one way or another it would assist the development of revolution everywhere.
That Stalin subscribed to Lenin’s view of the epoch as one of “War and Revolution” he made abundantly clear in Leninism:
In former days, it was customary to regard the proletarian revolution as an outcome of conditions that were purely local to the country under consideration. . . . This formulation is obsolete. Nowadays we have to regard the proletarian revolution, first and foremost, as the outgrowth of antagonisms within the world-wide system of imperialism, as the outcome of an effort which (in this country or that) breaks the chains of world-wide imperialism. . . . Where is the front likely to be broken next? Again at the weakest point, obviously. . . .
Earlier, in March, 1919, he had with Lenin, Trotsky, Bucharin, Zinoviev and others been a delegate at the foundation congress of the Communist International. From the moment when the Second Socialist International collapsed at the outbreak of war in 1914, Lenin had been insistent on the need for the formation of a Communist International “free from opportunism”; and when the Russian Revolution roused tremendous enthusiasm in the ranks of the working-class of other countries he led the way in creating this body. It has been asserted that it was formed as an appendage of the Soviet Foreign Office. That assertion I regard as wholly inaccurate. There is ample evidence in Lenin’s writings to prove that he would have established it even had there been no Russian Revolution. The latter, however, presented him with far more favourable circumstances, since it not only gave a great impetus to the development of the Bolshevik Party in Russia, but stirred the Socialist and working-class movements in every country with a desire to form parties in emulation of the Bolsheviks. Stalin had no hesitation in supporting Lenin’s proposal.
In that first gathering in the Smolny Institute in Leningrad there was no discussion of the new International’s relation to Soviet Foreign policy, or to the problems which would arise when the intervention war should be ended and diplomatic relations be established between the Soviet and capitalist governments. Indeed, at that time there appeared to be little prospect of such relations ever being established. The Soviets were fighting with their backs to the wall; many months of heroic struggle had yet to be endured before such problems of inter-State relations would arise. Nor was there the smallest guidance in any Marxist or Socialist writings. From the inception of relations with the capitalist countries, the Bolsheviks would be treading unmapped territory.
The Congress of 1919 was a small one, composed of a number of people connected with the Socialist movements of other countries who happened to be in Russia, and the leading members of the Russian Bolsheviks. Beyond making a few declarations and announcing the formation of the international it did little more than prepare the way for a really representative Congress in the following year.
The Second Congress met in July and August of 1920. Parties and groups of Socialists in more than fifty countries were represented. It was a remarkable assemblage which gathered first in the Uritsky Theatre in Leningrad and later in the St. Andrew’s Hall in the Kremlin. The Revolution had acted like a great magnet and drawn delegations from every continent and clime. But the revolutionary developments had not gone deep enough to split the great Labour Parties on a scale large enough to secure a wide mass-basis for the new International in Germany and Britain, while the working-class of the United States was still in its political infancy and had little of a movement to split. The official Social Democratic and Labour Parties of the Second International were not invited, being regarded as disintegrating bodies to be superseded by the parties of revolution.
In Italy, France, Czecho-Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Rumania the major Socialist parties responded to the invitation. Groups and parties large and small, were faced at once with Lenin’s insistence upon a revolutionary qualitative standard based upon the principles which had guided him in the building of the Bolshevik Party. This meant that some of the groupings, the French and Italian in particular, were faced with the obligation of splitting as a condition of membership of the International.
This Second Congress did not change its estimate of the international situation. Zinoviev, the first President, boldly asserted that a year, or not more than two years, would see the end of capitalism in Europe at least. And nobody contradicted him. Lenin analysed the character of the epoch opened by the Russian Revolution. He set no specific time limit to its duration. Indeed, he warned the revolutionaries against the conception that the current crisis was a hopeless one for the capitalists. He said:
There are no conditions which can be absolutely hopeless. The conduct of the bourgeoisie is like that of a desperate robber who has lost his bearings. It is committing blunder on blunder, aggravating the situation and hastening its own downfall. All this is true. But one cannot “prove” that there is absolutely no possibility for the bourgeoisie to beguile this or that minority of the exploited, by means of some concession; that it cannot suppress this or that movement or crush an uprising of some fraction of the oppressed and exploited. To attempt to “prove” beforehand the “absolute” hopelessness is merely pedantry, mere play of ideas and phrases. The real “proof” in this and similar questions can be derived only from experience. The bourgeois régime all over the world is undergoing the greatest revolutionary crisis. Now the revolutionary parties must prove by actual deeds that they possess sufficient class-consciousness, sufficient power of organisation, are sufficiently in touch with the exploited masses, have enough determination and efficiency to take advantage of this crisis for a successful victorious revolution.
To get this “proof” ready is the main purpose of assembling here in the present Congress of the Communist International. . . .
No one asserted that there could be a simultaneous rising in all countries, but it was accepted that the Revolution was on the up-grade and that every communist party had to prove itself capable of leading an insurrectionary struggle designed to establish in the immediate future, the dictatorship of the proletariat and soviets. It was also accepted that the Communist International Executive had to function as the centralised leadership of the world revolution. In short, it is clear that the Communist International set out to be an international party. At its Third Congress, held in 1921, it put matters thus:
In order to break the front of the international counter-revolution, in order to make use of the combined forces of the Communist International, and bring nearer the victory of the revolution, we must strive, with all our energy, for united international leadership in the revolutionary struggle. The conditions essential to this are the political and centralised organisation of the component elements of the Communist International, the doing away with the autonomy trickery of the opportunist, the creation of an appropriate political organisation of the Communist International and its entire machinery. . . . The Congress takes into account the national peculiarities according to countries, the differences in the conditions under which the struggle takes place, the strength of the enemy and the fighting ability and strength of the revolutionary forces. But the nearer we get to uniform international fighting leadership, the more necessary it becomes to harmonise the forms of organisation and tactics of the affiliated sections. . . .
Thus Revolutionary Marxism, derived from Europe in the ’90’s, was borne on the wings of the Russian Revolution back to Europe and on to the rest of the world.
The first world Congress of the Communist International in which Stalin played the leading rôle was the Fifth since its formation, was called the Congress for the Bolshevisation of the Communist Parties of the International, and was held in 1924 when the struggle with Trotsky was getting into its stride and the process of consolidating the Russian Party on the issue of “Socialism in one country” was maturing. Stalin at once thrust this issue before the young parties of the International. He did not regard it as purely Russian. It was fundamental. Lenin’s exposition of the “law of unequal development of capitalism” was not confused to Russia, and it was important that the other parties of the international should realise this. Moreover, their realisation would help Stalin’s position in the Russian Party; for at the moment of his succession to Lenin, Trotsky, Bucharin and Radek were representatives of the Russian Bolsheviks on the Executive of the Communist International. One by one, as they exposed themselves for men of little faith in “Socialism in one country” and deviators from Marxism as expounded by Lenin and Stalin, they were thrust out of the ranks of Bolshevism and Stalin’s supporters took their places in all institutions.
It will be observed that while there was recognition of the “unequal development” of the countries in the tactical aspects of the policy of the Comintern, the organisation of this body was to be governed by entirely the opposite principle, that of strict international centralisation. When therefore Stalin raised the question of “Socialism in one country,” the country which dominated the situation was naturally Soviet Russia. The Bolsheviks were convinced believers in centralisation of direction, and equally convinced that what was good for their Party must be good for the whole world despite its variations of development. It dawned on no one that the “law of unequal development of capitalism” might ultimately prove so potent that a centralised international Party would turn out to be impracticable both in theory and practice.
When Stalin became the leader of the Communist International in 1925 it was generally accepted in Communist circles that the revolution had ebbed. He regarded the international’s task as that of training the reserves of the Revolution, and developing Communist Parties that would be able to take advantage of the turn of the tide whenever and wherever that might occur.
He did not confine himself to the issues derived directly from Russian experience, but studied the situation and problems of other parties with the thoroughness which has marked all his labours. The stories of his inaccessibility and living in an atmosphere of strictly guarded seclusion are the product of journalistic imagination. The difficulties the journalists encountered in getting interviews with him are really the measure of the importance he attached to them in relation to his work. He was, and is, a most systematic worker. His office at the headquarters of the Russian Bolshevik Party is a model of simplicity and good order. He has a large room, plainly furnished. At one end there is a large table-desk at which he sits working and smoking his pipe for hours on end every day and far into the night. I don’t know whether he has taken to smoking proper pipe tobacco, but on all occasions on which I have been in his company he has smoked cigarette tobacco, breaking up the long-stemmed Russian cigarettes and tearing off the paper. Down one side of his room is a long table with some sixteen chairs—seats for the members of the Political Bureau. On the wall are large portraits of Marx and Lenin. He is never flustered, either by the amount of work before him or by its nature. Nor does he ever, when he has agreed to meet you, appear conscious of the fact that his secretary has set a time limit to the conversation. Indeed, when he is greatly interested he will ignore the time and the secretary must make adjustments later.
From the end of his period of dashing from one war front to another, the headquarters of the Russian Party claimed him. Out of this centre his influence and directives radiated to all parts of the world, into this centre from the ends of the earth came information, requests, greetings, demands. In the morning a car waited for him at the door of his Kremlin home. It returned with him in the small hours of the next day. Occasionally if some important issue was at stake in the headquarters of the Communist International he would take part in its discussions. Occasionally he would attend some performance at the Bolshoy Theatre. Now and then he would deliver a lecture to students. His home was a restful corner hidden from the eyes of the world.
His days were spent in conferences with the leaders of Government departments, of the republics, the trade unions, industry, the Army and communist organisations in other countries. His nights were filled with hours of work, studying the problems the day had provided and projecting the tasks ahead. But at no time did he appear overworked. His serenity hid his tireless activity. And contrary to the common conception of his relationship with other people, he was always seeking collective decisions. This applied as much to his relations with the leaders of the foreign Communist Parties as to those with the Political Bureau and Central Committee of his own Party. It is a plain fact that the numerous critical situations in the history of the parties making up the C.I. were examined, and decisions were taken by their leaders, more frequently in Stalin’s office than in the headquarters of the C.I. This has laid him open to the charge of being the dictator of the International. The accusation, however, overlooks the circumstance that he and his colleagues were the Russian Party representatives in the C.I. Executive, and that all parties within this organisation looked to the Russians as their leaders.
The stages in the history of Stalin’s leadership of world revolution are as clearly defined as those in the history of the Soviet Union itself. He took over the leadership at a period which he described as one of “partial stabilisation of capitalism,” and set before the parties of the International four essential tasks: (a) to unite the working-class in defence of the Soviet Union, the fatherland of world revolution; (b) to lead the workers in their defensive struggles by means of the “united front” policy calculated to defend the workers’ interests, wages, hours of labour, political rights, etc.; (c) by the same method to expose the Social Democratic leaders of the Second International and destroy their influence; and (d) to organise the Communist Parties on the principles of the Russian Communist Party in preparation for the new period of revolutionary struggle for power which lay ahead.
Conscious of the immaturity of the leaders of the other parties,’ Stalin and his colleagues in the C.I. Executive gave detailed attention to the question of training in leadership and assisting the leaders with their problems both theoretical and practical. The headquarters of the C.I. became much more than a place from which to issue documents, manifestos, and directives. It also boasted a great research department staffed by picked research workers drawn from the parties of other countries, who were constantly preparing reports on every phase of the economic, political and social life of the lands from which they had come. These were studied by the leaders and reinforced by countless interviews with delegates who streamed to Moscow from every quarter of the globe—from trade unions, parties, co-operative societies, cultural organisations of all kinds. Stalin himself frequently met workers’ delegations, listened to them, questioned them, and answered their questions.
In the first period of the C.I. world Congress succeeded world congress in rapid succession. By 1925 it had held five. The Red International of Labour Unions, formed in 1922 to develop the revolutionary process in the trade unions, had held three. Other international bodies such as the Class War Prisoners’ Aid, the Workers’ International Relief, the Friends of the Soviet Union, each in its own way assisting the revolutionary process, and all of them conceived as a means for developing mass sympathy and cadres of revolutionary leaders, also held frequent congresses.
After 1925, however, there was a change. Instead of the world congresses there appeared in the Comintern what was called the Enlarged Executive, meeting annually. This was a miniature world congress, but more select. The first stage aimed at creating a wide basis for the selection of leaders, the second at strengthening the centralised leadership. It was Stalin who led the transition from one to the other, and due to him that there was no further world congress until 1928.
Stalin then held the view that the world situation had considerably changed and called for new directives. The Soviet Union had launched the Five Year Plan and was leaving the New Economic Policy behind. Capitalist economy in the rest of the world had recovered sufficiently to pass beyond its pre-1914 levels of production. It was developing new techniques, and the trusts, cartels, and State capitalism were growing. The production levels were mounting and the markets were contracting. A new period of imperialist wars was foreshadowed, including wars of imperialism against the U.S.S.R. Gigantic class battles were beginning. Britain had just emerged from the General Strike, and there was a great movement of colonial peoples in China and India. The Chinese Revolution had just passed a high peak of ferocity and Chiang Kai-shek had slaughtered revolutionary workers by the thousand. Capitalism was on the eve of new crises. The “stabilisation period” was verging on a period of immense cataclysm.
The parties of the Communist International were therefore brought together and subjected to a detailed examination of their experiences. What then?
. . . alarm for the fate of the U.S.S.R. against which the military forces of the imperialists are being collected . . . fight against imperialist war . . . defend the Chinese Revolution and the U.S.S.R., call for militant international solidarity of the working-class. Intensify the struggle against the Social Democratic leaders. . . .
Each party received directions and advice according to the situation in its particular country. The struggle was still defensive but there was a prospect of insurrectionary battles.
Stalin did not appear at this Congress, although throughout its proceedings he was in constant consultation with Molotov, who was his second-in-command. The next Congress did not take place until 1935, seven years later. (It should be understood that a number of the Executive of the Comintern, including leading members of the most important parties, were resident in Moscow and constituted a permanent directing body.)
Much had happened in the interval between the Sixth and Seventh World Congresses. The Soviet Union had almost fulfilled two Five Year Plans and was hurrying from strength to strength. The capitalist world had emerged from the greatest economic crisis of its history. Japan had invaded Manchuria and the Chinese Communists were leading a Soviet Revolution against Chiang Kai-shek. The Nazis of Germany had come to power and smashed the working-class movement of that country. Mussolini had invaded Abyssinia. All the Axis powers had left the League of Nations. The Soviet Union had joined it. The armament race was in full swing. Dimitrov, Kuusinnen and Manuilsky were now leading the Communist International. Here is how Dimitrov summed up the situation.
If, thanks to the struggle for peace of the Soviet Union and the toilers of all capitalist countries, war can be delayed even for a certain time, this also will better enable the proletariat to strengthen its position in the capitalist countries, to strengthen the power of the Soviet Union and to create more favourable conditions for transforming the war between the imperialists, or a war of the imperialists against the Soviet Union, into a successful and victorious revolution.
However, should the proletariat not succeed in preventing war, the new world war launched by the imperialists will be a war of the imperialist bandits for plundering the peoples of the Soviet Union, for enslaving the small and weak peoples who are to-day independent and for the re-division of the colonies and spheres of influence of the imperialist Great Powers. . . . The launching of war by the imperialists will mark the beginning of a revolutionary crisis throughout the entire capitalist world. The task of the proletariat will be to fight for the victory of revolution and for the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war against the bourgeoisie.[2]
Did Stalin read this speech before Dimitrov delivered it? We can only assume that he did. That Dimitrov had at least discussed it with him during its preparation is certain. Two things were established by it. First, that in the opinion of the C.I. war was rapidly approaching. Second, that however the war might begin it would develop into a war against the Soviet Union by the imperialist Powers. The possibility of the present alignment of forces, by which Britain and America are allies of the Soviet Union, was not envisaged.[3]
While these Congress proceedings gave full recognition to the “unequal development of the Powers,” and admitted a justification for seeking an anti-Fascist combination in the struggle for peace, there was always the overriding assumption that whatever the Powers might do to postpone war, once war came they would unite against the Soviet Union. That this was Stalin’s view also will be clear from the course of events.
The immediate policy which emerged from the Congress was complementary to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The Fascist danger was recognised as paramount, and therefore, supremely conscious of the war threat to the Union, the Comintern advocated “collective security against the aggressor” as the method for at least prolonging the peace. It supplemented this “State” policy with a campaign for “A People’s Front against Fascism and War.” Abruptly ceasing to wage a headlong war against the Social Democrats, it took up the fight for the preservation of Political Democracy against the growing Fascism of the State. It announced: “The toiling masses in a number of countries are faced with the necessity of making a definite choice and of making it to-day: not between proletarian dictatorship and bourgeois democracy, but between bourgeois democracy and Fascism.”
This continued until 1939, when the reluctance of the non-aggressor powers to ally themselves with the Soviet Union led Stalin to sign the non-aggression pact with Germany. Soon afterward, Hitler’s army marched into Poland and the war burst upon Britain and France. Then, apparently still holding to the view that however the war had started it would be switched into a general capitalist war against the Soviet Union, Stalin declared to the working-class movement of the world that “Lenin’s theses of 1914 on imperialist war hold good.” The Comintern declared likewise, and the Communist Parties floundered into a semi-pacifist muddle until Hitler’s armies switched from West to East and struck at the Soviet Union in June, 1941.
This I regard as Stalin’s first big mistake since March, 1917, when he found himself floundering with other Bolshevik leaders, and Lenin crashed in upon them with his “April Theses.” This mistake lay not in characterising the war of 1939 as imperialist. That was true enough as a generalisation. Germany, Italy, France, and Britain were certainly imperialist powers. It lay in seriously under-estimating the strength and character of their differences. To lump all the imperialist Powers into one bag as having reached the same stage of development and decay makes no sense either of subsequent history or of the policy Stalin had been previously pursuing. If it was right for Communists, revolutionary Socialists, democrats and the peace-loving peoples of France and the U.S.A. to support the alliance with the Soviet Union in the war against the Nazi powers in 1941 and onwards, surely it was also right in 1939 when Britain and France declared war on Nazi Germany for them to strive for such an alliance. As a matter of fact, this was precisely the course they had been advocating under the banner of collective security for at least five years before 1939. The democratic powers were imperialist then and are imperialist now.
It appears to me that Stalin’s blunder has its roots in his one-sided elaboration of Lenin’s theory of the “unequal development of capitalism.” Stalin was the first to seize on the significance of Lenin’s doctrine of “building Socialism in one country” as it applied to Russia, but he had by no means developed it fully as applied to the foreign policy of the communists of other countries. It was generally recognised that the internal problems before the Communist Parties of other countries varied considerably, but their policy on international affairs was based on the over-simplified conception that the world is divided into two sections—the Socialist U.S.S.R. and the remaining capitalist world uniformly anti-Soviet. While they recognised differences in the capitalist countries and differences between them, there is always the assumption in their policy that the capitalists would converge into a common front against the U.S.S.R. That there were, and are, strong tendencies in each country in favour of the latter policy is obvious; so strong were they at one time in Britain that we almost found ourselves at war with Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union together. Had the British and French expeditionary forces landed in Finland this, thanks to Mr. Hore-Belisha, Mr. Chamberlain, and others, would have been the result. But once again the contradictory interests of the capitalist States intervened and saved us from that disaster.
Fortunately capitalism as a whole has never been able to secure world unity on anything. Groups of capitalists, groups of capitalist countries, can and do, combine. These groupings, however, only reveal cleavages on a large scale and none is ever stable. No sooner has one struggle been “settled” by them than new groupings appear on the basis of new contradictory interests. Paper schemes may provide an abstract basis for a unified world of capitalism, but the world of capitalist reality can never operate them.
It is an amazing fact that the foreign policy of the Soviet State in relation to other States has always been based on the recognition of this fact, but the policy of the Communist International for which Stalin was also responsible has been based on precisely the opposite assumption.
Such an over-simplification of class and capitalist relations was bound to bring its nemesis when Nazi Germany turned to attack the U.S.S.R. Then the Communists were at last compelled to recognise that, because of the unequal development of the political and social structure, the working-class in each country had to face different tasks even in foreign affairs. In the Soviet Union they had to support an alliance of the Socialist State with Imperialist States. In Germany they had to wage an underground struggle towards insurrection and to welcome the defeat of their own country. In the countries of political democracy they had to form an alliance with their own capitalist forces in the war against Nazism.
The unity of the working-class forces of the world operating in a world torn asunder by the contradictions and chaos of capitalism can be only a dialectical unity. The slogan “Workers of the World Unite” has no meaning apart from unity in the struggle for Socialism. The struggle for Socialism is as “unequal” as the development of capitalism, as varied in its forms and as contradictory. At one and the same time it may demand of the working-class in some countries an alliance with their capitalists and in other countries a fight to the death against their capitalists, as at the present time. This is the fundamental reason why all international organisations of workers have never been little more than loose associations for limited purposes and even then have broken apart under the impact of the ever-changing combinations of the capitalist forces. Capitalism divides the working-class and its organisations as well as unites them. But the full unity of the working people of the world will be realised only when capitalism has ceased to divide them, and that point can be reached only by the victory of Socialism in one country, then in another, and finally in all.
Had Stalin developed Lenin’s theory with regard to the unequal development of capitalism and applied it in the field of the international class struggle, as he certainly has done in relation to the building of Socialism in Soviet Russia, he would have recognised long ago that the function of the Communist International was that of a school to coach communist parties and groups to stand on their own feet in fraternal relations with each other, armed with the teachings of Marx and Lenin and the Russian Revolution. He would have seen that a centralised international party can only be based on a uniformity of experience and conditions, and that uniformity did not exist; that as things are to-day there can be unity of principle, of aim, of method, but never uniformity of application. Had he seen this, it would not have been necessary for him to have waited until world affairs forced his hand before he took the decision to dissolve the Comintern because it could no longer function.
The Communist International was not the first of the revolutionary international organisations to be dissolved. There was a Red International of Labour Unions. It has gone. There was the Workers’ International Relief Organisation. It too has gone. There were the Class War Prisoners’ Aid and the League against Imperialism. All are gone, not because Stalin or anybody associated with them has abandoned their principles or their aims, but because the changing forms of the struggle have destroyed the bases on which they were formed. The shifting, contradictory manner of the workers’ struggle has not destroyed the basis of the communist parties but it has certainly destroyed the Communist International.
I think, therefore, it would be unjust to say that Stalin’s dissolution of the Communist International signifies his abandonment of Leninism and a betrayal of his teacher. On the contrary, I consider it was his strong loyalty to Lenin, his consciousness of the fact that the C.I. was Lenin’s creation, which delayed the decision until it was forced on him by events. His mistake consists in having developed Leninism in a one-sided way—on the side of building Socialism in the Soviet Union and leaving it, as far as the working-class of other countries was concerned where Lenin had left it years ago. For this, however regrettable the admission, is true.
1. Leninism, p. 109.
2. Report of the Seventh World Congress of the C.I., p. 74.
3. Lest this criticism be regarded as an example of wisdom after the event, I venture to remind my readers that I foreshadowed the present alignment in 1935 at the Bristol Conference of the Socialist League. See my book, New Horizons, p. 313-15.
Next: XV. Stalin and the Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R.