Samezō Kuruma (1957)
What is the relationship in Capital between the theory of the value-form in Section 3 of Chapter 1 and the theory of the exchange process in Chapter 2? At first sight both seem to demonstrate the necessity of money. So why did Marx go to the trouble of discussing that in two separate places? Or we might pose the question more generally: What is the particular significance of each theory in terms of the descriptive method that Marx employs?
These are questions that anyone who has studied Capital to some extent has probably pondered, but understanding the relationship between the two theories is in fact quite difficult. Or, at least in my own case, the issue was a problem that I struggled with for a long time. In order to better understand this relationship I read a number of explanations of Capital, but all seemed somewhat beside the point, not offering a fully satisfactory answer. Finally, not so long ago, I arrived at an explanation of my own that seemed reasonable – although from my current perspective even that explanation was somewhat unclear.
My view took on more definite shape as a result of participating in a series of study meetings on Capital sponsored by the journal Hyōron, where I had the opportunity to come into contact with the polar opposite view held by Kōzō Uno. In responding to Uno’s arguments, I came to realize that his perspective was one that I had yet to consider; and this encounter with a new perspective helped me to gradually clarify my own thinking. The transcript of the study meetings, published in the pages of Hyōron,[10] gives an idea of my basic position at the time. But I did not carefully or systematically express my views and many points were inadequately discussed at the meetings. My view seemed to come together somewhat as a result of closely re-reading the comments Uno made at the meetings and examining the ideas he expressed in his subsequently published books: Kachi-ron (Theory of Value) and Shihon-ron nyumon (Introduction to Capital). So the main aim of these articles, which I completed thanks to the persistence of the Keizai shirin editors, is to present my current view on the subject.
When considering the significance of the theory of value-form and the theory of the exchange process, it is natural (and I think convenient) to begin by looking at the essential difference between them. One point immediately apparent to anyone is that the beginning of the theory of the exchange process has a description of the commodity owner. Marx thus posits the fundamental role played by the commodity owner and his desire for a certain thing. Careful readers will notice that this role played by the want of the commodity owner is abstracted from in the theory of the value-form. However, the question really begins from this point. First of all, even though it appears from the passage at the beginning of Chapter 2 that the role of the want of the commodity owner was abstracted from in the theory of the value-form, one needs to determine whether this is in fact true. Also, there is the question of whether it is indeed possible to understand the value-form in isolation from the role played by the owner’s want[11]. And there is the question of why the role played by the commodity owner is abstracted from in the theory of the value-form even though a commodity cannot exist in reality without an owner. If these questions are thoroughly clarified, the particular significance of each of the two theories will become clear in turn – or at least the effort will provide us with the key to elucidating the issue at hand. Once this has been accomplished the significance of the theory of value-form and the theory of exchange process with regard to our understanding of money should also be self-evident.
At the Hyōron study meetings, however, the discussion did not develop in that particular manner. The participants very quickly became deadlocked over the question of whether or not one should abstract from the commodity owner in the analysis of the value-form. Kōzō Uno confidently asserted that the want of the commodity owner should not be abstracted from, while I argued to the contrary along with several others. In the end, though, our side did not manage to convince Uno. Even though there was a discussion, which I participated very little in, regarding the significance of the theory of the value-form and the theory of the exchange process to an understanding of the necessity of money, no definitive consensus resulted from the discussion because it was not based on an adequate understanding of the fundamental questions at hand. Here I want examine the issue once again, beginning with the first question noted above, even if it will overlap somewhat with points I made at the study meetings.
Uno raised various arguments to support his idea that the role played by the want of the commodity owner should not be abstracted from in the theory of the value-form, but it seems to me that the following three points are the theoretical basis for his view:
I will criticize each of these three arguments, in sequential order. But to avoid any misunderstanding that might arise from the points above being my summary of Uno’s position (rather than a detailed account of his main thesis), and because I do not necessarily employ his exact terminology, each of the three articles begins with quotations from Uno himself, followed by the presentation of my own view in direct relation to his position.
In the simple form of value, the question of why a particular commodity is in the equivalent form cannot be understood without taking into account the want of the owner of the commodity in the relative form. It is thus mistaken to think that the role played by the want of the commodity owner is abstracted from in the theory of the value-form.
Uno’s first argument against abstracting from the want of the commodity owner, summarized above, is expressed in the following comments that he made at the Hyōron study meetings:
It is somewhat understandable why the exchange process and the value-form are divided in that particular manner, but I think it is problematic as a method. That is, in the examination of the exchange process, Marx seems to be offering a concrete and historical explanation as a supplement to the previous development of the value-form. Although I do not think that the sort of historical process explained in the chapter on the exchange process should be inserted, as is, within the section on the value-form, it does seem somewhat hard to understand, from a methodological standpoint, how one could think that an explanation corresponding to the content of Chapter 2 should not be inserted there. Use-value cannot be understood if it becomes abstract use-value in general that is set apart from the wants of individuals; and I think it would instead be clearer to take the commodity owner into consideration from the beginning of the value-form through to the money-form. For example, in seeking to express the value of the linen within the relation between the linen and the coat, I think that we can first understand the expression of value using the coat’s use-value by considering the want of the linen owner for the coat. (Sakisaka & Uno, 1948, p. 142)
I want to pose the fundamental question. In considering the fact that the linen is in the relative form of value and the coat in the equivalent form, is it really satisfactory to not consider why the linen has taken the coat for its equivalent form, and to not premise the linen owner’s desire for the coat? Would this form even be possible apart from that relation? (Sakisaka & Uno, 1948, p. 157)
The question is whether it is acceptable, even in the expression of value, to abstract from the commodity owner. For example, the expression “20 yards of linen is worth 1 coat” is not possible without the commodity owner. Is it really satisfactory to abstract that far? The commodity originally appears upon becoming the property of some person. (Sakisaka & Uno, 1948, p. 159)
Of course, in Capital the value-form and the exchange process are explained separately, and even assuming them separated as such, if we abstract from the owner of linen, to consider linen itself, we will not be able to understand why the linen in the relative form of value brings in the coat to the equivalent form; and if this is abstracted from anything could be in that form, so it would already be the expanded form of value. (Sakisaka & Uno, 1948, p. 160)
Uno’s ideas were expressed in the course of the particular discussions at the study meetings, so heterogeneous problems are intertwined in the passages quoted and we can see his view stated in various forms. I want to begin, therefore, by considering the points in common among the passages. For example, after noting that he wants to “pose the fundamental question,” Uno says:
In considering the fact that the linen is in the relative form of value and the coat in the equivalent form, is it really satisfactory to not consider why the linen has taken the coat for its equivalent form, and to not premise the linen owner’s desire for the coat? Would this form even be possible apart from that relation? (Sakisaka & Uno, 1948, p. 157)
This view, in itself, is reasonable. I certainly do not claim that the form exists “apart from this relation.” Still, that is not the essential question, but rather an issue that precedes it. Even if it is obvious that we cannot understand “why the linen has taken the coat for its equivalent form” without considering the want of the linen owner, there is still the question of whether it is indeed necessary to consider that issue, given the particular aim of the theory of the value-form. My difference of opinion with Uno concerns the latter question, not the former. And it is the understanding of the latter that should be the basis of discussion. It is thus convenient, I think, to begin by clarifying my fundamental view on that question.
The aim of the theory of the value-form is to clarify the form in which the value of a commodity is manifested. We do this by analyzing the value-equation, which is the form in which a commodity’s value is always manifested in reality. In that analysis the value-equation is taken as a given, which is natural considering the scientific method of political economy. The approach of taking the equation as a given and then proceeding to analyze it is not unique to the theory of the value-form. Indeed, the same is true for the entirety of Chapter 1 where the commodity is analyzed. In Section 1 and 2 of that chapter, however, Marx concentrates on the fact that there must be some quantitatively equal element in common between the commodities on each side of the equation. Section 3, in contrast, examines how the commodity on the left of the equation and the commodity on the right play different roles. Thus, in the theory of the value-form, Marx takes the equation 20 yards of linen = 1 coat as his given premise and through an analysis from this point of view recognizes, from the very structure of the equation, that the linen expresses its own value using the coat and that the coat serves as the material for the value-expression of the linen. The linen is therefore playing an active role, while the coat is in a passive role. With this as his starting point, Marx goes on to reveal the mechanism whereby the value of a commodity is expressed in the use-value of another commodity, as well as the necessary developmental process of value-expression that is restricted by this mechanism of value-expression.
This is my understanding of the gist of the theory of the value-form in Capital. Accordingly, even though we can only know why the coat (rather than some other commodity) is in the equivalent form by considering the want of the linen owner, pondering that issue is not a task pertinent to the theory of the value-form. It is quite sufficient, in analyzing the value-form, to take a certain equation as a given and then clarify the relation of value-expression within it, showing how the value of the commodity on the left is expressed in the use-value of the commodity on the right, so that the value of the commodity on the left assumes a form separate from its own use-value form. What we need to do, in short, is to analyze and clarify this relationship between the two commodities. Not only is it unnecessary to consider any other factor, to do so would significantly hinder our ability to pose the question in a pure form so that it can be answered.
In response to my basic view, sketched above, I imagine that various sorts of criticism might be voiced. Some may argue, for instance, that according to my view there is no need to consider why a certain commodity is on the right of the equation (e.g., a coat rather than wheat), because it is sufficient to analyze and clarify the relation wherein the value of the commodity on the left (relative value-form) is expressed using the use-value of the commodity on the right (equivalent form); whereas in fact, contrary to my view, it is impossible to understand that precise relation apart from the want of the owner of the commodity in the relative form. According to this criticism, the use-value of the commodity in the equivalent form is able to express the value of the commodity in the relative form because it is an object desired by the owner of the relative-form commodity. In other words, there is no way for the relation of value-expression to be clarified without taking into consideration this other relation. Therefore, far from being irrelevant, considering the want of the commodity owner is at the essence of the theory of the value-form.
Our everyday experience teaches us that the value of a commodity is expressed in the use-value of some other commodity. But how, exactly, is this expression of value through use-value possible? Is it because the owner of the commodity in the relative form wants the other commodity? Or is some other explanation needed? Here we have the crux of the issue.
We can begin by making a clear distinction between the question of why a specific commodity is positioned in the equivalent form, and the question of how the use-value of a commodity in the equivalent form is able to express the value of the commodity in the relative form. These are two different questions that must be considered separately. The former concerns the want of the owner of the commodity in the relative value-form; and it can be easily answered by considering that factor. But that is not the case for the latter. It remains to be solved even after we have assumed that a specific commodity is posited in the equivalent form on the basis of the want of the owner of the commodity in the relative value-form. It is only by taking an equation as a given that we can independently pose the latter question. And the elucidation of that question, in my view, is fundamental to the theory of the value-form. This is the reason why, as noted earlier, Marx takes a value-equation as a given in the theory of the value-form and sets himself the task of analyzing the equation in order to clarify the expression of value within it. How do we carry out this task? How should we explain the fact that the value of a commodity is expressed in the use-value of some other commodity that is equivalent to it? Marx offers us the following:
In order to decipher how the simple expression of the value of a commodity is embedded in the value-relation between two commodities, we must, for now, look at the value-relation independently of its quantitative aspect. The usual procedure is the precise opposite of this: one sees in the value-relation only the proportion in which definite quantities of two sorts of commodity count as equal to each other. One overlooks that the magnitudes of different things only become comparable in quantitative terms when they have been reduced to the same unit. It is only as expressions of such a common unit that they are of the same denomination, and are therefore commensurable magnitudes. ...
But these two qualitatively equated commodities do not play the same role. Only the value of the linen is expressed. And how? By relating itself with the coat as its “equivalent,” or the “thing exchangeable” for it. In this relation the coat counts as the form of existence of value, as the thing representing value – for only as such is it the same as the linen. On the other hand, it is also revealed here, or obtains an independent expression, that linen itself is value – for only as value can the linen relate itself to the coat as something equivalent with the linen or exchangeable for linen. ...
If we say that, as values, commodities are simply congealed masses of human labor, our analysis reduces them to the abstraction “value,” but does not give them a form of value distinct from their natural forms. It is otherwise in the value-relation of one commodity to another. The first commodity’s value character steps forward here through its own relationship with the second commodity.
For example, through the coat qua value-thing being equated to the linen, the labor embedded in the coat is equated to the labor embedded in the linen. It is true that the tailoring which makes the coat is concrete labor of a different sort than the weaving which makes the linen. But by being equated to the weaving the tailoring is in fact reduced to what is actually equal between the two kinds of labor, which is the characteristic they have in common as human labor. Through this detour, weaving too, in so far as it weaves value, has nothing to distinguish it from tailoring, and, consequently, is abstract human labor. Only the different sorts of commodities as equivalents makes the specific character of value-creating labor apparent, by in fact reducing the different kinds of labor embedded in the different kinds of commodities to their general quality of being human labor in general. (Marx, 1976a, pp. 140-142)
Here we need to pay particular attention to the fact that, in the value-equation 20 yards of linen = 1 coat (or 20 yards of linen are worth one coat), the linen does not immediately posit itself as equivalent to the coat to obtain the form of value. Rather, it first posits the coat as equivalent to itself, thus giving the coat the formal character as the direct embodiment of abstract human labor, as the “value-body” [Wertkorper], and it is upon this basis that the linen can first express its own value through the natural form of the coat that is this existence qua embodiment of value. Without such a “detour” the commodity cannot acquire the form of value. The linen cannot become the value-body by immediately equating itself to the coat, thereby declaring itself to be equal to the coat, which would be nothing but a “self-complacent” or “presumptuous” [hitoriyogari] act, so to speak. For the linen to be able to express its own value in the natural form of the coat, with the natural form of the coat being the form of the linen’s own value, the coat must first be posited with determinate being as the embodiment of value. In other words, the natural form of the coat, in its given state, must become a thing that has significance as the embodiment of abstract human labor. This occurs through the linen positing the coat as equal to itself. While the linen cannot become the value-body by declaring itself equal to the coat, it can make the coat the embodiment of value by declaring the coat to be equal to itself (although the coat only counts as such vis-a-vis the linen, not in relation to other commodities). By thus declaring itself identical with the coat – in terms of being value – and thereby making the coat the value-body, the linen expresses its own value-character in the form of a coat. In other words, the linen comes to have a value-form in distinction from its natural form as a use-value, which is its tangible form as a useful article of clothing.
The commodity only obtains the form of value through a detour, but this does not mean that the detour involves passing through two acts that follow each other temporally. It is instead achieved at once, through a single act. For the linen to express its value in the form of a coat, it only has to posit the coat as equal to itself, and through this same action of equating the linen makes the coat the value-body, thus simultaneously coming into a relationship with this coat qua value-body. This is how the linen comes to express its own value in the form of a coat.
The great amount of attention directed towards how the linen equates the coat to itself (thus making the coat the value-body) – rather than the linen equating itself to the coat – must seem “to the superficial observer,” to borrow Marx’s expression, an analysis of forms that “turns upon minutiae.” Indeed, the issue does center on minutiae. Marx in fact compares his analysis of economic forms to the study of “microscopic anatomy” and notes that “in the analysis of economic forms neither microscopes nor chemical agents are of assistance” so the “power of abstraction must replace both” (Marx, 1976a, p. 90). Precisely for this reason, the discussion of the above distinction must seem a mere scholarly pastime at first glance.
The crucial significance of the distinction Marx draws has been overlooked not only by the “superficial observer” but even by supposed authorities on Capital. This is reflected in the Japanese translations of Marx’s writings, such as the two different versions of the first German edition of Capital translated, respectively, by Fumio Hasebe and Minoru Miyakawa. Both of them end up, for example, conveying the opposite meaning of the following passage in which Marx explains the detour of value-expression:
Qualitativ setzt sie sich den Rock gleich, indem sie sich auf ihn bezieht als Vergegenstandlichung gleichartiger menschlicher Arbeit, d.h. ihrer eignen Werthsubstanz, und sie setzt sich nur einen Rock gleich statt x Rocke, weil sie nicht nur Werth uberhaupt, sondern Werth von bestimmter Grose ist, ein Rock aber grade soviel Arbeit enthalt als 20 Ellen Leinwand. (Marx, 1983b, p. 29)
Hasebe offers the following version:
Qualitatively the linen posits itself as equal to the coat by relating itself with the coat as the objectification of human labor of the same species, i.e., of its own value-substance, and the linen posits itself as equal to one coat, instead of x quantity of coats, because the linen is not just value in general, but value of a determined magnitude, and moreover because one coat contains just as much labor as 20 yards of linen.
Miyakawa, for his part, translates the passage as follows:
The linen posits itself as qualitatively equal to the coat by coming into relation with the coat as the objectification of an identical type of human labor, i.e., of the value-substance of the linen itself, and the linen posits itself as equal to one coat, instead of x coats, because the linen is not just value in general, but value of a certain magnitude, and moreover because one coat contains exactly as much labor as 20 yards of linen.
We can also consider their translations of another passage from the first German edition:
Indem sie ihn als Werth sich gleichsetzt, wahrend sie sich zugleich als Gebrauchsgegenstand von ihm unterscheidet, wird der Rock die Erscheinungsform des Leinwand-Werths im Gegensatz zum Leinwand-Korper, ihre Werthform im Unterschied von ihrer Naturalform. (Marx, 1983b, p. 30)
In Hasebe’s translation, it reads:
By the linen’s equating itself to the coat as value – and by the linen at the same time distinguishing itself from the coat as useful object – the coat becomes the phenomenal form of linen-value, which opposes the linen-body, becoming the value-form of the linen distinguished from its natural form.
Miyakawa translates the passage along the following lines:
By the linen’s equating itself to this coat as value, and at the same time by distinguishing itself from the coat as a useful object. ...
It should be immediately clear, however, that because “den Rock” is in the accusative case in the phrase “setzt sich den Rock gleich,” it should be translated in terms of the linen equating the coat to itself (rather than “equating itself to the coat” or “making itself equal to the coat”). Likewise, because the “ihn” in “ihn als Werth sich gleichsetzt” is in the accusative case, it should be translated as equates the coat to itself as value (rather than “equates itself to the coat as value” or “makes itself equal to the coat as value”).
What does it suggest, then, that two translators chose expressions that convey a meaning directly opposite to the original German? Considering the fact that both are extremely conscientious and meticulous translators, it seems likely that it was not the result of simple carelessness but rather was a case where each sought to correct a supposed oversight or error on the part of Marx. It must be said, though, that if the translators were attempting to make a correction, their attempt was based upon a fundamental misunderstanding (and even if they were simply careless, their error concerns a matter of crucial importance).
Kōzō Uno commits a similar error (albeit not in such a clear form); or at the very least he seems to lack a sufficient understanding of the importance of Marx’s distinction. In Uno’s book Kachi-ron (Theory of Value), for instance, he writes the following in a section entitled “The Value-Form of the Commodity”:
The “objectivity” [of the value of linen] cannot be grasped as is. The linen owner must express the value of linen through another use-value that he wants to exchange the linen for, such as a coat for example. In this case, for the linen owner, the commodity coat has already come to have the same quality as the linen. This means that “as a use-value, the linen is something palpably different from the coat; as value, it is equal to the coat, and therefore looks like a coat” (Marx, 1976a, p. 143), and thus the value of the linen, by being given expression in the coat, is able to express itself apart from its use-value.
This occurs, of course, not because the labor that makes the linen is simply the useful labor of weaving labor, but rather by means of it being reduced to human labor as a thing equal to the labor that makes the coat, or at least as the thing in common between the two different types of concrete labor; but this is certainly not immediately carried out as the abstract human labor the two have in common, being rather an abstraction carried out via the “detour” of the weaving labor of the linen being equated to the concrete tailoring labor of the coat. ...
For the linen’s value to be able to be expressed in the coat, the premise to begin with, as mentioned above, is that the linen must make itself equal to the coat, but if this is carried out we enter into the issue of the owner of the linen offering the linen for the certain amount of coats that he desires. (Uno, 1947, pp. 142-144)
Uno’s explanation, from the perspective of my own position, contains a number of unsatisfactory aspects. For instance, when he says that, “for the linen owner, the commodity coat has already come to have the same quality as the linen,” it would be more appropriate to say “linen” (instead of “linen owner”) because the coat is still a desired object for the linen’s owner, who views it as being qualitatively different, rather than having “the same quality as the linen.” From the perspective of the linen, meanwhile, which has no need to keep warm or strike a fashionable pose, the coat exists solely as value. Still, if we replace “linen owner” with “linen” the matter is exactly as Uno indicates. However, instead of explaining how the coat comes to have “the same quality as the linen,” Uno writes:
This occurs, of course, [because] the labor that makes the linen ... [is] reduced to human labor as a thing equal to the labor that makes the coat, or at least as the thing in common between the two different types of concrete labor; but this is certainly not immediately as the abstract human labor the two have in common, being rather an abstraction carried out via the “detour” of the weaving labor of the linen being equated to the concrete tailoring labor of the coat. (Uno, 1947, p. 142)
This “detour” differs greatly from the one I described earlier – or rather it is not a detour at all. If the weaving labor to make the linen is reduced to abstract human labor, by being directly equated to the concrete tailoring labor of the coat, then the linen could on its own accord become the direct embodiment of abstract human labor through this act, i.e., it could become the value-body, which would constitute a “self-complacent” act, as noted earlier. So here we have the real necessity of the “detour” of value-expression. Instead of a commodity declaring itself to be value by directly equating itself to another commodity, it first equates the other commodity to itself, positing that other commodity with determinate being as the value-body, and upon this basis it expresses its own value in the natural form of the other commodity. This is the true meaning of the “detour” and it is also precisely the manner in which Marx spoke of it. For instance, in a passage that I quoted earlier, Marx writes:
For example, through the coat qua value-thing being equated to the linen, the labor embedded in the coat is equated to the labor embedded in the linen. It is true that the tailoring which makes the coat is concrete labor of a different sort than the weaving which makes the linen. But by being equated to the weaving the tailoring is in fact reduced to what is actually equal between the two kinds of labor, which is the characteristic they have in common as human labor. Through this detour, weaving too, in so far as it weaves value, has nothing to distinguish it from tailoring, and, consequently, is abstract human labor. Only the expression of different sorts of commodities as equivalents makes the specific character of value-creating labor apparent, by in fact reducing the different kinds of labor embedded in the different kinds of commodities to their general quality of being human labor in general. (Marx, 1976a, p. 142)
Marx describes the detour of value-expression in the following way in the first German edition of Capital:
The commodity is, since the moment it is born, something twofold, use-value and value, the product of useful labor and the congelation of abstract labor. In order to represent itself as what it is, it must therefore duplicate its form. The form of a use-value it possesses by nature; it is its natural form. The value-form it can acquire only in intercourse with other commodities. But this value-form must itself be an objective form. The only objective forms of the commodities are their useful shapes, their natural forms. However, since the natural form of a commodity, of the linen, for instance, is the diametrical opposite of its value-form, it must turn a different natural form, the natural form of a different commodity, into its value-form. That which it cannot do immediately vis-a-vis itself, it can do immediately vis-a-vis another commodity, thus doing it vis-a-vis itself via a detour. It cannot express its value in its own body or in its own useful shape, but it can relate itself to a different use-value or commodity-body as the immediate determinate being of value. It cannot relate itself to the concrete labor contained in itself as the mere form of realization of abstract human labor, but it can relate itself to that contained in other commodity kinds. All it has to do is to equate the other commodity to itself as the equivalent. Generally, the use-value of a commodity exists only for a different commodity[12] so far as it serves, in this way, as the form of appearance of its value. (Marx, 1976b, p. 22)
If the detour of value-expression is not correctly understood, the meaning of the coat, in its given state, becoming the shape of value for the linen will not be correctly grasped. The use-value (or natural form) of the coat is able, in its given state, to be the shape of value for the linen because the linen has equated the coat to itself, positing the coat with the formal determination as value-body. The linen is first able to express its own value in the existence qua value-body that the coat is posited as. That is, in the relation where the linen expresses its own value using a coat, the coat functions only as this existence, whereas its own intrinsic utility (as a thing that satisfies the want of the linen owner) plays no role at all. For the owner of the linen, the use-value of the coat is not merely useful as the phenomenal form of the value of his linen (as the linen’s equivalent), and therefore the coat does not merely exist for the owner as the embodiment of value. Rather, the coat at the same time exists as the object that the owner wants. That is not the case for the commodity linen, however. The linen is not a person and thus lacks human wants. As far as the linen is concerned, the natural body of the coat cannot be of any use as a means of staying warm or looking fashionable. The natural body of the coat is only useful for the linen as a mirror that reflects its own value. Here the coat’s natural body only plays a role as the embodiment of abstract human labor. However, even though the natural form of the coat is only functioning as the embodiment of abstract human labor, the labor that is expressed in the natural form (or specific use-value) of the coat is the specific concrete labor of tailoring, not human labor as such.
Human labor pure and simple, the expenditure of human labor-power, although capable of every determination, is in and for itself indeterminate. It can only realize itself, objectify itself, if the human labor-power is expended in a determinate form, as determinate labor, since only the determinate labor is confronted with a natural matter, an exterior material, in which it objectifies itself. Only the Hegelian “concept” manages to objectify itself without an exterior matter. (Marx, 1976b, p. 20)
It is the concrete labor of tailoring that creates the specific use-value of a coat, and that specific use-value, in its given state, then becomes the shape of value for the linen. This certainly does not mean, however, that concrete labor ceases to be concrete labor. Rather, specific concrete labor, as such, comes to have significance as a certain mode in which human labor is realized or human labor-power is expended:
Linen cannot relate itself to the coat as value or incarnated human labor without relating itself to tailoring labor as the immediate form of the realization of human labor. However what interests the linen in the use-value coat is neither its woolen comfort nor its buttoned-up character, nor any other useful quality that stamps it as a use-value. The coat only serves for the linen to represent its value-objectivity as opposed to its starched use-value objectivity. The linen would have reached the same purpose, had it represented its value in Assa Fotida or Poudrette, or shoe polish. The tailoring labor, therefore, does not count for the linen, so far as it is purposeful productive activity, useful labor, but so far as it, as determinate labor, is the form of realization, mode of objectification, of human labor pure and simple. Were the linen to express its value in shoe polish, instead of a coat, then the making of polish, instead of tailoring, would count for it as the immediate form of realization of abstract labor. A use-value or commodity-body becomes therefore a form of appearance of value, or an equivalent, only by the fact that the other commodity relates itself to the concrete, useful kind of labor contained in it as the immediate form of realization of abstract human labor. (Marx, 1976b, pp. 20-21)
Grasping this point is the greatest difficulty concerning the understanding of the value-form; therefore, the failure to even perceive the need to grasp this point is the greatest barrier to a correct understanding of the value-form. The fact that the use-value of the coat, in its given state, becomes the form of value for the linen can, if not carefully reflected on, foster the illusion that the coat as a useful thing is capable in that given state of expressing the value of the linen by being an object that the linen owner wants. However, even if a child has some spare playing cards that he wants to trade for a spinning top and then asks if anyone would be willing to give him a top in exchange for ten cards, because this is not a value-relation between commodities the top does not become the phenomenal form of the cards’ value. What characterizes a value-relation between commodities is the relation of equivalence between commodities as objectified human labor:
As values, commodities are expressions of the same unity, of abstract human labor. In the form of exchange-value they appear to each other as values and relate themselves to each other as values. With this, they relate themselves at the same time to abstract human labor as their joint social substance. Their social relation consists exclusively in counting for each other as only quantitatively different, but qualitatively equal (and therefore replaceable by one another and exchangeable with one another), expressions of that social substance which is theirs. As a useful thing, a commodity possesses social determinateness as far as it is use-value for others than its possessor, thus satisfying social wants. But regardless of whose wants the commodity’s useful properties establish a relationship with, by these it always only becomes an object placed in a relation to human wants, not a commodity for other commodities. Only that which turns mere useful objects into commodities can relate them as commodities with each other and therefore place them into a social connection. That is exactly the value of commodities. (Marx, 1976b, p. 28)
In the case of the value-expression of one commodity using the use-value of another commodity, there is no reason for it to change that the relation of equivalence between commodities as objectified human is what characterizes the value-relation between commodities; but in such a case an inversion takes place that is inevitable in the fetishized commodity world:
In tailoring, as well as in weaving, human labor-power is expended. Both, therefore, possess the general property of being human labor, and there may be cases, such as the production of value, in which they must be considered only under this aspect. There is nothing mysterious in this. But in the value-expression of the commodity the matter is stood on its head. In order to express the fact that weaving, for instance, creates the value of linen through its general property of being human labor, rather than in its concrete form as weaving, the concrete labor that produces the equivalent of the linen, namely tailoring, is placed in relation to it as the tangible form in which abstract labor is realized. (Marx, 1976a, p. 150)
It is here that misinterpretations may arise, however, because matters become complicated and difficult to understand.
Within the value-relation, and in the expression of value included therein, the abstract and general does not count as the property of the concrete and the sensibly-real, but rather it is the opposite: the sensibly-concrete counts as the mere appearance-form or determinate realization-form of the abstract and general. For example, in the value-expression of linen, the tailoring-labor of the equivalent coat does not possess the general property of also being human labor. It is the opposite case, where being human labor counts as the essence of the tailoring labor, and being tailoring labor only counts as the appearance-form or determinate realization-form of this essence of tailoring labor. This quid pro quo is unavoidable because the labor manifested in the labor-product only forms value insofar as it is indiscriminate human labor, and therefore insofar as the labor objectified in a product is indistinguishable from the labor objectified in a different sort of commodity.
The inversion whereby the sensibly-concrete counts only as the appearance-form of the abstractly-general, rather than the abstractly-general counting as a property of the concrete, characterizes value-expression. At the same time, this makes it difficult to understand value-expression. If I say: Roman Law and German Law are both laws, that is obvious. But if I say, on the other hand, the Law, this abstract entity, realizes itself in Roman Law and German Law, in these concrete laws, then the connection becomes mystical. (Marx, 1976b, pp. 56-57)
To say that the role played by the want of the commodity owner is abstracted from in the theory of the value-form certainly does not deny the significance of the role played by the use-value of the commodity in the equivalent form nor negate in any way the role played by the commodity in the equivalent form as a specific use-value. It is only as a specific use-value that the coat expresses the value of the linen. But the coat is not playing a role, in this case, as a useful item that clothes the linen owner: it is only in its existence as something with significance as a certain realization-form of human labor (or mode of the expenditure of human labor-power) that the tailoring labor of the coat is able to express the value of the linen.
Uno, however, in rejecting Marx’s view that the role played by the want of the commodity owner is abstracted from in the theory of the value-form, does not seem to grasp this point adequately. For instance, in a passage that I quoted earlier, Uno makes the following comment:
It is somewhat understandable why the exchange process and the value-form are divided in that particular manner, but I think it is problematic as a method. That is, in the examination of the exchange process Marx seems to be offering a concrete and historical explanation as a supplement to the previous development of the value-form. Although I do not think that the sort of historical process explained in the chapter on the exchange process should be inserted, as is, within the section on the value-form, it does seem somewhat hard to understand, from a methodological standpoint, how one could think that an explanation corresponding to the content of Chapter 2 should not be inserted there. Use-value cannot be understood if it becomes abstract use-value in general that is set apart from the wants of individuals. (Sakisaka & Uno, 1948, p. 142)
As long as the role played by the want of the commodity owner is abstracted from, the role of use-value as a desired object is likewise set aside. This certainly does not mean, however, that the abstraction from the role played by use-value as a desired object should be thought of in terms of “abstract use-value in general that is set apart from the wants of individuals.” First of all, it is not at all clear what is meant by “abstract use-value in general.” If Uno is defining this in a manner similar to “use-value in general,” as understood by the theory of marginal utility, that is certainly not my own understanding, nor is it the view of Marx.[13] It is not as “use-value in general” that the coat expresses the value of the linen. Rather, the coat consistently plays the role of equivalent as a specific use-value. As long as the coat is posited as the equivalent form, its natural form is ultimately the form of value. Certainly the coat is posited as the equivalent form because it is an object that the linen owner wants; but the reason the coat is able to express the value of the linen is not because it is a desired object. The coat is able to express the value of the linen because the tailoring labor objectified in the coat is equated to the weaving labor objectified in the linen by means of the coat being equated to the linen. Thus, the tailoring labor in its existence as specific concrete labor becomes the realization-form of human labor in common with the weaving labor. The coat, as a specific use-value, takes on significance as the direct embodiment of human labor, becoming the value-body; and it is in its existence as such that the coat can express the value of the linen. Use-value in this case, therefore, is not abstracted from to arrive at use-value in general. Rather, a specific use-value in its given state appears in an existence separate from its existence as a useful thing, and it is in this existence that it plays the role of equivalent. We do not abstract from the specific qualities of a use-value to arrive at use-value in general. Instead we abstract from the commodity’s character as a useful article, where it only has significance in connection to some human want, so that the commodity is purified as the embodiment of human labor. Within this existence, as the purified embodiment of value, it for the first time becomes a value-mirror that selectively and purely reflects the value-character of another commodity.
In speaking of “use-value in general that is set apart from the wants of individuals,” perhaps Uno instead has in mind the “general use-value” of money as a “general means of exchange” (i.e., money’s capability of purchasing anything, which makes it an object that everyone wants); and it could also be that Uno believes the specific use-value is overlooked if we abstract from the role of desire in the analysis of the value-form, so that we think in terms of use-value in general, and that the simple form of value “cannot be understood” if the equivalent form within it is viewed in that manner. If that is indeed Uno’s view, it should be clear from the points made thus far that it is based on a misunderstanding. Even if the “general use-value” of money can be said to be the object of general desire (rather than some specific want), this does not change the fact that it is a use-value and must be thought of in relation to some want. Therefore, even if we were to think of the specific use-value as a general use-value, it would of no use at all in elucidating the fundamental issue of the theory of the value-form, which centers on how the value of a commodity can be expressed in the use-value of another commodity. It would only be useful in elucidating why all commodities, including all newly emerging ones, express their value in a particular commodity: gold. Moreover, even in the case of gold, which has that “general use-value,” the ability of its natural form to express the value of another commodity is not the result of it being the “general object of desire” but rather – in quite the same way as in the case of the coat – because other commodities equate the gold to themselves,[14] thus positing it with the formal determination as the embodiment of value or “value-body.” The fundamental riddle of value-expression – concerning why the value of a commodity can be expressed in the use-value of another commodity – cannot be elucidated by viewing the use-value of the commodity in the equivalent form as “general use-value” (i.e., by viewing it as a problem related to a want). Rather, the very general use-value of money can only be first understood upon elucidating the riddle of value-expression. This is precisely why Marx elucidates the fundamental relation of value-expression in the simple form of value, instead of the money-form.
Finally, there is the criticism made by Uno in the following passage, which I quoted earlier:
Of course, in Capital the value-form and the exchange process are explained separately, and even assuming them separated as such, if we abstract from the owner of linen, to consider linen itself, we will not be able to understand why the linen in the relative form of value brings in the coat to the equivalent form; and if this is abstracted from anything could be in that form, so it would already be the expanded form of value. (Sakisaka & Uno, 1948, p. 160)
First of all, to repeat a point made already, it is certainly not possible to understand why the linen posits the coat as its equivalent without considering the want of the linen owner. If we are dealing here, quite literally, with the question of “why the linen in the relative form of value brings in the coat to the equivalent form,” as Uno says, this is not the action of the commodity owner, so the why pertaining to it can be understood even apart from the owner. However, what actually brings the coat into the equivalent form is the linen owner, not the linen, so the why of the action cannot be understood apart from the owner. Despite being the action of the linen owner (and of no concern to the commodity linen), in order to carry out a pure analysis of the value-relation between two commodities it is no hindrance, and in fact a necessity, to set aside the want of the commodity owner. We do this by first treating a certain value-equation as a given, and then solely analyzing the relation of value-expression within it. Thus, the person carrying out the analysis must play two roles. He begins by proposing a certain equation as the sample. In establishing the equation, he acts as what might be called a “proxy” for the commodity owner. In place of the commodity owner, who in reality posits in the equivalent form the commodity that he wants to exchange his own commodity for, the person analyzing the equation posits whichever single commodity he wishes to have on the right of the equation. As long as the simple value-form is at issue, only a single commodity is needed, and there is no particular type of commodity that must be selected. Regardless of the commodity chosen, simply by being placed in the equivalent form, the concrete labor embodied in that commodity is equated to the labor of the commodity in the relative form of value, thus becoming the phenomenal form of abstract human labor that the two commodities have in common. By means of this, the commodity in the equivalent form becomes the phenomenal form of value for the commodity in the relative form. Thus, in setting up the equation, the person carrying out the analysis is perfectly free to choose whichever commodity he likes. In this sense, and only in this sense, “anything” could be in the equivalent form, as Uno says. But this is only the case for setting up the equation. Once a certain equation has been posited, such as 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, it is treated as a given and then analyzed. At that point, it is not acceptable for the commodity on either the left or the right of the equation to be randomly substituted. In terms of our example above, it is the coat, and not some other commodity, that is in the equivalent form, with the natural form of the coat becoming the form of value for the linen. In short, it is certainly not true that “anything” can be brought into the process of analysis.
This all seems obvious to me. I have a hard time understanding how Uno could say that, “if this is abstracted from anything could be in that form, so it would already be the expanded form of value.” In the case of a given equation, there is only one commodity in the equivalent form (as long as we are dealing with the simple value-form), and that single commodity is fixed in place. In setting up the equation, it is a random matter what sort of commodity is placed in the equivalent form, but it must be a single commodity rather than several commodities. Saying that any commodity can be placed in that form is merely a reflection, on the level of method, of the actual fact that it is unclear what sort of commodity the commodity owner himself will actually choose. Regardless of what commodity is chosen, that commodity, simply by being placed in the equivalent form, becomes the form of value of the owner’s commodity.
Given all of this, it is unclear (at least according to my way of thinking) how Uno could think that the simple value-form “would already be the expanded value-form.” And this makes it quite difficult to respond to his criticism. If forced to speculate, however, I would interpret his statement as follows. In the relation of the value-expression of the linen, where the coat is the equivalent of the linen, we abstract from the coat as a useful item that the linen owner wants, to concentrate solely on its existence as the embodiment of abstract human labor.[15] We think in terms of the value of the linen only first being able to be expressed in the existence of this value-body. Uno, however, may have interpreted the idea of abstracting from the aspect of a commodity as a useful thing to concentrate exclusively on its existence as the value-body, as an abstraction from the particularity of use-value to arrive at use-value in general. At the same time, he may have mistaken the fact that the linen is first able to express its value in that existence qua “value-body” as signifying that the coat becomes the value-form as use-value in general, instead of as a particular use-value. Perhaps based on that sort of misinterpretation, Uno says that because the particularity of concrete use-values is abstracted from to arrive at use-value in general, this must involve abstraction from various types of use-values to end up with the expanded value-form. If indeed this is Uno’s logic, it is similar to his mistaken idea, dealt with earlier, that “use-value cannot be understood if it becomes abstract use-value in general that is set apart from the wants of individuals”; so my earlier comments would be applicable here as well.
All of this, however, is speculation on my part regarding the meaning of Uno’s statements, after having struggled to understand what he is trying to say. I may be completely off the mark, but at present I can think of no other plausible explanation.
Without considering the commodity owner, it is not possible to understand why the commodity in the relative form of value and the commodity in the equivalent form are each in their respective forms, which would mean that it is all the same whether one of the commodities is in one form as opposed to the other. The demand for the active expression of value is the demand of the commodity owner, and a certain commodity is in the relative form of value because of the existence of that commodity owner. In contrast, as the commodity in the equivalent form is ideal, the owner has yet to appear in reality. It is by thinking in this manner that a subjective understanding of the value-form becomes possible.
As in the previous article, in addressing the argument summarized above, I will begin with Uno’s own words to avoid misunderstandings and then develop my views in direct relation to the passages quoted:
I want to clearly consider the relation of opposition between the relative value-form and the equivalent form. If this could be reversed at any time the oppositional relation would have no great meaning. ... The question posed here is how much of a difference there is between the relative value-form and the equivalent form if the commodity owner is not considered; this is the point that should be clarified. (Sakisaka & Uno., 1948, p. 164)
What is the actual significance of the linen and the coat being in opposite positions, with the linen actively seeking to express its value? I think that unless the owner of the linen wanted the coat, the linen would not be able to express its value in the use-value of the coat. If this want is also abstracted from, the coat itself could express its value in the linen as well, so that the “relative” form would become reciprocal. But I do not believe that that is the sense of “relative” in this case. (Sakisaka & Uno, 1948, p. 162)
If there were no owner of the linen, for example, there would also not be any desire for the use-value of the commodity in the equivalent form, which is the coat. Both the linen and the coat would then express their respective value in each other. With the existence of the owner, the linen for the first time assumes the relative value-form, and the linen owner, as such, comes to desire that the linen’s value be actively expressed. The coat in the equivalent form has yet to appear in a material form, so it does not become active. Which particular commodity is in the equivalent form is something decided by the owner of the commodity in the relative form. (Sakisaka & Uno, 1948, p. 166)
I also want to say that the commodity in the equivalent form is an ideal existence, so the commodity owner as well is not actually in a relation of opposition. If the two commodities are both thought of as actual commodities it would be the same as barter. Value-expression is naturally thinkable because the commodity owner has been presupposed. One might deal with the value-expression in a third-person manner, in terms of attempting to express value by positing one of the two given commodities in the relative form, but in that case it would be easy to fall into the error of Hilferding. ... Even in the case of the simple value-form, the commodity in the relative value-form and the commodity in the equivalent form are not in a relation of simple equality. ... If indeed the two commodities were equated because of being equal, then I think we would be dealing with a relationship where the commodity in the relative value-form and in the equivalent form could be on either side of the equation. ... When the owner of the commodity is taken into consideration, it becomes clear that the equation cannot easily be reversed. ... I would like it to be understood that, in the relation of equating for the commodity, it is not the case that equal things are premised from the beginning so that the equating is the outcome of this. If value-expression is thought of as preceding exchange, then the question of something equal between the two commodities existing will be clarified subsequently. That is to say, the commodity in the relative value-form is in the form for expressing its own value, but we do not know whether this will be actually realized. The commodity in the equivalent form, for its part, is not yet actually provided for exchange. (Sakisaka & Uno, 1948, pp. 233-235)
In the first passage quoted above, Uno poses the question in terms of wanting to “clearly consider the relation of opposition between the relative value-form and the equivalent form” and clarify “how much of a difference there is between the relative value-form and the equivalent form if the commodity owner is not considered.” From my perspective, however, Marx in the theory of the value-form – without giving any consideration to the commodity owner – managed to thoroughly elucidate the “relation of opposition between the relative value-form and equivalent form” (and thus explain “how much of a difference there is between the relative value-form and the equivalent form”) through his analysis of the value-equation as the form of value-expression. Moreover, this is something that anyone who has carefully read Marx’s analysis of the value-form should be able to perceive; and there is no reason to imagine that Uno is unaware of this. So when Uno says that the difference between the two forms is not clear without considering the commodity owner, he must be referring to some other issue. Basically, I think that Uno is trying to say the following. If we look at the structure of the value-equation itself, the meaning of the commodity on the left and on the right side of the equation, and their oppositional relationship, is clear even without considering the commodity owner. But it is only by taking the commodity owner into consideration that we can know why a particular commodity (linen) is in the relative value-form on the left of the equation, while another commodity (a coat) is in the equivalent form on the right. If this is not understood, no distinction between a given equation and its opposite could be arrived at, so it could be thought that each is merely a different way of expressing the same fact. This would result in an inability to subjectively grasp the value-form or understand the crux of that form. As for why that would be the case, Uno first offers the following argument:
What is the actual significance of the linen and the coat being in opposite positions, with the linen actively seeking to express its value? I think that unless the owner of the linen wanted the coat, the linen would not be able to express its value in the use-value of the coat. If this want is also abstracted from, the coat itself could express its value in the linen as well, so that the “relative” form would become reciprocal. (Sakisaka & Uno, 1948, p. 162)
As I discussed in detail in my earlier article, the value of the linen happens to be expressed in a coat because the coat is an object that the linen owner wants, but this is not an issue relevant to the theory of the value-form. The aim of that theory is to unravel both the riddle of a commodity’s price (i.e., money-form) and the riddle of money. Upon deeper reflection, however, we find that the riddle of the money-form is ultimately rooted in the peculiar fact that the value of a commodity is expressed in the oppositional element to value: a commodity’s use-value. In order to solve the riddle of the money-form, therefore, we must first answer the fundamental question of how it is possible, exactly, for a commodity’s value to be expressed in the use-value of another commodity. The problem does not present itself in that manner when we directly consider the money-form. For in the case of the money-form, the value of every commodity is expressed in a single independent commodity (gold), so the issue pushed to the forefront is the mysterious nature of gold that stems from this special privilege. Only in the case of the simple value-form does it becomes vividly apparent that the value of a commodity is expressed in the use-value of another commodity equated to it, thus making it possible to first pose, in a pure form, the key question of how this is possible.[16] This is the fundamental issue that Marx examines in his analysis of the simple form of value. Therefore, he does not raise the question of why the coat is posited as the equivalent form for the linen. There is no question that the owner of the linen is the one who posits the coat as the equivalent form, and that he does so because he wants the coat. Yet no matter how long we might dwell on this fact, it is of no use in elucidating the fundamental problem at hand. That problem remains even after the role of the commodity owner has been clarified. It is first posed in an independent form when the process through which a certain value-equation is created (according to the want of a commodity owner) is set aside and the equation is taken as a given. We have two separate issues, belonging to what might be called two different dimensions. It is an intentional act on the part of the commodity owner that posits a specific commodity in the equivalent form. This is a point that can be grasped easily by normal human cognition. In contrast, the process whereby the use-value of the commodity in the equivalent form becomes the value-form for the commodity in the relative value-form takes place independently of the consciousness of the commodity owner. The subject is the commodity, not a human being, and in place of human language we have a fetishistic world where the “language of commodities” is spoken.[17] This is precisely why – when considering this issue that is the core of the riddle of the value-form – the commodity owner must be abstracted from, by taking a certain equation as a given. Marx thus takes the equation 20 yards of linen = 1 coat as his premise, and then sets about clarifying the relation of value-expression within it solely by analyzing the form of the equation. Through this analysis Marx discovers the “detour” of value-expression – not perceived by earlier economists – and thereby unravels the fundamental riddle of the value-form.
If these points are adequately understood it becomes apparent how misguided it is, in terms of the aim of the analysis of the simple value-form, to think in the manner of Uno that “unless the owner of the linen wanted the coat, the linen would not be able to express its value in the use-value of the coat.” It also becomes clear that there is no need for Uno’s concern that “if this want is also abstracted from, the coat itself could express its value in the linen, so that the ‘relative’ form would become reciprocal.” Once we take the equation 20 yards of linen = 1 coat as a given, it is clear even without considering the want of the linen owner that the linen (not the coat) is in the position of expressing its own value as the commodity in the relative form of value. There is no reason, then, to imagine that “the coat itself could express its value in the linen as well.”
If, along with the equation above, the opposite equation (1 coat = 20 yards of linen) is posited at the same time, then indeed “the coat itself could express its value in the linen as well” and the value-expression would be carried out “reciprocally.” This is a premise that would naturally exist in an actual case where 20 yards of linen and 1 coat are exchanged as commodities. Furthermore, if we presuppose that the exchange between linen and the coat is repeatedly carried out, rather than being an isolated incident, then the rate of exchange between of 20 yards of linen and 1 coat is not the simple expression of the want of the owner of linen, but has instead been established objectively as the regular rate of exchange. This means that included in reality as the premise, along with the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, is the opposite value-expression: 1 coat = 20 yards of linen. Marx points out, for instance, that “the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, or 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat, also includes its converse: 1 coat = 20 yards of linen, or 1 coat is worth 20 yards of linen” (Marx, 1976a, p. 140).
That situation is premised by Marx, as is natural from a methodological standpoint. As long as Marx’s aim is to elucidate the value-relation by analyzing the value-equation, with a certain equation posited as his premise, he must assume that the equation expresses a relation of equivalent exchange (not merely the want of a commodity owner). When Marx says that “the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat ... also includes its converse: 1 coat = 20 yards of linen,” this means that the opposite relation of value-expression is simultaneously posited from the outset, which is to say that the opposite value-form is included within the premise itself. This does not mean, however, that a given value-expression naturally includes the opposite value-expression without the aforementioned condition of repeated (rather than isolated) exchange.[18] And it certainly does not mean that the subject-object relationship in a single value-expression is unclear. Nor does it mean that, within the value-expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, “the coat itself could express its value in the linen as well,” as Uno writes. This is precisely why Marx makes the following observation:
But in this case I must reverse the equation, in order to express the value of the coat relatively; and, if I do that, the linen becomes the equivalent instead of the coat. The same commodity cannot, therefore, simultaneously appear in both forms in the same expression of value. These forms rather exclude each other as polar opposites. Whether a commodity is in the relative form or in its opposite, the equivalent form, exclusively depends on the position it holds in the expression of value. That is, it depends on whether it is the commodity whose value is being expressed, or the commodity in which value is being expressed. (Marx, 1976a, p. 140)
In other words, the subject of value-expression is posited along with the equation. As long as the equation of value-expression is taken as a given, the subject is clear even without considering the commodity owner. If we assume that two equations of value-expression exist at the same time, expressing opposite relations, we can of course choose to examine either one. And depending on our choice one of the commodities will be the subject of value-expression. This certainly does not mean, however, that “the commodity in the relative value-form and in the equivalent form could be on either side of the equation.” If it appears that the subject and object are reversed, this is only because two different value-expressions are posited at the same time; it is not occurring within the same value-expression. Within a given expression of value, the commodity posited in each of the two forms is fixed. Those positions certainly cannot be altered. Moreover, the fact that we can observe the value-expression of either of the two commodities does not mean, as Uno suggests, that one is dealing with “value-expression in a third-person manner, in terms of attempting to express value by positing one of the two given commodities in the relative form.” We are not merely taking two commodities as givens, but also presuming two expressions of value. Each of the two commodities posits the other as its equivalent. Of course, it would be quite wrong-minded for someone to think that instead of two value-expressions it was simply two commodities that are posited and that we seek to “express value by positing one of the two given commodities in the relative form.” Uno refers to this as dealing with the expression of value in a “third-person manner,” but from my own perspective it is in fact the opposite. The misunderstanding stems rather from the attempt to play a role in value-expression despite being in a third-person position (as the analyst); i.e., despite not being in the position of the person concerned in value-expression. This is precisely the approach that I am criticizing. Uno also objects to this position, saying that “it would be easy to fall into the error of Hilferding,” but the reason he provides for his objection is completely different from my own view. For Uno, the defect in the approach above is that it goes no further than a third-person perspective, from which the truth regarding the value-form cannot be grasped. Uno insists that it is necessary to consider the standpoint of the commodity owner, and that without doing so the subject of value-expression would be unclear. From my perspective, however, the fundamental error is not related to a third-person stance. Indeed, a person analyzing the value-form must take such a stance, with a certain value-equation treated as a given. Once we have taken an equation as the premise, we then solely concern ourselves with elucidating the relation of value-expression within it. When a certain equation is premised, it is perfectly clear which commodity is the subject of value-expression, even without considering the commodity owner. This explanation, however, seems unlikely to satisfy Uno, as he has also made the following claim:
If there were no owner of the linen, for example, there would also not be any desire for the use-value of the commodity in the equivalent form, which is the coat. Both the linen and the coat would then express their respective value in each other. With the existence of the owner, the linen for the first time assumes the relative value-form, and the linen owner, as such, comes to desire that the linen’s value be actively expressed. (Sakisaka & Uno, 1948, p. 166)
The question centers here on the latter half of that comment, as I have already dealt with the first half. I think that the true basis for Uno’s way of thinking is the idea he presents here that the subject in value-expression is a human being (and could not be the commodity), so that without considering the commodity owner we are unable to know which commodity is the subject of value-expression. However, can it really be said that a human being is the subject of value-expression? My own view is that it is neither impossible nor a case of forced logic to think of the commodity, rather than the commodity owner, as the subject. Moreover, this is correct from a methodological standpoint.
What is clear first of all is that the equation of value-expression, 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, is created by the owner of the linen. Nevertheless, the value that is being expressed in the equation is that of the linen (not an expression of the linen owner’s value). If we then consider what makes the value-expression of linen inherently necessary, we see that it stems from the essential nature of linen as a commodity. That is, a commodity by nature is a twofold thing – as the unity of use-value and value – and its natural form is its form as a use-value, not the value-form. Thus, the form of value must be acquired in addition; otherwise the product could not acquire a form as a commodity. In short, the need for value-expression stems from the nature of the commodity itself. Yet the commodity itself is unable to perceive this necessity and obviously cannot carry out this or that action. It is the commodity owner who “comes to desire that the linen’s value be actively expressed.” Likewise, it is the owner who places a price tag on a commodity. However, as far as this is an expression of the commodity’s value as such, the commodity owner is not carrying out some arbitrary action as a person with some individual want. Rather, the commodity owner has perceived the essential nature of the commodity as his own instinct and is merely acting upon that basis. The commodity is therefore first and foremost the subject, whereas the owner can be viewed as nothing more than its automaton, which is why Marx speaks of “the personification of things and the reification of persons” (Marx, 1976a, p. 209).
I would have thought that anyone familiar with Capital would require no further explanation of this point, as Marx explains it in detail. So it is surprising that Uno insists that the subject of value-expression cannot be understood apart from the commodity owner. It would seem, then, that some special circumstance must account for Uno’s way of thinking. Here I want to offer my own frank conjecture regarding what that circumstance might be. I hope that my interpretation, even if off target, will at least contribute to our general understanding of the value-form.
The key issue concerning the value-form, as noted earlier, appears vividly for the first time in its most undeveloped form, which is the simple value-form. It is the analysis of this form that Marx concentrates on in Capital. However, the simple value-form is also the undeveloped form of value, which introduces a separate difficulty to the analysis of it purely as the form of value. This difficulty is connected to the fact that the simple value-form of a commodity is not yet a form independent of the want of its owner. In our example of 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, the coat is the form of value for the 20 yards of linen, with significance as the embodiment of abstract human labor of the same quality as the labor embodied in the linen. At the same time, the coat is the particular object that the linen owner wants, with significance as a product of specific concrete labor that differs from the labor that makes the linen. In other words, the coat is simultaneously in two completely different relations: it plays two completely different roles, with two completely different determinations. Without the “rather intense application of our power of abstraction” (Marx 1976b, p. 18), we would not be able to distinguish one relation from the other and those two essentially different relations would be mixed up. The restriction on the commodity’s value-form by the want of an individual commodity owner is more than just an inconvenient matter that has confounded economists. It is a serious defect for the value-form, as it runs counter to the essential nature of value itself. Therefore, the value-form, instead of remaining at the simple value-form, must proceed to the money-form, where it is first freed from the connection to the individual want of the commodity owner, thus reaching completion as a form of value.
In order to better appreciate the distinction between two different relations, which seem interconnected in the case of the simple value-form and therefore difficult to separate, we can look at what becomes of them in the case of the money-form. It probably goes without saying that when the value-form develops into the money-form – so that a particular commodity (gold) exclusively plays the role of equivalent qua money-commodity within the commodity world – commodities are divided into normal commodities and the money-commodity, so that C1 – C2 is divided into the two independent processes of C1 – M (sale) and M – C2 (purchase). We need to begin by examining the significance of each of the two processes. In the case of C1 – M, we have the process of the realization of the value-form C1 (i.e., C1=M) that expresses its own value ideally in a relation of equivalence to M, which is the generally valid figure of value. Meanwhile, the significance of M – C2 is completely different. Because M is already a commodity with the formal determination as general equivalent, and its natural form thus has general validity as the figure of value, there is no further need for it to turn the use-value of another commodity into the shape of value, and through this express its own character as value. So M cannot occupy the position of the relative form of value in the original sense. However, if we reverse the list of prices, it would at first glance be the same as the extended value-form (form B), with the value of M indicated in every possible commodity. Marx calls this the “specific relative value-form of the money commodity” [spezifische relative Wertform der Geldware],[19] with the term “specific” used to fundamentally distinguish it from the relative value-form in the original sense. In other words, despite money being on the left of the equation, and in that sense in the relative form of value, it does not forfeit its status as general equivalent and still maintains general direct exchangeability. Therefore, M – C2 is not a process involving the realization of the value-form of M by transforming M into actual value. Rather, it is a process whereby the formal, general use-value of a commodity, which already has the form of general validity qua value-body (and therefore the form of absolute exchangeability), is realized in a particular commodity that is the object of the individual want of the owner of the commodity now in the form of M. It is within this relation that the want of the commodity owner plays a role. As far as the commodity itself is concerned, being now in the form of M merely signifies that it is in the form of possessing general direct exchangeability, and it is a matter of indifference to this commodity whether that ability is realized through its exchange with this or that commodity type. The decision regarding which commodity it will be exchanged with in order to realize that potential is exclusively made by the owner (in this case, the owner of money). The owner reads backwards from the list of the values of commodities expressed in the form of M, which is made up of an infinite number of individual value-equations, and then chooses the particular M=C2 on the right of which is placed the object of his particular individual want. This is the only point at which the owner’s specific individual want plays a role. It is in this form that the ideal use-value of his money, as a general means of exchange, is realized.
In the case of C1=C2 (and therefore C1 – C2 as its realization), what is subsequently differentiated to become independent has yet to split apart; C1 equates C2 to itself, thus positing it with the formal determination as value-body, and then expresses its own value in the natural body of C2 (thus positing that natural body with significance as the embodiment of the abstract human labor within C1). Along with this relative value-expression of C1 in the original sense, there is at the same time the expression of the will of the owner of C1 who seeks to realize the formal use-value of C1 as a potential value-body – and therefore as a potential means of direct exchange[20] – in the concrete use-value of C2 which is the particular object that he happens to want (so that the natural body of C2 comes to have significance as the product of specific concrete labor of a different type than the labor that made C1). The former moment subsequently develops into the independent factor of C1=M, while the latter moment develops into M= C2. In contrast, the two factors have not yet split apart in the case of C1=C2. But the fact that they are not yet separate at that stage does not mean that they are indistinguishable, nor does it by any means suggest the latter constitutes an essential moment of the former. The expression of the want of the commodity owner (simultaneously encompassed within C1=C2) is not what constitutes the value-form as such. In fact, it is a heterogeneous factor that renders the form incomplete as a value-form. Therefore, the value-form cannot remain in the simple value-form: it has to develop to the money-form, where the value-form is first completed by freeing itself from the heterogeneous factor that develops into the separate and independent form of M=C2. If our intention in analyzing C1=C2 is to elucidate the value-form, we naturally need to uncover and extract the form that becomes independent as C1=M (i.e., the money-form), not the factor that develops subsequently to become independent as M=C2. This primarily involves uncovering the embryo of the money-form within C1=C2, thus providing a vital clue for unfolding the theory of the value-form in Capital. Marx proudly noted that this was one of his most important original ideas:
These gentry, the economists, have hitherto overlooked the extremely simple point that the form 20 yards of linen = 1 coat is but the undeveloped basis form of 20 yards of linen = gold of '2, and thus that the simplest form of a commodity, in which its value is not yet expressed as its relation to all other commodities but only as something differentiated from its own natural form, contains the whole secret of the money-form and thereby, in nuce, of all bourgeois forms of the product of labor. In my first presentation [Contribution], I avoided the difficulty of the development by providing an actual analysis of the expression of value only when it appears already developed and expressed in money. (Marx, 1987b, p. 384)
Every one knows, if nothing else, that commodities have a common value-form which presents a marked contrast to the varied natural forms of their use-values: the money-form. Here, however, we have to perform a task never even attempted by bourgeois economics; namely, to show the genesis of this money-form, i.e., to pursue the development of the expression of value contained in the value-relation of commodities, from its simplest, almost imperceptible shape, to the dazzling money-form. When this has been done, the riddle of money disappears also at the same time. (Marx, 1976a, p. 139)
The only difficulty in the comprehension of the money-form is that of grasping the general equivalent form, and hence the general form of value itself, i.e., form C. Form C can be reduced by working backwards to form B, the expanded form of value, and its constitutive element is form A: 20 yards of linen = 1 coat or x commodity A = y commodity B. The simple commodity form is therefore the germ of the money-form. (Marx, 1976a, p. 163)
This form [the simple value-form] is somewhat difficult to analyze, because it is simple. ([Footnote:] It is, to a certain extent, the cell-form or, as Hegel would say, the “an sich” of money.) The different specifications which are contained in it are veiled, undeveloped, abstract, and consequently only able to be distinguished and grasped through the rather intense application of the power of abstraction. (Marx, 1976b, p. 18)
The value-form of the commodity must itself again be an objective form. The exclusive objective forms of commodities are their use-figures, i.e., their natural forms. Now, since the natural form of a commodity, of the linen, for instance, is the diametrical opposite of its value-form, it must turn a different natural form, the natural form of a different commodity, into its value-form. That which it cannot do immediately vis-a-vis itself, it can do immediately vis-a-vis another commodity, thus doing it vis-a-vis itself via a detour. It cannot express its value in its own body or in its own use-value, but it can relate itself to a different use-value or commodity-body as the immediate existence of value. It cannot relate itself to the concrete labor contained in itself as the mere form of realization of abstract human labor, but it can relate itself to that contained in other commodity kinds. All it has to do is to equate the other commodity to itself as the equivalent. Generally, the use-value of a commodity exists only for a different commodity so far as it serves, in this way, as the form of appearance of its value. If one considers in the simple relative expression of value, x commodity A = y commodity B, only the quantitative relation, one will also only find the laws developed above about the movement of relative value.[21] ... However, if one considers the value-relation of the two commodities according to their qualitative side, one uncovers in every simple value-expression the secret of the value-form, and therefore, in nuce, that of money. (Marx, 1976b, p. 22)
In addition to his various arguments that I introduced earlier, Uno also says that “the coat in the equivalent form has yet to appear in a material form, so it does not become active” (Sakisaka & Uno, 1948, p. 166); that “the commodity in the equivalent form is an ideal existence, so the commodity owner as well is not actually in a relation of opposition”; and that “the commodity in the equivalent form ... is not yet actually provided for exchange” (Sakisaka & Uno, 1948, pp. 233-235). These sorts of views, however, are clearly based on a misconception.[22] The fact that the coat is the equivalent form for the value-expression of another commodity certainly does not mean that it does not exist actually as a commodity. The coat itself also actually exists as such, and it is precisely because of the possibility of it being “actually provided for exchange” with the value-expression in which the coat posits the linen in the equivalent form, that the value-expression of the linen (in which it posits the coat in the equivalent form) is also able to be given. In this case, when the linen owner says “20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat,” and the owner of the coat says “1 coat is worth 20 yards of linen,” exchange between those two parties is possible for the first time. If only one of the two commodities exists in reality, and therefore value-expression is only unilateral, exchange would never take place. However, this certainly does not mean that the subject and object of value-expression are unclear. Two commodities exist actually in this case, so there are two value-expressions, and the question of which is subject or object must of course be decided for each. This means that it is perfectly clear which commodity is in the relative value-form and which is the equivalent form.[23]
In other words, a failure to identify the subject/object of value-expression is not the result of overlooking the want of the commodity owner or of inadequately pondering whether or not a commodity appears in reality. Rather, it is solely the result of not taking a value-equation as a given or of focusing exclusively on its content without considering the form of value-expression (thus remaining on the level of the theory of the substance of value). If there is confusion between subject and object, as Uno notes with concern, I think the best way to deal with the problem would be to adopt the standpoint of strict scientific analysis. That is, we should take a certain equation as a given and engage in the elucidation of the value-form, grasping it through an observation of the form of value-expression and extracting and analyzing the relation of value-expression within it. Uno, however, recommends that we consider the want of the commodity owner and the existence (or non-existence) of the commodity, which, from my perspective, is a case of going to an opposite extreme in the hope of preventing an error. There are cases where one must fight one evil with another, but in this case at least I cannot agree with such an approach.
The essential difference between the general equivalent form and the money-form first becomes clear when we consider the want of the commodity owner. That is, when the general equivalent becomes money it is no longer limited to the relation where it is desired for its original use-value, and thus it expresses the value of a commodity. If we set aside this characteristic, there would be no essential distinction established between the general equivalent form and the money-form.
Within the developmental stages of the value-form in Capital, after the general equivalent form (form C), Marx takes the further step of introducing the money-form as the fourth form (form D). However, Marx says that there is no essential difference between the two forms. Therefore, at first glance, one may wonder why he bothered to distinguish between them, and it might seem that Kōzō Uno – in his argument summarized above – has managed to compensate for Marx’s failure to clarify the essential difference between the two forms (despite having gone to the trouble of distinguishing between them). Uno’s explanation, which supposes this error on the part of Marx, adheres to the following line of reasoning:
For Marx, the “money-form” is merely a matter of the linen, which is the equivalent form qua “general value-form,” changing into gold. He says that “form D differs not at all from form C, except that now, instead of linen, gold has assumed the general equivalent form,” but as I mentioned earlier, if we clearly suppose the existence of the owner of the commodity in the relative value-form, we can understand that in the case of the money-form a change occurs so that the liberation from its use-value is completed, whereas this had still only been latent in the case of the general value-form. (Uno, 1947, p. 164)
It is not clear what use-value is being freed from, exactly, when Uno speaks of the “liberation from its use-value,” but the overall gist of his argument seems to concern the liberation of the value-form from the restriction by some individual want, such as the case where a commodity’s value is expressed using the object that the commodity owner happens to want. Uno writes:
The general equivalent is distinguished from other commodities, and “it is not until this exclusion has once and for all confined itself to one specific kind of commodity that the uniform relative value of the whole commodity world gains objective fixity and general social validity” (Marx, 1976a, p. 162). At the same time, it can then no longer be said that this is still a relation where each commodity owner desires the general equivalent because of its use-value and expresses his own commodity’s value by means of it. In the case of what Marx calls the general value-form, it can be said that already each commodity is developing such a relation, but for value-expression to be “completely” transformed in that manner it is necessary for the equivalent to be “restricted to one particular commodity.” This is precisely the development of the relation where the general equivalent is posited as the “form of general direct exchangeability,” on the one hand, while all of the other commodities are posited with the “form of indirect exchangeability,” on the other hand. Stated differently, commodities in general make the general equivalent into something able to purchase a commodity at any time, while at the same time those commodities cannot directly purchase each other. ...
Along with the general equivalent becoming this sort of money-commodity, however, as already mentioned, it is not directly the use-value qua commodity, as such, that is the desired object, but rather it is set against other commodities as “use-value for everyone, i.e., general use-value” that serves as the “general means of exchange.” (Uno, 1947, pp.161-162).
The development of the value-form is also the process of the genesis of a value-form independent of the individual want of the commodity owner. This genesis of the value-form constitutes a necessary moment within the development of commodity production; the value-form is completed with the money-form and at the same time the equivalent commodity comes to be “’use-value for everyone, i.e., general use-value’ that serves as the ‘general means of exchange.’” All of these points are undeniable truths; but Marx did not overlook them, nor did he fail to identify their importance. Indeed, Marx writes:
In the direct exchange of products, each commodity is directly a means of exchange to its owner, and an equivalent to those who do not possess it, although only in so far as it has use-value for them. At this stage, therefore, the articles exchanged do not acquire a value-form independent of their own use-value, or of the individual wants of the exchangers. The need for this form first develops with the increase in the number and variety of the commodities entering into the process of exchange. The problem and the means for its solution arise simultaneously. Commercial intercourse, in which the owners of commodities exchange and compare their own articles with various other articles, never takes place without different kinds of commodities, that belong to different owners, being exchanged for, and equated as values with one single further kind of commodity. This further commodity, by becoming the equivalent of various other commodities, directly acquires the form of a general or social equivalent, if only within narrow limits. This general equivalent form comes and goes with the momentary social contacts which call it into existence. It is transiently attached to this or that commodity in alternation. But with the development of commodity exchange it fixes itself firmly and exclusively onto particular kinds of commodity, i.e., it crystallizes out into the money-form. ...
The money commodity acquires a dual use-value. Alongside its special use-value as a commodity (gold, for instance, serves to fill hollow teeth, it forms the raw material for luxury articles, etc.) it acquires a formal use-value, arising out of its special social function. (Marx, 1976a, pp. 182-184)
Marx, in this manner, clearly recognizes that commodities having “a value-form independent of their own use-value, or of the individual wants of the exchangers,” is a need that “first develops with the increase in the number and variety of the commodities entering into the process of exchange,” and that it is the formation of the general value-form – and further, the money-form – that precisely satisfies this need, with the money-commodity acquiring “a formal use-value, arising out of its special social function.” It is worth noting, however, that unlike Uno, who thinks this is a problem pertaining to the theory of the value-form (and that the development of the value-form cannot be understood without focusing on it), Marx makes no mention of it in the theory of the value-form. Marx first raises this problem in the theory of the exchange process because it falls outside of the framework of the particular problem elucidated in the theory of the value-form. It is certainly not the task of the theory of the value-form to discuss every sort of problem related to the value-form, which at any rate would be impossible; just as the discussion of value in Chapter 1 does not (and could not) deal with every conceivable problem related to value.
The task particular to the theory of the value-form is to unravel the riddle of the commodity’s price (i.e., the riddle of the money-form), and therefore the riddle of money. The money-form itself is the developed value-form, so the riddle of the money-form is nothing more than the developed form of the fundamental riddle of the value-form. In carrying out his analysis, Marx traces his way back from the money-form so as to reduce it to its elementary form: the simple form of value. He discovers, through this analysis, the core of the riddle of the money-form, which is the peculiar fact that a commodity’s value is expressed in another commodity’s use-value (the oppositional factor to value). Here we have the riddle of the value-form; and it is the basis of the riddle of the money-form. Without solving the former riddle there is no way to solve the latter – whereas the riddle of the money-form is easily unraveled once the riddle of the value-form has been solved. Marx writes:
It is clear that the actual money-form does not in itself provide any difficulty. Just as soon as the general equivalent form is penetrated it no longer costs one the least sort of headache to comprehend that this equivalent form holds fast to a specific sort of commodity, like gold; and all the less headache in that the general equivalent form from its nature preconditions the social excluding of one determined sort of commodity by all other commodities. The only problem that remains is that excluding gains objectively social consistency and universal validity, and hence neither happens to different commodities in turn nor possesses a merely local significance in particular circles of the commodity world alone. The difficulty in the concept of the money-form is limited to the comprehension of the general equivalent form, and thus of the general value-form as such, form III. Form III, however, is analyzed reversely into form II, and the constituent element of form II is form I: 20 yards of linen = 1 coat or x commodity A = y commodity B. Now if one knows what use-value and exchange-value are, then one finds that this form I is the simplest, most undeveloped manner of manifesting a random labor-product (e.g., linen) as commodity, that is, as unity of the opposites use-value and exchange-value. One then easily finds at the same time the sequence of metamorphoses which the simple commodity-form: 20 yards of linen = 1 coat must pass through in order to attain its finished structure: 20 yards of linen = 2 pounds Sterling, i.e., the money-form. (Marx, 1976b, pp. 69-70)
Marx pointed out, in a June 22, 1867 letter to Engels, that earlier economists had not perceived the significance of the simple form of value:
These gentry, the economists, have hitherto overlooked the extremely simple point that the form 20 yards of linen = 1 coat is but the undeveloped basis form of 20 yards of linen = gold of '2, and thus that the simplest form of a commodity, in which its value is not yet expressed as its relation to all other commodities but only as something differentiated from its own natural form, contains the whole secret of the money-form. (Marx, 1987b, p. 384)
Marx’s comments do not pertain solely to the orthodox economists who displayed almost no interest in the question of the value-form. He notes that even the “few economists, such as S. Bailey, who have concerned themselves with the analysis of the form of value” (Marx, 1976a, p. 141), not only failed to solve the riddle in the analysis of the simple value-form but were not even aware of its existence and that the “real problem, how it is possible to express the value in exchange of A in the value in use of B – does not even occur to him [Bailey]” (Marx, 1989, p. 335).
In the first of my articles published in Keizai shirin (cf. my comments on “Uno’s First Argument”), I discussed how the analysis of the simple value-form in Capital primarily addresses the task of clarifying the riddle of that form, which Marx brilliantly accomplished in uncovering the “detour” of value-expression. In seeking to unravel the riddle, we must set aside the want of the commodity owner, as Marx did, because introducing that issue there only hinders the solution of the problem at hand and generates confusion. In response to my article, Uno quickly presented a counter-criticism in an article of his own entitled “The Tasks of the Theory of the Value-Form: A Response to Professor Kuruma’s Criticism,” published in the June 1950 issue of Keizai hyōron. One of the main grounds of his argument presented in that article is the idea that the position of the simple value-form within the developmental process of the value-form could not be understood if we abstract from the want of the commodity owner. Below, in italics, are passages quoted from Uno’s article (Keizai hyōron, No. 6, 1950, pp. 79-80) where he presents his argument, followed by my response in brackets (to avoid having to quote the same passages twice).
In the simple value-form, even though the coat, “as a specific use-value, takes on significance as the direct embodiment of human labor, becoming the value-body” (Kuruma, 1957, p. 70), it becomes such as a result of the owner of the linen positing the coat as the equivalent, so that it is not the equivalent generally for other commodities.
[It certainly is true that in the case of 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, the coat only has significance as the equivalent vis-a-vis the linen – rather than generally as the equivalent for every other commodity too – but this fact should not be explained in terms of the equation being the outset of the value-form. Rather, the fact that it is merely the initial form should be explained on the basis of it only having significance as the equivalent vis-a-vis the linen, which itself can be explained by the fact that the coat is only equated to the linen and not to any other commodities. In other words, it is a fundamental fact that, no sooner than a commodity is equated to another commodity, it becomes the form of that other commodity’s value. The theoretical problem at hand ultimately comes down to grasping the “how” pertaining to this fact.]
Professor Kuruma, however, draws the distinction in the following terms: “The coat is posited as the equivalent form because it is an object that the linen owner wants, but the reason the coat is able to express the value of the linen is not because it is a desired object” (Kuruma, 1957, p. 69). This sounds reasonable enough, to be sure ... but this idea does not elucidate the fact that in this simple form of value the coat expresses the value of the linen or the fact that the value of the linen is not adequately expressed, nor does it clarify the fact that the form of value must therefore necessarily be developed.
[This is a matter of course. My discussion there was entirely related to problems common to the value-form, or what might be called the problem of the value-form itself (i.e., the fundamental mechanism of value-expression), so it is natural that the defects of the simple value-form and the necessity for it to develop beyond that level were not clarified by that discussion.]
As I mentioned earlier, my own view is that this point constitutes the theoretical task regarding the value-form.
[If the question is whether the task of the theory of the value-form concerns the elucidation of the fundamental mechanism of value-expression or the elucidation of the development of form, I do not have an answer because both are crucial to that theory. Still, from my perspective, the ultimate task of the theory of the value-form is to solve the riddle of the commodity’s money-form, and thereby also solve the riddle of the money-fetish. And those riddles themselves are merely the riddle of the developed value-form or the development of the fundamental riddle concerning the value-form. In order to unravel this fundamental riddle, Marx analyzes and traces back the money-form, reducing it to the simplest form of value so that he can clarify the fundamental mechanism of value-expression. Then, starting out once again from this point, while limiting himself to that mechanism of value-expression, Marx follows the developmental process of the value-form from the simple value-form to its completion as the money-form. This is my view regarding the nature of the theory of the value-form in Capital and the approach one should take in dealing with that theory. Clarifying the fundamental mechanism of value-expression and clarifying the development of the value-form are partial tasks indispensable to the solution of the ultimate theoretical task concerning the value-form; so both must be accomplished before we can arrive at the theory of the value-form. However, if the question is which of the two tasks is the fundamental one to be carried out first, it is of course the former; because without clarifying the fundamental mechanism of value-expression we cannot basically understand how the development of the value-form is possible. Moreover, I do not hesitate to say that it is the former task that also poses the greatest challenge for the understanding of the value-form. Marx describes it as “the point where all the difficulties originate which hinder an understanding of the value-form” (Marx, 1976b, p. 21); whereas once that problem has been solved, one “easily finds at the same time the sequence of metamorphoses which the simple commodity-form: 20 yards of linen = 1 coat must pass through in order to attain its finished structure: 20 yards of linen = 2 pounds Sterling, i.e., the money-form” (Marx, 1976b, p. 70).]
Kuruma says that the “fact that the use-value of the coat, in its given state, becomes the form of value for the linen can, if not very carefully reflected on, foster the illusion that the coat as a useful thing is capable in that given state of expressing the value of the linen by being an object that the linen owner wants” (Kuruma, 1957, p. 65); but could it then be said that in the simple value-form “the coat as a useful thing” without “being an object that the linen owner wants” is “capable in that given state of expressing the value of the linen?”
[This manner of quoting me is rather unbecoming for a person who I respect as much as Professor Uno. I certainly did not say that the coat as a useful thing, without being a desired object for the linen owner (and therefore without being equated to the linen), is capable in its given state of expressing the value of the linen. As should be clear from the sentence Uno quotes just prior to this, I am saying that the coat, in its given state, does not express the value of the linen by being a useful object desired by the linen owner. I explained this earlier in my article in more detail as follows: “Certainly the coat is posited as the equivalent form because it is an object that the linen owner wants; but the reason the coat is able to express the value of the linen is not because it is a desired object. The coat is able to express the value of the linen because the tailoring labor objectified in the coat is equated to the weaving labor objectified in the linen by means of the coat being equated to the linen. Thus, the tailoring labor in its existence as specific concrete labor becomes the realization-form of human labor in common with the weaving labor. The coat, as a specific use-value, takes on significance as the direct embodiment of human labor, becoming the value-body; and it is in its existence as such that the coat can express the value of the linen.” (Kuruma, 1957, pp. 69-70) I also dealt with this issue in the following passage: “There is no question that the owner of the linen is the one who posits the coat as the equivalent form, and that he does this because he wants the coat. Yet no matter how long we might dwell on that fact, it is of no use in elucidating the fundamental problem at hand. That problem remains even after the role of the commodity owner has been clarified. It is first posed in an independent form when the process through which a certain value-equation is created (according to the want of a commodity owner) is set aside and the equation is taken as a given. We have two separate issues, belonging to what might be called two different dimensions. It is an intentional act on the part of the commodity owner that posits a specific commodity in the equivalent form. This is a point that can be grasped easily by normal human cognition. In contrast, the process whereby the use-value of the commodity in the equivalent form becomes the value-form for the commodity in the relative value-form takes place independently of the consciousness of the commodity owner. The subject is the commodity, not a human being, and in place of human language we have a fetishistic world where the ‘language of commodities’ is spoken. This is precisely why – when considering this issue that is the core of the riddle of the value-form – the commodity owner must be abstracted from, by taking a certain equation as a given.” (Kuruma, 1957, p. 80)]
The problem is that if, in the simple value-form, a division is made, in the manner of Professor Kuruma, between “the coat being posited in the equivalent form” and “the coat in the equivalent form being able to express the value of the linen,” the position of the simple value-form within the developmental process of the value-form becomes unclear.
[It does not become unclear at all. As Marx plainly notes: “One sees right away the insufficiency of the simple form of value, of this embryonic form which must undergo a series of metamorphoses before ripening into the price-form. The expression of the value of commodity A in terms of some other commodity B merely distinguishes the value of A from its own use-value, and therefore also only places A in an exchange-relation with one particular different kind of commodity, instead of representing A’s qualitative equality with all other commodities and its quantitative proportionality to them. To the simple relative form of value of a commodity there corresponds the isolated equivalent form of another commodity. Thus, in the relative expression of value of the linen, the coat possesses the form of equivalent, the form of direct exchangeability, only in relation to this one kind of commodity, the linen. However, the simple form of value passes by itself into a more complete form. Although this simple form expresses the value of commodity A in only one commodity of another kind, it is a matter of complete indifference what this second commodity is, whether it is a coat iron, corn, etc. Different simple expressions of the value of one and the same commodity arise therefore according to whether this commodity enters into a value-relation with this or that other kind of commodity. The number of such possible expressions of commodity A is limited only by the number of the different kinds of commodities distinct from A. The isolated expression of A’s value transforms itself therefore into the indefinitely expandable series of different simple expressions of that value” (Marx, 1976a, p. 154). The reason that the simple value-form is incomplete as a value-form, as well as the circumstances of its transformation to form B, can thus very well be explained through an analysis that concentrates solely on form – without considering the factor of the want of the commodity owner and hence the reason why a certain commodity (say a coat rather than wheat) is posited as the equivalent form.]
The point noted by Marx in the passage I just quoted concerns the simple value-form; but in the case of the developed value-form as well, the form’s defect – and its development into the general equivalent form – can be fully explained through an analysis of the form alone, as is immediately apparent from reading Capital. There is some room for doubt, however, regarding the transition from the general value-form to the money-form, as mentioned earlier. That transition, likewise, bears no relation to the want of the commodity owner, but unlike the previous cases, the change in form is not an essential one. Marx writes:
Fundamental changes have taken place in the course of the transition from form A to form B, and from form B to form C. As against this, form D differs not at all from form C, except that gold instead of linen gold has now assumed the general equivalent form. Gold is in form D what linen was in form C: the general equivalent. The advance consists only in that the form of direct general exchangeability, in other words the general equivalent form, has now by social custom irrevocably become entwined with the specific bodily form of the commodity gold. (Marx, 1976a, p. 162)
Given Marx’s view that no “fundamental change” has taken place, why did he go to the trouble of recognizing the money-form as the fourth form, in distinction from the general value-form? At first glance it seems a meaningless distinction. Uno’s view is that the shift from the general value-form to the money-form has great significance. He commends Marx for drawing a distinction between the two forms, but then criticizes him for merely distinguishing between the two without clarifying the true significance of the distinction. The reason that Marx falls short, in Uno’s mind, is that he failed to consider the vital factor of the want of the commodity owner, which apparently demonstrates that the owner’s want should not be abstracted from in the theory of the value-form. This is the view Uno proposed in the article from which I just quoted at length, but I think it should now be fully apparent that it lacks validity. The crux of Uno’s explanation is the discovery that the characteristic of the money-form centers on the fact that when the general equivalent becomes the money-commodity, “it is not directly the use-value qua commodity, as such, that is the desired object, but rather it is set against other commodities as ‘use-value for everyone, i.e., general use-value’ that serves as the ‘general means of exchange.’” Uno’s view, however, amounts to nothing more than making “serv[ing] as the general means of exchange” the basis or premise of the conceptual determination within the theory of the value-form. Granted, the function as a “general means of exchange” is one that the money-commodity inevitably comes to acquire along with the development of the value-form into the money-form. Yet this is certainly not a function in the expression of value but rather a function in the exchange process. It is thus a methodological error to make it the premise for unfolding the theory of the value-form – just as it would be wrong to carry out an examination of the function of money as the measure of value by presupposing the function of money as the means of circulation. It is true that the function of money in value-expression takes on even greater concrete significance through the development of the function of money in the exchange process, but it is not acceptable to have the latter as a premise of the former. The conceptual determinations within the theory of the value-form are extremely abstract and formalistic, but this is a necessity from a methodological standpoint, and through the subsequent development our understanding gradually becomes more concrete.
Yet there remains the question of why Marx made a distinction in the theory of the value-form between the general value-form and the money-form. Is there a distinction between them apart from the idea of becoming a “general means of exchange”?
I have already noted my view that Marx, in the theory of the value-form, first clarifies the fundamental mechanism of value-expression by analyzing the simple value-form, and then (while restricting himself to that mechanism) clarifies the process whereby the form of value-expression develops sequentially until it reaches completion as the money-form. The mechanism of value-expression necessarily deals with riddle of the equivalent form, and since the developmental process of the value-form is at the same time the developmental process of the riddle of the equivalent form, the elucidation of the developmental process of the value-form also clarifies the developmental process of the riddle of the equivalent form that crystallizes in the money fetish that dazzles people’s eyes. We recognize, from the perspective of the development of the riddle of the equivalent form, the extremely important meaning of the fact that the general equivalent form adheres ultimately to the natural form of a particular sort of commodity (i.e., the fact that the general form of value becomes the money-form); for this adherence accompanies the tremendous unfolding of the fetish-character of the equivalent form. This is illustrated by the fact that vulgar economists have tried to elucidate the riddle of money fetish (i.e., the riddle of gold and silver) by listing the names of commodities that have played the role of general equivalent other than gold or silver:
The relative value-form of a commodity, of the linen for example, expresses the value-existence of the linen as something quite different from its body and bodily properties, namely, for example, as something which looks like a coat. This expression itself therefore indicates that it conceals a social relation. It is the other way around with the equivalent form. The equivalent form consists precisely in this, that the commodity-body, the coat for instance, this thing in its unadorned figure, expresses value, and is therefore endowed with the value-form by nature itself. Admittedly this holds good only within the value-relation, in which the commodity linen relates itself with commodity coat as its equivalent. However, the properties of a thing do not arise from its relation to other things; they are, rather, merely activated by such relations. The coat, therefore, seems to have its equivalent form – its property of direct exchangeability – just as much from nature as its property of being heavy or its ability to keep us warm. Hence the riddling character of the equivalent form, which only impinges on the crude bourgeois vision of the political economist when it confronts him in its fully developed shape, that of money. He then seeks to explain away the mystical character of gold and silver by substituting less dazzling commodities for them and, with ever-renewed satisfaction, reeling off a catalogue of all the inferior commodities which have played the role of the commodity-equivalent at one time or another. He does not suspect that even the simplest expression of value, such as 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, already presents the riddle of the equivalent form for us to solve. (Marx, 1976a, pp. 149-150)
The following passage from Capital, which supports the view I have presented thus far, also deals with the gist of the theory of the value-form:
We have already seen, from the simplest expression of exchangeable value, x commodity A = y commodity B, that the thing in which the magnitude of the value of another thing is represented seems to have the equivalent form independently of this relation, as a social natural-property which it possesses. We followed the process by which this false semblance solidified itself. This semblance was completed when the general equivalent form adhered to the natural form of a particular commodity or crystallized into the money-form. Although a particular commodity only becomes money because all other commodities express their values in it, it seems, on the contrary, that all other commodities universally express their values in a particular commodity because it is money. The movement through which the process has been mediated vanishes in its own result, leaving no trace behind. Without any initiative on their part, the commodities find their own value-figure ready to hand, in the form of the body of a commodity existing outside and alongside them. This physical object, gold or silver in its crude state, becomes, immediately on the emergence from the bowels of the earth, the direct incarnation of all human labor. Hence the magic of money. (Marx, 1976a, p. 187)
We can see, then, that the main theoretical issue at hand can be more easily understood if we consider why the general value-form is recognized as the stage prior to the money-form, rather than concentrating on why Marx recognized the money-form independently of the general value-form. What is posited before us in reality is the money-form, and thus it is natural to think of it as the final form. Our task is to solve the riddle of this money-form, but to do so we must first reduce it to the general value-form. It is in the form where every sort of commodity is on the left of the equation, and a special commodity is on the right, that for the first time the inherent relation becomes clear wherein “all other commodities universally express their values in a particular commodity because it is money.” In the money-form, “the movement through which this process has been mediated vanishes in its own result, leaving no trace behind.” When the list of commodities on the left in the general value-form is dissolved, the value-form at first glance takes the form of price identical to the simple value-form. This also completes the peculiar riddle of money. Making the reduction to the general form of value is the indispensable first step towards solving the riddle of money.
This, at any rate, is the manner in which I understand the distinction between the general value-form and the money-form. So I do not think that the significance of this distinction will be misunderstood if we do not consider the want of the commodity owner. It is true, of course, that by taking the want of the commodity owner into consideration we can understand that there is additional significance to the transition from the general form of value to money-form, and our understanding thus becomes more concrete. However, as I have repeatedly emphasized, approaching the issue from that perspective does not help us solve the task inherent to the theory of the value-form, and in fact hinders a solution by blurring the issue at hand. If we become too engrossed by the fact that the coat is posited as the equivalent of the linen because of the want of the linen owner, for instance, we would end up overlooking the fundamental riddle of the value-form which concerns exactly how it is possible for the use-value of the coat (in its given state) to become the value-form of the linen; and we would also be unable to clarify the “detour” of value-expression that is the key to solving this riddle. This demonstrates why Marx had to abstract from the want of the commodity owner in the theory of the value-form. – That is the gist of my view.
10. [The transcript was later published by Kawade Shobo in 1949 as a two-volume book entitled Shihon-ron kenkyu (Study of Das Kapital), and then issued in a single volume under the same title by Shiseido Shoten in 1958. – EMS]
11. Uno said that it is not possible to understand the value-form apart from the role played by the owner’s want, and in insisting on that position he provided those of us on the other side of the debate with material for reflection and a valuable opportunity to better formulate our ideas.
12. For the owner of the “different commodity,” the “use-value of a commodity” exists not only as such but also as the object he wants.
13. Marx, in a letter to Engels, derisively commented (parenthetically) on the following criticism made by the “critical genius of professorial political economy,” Karl Knies:
“Not even great perspicacity such as is at the command of Marx is able to solve the task of ‘reducing use values’ (the idiot forgets that the subject under discussion is ‘commodities’) i.e., vehicles for enjoyment, etc. to their opposite, to amounts of effort, to sacrifices etc. (The idiot believes that in the value-equation I wish to ‘reduce’ use-values to value.) That is to substitute a foreign element. The equation of disparate use values is only explicable by the reduction of the same to a common factor of use value. (Why not simply to – weight?).” (Marx, 1991, p. 252)
14. It is not only a single commodity (such as linen) that equates gold to itself, of course, but all of the other commodities that constitute the commodity world.
15. In this case, needless to say, we are dealing with “abstract human labor” in common solely between the labor that makes the linen and the labor that makes the coat.
16. Marx writes:
“Bailey’s reasoning is of the most superficial description. Its starting point is his concept of value. The value of the commodity is the expression of its value in a certain quantity of other values in use (the use-value of other commodities). ... [The real problem, how it is possible to express the value in exchange of A in the value in use of B does not even occur to him.]” (Marx, 1989a, p. 335)
17. “If we say that, as values, commodities are simply congealed quantities of human labor, our analysis reduces them to the abstraction ‘value,’ but does not give them a form of value distinct from their natural forms. It is otherwise in the value-relation of one commodity to another. The first commodity’s value character steps forward here through its own relationship with the second commodity.
“For example, through the coat qua value-thing being equated to the linen, the labor embedded in the coat is equated to the labor embedded in the linen. It is true that the tailoring which makes the coat is concrete labor of a different sort than the weaving which makes the linen. But by being equated to the weaving the tailoring is in fact reduced to what is actually equal between the two kinds of labor, which is the characteristic they have in common as human labor. Through this detour, weaving too, in so far as it weaves value, has nothing to distinguish it from tailoring, and, consequently, is abstract human labor. Only the different sorts of commodities as equivalents makes the specific character of value-creating labor apparent, by in fact reducing the different kinds of labor embedded in the different kinds of commodities to their general quality of being human labor in general. ...
“We see, then, that everything our analysis of the value of commodities previously told us is repeated by the linen itself, as soon as it interacts with another commodity, the coat. Only it reveals its thoughts in a language with which it alone is familiar, the language of commodities. In order to say that its own value has been created by labor in its abstract quality of being human labor, it says that the coat, in so far as it counts as its equal, i.e., in so far as it is value, consists of the same labor as it does itself. In order to say that the sublime objectivity which makes up its value differs from its starched body, it says that value has the appearance of a coat, and therefore that in so far as the linen itself is a value-thing, it and the coat are as alike as two peas.” (Marx, 1976a, pp. 142-144)
“If I say: The linen qua commodity is use-value and exchange-value, then this is the judgment concerning the nature of the commodity obtained through analysis. On the other hand, in the expression 20 yards of linen = 1 coat or 20 yards of linen is worth 1 coat, the linen itself says that it is (1) use-value (linen), (2) exchange-value differing from that use-value (a thing equal to a coat), and (3) a unity of both these differences, therefore a commodity.” (Marx, 1976b, p. 61)
18. We are not dealing with value-expression, in the strict sense of the term, without this condition of repeated exchange.
19. “The simple relative value-expression of a commodity in money – x commodity A = y money-commodity – is the price of this commodity. ... On the other hand, the developed relative expression of value, i.e., the endless row of relative value-expression, becomes the specific relative value-form of the money-commodity. But this row is now already given within the various commodity prices. If we read the price-list backwards, we can see the magnitude of the value of money indicated in every possible sort of commodity. This row also comes to have new significance. Since gold is money, already in its natural form, the general equivalent form, i.e., the form of general direct exchangeability, is rendered independent of these expressions of relative value. Therefore, the row of value expressions now at the same time, in addition to the magnitude of the value of gold, expresses the developed world of the material wealth, i.e., use-values, into which gold is directly convertible.” (Marx, 1983b, pp. 59-60)
“The commodity that figures as the general equivalent is ... excluded from the uniform and therefore from the general relative form of value of the commodity world. If the linen, or any commodity in the general equivalent form, were, at the same time, to share in the relative form of value, it would have to serve as its own equivalent. We should then have: 20 yards of linen = 20 yards of linen, a tautology in which neither value nor its magnitude is expressed. In order to express the relative value of the general equivalent, we must rather reverse form C. This equivalent has no relative form of value in common with other commodities; its value is, rather, expressed itself relatively in the infinite row of all other commodity-bodies. Thus, the expanded relative form of value, or form B, now appears as the specific relative form of value of the equivalent commodity.” (Marx, 1976a, p. 161)
“The expression of the value of a commodity in gold – x commodity A = y money commodity – is the money-form or price of the commodity. ... On the other hand, the expanded relative expression of value, the endless row of equations, has now become the specific relative form of value of the money commodity. This row, however, is now already socially given in the prices of the commodities. We only need to read the quotations of a price list backwards to find the magnitude of the value of money expressed in all possible commodities. A price, however, money does not have. This uniform relative form of value of the other commodities is not open to money, because money cannot be brought into relation with itself as its own equivalent.” (Marx, 1976a, p. 189)
Cf. Marx, 1976a, pp. 199 and 205.
20. In the case of C1 as well, as far as it is posited in the equivalent form for another commodity, a potentiality naturally taken into consideration by the producer of C1 from the outset, it comes to be the value-body for the other commodity and thus also has direct exchangeability vis-a-vis that commodity.
21. Cf. Marx, 1976a, pp. 144-146.
22. Uno seems to be confusing two things. As I noted above, it is a clear error to declare that the commodity in the equivalent form does not appear as an actual good; however, it is also a clear fact that the commodity in the equivalent form, within the value-relation in which it is posited as equivalent, i.e., as far as being the material for the value-expression of the commodity in the relative form of value, exists as something imagined in the mind. It can be thought that Uno links this fact to the observations he makes, but in so doing he is clearly mistaken. In fact, the opposite supposition should be made, as I note in the main text above.
23. “Let us consider transactions of exchange between linen-producer A and coat-producer B. Before the deal is struck, A says: 20 yards of linen are worth 2 coats (20 yards of linen = 2 coats), but B says: 1 coat is worth 22 yards of linen (1 coat = 22 yards of linen). Finally, after they have haggled for a long time, they come to agreement. A says: 20 yards of linen are worth 1 coat, and B says: 1 coat is worth 20 yards of linen. In this case, both linen and coat are situated at the same time in relative value-form and equivalent form. But (nota bene), the circumstance obtains for two different persons and in two different value-expressions, which appeared only at the same time. As far as A is concerned, his linen (because for him the initiative has its origin in his commodity) is situated in the relative value-form, and it is the commodity of the other person (the coat) on the other hand which is situated in equivalent form. It is the other way around from the standpoint of B. The same commodity thus never – not even in this case – possesses both forms at the same time in the same value-expression.” (Marx, 1976b, pp. 50-51)