During the month of March, Chiang troops refused to withdraw. A great number of Japanese troops had not yet been repatriated and several thousand more French troops arrived, consisting both of new soldiers, recruited in France, Germany and North Africa, and of those who had been arrested by the Japanese on March 9, 1945, and had just been released from custody. The number of foreign troops in the streets of Hanoi was greater than it had been during the first days of the revolution.
But the situation was now different from the time when the Chiang troops had entered the capital.
Before, our troops had been forced to move to the outskirts. If we ever wanted to carry a large number of rifles through the city, we had to put them in a cart and cover them with rush mats. Now units of our armed forces were able to march freely through the streets of Hanoi. Formerly the Vietnamese sentries guarding the government offices had been ordered to withdraw temporarily behind the fences; now they were able to stand on duty in front of the offices, rifle in hand, without being troubled by Chiang troops. Apart from the Chiang troops’ check points, there were also those of our own troops and joint Vietnamese-French ones. The city’s armed self-defence fighters were present everywhere, ready to defend their homes and fatherland and protect the people. By the Preliminary Agreement signed by our government and the French government, the Chiang army had to give our country de facto recognition as a sovereign state. They could no longer interfere in our security as in the past. They knew that they were about to pull out. As for the French, they were fully aware that Viet Nam was no longer their colony and they could no longer act as they had done before.
Although the situation was growing tense due to the presence of the French, the atmosphere had become more relaxed. It was true that the numbers of the enemy armies had increased, but nobody dared to deny our sovereignty.
Through the emissaries sent by him to discuss with us the question of taking over from the Chiang troops, Leclerc affirmed that he would honour his commitments and expressed his wish that the Vietnamese government would do the same. Once, during a meeting with me, he wanted to know the Vietnamese people’s attitude towards the French. I said to him:
“You and I are militarymen. Do you want me to speak frankly?
“Of course,” he replied.
“The French are just paying lip service to peace, while their actions are those of aggressors. That’s what the Vietnamese public think of them.”
On March 23, Leclerc left Hanoi.
The command of the French forces in northern Indochina was transferred to Valluy.
No major clashes had yet occurred between us and the French since they arrived in Hanoi. The Chiang troops were still there and their presence forced the French to act cautiously. We deemed it necessary to exploit the contradictions between Chiang Kai-shek and the French at that time in order to drive away the Chiang troops as soon as possible, and force the French to do what they had pledged.
All of a sudden, on March 27, some days after Leclerc’s departure from Hanoi, the French ordered a small detachment to break into the premises of our Finance Department. The French soldiers removed the Vietnamese flag and prevented the Vietnamese staff from entering. This office stood at a key crossroads on the road from the citadel to the old Governor General’s palace. We found out later that Saigon had instructed Valluy to occupy that building so that it could be used as the headquarters of the French High Commissioner when the latter arrived in Hanoi.
That was the first act of provocation.
Our officers in the Liaison Commission strongly protested against this action by the French and demanded an immediate investigation. I also met Valluy to lodge a protest against this violation of our sovereignty and demanded that the French should leave the place at once and return authority to guard it to the Vietnamese troops.
Throughout North Viet Nam a wave of indignation was mounting, and on March 29 a general strike was called. People closed shops and markets and refused to cooperate with the French. There was a prompt response from the Chinese nationals too. Shops, restaurants and tea-rooms closed except a few French owned ones in Trang Tien Street and Trieu Quang Phuc Street... But even there, the Vietnamese employees refused to work and gathered in the streets to talk. Posters calling for non-cooperation with the French were stuck up on the doors. The vans of the French commissariat, sent to purchase food, returned empty. Those French soldiers who had been given town leave, stood about on the pavements at a loss what to do. They realized that the Vietnamese people, who had been cold to them, were now showing outright hostility.
Our firm reaction caused the French to reconsider their policy and finally compelled them to return the Finance Office to us. The Vietnamese flag was hoisted again. The office personnel returned to work as usual. But the French still insisted on sharing guard duty and creating a joint body composed of twelve people from each side.
Our compatriots in the capital as well as the Chinese nationals refused to cooperate with the French until a communiqué was issued by the Hanoi Administrative Committee calling on everyone to return to work and to reopen their shops.
The delegates of our Armed Forces and of the French Army met to discuss the implementation of the military clauses of the March 6 Preliminary Agreement. General Salan and General Valluy represented the French side and Vu Hong Khanh and myself the Vietnamese, in our capacity as Vice Chairman and Chairman of the Military Commission. After many prolonged meetings the two sides reached a temporary agreement on April 3.
Under this agreement, the French troops who assumed the task of taking over should be of French nationality; non-French nationals should only be used as guards in the Japanese P.O.W. camps. This condition was aimed at excluding members of the Foreign Legion from the take-over troops. The Vietnamese troops in the take-over force were part of the Vietnamese armed forces. They had their own command, and were placed under the control of the General Staff of the Vietnamese Armed Forces receiving direct orders from the General Staff.
The French and Vietnamese troops should form a joint take-over force in Hanoi, Nam Dinh, Hue, Da Nang and some frontier towns. In other places such as Thai Binh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Dong Hoi, Quang Tri, the French should nominally take over from the Chiang troops and then hand over to the Vietnamese Armed Forces. Plans for future movements of Vietnamese and French take-over troops should be discussed and agreed upon by the Commands of both sides and be submitted to the Vietnamese Government at least 48 hours before execution. Military vehicles used to carry supplies for such troops were allowed to carry at most four armed men each, with the total number of armed men in any convoy not exceeding sixty.
A Vietnamese-French Central Liaison and Control Commission was set up in Hanoi to supervize the implementation of the Agreement. If necessary similar regional commissions should be set up.
The two sides agreed to send a ceasefire Commission to southern Trung Bo.
The discussions on the procedures for realizing a ceasefire in Nam Bo were very heated and lasted several sessions. Our delegates strongly protested against the illegal attacks launched by the French troops in Nam Bo. We insisted that a ceasefire commission should be sent to Nam Bo to implement Article Three of the Preliminary Agreement. Salan eluded our legitimate request, arguing that the ceasefire question was to be settled by the two governments. This argument was refuted by our delegates. Due to the negative attitude of the French side, the discussions did not achieve any results.
Clashes took place in many places where French troops were stationed. In Haiphong, on April 11, French troops blatantly occupied the premises of many offices. Our compatriots there immediately closed shops and markets, went on strike in protest against the French action and our delegates in the Vietnamese French Liaison and Control Commission made a strong representation. The French had to withdraw from the places they had illegally occupied. Some days later, while the people of Haiphong were gathering for a mass rally, the news came that the French had sent 500 troops to Hanoi without notifying us. Meanwhile a number of French troops had started to attack the Haiphong headquarters of the Democratic Party near Ha Ly bridge. The rally at once turned into a demonstration. Tens of thousands of people took to the streets in the rain, shouting angry slogans. The next day a general strike took place. The city was deserted. Shops closed. Long lines of empty buses and taxis were standing at the stations. There were no ferry boats to cross the river. Filled with apprehension the French sent armoured cars which took up position at the ends of the streets. Finally they had to apologize. At the end of April another clash took place between the French troops and our self-defence units. The French made attacks with tanks and armoured cars against us in Tran Hung Dao Street, Station Road and Ho Chi Minh Boulevard. Our self-defence units fought back fiercely. It was a long time before the Haiphong Vietnamese-French Liaison and Control Commission could restore order.
In the middle of April, a Vietnamese delegation headed by Comrade Hoang Quoc Viet, together with a number of French officers, flew to Nha Trang to enforce the ceasefire. Here the French had summoned former mandarins and village notables to work for them. Those who refused to cooperate with them were terrorised. Their scheme was to restore their protectorate over the areas they occupied in southern Trung Bo. Our delegation made repeated representations to the French authorities there. After seven days, as the discussions had failed to yield any results due to the obstinate attitude of the French side, our delegation left Nha Trang.