Within a week after the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, the Provisional Government issued a decree organizing general elections throughout the country to elect a National Assembly. Never before in the history of independence struggles had a decree on general elections been promulgated so soon after the seizure of power.
In the first place, this was an expression of the Party’s confidence in the patriotism and political consciousness of the people. Our countrymen had been subjected to nearly a century of colonial rule by the French. The general elections would be a wide far-reaching political campaign. Through exercising their sovereign power, the citizens would heighten their sense of responsibility to the country. In conditions of utter complexity and confusion, both in the internal and the external situation, a National Assembly formally elected by the people and a Government formally established along democratic principles would have the required prestige, capacity and strength to mobilize the moral and material forces of the people in national resistance and reconstruction and in relations with foreign countries.
The September 8 decree by the Provisional Government stipulated that the general elections would be held within two months. The French came back to the South. The war was spreading day by day. The French aggression was not the only major obstacle. In the North, the Nationalist Party and the Revolutionary Alliance frantically opposed the elections. They knew that elections conducted in a fair way could bring them no advantage.
The reactionary press demanded that the Provisional Government should resign at once. It claimed that the current administration was a Communist dictatorship. They tried by every means to incite a number of bourgeois elements, former mandarins, landlords and rich peasants to oppose us. They hoped that Chungking would behave more brutally toward us.
The Chiang militarists in Hanoi had realized that it would be impossible to use force to overthrow our central government. Tieu Van suggested to Uncle Ho that a government should be established with the participation of three forces: the Nationalist Party, the Revolutionary Alliance and the Viet Minh. He wanted a government in which his agents would be in majority.
We had repeatedly told the leaders of the Nationalist Party and the Revolutionary Alliance that it was essential to have general elections. That could meet the aspirations and the interests of the people. Candidates from various parties would be given all facilities to expound their political lines. We also stressed our desire to achieve unity with all forces to reconstruct the country and step up the resistance that was already taking place with greater and greater intensity in the South.
Toward the end of November, a joint meeting was held between various parties. The leaders of the Nationalist Party and the Revolutionary Alliance agreed to the following points: establishment of a united national government; merging of all armed forces; ending of all clashes; cessation of mutual attacks in the press.
However, only a few days later, the loudspeaker in front of the office of the “Viet Nam” newspaper in Quan Thanh Street was again clamouring day and night for the Provisional Government’s resignation. Perhaps their Chiang masters had pointed out to the reactionaries that what had been agreed on would not benefit them. Along with kidnappings, killings and extortions of money, they went on to organize demonstrations to foster disorder in the city.
The people of the Capital were very angry and requested the Government to mete out due punishment to the reactionaries. Letters were sent to the press denouncing their sabotage activities. Many self-defence units adopted resolutions in which they declared their readiness to punish the reactionaries when ordered to do so.
The bayonets of the Chiang troops and the guns of the Chiang gendarmes, who were present everywhere in the city, were the prop of the reactionaries. Because our people and armed forces tried hard to avoid all provocations, the reactionaries had so far not yet received any truly severe punishment.
In face of this situation, the Standing Bureau’s policy was as follows: we should avoid all provocations, but at the same time the masses should struggle against, expose, and isolate the reactionaries, and make the Chiang troops’ leaders realize that the more their agents engaged in sabotage activities, the more vigorously the people would oppose them.
Comrade Tran Quoc Hoan and myself discussed a plan aimed at implementing that policy and stopping the wrecking activities which were creating disorder in the city.
It was necessary to act cautiously. The demonstrators were always accompanied by armed men. They could rely on the Chiang troops, who arrogated to themselves the right to keep order in the city. We had to punish the disruptive elements, but we had absolutely to avoid provocations or any big clashes.
We saw that we could mobilize the self-defence forces together with members of patriotic organizations in this work. Self-defence fighters were to wear plain clothes and carry arms secretly when on mission. Struggles should take place away from positions of Chiang troops.
One self-defence team was charged with the first, trial skirmish.
That day, news came to the self-defence headquarters in Tran Hung Dao Street, that provocateurs had just gathered in Hang Dau Street. Three fighters were sent out, their weapons well hidden.
The provocateurs, some few dozen in number were in Hang Giay Street, holding forth through megaphones and distributing copies of their publication in front of Dong Xuan Market. Chiang sentries had been posted at both ends of the street.
A self-defence fighter elbowed his way in and asked a provocateur, “What paper is that?”
“Viet Nam”, the other answered.
“Viet Nam? Your paper should be named ’The Traitor’!” snapped the self-defence fighter, snatching the bundle of papers and throwing it to the ground.
The scuffle began. The people around immediately joined in the fight. Taken by surprise, the provocateurs fled in disorder. Some of them took refuge in private houses. Ona was pursued by a self-defence man who, with the help of the people in the house, found him hidden behind a door. Dragged out, he begged for mercy. The master of the house told him, “Stop your disruptive activities and slanders against the Government, the people won’t tolerate it.”
The Chiang troops on sentry duty fired a few shots in the air when the row broke out, but none of them got out of their sand-bagged positions.
The provocateurs were routed. The self-defence fighters, after fulfilling their mission, walked in a leisurely way back past the sentry posts as if they were mere passers-by.
This incident gave a measure of the reactionaries’ morale and the extent to which the Chiang troops might intervene. The latter, as a rule, reacted weakly to what they thought were spontaneous manifestations of the common people’s indignation at their agents.
A few days later, the reactionaries again held a big demonstration near Lake Hoan Kiem. This time, our force was more numerous and we had learnt of their plan sooner. But they too were prepared for clashes. They shot at one of our men. Their crime aroused great indignation: people rushed in in great numbers, using any thing which came to hand — even bicycle frames from a nearby shop — as a weapon to fight the reactionaries. The latter hid their guns, threw away their signs and megaphones and fled in disorder.
The demonstrations became rarer.
But the reactionaries intensified terrorist acts, attempting to kidnap or murder candidates to the elections, Communist party members, Viet Minh cadres, and members of their own organizations who showed sympathy with us or had broken away to join the revolutionary side.
The Chiang militarists, seeing the failure of their repeated proposals for a government reshuffle, began openly to exert greater pressure on us.
Late in November, a French national was shot dead in front of the Aviat factory. We started an investigation at once. Our Government had always advocated a humane and lenient policy toward the French nationals. In his letter to the French in Indochina in October, Uncle Ho made it clear that the French would be regarded as friends if they went about their business honestly and quietly.
The next day, the Chiang Army Command sent Uncle Ho a letter inviting him to its headquarters. Our comrades discussed whether he should go. He said, “Let me go, as they have invited me. For the time being, they won’t dare do anything against us.”
At nine in the morning, Uncle left in a car, accompanied by a few bodyguards. He came to Tieu Van’s. Chu Phuc Thanh had sent his men there to ask him to come to his office near Don Thuy hospital. When he arrived, Chiang officers asked the guards to stay outside and requested Uncle Ho to go upstairs and see Chu.
We at home were waiting. Lunch time came but there was no news of him. Although confident in his experience in dealing with complex situations we were anxious.
Some time after midday, a guard brought us a note from him. The letter was not sealed. It contained a few words in Chinese “Just go about your work. I’ve got things to do here”.
It was obvious that there was trouble. Uncle Ho knew that we were worried, so he had tried to inform us briefly of the situation. The comrade who brought the note said that Uncle Ho was still upstairs with Chu.
We discussed what to do and sent some people to Chu’s place to see what was happening.
A few moments later, one of the comrades with Uncle Ho was on the phone telling us to send a car for him. We were puzzled at the request and did not know what had happened to the car Uncle Ho had used.
Uncle Ho did not return till two o’clock in the afternoon. We all heaved a sigh of relief.
The incident was rather complicated. That morning, Chu Phuc Thanh slanderously accused one of our cadres of having shot the French national. The comrade in question was Son, one of our present cadres and a former member of the leadership of the Viet Nam Revolutionary Alliance back in Liu Chou (China). Chu’s men went so far as to affirm brazenly that the car used by the “murderer” had been none other than Uncle Ho’s.
Uncle Ho pointed out the absurdities contained in the accusation. The man they accused of the murder had been away on a mission to Nam Dinh for four days. Then Chu shifted to another subject: he blamed our government for “failure to ensure order and security”. Afterwards he shifted to the question of food supplies, complaining that we had not supplied him with all the rice he had requested. He kept bringing up problem after problem in order to create a tense atmosphere. But finally he ran out of arguments and had to bring the talk to an end. To save face, and also to maintain a tense situation, he said the car and its driver, Hao, should be kept in custody, to help find the murderer. In spite of our repeated protests, the driver was released only three months later, and the car never.