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Tony Cliff

Russia: A Marxist analysis

Chapter XIV:
Crisis on the labour front
(Part 1)

Introduction

Stalin’s regime has become, above all else, an impediment to the development of the most important productive force: the worker himself.

As we have seen elsewhere, while the industrial working class in Russia is larger than that in the United States, and the number of engineers employed in industry in the former is double that in the latter, total industrial output is only about ball. To what extent this low productivity is a result of mismanagement and blunders at the top, or of resistance of workers from below, of course cannot be estimated. The two aspects naturally cannot be divorced. Capitalism in general, and its bureaucratic state capitalist species in particular, is concerned with cutting costs and raising efficiency rather than with satisfying human needs. Its rationality is basically irrational, as it alienates the worker, turning him into a “thing, a manipulated object, instead of a subject who moulds his life according to his own desires. That is why workers sabotage production. The present chapter aims to bring the whole problem into perspective, to see the dynamics of labour relations, the way they are affected by technical changes, by changes in the organisation of production, and above all by the greater maturity, and self- reliance of the working class itself.

The retreat from open coercion

Peasants and artisans at the infancy of industrial capitalism showed a stubborn resistance to offering their services at all. As a result, the early factories were manned by temporary rather than permanent workers, and early factory records show a rapid turnover of the work force. The reasons for resistance were obvious. Poverty at home was p referable to poverty and hardship elsewhere. To break the workers’ resistance, penalties were commonly used. In One spinning factory the doors were locked during working hours; it was prohibited to drink water even when it was very hot; and fines were imposed for such misdemeanours as leaving a window open, being dirty, washing oneself during working time, whistling, putting the light out too soon or not soon enough, being found in the wrong place, and so on. [1]

Forced labour was so taken for granted that Jeremy Bentbani, the patriarch of reformers, could spend about twenty years of his busy life elaborating plans for an efficient prison-factory : a it five-storeyed panopticon, one-half of which would be a prison, the other half a factory. The panopticon, he said, would be a cure for laziness, a ‘mill for grinding rogues honest and idle man industrious’.” [2] [A]

One of the cruellest institutions to discipline the workers and make them amenable to factory life was the poorhouse.

In the absence of a ready and adaptable supply of labour, recruiting agents for the employers scoured the countryside for workhouse labour until the 1830s and even later ... And as the Parishes sought to lighten their burden by “workhouse relief”, while the employers used the system of poor relief to recruit pauper labour at lower wages, the distinction between work and punishment for poverty became blurred. [4]

However the system was self-defeating. The poorhouse and the forced labour associated with it led, if not to a decline in labour productivity, to stagnation.

Within a few years (of the establishment of the Speenhamland system of poor relief introduced in 1795), the productivity of labour began to sink to that of pauper labour, thus providing an added reason for employers not to raise wages above the scale. For once the intensity of labour, the care and efficiency with which it was performed, dropped below a definite level, it became indistinguishable from “boondoggling”, or the semblance of work maintained for the sake of appearance. [5]

After the workers were “broken” into the manufacturing system, the old system of coercion gave way to “freedom”. The worker became “free” in a dual sense, free from the means of production and free to sell his labour power.

The long history of the transition from forced “wage labour” to “free labour” that took place in the West, has been telescoped in dynamic Russian state capitalism into a generation.

After Stalin’s death, to begin with, many of the inmates of the forced labour camps were freed, and the lot of the rest was. greatly improved. Then the legal restrictions and penalties op wage earners were lightened considerably.

Let us deal with each in turn.

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Forced labour abandoned

One of the first acts of the new leadership after Stalin’s death was to proclaim a large-scale amnesty for people in prisons and labour camps. This amnesty of 27 March 1953 [6] covered the following categories of prisoners: (1) those sentenced to periods of up to 5 year’s imprisonment, (2) pregnant women or women with children up to ten years of ago irrespective of the length of their sentence, (3) minors up to the age of 18, (4) men over 55 and women over 50, and (5) persons with incurable diseases. All prisoners serving sentences of more than 5 years and not covered by these points, except those in prison for counter-revolutionary activities, misappropriation of “socialist property”, banditry and murder, had their sentences halved.

Some two years later, on September 17, 1955, a further amnesty was announced, this time affecting Soviet citizens who had been sentenced for collaboration with the German occupation forces. [7] Under the terms of the amnesty all those who had sentences of up to 10 years were freed, those with sentences over 10 years had them halved. (Populations of entire republics were included in the term “collaboration with the German occupation forces”. [B])

A third amnesty was proclaimed on November 7 1957 on the occasion, of the 40th anniversary of the October revolution. . This released all prisoners serving sentences of 3 years or less, including women with children up to the age of eight years old, pregnant women, men over 60, women over fifty-five and minors aged sixteen or under regardless of length of sentence. The sentence of all prisoners whose term was over three years was halved. This amnesty did not cover persons convicted of counter-revolutionary activities, armed robbery, premeditated murder, robbery, deliberate infliction of grievous bodily harm, malicious hooliganism, rape, large-scale misappropriation of “socialist property” and recidivists.

Although the 1957 amnesty covered much the same ground as the 1953 one, it was more restricted. Thus for example. it applied to minors up to 16, not 18, and to men and women aged 60 and 55 respectively, not 55 and 50, as in the earlier. The biggest difference, as far as the categories were concerned, was that the 1957 amnesty did not apply to people convicted of embezzlement, or military personnel, or people accused of misusing authority.

None of the three amnesties covered persons convicted of “counter-revolutionary” activities, i.e., of political crimes.

Altogether, by 1957, 70 per cent of the prisoners in forced labour camps bad been released and two-thirds of the camps had been closed, being replaced by “corrective labour colonies”. [8] The new feature of these colonies is that prisoners are committed to designated regions, but are not confined to a camp: they live at liberty, work for wages as free labourers, and may be visited by relatives.

The slave labourers themselves played quite an important part in accelerating the release of many of the inmates, and in changing the character of the camps. A few months after Stalin’s death a mass strike broke out at Vorkuta, which held halt a million prisoners. “On July 20 1953, 7,000 prisoners refused work in the first pit. On July 25th, all fifty were idle. The coal trains which had been crawling along in an unending chain had disappeared. Two hundred and fifty thousand prisoners – the whole active mining population and half the total inhabitants of Vorkuta – had joined the strike ... On August 1, 120 strike leaders were shot. And still the strike continued ...” It was still in full-scale progress when (the writer of these lines) left Vorkuta on August 4. [9]

There was more trouble at Vorkuta later. Two Germans who were in the same labour camp reported after their release:

Strike broke out in Vorkuta in the late summer of 1955. The authorities handled it like the first one – with concessions in one camp, with brutal force in another, anxious above all to divide the workers of different pits and camps. But the demand was everywhere the same – loyal execution of amnesty decrees of 1954. In fact, this last strike was successful beyond its official demands. For not only did the tribunals considerably speed up the releases of “two-thirders”: in September. just before we left, order was given to transfer entire huts of the other “politicals” to the “easier regime”, so far only granted to the “one-thirders”. [10]

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Legal restriction on wage earners relaxed

On 25 April, 1956, the Supreme Soviet issued a decree entitled On Abolishing Court Liabilities of Wage Earners and Salaried Workers for leaving Employment in Enterprises and Institutions without Permission and for Absence from Work without Valid Reason. [11] This put an end to the monstrous decree of 26 June 1940, under which a worker absent even a single day or more than 20 minutes late once or less that 20 minutes three times a month or four times in two successive months, was liable to compulsory labour without confinement for up to six months at his place of work and to a reduction in wages of up to 25 per cent. Under the 1940 decree no worker could leave his job unless he was either physically unfit, was accepted at an educational institution, or was given special permission by a higher authority. [C]

The decree of 25 April 1956, was therefore a major legal change for Russian workers.

It seems that even before this new decree, the 1940 decree had fallen into disuse since 1951, together with practically all pre-war and wartime penalties imposed on workers for violation of labour discipline. Thus one book on the Soviet labour code published in 1952 writes:

In connection with the strengthening of labour discipline in enterprises and institutions, the necessity for applying the legal measures provided for by pre-war and wartime legislation for certain types of infringement of labour discipline disappeared, and these measures were replaced by measures of comradely public pressure or disciplinary pressure. [12]

The same paragraph is repeated in the 1954 textbook of labour law. [13]

That 14 July 1951 marked a change in the law is really ascertained only by the fact that the 1956 decree explicitly revokes the previous decree, which was never published and whose exact provisions are still unknown. Its title we learn from the 1956 decree: On Substituting Disciplinary Measures and Public Influence for Court Liability of Wage Earners and Salaried Workers for Wilful Absence from Work, Except in Cases of Repeated and or Prolonged Absence. Thus as long ago as 1951 the necessity for greater leniency was bowed to.

It is possible the authorities did not publish the 1951 decree for fear that a sudden relaxation would give rise to a wave of absenteeism, slackness or labour turnover. A gradual change, they may have hoped. would avoid this.

To counteract the possible dangerous effects on labour discipline of the legal relaxation introduced by the 1956 decree, stricter management of the social insurance benefits was introduced in the same decree so as to make them dependent on length of service in one place. Article 6 establishes that workers and salaried employees leaving of their own accord lose their seniority and may receive benefits for temporary disability only after working at least 6 months at the new place of employment. Sickness benefit amounts to 100 per cent of the pay packet after the worker has been in one place more than 6 years. For 3 to 6 years’ service in the same place it is 80 per cent, for 2-3 years 60 per cent, and for 6 months to 2 years. 50 per cent.

Article 7 of the decree lists the penalties imposed by the Director of the enterprise on workers and employees absenting themselves without due cause. They are as follows: (1) Disciplinary action in accordance with the internal labour regulations of the enterprises where there are special statutes on discipline, in accordance with these statutes; (2) deprivation for three months of the right to a percentage increase for service, or a decrease of up to 25 per cent of a one-time bonus for length of service: (3) dismissal with a corresponding entry in the labour book to the effect that the employee has been dismissed for being absent without due cause. [D]

The decree of 25 April 1956; in addition to strengthening the economic pressure on the workers, also left intact a number of administrative measures specifically connected with the labour book and the internal passport. In the Labour Book are entered name, age education (elementary, secondary or higher), basic profession. information on work, transfers from one enterprise to another, reason for dismissal or discharge, details of awards, commendations and gratuities. Workers and employees are only to be engaged upon presentation of their Labour Books which are then surrendered into the management’s keeping for the period of their employment with the factory or establishment in question.

The fact that the Labour Book gives the prospective employer (as well as the authorities) the full record of job transfers as well as reasons for such transfers must certainly act as a restraint on the worker’s freedom of movement.

In addition to the Labour Book there is the Internal Passport. All Soviet citizens must have a passport issued by the police, and police permission must be requested for any change of residence, which is then entered in the document.

It is significant that on March 23, 1956, just one month before the repeal of the prohibition to change employment, the Moscow City Soviet passed a special decree to enforce strict observance of the passport regulations, and that further similar decrees were promulgated in April and August of 1958. Thus the worker who has left his job, especially if he did so against the wishes of the plant management, may meet with a refusal when he presents his passport to the police for permission to move elsewhere. [15]

There are two main reasons for the relaxation of legal penalties. First, the more complicated production is, the less effective is a penalty. The latter can prevent a worker from committing a certain misdemeanour, but it cannot make him do what he does not want. If the threat of penalty stops him from loafing or absenting himself, it cannot prevent him from pretending to be busy while not really working, or from damaging equipment, stealing supplies, etc. Secondly, the present Russian working class, modern and up-to-date, is less amenable to continuous rigorous discipline than the previous generation, and excessive pressure may well be self-defeating.

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Larger carrot

If the stick is not effective in achieving labour discipline in a complex economy with a modern, skilled, and cultured working class, the authorities must try the carrot. Where crude compulsion could not get the workers to use their abilities and intelligence to the fullest, or even cooperate willingly in production, would not an improvement in their conditions elicit this?

With this in mind, the authorities in the post-Stalin period introduced a number of changes in the interests of the workers as producers and consumers.

First, there was a reduction in the emphasis on the production of capital goods.

Consumer goods versus producer goods

From August 1953 to the summer a “New Course” was widely broadcast. This was “to achieve in two to three years a sudden increase in the production of supplies for the population”. On 8 August 1953, Prime Minister Malenkov announced the new consumer goods programme to the Supreme Soviet and said: “The Soviet people, and particularly those engaged in producing goods for the masses, has the right to demand from us durable, well-finished, high-class goods ... The Government and Central Committee consider it necessary ... to raise the targets for the production of goods for the masses very considerably. [16] To stress the importance of the “New Course” A.I. Mikoyan, a leading figure. in the Government and the Party, was appointed Minister of Internal Trade. He promptly set about greatly raising the targets and said that in the course of the next three years, 1954-56, the production of manufactured consumer goods would increase by almost 50 per cent. [17] He went on to give the following production targets [18]:

Mikoyan even suggested that food and consumer goods be imported. His advice was acted upon, the Malenkov government drawing on its gold reserves in order to finance large-scale imports of meat, butter, eggs, textiles and other consumer goods.

However, the honeymoon period for light industry was short-lived. In the framework of international economic and military competition, the subordination of consumption to accumulation is unavoidable. And indeed, as early as autumn, 1954, an offensive led by Khrushchev, Bulganin (then Minister of Defence) and Shepilov, was launched against the “pampering” of the consumers. and sought a return to a greater emphasis on heavy industry. On 23 September 1954, Khrushchev said openly in an interview with Professor Bernal, that heavy industry would continue to have priority in the Soviet economy. [19]

A Soviet delegation to China in October 1954, headed by Khrushchev, Bulganin and Mikoyan placed Soviet heavy industry under an added obligation by offering long term credit and assistance for China’s industrialisation by the delivery of factory equipment and the construction of whole factories.

On 25 January 1955, Khrushchev came out openly against the “New Course” at a Party Central Committee meeting. He said:

“Ill-starred theoreticians are trying to prove that at a certain stage of socialist building the development of heavy industry-so they allege-ceases to be the main task and that light industry can and must outstrip all other branches of industry. This is a profoundly mistaken reasoning, alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. This means nothing less than a slander of the Party, this is a Right-wing deviation, an expression of views hostile to Leninism wihch were at one time propagated by Rykov, Bukharin and their ilk.

The paramount task, to the solution of which the Party devotes all its efforts, has been and remains the strengthening of the might of the Soviet State and, consequently, the accelerated development of heavy industry, which forms the firm bhsis of the whole of the national economy and the indestructible strength of the country ... [20]

On 8 February Malenkov resigned as Prime Minister and Bulganin took his place.

A comparison of the relative shares of light and heavy industry shows that there has been no change since Stalin’s time.

Thus, the share of the light and food industries in state capital investment in industry was, during the First FYP (1928-1932) 16.0 per cent; 2nd FYP (1933-37), 17.5 per cent; 3rd FYP (the 3½ years 1938-41), 15.9 per cent; 4th FYP (1946-50), 12.3 percent; 5th FYP (1951-55), 9.6 per cent; 6th FYP (1956-60) – target – 9.8 per cent; Seven-Year Plan (1959-65) – target – 8.5-9 per cent. [21]

With regard to capital investment in consumer goods industries, the allocation scheme followed by Khrushchev still has some way to go before it reaches the “middle Stalin” period, when 17 per cent of all industrial investment went to the sector producing goods for consumption.

The share of consumer goods in industrial output continues to be depressed, and even to decline, though more slowly than under Stalin. [E] This is, after all, inevitable, as a decline beyond a certain point would threaten labour incentive and even the viability of the regime.

In absolute terms consumer goods output has improved. However, on the whole, the results have in many cases not reached the targets of even the First Five Year Plan as regards output per head of tile population. [23] [F]

Between 1932 – the last year of the First FYP – and 1961. the population rose by nearly 40 per cent, and the population of the towns, whose consumption standards everywhere in the world are much higher than of the countryside, about trebled.

Chapter 14 Index

Housing – no more the Cinderella?

Khrushchev’s policy on the housing question is very different to Stalin’s policy of gross neglect. Housing constituted the following percentages of fixed capital investment by the state:

First FYP (1928-32), 11.8 per cent; 2nd FYP (1933.37), 10.2 per cent; 3rd FYP (3½ years 1938-41), 12.7 per cent; 4th FYP (1946-50), 12.7 per cent; 5th FYP (1951-55), 15.5 pet cent; 6th ZFYP (1956-60, target), 20.2 per cent. [25]

The Seven-Year Plan (1959-65) visualises a notable increase in housing. It is intended that the 60 odd million square metres built in 1959 is to rise to 90 million square metres by 1965.

The present housing situation is so bad, however, that even if the Seven-Year Plan is fulfilled, the amount of space at the disposal of the average urban dweller will be below the officially established minimum of 9 sq. metres per person. Total urban housing amounted to 640 million sq.m. at the end of 1955. [26] This was to house a population of 84.6 million [27], allowing average per capita accommodation of 7.6 sq.m. in terms of “total living surface” (i.e. including corridors, toilets, etc.). Actual living space is generally considered to average 65 per cent of “total living surface”, thus allowing real average per capita accommodation of about 4.9 sq.m. In 1927-8 the average was 6.1 sq.m. [G]

In terms of dwelling units the expected increment in new urban construction during the Seven- Year Plan period is 15 million apartments. This seems an impressive figure until one looks at the projected addition of 12 million persons to the urban labour force. According to the noted Soviet economist V. Nemchinov, 55 per cent of the housing to be completed under the plan will be needed merely to maintain present housing standards, taking into account population growth and normal housing depreciation. [28]

The number of persons per room in towns was 2.60 in 1923, rose to 3.91 in 1940, declined to 3.47 in 1950 and again to 3.43 in 1950 and to 3.04 in 1960. [29]

The rate of recent house building in USSR has been the highest in the world in terms of the number of dwellings per thousand of population (in 1962, 11.7 dwellings per 100 inhabitants in Russia, as against 10.5 in Switzerland, and 10.1 in W. Germany). [30] But the dwellings were smaller, and, of greater importance, the backlog of neglect over more than a generation is the worst to be found in any industrial country. T. Sosnovy calculated that it would take USSR until 1980 to achieve an average living space of 7.3 sq.m. per person-which would still represent only 82 per cent of the Soviet minimum sanitary standard. [31] This is about half the actual Belgian standard, or a third of that of France or Sweden.

There seems little hope of a significant alleviation of present overcrowding, unavoidable sharing of kitchen and bathroom facilities by several families, and so on.

The authorities are therefore unable to offer housing as a substantial “carrot”. Consumer goods have also been shown to be inadequate for this purpose, and, of vital importance to a consideration of the standard of living, the supply of agricultural goods is even worse.

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Length of the working day and holidays

After the Twentieth Congress several measures were introduced reducing the hours of work till most workers were on a 46-hour week. At the Congress Khrushchev promised: (1) the gradual introduction, beginning in 1957, of a 40-hour working week in selected industries where conditions permitted, and (2) a shortening of the workday of most workers from 8 to 7 hours (Saturdays from 8 to 6 hours) during the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-60). In January 1951, it was reported that a 7-hour day was introduced in the mining industry in general and a 6-hour day for face workers. [32] The iron and steel industry was to be put on a 7-hour day from 1 September 1957. [33]

The 21st Party Congress (January 1959) pledged a standard 40- hour week, and a 35-hour week in unhealthy occupations, by no later than 1962. A statement jointly issued by the Central Committee of the Party, the Council of Ministers, and the central trade union organisation, announced a detailed time-schedule for this gradual extension of the. 7-hour day. [34]

The introduction of the 7-hour day is in reality a return to the decree of 2 January 1929. At that time the government ordered the workday to be reduced gradually to 7 hours by 1 October 1933 for all workers. However in 1940 the 8-hour workday was reintroduced.

A bonus rate must be paid for overtime, usually time-and-a-half for the 8th, 9th and 10th hours and double time for the 11th and subsequent hours. In the construction industry, the comparable overtime rates are time-and-a-quarter and time-and-a-half respectively. Double time is paid for work on the 6 statutory holidays (1 January, 1 and 2 May, 7 and 8 November and 5 December).

An alternative day off is usually given in place of Sunday or other regular rest day work. If this is not possible double time is paid. (In the construction industry time-and-a-half).

The length of holidays in Russia compares favourably with that prevailing in Western Europe, especially for workers in arduous or unhealthy occupations. For example, miners and steel workers are allowed up to four weeks’ holiday with pay. The following table shows the distribution of holidays for all wage and salary earners. [35]

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Pensions

Until 1956 the monthly old age pension for workers amounted to 50-240 rubles in towns and up to 180 rubles in rural areas. The State Pension Law of July 14, 1956 [36], raised the minimum to 300 rubles in towns and 270 rubles in rural areas.

This is an improvement. However, to keep in perspective the pension should be set against prices. Here are the official Soviet prices (in rubles) of a few representative commodities (per kilogram in the case of food, unless otherwise stated): chicken, 16.5; beef (stewing), 12; pork, 19.5; average fish, 11; butter, 28; milk, 2.2 per litre; eggs (10), 7.5; rye bread, 1.24; potatoes, 1; cabbage, 1.5-2; coffee, 40; wool-mixture blanket, 100+; cotton print dress, 200; bicycle, 450-600; motorcycle, 4,200; radio, 400; washing machine, 2,250; family divan, 1,300; toilet soap, (bar) 2.2; lipstick, 4.5-6. [37]

The minimum monthly pension of an urban worker can buy 18 kg. of chicken. In capitalist Britain a single person’s old-age pension can buy nearly 40 kg. a month. The corresponding figures for butter are 11 and 37 kg., for milk 137 and 274 litres, for eggs 400 and 900. The Russian’s monthly pension can buy ²/₅ of a man’s overcoat, the Englishman’s a whole one. The severe hardship suffered by Britain’s old-age pensioners is well-known to readers. How much tougher for the Russians, even after Khrushchev’s improvements. (Incidentally, kolkhoz members who make up nearly half the population of Russia have so far never had paid holidays, nor do they qualify for the main existing social services, including pensions, etc. The Twenty-Years’ Programme announced by the 22nd Congress of the CPSU [October 1961] promises to remedy this: “Sickness and temporary disability grants, and old age pensions, it says, “will be extended to kolkhoz members”.)

Minimum wage raised

On September 8 1956, the minimum wage or salary was raised to 300 rubles a month in town and workers settlements, and 270 rubles in rural areas. [38] Previously the corresponding figures were 200 and 180 rubles. It was estimated that some 6-8 million wage and salary earners benefited from the changc. [39] The decree on the 7-year plan provides for increasing the minimum wage to 400-450 rubles per month during 1959-62, and to 500-600 rubles during 1963-65. Things are not working out exactly as intended: in a speech to the Supreme Soviet in December 1963, the Chairman of Gosplan indicated that the minimum wage in 1965 will not reach 50-60 new rubles (500-600 old rubles) but only 40-45. The prices of goods shown above make clear how modest this is; it is far below the minimum old-age pension in Britain.

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The carrot not big enough

In spite of all the changes, living standards in Russia are still far below those in Western Europe and only marginally above those in Russia in 1928 (prior to the Plan era).

It was estimated that in 1937 real wages (including social services) were only 57.6 per cent of those in 1928. [40] They rose to some three-quarters of the 1928 level in 1952 [41], and have continued to rise since then. But as late as 1954 they had not yet regained the 1928 level. [42] The average real wage in Russia in 1958 was about a quarter of that in the United States. [43] Even compared with East European industrial workers, the Russian worker shows up badly. Thus it was estimated that the real wages of industrial workers in Poland in 1958 was 36 per cent higher than in Russia. in Czechoslovakia 47 per cent, and in East Germany 53 per cent higher. [44]

The promise of half a room per person in 1970 and comparable standards as regards other necessities cannot act as great incentives to workers.

Russia has become a modern industrial Country. But the great mass of her working people still continue to live under conditions characteristic of economically backward countries. This contradiction can and in all probability will be overcome. There is nothing inherent in the nature of state capitalism to prevent it. But even if the carrots offered the workers were much bigger, their effectiveness in making the workers willing to cooperate in production would be very small. A passage written about Western countries applies equally to Russia:

The main problem facing industry today is how to apply the carrot and stick theory in a situation where jobs are open to choice and dismissal merely means getting another job. More figuratively, how does one make the donkey work when carrots grow everywhere and no sticks are available? The modern factory manager is often genuinely perplexed at the apparent indiscipline, lack of intent, and even sabotage. which appear to surround him ... [45]

A major reason why bigger carrots do not lead to greater discipline is that the higher the real wages, the greater are workers’ demands. Reports in the Soviet press suggest a widespread feeling among workers that the supply of consumer goods is inadequate and could be better. [H] This inadequacy comes into relief when considered against the background of the tremendous successes of the regime.

The feeling of resentment was expressed clearly in a letter to the Young Communist League paper, Komsomolskaya Pravda:

so our scientists launched a rocket to the moon ... Do you think this preoccupation with sputniks and the cosmos in general is timely or ... perhaps premature? What I mean to say by this is that we still have plenty of terrestrial worries: there is a lack of living quarters; of children’s nurseries; commodities are expensive. I have no doubt this rocket cost so much everybody would be stupefied if they knew the amount.

Say to any labourer: “Look, Ivan, if we did not launch this rocket your Vovik could go to the kindergarten; a yard of cloth would cost not four notes but only one half, and you would be able to buy an electric iron in the store” – and I am sure, he would answer: “For God’s sake, do not launch these rockets!”

Rockets, rockets, rockets! – who needs them now! For the time being, to hell with the moon; let me put something better on my dinner table instead. Afterwards, certainly, let up play around with the moon.

Whether you will print this or not is your business; I doubt if you will risk it. But I am quite cool towards those sputniks and rockets. Premature. Useless. Greetings, Aleksei N. [46]

The frustrations born of the unsatisfied “revolution of rising expectations” are due not only to the lagging of people’s material standards behind the remarkable technical achievements of recent years, but also to the congealing of social inequality.

Chapter 14 (cont’d)

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Footnotes

A. Similarly in Germany prison labour was associated with the rise of capitalism. On this topic P. Reiwald (Die Gesellschaft und ihre Verbrecher, Zurich 1948, p.240) writes: Prison “started as a business enterprise”. “Prison as a punishment was – with one exception – unknown in earlier times.” The Middle Ages knew only punishment of the body or death. There was the debtors’ prison which, was used only for those who did not pay their debts. Prisons “first arose with the needs of rising capitalism”. (Ibid., p.241). Similarly G. Rusche and O. Kirchheimer (Punishment and Social Structure, New York 1939, p.42) said, “The houses of correction were establishments where work-shy people were forced to carry out their daily work in accordance with the requirements of industry ... The essence of the house of correction was the uniting of poorhouse, workhouse and penal institution. Its principal aim was to make the labour power of work-shy people socially useful. Thus the first houses of correction arose in the leading early industrial country: in the Netherlands, which suffered in the 17th century from a lack of labour power. The Prison of Spandau was built to stimulate Prussian. textile production. [3]

B. See Chapter XV.

C. See above.

D. As we shall. see later, the economic measures of the 1956 decree aimed at restricting labour turnover were not successful, and so the rules regarding seniority were changed. A decree issued by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on January 25, 1960, and approved by the Supreme Soviet on May 7, revised sick-pay benefits for job-holders as follows:

(1) ... workers and employees who have left their previous jobs of their own will are to be paid temporary disability benefits in all cases on a common basis, regardless of the amount of time they have worked at new jobs.

(2) ... workers and employees dismissed of their own will retain uninterrupted seniority if they begin (new) work within one month after the day of their dismissal. [14]

E. Division of gross output of industry into means of production and means of consumption (in percentage) [22]:

F. Compare the above figures regarding consumer goods with the output of heavy industry [24]:

G. See above.

H. Of course if not for the increasing supplies of clothing, television, etc., the Soviet worker would have even less urge to work.

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Notes

1. J.L. and B. Hammond, The Town Labourer, London 1925, pp.19-20.

2. D. Bell, The End of Ideology, New York 1961, p.228.

3. W. Hofmann, Die Arbeitsverfassung der Sowjetunion, Berlin 1956, p.270.

4. R. Bendix, Work and Authority in Industry, New York 1963. pp.41-2.

5. K. Polanyi, The Great Transformation, New York 1944, p.79.

6. Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, Moscow 1953, No.4.

7. ibid., No.19, 1956.

8. What was done to Strengthen Socialist Legality?, Partiinaya Zhizn, No.4, 1957.

9. B. Garland, a Berlin journalist who spent eight years in Russian labour camps, Russia’s Slaves Rebel, The Observer, 14 February 1954.

10. H. Koerner and B. Raeder, Slaves into Serfs, The Observer, 3 June 1956.

11. Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 8 May 1956.

12. N.G. Aleksandrov and A.E. Pasherstnik, Soviet Labour Law, Russian, Moscow 1952, p.101.

13. N.G. Aleksandrov, Soviet Labour Law, Russian, 1954, p.110.

14. Vedamosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR. No.4. 28 January 1960.

15. Biulleten Ispolnitelnova Komiteta Moskovskovo gorodskovo soveta, 1956, No.8, and 1958, No.11 and 19. In P. Barton, The Current Status of the Soviet Worker, Problems of Communism, July-August 1960.

16. Pravda, 9 August 1953.

17. Pravda, 28 October 1953.

18. ibid.

19. The interview was not published until three months later in Pravda of 24 December 1954.

20. Pravda, 26 January 1955.

21. Attainments during Forty Years of Soviet Power in Figures, Russian, Moscow, 1957, p.210; Pravda, 22 February 1956; Pravda, 15 January 1959.

22. National Economy of USSR 1956, op. cit.., p.43; Pravda, 22 January 1960; Pravda, 20 October 1959.

23. For targets of the First Five-Year Plan see above, p.34: for 1961 output; Soviet News, 31 January 1962.

24. ibid.

25. Attainments during Forty Years of Soviet Power in Figures, op. cit., p.210; Pravda, 22 February 1956.

26. National Economy of USSR 1956, op. cit., p.163.

27. ibid., p.26.

28. V. Nemchinov, Some Problems in the Planning of the National Economy, Kommunist, No.1, 1959.

29. T. Sosnovy, Town Planning and Housing, Survey, London, October 1961.

30. The Times, 6 November 1963.

31. Sosnovy, op. cit.

32. Pravda, 3 January 1957.

33. Moscow News, 29 June 1957.

34. Pravda, 20 September 1959

35. Vestnik Statistiki, No.10, 1958, Statistical Supplement.

36. Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1956, No.15, Article 313.

37. Lynn Turgeon, Levels of Living, Wages and Prices in the Soviet and United States Economies, Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies, Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, US Government Printing Office, Washington 1959, pp.335-36.

38. Pravda, 9 September 1956.

39. H. Schwartz in the New York Times, 10 September 1956

40. N. Jasny, Soviet Industrialization, 1928-1952, Chicago 1961, p.224.

41. ibid., p.419.

42. J.G. Chapman, Consumption, in A. Bergson and S. Kuznets, Economic Trends in the Soviet Union, Cambridge (Mass.) 1963, p.240.

43. ibid., p.252.

44. A. Zauberman, The CMEA: A Progress Report, Problems of Communism, July-August 1960.

45. J.A.C. Brown, The Social Psychology of Industry, London 1962, p.18.

46. Komsomolskaya Pravda, 11 July 1960.

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