The Swing Back - Tridib Chaudhuri
Encouraged by these encomiums and also carried over by the logic of the basically opportunist left-theoretic craze which infected the party from top to bottom about this time (Dec 1948 July August 1949) Ranadive moved step by step into a position which might some day come in manifest contradiction with the practical exigencies of the basic world-policy of international Stalinism and Soviet power-politics which had originally called for the initial left-turn in September 1947.
Under the circumstances of 1947-48 the demonstrative swing to the left was dictated to a great extent by practical necessities of rehabilitating the party in the confidence of the masses after the ignominious betrayals of the People's War Phase. It also became increasingly necessary, as we have seen, for enthusing the romantic leftism and millitancy of youthful petty-biourgeois cadres of the party and throw them at the head of 'mass-actions' to be launched against the Nehru Government. But driven by the logic of inherent self-contradiction of a basically reformist political strategy trying to wear a' left' mask and carry out certain adventurist' left' tactical manoeuvres for securing its own limited reformist objectives, the CPI leadership brought themselves to a dangerous theoretical and tactical ground which came into open contradiction with the fundamental postulates of Stalinist reformism. On the agrarian question, for example, in the background of the Congress Government's demagogic propaganda about the new legislative measures for the abolition of landlordism with compensation, it was supposed that in order to out-manoeuvre the Congress and to broad-base the party amongst the peasant masses especially amongst poor peasantry and the agricultural workers, the agrarian policy of the party might with advantage be recast in terms of 'class struggle' between the rural bourgeoisie and rural proletariat, between the rich peasantry or 'Kulaks' and the poor peasantry and agricultural workers. This would also enable the party to appear theoretically 'more left' than anybody else. Prompted by these motives the slogans of 'land-nationalisation' and 'redistribution of land' in favour of poor peasantry and landless agriculturists were eventually put forward boldly (PB Resolution— On the Agarian question, Dec. 1948-Jan. 1949) and nonchalantly, while veteran leaders of East-European People's Democracies including late Dimitrov even, hesitated to speak of land-nationalisaton and considered it having "no practical significance”for their countries (see LPPD No 1, 1949—Report to the CC.Plenum of the Bulgarian Workers Party)! Last but not the least, as a measure of self-defence in the partisan struggle for leadership within the party, against Joshi-ites and their allies, who wanted to take their stand on the comparatively moderate class-collaborationist formulations of People's Democracy put forward by Mao Tse-Tung in China, Ranadive also 'dared' come out with an open and vehement criticism of the reformism of Mao Tse-Tung and certain aspects of his theory and practice of People's Democracy in China which provided the ground work of the entire popular democratic outlook for Stalinism.1 He might have been encouraged in making this criticism by putting credit in speculations given currency by Anglo-American imperialist press about this time about Mao Tse-Tung turning out to be rebel like Tito eventually. He therefore sought to reinforce his own theoretical position vis-a-vis those of his rivals by swearing allegiance to the classics of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and contrasting Zhdanov's formulations about People's Democracy with those of the 'revisionist' Tito-Mao.
Here evidently Ranadive overshot his mark. For by the time Ranadive remembered his Marxism, the civil war in china was drawing to a close with the defeat and rout of the America backed KMT-Chiang clique and the People's Republic of China was proclaimed.Mao Tse-Tung and the Chinese CP. as well as the People's Republic of China with its specific economic, social and political policies based on collaboration between labour and capital and liberal agrarian reforms, were already far more powerful and tremendously important factors in moulding the world policies of Stalinism, and in the real-politik of Soviet power-rivalry vis-avis Anglo-America, than Ranadive could imagine in the excitement and fury of his underground partisan struggles for leadership against Joshiites, pro-joshiites and other political rivals. His theoretic left aberrations might in other circumstances have been ignored altogether or he might have been allowed sufficient time to retrace his steps and withdraw himself gradually from the precarious position to which he had been compelled unwillingly to betake himself. He seemed to have realised the enormity of his own indiscretions and tried to make humble amends at the earliest opportunity, as his lengthy telegram of congratulation to Mao, on the latter's election as the President of the People's Republic of China, amply testify.
But the emergence of the People's Republic of China and its tremendous significance as a new decisive factor in world politics altered the correlationship offerees in the international arena in such a way that compelled every power with some interest or stake in the Far East including the Government of India also, to reassess its own position and recast its policies accordingly. The intensification of Anglo-American inter-imperialist contradictions all'over the world, and in the Pacific and South East-Asian regions in particular, by this time, inevitably caused an open divergence in Anglo-American policies in the Far East. In consideration of its trading interests and other financial stakes in China, Britain was impelled to accord formal diplomatic recognition to the communist-led People's Republic of China in the face of decided American opposition, closely followed by India and other Commonwealth countries.2 The rift in the Anglo-American imperailist camp was widening. In opposition to American endeavours to prop up and politically reinforce its unchallenged naval and military sway over the Pacific by imposing puppet regimes in Korea, Japan, Philippines, Formosa and Indo China, and thursting prongs at the sametime, towards South East Asia— an exclusively British sphere of influence till recently, Britain tried to throw up its own defence-line by rallying together the support of Commonwealth powers. Both USA and Britain were faced with the challenge of sweeping upsurge of the revolutionary freedom movements of peoples of these regions. In the background of its own conflict of interests with the United States, British imperialism found it more advisable to combine a policy of brutal repression against liberation movements in its own domains like Malaya, with an understanding with the new governments that have actually come to power on the crest of popular upsurge, provided these governments agreed to play satellite role of colonial capitalist states, or at-least agree to accord reciprocal recognition to British finacial interests and refrain from making too drastic in-roads on the rights of trade and property of British nationals in the manner of assurance already given by popular democratic People's Republic of China.
The Nehru Government in India is faithfully following the foot-step of Britain in this respect uptil now. But it is also trying at the same time to find its own bearings independently—so far as it lies in its power—to reach to a possible line of modus vivendi by coming to terms with the new forces that were raising heads in neighbouring countries and save themselves from the sweeping catastrophe of war and revolution which threaten to envelop the capitalist world as a whole sooner or later. The Nehru Government has also been compelled in other words, to reassess its own position in the light of the altered correlationship of international forces since the emergence of the Chinese People's Republic and has correspondingly induced others to recast their evaluations about itself.
The last six months of 1949 has in effect set in motion forces in the international arena which makes earlier policy formulations of two years back entirely out of date, and indications are not wanting which go to show that international Stalinist movement has, in the background of the shifts that have inevitably occurred in world scene in recent past, felt the necessity of recasting its line and tactics with regard to India.
We have to bear this fact in mind particularly when we sit to consider the impending changes in the political line of the Communist party of India. This change has not come, we must remember firstly, because of any conscious revolt on the part of the leading party-cadres outside Polit-Bureau or conscious Marxist-Leninist elements of the rank-and-file against the alleged anti-Marxist, anti-Lenin-Stalin opportunist left deviations of Ranadive andvPolit-Bureau. The initiative or the signal for this change came from the above on behalf of the international leadership as represented by the Cominform Editorial Board.
Although the Cominform directives has in effect asked the CPI to overhaul its strategy and tactics completely and follow the China-way, it has to be noted that even the message of Mao Tse-Tung in his reply to Ranadive's congratulatory telegram that the Indian people must follow the China-way did not induce the Party-whether leadership or rank-and-file—to change or amend their line. It should also be remembered that the theoretic 'left-sectarian' and other 'deviations' which are now being discovered in the Ranadive line were perpetrated more than two years or at least one and half years back. But nobody whether Cominform leaderhship or the 'now-wise' leaders who are tearing the Ranadive line to pieces seemed to care that there were any deviations or contradictions at all. Nothing changes the Stalinist pattern of thought as we have seen earlier, without the cue of that change coming from the international centre of the Stalinist world-movement—the CPSU and Cominform etc. It will therefore be necessary to keep our eyes open to that aspect of the question as well, to the necessity that might have been felt by the leadership of the CPSU in the background of recent developments in Asia and the East, of changing its asessments about the situation in India. That will serve to explain both the Cominform directive to the CPI and the tirade against Ranadive's 'left' deviations.
1. Ranadive's revelations in this respect are interesting. "One of the legacies of the reformist period,' he wrote in his "Report on Although Mao Tse Tung's theory was originally propounded in 1940 and has held ground ever since in the international Stalinist movement including the CPI. Ranadive suddenly remembered his Marxism after 8 years, and pronounced Mao's sympathies for the development of Capitalism in China to be "reactionary” and "in contradiction to world understanding of the Communist Parties” (On Strategy and Tactics'; Communist No 4. 1949; PP-77-80) The CPI Polit-Bureau and the reconstituted Central Committee has since unconditionally withdrawn this criticism and apologised to MaoTse-Tung and Chinese Communist Party for it.
2. In point of time India's recognition of the PRC was announced earlier than that of Britain.