The Swing Back - Tridib Chaudhuri
In order to judge the correctness or otherwise of the charges brought against Ranadive on various counts of left-Sectarian deviation and the political significance of those charges it will be necessary to discuss at-length the theoretical implications of the new line which has been suggested to the CPI by the new Cominform directive.
This directive came in the form of a two column Editorial article in the Cominform weekly "For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy" (January 27, 1950) entitled 'Mighty Advance of the National Liberation Movement in the Colonial and Dependent Countries.! This article made a passing reference in two short paragraphs to the post-war political situation in India after the imposition of the Mountbatten Plan of 'sham independence'and the tasks confronting the Indian communists in that context. Apparently the article was nothing but an usual disquisition on the unprecedented sweep and scope of colonial national liberation movements in the post-war internatinal situation, and the conditions of its success in China and other Asian countries. It contained, as we have mentioned earlier, no adverse criticism of the line of policy which was being actually followed in this country by the CPI for the last two years under the leadership of Ranadive, or of the political thesis of the Calcutta Congress which provided the theoretical background for that line. But in spite of that these two short paragraphs were powerful enough to upset the entire Indian Communist Party and its organisational and political activities. It at once threw the CPI Polit-Bureau in confusion and unleashed a spate of 'self-critical' invectives and insults against the latter from all and sundry. After a few feeble attempts at self-justification and to salvage of some parts at least its 'hither-to-correct' revolutionary line of programme and also to save its political 'face', the Polit-Bureau itself was ultimately forced to come out in contrite self condemnation of all sorts 'deviations', 'criminal mistakes', and 'lapses' that were committed. In the background of the high-powered revelation vouched in these two paragraphs the whole party has now after two years come to realise that it was the fundamentally mistaken theoretical formulations of the Calcutta Thesis which lay at the root of these colossal tactical mistakes, deviations and lapses. The Calcutta Thesis which was adopted by the entire Party Congress with loud acclamations and 'hails' as the only correct revolutionary line, 'doing honour 'to the party rank-and-file and its leadership, is now thrown overboard at a stroke of the pen. It is certain that Ranadive and his Polit-Boreau who were responsible for leading the party these two and half years will also have to go. 'The day of reckoning' has come for Ranadive as P.C. Joshi had been crusing and hoping these two years. The two brief paragraphs of the Cominform Editorial were potent enough to bring about all this and close the two-year chapter in the history of the party with a bang. The Zhdanov speech to the inaugural Cominform Conference had served the notice for quit on Joshi. The Cominform Editorial serves a similar notice on Ranadive. Exit Randive! Enter Rajeswar Rao or someone else who will be pliable enough and adaptative enough to uphold the line of the Cominform directive and switch the party to the position now required by the international leadership. It goes without saying that all these are bound to be the effects of those two brief paragraphs of the Cominform Editorial.
But we are here more concerned with its Political implications.The two aforementioned paragraphs of the Comminform article which specifically refer to India and the tasks of Indian Communists read thus:
The mass movement of the peoples in colonies and semi colonies, the movement that unfolded after the war and developed into an armed struggle, forced the British imperialists to make a tactical retreat. A sham indepen- dence was bestowed on India. But the interests of British imperialism remain 'sacred and inviolable. The Mountbattens have departed but British imperialism remains, and octopus-like grips India in its bloody tentacles.
In these conditions the task of Indian Communists, drawing on the experience of national liberation movement in China and other countries, is naturally', to strengthen the alliance of the working class with all the peasantry, to fight for the introduction of urgently needed agrarian reform-on the basis of the common struggle for freedom and national independence of their country, against Anglo-American imperialists oppressing it and against the reactionary big bourgeoisie and the feudal princes collaborating with them-to unite all classes, parties, group and organisations willing to defend the national independence and freedom of India.
The reference to the necessity of "drawing on the experience of the national liberation movement in China" was specially significant in view of the bitter criticism made by Ranadivite Polit- Bureau against certain aspects of the line of policy of the Chinese Communist Party and Mao Tse-Tung. It was specifically stated earlier in the article that:
"The victory of the Chinese people is of enormous significance in strengthening the national liberation struggle in the colonial and dependent countries."
The view expressed by the Chinese Communist leader Liu ShaoChi in his opening speech to the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian countries in Peking (November, 1949) about conditions of the victory of the Chinese People's revolution and his statement that—
"The path taken by the Chinese people-is the path that should be taken by the people of many colonial and dependent countries in their struggle for national independence and people's democracy"-was quoted with special approval.1 The lessons of the experience of Chinese people's liberation struggle, which was led by the Communist Party of China and to which the attention of Indian communists were specially drawn, was summed up in the following terms:
The experience of the victorious national liberation struggle of the Chinese people teaches that the working class must unite with all classes, parties and group and organisations willing to fight the imperialists and their hirelings and to form a broad, nation-wide front, headed by the Working class and its vanguard, the Communist Party.
This provides the political premise on the basis of which the liberation struggle in India must proceed and the CPI was in effect asked to recast its tactics on that basis, on the Chinese pattern of a nation-wide united front with all classes, parties, groups and organisations willing to fight the imperialists and their hirelings. From the point of view of its fundamental political and theoretical implications it was an order to a return to the previous policy of United National Front which held the field from 1936 onwards with minor changes that were necessitated by the tactical retreat of British imperialism and the practical consequences of the Mountbatten Plan. And in order to make sure that CPI ranks do not misunderstand their day-to day tactical tasks, it was again reiterated with emphasis after the two above mentioned specific references to India that:
The Communist Parties, trade unions and all democratic organisations in the Colonial and dependent countries should rally the working people and all progressive forces, daily expose the colonising plans of foreign imperialists and the treacherous anti-popular role of reaction which collaborates with the imperialists.
Unity with all progressive democratic forces, rallying of the working sections of the people, peasants, workers, Lower- middle-classes, intellectuals along with people of all other classes (including the 'national bourgeoisie') who are against imperialism and the exposure of colonising plans of foreign imperialists and the role of native collaborators of imperialism-these were the two main political tasks which are set forth by the Cominform Centre to the CPI ranks beyond which it must not go for the present. This naturally meant in the first instance peremptory order to the party to cease the type of "militant mass-action" participated by students and other petty-bourgeois elements, which had earned compliments from Comrade Balabushevich, forthwith. The tactics of "combining the most elementary forms of struggle with the most advanced ones, "of wielding arms in the "Telengana way" and arguing workers' petitions before Industrial Tribunals in Bombay and Calcutta and trying to rush the masses by hurrah methods "to the point where they will echo the party's cry for ending the Government," the tactics of "general rising and seizure- of-power struggles" etc., must stop and give place to the struggle for unity and collaboration with all progressive democratic forces and political exposure of imperialists and their collaborators.
In the background of the emphasis laid on the tactics of unity with all progressive classes, parties, groups and organisations etc., and on the necessity of drawing upon the experiences of the successful national liberation movement in China under the leadership of Chinese Communists, the Cominform directive was also a clear pointer to the CPI for revising their policy of opposition to the national bourgeoisie as a whole and coming out openly for uniting them, excluding the big-bourgeoisie of course who were collaborating. As Mao Tse-tung had pointed out long before, the People's Democratic Revolution was an anti-imperialist and anti- feudal revolution only and definitely not an anti-capitalist one. Hence the Chinese Communists "were far from being unsympathetic to capitalism actually promoted its development." All Chinese Communist leaders from Mao. to Liu Shao-Chi and Li Li-San were emphatic that one of the major conditions for the success of Chinese Communist Party in establishing its leadership in the national liberation movement and carrying that movement to victory lay in the fact that "it found the correct policy in dealing with national bourgeoisie, differentiating the national bourgeoisie which opposed imperialism from the big bourgeoisie who have capitulated to imperialism, not opposing the national bourgeoisie as a national enemy, but treating it as an ally" (Li Li-San, Speech to TUCAA; Peking Nov. 1949). The CPI were now in effect told to do the same thing in India. This was the concrete meaning of the tactics of the 'broad nation-wide united front with all classes, parties' etc., which was suggested in the Cominform directive. Liberation Armies?
What was the view expressed in the Cominform Editorial- it may be asked here about armed struggles and the formation of Liberation Armies without the help of which the Chinese people's liberation movement could not certainly have achieved the phenomenal success which it has won and come to power? Were such struggles and the organisation of people's Liberation Armies to be undertaken in India also? No direct answer was given to the question with any special reference to India. It was only remarked as a bare statement of fact that:
A decisive condition for the victorious outcome of the national-liberation struggle is the formation, when the necessary internal conditions allow for it, of people's liberation armies under the leadership of Communist Party;
and
that the example of China, Viet Nam, Malaya and other countries show, armed struggle is now becoming the main form of struggle in many colonial and dependent countries.
But no mention was made of India amongst countries where internal conditions for the formation of National Liberation Armies and for the commencement of armed struggle against imperialists and their collaborators had been reached. China, Viet Nam, Malaya, South Korea, Philippines, Indonesia and even Burma were specifically mentioned.2
But absolutely no reference was made to the wielding of arms in Telengana, Kakdwip and Hajong areas in this country of which the CPI Pout-Bureau boasted so much. Balabushevich had called the Telengana armed struggle, "the harbinger of Indian agrarian revolution and 'the most important content of the national liberation struggle' which was being led by the CPI. But not so the Cominform Editorial Board.
In their view the main tasks before Indian Communists now were the following:—
(1) To regard the Indian struggle mainly in the light of a colonial national liberation struggle against foreign imperailism and native feudalism, and the treacherous big-bourgeois collaborators who had joined hands with imperialism, and to revise their tactics entirely in that light;
(2) To forge a united-front with all classes, parties, groups and organisation against imperialists and their collaborators.
(3) To distinguish the 'national bourgeoisie' who were opposed to imperialism from the collaborationist big-bourgeoisie, and to treat them as an ally and bring them inside the united front.
(4) To expose the colonising plans of the ithperialsts and their collaborators politically, and again to unite with everybody who are willing to defend the national independence and freedom of India.
These were the immediate tasks which had to be carried out first. It is evident that in the opinion of the Cominform Editorial Board the necessary internal conditions for the commencement of the armed form of struggle or the formation of People's Liberation Armies would not be fulfilled till these initial tasks were carried out. Aimed struggle was certainly a decisive condition for the victory of the national liberation struggles. But the internal political conditions and the correlation of forces in this country had not as yet advanced to that point of maturity so as to enable the movement to take the character of an armed struggle ('general uprising', 'wielding of arms', the 'Telengana way' etc. in terms of the Ranadivite Pout-Bureau) or "to allow" the formation of Liberation Armies.
These are in short the salient points of the directive of the Cominform Editorial. So far its basic political content or its emphasis on the national liberationist democratic character of the present phase of mass-struggle in India was concerned, it cannot be said however that any basic change ,was involved in the Cominform directive from the general stand-point of the Calcutta Thesis of the CPI, or from that ofthe inaugural address ofZhdanov to the Cominform Conference in September, 1947. The essential political content ofthe programme of Democratic Front as outlined by the Second Congress of the CPI in 1948, as well as that of the Zhdanov speech was principally based, like the new Cominforni directive, on the strategy of a democratic anti-imperialist national liberation struggle against Anglo-American imperialism, and not on that of Socialist revolution or on class and mass actions under the leadership of the proletariat for the overthrow of capitalism. The main enemy was Anglo-American imperialism and not the imperialist capitalist system as such or the bourgeois order of the society.
Zhdanov had made it unmistakably clear in his inaugural Cominform speech in 1947 that even in highly advanced capitalist and metropolitan countries like Great Britain, France, and Italy- resistance to imperialism (esp. America) for the defence of national independence and sovereignty were to be the main political planks of the mnovement to be organised and led by the Communists. The Communist Parties of these countries were therefore directed by Zhdanov—
To unite their efforts on the basis of a common anti- imperialist and democratic platform, and to gather around them all the democratic and patriotic forces of the people.
He further said—
Communists must support, all the really patriotic elements who do not want their countries to be imposed upon, who want to resist enthralment to foreign capital and to uphold their national sovereignty. The Communists must be the leaders in enlisting all anti- fascist and freedom loving elements in the struggle against the new American expansionist plans for enslavement of Europe. (mc International Situation pp. 46-47)
National honour, independence, lasting peace and popular democracy-these were to be the main slogans of the day and communists everywhere (and those of France. Italy and Great Britain in particular) were enjoined to "act as courageous sentinels of enduring peace, popular democracy, of the national sovereignty, liberty and independence of their countries." and "to take the lead of all the forces prepared to uphold national honour and independence." 3
There was no reference to Socialist revolution, class struggle or overthrow of capitalism anywhere in this lengthy peroration of the CPSU spokesman before the Comminform, except a passing one to the possibility of "paving the way for entry on to the path of Socialist development," in the case of the new democratic states of Eastern Europe where the process of popular democratic revolution was more or less complete. There is hardly any scope of misunderstanding here. The appropriate time for preparing the ground for a transition to socialism will come only after the establishment of popular democracy, so that the immediate historic objective of the entire world movement from West Europe to East Asia would remain confined for the present, within the political limits and class alliances of a national democratic struggle against American or Anglo-American imperialism.
The Cominform Editorial only reiterated the same thing with reference to India-with particular emphasis on the necessity of drawing upon and closely following the experiences of the Chinese Liberation movement as led by the CP. China.
1. Liu Shao Chi is one of the most important members of the Polit-Bureau of the Chinese CP and is regarded as the most important theoretician of the party after Mao Tse-Tung himself and the ablest exponent of Mao Tse-Ttmg's theory of People's Democracy. The entire Cominform Editorial article echoes Liu Shao-Chi's views and its operative parts which we quoted above are literal word for word repetitions of certain portions of the summary he gave in his speech to the TUCAA, of experiences of the Chinese liberation movement and of the conditions of victory.
2. Liu Shao Chi's remarks in this connection are rather significant. When speaking of armed struggles he also mentioned these countries only, excluding India specifically and said that-"the fighters of national liberation wars in Viet Nam, Burma, Indonesia, Malaya and Philippines are acting entirely correctly." But he kept absolutely mum about "armed liberation struggles" and "uprisings" organised by the CPI He also emphasised the imperative necessity of forming People's Liberation Armies "whenever and wherever possible." It is evident that armed struggle must not have, in his view, seemed possible in India at the present stage of the movement. The implications are clear : any attempt that might have been made in India to give the movement the character of armed uprising and seizure-of-power struggles must have been entirely incorrect.
3. These were the concluding tines of Zhdanov's speech as the Delegate and spokesman of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Cominform Conference containing the formulation of "the special historical task" that devolves upon the Communists of West Europe in the context of the "new post-war alignment of political forces of the formation of the two camps; the impnialist anti-democratic camp led by USA and Great Britain, and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp led by the USSR and based on the USSR and the People's Democracies.' The Cominform declaration reproduced these passages of the CPSU Delegate's address literally, which thus became the fundamental Thesis and Platform of Action for the entire Cominferm and for the Stalinist Communists through- out the world (See: Report of the Frist Cominform Conference; Warsaw, September 1947; and the Decimation of the, Communist Information Bureau as published in "Lasting Peace" No. I. 1947).