The Swing Back - Tridib Chaudhuri
One of the impressions that is being sought to be created deliberately by Stalinist adherents since the purport of the new cominform directive on Indian Communists became known in this country, is that the political and tactical line which the CPI had been following under Ranadive's leadership since the Calcutta Congress, was as a matter of fact, nothing but a very unrealistic and dogmatic 'ultra-left' line, indistinguishable from that infantile left-comunism, which Lenin condemned so vehemently years ago. In its recoil from the right-reformism of Joshi, the Calcutta Thesis had simply pushed the Party to the other extreme—it is said—in the opposite direction towards left-sectarianism, and eventually led it step by step towards an anti-Marxist Trotskyist position. As such the Ranadive line merited out-right rejection long ago. The CPI Polit-Bureau itself has also come out in a penitent 'self-critical' humility owning up all sorts of 'left'-deviationist mistakes and crimes including Trotskyism. The leading cadres of the party outside Pout-Bureau are similarly engaged in hurling a chorus of accusations against it in the same strain, for having misled the party during these two years and committing all sorts of 'left' and 'ultra-left' sins.
In the background of the patent futility of the senseless adventurism and the so-called 'militant mass-actions' organised by the Communist Party in these two years, and their disastrous consequences both for the party itself, and for the development of a vigorous and broad-based mass-movement against Congress- capitalist reaction, there will be a general disposition in Marxist and leftist political circles to look with a certain amount of sympathy and approval, upon this criticism of the so-called ultra leftism of Ranadive at the instance of the Cominform—the highest authoritative Centre of the international Communist movement today.1 This would be comparable to the general reaction and indignation against the crass reformism of joshi in the past; and the acclamation by certain leftist circles in that back-ground, of the rejection of Joshi-line by the Calcutta Congress of the CPI.
Marxism-Leninism always draws a sharp dividing-line between opportunist right-reformism on the one hand and dogmatic ultra-leftism on the other, both of which often outwardly masquerade as revolutionary phrasemongering. The correct revolutionary strategy and tactics lie along this dividing line and Marxist-Leninists always try through lessons derived from the hard school of practical political experience in the ups and downs of mass-struggles, and also from basic scientific teachings of Marxism to avoid any deviation from this line either to the 'right' or to the 'left.' It is therefore being constantly preached by Stalinist adherents rather assiduously that the new Cominform directive is "a brilliant contribution" to the understanding of the tasks of the present phase of national liberation struggle in India "based upon the correct application of Lenin's and Stalin's teachings." It will undoubtedly help to pull back the Indian communists from the mistakes and misconceived ultra-left policies of the last two and half-years, and enable the CP to take up the correct Marxist- Leninist stand midway between the right-reformism of Joshi and the left-sectarianism of Ranadive, both of which are equally dangerous for the proper development of the revolutionary working class movement.
If Joshi had dragged the party far too right in the direction of brazen-faced reformist collaboration with imperialism and the national bourgeoisie in the name of People's War and United Front, Ranadive committed—it is argued—the opposite sort of mistake. In his eagerness to combat the reformism of Joshi he had swung the Party far to the left towards dogmatic left-sectarianism, which is as much a deviation from the correct revolutionary line as right —reformism and is no less harmful. The Cominform Editorial article has therefore come as a timely (!) and much needed warning for the entire party. It will certainly enable leading party cadres and the CPI rank-and-file to fight both against right-reformist and ultra- left mistakes of the past, both against Joshi-ite and Ranadivite deviations, and find their way back to the correct revolutionary strategy and tactics in the true spirit of Marxism.
This undue emphasis on the propaganda against the so-called left deviations of Ranadive and the present vehemence of its condemnation may however actually prove nothing but a prelude to a swing back to a subtler form of rightism and a new variety of reformmist class collaborationist line of policy, in the guise of correcting past left-sectarian mistakes—If there is to be an about face towards the right again and a return to open class-collaborationist alliance with certain sections of the Indian bourgeoisie against others, who are in power for the present, or political pressure brought on the present bourgeois ruling circles for a change of governmental policy by utilising the opposition of their discontented and disgruntled rivals, then the present line which was so long confined merely to a policy of barren opposition to the government of the day, must be condemned and thrown overboard as 'ultra-left.' If the sphere of political operation of the party has to be transferred from the arena of opposition to the arena of power-power under the existing order of society and without disturbing its basic class-structure in any way—the denouncement and rejection of the previous policy of unleashing "militant mass actions" and organising "revolutionary onslaughts" against the Nehru Government appears inevitable. If it is felt that the support of considerable sections of the national bourgeoisie could be pressed into service with profit for bringing the party to the forefront again and inducing the Government of the day to reckon with its views, then some theoretical plea must be discovered for an alliance with them. All indirect or direct references to fundamental social change; or to the imminence of a Socialist revolution and the overthrow of capitalism must in that case also be eschewed demonstratively. The theoretical ground for this could be most conveniently cleared with an apparent air of plausibility about it, by rejecting the existing tactical line of the party as left deviationist and fundamentally misconceived.
A relative shift to the right from a tactical line which has somehow moved far "too left" is always justifiable from the point of view of Marxism and commonsense [Marxism is, as a matter of fact, nothing but concentrated revolutionary realism and common sense]. If the Ranadive line and the Calcutta Thesis can be proved to have been really ultra-left then its summary rejection and the subsequent adoption of an open class-collaborationist policy would be provided with the required ideological and theoretical sanction in the minds of the rank-and-file. But this new variant of right-reformism could stilt be distinguished from old "Joshi-ite right-reformism" by calling it the scientific Lenin- Stalin Bolshevik line, which is opposed both to deviations on the left as well as those on the right. It would thus be still possible to characterise the new right about-turn as a genuine 'left' stand, and a correct revolutionary Marxist-Leninist stand at that, sharply demarcated from the Ranadivite 'ultra-left' but formally distinguished at the same time from the officially condemned, tarred and feathered Joshi-ite ultra-right. That is the genesis of the legend of Ranadive's 'ultra-leftism.'
In other words the CPI is now required by the international Stalinist leadership—the CPSU and the Cominforin i.e., —for reasons of their own, to make a turn to the right again. But the fact has to be kept carefully concealed from the view of the average rank-and-file workers of the party. They must continue to believe that they are still in the 'left,' but not the wrong kind left, the ultra-left. If the party is again apparently moving to the right, that is nothing but a relative shift-back from a left-deviationist line of policy to the correct revolutionary Marxist-Leninist policy, holding delicate balance between left-sectarianism and right-reformism. It must not be confused with Joshi's reformism which even Joshi himself has condemned unreservedly. It is not to be a back-to- Joshi policy. The Cominform article actually helps the CPI, it is contended, to fight both right-reformism and ultra-leftism, and in the immediate context serves to correct Ranadive's left-sectarian mistakes especially. As always, the party is again enabled to find its way back to the 'correct' 'revolutionary' strategy and tactics. When it is a question of having committed a mistake it is always a Browder, a Tito, a Joshi or Nosaka, a Furubotten and a Sharkey on the right, or a Nakanishi Shiga, Miyamoto and Ranadive on the left, who are primarily responsible.2 The international leadership-the CPSU and its mouthpiece the Cominform, are of course always correct, always infallible and above reproach.
The legend of the so-called "leftism" or "ultra-leftism" of Ranadive needs to be examined therefore a bit more closely. Was the Ranadive line as formulated by the Calcutta Thesis and its subsequent elaborations by the CPI Polit-Bureau, politically a 'left' line at all? How much 'left' was Ranadive's ultra-leftism really? Leftism as the expression of a defined political and ideological trend in the working class emancipation movement must be sharply distinguised from that type of adventurist terrorist armed actions totally divorced from any broad-based political support from the masses, which was indulged in by the CPI during the course of past two years. As a matter of fact these are rather the expressions of a basic political reformism and opportunism which shrinks, in the words of Lenin from "the persistent, patient and sustained work of educating the masses in the spirit of class- consciousness even in the most un-inspiring humdrum days of bourgeois-constitutional Shipov bliss." It relies in the main on sharp shooting pressure tactics to gain its immediate, but very limited, political objectives against the government of the day without undermining it fundamentally.
Adventurism in nine cases out of ten is nothing but the direct outcome of this reformism and an anti-working class, anti- people political opportunism. It has nothing in common with 'leftism' on the political and ideological plane which aims at fundamental social and political transformation by political mass- action and the organised strength of the masses under the leadership of the working class.
In the recent self-critical documents of the CPI Polit-Bureau, as well as in the adverse criticism of the Polit-Bureau by ex- Ranadivites outside, who have now suddenly become very much aware of the 'criminal' lapses of the Ranadive line, there is a general tendency to explain away the adventurism of the past two years by reference to the so-called "leftism" or 'ultra-leftism" of the Calcutta Thesis and that of the subsequent theoretical formula- tions on 'Strategy and Tactics etc., by the Polit-Bureau. "Any one who commits mistakes regarding the nature of revolution is bound to commit mistakes regarding concrete revolutionary tasks"—it has been said in the one of these self-critical documents (Draft Statement prepared by the CPI. PB for the new Central Committee)—as if the tactics of acid-bulb throwing, tram-burning and armed raids on isolated police out-posts in outlying rural areas, were the results of Ranadive's misconceptions as to the nature of the Indian Revolution! Because Ranadive failed to realise that India is still 'a colonial country' under foreign imperialist domination (so the Stalinists contend, since the publication of the Cominforni Editorial), and that the new phase of Indian revolution is still mainly an anti-feudal anti-imperialist bourgeois-democratic revolution, and not an anti-capitalist Socialist one, he became confused himself and misled the party to these adventurist tactics! It is sometimes also argued that Ranadivite adventurism was due to his misunderstandings about the present tactical stage of the Indian revolution and mistaking it for the stage of seizure of power, corresponding to something like the intervening months between February and October 1917 in Russia—the midway phase between the February and October Revolutions3 while as a matter of fact, seizure of power—a Socialist seizure of power for the matter of that, was far off as yet—as if a Socialist seizure of power is ever effected by these tactics!
Both Ranadive himself and his recent critics must have known however—and there is no reason to suppose that they were unacquainted with the fact—that even while actually standing midway between February and October, and urging the Bolshevik Party to the slogan of "All Power to the Soviets" in terms of a Socialist seizure-of-power, Lenin defined the main task of the Bolsheviks as one of "patiently explaining" before the masses the class character of the bourgeois government and the class significance of the problems that confronted them. Reporting on the political situation of Russia in May, 1917 he emphasised clearly that:
To speak of civil war before people have come to realise the need for it, is undoubtedly to fall in Blanquism. We are for a civil war aged by a class conscious proletariat at the head of the people. Only he can be over thrown who is known to the people as a despot The masses are influenced by tradition and deception. They still lack political experience. Therefore our task is patient explaining...
"To speak of violence now" said Lenin then, beyond any scope of misunderstanding, "is pure nonsense", and continued further:
The masses of our population have never been Socialists. They have not the slightest conception of Socialism, they are just awakening to political life. But their class consciousness is growing and broadening with extraordinary rapidity.
One must know how... to approach them with explanations.
One must know how to look from the Marxist standpoint which says that the imperialist war would turn into civil war, as a result of objective conditions not as a result of subjective desires.
He admonished the Bolsheviks against regarding the task of "patiently explaining" as nothing but a bloodless, colourless, humdrum work and said :
This may appear to be 'nothing more' than mere propaganda work, but in reality it is extremely revolutionary practical work; for there is no advance for a revolution that has come to a standstill, that has choked itself with phrases, not because of external circumstances, not because of the violence of the bourgeosie, but because of naive trust of the masses. Tasks of the Proletariat, Selected Works, pp 30-31.
And here follows the concrete programme which Lenin set forth before his party:
Only by combating this naive trust (and one can combat it only ideologically, by comradely persuasion, by pointing to the lessons of experience can we escape the prevailing orgy of phrase-mongering and make real progress in stimulating class consciousness both of the proletariat and of the masses in general, as well as stimulating determined initiative in various localities... for the realisation, development and consolidation of their democratic liberties.
No comment is required on these clear-cut and unambiguous directives.
If Lenin could say this after the formation of the Soviets and the overthrow of the Czar, under conditions when side by side with Govemement of the bourgeoisie emerged the 'dual power of the Workers' Pesants' and Soldiers' Soviets ( a concrete realisation of the Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat and Peasantry), when elemental mass-forces were on the move, consciously intervening in the affairs of the state, it is more than obvious that time for any form of violent or armed action, (not to speak of the type of adventurist-terroristic armed action completely divorced from aiy conceivable contact with the political consciousness of the masses, in which the CPI indulged), was far remote from the conditions of our country. By no stretch of imagination it could be conceived as called for by the objective historic situation or the level of mass-consciousness obtaining in India any time after 1948. Revolutionary Marxism certainly does not rule out violence, force or armed action as a method of social and political transformation. But it is always violence consciously employed by the armed people, themselves, on behalf of the overwhelming majority of the people against the minority of capitalists and other exploiters who monopolise power, with a clearly defined political objective in view viz; the overthrow of the rule of these capitalists and exploiters and the establishment, in its place, of the rule of the toiling people headed by working class "for civil war, but for a civil war waged by a class conscious proletariat"—that is the irrevocably fundamental standpoint of Marxism-Leninism about seizure-of-power struggles.
There is no reason to suppose, as we have already indicated, that Ranadive or the CPI leadership were unacquainted with these cardinal principles of armed action or seizure-of-power struggles as envisaged by Marxism-Leninism. The type of armed action to which the CPI resorted in the name of seizure-of-power struggles were so much removed from any living contact with the actual needs or consciousness of the masses (except to a certain extent in Telengana in Hyderabad, the Kakdwip village in the Sundarban areas of West Bengal and the tribal Hajong area in the Garo Hills all of which lie in very inaccessible and outlying parts of the country and are separated by hundreds and thousands of miles from each other), were so frivolously and flimsily conceived and the inadequateness of the preparation of the mass-front organisations and the party for withstanding the recoil of these actions were so very marked—that even a very ultra-left 'revolutionary' doctrinaire like a Ranadive, or a Bhowani Sen, could not be supposed as entertaining the least illusion about these actions developing, into, or ever leading to the overthrow of the existing government and to seizure of power by any far chance. As a matter of fact the Polit-Bureau of the CPI could not keep their eyes altogether shut to the hard reality that in the major part of this vast country the state of organisation and political consciousness of the people had not yet reached the stage of armed seizure-of-power struggles. It could not be otherwise in a colonial country where the national bourgeoisie had just come to power on the crest a national mass-upsurge by utilising their vantage position in the leadership of the national mass-movement to drive a bargaining deal with foreign imperialism behind the backs of the masses.
The level of consciousness and organisation of the masses proved absolutely inadequate, it must not be forgetten, to prevent the ignominious compromise between imperialism and the native bourgeoisie against the vital interests of the nation and the toiling people. The minds of the masses were still steeped deep in fond illusions about the very same bourgeois national leaders who had come to power by betraying them. The process of disillusionment had of-course begun on the morrow of the "transfer of power"; and new mass-movements of profound historical significance had started. The masses had begun to awake to the new consciousness of their own independent class interests and class demands. They had also naturally begun to judge their 'trusted national leaders' and their national government in terms of these demands. But nevertheless in 1948-49, it was no more than the first beginnings of the new stirring amongst the common people and the opening out of a new phase of mass-struggles which would henceforth be directly and primarily directed against the ruling bourgeoisie and the so-called 'national' government.
But in spite of this, the overall political situation in the country was however still patently dominated by two major facts:
(1) a temporary stabilisation of the political power of the national bourgeoisie as the new ruling-class in collusion with and backing of foreign imperialism, and their close alliance with native feudal vested interests;
and (2), the inevitably imperfect and gradual process of the disillusionment of the masses, and lack of self-confidence in their minds about strength of their own class-organisations.
The result was, as the Polit-Bareau was forced to admit, that the level of consciousness of the workers and peasants in most parts of the country, even in class-organisations under direct CPI leadership and control, did not rise as yet above filing cases before governement Tribunals, and pressing their minimum economic demands, petition in hand, before the authorities. "We (i.e., the CPI) still participate in Parliaments, lead deputations and demonstrations, appear before Industrial Tribunals in trade disputes, participate in Tripartite (Govt. Employer-Employee) Conferences etc., —the CPI. Polit Bureau wrote in their lengthy disquisition on "Strategy and Tactics" about the middle of last year (see CommunistNo. 4.1949). "We can't get away"—it was frankly owned up "from the most elementary forms of struggle" .... "Life is such that the Party which wields arms in Telengana, files cases before Industrial tribunals in Bombay and Calcutta"!
The Irony of combining the 'Telengana Way' slogan with timidly filing workers' cases before Industrial Tribunals did not escape the notice of the Pout-Bureau altogether. But this was put down in the Report on "Strategy and Tactics" to the "uneven development of the consciousness of the masses." It was also recognised that the "bourgeoisie still possessed great influence in the country." The situation was "full of revolutionary possibilities", but unfortunately the masses were not "learning and moving with uniform consciousness." It was all due to the inertness of the masses! The masses had to be spurred into action somehow and enabled to. get over their passiveness. This could only be done under the circumstances, by the party intself coming forward to take up the initiative and launch militant struggles on its own account. "Just because it is a revolutionary period the most elementary struggles (Petition-filing before Industrial Tribunals?) will set in motion forces which enable the masses to overcome their present consciousness"—it was expected, and rapidly lead them take up the most advanced forms of struggle! Apparently Ranadive and his colleagues seemed to have little doubts about that.
In the background of the objective historic possibility of the miscarriage of the democratic revolution in Russia (1905), and the danger of an imperialist-bourgeois alliance coming to power owing to the weakness and the inadequate level of preparation and conciousness of the masses, Lenin uttered long ago the supreme revolutionary caution that it will be necessary "or continue in the persistent, patient, sustained work of educating the proletariat in the spirit of class-consciousness and to proceed along a thorny, hard and long, but familiar and beaten trail" (Two Tactics Selected Works pp. 312-3). This caution was however totally ignored. In order to rouse the party rank-and-file to militant mass actions and armed struggles (which earned praises from men like Balabushevich and others) it was constantly dinned into their ears 'that the situation is full of revolutionary possibilities,' and once the party starts fighting and puts the issues of political power squarely before the masses, they would automatically begin to learn with astonishing rapidity. It was not a question of masses learning by their own experience; or the party undertaking to explain patiently to the masses the political class significance of that experience, and leading them step by step through the ups and downs of their actual struggles to higher levels of consciousness and organised action on which Lenin emphasised in 1917. It was rather a case of "start-fight-the-masses-will follow" sort of complacence which has always provided the main argument for Blanquism and all kinds of fire brand adventurism. "The objective of overthrowing the bourgeoisie"combined with the "existence of a revolutionary period and rapidly moving revolutionary developments", it was accordingly deduced, "compels resort to militant and revolutionary forms of struggle." "Hence strikes, agrarians struggles, general strikes, political strikes, rising to higher forms of struggle and to a general rising" such are the forms of struggle that flow from the situation.4 So the party must, be prepared to use the most elementary forms of struggle with the "highest and most advanced forms," seizure- of-power struggles and armed insurrections—"with the one object of rapidly bringing the masses to the point at which they themselves will echo the party's cry of ending the government" ('On Strategy and Tactics').
The masses of course did not echo the CPI slogans. It was rather the CPI which got itself increasingly isolated day by day from the masses. But that hardly deterred the CPI leadership. They were faithfully following the job-chart with 'which they were briefed in the overall plan of "resistance to the anti-Soviet Anglo- American imperialist plans of aggression along every line." The realities ofthe objective historical situation in India, the alignment of class forces here or the level of consciousness and organisation of the major sections of the Indian toiling people were factors of secondary importance so far as the CPI were concerned. The major objective was to be engaged in some sort of trouble-raising in this country, in common with Communist movements elsewhere in Asia, so as to create the impression that a revolution was breaking out, that a mass-upsurge had begun in India and the govenrment of the Congress bourgeoisie, which had come to power with Anglo American backing and slavishly toeing the anti Soviet Anglo- American line of foreign policy, was going to crumble down in no time. If the masses could not be mobilised for that purpose owing to "the uneven development of their consciousness", then the party rank-file must be inspired to do the job with the exhortation that as soon as they start fighting the masses will follow. Only in this way can we explain Ranadive's arguments in favour the necessity of "combining the most elementary with the most advanced forms of struggle" and resorting to armed seizure- of-power struggles on the plea of "rapidly moving revolutionary developments in a revolution-period." Because only in this way he could at least make the party rank-and-files move. He did the best-it must be conceded—that he could, and was 'expected' to do under the circumstances.
1. It has already induced one of the leading left parties of Western India, the Maharastra peasant's and Worker's Party (Shctkari Icamgar Paksha) to come out with a statement welcoming the new Cominform directive and proclaiming its political allegiance to the Cominform Centre while vehemently criticising the CPI at the same time for its 'left- sectarianism' and 'adventurism.' Coming close on the publication of Mr. P.C. Joshis' letter to foreign communist Parties against Ranadive (Views, No. 1.) the declaration of the SKP caused a certain amount of political flutter both in this country and abroad, and gave currency to the report that a rival Communist Party was being formed in India. The leader of the MSKP, Mr. S. S. More has denied this subsequently.
2. Browder was the former leader of the US Communist Party till 1946 and was expelled from the party like Joshi on the charge of right-reformism. Nosaka, Eunibotlen and Sharkey have been denounced, one time or other, as right-deviationist in Japan, Norway and Australia. Nosaka and Sharkey have again been put on grace. Furubotten has broken with CPN and formed his own party. Nakanishi Shiga and Miyamoto were recently condemned by the CP. Japan on charges of left-deviation when they came out with too outspoken a criticism of the Nosaka-line and for advocating a more militant class-struggle programme without taking account that Nosaka—a close friend of Mao Tse-tung-had been restored to favour again. Ranadive has to go for having criticised Mao; his Japanese counterpart for falling foul with Mao's friend on being misled initially by Cominform criticism of the latter.
The original Cominform charge-sheet against Tito contained indictment, it should be noted, both on counts of right and left deviations. He is now of course no more a 'deviationist' merely, but a full-fledged "Fascist hireling" in the pay of US imperialism! The main differences with which Sharkey have been involved, concern the Communist Party of Great Britain and certain leaders of CP, France and Italy, whom he charged with right-deviationism. He in his turn has been accused of Browderism and Titoism!
3. In December 1948 the CPI Polit-Bureau had actually defined the present phase of Indian revolution as "mixed"—comparable partly to February and partly to October.
4. The short hand formula for this which, according to the Calcutta District Committee of the Party, was handed to the rank-and file about this time, runs thus—surround the factory management and the employers—after 'surrounding' start 'beating'—from 'beating' to 'strike'—from 'strike' to a 'procession of the armed people'—from 'armed procession' to 'street-barricades', 'violent clashes' and 'armed insurrection' for seizure of power." It was all as easy as that!