MIA > Archive > Boudin > Socialism and War
When one decides to put up a building, his first task is to clear the ground upon which he intends to build. This may not be exactly “constructive” work, but it is nevertheless a necessary part of any construction. It is the same in any mental building operation. You cannot do the work of construction properly without first clearing your lot of any rubbish that may have accumulated, or of the old structures that you may find occupying the place where you want to build the new. I have therefore decided to devote this introductory lecture to a discussion of the many current misconceptions about the war and its causes. Incidentally, this critical process may accustom my audience to examine the questions involved from many angles and therefore be in a better position to judge more critically my own performance when I get to the “constructive” part of my task. Let us, therefore, look at the explanations which have so far been advanced. But before doing so we must formulate the question that the explanation is supposed to answer.
This question presents itself to us in two forms: First: Who or what caused the war? And, second: What is this war all about? These two formulations while, naturally, closely resembling each other, and often covering the same ground, are by no means identical. The second formulation of the question is deeper, and also broader. It is deeper, because it is not satisfied with finding the “guilty party”, but wants the cause, the reason, for his guilt. It is broader, because it is not satisfied by finding someone who may be justly said to have caused the war, but wants to know why he was permitted to do so. Or, to put it in another form, the first question is answered by finding one “guilty party,” whereas the second is not until we have discovered two “guilty parties”, so to say.
And there is good reason for this broadening of the question. We all know that it takes two to make a bargain. And it also takes two to make a fight. One can no more fight alone than he can bargain alone. If one is looking for a fight he must find somebody who is willing to take him up before there can be a fight. If we want to find the real explanation of this war it is not, therefore, sufficient to find the “party” that started the fight, nor even the thing he was after in starting the fight. We must go a step further and find the reason why the other party to the fight was willing to take up the fight rather than give up the thing the aggressor was after. As you know, this war was started by what is called an “ultimatum”,— a notice to “give up or fight,”— and the party receiving the notice deciding to fight rather than give up. And the real crux of our problem is to find what made the thing demanded and refused so important to the nations involved in the great conflict as to make it worth their while to engage in this most bloody of wars about it. In other words, we must find not merely a first cause, but an efficient cause— efficient to make both sides go to war.
Bearing this in mind, let us look at the events that led up to the war, in chronological sequence, in order to see whether or not we can discover such an efficient cause floating on the surface of the troubled waters.
On July 23rd, the Austro-Hungarian Government sent an ultimatum to Servia[a] making certain demands, and gave as its reasons therefor that its demands were dictated, first, by a desire to mete out adequate punishment to those guilty of complicity in the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and second, by a desire to stop a propaganda which was threatening the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
We may assume for the purposes of this first step of our investigation that the reasons stated by Austria were sufficient to make that country go to war in case her demands were not complied with. So far so good. But at the very next step we meet with difficulties. Why should Servia have refused to comply with these demands? What purpose could Servia have in protecting regicides? Even republics are now-a-days slow to protect regicides. And surely the government of His Majesty King Peter Karageorgewitch was not exerting itself on behalf of any democratic-republican principles. Nor is there any reason why Servia should want to encourage a propaganda that would bring about the disruption of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Unless she had some particular object in view as a result of that disruption. But then we are only at the beginning of our problem,— that of discovering the object that Servia had in either protecting the murderers of the Archduke or encouraging the propaganda complained of, that would make it worth her while risking such a war.
And the difficulties grow as we go along. For it goes without saying that Servia would not have dared defy Austria had she had no outside backing. So that in accounting for Servia’s refusal to comply with the demands of the Austrian ultimatum we must find an object worth fighting for not only for Servia but also for her backers. That brings us to Russia.
What did Russia have at stake in this Austro-Servian controversy, or what other object may she have had, that made her back up Servia? Indeed, the Czar of Russia, whose grandfather died at the hands of regicides and who has himself spent most of his life in fear of regicides, must have had some very strong reasons in backing up Servia that would make him not only risk a world-war but act as the protector of regicides. You will recall Wilhelm’s letter to Nicholas in which the German Kaiser urged upon his Russian cousin their common interest in punishing regicides. To my mind this was the most telling appeal that could be made to the Russian Czar. And yet, it remained without an effect. What was it that robbed this appeal of its efficacy?
The official explanation that Russia went into this world-war in order to protect a “Slavic” nation against an alien race, is, of course, a mere hollow pretext,— a pretext that would hardly be advanced even by Russia except for home consumption, and, perhaps, for the most gullible and ignorant foreigners. We all know that the non-Russian Slavs are much worse off in Russia than in Austria. The Poles are Slavs. And yet that did not deter Russia from instigating the partition of Poland. Nor from ruthlessly destroying all signs of national life among the Poles within the Russian Empire. Nor yet from otherwise oppressing them in such a manner as to gain their everlasting hatred. And even the Balkan nations themselves have had occasion to find out what Russian protection of its “little brothers” of the southern peninsula really meant. With the result, among other things, that Bulgaria is playing the role of a German dependency from fear of Russian aggression. Clearly, therefore, the “protection of a Slav nation” could not have been the real moving cause which made Russia enter upon this world-conflict. What was it?
After Russia came Germany. Russia having declared her readiness to “protect” Servia against Austria, Germany came upon the scene with the announcement that if Austria was not permitted by Russia to have her way with Servia, she, Germany, would go to war with Russia, and, if necessary, with Russia’s allies. What interest did Germany have in this quarrel? History fails to disclose any particular love or affection between the members of the royal house of Hohenzollern and the Princes of the Hapsburg family. If history discloses any predilection at all in that regard, it is to fight each other rather than fight for each other. Surely the killing of the Hapsburg Prince could not cause Germany’s hosts to form in battle array. Nor was there anything in the “propaganda” complained of by Austria to cause Germany to go to war. Viewed from a purely German-national point of view that propaganda could only be welcome to Germany. The disruption of the Austro-Hungarian Empire— assuming that the “nefarious propaganda” could really have that effect, as was asserted by the Austro-German statesmen— would mean the attainment of the dream of German patriots for generations past,— a real United Germany. The continued existence of the Hapsburg Empire is depriving Germany of her choicest provinces, of the most ancient seats of German culture, of the most German part of Germany. Why, then, should Germany enter upon the most stupendous struggle the world has ever seen in order to preserve the integrity of the Hapsburg Monarchy?
The official answer is that Germany was bound to Austria by treaty, and therefore had to come to her assistance. But this answer, like the “Slav brother” answer of Russia, cannot be taken seriously even in Germany. How can it be? Has not Germany herself declared, almost in the same breath, that treaties were mere “scraps of paper” when serious interests are involved? If the mere exigencies of a campaign were, according to Germany’s own declaration, a sufficient reason for the breaking of a treaty which involved the commission of a crime besides, it goes without saying that the existence of a treaty could not possibly make Germany engage in a war in which, as she herself claims, her very existence is at stake. Besides, there were, as a matter of fact, no such treaty obligations. The terms of the Triple Alliance bound its members to come to each other’s rescue only in case of a defensive war. Austria was clearly the aggressor. This was the position officially taken by Italy, the third member of the Triple Alliance. It is interesting to note that Italy’s course has found many defenders even in Germany, and in quarters where the defensive character of the war waged by the Teutonic Allies is vehemently insisted upon. These German defenders of Italy assert that Italy's vital interests dictated a policy of neutrality, and that this absolved her from her treaty obligations towards Germany and Austria. If these arguments are good enough to excuse a faithless ally they would most assuredly have been found more than sufficient to justify Germany's course had she desired to stay out of the fight— aside from the fact that if Germany had desired to stay out there would have been no fight. It is therefore clear that treaty obligations could not have caused Germany to enter into this war. She evidently must have some object— some vital interest— of her own, to assert or defend which she is fighting. What is it?
Then France took a hand in the matter and decided to join in the war. France was far removed from the seat of trouble and had no apparent interest in the original quarrel, nor in any of its complications, except as an ally of Russia. But we have already seen that “treaty obligations", as such, do not make nations go to war. And France is no exception to the rule: Had she no interest of her own she certainly would not have gone into this terrible war. What, then, was France’s reason for going to war? An attempt is made of explaining France’s entry into the war by her desire to revenge herself on Germany, for the injury and humiliation suffered by her forty-four years ago.[b] It is, to say the least, passing strange that a country burning with the passion of revenge to the extent of being willing to risk the eventualities of a war like the present one, should have been able to restrain herself for a generation and a half, and that the flames of this passion should burst forth now when most of those who have witnessed the injury and felt its effects most keenly have died out and a new generation has arisen to whom the wrongs of 1870-1871 are but a distant tradition. The truth is, that at no time was the feeling for revenge less prevalent in France than at the time immediately preceding the outbreak of this war. Besides, going to war under the conditions under which this war opened was certainly a poor way of revenging herself on Germany. You must remember that France was hardly half prepared for a war like this, and her allies were even less so. It was also well known that Germany’s first move after the declaration of war would be to overrun France. Even if this should not mean final disaster for France, it would certainly mean at least enormous sacrifices. Such sacrifices are not made in order to redress injuries which have been quietly borne for forty-four years.
Then comes the entry of England,[c] even more of a puzzler, when only the surface of things is considered, than the action of the countries we have already discussed. England was not a party to the original quarrel. She is neither kith nor kin to the Serbs. She had no apparent interest in protecting the murderers of the Austrian Archduke; nor in the propaganda looking to the “disruption” of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. She even had no “treaty-obligations” to fall back upon. Her own explanation is that she went to war because Belgian neutrality had been violated. I shall not enter here upon a discussion of the question as to whether or not England’s claim to be the protector of small nations, and particularly those that have been formally declared neutral by international agreement, is well founded. Although I do not hesitate to state my conviction that England’s protection of small nations had about it the air, although perhaps not the brutal manner, of Russia’s protection of the Slavs. It is not necessary to enter here upon such a historical discussion for the reason that England’s attitude in the present war is quite sufficient to disprove any claim, if such be advanced, that England went into this war for the only purpose of protecting the principle of the inviolability of neutral nations.
It should be recalled that Belgium is not the only country whose neutrality has been violated by Germany in this war. Before Belgium was invaded, the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg— a country neutralized by international agreement in the same manner as was Belgium— had been invaded by the German army. And yet England did not say a word about it, so far as we know. England never claimed and does not claim now that the violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg caused her to draw the sword. There certainly is no particular sacredness about Belgian neutrality that would put it in a class by itself as compared with the neutrality of other “neutral” countries, such as Switzerland or Luxemburg. Why, then should England bear with equanimity and without so much as a protest the violation of Luxemburg’s neutrality, and at the same time be ready to go to war for the violation of the neutrality of Belgium?
Now, this does not necessarily imply, as some assert, that England’s claim that she was moved to enter into this war by the violation of Belgian neutrality, is sheer hypocrisy. That is a question which need not be gone into here. It is sufficient for our purposes that England’s discrimination between Luxemburg and Belgium proves that if England did go into the war because of the violation of Belgian neutrality, it is not because of her desire to protect the principle of neutrality, but because of some vital interest that she has in maintaining the neutrality of Belgium. And we are consequently confronted with the problem of discovering that interest.
And while we are about looking for efficient causes we must not restrict ourselves to those who willingly entered into the fight, but look into the case of all of those who are in the fight whether willingly or not. This includes Belgium. I have said in the beginning that it takes two to make a war. And while it is true that Belgium did not go to war in the same sense that the other warring countries did, she nevertheless took up the fight, having refused Germany’s demand for a “peaceful” passage through her territory. This action on the part of Belgium requires just as strong reasons as does the action of the countries which formally went to war. In fact even more so. For the consequences to Belgium were immeasurably more serious, and there can be no doubt of the fact that Belgium could not but realize the consequences to herself of her defiance of Germany’s wishes. On the other hand, it does not seem, on the surface of things, that any harm could have resulted to Belgium from a compliance with Germany’s demands. Why, then, should Belgium have taken the awful risks consequent upon the defiance of the greatest and most ruthless military power of modern times?
The idea that Belgium would permit herself to be “crucified” on the altar of the neutrality principle— the “scrap of paper” which her more powerful neighbors signed only to tear up whenever it proved an inconvenience— is too absurd to contemplate. What interest did she have to preserve? The official documents do not disclose any. It may be added that Belgium did not even have any “honor” to protect. Belgium is not a Great Power, and there is therefore nothing “dishonorable” for her in submitting to the demands of Germany; and her compliance would not have involved any loss of position in the “council of nations” as she had none to lose.
The very fact that she was a “neutral” country took her out of the category of states, great or small, which claim such position. Her position was rather that of a ward of the so-called Concert of Powers. By the treaty of neutrality she had disclaimed all pretensions as a military power, relying on her own arms for the defence of either her interests or her “honor”. She put herself frankly at the mercy of her stronger neighbors. This put all considerations of so-called honor out of the question. And the only thing that could have possibly induced her to pursue the course that she did would be some great and vital interest. What was it? No representative of Belgium has so far given us any intimation thereof. Nor has it been suggested by her opponents. The claim has recently been put forward on behalf of Germany that long before the outbreak of the present war Belgium had made an arrangement with either France or England or both to pursue the course which she actually did follow in the present war. But as to why she would have done so, no explanation is vouchsafed us.
The result of our examination of the surface of things for the discovery of an efficient cause for this war, has thus proven fruitless. The nearest we could get to it has been the discovery of an apparent reason for one of the original parties to the quarrel,— that is, if her own declarations be taken at their face value;— but absolutely no reason whatever for the other party to the quarrel to take Austria up, nor any reason for the other countries to intervene and turn what was on its face a local quarrel into a world-war. There evidently must have been some other reason or reasons than those professed by the parties engaged in this war,— some reason lying deep below the surface of things, a reason deep enough and comprehensive enough to be an efficient cause for a conflagration embracing almost the entire world.
In leaving the surface of things and the explanations offered by the combatants themselves, we are confronted with a maze of suggestions as to who or what caused this war, in which it is at first glance rather hard to find one’s way. But after a while we discover that after all they are merely variations on a few easily recognizable themes: It is interesting to note in his connection, that the only thing on which most of those who have so far offered any explanation for the war agree, is, that whoever or whatever may be to blame for it, capitalism— that is the economic conditions under which we are living— is not to blame for this war. This it true even of Socialist writers, and is in striking contrast to the opinions expressed by Socialists on the same subject prior to the outbreak of the present conflict.
When we come to classify the explanations offered we shall find that they fall under six heads:
The first, and most prevalent in this country, is that the German Kaiser is at the bottom of the whole trouble. This is also the view of most American Socialists. “The German War Lord did it, with his little hatchet Militarism” shout most American Socialists in chorus.
Next in importance, because of their number and vociferousness, come those who put the responsibility for this war upon the Russian Czar.
Then come those who say that it is all due to England’s jealousy of Germany’s growing trade.
Then comes a class consisting, as far as I can ascertain, of Joshua Wanhope— a Socialist writer of some standing and chief editorial writer of the New York Call, the most important Socialist newspaper in this country— who puts it up squarely to Rothschild.
These four explanations, as you will have noticed, put it up to some particular person, group of persons, or nation. Then there are two which put the blame on more general causes: One is that “autocratic institutions” did it, in their desire to stem the rising tide of freedom and democracy; the others is that “the ruling classes” did it— not the ruling class of any particular country but the ruling classes as a whole, in their desire to crush the oncoming revolution.
Now let us see what there is to these explanations.
The first explanation— that the German Kaiser did it— should not detain us very long. Mr. Wanhope, whom I have already mentioned, has disposed of this contention in an article which appeared in the Sunday Call last August, under the title “Was the German Kaiser Framed Up?” In this article, in which Wanhope advances his remarkable theory that Rothschild did it, he incidentally, and as a preliminary step, disposes of the German-Kaiser theory so effectively and in such a brilliant manner that I can do no better than refer you to that article for detailed and comprehensive treatment of the subject. I shall therefore limit myself here to a summary of his argument. In substance it is this:—
It is utterly absurd to imagine that one man could bring on such a war as the present one. It is particularly absurd for any Socialist to make such an assertion. The Materialistic Conception of History, which is the basis of all Socialist theory, would have to be turned inside out before such an explanation of the war could be accepted. But you need not necessarily accept the Materialistic Conception of History in order to see the absurdity of blaming it on the Kaiser. All you need is to use some common sense. No war, much less a war like the present one, can be carried on without the expenditure of immense sums of money, such as the War Lord could not possibly raise without the assistance and active co-operation of the Money Lords. Alone he was utterly powerless to cause this war. He cannot therefore be considered the real cause of the war, and we must look elsewhere if we want to get to the bottom of this business.
All of which is undoubtedly true, and quite self-evident. And I may add, that the assertion that the German Kaiser did it, by, through, or for Militarism, does not really explain anything. It reminds me very much of the explanation of the mechanism of the world which ascribes the stability of our planet to the fact that it is supported by a gigantic whale or turtle. The German Kaiser went to war because of Militarism. But Militarism is no more a first cause than the enormous whale or turtle on whose back the Earth was supposed to rest. The phenomenon which we call Militarism itself needs an explanation. It too, must have some cause. So that this and similar explanations, like the aforementioned explanations of the world-mechanism, simply put the problem one remove further back. They are really no explanations at all.
The reasoning that disposes of the Kaiser theory of the war, also disposes of the Czar theory. If the German Kaiser could not have caused the war, the Russian Czar most assuredly could not. Neither his military nor his financial powers are at all comparable to those of his German cousin. Furthermore, it must be said in defence of the Czar that whatever his transgressions may be, the crime of causing war cannot be laid at his door, for he was clearly not the prime mover in this drama. The first and last steps in the opening chapter of this world-drama were taken by the Teutonic Allies. The curtain opens on Austria delivering her ultimatum to Servia, making demands which it was clear could not possibly have been complied with without Servia giving up her independence. And it closes on Germany declaring war on Russia and France, refusing to submit anything to arbitration as requested by the Czar. All that the Czar did was to declare his readiness to go to war if Austria insisted on crushing Servia. He may not have been pacific, but he was certainly passive. The active parts were clearly played by his opponents. He could not therefore have caused the war. At most he may have helped his opponents, whoever or whatever may have been the real moving cause of this war.
The theory that Sir Edward Grey— alias English jealousy— caused this war is not in any better condition as an explanation of events than either of the two theories examined so far. England was not only not the prime mover in the events that led up to the war, but she was actually not in it until the war was well under way. It is conceded that England tried to have the Austro-Servian dispute settled by arbitration; also that she was ready to stay out of the war upon certain conditions looking towards the protection of Belgium and France. This would seem a rather strange course for the country that wanted to bring about the war. But let us pass that over. Let us assume that all this was part of a deep-laid scheme by which “perfidious Albion” sought to inveigle her innocent competitor into a disastrous war,— a war, by the way, which this same innocent competitor assures us England never had the slightest chance of winning. For, as is well known, England is not only very jealous, but also extremely stupid. Does that, after all, explain this war?
I think not. To begin with, English Jealousy, like French Revenge, would have to be of a queer kind to cause a war between Germany and England just now. As is well known, Anglo-German relations were much more amicable during the period immediately preceding the war than they had been at any time during this century. This condition was due in no small degree to England’s readiness to make concessions to Germany, a readiness which sometimes surprised the Germans themselves, but which fully accorded with England’s declared policy of keeping out of a great war as long as she could. It was this policy that kept her out of a war with Russia since the Crimean War notwithstanding their traditional and continued enmity, due to the serious divergence of interests and intense competition of these countries on the Asiatic continent.
But there is even more serious objection to the English Jealousy theory. At most it could explain only England’s participation in the war. Just as French Revenge could explain only French participation in it. Neither could explain the participation of all the other nations. In other words, either of these theories might at most explain the participation of the respective countries to which they apply in the World War, but neither separately nor together could they explain the bringing about of a World War. England and France, it should also be remembered, are ancient enemies. The Fashoda incident[d] is still fresh in our memory. Granted, however, that English Jealousy and French Revenge are sufficient to account for France and England now joining hands against the common object of their aforesaid respective national attributes, how could these have caused Russia to take the position which she took on the Austro-Servian question, which was the pivot on which the question of peace and war hinged after Austria set the ball rolling by her ultimatum? Assuredly Russia was not going into this greatest of all wars known to history merely to help her ancient enemy, England— many of whose people even now openly declare that the alliance with Russia is a disgrace to their country, and with whom, it is even now freely asserted, she will ultimately have to go to war in order to settle their Asiatic and Mediterranean accounts.
Then there is Belgium to baffle us still further. Why should Belgium sacrifice herself on the altar of English Jealousy of Germany?
English Jealousy as an explanation of the great World War is, therefore, a complete failure.
So we must turn to the next explanation in order,— Mr. Rothschild. I bespeak your earnest attention for that gentleman. For, fanciful as the Rothschild theory seems to be, and utterly erroneous though I hope to prove it, it is a laudable attempt to cut away from the dry rot and the beaten tracks in which most of the discussion about the causes of the present war has been wandering. It has at least the merit of originality and of considerable ingenuity. The substance of this theory is, that Rothschild, disliking the Kaiser, “sicked” him on to the Allies, giving him the money necessary to wage war on them, in the hope that the poor Kaiser would break his neck in the enterprise. To use Mr. Wanhope’s own expressive phrase: The Kaiser was “framed up” by Rothschild, who was acting the part of an international agent provocateur.
Unfortunately, the theory of a “frame up” does not “hold water” upon closer scrutiny. It is confronted at the very outset with the difficulty that every argument which Wanhope advances to prove the absurdity of the idea that one man could cause such a world-war as is the present conflict, can be advanced with equal force against the idea that one man could do it even if that one man were Rothschild. Rothschild is by no means in a better position to accomplish that gigantic feat than is the Kaiser. Of course, by “Rothschild” Mr. Wanhope does not mean an individual, but the great banking interests. But it must be remembered, that by “the Kaiser,” and “the Czar”, when used in this connection, is not meant the persons of Wilhelm II, or Nicholas II, but the group of which these two worthies are the respective heads, otherwise known as “The Military Machine”, “The Military Clique”, “Junker-dom”, “The Grand Ducal Cabal”, “Hofcamarilla”, etc., etc. In other words: The Military Party in Germany and whatever may correspond to it in Russia. And if the German Kaiser and the Junkers who compose the Military Party in that country could not bring about the war then surely Rothschild with his group of bankers could not do it.
The preference which Wanhope gives to Rothschild over the Kaiser, as a cause of war is based on the assumption that Rothschild has sufficient money for war-purposes while the Kaiser hasn’t. But this assumption is clearly unwarranted. “Rothschild” has no more money for such purposes than “the Kaiser”. Bankers never lend their own money. If those who borrow from bankers, including the governments which borrow from “Rothschild”, would depend on the banker’s own money they would be very badly off. In fact a man who lends his own money is not a banker. He is an investor. It is of the essence of banking that you lend other people's money. But when it comes to lending other people’s money you must ask them whether they want their money loaned and to whom. Of course, that does not apply to lending small sums, nor of comparatively large sums, made up of small-fry deposits. But when it comes to lending the many billions of dollars which the German Kaiser needs to carry on this war the gentlemen bankers must ask the capitalist class, who alone can furnish it. And if the capitalist class as a whole does not want the war, the money will not be forthcoming, either through the bankers or otherwise.
Of course, the bankers are themselves an important and very influential portion of the capitalist class. But they are not the capitalist class by any means. And as a separate group they are by no means a more substantial economic group than the Kaiser and the “Military Party”. Mr. Rothschild’s importance is not in his own right, so to say, but by virtue of the fact that he usually represents the capitalist class. And his importance, therefore, adheres to him only so long as he does in fact represent the capitalist class. The idea, therefore, that Mr. Rothschild as Mr. Rothschild, that is in his character as banker, representing only the banking interests as such, could, without reference to the capitalist class as a whole, furnish the Kaiser with the sinews of war is utterly fallacious. This makes it unnecessary for us to discuss the reason given by Wanhope for Rothschild’s dislike of the Kaiser which led him to arrange the “frame up”. That is, in so far as those reasons are sufficient for Mr. Rothschild in his narrow and limited character of banker with special banking interests. There is still the possibility that Mr. Rothschild is speaking in his larger capacity of leader of the capitalist class, representing not narrow banking interests as such and distinguished from the interests of the capitalist class as a whole, but the entire capitalist class, or at least its controlling economic powers. But then Mr. Rothschild expands into the capitalist class not only in his money-furnishing capacity, but also in the reasons for the dislike of the Kaiser. That is, the dislike of the Kaiser must be by the capitalist class, or at least its most important section, and then the question is to be answered: “What’s the matter with the Kaiser?” from the capitalist point of view.
The suggestion is offered that Mr. Rothschild— that is, the capitalist class— does not like the interference of autocrats in his business, and therefore prefers the republican or parliamentary form of government. But this suggestion is insufficient on its face as a reason for the “framing up” of the Kaiser. In the first place, it must be conceded that autocratic as the German Kaiser undoubtedly is, he is considerably less so than his cousin the Russian Czar. That he should be singled out for destruction while his cousin of Petrograd is not only let alone but actually made a pet of is certainly strange. As a matter of fact the liking of the capitalist class for republican-democratic forms of government is a mere tradition. It would be no difficult matter to prove that while the capitalist class can and does thrive very well under republican-democratic forms of government, and under certain circumstances actually prefers them, its ardor for these forms of government has not only cooled off considerably during the life of this generation, but has actually largely turned into its opposite. So that, on the whole, the capitalist class to-day not only gets on very well with “the Kaiser”, but grows to like his government more and more from day to day. In fact, the only kind of autocratic government of which the capitalist class still disapproves— in so far as it still does disapprove of any kind of autocratic government— is the obsolete one of the Russian type.
And yet we are asked to believe that Mr. Rothschild, representing the capitalist class, overlooked the Russian Czar, indeed entered into alliance with him, but singled out the German Kaiser for destruction.
But let us pass that for a moment. Let us assume that for some reason as yet undiscovered by us the capitalist class does not approve of the Kaiser, and that its business-committee, the “banking interests”, have decided to put him out of business. Is it at all likely that they would go about it in the manner assumed by the Rothschild theory of the war?
It should be remembered that the Kaiser could not be where he is, nor what he is, if the capitalist class disapproved of him as thoroughly as must be assumed in order to make this theory at all intelligible. If the capitalist class disapproved of the Kaiser as seriously as all that, he could no more maintain himself as the head of the German people than Mr. Huerta could as the head of the Mexican people when “we” disapproved of him; but if he could perchance maintain himself at the head of the governmental machine of Germany, it is beyond possibility that he could not maintain that government in the degree of efficiency which it has attained, and, above all, he could not maintain the German army in that degree of efficiency that makes it the formidable weapon of warfare that it undoubtedly is. To maintain the German army in its present state of efficiency “three things are needed— money, money, and money.”
If it were true, therefore, that the capitalist class wanted to put the Kaiser out of business, the surest, indeed the only way of accomplishing that result would be for them not to give him the money which was necessary to put his government and his army and navy in their present state of efficiency. That would probably have compelled him either to entirely abdicate or to change his attitude towards the capitalist class by instituting such reforms in the government of Germany as the capitalist class might demand. And if he should prove utterly unamenable to reason, then it would have been time enough to call in outsiders. And then it would hardly have been a war, it would probably have been called “intervention”— an enterprise much less costly, and, above all, much more certain of the desired result than a war like the present one. It would seem an utterly absurd and extremely unbusinesslike way of “framing up” the Kaiser to first give him all the money he needed for the purpose of so perfecting his war-machine as to make it well-nigh unconquerable— if not actually so— and then try to beat him at his own fighting-game.
The absurdity of the idea becomes even more apparent when we recall that according to Mr. Wanhope’s own statement— a statement undoubtedly true— even with his military machine in its present state of efficiency, the Kaiser could not have entered upon this war without the funds supplied to him by Mr. Rothschild, representing the capitalists. In other words, without these funds his war machine could not have functioned on a war basis. He could not therefore have gone into the war, or if he did go into it he would not have maintained himself for any appreciable length of time. Why, then, did the capitalist class furnish the Kaiser with the necessary funds to give him the fighting chance, a fighting chance which he, in his collective capacity undoubtedly a good “fighting-man”, considered good enough to risk a war of aggression on, a fighting-chance, indeed, which may yet prove Mr. “Rothschild” to have made a grievous error in his calculations as to the outcome of the fighting. The idea is simply preposterous!
You must remember that this war is no play matter even for the capitalist class. I know it is the fashion among Socialists to assume and assert that the burdens and miseries of war are borne wholly by the working class, and that for the capitalist class it is a sort of picnic, abounding in fun and excitement, besides being a good business. I shall not enter here upon a discussion as to how far this is true of war in general. But as to the present war, I must say that the idea is utterly baseless. This war is certainly no picnic for any social class. Certainly not to the capitalist class, either in the Alliance or the Entente countries. It is even doubtful whether it is good business. The destruction of property is entirely too great for that. As to the destruction of life it is so appalling, and so indiscriminate as to class, as to make the sacrifices of the capitalist class very real and very substantial. In fact, from their point of view their sacrifices are much greater than those of the working class, which has nothing but its limbs and lives to offer for its country. Of course, this last assertion on the part of the capitalist class is due entirely to its narrow-minded capitalist outlook upon the world and inhabitants thereof. But even this erroneous claim is of importance when we come to consider the likelihood of the capitalist class going into this war either thoughtlessly or needlessly. For even an erroneous idea born of narrow-minded class-bigotry is a real psychological factor which may exert a great influence upon action.
There can, therefore, be no doubt of the fact that the capitalist class is backing up this war with its money and its lives not because it wanted to “frame up” somebody so that he may break his neck, but because some great capitalist interests are involved; interests for which it considers it worth while to make great sacrifices in lives and money— which accounts for the enthusiasm displayed by the capitalist class for this war in all the belligerent countries, by the capitalists fighting on the side of the Kaiser at least as much as, if not more than, by the capitalists of the countries fighting against him. What is that interest? So that we are still on the quest for the interest of any of those engaged in this war.
And our labors are not likely to be better rewarded by an examination of the two remaining explanations. That this is a war of “autocratic institutions” on the one hand against Freedom and Democracy on the other is a proposition which needs only to be stated in order to be refuted. For when you have stated it you will find yourself at a loss to point out which is which. And unless it is known in advance on which side you are no one will be able to tell which you refer to as “Autocratic Institutions” and which as “Freedom and Democracy.” It seems to me quite self-evident that in a war in which Germany, Austria and Turkey are ranged on the one side and Russia, France and England with Japan on the other, it is quite impossible for any quibbler on either side to claim that the war was started either by Freedom and Democracy to stamp out the remnants of Autocracy or by Autocracy to stem the “rising tide of Democracy”. It seems to me self-evident that were this a struggle between Autocracy and Democracy as such, the alignment of powers would have been quite a different one. If anything can be considered certain in international affairs it is this: In such a struggle the Czar and the Kaiser would be fighting side by side instead of against each other.
So there remains only the explanation that the ruling classes of all the countries engaged in this war, have brought this war about in order to stifle the revolutionary movement.
I must confess I am somewhat biased in favor of this explanation,— it accords with an opinion long held by Socialists that when the capitalist class of any country finds itself threatened by internal revolution it will resort to external war in an attempt to weaken the working class physically and morally. It must also be conceded that it is the only explanation offered thus far which shows any appreciation of the laws of cause and effect and of the relation in which a means stands to its object. Those who take this view at least can point to the fact that this war has had the result of practically destroying the international Socialist movement, or at least incapacitating it for decades to come. At least that will in all likelihood be its effect, unless this madness is carried so far— the war carried on so long— that it will bring the entire capitalist system to the verge of collapse, when the sheer weight of the accumulated misery shall have caused a decided revulsion of feeling on the part of the working class. If, therefore, the purpose of the ruling classes had been the disorganization of the working class and the crippling of its emancipatory movement, they certainly could not have selected a better means of accomplishing their purpose than the present war.
And yet, notwithstanding the obvious temptation to ascribe to a ruthless and crafty foe the deliberate designing of a certain baneful result which his acts have brought about, I am sure that a careful and dispassionate examination of the actual facts will not justify such a conclusion. The break-down of the international labor movement was undoubtedly a prize well worth making some sacrifices for. But neither the condition of the movement in the different countries during the time immediately preceding the outbreak of the war, nor the manner in which the war was brought about, nor yet the manner in which it has been conducted since its outbreak, at all accord with the theory of either a real or a sham battle between the different groups of the ruling classes for the purpose of destroying the revolutionary efficacy of the working class.
The idea of this war being a sham battle as far as the ruling classes of the different countries are concerned, and that the war is a “frame-up” upon the working class, deserves to be classed for absurdity and preposterousness with the theory that Rothschild “framed up” the Kaiser. In fact it does that theory one better. For that theory at least concedes the reality of the fighting on the part of all concerned, while this proceeds upon the assumption that the only real fighting is done by members of the working class. But as I have already stated before, in this war at least, the ruling classes fight with might and main as much as the working class. There is certainly no sham about the fighting in this war, and this applies about equally to all concerned. So that the only version of this theory that can be seriously considered is that one, or some, or all the countries engaged in the present war deliberately brought about this greatest of conflicts in an effort to avert an impending revolution or throttle a growing revolutionary movement.
The efficacy of fighting a foreign enemy as a means of suppressing an internal enemy, has been brilliantly vindicated in this very war, the causes of which we are investigating. The recipe is, however, of ancient origin, and has been repeatedly tried with marked success by sundry rulers and ruling classes in ancient as well as modern times. War might well be called the grave of incipient revolutions. But, on the other hand, war might with equal propriety be called the mother of revolutions, for many a revolution was born of war, or at least had its birth hastened by war. And we do not have to go far afield into history in order to find examples of war-born revolutions. The present French Republic is the result of a revolution brought about by a war,— the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71; and the last great war preceding the present war, the Russo-Japanese War, had as its aftermath a revolution,— the Russian Revolution.
This double-character of war as a preventive of revolutions and as a cause of revolutions, naturally requires extreme care in its handling whenever it is desired to make use of it in its first character. Two circumstances must unite before any ruler or ruling class will resort to it as a means of combating a revolutionary movement: the danger of revolution must be imminent, and the prospective war must have some inherent element of popularity. War is a serious matter for any country, at any time. It is particularly serious for a country threatened with revolution, both as a war and as a possible revolution-breeder. Going to war to prevent a revolution is therefore in the nature of a capital operation, which no one would be foolhardy enough to undergo unless the danger sought to be avoided is so imminent as to make death almost a certainty if the operation is not risked. On the other hand, no matter how grave the danger, the operation will not be undertaken unless the circumstances are such as to give some chance of success instead of insuring the end which it is desired to avoid. An unpopular war would be almost sure to hasten an impending revolution, instead of averting it. Let us therefore make a brief survey of conditions in the countries engaged in the present war in order to ascertain whether they were such as to justify the assumption that all or any of them could have caused this war in order to prevent an impending revolution.
There was Austria-Hungary, who set the ball rolling. I do not think there is a man living who would dare to assert that there was in that country the slightest indication of impending revolution, not only imminent but even remote. It is true that in Austria at least there was a strong Socialist movement, but the movement was of a kind that, whatever else might be thought of it, surely no one could think for a moment that it would or might break out into revolt at any time within the near future. And by this I do not at all mean to reflect on the revolutionary character of the Austrian Socialist movement, although one is very much tempted to do so, seeing the way they reacted on the call to arms issued by their government. Hindsight is proverbially better than foresight. And we may now from the vantage-point of after the fact safely place a low estimate on the revolutionary character of the Austrian Socialist movement. But we do not need our post-bellum experience to take the revolutionary measure of the Austrian Socialist movement. “Revolutionary” being used here in the sense and from the point of view of the government which is supposed to be seeking to suppress it. In this sense “revolution” means an acute eruption. For a government will no more attempt to prevent an “evolutionary” revolution by means of a war, than an individual would attempt to cure by a capital operation one of those chronic ailments with which men often live to die of old age.
And what was said of Austria is equally true of her ally and mentor, Germany. The Socialist movement in Germany was, indeed, considerably stronger than in Austria. But to offset that, the spirit of orderliness, decorum, and “evolutionism” was much stronger in the German movement than in the Austrian. Its determination not to be provoked into a premature fight was well known. Whether from choice or necessity it had long ago resolved to attain its purposes by legal ends, and it was quite certain in July, 1914, that it would not take the initiative to transfer the fight to extra-legal fields; at least, not unless something quite extraordinary happened to swerve it from its former course.
So much for the Austro-German combination. And substantially the same is true of the other side.
There was, indeed, a very serious strike in Russia immediately preceding the war. But it was certainly not of a character to warrant a resort to war. And of all European rulers the Russian Czar was the least likely to be tempted to resort to war as means of suppressing a revolution. The disastrous effects of the Russo-Japanese War on the internal affairs of his Empire were too fresh in his memory for that. It may also be stated parenthetically that had the Russian Czar really found himself in such a critical situation as to require a resort to such heroic measures, his good friend and cousin of Berlin would have come to his assistance, and if there had been a war at all it would have assumed an entirely different character.
Of Russia’s allies, neither France nor England were threatened with any revolutionary movement that anybody was aware of. In France there were some individuals who talked loud, but the old saying that “barking dogs don’t bite” seems to have been specially cut to fit them. They had barked for years without doing anything in particular. It may also be remarked that they did not even bark their loudest about this time. So there was no occasion for any extraordinary measures in the way of revolution-preventing. And certainly not the slightest reason for a war on that score.
England hadn’t had a revolution nor any real revolutionary movement in so long a time that the idea of England going into this world-struggle in order to avert a revolution strikes one like an echo from Gilbert and Sullivan. As far as we know neither the Parliamentary Labor Party, nor the Independent Labor Party, nor the British Socialist Party were at all likely to institute a revolution within the near future. It is true that there were two disturbing factors to ruffle England’s peace of mind in the persons of Mr. Hilaire Belloc and Sir Edward Carson. But the danger was hardly imminent enough to require immediate mobilization. Mr. Belloc’s mystical speculations had hardly assumed definite enough shape to make immediate action urgent. And Sir Edward’s differences with His Majesty’s Government were of a kind that are never settled by the same means as are differences between ruling classes and the “lower orders”. If Sir Edward’s opposition had really become very serious the chances are that the dispute would have been terminated by Sir Edward becoming His Majesty’s Government and Mr. Asquith turning into His Majesty’s Opposition.
In short, the very first element of a situation requiring a war to suppress “the rising tide of the revolution”— namely the presence of that “rising tide”— is entirely lacking. As without a threatening revolution there could be no war to suppress it, it is unnecessary to discuss the second question, namely, whether the war could have been expected to be popular enough to prevent a revolution if one had been threatened. Nevertheless, I shall say, “for the purposes of the record”, that the war did have all the chances of proving a very popular one in all the countries concerned. But this raises another and very interesting question: Why is this war so popular? In the lectures which are to come I shall therefore endeavor to answer not only the question “What brought about the war?”, but also the question: “What makes this war so immensely popular?”
a. Modern Spelling: Serbia
b. Boudin is referring to the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, in which France was forced by Germany to give up the territories of Alsace and Lorraine, among other indemnities.
c. As Boudin himself states in Chapter IV, "England" is used "as synonymous with the United Kingdom", in keeping with the custom of the day.
d. The Fashoda Incident was an 1898 confrontation between the military forces of France and Britain that took place in the eponymous Nile river town of Fashoda (now Kodok), during the so-called "Scramble for Africa". The incident was one of the first of many war scares resulting from colonial competition in the leadup to the first World War.
Last updated on 24 October 2022