Buddhadeva Bhattacharya
Since the question of joining the CPI did not arise because of fundamental political and programmatic differences the only point at issue among Anushilan marxists was whether to join the CSP, or to form a party of their own. Jogesh Chandra Chatterji, the first General Secretary of the RSP, recalls in his autobiography:
Under the circumstances the clear question before us was whether to stand as a separate revolutionary Socialist Party or to work through some other party that was nearest to our ideology. To start a separate party was not an easy affair for us.1
They lacked the resources essential for forming a new parry. Chatterji says:
How were to get money to run a party? For a public party well-known personalities, money and other resources are required. But we had none. So there seemed to be no other alternative before us than to join some existing party. After discarding the Royists2 and Communists, the Congress Socialists were the only alternative left before US.3
In the summer of 1938, Jogesh Chandra Chatrerji, Keshav Prasad Sharma and Tridib Kumar Chaudhuri met Jayaprakash Narayan at Sonepur. In Chatterji's account we read
We had a four days' talk. J. P. convincingly assured us that the C.S.P. stood clearly and definitely for Marxism. Just like us, the revolutionaries, the C.S.P. had no faith in Gandhism or non-violence and it too like us believed in the attainment of independence through an armed revolution. He also appealed to us not to start a separate party but to join hands with them and thus make the C,S.P. a real All India Revolutionary Socialist Party. He also suggested that I should have further talks with Acharyaji (Narendra Deva—B.B.) and then take the decision. Acharyaji also said the same very thing and urged upon us the necessity of joining the party at the earliest. Then we took the final decision with this understanding that for a certain period we would keep our existence separate and then merge.4
They, thus, joined the CSP, perhaps through the influence of Acharya Narendra Deva, a founder of the CSP and a longtime sympathizer with the activities of the Anushilan Samiti,5 and started work inside it from 1938 onwards. But they started as a group inside the CSP.6
According to Tridib Kumar Chaudhuri almost the entire membership of the Anushilan Samiti agreed to the decision to join the CSP even though only about half of the member- ship had actually accepted marxism. The non-marxists went along with the merger perhaps out of loyalty to their old revolutionary comrades.7 In addition about one quarter of the membership of the HSRA, including of course Jogesh Chandra Chatterji and his followers, also joined this group within the CSP.8
Anushilan marxists found in the CSP the only party which could be a fit instrument for work among! the masses for realizing their objectives. The CSP was formed in 1934 at the end of the Civil Disobedience movement of 1932-34 by a number of young Congress workers who had come under the influence of, and had accepted, marxian socialism.9 In the language of the Meerut Thesis (January 20, 1936, 'the word "Congress" prefixed to "Socialist" only signified the organic relationship—past, present and future—of that organization with the national movement.' The immediate task before the CSP was to develop the national movement into a real anti-imperialist movement—a movement aiming at freedom from the foreign power and the native system of exploitation,' For that it was felt 'necessary to wean the anti-imperialist elements in the Congress away horn its present bourgeois leadership and to bring them under the leadership of revolutionary socialism.''10
The CSP's programme was defined as a 'Marxist one' since 'Marxism alone can guide the anti-imperialist forces to their ultimate destiny.11 The Faizpur Thesis (adopted by the CSP in its Third annual Conference on December 23 & 24, 1936) further elucidated the Meerut thesis and defined its task in terms of transforming the Indian National Con- gress into a powerful anti-imperialist front.12 M. R. Masani in his General Secretary's Report (1936) declared that 'at Meerut in January, 1936, the Party took shape as a Marxist Socialist Party.' At Faizpur the precise role of the Party in the broader anti-imperialist movement was spelt out.13 From the policy-declarations of the CSP it was evident that here was a party committed to marxian socialism and leading anti-imperialist people's movement to its logical conclusion, i.e., the establishment of a workers' and peasants' republic and here was a party which had grown out of the experiences of the anti-imperialist national movement. That explains the stand of Anushilan marxists to join the CSP.
But their expectations were soon belied. Anushilan marxists soon found to their chagrin that there remained a hiatus between the profession and practice of the CSP leadership- The CSP leadership though formally subscribed to marxian revolutionary socialism and criticized the Gandhian ideology,14 in actual practice it supported the Gandhian right-wing leadership. Differences between the CSP and Anushilan members came on the surface at Tripuri Congress when the CSP remained neutral on the Pant resolution (of which more later) and the Anushilanites sided with Subhas Chandra Bose.
On hindsight, it seems relevant to reflect upon the nature of the CSP which professed itself, as we have seen above, to be a marxist socialist party. This declaration presupposes at least ideological homogeneity of the leadership of the party, if not of the entire membership But on a close examination of the ideological orientation of the top leadership of the party it is seen that there were three distinct ideological strands current inside the party-marxian socialism, fabian socialism and gandhian socialism Jayaprakash Narayan and Acharya Narendra Deva were exponents of marxian point of view, Minoo Masani and Asoka Mehta represented the social democratic strand and Achyut Patwardhan and Rammanohar Lohia were the votaries of gandhian method of non-violent direct action.15 Iviadhu Limaye says:
At its inception, the CSP was far from being a homogeneous party, even diametrically opposed elements having entered it.
Referring to the early thirties, he says that this was
a period of ferment of ideas... A profound change was taking place in the outlook and mentality of the young generation. Socialism was in the air, not as a distinct creed, programme and organization-much less a way of life, but as sort of a fashion...the C.S.P...initially had no clearly defined ideology...16
From the available record it seems clear that their profession of marxism was based less on their firm ideological conviction but more on the 'hypnotic spell'17 of the Russian revolution and its achievements. But there was a contrary pull too-the pull of Gandhi's magnetic personality and implicit faith in his leadership. And this pull got the better of its declared pro-struggle anti-imperialism when the CSP was faced with taking a crucial decision at Tripuri Congress.
As is known to the students of Indian politics, the climax of the crisis resulting from the growing cleavage between the the Right and the Left occurred at the annual Congress session held at Tripuri in March 1939. As Subhas Chandra Bose says, 'Since 1938, the issues on which we Leftists have found ourselves at loggerheads with Gandhiites and on which no compromise has been possible—are the resumption of the national struggle for Independence and the correct war policy of the Indian people."18 In his presidential address read in absentia because of his serious illness, Subhas Chandra confined himself only to a few important issues. His main emphasis was on an immediate demand for freedom.
...the time has come for us to raise the issue of Swaraj and to submit our national demand to the British government in the form of an ultimatum . and give a certain time-limit within which reply is to be expected. If no reply if received within this period or if an unsatisfactory reply is received, we should resort to such sanctions as we possess in order to enforce our national demand.19
Bose wanted to take advantage of Britain's difficulty in the approaching war crisis. To Bose's chagrin, his suggestion of an ultimatum did not find a place in the resolution on the national demand which was moved by Jawaharlal Nehru. This was, what N. S. Jog calls, 'setback No. 1 for the President."20 The Right was opposed to the ultimatum formula.21 The CSP leaders did not also like the ultimatum formula. 9 But that was not all. A worse one followed when G. B. Pant introduced a resolution which reaffirmed the delegates' faith in gandhian 'fundamental policies' and 'programme' and required that the President accept the wishes of Gandhi in the formation of a Working Committee. It also expressed confidence in the previous Working Committee and criticized attacks that had been levelled against it.22 The resolution was adopted both by the Subjects Committee and later in the open session. The passage of this resolution was in effect a vote of no-confidence in Bose, who had disagreed with both Gandhi and the Working Commitee's conduct of the nationalist struggle and had made this a central issue in his campaign for the presidency. In the Subjects Committee, the congress socialists, the communists and the royists had all opposed the motion but in the open session, the CSP leaders remained netural.23
1. Jogesh Chandra Chatterji, op. cit., pp. 513
2. Since the scope of this paper has been delimited we have not referred to the political programme and activities of M.N. Roy. For a detailed analysis of Roy's views and activities up to 1939, se John Patrick Haithcox, Communism and Nationalism in India: M.N. Roy and Comintern Policy 1920-1939, Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1971.
3. Jogesh Chandra Chatterji, op. cit., pp. 513-4.
4. ibid., p. 514.
5. David M, Laushey, Bengal Terrorism and the Marxist Taft Aspects of Regional Nationalism an India 1906-1942, Firms K. L, Mukhopadtoray, Calcutta, 1975, p. 124.
6. Anushilan marxists started a journal called The Socialist from. Calcutta in the latter part of 1938. Satish Sinker (an Anushilanite who subsequently became one of the top leaders of the RSP) was its editor. The editorial board consisted of Acharya Narendra Deva and some other CSP leaders. But it was entirely run by Anushilan marxists. The present writer gathers from knowledgeable sources that only ¾ issues came out. The issues could not however be traced.
7. David M. Laushey, op. cit., p. 125.
8. ibid.
9. J. P. Papers. File No. 220/1937-39 (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Now Delhi). Also Thomas A. Rusch, Role of the Congress Socialist Party its the INC. 1931-42 (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation). The microfilm was made available to the present writer by Dr Rakhahari Chatterji.
10. Congress Socialist, 29 February 1936, p. 9.
11. ibid.
12. All India Congress Socialist Party (1937), pp. 21-7.
13. ibid. General Secretary's Report (1936) is to be found in the same document, pp. 35-55.
14. e. g., Jayaprakash Narayan, Why Socialism, AICSP, Benaras, 1936.
15. Han Kishore Siugh, A History of the Praja Socialist Party (1934-59), Narenda Prakashan. Lucknow, 1959, pp. 16-24
16. Madhu Limaye, Evolution of Socialist Policy, Chetana Prakashan Ltd., Hyderabad, 1952, p. 1.
17. M. R. Dandavate. 'Evolution of Socialist Policy and Perspective (1934-1964),' in S. M. Joshi Garab Grenth, S. M. Joshi 60th Anniversary Committee, Poona, 1961, p. 89.
18. Subbas Chandra Bose, The Indian Struggle 1936-42, Chuckervertty, Chatrerjee & Co. Ltd., Calcutta, 1952, p. 83.
19. Subbas Chandra Bose, Crossroads (Camp. Netap Research Bureau, Calcutta), Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1962, pp. 109-10.
20. Sisir Kumar Bose (ed-in-chief), A Beacon Across Asia, Orient Longman, New Delhi, p. 85. Jog says that the 'resolution on national demand was moved by Jayaprakash Narayan...In fact it was introduced by Jawaharlal Nehru. For details, see National Front, 19 March 1939, pp. 97, 100 & 101 and 9 April 1939, p. 162. See also Amrita Bazar Patrika, 12 March 1939, pp. 9 & 16, 13 March 1939, p. 13.
21. L. P. Stubs, op. cit., p. 450.
22. The resolution was as follows: The Committee (AICC-B.B.) declares its firm adherence to the fundamental policies of the Congress which have governed its programme in the past years under the guidance of Mahatma Gandhi and is definitely of opinion that there should be no break in these policies and that they should continue to govern the Congress programme in future. The Committee expresses its confidence in the work of the Working Committee which functioned during the last year and deplores that any aspersions should have been cast against any of its members. 'In view of the critical situation that may develop during the coining year and in view of the fact that Mahatina Gandhi alone can lead the Congress and the country to victory during such crisis, the Committee regards it as imperative that the Congress Executive should command his implicit confidence and requests the President to nominate Working Committee in accordance with the wishes of Gandhiji. '—See Pattabbi Sitaramayya. The History of the Indian National Congress, vol. II (1935-1947), Padma Publications Ltd., Bombay, 1947, p. 110.
23. JP Papers. File No. 218/1936-47.