Zinovy Beletsky 1947
Author: Zinovy Beletsky;
Written: 1947;
First published: in Вопросы философии (Problems of Philosophy journal) No. 1, 1947, pg. 314-325 (the whole speech in Russian). Here are translated excerpts of Beletsky’s speech in the 1947 philosophical meeting criticizing G. F. Aleksandrov’s book History of Western European Philosophy.
Source: https://www.twirpx.com/file/3366333/
Translated: by Anton P.
Translator’s note: This is an important document of the Zhdanov era in Soviet philosophy. It comes from the June 1947 philosophers’ discussion in which Zhdanov criticized G. F. Aleksandrov’s book “History of Western European Philosophy” for lacking partisanship and being “too soft” in its assessment of German idealism (Kant and Hegel).
Professor Beletsky’s excerpt is important because Beletsky had a direct correspondence with Stalin personally. He was the one whose 1944 letter to Stalin resulted in the renunciation of the third volume of the “History of Philosophy” and in 1947 another Beletsky letter to Stalin led not only to the demotion of Aleksandrov and the withdrawal of his book, but also to the adaptation of a militantly anti-Hegelian official attitude in Soviet philosophy until 1956, characterized by Stalin’s (and Beletsky’s) classification of the entire German idealism as an “aristocratic reaction to the French revolution.”
In short Beletsky was a kind of “Lysenko of philosophy,” and this document is important because it influenced official trends in Soviet philosophy and historiography of philosophy.
Considering the past philosophy, we are obliged to distinguish between the objective scientific material on which it relies in this or that epoch, and those ideological, theoretical structures in which the social existence of this or that social group is specifically reflected. But although philosophy always starts from certain scientific knowledge of its time, nevertheless, if we talk about idealistic philosophy, in this philosophy scientific knowledge is always perverted in the interests of a certain reactionary worldview. Science is always at the service of religion. This cannot be said about the materialist philosophy, where scientific knowledge is of decisive importance, for materialistic philosophy is always progressive in nature, without ceasing to be partisan. In antagonistic social formations, materialistic philosophy expresses the advanced, progressive features in the development of the ruling classes. Thus, the French materialism of the 18th century was the ideology of the revolutionary French bourgeoisie. German idealism at the end of the 18th century and the first half of the 19th century was the ideology of reactionary, Junker, semi-feudal and semi-bourgeois Germany.
However, if German idealism gives a completely perverted image of reality, thereby justifying the social position of the Prussian aristocracy, then it would be wrong to think that French materialism was not also in its own way limited by the position in society of the French bourgeoisie. The metaphysical nature of French materialism, its inability to rise to a scientific explanation of social phenomena, its contemplation in the field of the theory of knowledge – all this was predetermined to a large extent by the fundamental position of the rising French bourgeoisie oppressed by feudal monarchism. Unscientific features persisted in French materialism as well.
The task of the historian of philosophy is not to show how philosophical ideas moved from one school to another, but to show how and why certain ideas and philosophical teachings arose in certain epochs, what social role they played and what was their political and scientific meaning, We must firmly remember that there is only one basis and one approach for a truly scientific examination of philosophical doctrines, and that is civic history. And only relying on it, you can understand the true essence of all philosophical schools and teachings.
It should be noted that the political approach to the analysis of philosophical doctrines does not exclude the study of epistemological and logical problems. Philosophy’s own subject matter does not disappear. On the contrary, all the main problems of philosophy with this approach for the first time receive a truly scientific explanation.
With a correct, scientific presentation of philosophical teachings, we will be able to understand why, in a given period, certain political, class, material relations received this or that spiritual expression and why, on the other hand, only in a given certain form of social consciousness these relations found their expression. We will understand what role this or that philosophy played for its time and place. Such an exposition will be both partisan and critical.
Rational criticism is not introduced so that we characterize the history of philosophy only from the point of view of the present day, without analyzing it in relation to its time and place, without showing its social meaning. We are obliged to understand and explain any philosophical theory in relation to our time and our society.
In order for this idea to become completely clear, I will briefly dwell on the consideration of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.
Kant’s work Critique of Pure Reason is known to have been written before the Great French Revolution. However, from beginning to end, this work is directed both against French materialism and against the ideas of the French revolution; moreover, in this work, Kant laid the foundations of that reactionary-philosophical theory, which later became known as German ideology.
Kant in his work Critique of Pure Reason resolves one basic question – the question of whether a person can draw his ideas from objects of the outside world. And he proves that the outside world cannot be the basis for the emergence of ideas, that a person receives ideas through a super-experience. They arise as a result of the pure activity of the mind. Ideas, according to Kant, help a person navigate the goals and principles laid by God as the basis of the universe. Everything that a person finds in life, all this, Kant teaches, is given from above, by God. We, people, should perceive life as it is given from God. To change anything in society, says Kant, we cannot, we have no right.
Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason strongly refutes the philosophy of French materialism, a philosophy that taught that a person can create ideas, relying on nature, and can, according to the ideas received, change life in a practically revolutionary way.
Thus, Kant’s idealist philosophy was a theoretical refutation of the idea of revolution. It forbade the possibility of a revolutionary transformation of society. This was the deep purpose of Kant’s philosophy. This was its ideological spirit. Apriorism, the transcendental method – all this served Kant only as a means, a way for his “theoretical” constructions that justified the inviolability of the Prussian state.
It is therefore foolish to think that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason was worried about some kind of universal human science, was solving some common human problems, striving for some kind of universal human progress.
If we approach Kant’s philosophy in an objectivist way, then it appears as a collection of some intricate philosophical constructions, supposedly created in the interests of knowing pure truth. If we approach it from the side of those socio-political goals that Kant was forced to resolve, then it turns out that all this complex construction was necessary for him to theoretically substantiate the ideals he asserted – the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and free will.
When considering the philosophy of Kant, we can, of course, stop at the analysis of his method. But it does not follow from this that the true meaning of Kant’s philosophy was reduced to method, and not to its system. And this does not mean that in the philosophy of Kant, like Hegel, the method was not organically merged with the system and did not serve, like the system, one purpose – the theoretical substantiation of the interests of Prussianism. In its mystified form, dialectics became fashionable in Germany, since, apparently, it made it possible to throw a veil over the existing state of affairs.
Kant’s philosophy sought to strike a blow at both materialism and science. It is no accident that Chernyshevsky wrote: “Kant denies all natural science, he denies the reality of pure mathematics.” Further, he turns to those who undertake to interpret “transcendentally given forms of intuition.” “These forms,” he writes, “were invented by Kant in order to defend freedom of will, the immortality of the soul, the existence of God, the providence of God ... from – whom?-In fact, from Diderot and his friends ... He broke everything that Diderot and his friends relied on. Diderot relied on natural science, on mathematics – Kant’s hand did not flinch to smash all natural science to smithereens” (Nikolay Chernyshevsky, Selected Philosophical Works, 1938, p. 514).
The criticism given by Chernyshevsky to Kant’s philosophy is correct from the first to the last letter. This is a militant criticism.
Analyzing the Critique of Pure Reason, Georgy Aleksandrov comes to a strange conclusion. He writes: “With his criticism of God as an object of knowledge, Kant dealt a serious blow to religion” (GF Aleksandrov, History of Western European Philosophy, p. 371). Kant struck a blow to religion! It was known that Kant had substantiated religion in modern times from the point of view of science. But the fact that he struck a blow to religion is a revelation transferred from liberal textbooks.
How, then, do the ideas developed by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason resonate with his socio-political views?
A continuation of the Critique of Pure Reason is Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. In this work, Kant outlined his doctrine of morality, a doctrine that played an exceptionally painful role in the formation of a reactionary philistine-Prussian morality in Germany.
Based on the ideas developed in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant teaches that the material, sensual life of people is irrelevant. All contradictions of a material nature, according to Kant, should disappear in morality. The essential for a person is not his sensual interests and needs, but the moral law, duty.
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant argues that a person is only obliged to obey those higher principles according to which society exists. A person has no right to change anything in his own life. The state, the laws, the king – all this is imposed by the highest will. All that remains for a person is the careful fulfillment of his duties, moral improvement.
In the light of this moral principle, all estates are portrayed as equal and free, for every person in society carries in his soul the principle of freedom, as a desire to perform duty without coercion.
Kant’s works Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical Reason – these are not abstract works, not divorced from concrete reality. These are militant, programmatic, political works in which Kant theoretically substantiated the need for the existence of the Prussian state, the need to preserve the existing order of things. This was the partisanship of Kant’s philosophy. Kant’s philosophy defended the German reaction against the French Revolution, it defended idealism against materialism, religion against science.
How does Georgy Aleksandrov assess the Critique of Practical Reason? In this case, he is true to himself. He gives some kind of abstract, objectivist, scholastic analysis of this work. He says that the idea of the self-contained character of the human person found its development and completion in Kant’s doctrine of morality. He points out that Kant’s doctrine of the categorical imperative was of an exclusively abstract, contemplative and idealistic character (p. 379). Kant’s reactionary teaching on the categorical imperative, it turns out, was of a contemplative and idealistic character! Which liberal historian of philosophy would disagree with this?
Aleksandrov writes that the French and Kant have the same slogans – equality, freedom, brotherhood. But he does not understand that ethnic slogans are similar only in form, but in essence they are opposite in size. The French put forward revolutionary slogans, and Kant turned them into reactionary ones. Kant substantiates the moral principle of equality of all estates before the Prussian state, and the French attributed it only to the third, revolutionary class. What is common here and what can be compared here? Assessing Kant’s doctrine of morality as a whole, Aleksandrov writes: “From what has been said, one can see not only the inconsistent, but also the conservative nature of Kant’s ethics” (p. 380).
This assessment is not true in essence. Kant’s ethics was, firstly, consistent from beginning to end, and secondly, not conservative, but certainly reactionary.
What result can one come to after reading the chapter on Kant in Aleksandrov’s History of Western European Philosophy? The result is one. Kant, for all his shortcomings, served the cause of human progress.
After Kant, Georgy Aleksandrov apparently had great respect for Hegel. Aleksandrov seeks, like Kant, to portray Hegel as a progressive thinker. He examines Hegel’s philosophy in two ways. He distinguishes his general theoretical views from socio-political. In the general philosophical part, according to Aleksandrov, Hegel made a huge contribution to universal human science. He developed the dialectical theory of knowledge and dialectical logic. In socio-political views, Hegel was reactionary. Therefore, considering Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and Logic, Aleksandrov did not set himself the task of linking them with his reactionary socio-political views, but analyzed them as independent works and not quite perfect, but standing in the ranks of universal human progress. Aleksandrov sought to convince the reader that the ideas developed by Hegel in these works were the source of the emergence of Marxist philosophy.
Characterizing Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit as a whole, Aleksandrov writes: “It is clear that it was not this mystical feature of Hegel’s dialectics that attracted the close attention of leading scientists. They were attracted by his teaching on the development of consciousness, thinking, on the struggle of opposites as a source of development” (p. 409).
Evaluating Hegel’s Logic, Aleksandrov declares: “Hegel’s doctrine of development, his idea that cognition is the cognition of the struggle of opposites and that contradiction is the source of development, is a historical merit of the philosopher. This is the essence of the “rational kernel” of his dialectic” (pp. 411-412).
From the book of Georgy Aleksandrov, the reader learns important things. Hegel, it turns out that he taught about the struggle of opposites. In fact, it is known that Hegel’s teaching was reduced to the reconciliation of opposites. Hegel saw the source of development in the contradictory development of concepts, in the dialectical struggle between concepts. What can attract the “close attention of leading scientists” here? Aleksandrov tries to prove that in the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel developed a dialectic theory of knowledge, and in Logic, an idealistic dialectic. Both the dialectical theory of knowledge and the idealistic dialectic were perceived in a revised form by Marx. According to Aleksandrov, it turns out that the works The Phenomenology of Spirit and Logic were a bridge connecting Hegel with Marx, that in these works Hegel acted as a progressive malignant.
In reality, this was not the case. Firstly, the views developed by Hegel in these works both on the theory of knowledge and on questions of logic are in complete unity with his reactionary political views, and secondly, Marx not only did not accept the Hegelian theory of knowledge and logic in a revised form, but he rejected them. Marx created his own new theory of knowledge based on historical materialism. He developed a new dialectical method based on social development and the achievements of the sciences. As for the question of whether Hegel’s theory of knowledge and his dialectical logic were in unity with his political views, it can be shown when considering the Phenomenology of Spirit.
In his work Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel analyzes forms of human thinking. He identifies three main forms of thinking – sensory consciousness, rational and irrational. Hegel teaches that sensory consciousness corresponds to childhood and adolescence; the rational to mature age, and the irrational to the senile. But these three stages of developing thinking characterize not only individual thinking. They also characterize the process of world history.
The peoples of the East and Greece passed through childhood and adolescence in the development of consciousness. This period corresponds to sensory consciousness. Matured age in history refers to Rome. This period is associated with the development of abstract thinking. And finally, the period in history associated with the development of intelligent thinking belongs to the Germanic world. Only the peoples of the Germanic world, Hegel teaches, have reached a high level in the development of consciousness, and only this people has therefore been given the right to lead world history. The Phenomenology of Spirit provided a theoretical basis for Hegel’s political views. Hegel did not develop a revolutionary theory of knowledge, but a reactionary one, and Marx did not and could not use this theory.
The same is the case with Hegel’s Logic. This can be easily seen both when reading Logic and when studying the work of Marx Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. The historian of philosophy cannot separate the theoretical part in philosophy from the social and political one. The philosophy of Kant and Hegel was equally reactionary both in its theoretical part and in the socio-political field. We are obliged to show that the German philosophy of the late eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century laid the foundation for the development of all later reactionary German philosophy.
Speaking about German philosophy, I now pay attention to only one side of the question, how this philosophy was connected with German reality and how it served Prussian Germany. However, it does not follow from what has been said that the historian of philosophy is not obliged to seek out and show features, aspects in philosophy that could, under certain conditions, turn out to be progressive. It is known that Hegel discovered dialectics, tried to reveal the idea of development, but in Hegel this idea did not receive a revolutionary meaning due to his reactionary political convictions.
I would like to note once again that the social approach to the history of philosophy gives us the opportunity to approach objectively and scientifically to any philosophy, makes it possible to understand both the positive and negative sides of any philosophy.
Philosophy has always been specifically associated with a certain time, certain states and classes. From the fact that philosophers say that their philosophy is of a universal human nature, it does not yet follow that it is in reality such.
It is absolutely impossible to criticize the entire past philosophy from the doorway. We need to figure out what and how to criticize. We cannot criticize Thales for the fact that he took water for the beginning of everything. From a modern point of view, this is absurd, but for its time it was a great achievement. Nor should Diderot be criticized for the fact that his materialism was not dialectical. Diderot could not develop a dialectical method, since he lived at a time when both natural science and social life did not yet allow the disclosure of dialectics. If we talk about the philosophy of Diderot, the task is to show, firstly, on what socio-historical and scientific basis this philosophy was formed, and, secondly, what was progressive, revolutionary for its time and which were its limitations.
From what has been said, however, it does not at all follow that in the history of philosophy there was a progressive process of the development of the knowledge of mankind. From the process of the progressive development of human knowledge, it is impossible, firstly, to throw out natural science and social sciences, and, secondly, if we are already talking about philosophy, then what kind of progressive development of knowledge can we talk about, having before us the philosophy of Plato, Berkeley, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, etc.? This philosophy set itself the task of subordinating science to religion. In philosophy, therefore, not only progress was expressed, but also regression.
Not understanding the role and significance of civil history and natural science in the development of philosophy, Georgy Aleksandrov could not pose and solve the problem of the unequal role of philosophy in different historical periods. It is known that the role of philosophy in the ancient world was not at all the same as it began to play in modern times. In Greece, philosophy was merged with the sciences of that time, natural science in the first place. In modern times, natural and social sciences have separated from philosophy. In connection with this, the first role of philosophy has changed.
Aleksandrov’s mistake is to believe that philosophy developed in the process of the struggle between materialism and idealism. Therefore, he sought to enroll in the camp of materialists as many philosophers as possible, thinking that Marxism wins something from this. He ranked among the materialists Parmenides and the Pythagoreans.
No philosophy has ever possessed and never will have the ability to change and renew the world. Only Fichte and Hegel had such a view of philosophy. The ability to change the world is possessed not by philosophy, but by revolutionary movements, which has realized their place and role in society.
With the help of philosophy, a revolutionary movement realizes its historical role. A theory becomes a force only when it is possessed by the people. Philosophy is not a force in itself, but only if it becomes a force when it serves the interests of practice, when it answers the questions put forward by practice. German idealism’s greatest mistake was the Hegelian concept of philosophy as a pure, immanent process of the development of human thinking. But in order for a revolutionary movement to be able to practically apply the lessons of a philosophy in its own social struggle, academicism and scholasticism should be decisively removed from philosophy in the very near future. Our philosophy should fully connect with life and go forward with it.