Zinovy Beletsky: On the shortcomings and mistakes in the coverage of the history of German philosophy of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, 1944
Written: 1944
First published: April 1944 in Bolshevik magazine 7-8, pp. 16-17, as a Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b). It was in fact written and presented by Beletsky and passed by the Central Committee.
Source: work-way.com
Translated by: Anton P.
In 1943, the Institute of Philosophy of the USSR Academy of Sciences published the third volume of the History of Philosophy (edited by Comrades G. Aleksandrov, B. Bykhovsky, M. Mitin, P. Yudin). A significant part of the volume is devoted to the presentation and assessment of German philosophy of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. In the third volume of the History of Philosophy, serious mistakes were made in the presentation and assessment of German philosophy.
The classics of Marxism-Leninism distinguish two sides in Hegel’s philosophy: the dialectical method and the conservative metaphysical system. If Hegel’s dialectical method contained a “rational kernel” – the doctrine of development – and was the progressive side of Hegel’s philosophy, then his idealistic dogmatic system was conservative, required an end to development and was in sharp contradiction with the dialectical method.
Meanwhile, in the chapters of Volume III of the History of Philosophy, dedicated to the philosophy of Kant, Fichte and Hegel (the authors of the chapters are Comrades Asmus, Bykhovsky, Chernyshev), the contradiction between the progressive side of Hegel’s philosophy – his dialectical method – and the conservative side – his dogmatic system – is blurred. Volume III does not take into account that Hegel tried to build a complete philosophical system, which was supposed to express absolute truth. Hegel, in essence, proclaimed the end of history, the end of all development – mankind, through Hegel’s philosophy, supposedly comes to the knowledge of the absolute idea. Criticizing the desire of Hegel to pass off his philosophical system as absolute truth, Engels wrote: But this meant proclaiming the entire dogmatic content of Hegel’s system as absolute truth and thereby contradicting his dialectical method, which disintegrates everything dogmatic. This meant crushing the revolutionary side under the weight of the overgrown conservative side. And not only in the field of philosophical knowledge, but also in relation to historical practice. Humanity, in the person of Hegel, has risen to the knowledge of the absolute idea, in the practical field, he must have gone so far ahead that it already became possible for him to carry the absolute idea into reality. The absolute idea should not have made too broad political demands on its contemporaries. That is why at the end of “The Philosophy of Right” we learn that the absolute idea must be realized in that monarchy, limited by estate representation, which Frederick William III so stubbornly and so vainly promised his subjects, that is, the limited and moderate indirect rule of the propertied classes, adapted to the then petty-bourgeois relations of Germany. And in conclusion, the necessity of the nobility is proved there in a speculative way. (Marx and Engels. Vol. XIV, p. 639).
The contradiction between Hegel’s method and system permeates all his philosophical views. It is clear that in the subsequent period various kinds of reactionaries in politics and philosophy clung to the conservative side of Hegel’s teachings, to his system, and acted as ardent opponents of Hegel’s dialectical method. The revolutionary thinkers used the progressive side of Hegel’s philosophy – his dialectical method. Marx and Engels rejected the reactionary system of Hegelian philosophy. At the same time, they retained the progressive that was contained in Hegel’s dialectical method. But Marx and Engels radically revised Hegel’s method, turned it upside down, and thus Hegel’s idealistic dialectic gave way to Marx’s materialistic dialectic. My dialectical method, wrote Marx in the afterword to the second edition of Volume I of Capital, is not only fundamentally different from Hegel’s, but is its direct opposite. For Hegel, the process of thinking, which under the name of an idea he even turns into an independent subject, is a demiurge [creator] of reality, which is only its external manifestation. For me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing more than material, transplanted into the human head and transformed in it.
Therefore, Marx could not simply take Hegel’s dialectic, since Hegel’s dialectic was inextricably linked with his idealist philosophical system. In Hegel’s philosophy, idealism and dialectics are merged into one whole, and the ultimate task of dialectics was to prove the truth of objective idealism. Hence it is clear that the materialist dialectic of Marx is in its very essence opposite to the idealist dialectic of Hegel. As we know, Lenin pointed out that Hegel only guessed the dialectic of things in the dialectic of concepts, he guessed no more (Lenin, Philosophical Notebooks, p. 189) and that Hegel’s dialectic had to be isolated from the dung heap of absolute idealism (Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism. Works. Vol. XIII, p. 199).
In his work On Dialectical and Historical Materialism, Comrade Stalin gave a truly scientific assessment of Hegel’s dialectics and with exhaustive clarity defined the relationship of Marxist dialectics to Hegelian dialectics. Comrade Stalin said: When characterizing their dialectical method, Marx and Engels usually refer to Hegel as the philosopher who formulated the main features of dialectics. This, however, does not mean that the dialectic of Marx and Engels is identical with the dialectic of Hegel. In fact, Marx and Engels took from Hegel’s dialectic only its “rational kernel”, discarding the Hegelian idealistic husk and developing dialectics further in order to give it a modern scientific look. (Stalin, Questions of Leninism, p. 535. 11th ed.).
Meanwhile, the authors of Volume III of the History of Philosophy departed from the Marxist-Leninist assessment of the significance of Hegelian dialectics, did not show the limitations of Hegelian dialectics, did not emphasize its opposition to materialist dialectics, and in a number of cases the characteristics of Hegelian dialectics hardly differ from Marxist dialectics. Considering Hegel’s philosophy, the authors of the volume clearly overestimate Hegel’s merits in substantiating a historical view of the development of nature and society, in developing the doctrine of the role of practice in the theory of knowledge. In Volume III of the History of Philosophy, Hegel’s dialectic is incorrectly portrayed as complete and all-embracing. For example, on page 216 of the volume it says: The historical significance of Hegel in the history of philosophy is based on the fact that in his teaching the dialectical method of thinking was completed and received a comprehensive encyclopedic development.
It is clear that there is nothing of the kind in Hegel’s philosophy. Hegel did not complete and could not complete the development of the dialectical method just because he was an idealist and a conservative in social views; moreover, as is known, for the fulfillment of such a task during the life of Hegel, neither the social conditions necessary for this, nor the conditions of scientific development were yet formed, therefore his dialectics could not be either all-embracing or complete. The authors of Volume III groundlessly ascribe to Hegel the spread of dialectics to public life. On page 218 the authors write: The deepening of the dialectical method, the creation of a new, dialectical logic was Hegel’s great historical merit. The substantiation of the universality of dialectics, the extension of the dialectical method not only to nature, but also to social life, the conquest of human history for dialectics – such is his other historical merit.
It is known that Hegel was unable to draw a historical view of the development of nature. It is all the more groundless to ascribe to Hegel the spread of dialectics to public life. The application of dialectics to the analysis of social life would inevitably lead Hegel to revolutionary conclusions in relation to contemporary German reality, which, as we know, he did not make. Dialectics requires to consider social life in change, in development, and each already achieved stage of social development not as the final result of social progress, but as a necessary and starting point for the subsequent development of society. Meanwhile, Hegel considered the modern state system of Germany to be the end result of historical development, and the Prussian monarchy to be the embodiment of the absolute spirit.
It is also wrong to assert the authors of the volume that Hegel created a new theory of the historical process. On page 221 of the volume it is said: The world-historical significance of Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit” consists in the disclosure of a new, in-depth concept of history, in the approval of a new concept of development. On the same page, the following incorrect statement is put forward: Hegel deeply grasped here the essence of history as a natural process, united in its contradictoriness, as a mobile, dynamic interconnection of events. The authors in this case ascribed merit to Hegel, which in reality does not belong to him. Compared with Montesquieu or Herder, Hegel made a well-known step forward in understanding history. However, Hegel’s views on history remained within the limits of that idealistic understanding of the historical process, which was characteristic of all preceding sociology. Hegel’s views on history cannot today be regarded otherwise than as completely outdated. In general, the philosophy of history, writes Lenin about Hegel, gives very, very little – this is understandable, for it is here, precisely in this area in this science, that Marx and Engels made the greatest step forward. Here Hegel is most outdated and antiquated. (Lenin, Philosophical Notebooks, p. 251).
The authors of Volume III did not take into account that the opposition between the Hegelian idealist dialectics and the Marxist dialectical method reflects the opposition between the bourgeois and proletarian worldviews. It is known that Hegel’s dialectic is addressed exclusively to the past; it is applied to the past history of human society, to the history of law, aesthetics, religion and philosophy. In addition, Hegel illuminates the past from a preconceived, idealistic point of view, from the point of view of the self-development of the absolute spirit. In contrast to this, the classics of Marxism-Leninism created and substantiated a dialectical-materialist understanding of social life, applied dialectics not only to the past, but also to the present and future development of human society. Speaking about the application of the dialectical method to public life, Comrade Stalin writes: If the world is in continuous movement and development, if the withering away of the old and the growth of the new is the law of development, then it is clear that there are no more unshakable social orders, eternal principles of private property and exploitation, eternal ideas of subordination of peasants to landlords, workers to capitalists. This means that the capitalist system can be replaced by the socialist system, just as the capitalist system replaced the feudal system in its time. (Questions of Leninism, p. 540, 11th ed.).
One of the main features of the Marxist dialectical method as applied to the practical activities of the Bolshevik Party is that in politics it is necessary to focus not on those strata of society that are not developing anymore, although they are present; moment the prevailing force, and those layers that develop have a future, although they do not represent the prevailing force at the moment. So, says Comrade Stalin, in order not to be mistaken in politics, one must look forward, not backward.
In volume III, the philosophy of Kant, Fichte, Hegel is portrayed primarily as progressive, as a result of which their conservative philosophical system is obscured. The classics of Marxism-Leninism sharply criticized the conservative political views of German philosophers and emphasized the predominance of the conservative side in their worldview. Engels, for example, wrote about Hegel: Hegel himself, despite the frequent outbursts of revolutionary anger in his writings, generally inclined mainly towards the conservative side. (Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach. Works of Marx and Engels. Vol. XIV, p. 641) Marx and Engels wrote about Hegel's philosophy of right: Looking a little closer, we discover that here, as in many other cases, German idealism only sanctions the laws of the existing society and throws a supersensible veil on them. (Marx and Engels, The Death Penalty. Vol. IX, p. 88). Volume III of the History of Philosophy did not take into account these instructions of Marx and Engels, did not criticize such reactionary socio-political ideas of German philosophy as the praise of the Prussian monarchical state, the exaltation of the Germans as a “chosen” people, a disdainful attitude towards the Slavic peoples, the apologetics of war, justification of colonial conquest policy, etc. Thus, the volume obscures the fact that the ideologists of the German imperialist bourgeoisie use the reactionary sides of the philosophy of Kant, Fichte and Hegel.
Thus, for example, in the third volume of the History of Philosophy, the following reactionary arguments of Hegel about war from his Philosophy of Right are completely ignored. Hegel writes: The high significance of war lies in the fact that thanks to it, as I have expressed elsewhere, the moral health of peoples is preserved, its indifference to the solidification of finite determinations; just as the movement of the winds prevents the lake from rotting, which would surely happen to it with a prolonged calm, so the war protects the peoples from decay, which would certainly be the result of a long, and even more so eternal peace. Hegel writes further that successful wars prevented internal unrest from developing and strengthened state power ... people are sucked in by the swamp, their particular features are more and more consolidated and ossified ... From the war, the peoples, not only come out fortified, but nations, within which there are irreconcilable antagonisms, find inner peace thanks to external wars. War, it is true, brings with it insecurity of property, but this real insecurity is nothing more than a necessary movement ... Wars arise where they are caused by the nature of things; crops again give shoots, and idle chatter falls silent before serious repetitions of history. (Philosophy of Right, pp. 344-345). From the above quotation, it is clear that Hegel in the most definite way speaks for the need for wars. In this case, he acts as a preacher, an apologist for war.
In the third volume, the reactionary arguments of Hegel, exalting the German people as a chosen people, supposedly called to rule over other peoples, are passed over in silence. Speaking about the progressive march of the developing self-consciousness of the world spirit, Hegel makes a general conclusion that in world history for a given epoch one people becomes the dominant people, which can constitute an epoch: the spirits of other peoples have no rights, and they, as well as those whose era has passed, no longer count in world history. (ibid., p. 356). The authors cite this reasoning of Hegel, but do not explain that all this was required for Hegel to substantiate the “chosenness” and the special role of the German people in history. In his writings, Hegel pursued the point of view of German nationalism and the purely Prussian principle of the domination of the German people over other peoples.
The authors of Volume III also pass over in silence Hegel’s thesis about the need for systematic colonization of other peoples. Hegel wrote in Philosophy of Right that civil society sees itself compelled to found colonies. The growth of the population alone influences it in this direction, but, in particular, the fact that part of the population cannot satisfy their needs with labor if production exceeds the need for consumption is important. (p. 257). Not criticized in the volume are also the reactionary arguments of Hegel about the Slavic peoples. Hegel in his Philosophy of History wrote: ...in Eastern Europe we find the huge Sclavonic [Slavic] nation, whose settlements extended west of the Elbe to the Danube ... Yet this entire body of peoples remains excluded from our consideration, because hitherto it has not appeared as an independent element in the series of phases that Reason has assumed in the World. (p. 330).
The authors of Volume III did not show the reactionary meaning of Hegel’s statements glorifying the Prussian state. In the Philosophy of Right Hegel holds the idea that the state is an earthly being. Hegel writes that the existence of the state is the procession of God in the world; it is based on the power of reason, which realizes itself as will. When thinking about the state, one must bear in mind not special states, special institutions, but rather the idea itself, this real God. (pp. 268-269). Hegel considers the highest type of state to be a constitutional monarchy. He writes: The development of the state into a constitutional monarchy is a matter of the new world, in which the substantial idea has acquired an infinite form (p. 296). And further: When considering the organization of the state, that is, here when considering a constitutional monarchy, one should not take into consideration anything other than the need for an idea within oneself; all other points of view must disappear. The state should be viewed as a great architectonic edifice, as a hieroglyph of reason that embodies itself in reality. (p. 306). Persistently defending the reactionary type of state, Hegel emphasizes the divine sovereignty of the monarch and the lack of rights of the people. In The Philosophy of Right, Hegel writes that a people is nothing more than a shapeless mass, whose actions are spontaneous, unreasonable, wild and terrible. (p. 328).
Volume III misrepresents Fichte’s political views. On page 165 it says: Fichte’s nationalism is, first of all, the form of his democracy, that is, the form in which Fichte’s conviction of the right of the people to freely determine the basic principles of their political life was clothed. Meanwhile, Fichte wrote in one of his speeches to the German nation: Only a German, as an original person, not frozen in definite forms, truly has his own people; the foreigner does not have it. Therefore, only a German can have love for his people, love for his homeland in the true sense of the word. Or again: If the German does not save the modern culture of mankind, then it is unlikely that another European nation will save it. From what has been said it is clear that Fichte was not a democrat, but was a Prussian nationalist.
Thus, in the chapters of the third volume of the History of Philosophy, devoted to the philosophy of Kant, Fichte and Hegel, an erroneous presentation of the history of German philosophy is given, exaggerating its significance, blurring the contradiction between the system and the method of Hegel’s philosophy, causing confusion in the minds of readers. The volume does not criticize the reactionary socio-political views of German philosophers of the late 18th and early 19th centuries.
In 1943, the Stalin Prize was awarded for three volumes of the History of Philosophy. The Stalin Prize Committee reviewed this issue again and decided that the Stalin Prize awarded for the three volumes of the History of Philosophy that had been published did not apply to the third volume of this edition.
It is clear that Volume III of the History of Philosophy must be radically revised. In the new, revised edition of Volume III of the History of Philosophy, it is necessary to give a correct, Marxist-Leninist exposition of the role and essence of German philosophy of the late 18th and early 19th centuries.