J. V. Stalin


Plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 1

July 4-12, 1928

Source: Works, Vol. 11, January, 1928 to March, 1929
Publisher: Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954
Transcription/Markup: Salil Sen for MIA, 2008
Public Domain: Marxists Internet Archive (2008). You may freely copy, distribute, display and perform this work; as well as make derivative and commercial works. Please credit "Marxists Internet Archive" as your source.


The Programme of the Comintern
Speech Delivered on July 5, 1928

The first thing we have to consider, comrades, is the size of the draft programme of the Comintern. 2

Some say that the draft programme is too large, too ponderous. They demand that it be compressed to a half or a third. They demand that some general formulas should be given in the programme and nothing more, and that these formulas be called a programme.

I think that these demands are devoid of foundation. Those who demand that the programme be compressed to a half or even a third do not understand the tasks that confronted those who drew up the draft. The point is that the programme of the Comintern cannot be the programme of any one national party, or, say, a programme for only the "civilised" nations. The programme must cover all the Communist Parties of the world, all nations, all peoples, both white and black. That is the basic and characteristic feature of the draft programme. But how is it possible to cover the basic needs and basic lines of work of all the sections of the Comintern, both Eastern and Western, if the programme is compressed to a half or a third? Let the comrades try to solve this insoluble problem. That is why I think that to compress the programme to a half or a third would mean converting it from a programme into a mere list of abstract formulas without any value for the sections of the Comintern.

Those who drew up the programme were faced with a double problem: on the one hand, to cover the chief and basic features of all the Communist Parties of the world, and, on the other hand, to do so in such a way that the various propositions of the programme should not be empty formulas, but should provide practical guiding principles for the most diverse countries and peoples, for the most diverse Communist Parties and communist groups. You must agree that it is quite impossible to solve this double problem in a brief and concise draft.

What is most curious is that the very comrades who propose that the programme be compressed to a half or even a third, also put forward proposals which would tend to expand the present draft programme to twice, if not three times its size. In point of fact, if we are to give in the draft programme lengthy formulations on the trade unions, on the co-operatives, on culture, on the European national minorities and so on, is it not obvious that the effect of this cannot be to compress the programme? The size of the present draft would have to be doubled, if not trebled.

The same thing must be said of those comrades who demand either that the programme be a concrete instruction for the Communist Parties, or that it explain every possible thing, down to the individual propositions in it. In the first place, it is wrong to say that the programme must be only an instruction, or mainly an instruction.

That is wrong. That cannot be demanded of a programme, to say nothing of the fact that the result would be to enlarge the size of the programme incredibly. In the second place, a programme cannot explain every possible thing, down to its individual declarative or theoretical propositions. That is the business of commentaries to the programme. A programme must not be confused with a commentary.

The second question concerns the structure of the programme and the order of arrangement of the individual chapters within the draft programme.

Some comrades demand that the chapter on the ultimate aim of the movement, on communism, be transferred to the end of the programme. I think that this demand also is devoid of foundation. Between the chapter on the crisis of capitalism and the chapter on the transition period, there is in the draft programme a chapter on communism, on the communist economic system. Is this arrangement of chapters correct? I consider that it is quite correct. You cannot speak of the transition period without first speaking of the economic system, in this case the communist economic system, the transition to which the programme proposes. We speak of the transition period, the transition from capitalism to another economic system. But a transition to what, to what system exactly—that is what must be first discussed before proceeding to describe the transition period itself. The programme should proceed from the unknown to the known, from the less known to the better known. To speak of the crisis of capitalism and then of the transition period, without first speaking of the system to which the transition is to be made, would confuse the reader and infringe an elementary requirement of pedagogy, one that is at the same time a requirement for the structure of the programme. Well, the programme should make it easier for the reader in leading him from the less known to the better known, and not make it more difficult for him.

Other comrades think that the paragraph on Social-Democracy ought not to be included in the second chapter of the draft programme, which deals with the first phase of the proletarian revolution and with the partial stabilisation of capitalism. They think that they are thereby raising a question of the structure of the programme. That is not so, comrades. Actually, it is a political question that confronts us here. To delete the paragraph on Social-Democracy from the second chapter would be to commit a political mistake in regard to one of the basic questions of the reasons for the partial stabilisation of capitalism. It is not a matter here of the structure of the programme, but of the appraisal of the political situation in the period of partial stabilisation, an appraisal of the counter-revolutionary role of Social-Democracy as one of the factors of this stabilisation. These comrades cannot but know that we cannot dispense with a paragraph on Social-Democracy in the chapter on the partial stabilisation of capitalism, because this stabilisation itself cannot be explained without describing the role of Social-Democracy as one of the major factors of the stabilisation. Otherwise, we should also have to exclude from this chapter the paragraph on fascism, and transfer it, like the paragraph on Social-Democracy, to the chapter on parties. But to exclude these two paragraphs—on fascism and on Social-Democracy—from the chapter dealing with the partial stabilisation of capitalism would mean to disarm ourselves and deprive ourselves of all possibility of explaining the capitalist stabilisation. Obviously, we cannot agree to that.

The question of NEP and war communism. NEP is a policy of the proletarian dictatorship which is designed to overcome the capitalist elements and to build a socialist economy by utilising the market and through the market, and not by direct products-exchange, without a market and apart from the market. Can capitalist countries, even the most highly developed, dispense with NEP in the transition from capitalism to socialism? I do not think that they can. In one degree or another, the New Economic Policy, with its market connections, and the utilisation of these market connections, will be absolutely essential for every capitalist country in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

We have comrades who deny this proposition. But what does denying this proposition mean?

It means, in the first place, to hold that immediately after the proletariat has come to power we shall have ready to function 100 per cent a machinery of distribution and supply between town and country, between industry and small-scale production, which will make it possible to establish at once direct products-exchange, without a market, without commodity circulation, and without a money economy. The matter has only to be raised to realise how utterly absurd such an assumption is.

It means, in the second place, to hold that after the seizure of power by the proletariat the proletarian revolution must adopt the course of expropriating the middle and petty bourgeoisie, must take upon its shoulders the incredible burden of finding work and assuring means of subsistence for an artificially created army of millions of new unemployed. The matter has only to be raised to realise how ridiculous and foolish it would be for the proletarian dictatorship to adopt such a policy. One of the good things about NEP is that it relieves the proletarian dictatorship of these and similar difficulties.

But it follows from this that NEP is an inevitable phase of the socialist revolution in all countries.

Can the same thing be said of war communism? Can it be said that war communism is an inevitable phase of the proletarian revolution? No, it cannot. War communism is a policy forced upon the proletarian dictatorship by a situation of war and intervention; it is designed for the establishment of direct products-exchange between town and country, not through the market but apart from the market, chiefly by measures of an extra-economic and partially military character, and aims at organising such a distribution of products as can ensure the supply of the revolutionary armies at the front and of the workers in the rear. Obviously, if there had not been a situation of war and intervention, there would have been no war communism. Consequently, it cannot be asserted that war communism is an economically inevitable phase of development of the proletarian revolution.

It would be incorrect to think that the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. began its economic work with war communism. Some comrades incline towards this opinion. But it is a wrong opinion. On the contrary, the proletarian dictatorship in our country began its constructive work not with war communism, but with the proclamation of the principles of what is called the New Economic Policy. Everyone is familiar with Lenin's pamphlet, The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Power, 3 which was published in the beginning of 1918, and in which Lenin first substantiated the principles of the New Economic Policy. True, this policy was temporarily interrupted by the conditions of intervention, and it was only three years later, when war and intervention had been ended, that it had to be resumed. But the fact that the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. had to return to the principles of the New Economic Policy, which had already been proclaimed at the beginning of 1918—this fact plainly shows where the proletarian dictatorship must begin its constructive work on the day following the revolution, and on what it must base its constructive work—if, of course, it is economic considerations we have in mind.

Sometimes war communism is confused with the civil war, and the two are identified. That, of course, is incorrect. The seizure of power by the proletariat in October 1917 was undoubtedly a form of civil war. But it would be wrong to say that we began to apply war communism in October 1917. It is quite possible to conceive a state of civil war in which the methods of war communism are not applied, in which the principles of the New Economic Policy are not abandoned, as was the case in our country in the early part of 1918, before the intervention.

Some say that the proletarian revolutions will take place in isolation from one another, and that therefore not a single proletarian revolution will be able to escape intervention, and hence war communism. That is not true. Now that we have succeeded in consolidating Soviet power in the U.S.S.R., now that the Communist Parties in the principal capitalist countries have grown and the Comintern has increased in strength, there cannot and should not be isolated proletarian revolutions. We must not overlook such factors as the increasing acuteness of the crisis of world capitalism, the existence of the Soviet Union, and the growth of communism in all countries. (A voice: "But the revolution in Hungary was isolated.") That was in 1919. 4 Now we are in 1928. It suffices to recall the revolution in Germany in 1923, 5 when the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. was getting ready to render direct assistance to the German revolution, to realise how utterly relative and conditional the arguments of some comrades are. (A voice: "The isolated revolution in Germany— the isolation between France and Germany.") You are confusing spatial remoteness with political isolation. Spatial remoteness is, of course, a factor. Nevertheless, it should not be confused with political isolation.

And what about the workers in the interventionist countries?—do you think they will remain silent if there is intervention in a German revolution, say, and will not strike at the interventionists from the rear?

And what about the U.S.S.R. and its proletariat?— do you think that the proletarian revolution in the U.S.S.R. will look calmly on at the misdeeds of the interventionists?

To injure the interventionists, it is by no means essential to establish spatial connection with the revolutionary country. It is enough to sting the interventionists at those points in their own territory which are most vulnerable to make them sense the danger and comprehend the full reality of proletarian solidarity. Suppose that we offended bourgeois Britain in the Leningrad area and caused her serious damage. Does it follow that Britain would necessarily take revenge on us in Leningrad? No, it does not. She might take revenge on us somewhere else, in Batum, Odessa, Baku, or Vladivostok, say. The same is true of the forms of assistance and support rendered by the proletarian dictatorship to a proletarian revolution in one of the countries of Europe, say, against imperialist interventionists.

But while it cannot be admitted that intervention, and hence war communism, must necessarily occur in all countries, it can and should be admitted that they are more or less probable. Therefore, while not agreeing with the arguments of these comrades, I do agree with their conclusion, namely, that the formula in the draft programme which speaks of the possibility, in definite international conditions, of war communism in countries where a proletarian revolution has taken place, might be replaced by a formula saying that intervention and war communism are more or less probable.

The question of the nationalisation of the land. I do not agree with those comrades who propose that the formula on the nationalisation of the land in the case of capitalistically developed countries should be altered, and who demand that in such countries the nationalisation of all the land should be proclaimed on the first day of the proletarian revolution.

Nor do I agree with those comrades who propose that nothing at all should be said about the nationalisation of all the land in the capitalistically developed countries. In my opinion, it would be better to speak, as the draft programme does, of the eventual nationalisation of all the land, with an addition to the effect that the right of the small and middle peasants to use of the land will be guaranteed.

Those comrades are mistaken who think that the more capitalistically developed a country is, the easier it will be to nationalise all the land in that country. On the contrary, the more capitalistically developed a country is, the more difficult will it be to nationalise all the land, because the stronger are the traditions of private ownership of the land in that country, and the harder, therefore, will it be to combat those traditions.

Read Lenin's theses on the agrarian question at the Second Congress of the Comintern, 6 where he explicitly warns against hasty and incautious steps in this direction, and you will understand how mistaken the assertions of these comrades are. In the capitalistically developed countries private ownership of the land has existed for centuries, which cannot be said of the countries less developed capitalistically, where the principle of private ownership of the land has not yet become deeply rooted in the peasantry. Here, in Russia, the peasants at one time even used to say that the land belonged to no man, that it was God's land. This, in fact, explains why as early as 1906, in expectation of a bourgeois-democratic revolution in our country,

Lenin put forward the slogan of the nationalisation of all the land, with the proviso that the small and middle peasants should be guaranteed the use of the land, considering that the peasants would understand this and reconcile themselves to it.

Is it not noteworthy, on the other hand, that in 1920, at the Second Congress of the Comintern, Lenin himself warned the Communist Parties of the capitalistically developed countries not to put forward immediately the slogan of nationalising all the land, since the peasants of these countries, imbued as they are with the private property instinct, would not stomach such a slogan at once. Can we ignore this difference and refuse to pay heed to Lenin's recommendations? Obviously, we cannot.

The question of the inner substance of the draft programme. It appears that certain comrades consider that in its inner substance the draft programme is not quite international, because, they say, it is "too Russian" in character. I have not heard such objections put forward here. But it appears that such objections exist in some circles round about the Comintern.

What can have furnished grounds for such an opinion?

Is it, perhaps, the fact that the draft programme contains a special chapter on the U.S.S.R.? But what can there be bad in that? Is our revolution, in its character, a national and only a national revolution, and not pre-eminently an international revolution? If so, why do we call it a base of the world revolutionary movement, an instrument for the revolutionary development of all countries, the motherland of the world proletariat?

There were people among us—our oppositionists, for instance—who considered that the revolution in the U.S.S.R. was exclusively or mainly a national revolution. It was on this point that they came to grief. It is strange that there are people round about the Comintern, it appears, who are prepared to follow in the footsteps of the oppositionists.

Perhaps our revolution is, in type, a national and only a national revolution? But our revolution is a Soviet revolution, and the Soviet form of proletarian state is more or less obligatory for the dictatorship of the proletariat in other countries. It is not without reason that Lenin said that the revolution in the U.S.S.R. had ushered in a new era in the history of development, the era of Soviets. Does it not follow from this that, not only as regards its character but also as regards its type, our revolution is pre-eminently an international revolution, one that presents a pattern of what, in the main, a proletarian revolution should be in any country?

Undoubtedly, the international character of our revolution imposes upon the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. certain duties towards the proletarians and oppressed masses of the whole world. This was what Lenin had in mind when he said that the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. exists in order to do everything possible for the development and victory of the proletarian revolution in other countries. But what follows from this? It follows, at least, that our revolution is part of the world revolution, a base and an instrument of the world revolutionary movement.

Undoubtedly, too, not only has the revolution in the U.S.S.R. duties towards the proletarians of all countries, duties which it is discharging, but the proletarians of all countries have certain fairly important duties towards the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. These duties consist in supporting the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. in its struggle against internal and external enemies, in war against a war designed to strangle the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R., in advocating that imperialist armies should directly go over to the side of the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. in the event of an attack on the U.S.S.R. But does it not follow from this that the revolution in the U.S.S.R. is inseparable from the revolutionary movement in other countries, that the triumph of the revolution in the U.S.S.R. is a triumph for the revolution throughout the world?

Is it possible, after all this, to speak of the revolution in the U.S.S.R. as being only a national revolution, isolated from and having no connection with the revolutionary movement throughout the world?

And, on the other hand, is it possible, after all this, to understand anything at all about the world revolutionary movement, if it is considered out of connection with the proletarian revolution in the U.S.S.R.?

What would be the value of the programme of the Comintern, which deals with the world proletarian revolution, if it ignored the fundamental question of the character and tasks of the proletarian revolution in the U.S.S.R., its duties towards the proletarians of all countries, and the duties of the proletarians of all countries towards the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R.?

That is why I think that the objections concerning the "Russian character" of the draft programme of the Comintern bear the stamp—how shall I put it mildly?— well, a bad stamp, an unpleasant flavour.

Let us pass to a few separate remarks.

I consider that those comrades are right who suggest amending the sentence on page 55 of the draft programme which speaks of the labouring sections of the rural population "who follow the proletarian dictatorship." This sentence is an obvious misunderstanding, or perhaps it is a proof-reader's error. It should be amended.

But these comrades are quite wrong when they propose the inclusion in the draft programme of all the definitions of the dictatorship of the proletariat given by Lenin. (Laughter.) On page 52 we have the following definition of the dictatorship of the proletariat, taken in the main from Lenin:

"The dictatorship of the proletariat is the continuation of its class struggle in new conditions. The dictatorship of the proletariat is a stubborn struggle—bloody and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administra-tive—against the forces and traditions of the old society, against the external capitalist enemies, against the remnants of the exploiting classes at home, against the shoots of a new bourgeoisie that spring from the soil of commodity production which has not yet been eliminated." 7

The draft programme contains also a number of other definitions of the dictatorship, corresponding to the particular tasks of the dictatorship at various stages of the proletarian revolution. I think that this is quite sufficient. (A voice: "One of Lenin's formulations has been omitted.") Lenin has whole pages on the dictatorship of the proletariat. If they were all to be included in the draft programme, I am afraid it would be increased to at least three times its size.

Incorrect, too, is the objection raised by some comrades to the thesis on the neutralisation of the middle peasantry. In his theses at the Second Congress of the Comintern, Lenin explicitly states that on the eve of the seizure of power and in the first stage of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the capitalist countries the Communist Parties cannot count on anything more than neutralising the middle peasantry. Lenin explicitly states that only after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been consolidated can the Communist Parties count on organising a stable alliance with the middle peasant. Clearly, when compiling the draft programme, we could not ignore this directive of Lenin's, to say nothing of the fact that it coincides exactly with the experience of our revolution.

Incorrect, too, is the comment on the national question made by a number of comrades. These comrades have no grounds for asserting that the draft programme ignores the national factors in the revolutionary movement. The question of the colonies is fundamentally a national one. Imperialist oppression, oppression in the colonies, national self-determination, the right of nations and colonies to secession, etc., are given sufficient prominence in the draft programme.

If it is the national minorities in Central Europe that these comrades have in mind, this may be mentioned in the draft programme, but I am opposed to the national question in Central Europe being given separate treatment in it.

Lastly, as to the remarks made by a number of comrades on the statement that Poland is a country representing the second type of development towards proletarian dictatorship. These comrades think that the classification of countries into three types—countries with a high capitalist development (America, Germany, Britain), countries with an average capitalist development (Poland, Russia before the February Revolution, etc.), and colonial countries—is wrong. They maintain that Poland should be included in the first type of countries, that one can speak only of two types of countries—capitalist and colonial.

That is not true, comrades. Besides capitalistically developed countries, where the victory of the revolution will lead at once to the proletarian dictatorship, there are countries which are little developed capitalist-ically, where there are feudal survivals and a special agrarian problem of the anti-feudal type (Poland, Rumania, etc.), countries where the petty bourgeoisie, especially the peasantry, is bound to have a weighty word to say in the event of a revolutionary upheaval, and where the victory of the revolution, in order to lead to a proletarian dictatorship, can and certainly will require certain intermediate stages, in the form, say, of a dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.

In our country, too, there were people, such as Trotsky, who before the February Revolution said that the peasantry was not of serious consequence, and that the slogan of the moment was "no tsar, but a workers' government." You know that Lenin emphatically dissociated himself from this slogan and objected to any underestimation of the role and importance of the petty bourgeoisie, especially of the peasantry. There were some in our country at that time who thought that after the overthrow of tsarism the proletariat would at once occupy the predominating position. But how did it turn out in reality? It turned out that immediately after the February Revolution the vast masses of the petty bourgeoisie appeared on the scene and gave predominance to the petty-bourgeois parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks, who had been tiny parties until then, "suddenly" became the predominating force in the country. Thanks to what? Thanks to the fact that the vast masses of the petty bourgeoisie at first supported the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks.

This, incidently, explains why the proletarian dictatorship was established in our country as a result of the more or less rapid growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a socialist revolution.

There is scarcely reason to doubt that Poland and Rumania belong to the category of countries which will have to pass, more or less rapidly, through certain intermediate stages on the way to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

That is why I think that these comrades are mistaken when they deny that there are three types of revolutionary movement on the way towards the dictatorship of the proletariat. Poland and Rumania are representative of the second type.

These, comrades, are my remarks on the draft programme of the Comintern.

As to the style of the draft programme, or of certain individual formulations, I cannot affirm that in this respect the draft programme is perfect. It is to be presumed that some things will have to be improved, more precisely defined, that the style, perhaps, will have to be simplified, and so on. But that is a matter for the Programme Commission of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern. 8

Industrialisation and the Grain Problem
Speech Delivered on July 9, 1928

Comrades, before I pass to the specific question of our difficulties on the grain front, allow me to deal with some general questions of theoretical interest which arose here during the discussion at the plenum.

First of all, the general question of the chief sources of development of our industry, the means of guaranteeing our present rate of industrialisation.

Ossinsky and then Sokolnikov touched upon this question, perhaps without themselves realising it. It is a question of paramount importance.

I think that there are two chief sources nourishing our industry: firstly, the working class; secondly, the peasantry.

In the capitalist countries industrialisation was usually effected, in the main, by robbing other countries, by robbing colonies or defeated countries, or with the help of substantial and more or less enslaving loans from abroad.

You know that for hundreds of years Britain collected capital from all her colonies and from all parts of the world, and was able in this way to make additional investments in her industry. This, incidentally, explains why Britain at one time became the "workshop of the world."

You know also that Germany developed her industry with the help, among other things, of the 5,000 million francs she levied as an indemnity on France after the Franco-Prussian war.

One respect in which our country differs from the capitalist countries is that it cannot and must not engage in colonial robbery, or the plundering of other countries in general. That way, therefore, is closed to us.

Neither, however, does our country have or want to have enslaving loans from abroad. Consequently, that way, too, is closed to us.

What then remains? Only one thing, and that is to develop industry, to industrialise the country with the help of internal accumulations.

Under the bourgeois system in our country, industry, transport, etc., were usually developed with the help of loans. Whether you take the building of new factories or the re-equipment of old ones, whether you take the laying of new railways or the erection of big electric power stations—not one of these undertakings was able to dispense with foreign loans. But they were enslaving loans.

Quite different is the situation in our country under the Soviet system. We are building the Turkestan Railway, with a length of 1,400 versts, which requires hundreds of millions of rubles. We are erecting the Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station, which also requires hundreds of millions of rubles. But have they involved us in any enslaving loans? No, they have not. All this is being done with the help of internal accumulations.

But what are the chief sources of these accumulations? As I have said, there are two such sources: firstly, the working class, which creates values and advances our industry; secondly, the peasantry.

The way matters stand with the peasantry in this respect is as follows: it not only pays the state the usual taxes, direct and indirect; it also overpays in the relatively high prices for manufactured goods—that is in the first place, and it is more or less underpaid in the prices for agricultural produce—that is in the second place.

This is an additional tax levied on the peasantry for the sake of promoting industry, which caters for the whole country, the peasantry included. It is something in the nature of a "tribute," of a supertax, which we are compelled to levy for the time being in order to preserve and accelerate our present rate of industrial development, in order to ensure an industry for the whole country, in order to raise further the standard of life of the rural population and then to abolish altogether this additional tax, these "scissors" between town and country.

It is an unpalatable business, there is no denying. But we should not be Bolsheviks if we slurred over it and closed our eyes to the fact that, unfortunately, our industry and our country cannot at present dispense with this additional tax on the peasantry.

Why do I speak of this? Because some comrades, apparently, do not understand this indisputable truth. They based their speeches on the fact that the peasants are overpaying for manufactured goods, which is absolutely true, and are being underpaid for agricultural produce, which is also true. But what do they demand? They demand the establishment of replacement prices for grain, so that these "scissors," these underpayments and overpayments, would be done away with at once. But what would be the effect of doing away with the "scissors" this year or next year, say? The effect would be to retard the industrialisation of the country, including the industrialisation of agriculture, to undermine our young industry which is not yet firmly on its feet, and thus to strike at our entire national economy. Can we agree to this? Obviously, we cannot. Should the "scissors" between town and country, should all these underpayments and overpayments be done away with? Yes, they certainly should. Can we do away with them at once without weakening our industry, and hence our national economy? No, we cannot.

What, then, should our policy be? It should be gradually to close the "scissors," to diminish the gap from year to year, by lowering the prices for manufactured goods and improving agricultural technique—which cannot but result in reducing the cost of producing grain— and then, within the space of a number of years, to do away completely with this additional tax on the peasantry.

Are the peasants capable of bearing this burden? They undoubtedly are: firstly, because this burden will grow lighter from year to year, and, secondly, because this additional tax is being levied not under conditions of capitalist development, where the masses of the peasantry are condemned to poverty and exploitation, but under Soviet conditions, where exploitation of the peasants by the socialist state is out of the question, and where this additional tax is being paid in a situation in which the living standards of the peasantry are steadily rising.

That is how matters stand with regard to the basic sources of the industrialisation of our country at the present time.

The second question concerns the problem of the bond with the middle peasant—the problem of the aims of the bond and the means for effecting it.

It would follow from what some comrades say that the bond between town and country, between the working class and the main mass of the peasantry, is based exclusively on textiles, on satisfying the personal requirements of the peasantry. Is this true? It is quite untrue, comrades. Of course, it is of immense importance to satisfy the peasants' personal requirements for textiles. That is how we began to establish the bond with the peasantry in the new conditions. But to assert on these grounds that the bond based on textiles is the beginning and end of the matter, that the bond based on satisfying the peasants' personal requirements is the all-inclusive or chief foundation of the economic alliance between the working class and the peasantry, is to commit a most serious error. Actually, the bond between town and country is based not only on satisfying the peasants' personal requirements, not only on textiles, but also on satisfying the economic requirements of the peasants as producers of agricultural products.

It is not only cotton fabrics that we give the peasants. We also give them machines of all kinds, seeds, ploughs, fertilisers, etc., which are of the weightiest importance for the advancement and socialist transformation of peasant farming.

Hence, the bond is based not only on textiles, but also on metals. Without this, the bond with the peasantry would be insecure.

In what way does the bond based on textiles differ from the bond based on metals? Primarily in the fact that the bond based on textiles chiefly concerns the peasants' personal requirements, without affecting, or affecting to a comparatively small extent, the production side of peasant farming, whereas the bond based on metals chiefly concerns the production side of peasant farming, improving it, mechanising it, making it more remunerative and paving the way for uniting the scattered and small peasant farms into large socially-conducted farms.

It would be a mistake to think that the purpose of the bond is to preserve classes, the peasant class in particular. That is not so, comrades. That is not the purpose of the bond at all. The purpose of the bond is to bring the peasantry closer to the working class, the leader of our entire development, to strengthen the alliance of the peasantry with the working class, the leading force in the alliance, gradually to remould the peasantry, its mentality and its production, along collectivist lines, and thus to bring about the conditions for the abolition of classes.

The purpose of the bond is not to preserve classes, but to abolish them. Whereas the bond based on textiles affects the production side of peasant farming very little and therefore, generally speaking, cannot result in the remoulding of the peasantry along collectivist lines and in the abolition of classes, the bond based upon metals, on the contrary, affects primarily the production side of peasant farming, its mechanisation and its collectivisation, and for this very reason should result in the gradual remoulding of the peasantry, in the gradual elimination of classes, including the peasant class.

How, in general, can the peasant—his mentality, his production—be remoulded, remade, along the lines of bringing his mentality closer to that of the working class, along the lines of the socialist principle of production? What does this require?

It requires, firstly, the widest agitation on behalf of collectivism among the peasant masses.

It requires, secondly, implanting a co-operative communal life and the ever wider extension of our co-operative supply and marketing organisations to the millions of peasant farms. There can be no doubt that had it not been for the broad development of our co-operatives, we should not have that swing towards the collective-farm movement that we observe among the peasants at the present time, for the development of supply and marketing co-operatives is in our conditions a means of preparing the peasants for going over to collective farming.

But all this is still far from enough to remould the peasantry. The principal force for remoulding the peasantry along socialist lines lies in new technical means in agriculture, the mechanisation of agriculture, collective peasant labour, and the electrification of the country.

Lenin has been referred to here, and a passage on the bond with peasant farming has been quoted from his works. But to take Lenin in part, without desiring to take him as a whole, is to misrepresent Lenin. Lenin was fully aware that the bond with the peasantry based on textile goods is a very important matter. But he did not stop there, for, side by side with this, he insisted that the bond with the peasantry should be based also on metals, on supplying the peasant with machines, on the electrification of the country, that is, on all those things which promote the remaking and remoulding of peasant farming on collectivist lines.

Please listen, for example, to the following quotation from Lenin:

"The remaking of the small tiller, the remoulding of his whole mentality and habits, is a work of generations. As regards the small tiller, this problem can be solved, his whole mentality can be put on healthy lines, so to speak, only by the material base, by technical means, by introducing tractors and machines in agriculture on a mass scale, by electrification on a mass scale. That is what would remake the small tiller fundamentally and with immense rapidity" (Vol. XXVI, p. 239).

Quite clearly, the alliance between the working class and the peasantry cannot be stable and lasting, the bond cannot be stable and lasting and cannot attain its purpose of gradually remoulding the peasantry, bringing it closer to the working class and putting it on collec-tivist lines, if the bond based on textiles is not supplemented by the bond based on metals.

That is how Comrade Lenin understood the bond.

The third question is that of the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the class struggle under NEP conditions.

It is necessary first of all to establish the point that the principles of NEP were laid down by our Party not after war communism, as certain comrades sometimes assert, but before it, already at the beginning of 1918, when we were able for the first time to set about building a new, socialist economy. I could refer to Ilyich's pamphlet, The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Power, published in the beginning of 1918, where the principles of NEP are set forth. When the intervention ended and the Party introduced NEP, it described it as a new economic policy because this policy had been interrupted by the intervention and we were in a position to apply it only after the intervention, after war communism, compared with which NEP really was a new economic policy. In confirmation of this, I consider it necessary to refer to the resolution of the Ninth Congress of Soviets, where it is stated in black and white that the principles of the New Economic Policy were laid down before war communism. This resolution, "Preliminary Results of the New Economic Policy," says the following:

"What is known as the New Economic Policy, the basic principles of which were precisely defined already at the time of the first respite, in the spring of 1918,* is based on a strict evaluation of the economic resources of Soviet Russia. The implementation of this policy, which was interrupted by the combined attack of the counter-revolutionary forces of the Russian landlords and bourgeoisie and European imperialism on the workers' and peasants' state, became possible only after the armed suppression of the counter-revolutionary attempts, at the beginning of 1921" (see Resolutions of the Ninth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, p. 16 9.

You will thus see how mistaken is the assertion of some comrades that it was only after war communism that the Party realised the necessity for building socialism in the conditions of a market and a money economy, that is, in the conditions of the New Economic Policy. And what follows from this?

It follows, first of all, that NEP cannot be regarded as only a retreat.

It follows, further, that NEP presumes a victorious and systematic socialist offensive on the capitalist elements in our economy.

The opposition, in the shape of Trotsky, thinks that once NEP has been introduced, only one thing remains for us to do, and that is to retreat step by step, as we retreated at the beginning of NEP, "extending" NEP and surrendering positions. It is on this incorrect conception of NEP that Trotsky bases his assertion that the Party "extended" NEP and retreated from Lenin's position by permitting the renting of land and the hiring of labour in the countryside. Please listen to Trotsky's words:

"But what is the significance of the Soviet Government's latest measures in the countryside—sanctioning the renting of land and the hiring of labour—all that which we call extending rural NEP. . . . But could we have abstained from extending NEP in the countryside? No, because then peasant farming would have fallen into decay, the market would have narrowed, and industry would have been retarded" (Trotsky, Eight Years, pp. 16-17).

That is the length to which one may go if one gets into one's head the mistaken notion that NEP is a retreat and nothing but a retreat.

Can it be asserted that, in permitting the hiring of labour and the renting of land in the countryside, the Party "extended" NEP, "retreated" from Lenin's position and so on? Of course not! People who talk such nonsense have nothing in common with Lenin and Leninism.

I might refer to Lenin's letter to Ossinsky of April 1, 1922, where he speaks explicitly of the necessity of permitting the hiring of labour and the renting of land in the countryside. That was towards the end of the Eleventh Party Congress, where the question of work in the countryside, of NEP and its consequences had been widely discussed by the delegates.

Here is a quotation from this letter, forming the draft of a resolution for the delegates at the Party congress:

"On the question of the conditions for permitting the hiring of labour in agriculture and the renting of land, the Party Congress recommends all functionaries engaged in this field not to hamper either of these trends with excessive formalities, and to confine themselves to carrying out the decision of the last congress of Soviets, and also to studying what practical measures would be expedient in order to restrict the possibility of extremes and harmful excesses in this matter" (see Lenin Miscellany, IV, p. 396 10).

You see how foolish and baseless is the talk about an "extension" of NEP, about a "retreat" from Lenin's position in connection with the introduction of the renting of land and the hiring of labour in the countryside, etc.

Why do I speak of this?

Because the people who are talking about an "extension" of NEP are seeking to use this talk as a justification for retreating in face of the capitalist elements in the countryside.

Because people have arisen inside and around our Party who see in the "extension" of NEP a means of "saving" the bond between the workers and the peasants, people who, on the grounds of the repeal of the emergency measures, demand that the restrictions on the kulaks be discarded, and who demand that the capitalist elements in the countryside be given a free hand—in the interests of the bond.

Because the Party must be safeguarded against these anti-proletarian sentiments by all ways and means in our power.

Not to go too far afield, I shall refer to a note from a comrade, Osip Chernov, a member of the staff of Bednota, 11 in which he demands a series of relaxations for the kulaks, relaxations which would be nothing but a real and undisguised "extension" of NEP. I do not know whether he is a Communist or not. But this comrade, Osip Chernov, who is a supporter of the Soviet regime and of the alliance between the workers and the peasants, is so muddled over the peasant question that it is difficult to distinguish him from an ideologist of the rural bourgeoisie. What, in his opinion, are the reasons for our difficulties on the grain front? "The first reason," he says, "is unquestionably the progressive income tax system. . . . The second reason is the legal changes in the election regulations, the lack of clarity in the regulations as to who is to be regarded as a kulak."

What must be done to remove the difficulties? "It is necessary in the first place," he says, "to abolish the progressive income tax system as it now stands, and replace it by a land taxation system, and to put a light tax on draught animals and major agricultural implements. . . . A second, and no less important, measure is to revise the election regulations, so as to make more prominent the signs showing where an exploiting, kulak farm begins."

There you have the "extension" of NEP. As you see, the seed cast by Trotsky has not fallen on barren soil. Incorrect understanding of NEP gives rise to talk about "extension" of NEP, and talk about "extension" of NEP results in all sorts of notes, articles, letters and proposals recommending that the kulak should be allowed a free hand, that he should be relieved of restrictions and enabled to enrich himself without hindrance.

In reference to this same question, the question of NEP and the class struggle under NEP conditions, I should like to mention another fact. I am referring to the statement made by one of the comrades to the effect that, in connection with the grain procurements, the class struggle under NEP is only of minor importance, that this class struggle is not and cannot be of any serious importance in our grain procurement difficulties.

I must say, comrades, that I cannot at all agree with this statement. I think that, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, there is not and cannot be a single political or economic fact of any importance which does not reflect the existence of a class struggle in town or country. Does NEP abolish the dictatorship of the proletariat? Of course not! On the contrary, NEP is a specific form of expression and an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat. And is not the dictatorship of the proletariat a continuation of the class struggle? (Voices: "True!") How, then, can it be said that the class struggle plays only a minor role in such important political and economic facts as the kulaks' attack on Soviet policy at the time of the grain procurements and the counter-measures and offensive actions undertaken by the Soviet Government against the kulaks and speculators in connection with the grain procurements?

Is it not a fact that at the time of the grain procurement crisis we had the first serious attack by the capitalist elements of the countryside on Soviet policy under NEP conditions?

Have classes and the class struggle ceased to exist in the countryside?

Is it not true that Lenin's slogan about relying on the poor peasant, an alliance with the middle peasant and fighting against the kulaks is the basic slogan of our work in the countryside under the present conditions? And what is this slogan if not an expression of the class struggle in the countryside?

Of course, our policy must by no means be regarded as a policy of fanning the class struggle. Why? Because fanning the class struggle would lead to civil war. Because, inasmuch as we are in power, and inasmuch as we have consolidated our power and the key positions are in the hands of the working class, it is not in our interest that the class struggle should assume the forms of civil war. But this in no way implies that the class struggle has been abolished, or that it will not grow sharper. Still less does it imply that the class struggle is not the decisive factor in our advancement. No, it does not.

We often say that we are promoting socialist forms of economy in the sphere of trade. But what does that imply? It implies that we are squeezing out of trade thousands upon thousands of small and medium traders. Is it to be expected that these traders who have been squeezed out of the sphere of trade will keep silent and not attempt to organise resistance? Obviously not.

We often say that we are promoting socialist forms of economy in the sphere of industry. But what does that imply? It implies that, by our advance towards socialism, we are squeezing out and ruining, perhaps without ourselves noticing it, thousands upon thousands of small and medium capitalist manufacturers. Is it to be expected that these ruined people will keep silent and not attempt to organise resistance? Of course not.

We often say that it is necessary to restrict the exploiting proclivities of the kulaks in the countryside, that they must be heavily taxed and the right to rent land limited, that kulaks must not be allowed the right to vote in the election of Soviets, and so on and so forth. But what does that imply? It implies that we are gradually pressing upon and squeezing out the capitalist elements in the countryside, sometimes driving them to ruin. Is it to be presumed that the kulaks will be grateful to us for this and will not endeavour to organise part of the poor peasants or middle peasants against the Soviet Government's policy? Of course not.

Is it not obvious that our whole forward movement, our every success of any importance in the sphere of socialist construction, is an expression and result of the class struggle in our country?

But it follows from all this that the more we advance, the greater will be the resistance of the capitalist elements and the sharper the class struggle, while the Soviet Government, whose strength will steadily increase, will pursue a policy of isolating these elements, a policy of demoralising the enemies of the working class, a policy, lastly, of crushing the resistance of the exploiters, thereby creating a basis for the further advance of the working class and the main mass of the peasantry.

It must not be imagined that the socialist forms will develop, squeezing out the enemies of the working class, while our enemies retreat in silence and make way for our advance, that then we shall again advance and they will again retreat until "unexpectedly" all the social groups without exception, both kulaks and poor peasants, both workers and capitalists, find themselves "suddenly" and "imperceptibly," without struggle or commotion, in the lap of a socialist society. Such fairy-tales do not and cannot happen in general, and in the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular.

It never has been and never will be the case that a dying class surrenders its positions voluntarily without attempting to organise resistance. It never has been and never will be the case that the working class could advance towards socialism in a class society without struggle or commotion. On the contrary, the advance towards socialism cannot but cause the exploiting elements to resist the advance, and the resistance of the exploiters cannot but lead to the inevitable sharpening of the class struggle.

That is why the working class must not be lulled with talk about the class struggle playing a secondary role.

The fourth question concerns the problem of emergency measures against the kulaks and speculators.

Emergency measures must not be regarded as something absolute and established once for all.

Emergency measures are necessary and expedient in definite, emergency circumstances, when no other means of manoeuvre.

We often say that it is necessary to restrict the exploiting proclivities of the kulaks in the countryside, that they must be heavily taxed and the right to rent land limited, that kulaks must not be allowed the right to vote in the election of Soviets, and so on and so forth. But what does that imply? It implies that we are gradually pressing upon and squeezing out the capitalist elements in the countryside, sometimes driving them to ruin. Is it to be presumed that the kulaks will be grateful to us for this and will not endeavour to organise part of the poor peasants or middle peasants against the Soviet Government's policy? Of course not.

Is it not obvious that our whole forward movement, our every success of any importance in the sphere of socialist construction, is an expression and result of the class struggle in our country?

But it follows from all this that the more we advance, the greater will be the resistance of the capitalist elements and the sharper the class struggle, while the Soviet Government, whose strength will steadily increase, will pursue a policy of isolating these elements, a policy of demoralising the enemies of the working class, a policy, lastly, of crushing the resistance of the exploiters, thereby creating a basis for the further advance of the working class and the main mass of the peasantry.

It must not be imagined that the socialist forms will develop, squeezing out the enemies of the working class, while our enemies retreat in silence and make way for our advance, that then we shall again advance and they will again retreat until "unexpectedly" all the social groups without exception, both kulaks and poor peasants, both workers and capitalists, find themselves "suddenly" and "imperceptibly," without struggle or commotion, in the lap of a socialist society. Such fairy-tales do not and cannot happen in general, and in the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular.

It never has been and never will be the case that a dying class surrenders its positions voluntarily without attempting to organise resistance. It never has been and never will be the case that the working class could advance towards socialism in a class society without struggle or commotion. On the contrary, the advance towards socialism cannot but cause the exploiting elements to resist the advance, and the resistance of the exploiters cannot but lead to the inevitable sharpening of the class struggle.

That is why the working class must not be lulled with talk about the class struggle playing a secondary role.

The fourth question concerns the problem of emergency measures against the kulaks and speculators.

Emergency measures must not be regarded as something absolute and established once for all. Emergency measures are necessary and expedient in definite, emergency circumstances, when no other means of manoeuvring are available. Emergency measures are unnecessary and harmful in other circumstances, when other, flexible means of manoeuvring in the market are available. Those who think that emergency measures are a bad thing in all circumstances are mistaken. A systematic struggle must be waged against such people. But mistaken, too, are those who think that emergency measures are necessary and expedient at all times. A resolute struggle against such people is essential.

Was it a mistake to resort to emergency measures in the conditions of the grain procurement crisis? It is now recognised by all that it was not a mistake, that, on the contrary, the emergency measures saved the country from a crisis of our whole economy. What induced us to resort to these measures? The deficit of 128,000,000 poods of grain by January of this year, which we had to make good before the roads were spoiled by the spring thaws, at the same time ensuring a normal rate of grain procurement. Could we refrain from resorting to emergency measures in the absence of a reserve of about 100,000,000 poods of grain essential for being able to hold out and to intervene in the market with the object of reducing grain prices, or in the absence of an adequate reserve of foreign currency essential for importing large quantities of grain from abroad? Obviously, we could not. And what would have happened if we had not made good this deficit? We should now be having a most serious crisis of our entire national economy, hunger in the towns and hunger in the army.

If we had had a reserve of about 100,000,000 poods of grain with which to hold out and then wear down the kulak by intervening in the market with a view to reducing grain prices, we should not, of course, have resorted to emergency measures. But you know very well that we had no such reserve.

If at that time we had had a foreign currency reserve of 100,000,000 or 150,000,000 rubles with which to import grain from abroad, most likely we should not have resorted to emergency measures. But you know very well that we had no such reserve.

Does that mean that we should continue to remain without a reserve in the future and again resort to the aid of emergency measures? No, it does not. On the contrary, we must do everything in our power to accumulate reserves and to rule out completely the necessity of resorting to any emergency measures. People who contemplate converting the emergency measures into a permanent or prolonged policy of our Party are dangerous, because they are playing with fire and are a source of danger to the bond.

Does it follow from this that we must renounce once for all resort to emergency measures? No, it does not. We have no grounds for asserting that emergency circumstances necessitating resort to emergency measures will never recur. To assert that would be sheer quackery.

Lenin demonstrated the necessity for the New Economic Policy; yet he did not consider it possible under NEP to renounce resort even to the methods of the Poor Peasants' Committees in certain conditions and under certain circumstances. Still less can we renounce once for all resort to emergency measures, which cannot be put on a par with so drastic a measure for combating the kulaks as the methods of the Poor Peasants' Committees.

It may not be superfluous to recall an incident involving Preobrazhensky at the Eleventh Congress of our Party that has a direct bearing on the matter in hand. You know that at the Eleventh Congress in his theses on work in the countryside Preobrazhensky attempted to reject "once for all" under NEP conditions the policy of combating the kulaks by the methods of the Poor Peasants' Committees. Preobrazhensky wrote in his theses: "The policy of repudiating this stratum (the kulaks and well-to-do peasants) and of gross extra-economic suppression of it by the methods of the Poor Peasants' Committees of 1918 would be a most harmful mistake" (2).

You know that Lenin replied to this as follows:

"The second sentence of the second paragraph (directed against the methods of the Poor Peasants' Committees') is harmful and wrong, since war, for example, might compel us to resort to the methods of the Poor Peasants' Committees. This should be spoken of quite differently—in this way, for example: in view of the paramount importance of improving agriculture and increasing its output, the policy of the proletariat towards the kulaks and well-to-do peasants at the present moment* should aim chiefly at restricting their exploiting efforts, and so forth. The whole point lies in the ways and means by which our state can and should restrict those efforts and protect the poor peasants. This must be studied and we must see to it that it is studied practically, but general phrases are futile" (see Lenin Miscellany, IV, p. 391 12).

Clearly, emergency measures must be regarded dia-lectically, for everything depends on the conditions of time and place.

That, comrades, is how matters stand with the questions of a general character that arose in the course of the discussion.

Allow me to pass now to the question of the grain problem and the basic causes of our difficulties on the grain front.

I think that a number of comrades have committed the error of lumping together different kinds of causes of our difficulties on the grain front, of confusing temporary and circumstantial (specific) causes with chronic and fundamental causes. There are two sets of causes of our grain difficulties: chronic, fundamental causes, the elimination of which will require a number of years, and specific, circumstantial causes, which can be eliminated now, if a number of necessary measures are adopted and carried out. To lump all these causes together is to confuse the whole question.

What is the underlying significance of our difficulties on the grain front? It is that they confront us squarely with the problem of grain, of grain production, with the problem of agriculture in general, and of cereal production in particular.

Do we have a grain problem at all, as an urgent question? We undoubtedly do. One must be blind to doubt that the grain problem is now harassing every aspect of Soviet social life. We cannot live like gypsies, without grain reserves, without certain reserves in case of harvest failure, without reserves with which to manoeuvre in the market, without reserves against the contingency of war, and, lastly, without some reserves for export. Even the small peasant, for all the meagreness of his husbandry, cannot do without reserves, without certain stocks.

Is it not clear that a great country covering one-sixth of the world cannot do without grain reserves for its internal and external requirements?

Supposing the winter crop in the Ukraine had not perished and we had ended the grain procurement year just "breaking even"—could this have been considered enough? No, it could not. We cannot continue to live just "breaking even." We must have at our disposal a certain minimum of reserves if we want to uphold the position of the Soviet Government both internally and externally.

Firstly, we are not guaranteed against armed attack. Do you think we can defend the country if we have no reserves of grain for the army? Those comrades were perfectly right who said here that the peasant today is not what he was six years ago, say, when he was afraid that he might lose his land to the landlord. The peasant is already forgetting the landlord. He is now demanding new and better conditions of life. Can we, in the event of enemy attack, wage war against the external enemy on the battle front, and at the same time against the muzhik in the rear in order to get grain urgently for the army? No, we cannot and must not. In order to defend the country, we must have certain stocks for supplying the army, if only for the first six months. Why do we need this six-months' breathing space? In order to give the peasant time to awaken to the situation, to realise the danger of the war, to see how matters stand and to be ready to do his bit for the common cause of the country's defence. If we content ourselves with just "breaking even," we shall never have reserves against the contingency of war.

Secondly, we are not guaranteed against complications in the grain market. A certain reserve is absolutely essential to enable us to intervene in the grain market and make our price policy effective. For we cannot, and must not, resort every time to emergency measures. But we shall never have such a reserve if we always find ourselves on the edge of a precipice and are content if we can end the procurement year just "breaking even."

Thirdly, we are not guaranteed against crop failure. A certain grain reserve is absolutely essential to enable us in the event of crop failure to supply the famine areas at least to some extent and at least for some time. But we shall not have such a reserve if we do not increase the production of marketable grain and do not positively and decisively abandon the old habit of living without reserves.

Lastly, a reserve is absolutely essential to enable us to export grain. We have to import equipment for industry. We have to import agricultural machines, tractors and spare parts for them. But this cannot be done if we do not export grain, if we do not accumulate a certain reserve of foreign currency obtained by exporting grain. Before the war we used to export from 500,000,000 to 600,000,000 poods of grain annually. We were able to export so much because we went short ourselves. That is true. It should, however, be realised that all the same our marketable grain before the war was double what it is today. And it is just because we have now only half as much marketable grain that grain is ceasing to be an item of export. And what does ceasing to export grain mean? It means losing the source which enabled us to import—as we must import—equipment for industry and tractors and machines for agriculture. Can we go on living in this way—without accumulating grain reserves for export? No, we cannot.

So you see how insecure and unstable our position in the matter of grain reserves is

This is apart from the fact that not only have we no grain reserves for all these four purposes; we have not even a minimum reserve to enable us to carry over without distress from one procurement year to the next and to supply the towns uninterruptedly in such difficult months as June and July.

Can it then be denied that the grain problem is acute and that our difficulties on the grain front are serious?

But, because of our grain difficulties, we are also having difficulties of a political character. Under no circumstances must this be forgotten, comrades. I am referring to the discontent which was to be observed among a certain section of the peasantry, among a certain section of the poor peasants, and also of the middle peasants, and which created a certain threat to the bond.

Of course, it would be quite wrong to say, as Frum-kin does in his note, that there is already an estrangement instead of the bond. That is not true, comrades. An estrangement would be a serious thing. An estrangement would mean the beginning of civil war, if not civil war itself. Don't let us frighten ourselves with "terrible" words. Don't let us give way to panic. That would be unworthy of Bolsheviks. An estrangement would mean that the peasantry had broken with the Soviet Government. But if the peasant really had broken with the Soviet Government, which is the chief purchaser of peasant grain, he would not be enlarging his crop area. Yet we find that this year the spring crop area has been enlarged in all the grain areas without exception. Does that look like estrangement? Can one call this state of things a "hopeless prospect" for peasant farming, as Frumkin, for example, says it is? Does that look like a "hopeless prospect"?

What is the basis of our grain difficulties, meaning by that the chronic and fundamental causes of the difficulties, and not the temporary, circumstantial ones?

The basis of our grain difficulties lies in the increasingly scattered and divided character of agriculture. It is a fact that agriculture, especially grain farming, is growing smaller in scale, becoming increasingly less remunerative and less productive of marketable surpluses. Whereas before the revolution we had about 15,000,000 or 16,000,000 peasant farms, now we have some 24,000,000 or 25,000,000; moreover, the process of division tends to become more marked.

It is true that our crop area today falls little short of pre-war, and that the gross output of grain is only some five per cent less than it was before the war. But the trouble is that, in spite of all this, our output of marketable grain is only half, that is, about 50 per cent, of prewar. That is the root of the matter.

What is the point? The point is that small-scale farming is less remunerative, produces smaller marketable surpluses and is less stable than large-scale farming. The Marxist thesis that small-scale production is less profitable than large-scale production fully applies to agriculture also. That is why, from one and the same area, small-scale peasant farming yields much less marketable grain than large-scale farming.

What is the way out of this situation?

There are three ways, as the Political Bureau resolution tells us.

1. The way out is to raise the productivity of small-and middle-peasant farming as far as possible, to replace the wooden plough by the steel plough, to supply small and medium machines, fertiliser, seed and agronomic help, to organise the peasantry into co-operatives, to conclude contracts with whole villages, supplying them with the best-grade seed on loan and thus ensuring the peasants collective credit, and, lastly, to place big machines at their disposal through machine-hiring stations.

Those comrades are mistaken who assert that small-peasant farming has exhausted its potentialities for further development, and that therefore it is not worth while to give it any further help. That is quite untrue. Individual peasant farming still possesses no inconsiderable potentialities for development. One only has to know how to help it to realise these potentialities.

Nor is Krasnaya Gazeta13 right in asserting that the policy of organising the individual peasant farms in supply and marketing co-operatives has not justified itself. That is quite untrue, comrades. On the contrary, the policy of organising supply and marketing co-operatives has justified itself fully, by creating a real basis among the peasantry for a swing towards the side of the collective-farm movement. There is no doubt that if we had not developed supply and marketing co-operatives, we should not have that swing in the attitude of the peasantry towards collective farming which now exists, and which is helping us to lead the collective-farm movement forward.

2. The way out, further, is to help the poor and middle peasants gradually to unite their scattered small farms into large collective farms based on new technical equipment and collective labour, as being more profitable and yielding larger marketable surpluses. I have in mind all forms of uniting small farms into large, socially-conducted farms, from simple co-operatives to artels, which are incomparably more productive and yield far larger marketable surpluses than the scattered small-peasant farms.

That is the basis for the solution of the problem.

Comrades are mistaken when, while advocating collective farms, they accuse us of "rehabilitating" small-peasant farming. They evidently think that the attitude towards the individual peasant farms should be one of fighting and destroying them, and not of assisting them and drawing them over to our side. That is quite wrong, comrades. Individual peasant farming is in no need of "rehabilitation." It is not very remunerative, it is true. But that does not mean that it is altogether unprofitable. We should be destroying the bond if we adopted the attitude of fighting and destroying individual peasant farming, departing from the Leninist position that the collective farms must render day-to-day assistance and support to the individual peasant farms.

Even more mistaken are those who, while extolling the collective farms, declare that individual peasant farming is our "curse." This already smacks of downright war on peasant farming. Where do they get this idea from? If peasant farming is a "curse," how do they explain the alliance of the working class and the main mass of the peasantry? Alliance of the working class with a "curse"—can there be anything so fantastic? How can they say such things and at the same time preach in favour of the bond? They recall what Lenin said about the necessity of our gradually changing over from the peasant nag to the steel steed of industry. That is very good. But is that the way to change over from one horse to another? To proclaim peasant farming a "curse" before a broad and powerful base has been created in the shape of a ramified system of collective farms—would not the upshot be that we should be left without any horse, without any base at all? (Voices: "Quite right!") The mistake of these comrades is that they counterpose collective farming to individual peasant farming. But what we want is that these two forms of farming should not be counterposed to one another, but should be linked together in a bond, and that within the framework of this bond the collective farms should assist the individual peasant and help him little by little to go over to collectivist lines. Yes, what we want is that the peasants should look upon the collective farms not as their enemy, but as their friend who helps them and will help them to emancipate themselves from poverty. (Voices: "True!") If that is true, then you should not say that we are "rehabilitating" individual peasant farming, or that peasant farming is our "curse."

What should be said is that, compared with the big collective farm, the small-peasant farm is less profitable, or even the least profitable, but that all the same it is of some, not inconsiderable, benefit. But from what you say it follows that small-peasant farming is altogether unprofitable, and perhaps even harmful.

That was not Lenin's opinion of small-peasant farming. Here is what he said on this score in his speech on "The Tax in Kind":

"If peasant farming can develop further, we must firmly assure its transition to the next stage too, and this transition to the next stage will inevitably consist in the small, isolated peasant farms, the least profitable and most backward, gradually uniting to form socially-conducted, large farms. That is how Socialists have always conceived it. And that is how our Communist Party conceives it" (Vol. XXVI, p. 299).

It follows that individual peasant farming is after all of some benefit.

It is one thing when a higher form of enterprise, large-scale enterprise, contends against a lower form and ruins, kills it. That is what happens under capitalism. It is quite another thing when the higher form of enterprise does not ruin the lower form, but helps it to raise itself, to go over to collectivist lines. That is what happens under the Soviet system.

And here is what Lenin says about the relations between the collective farms and the individual peasant farms:

"In particular, we must see to it that the law of the Soviet Government (on collective farms and state farms—J. St.) requiring that the state farms, agricultural communes and similar associations should render immediate and all-round assistance to the surrounding middle peasants, is actually, and moreover fully, carried out. Only if such assistance is in fact rendered is agreement with the middle peasant feasible.* Only in this way can, and should, his confidence be won" (Vol. XXIV, p. 175).

It follows from this that the collective farms and state farms must assist the peasant farms precisely as individual farms.

Lastly, a third quotation from Lenin:

"Only if we succeed in practice in showing the peasants the advantages of common, collective, co-operative, artel cultivation of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of co-operative, artel farming, will the working class, which holds state power in its hands, actually prove to the peasant the correctness of its policy and actually secure the real and durable following of the vast masses of the peasantry" (Vol. XXIV, p. 579).

You see how highly Lenin appreciated the value of the collective-farm movement for the socialist transformation of our country.

It is extremely strange that some comrades in their long speeches focussed attention exclusively on the question of the individual peasant farms and did not say a single word, literally not a single word, about the task of promoting collective farms, as an urgent and decisive task of our Party.

3. The way out, lastly, is to strengthen the old state farms and to promote new, large state farms, as being the economic units that are the most remunerative and yield the largest marketable surpluses.

Such are the three principal tasks, the accomplishment of which will enable us to solve the grain problem, and thus do away with the very basis of our difficulties on the grain front.

The specific feature of the present moment is that the first task, that of improving individual peasant farming, although it still remains our chief task, is already insufficient for the solution of the grain problem.

The specific feature of the present moment is that the first task must be supplemented in practice by the two new tasks of promoting collective farms and promoting state farms.

Unless we combine these tasks, unless we work persistently along all these three channels, it will be impossible to solve the grain problem, whether in the sense of supplying the country with marketable grain or in the sense of transforming our entire national economy on socialist lines.

What was Lenin's view of this matter? We have a document which shows that the Political Bureau resolution submitted to this plenum fully coincides with the practical plan for the development of agriculture which Lenin outlined in this document. I am referring to the "Mandate of the C.L.D." (Council of Labour and Defence) written in Lenin's own hand. It was published in May 1921. In this document Lenin analyses three groups of practical questions: the first group concerns trade and industry, the second group concerns the promotion of agriculture, and the third group concerns the various economic councils 14 and regional conferences on the regulation of economic affairs.

What does this document say on the subject of agriculture? Here is a quotation from the "Mandate of the C.L.D.":

"Second group of questions. Promotion of agriculture: a) peasant farming, b) state farms, c) communes, d) artels, e) co-operatives, f) other forms of socially-conducted farming" (see Vol. XXVI, p. 374).

You will see that the practical conclusions contained in the Political Bureau resolution on the solution of the grain problem, and of the agricultural problem in general, fully coincide with Lenin's plan as set forth in the "Mandate of the C.L.D." of 1921.

It was very interesting to observe the truly youthful joy with which that giant, Lenin, who could move mountains and bring them face to face, greeted every item of news of the formation of a couple or so of collective farms, or of the arrival of tractors in some state farm. Here, for instance, is an excerpt from a letter to the Society for Technical Aid to Soviet Russia:

"Dear Comrades, extremely gratifying reports have appeared in our newspapers regarding the work of members of your Society in the state farms of the Kirsanov Uyezd, Tambov Gubernia, and at Mitino Station, Odessa Gubernia, as well as regarding the work of a group of miners from the Donets Basin. . . . I am applying to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee requesting that the most outstanding farms should be classed as model farms and rendered special and priority assistance necessary for the favourable development of their work. I once more profoundly thank you in the name of our Republic, and request you to bear in mind that your assistance to us in the way of tractor cultivation of the soil is especially timely and valuable. I am particularly pleased to have this opportunity of congratulating you on your project to organise 200 agricultural communes" (Vol. XXVII, p. 309).

And here is an excerpt from a letter to the Society of Friends of Soviet Russia in America:

"Dear Comrades: I have just verified by a special request to the Perm Executive Committee, the extraordinary favourable news published in our press with reference to the work of the members of your Society headed by Harold Ware and organised as a Tractor Unit, in the Government of Perm, on a Soviet Farm* 'Toykino.' . . . I am appealing to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to place this Soviet Farm in the ranks of Model Farms and to render it in every possible way special and extraordinary assistance in its constructive work, as well as supplying it with gasoline, metals and other material necessary for the organisation of a Repair Shop. Once more, I wish to thank you in the name of our Republic and to point out that no other form of relief is so timely and so important for us as the one rendered by you" 1 (Vol. XXVII, p. 308).

So you see with what joy Lenin received every item of news, however small, regarding the development of collective farms and state farms.

Let this be a lesson to all who think they can deceive history and dispense with collective farms and state farms in victoriously building socialism in our country.

I am concluding, comrades. I think that the grain difficulties will not have been without their value for us. Our Party has learned and progressed by overcoming difficulties and crises of every kind. I think that the present difficulties will steel our Bolshevik ranks and induce them to tackle the solution of the grain problem in thorough fashion. And the solution of this problem will remove one of the biggest difficulties standing in the way of the socialist transformation of our country.

On the Bond Between the Workers and Peasants and on State Farms
From a Speech Delivered on July 11, 1928

Some of the comrades reverted in their speeches on the state farms to yesterday's dispute on the question of the grain procurements. Well, let us revert to yesterday's dispute.

What was the dispute about yesterday? First of all, about the "scissors" between town and country. It was said that the peasant was still overpaying for manufactured goods and being underpaid for his agricultural produce. It was said that these overpayments and underpayments constitute a supertax on the peasantry, something in the nature of a "tribute," an additional tax for the sake of industrialisation, a tax which we must certainly abolish, but which we cannot abolish at once if we have no intention of undermining our industry, of undermining a definite rate of development of our industry, which works for the whole country and which advances our national economy towards socialism.

There were some who did not like this. These comrades apparently fear to admit the truth. Well, that is a matter of taste. Some think that it is not advisable to tell the whole truth at a plenum of the Central Committee. But I think that at the plenum of the Central Committee of our Party it is our duty to tell the whole truth. It should not be forgotten that the plenum of the Central Committee cannot be regarded as a mass meeting. Of course, "supertax," "additional tax" are unpleasant words, for they hit hard. But, in the first place, it is not a question of words. In the second place, the words fully correspond to the facts. In the third place, they, these unpleasant words, are intended to hit hard and to compel Bolsheviks to set to work seriously to do away with this "supertax," to do away with the "scissors."

And how can these unpleasant things be done away with? By systematically rationalising our industry and lowering prices of manufactured goods. By systematically improving agricultural technique and raising harvest yields, and gradually lowering the cost of agricultural produce. By systematically rationalising our trade and procurement apparatus. And so on and so forth.

All this, of course, cannot be done in a year or two. But it has to be done without fail in the course of a few years if we want to save ourselves from all sorts of unpleasant things and from facts that hit us hard.

Some of the comrades yesterday pressed hard for the abolition of the "scissors" at once and as good as demanded the establishment of replacement prices for agricultural produce. I, as well as other comrades, objected to this and said that this demand was contrary to the interests of the industrialisation of the country at the present moment, and, consequently, was contrary to the interests of our state.

That is what our dispute was about yesterday.

Today, these comrades say that they no longer insist on a policy of replacement prices. Well, that is very good. It appears that yesterday's criticism was not without effect on these comrades.

A second question concerns the collective farms and state farms. I remarked in my speech that it was unnatural and strange that, when speaking of measures for promoting agriculture in connection with the grain procurements, some comrades did not say a single word about such weighty measures as developing collective farms and state farms. How is it possible to "forget" such a serious thing as the task of developing collective and state farms in agriculture? Do we not know that the task of developing individual peasant farming, important though it is at the present moment, is already insufficient, and that if we do not supplement this task in practice with the new tasks of developing collective farms and state farms, we shall not solve the grain farming problem and shall not escape from our difficulties, either in the sense of the socialist transformation of our entire national economy (and, hence, of peasant farming), or in the sense of ensuring the country definite reserves of marketable grain.

In view of all this, how can the question of developing collective farms and state farms be "forgotten," evaded, passed over in silence?

Let us pass now to the question of large state farms. The comrades who assert that there are no large grain farms in North America are mistaken. In point of fact, there are such farms both in North and South America. I might quote such a witness as Professor Tulaikov, who made a study of American agriculture and published his findings in the magazine Nizhneye Povol-zhye 15 (No. 9)

Permit me to quote from Tulaikov's article.

"The Montana wheat farm is owned by the Campbell Farming Corporation. It has an area of 95,000 acres, or about 32,000 dessiatins. The farm is one continuous tract, divided for purposes of operation into four sections, what we would call khutors, each of which has a separate manager, the whole farm being managed by one person, the director of the corporation, Thomas Campbell.

"This year, according to a press report, which emanates of course from the farm itself, about half the total area is under cultivation, and it is expected to secure about 410,000 bushels of wheat (about 800,000 poods). 20,000 bushels of oats and 70,000 bushels of linseed. The income from the enterprise is expected to total 500,000 dollars.

"On this farm, horses and mules are almost totally replaced by tractors, motor lorries and automobiles. Ploughing, planting and all field work in general, and harvesting in particular, are carried on day and night, the fields at night being flood-lit to enable the machines to work. Because of the vast extent of the fields, the machines can cover long distances without making a turn. For instance, reaper-threshers with a 24-foot header, if the state of the crops permits their use, travel 20 miles, that is, a little over 30 versts. Formerly, 40 horses and men would have been required for this work. Four sheaf-binders are hitched to one tractor, and cover a strip 40 feet wide and 28 miles long, that is, a distance of roughly 42 versts. Binders are used if the grain is not dry enough to be threshed at the same time as it is reaped. In that case, the binding device is removed from the reapers and the cut stalks are laid in rows with the help of a special conveyer. The rows are left lying 24 or 48 hours, during which time the grain dries and the seeds of the weeds-cut together with it fall to the ground. After this, the grain is taken up with a reaper-thresher the cutter of which has been replaced by an automatic lifting device which delivers the dried grain straight into the thresher drum, The machine is operated by only two men, one driving the tractor and the other tending the thresher. The grain pours straight from the thresher into six-ton trucks which carry it to the elevator, trains of ten trucks each being drawn by one tractor. The report says that in this way from 16,000 to 20,000 bushels of grain are threshed daily" (see Nizhneye Povolzhye, No. 9, September 1927, pp. 38-39).

There you have a description of one giant wheat farm of the capitalist type. There are giant farms of this kind in both North and South America.

Some comrades said here that in the capitalist countries conditions for the development of such giant farms are not always favourable, or not altogether favourable, and therefore such farms are sometimes divided up into smaller units ranging from 1,000 to 5,000 dessiatins each. That is quite true.

These comrades conclude from this that large-scale grain farming has no future under Soviet conditions either. There they are quite wrong.

These comrades evidently fail to understand, or do not see, the difference in conditions between the capitalist system and the Soviet system. Under capitalism there is private ownership of land, and therefore absolute ground rent, which increases the cost of agricultural production and creates insuperable barriers to its serious progress. Under the Soviet system, however, there is neither private ownership of land nor absolute ground rent, which cannot but lower the cost of agricultural production and, consequently, cannot but facilitate the advance of large-scale agriculture along the road of technical and all other progress.

Furthermore, under capitalism the object of large grain farms is to obtain the maximum profit, or, at any rate, such a profit on capital as might correspond to what is known as the average rate of profit, without which, generally speaking, they cannot carry on or exist at all. This circumstance cannot but increase the cost of production, thereby creating the most serious obstacles to the development of large grain farms. Under the Soviet system, on the other hand, large grain farms, being at the same time state farms, do not at all require for their development either the maximum profit or the average profit, but can content themselves with a minimum profit (and sometimes do without any profit at all for a while), and this, coupled with the absence of absolute ground rent, creates exceptionally favourable conditions for the development of large grain farms.

Lastly, whereas under capitalism there is no such thing as credit privileges or tax privileges for large grain farms, under the Soviet system, which is designed to give the utmost encouragement to socialist economy, such privileges exist and will continue to exist.

All these and similar factors create under the Soviet system (as distinct from the capitalist system) very favourable conditions for promoting the development of state farms as large grain farms.

Finally, there is the question of the state farms and collective farms as strong points for strengthening the bond, as strong points for ensuring the leading role of the working class. We need collective farms and state farms not only in order to ensure our long-range aim of the socialist transformation of the countryside. We need collective farms and state farms also in order to have socialist economic strong points in the countryside at this moment, these points being necessary for strengthening the bond and for ensuring the leading role of the working class within the framework of the bond. Can we count at this very moment on being able to create and develop such strong points? I have no doubt that we can, and should. Khlebotsentr [54] reports that it has contracts with collective farms, artels and co-operatives, under which it is to receive from them 40,000,000 or 50,000,000 poods of grain. As to the state farms, the data show that this year our old and new state farms should provide another 25,000,000 or 30,000,000 poods of marketable grain.

If we add to that the 30,000,000-35,000,000 poods that the agricultural co-operatives should obtain from the individual peasant farms with which they have contractual arrangements, we shall have a full guarantee of over 100,000,000 poods of grain capable of serving as a definite reserve, at any rate in the home market. That, after all, is something.

There you have the first results given by our socialist economic strong points in the countryside.

And what follows from this? It follows that those comrades are mistaken who think that the working class is powerless in the matter of defending its socialist positions in the countryside, that only one thing remains for it to do, namely, endlessly to retreat and continuously to surrender its positions to the capitalist elements. No, comrades, that is not true. The working class is not so weak in the countryside as might appear to a superficial observer. That cheerless philosophy has nothing in common with Bolshevism. The working class has quite a number of economic strong points in the countryside, in the shape of state farms, collective farms, and supply and marketing co-operatives, relying on which it can strengthen the bond with the countryside, isolate the kulak, and ensure its leadership. The working class, lastly, has a number of political strong points in the countryside, in the shape of the Soviets, in the shape of the organised poor peasants, and so on, relying on which it can strengthen its positions in the countryside.

Relying on these economic and political bases in the countryside, and utilising all the means and resources (key positions, etc.) at the disposal of the proletarian dictatorship, the Party and the Soviet Government can confidently carry on the work of the socialist transformation of the countryside, step by step strengthening the alliance of the working class and peasantry, and step by step strengthening the leadership of the working class within that alliance.

Particular attention in this connection should be paid to work among the poor peasants. It must be taken as a rule that, the better and more effective our work among the poor peasants is, the greater will be the prestige of the Soviet Government in the countryside, and, on the contrary, the worse our relations with the poor peasants are, the lower will be the prestige of the Soviet Government.

We often speak of the alliance with the middle peasants. But in our conditions in order to strengthen this alliance a determined struggle must be waged against the kulaks, against the capitalist elements in the countryside. The Fifteenth Congress of our Party was therefore quite right when it issued the slogan of intensifying the offensive against the kulaks. But can a successful struggle be waged against the kulaks if work among the poor peasants is not intensified, if the poor peasants are not roused against the kulaks, if systematic aid is not rendered the poor peasants? Obviously not! The middle peasantry is a vacillating class. If our relations with the poor peasants are bad, if the poor peasants are not yet an organised support of the Soviet Government, the kulak feels that he is strong, and the middle peasant swings towards the kulak. And on the contrary: if our relations with the poor peasants are good, if the poor peasants are an organised support of the Soviet Government, the kulak feels that he is in a state of siege, and the middle peasant swings towards the working class.

That is why I think that it is one of the most vital immediate tasks of our Party to intensify the work among the poor peasants, to organise the rendering of systematic assistance to the poor peasants, and, lastly, to turn the poor peasants themselves into an organised support of the working class in the countryside.


* My italics. — J. Stalin


Notes

1. The plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), July 4-12, 1928, heard and took note of an information report on the questions to be discussed by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, and approved in principle the draft programme of the Comintern. Itadopted resolutions on grain procurement policy in connection with the general economic situation, on the organisation of new (grain) state farms, and on improving the training of new experts. At the sittings on July 5, 9 and 11, J. V. Stalin delivered the speeches which are published in this volume. (For the resolutions of the plenum, see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 391-404.)

2. The draft programme of the Communist International, which had been discussed at the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) in July 1928, was drawn up by the Programme Commission appointed by the Fifth Congress of the Comintern (June-July 1924). J. V. Stalin was a member of the commission and directed the drafting of the programme. The draft, adopted by the Programme Commission of the E.C.C.I. on May 25, 1928 and approved by the July plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), formed the basis of the Programme of the Communist International endorsed by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern (July-September 1928). Regarding the draft programme, see pp. 211-13 in this volume.

3. See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 27, pp. 207-46.

4. A Soviet Republic was proclaimed in Hungary on March 21, 1919. Its position from the very first was a very difficult one. The country was in the throes of a severe financial and food crisis, and had to contend with internal counter-revolution and with the Entente, which organised an economic blockade of Soviet Hungary and armed intervention. The Hungarian Social-Democrats who had joined the government of the Hungarian Republic conducted treasonable undermining activities in the rear and at the front, and negotiated with Entente agents for the overthrow of the Soviet power. In August 1919 the Hungarian revolution was crushed by the joint efforts of the internal counter-revolution and the forces of intervention.

5. This refers to the profound revolutionary crisis in Germany in the autumn of 1923, when, as the result of a powerful revolutionary movement, workers' governments were set up in Saxony and Thuringia and an armed uprising of the workers took place in Hamburg. However, the revolution of 1923 in Germany was defeated.

6. V. I. Lenin, "Preliminary Draft ofTheses on the Agrarian Question" (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 129-41).

7. See Draft Programme of the Communist International, Moscow and Leningrad, 1928, p. 52; see also V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 30, pp. 75-76, and Vol. 31, p. 27.

8. The Sixth Congress of the Comintern was held in Moscow, July 17-September 1, 1928. It discussed a report on the activities of the E.C.C.I. and reports of the Executive Committee of the Communist Youth International and of the International Control Commission, measures for combating the danger of imperialist wars, the programme of the Communist International, the revolutionary movement in the colonies and semi-colonies, the economic situation in the U.S.S.R. and the situation in the C.P.S.U.(B.), and endorsed the Rules of the Comintern. The congress drew attention to the growth of the internal contradictions of capitalism, which were inevitably leading to a further shaking of the capitalist stabilisation and to a sharp accentuation of the general crisis of capitalism. The congress defined the tasks of the Communist International springing from the new conditions of the working-class struggle. In its resolution on the situation in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and in the C.P.S.U.(B.), the congress took note of the achievements of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. and their importance in strengthening the revolutionary positions of the international proletariat, and called upon the working people of the world to defend the Soviet Union. J. V. Stalin was elected to the Presidium of the congress, to the Programme Commission and to the Political Commission set up to draft the theses on the international situation and the tasks of the Communist International.

9. See Decisions and Resolutions of Congresses of Soviets of the R.S.F.S.R., Moscow 1939, p. 225.

10. See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, p. 293.

11. Bednota (The Poor)— a daily newspaper, organ of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), published in Moscow from March 1918 to January 1931.

12. See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, p. 212.

13. Krasnaya Gazeta (Red Newspaper)—a daily newspaper published by the Leningrad Soviet of Workers', Peasants' and Red Army Men's Deputies from January 1918 to February 1939.

14. This refers to the local economic conferences. They were In existence in 1921-23 under the Executive Committees of the Soviets.

15. Nizhneye Povolzhye (Lower Volga)— a monthly magazine published in Saratov by the Lower Volga Regional and Saratov Gubernia Planning Commissions from 1924, and by the Saratov Gubernia and Territorial Planning Commission from 1926. From August 1932 to 1933 it was published by the Territorial Planning Commission in Stalingrad.