From: JulioHuato@aol.com Date: Fri, 6 Feb 1998 12:59:28 EST Subject: Re: Annette on dialectics of nature I'm not sure I fully understand Annette's points, but I'll try to address some of them anyway. Bear with me. What is the extension of dialectics? If we restrict dialectics to refer exclusively to the cognitive realm, then dialectics is, as Flora suggests, only in our minds. Now, there is a slightly different position: dialectics can be objective, yet restricted to the human realm. According to this, human history is dialectic, maybe because humans' interaction with nature and with one another injects dialectics into reality. But, it continues, nature in itself is not dialectic. The problem with this position is that, according to science (which has arguably the best cognitive standards that humans have developed), we are not deux ex machina in the universe, but a specific subset of nature with some interesting specificities. To mention a case, evolution is not a human product. It is a natural product that predates us. Now I fail to see how the play of dialectical categories (say, as exposed in Hegel's Logic) can be viewed as counterposed to the findings of evolutionary biology. IMO, Hegel's movement of the Idea (however mystified) is vastly more general than (and contain) the patterns of biological evolution. So, IMO, Andy's point ("anyone who recognises that dialectical forms are manifested in history and asserts that such laws are not manifested in other aspects of nature, has the onus of showing why this is so") stands. >To show this, we have to find the dialectical contradictions. And we have some problems in cosmological evolution!!> Now, if we see the task of science as limited to finding and confirming dialetics in nature and/or history (including our minds), then science becomes a silly game and we miss the boat. However, the comprehensive approach, the view of the world as fully interconnected and dynamic, and even the 3 despised "laws" (Engels) (if we were to limit its content to those items) with which dialectics undertakes scientific research can only be fruitful to advance science's (and society's) own goals. Think of formal logic. Science uses formal logic and the exercise is often fruitful. However, the aim is not to find and confirm formal logic, but to reflect specific aspects of reality. Even if that's not the purpose, still formal logic gets confirmed when used fruitfully, but that's a byproduct. I would claim that dialectics could do an even better job that formal logic alone, but still its role would be sublated to the goals of science. On the other hand, this whole question may be a semantic misunderstanding. Annette says, >My opinion is: Yes, there are dialectically interactions in nature, because there is evolution. (Exactly speech demands to say not :"dialectics in nature". „dialectics" means „method", „theory" (like „physics"). )> Why does "dialectics" mean exclusively method (and/or theory) and not the objective forms of movement and interconnection, etc.? At least in Hegel, IMO, such restriction in the use of the term doesn't seem to be warranted. In understanding this point of view I can see an identity and a distinction. Yes, I support the thinking of a particular role of people. But I can distinguish these aspects WITHIN the dialectic. Lau Kam To wrote:„Dialectics is either comprehensive or you have internal contradiction within the dialectis itself." Why not the second? It would be amazing, if „dialectid" wouldn´t be dialectically!> I don't know how to handle this. Let me try to clarify it at least. Statement 1: Dialectics is comprehensive. Statement 2: Dialectics is limited to human affairs or, in the more restricted view, human knowledge. What's the transition between them? How does the contradiction resolve itself? By specifying the traits of human dialectics as opposed to natural dialectics? Ultimately, by humans' attempting to conquer (appropriate) nature (including their own unbridled nature) through science, industry, art, philosophy, etc.? IMO, 1 would sublate 2. >(I have a problem: Really I can´t say anything about nature „in-itself". I can say something about dialectical interactions in nature for all nature „for us". But „for us" war the whole evolution of nature to our existence!).> IMO, this is a case of the old Kantian dilemma: Are we truly able to know the thing (eg, nature) in itself? Hegel responded to this in a way that I find convincing. More generally, is there really nature out there? How can we be certain? IMO, the materialist responses to these questions are persuasive. However legitimate Annette's problem, for the most part natural sciences have been doing remarkably well while ignoring it in practice. Curiously enough, IMO, the more natural sciences try to grasp nature "in itself," the more meaningful their findings seem to become "for us." >Now to some points of your discussion: Alex asks, if Marxis needes a dialectic of nature to justify the validity of historical materialism? I think: no. It was a false assumtiom from Stalin, that historical materialism is the „extension" of dialectics in nature to society. I need the dialectic of nature against the spiritualist deniers of evolution in nature! They assumed „eternal harmonical cycles" in nature and derive from that, that we have to subordinate our activities in the world under these „natural" cycles again. I´am defending for a co-evolution-concept.> I'd state the question in different terms. The validity of historical materialism, to the extent that it results from an application of dialectics (the method), presuposes its (the method's) validity. In turn, its validity is a function of its objective content, including its ability to reflect the world's (including nature's) objective "logic." Now, to the extent that historical materialism is a theory of human history, its validity results from its ability to reflect phenomena within its restricted, specific object of research. I have a problem viewing dialectics, in general or a part thereof, as a means to "justify" conclusions, even if they seem to be "progressive." (In economics, there are also theoreticians who believe firmly that the radical critique of capitalism should jettison the labor-theory of value and keep its "revolutionary conclusions" clean of "metaphysics.") Finally, I'd like to know more about Annette's co-evolution concept. Julio