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Problems of Peaceful Reconstruction

By N. LENIN

[The following is a speech delivered by Lenin at a trade union congress, early in 1920, at a time when hope awakened in Soviet Russia that the country would be permitted to take up its peaceful tasks of reconstruction. Although apparently dealing with several Russian problems, it nevertheless develops one chief idea, namely, the necessity for the working class of Russia to cope not only with the political problems of the Russian state, but also, if not mainly, with the tremendous economic task of putting the country on a sound economic basis. This is the standpoint from which Lenin discusses the aims of trade unions in Russia, showing the complete fallacy of those who do not see beyond the immediate moment, and who would apply old, obliterated standards to the trade unions in Russia. With his remarkable ability of combining the sense for actualities with historical perspective, Lenin points out that only the working class of Russia can develop the necessary unity of purpose and solidarity of action, and that the trade unions are the agency destined to work in this direction, putting aside all "particularistic" aims and purposes. By so doing, they will easily overcome the contradictory tendencies in the Russian peasantry and make them also an element working for the benefit of Soviet Russia.]

COMRADES: Permit me first of all to greet, in the name of the People's Commissars, the Third All-Russian Congress of the Trade Unions. Comrades: The Soviet Government is just now living through an especially important moment in many respects, for there stand before us complex and most interesting problems. And just this particular moment imposes upon the trade unions very responsible tasks in building up Socialism. I should like, therefore, to dwell no less upon the single resolutions of the conference just concluded than on the changes of the Soviet policy which bring the activity of the trade unions into special connection with the work of Socialist construction. Comrades: The specific character of the present moment is the transition from war, which up to now has been taking up undividedly the care, attention, and strength of the Soviet Government—to peaceful economic construction.

At this point I must emphasize the fact that the Soviet Government, and, together with it, the Soviet Republic, is living through such a period not for the first time. It is the second time that we

are obliged to place peaceful economic work foremost. The first time in the history of Soviet Russia that we experienced such a moment was at the beginning of the year 1918. After the short but violent attack of German imperialism, while the old capitalistic army was in a state of complete dissolution, and we had no army nor could we create any at a moment's notice, the Brest peace was forced upon us. Then also, at the beginning of 1918, it seemed as if the war problems would recede and we were to go over to peaceful economic construction. At that time I rendered a report before the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, and on April 29, 1918—almost two years ago—the Central Executive Committee adopted in connection with my report a number of theses. Among those theses there were also such as dealt with labor discipline. In general this period was similar to the present. To insist that the decisions of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government are but a consequence of the present debates is a gross mistake, and such an opinion would be apt to throw a false light upon the whole activity, the decisions,

and the relations of the Communist Party, as well as of the Soviet Government, to this problem. It is useful, therefore, in order to understand the merits of the question and properly to approach its solution, to make a comparison between the situation in the year 1918 and now. At that time, after the short war with German imperialism, there stood before us the problem of peaceful economic creation. Civil war had not yet begun. Thanks to German aid in Ukraine, Krasnov was putting in his appearance in the Don region. We were not attacked in the north, and the Soviet Republic was in possession of a tremendous territory, as it lost only what the Brest peace had torn away. The situation was such as to call forth an expectation of a long period of peaceful economic construction. It is under such circumstances that the Communist Party put, on the order of the day, exactly the point which the All-Russian Executive Committee emphasized in its resolution of April 29, 1918: propaganda, earnest admonition, and putting greater stress upon the necessity of labor discipline. It is also to be noted that dictatorship, even of a single person, is not contradictory to Socialist democracy. One must bear this in mind in order rightly to understand the decisions taken at the party conference, and the problems that stand before us in general. Not only does this solve the questions brought forth now, but it is intimately connected with the very foundations of the present epoch. Anyone who doubts this, should draw a comparison with the situation two years ago; he will understand then that the moment compels us now to turn all our attention to the problems of labor discipline and the labor army, although two years ago there was yet no talk of a labor army. In drawing this comparison we come to the right conclusion that trifles have to be disregarded and only what is fundamental and of general importance must be emphasized.

The whole attention of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government should be concentrated on the work of peaceful economic construction, around the problem of dictatorship and individual administration. Our experiences during the two years of bitter war demand of us authoritatively a decision on the question which we already raised in 1918, when we had as yet no civil war or any experience. For that reason not only the experiences of the Red Army and the victorious civil war, but something immeasurably deeper, closely connected with the dictatorship of the working class, have compelled us now, after the civil war, just as was the case two years ago, to concentrate all attention on labor discipline, which is the corner-stone of the whole economic structure of Socialism, a touch-stone at which our conceptions of the dictatorship of the proletariat part. After the overthrow of capitalism, every day of the revolution removes us fundamentally farther from that obsolete conception of the former internationalists who, petty bourgeois through and through, thought that a decision of the majority as to a retention of private property with regard to the ownership of land, means of

production, and capital, a decision of a majority within the democratic institution of bourgeois parliamentarism, could decide the question itself, where, as a matter of fact, only a bitter class struggle can bring a decision.

The significance of the dictatorship of the proletariat, its actual practical implications, began to unfold before us at the time when, after the conquest of the power, we turned to practice. And at this point, it became apparent that the class struggle had not come to an end, since the victory over capitalism and the land-owners had not destroyed this class. It struck it to the ground, but it did not destroy it. I shall point only to the international solidarity of capital, which is much stronger and more firmly entrenched than that of the working class. Capital—if one considers it as an international power—is even now not only in a military way, but also economically, stronger than the Soviet Government. This fact should be taken as a starting point, and it must not be overlooked. The forms of the struggle against capital change; at one time they bear an open international character; at another, they are confined to one country. The forms change, but the struggle goes on and the fundamental law of the class struggle, as it was brought forth in former revolutions, finds its confirmation in our revolution. The more sacrifices the proletariat makes in the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, the more the working class learns, and the revolution grows directly during this struggle. The struggle does not end even with the overthrow of the capitalists, and only after this overthrow in one country has been fully attained, does it achieve practical importance for the whole world. Did not indeed, at the beginning of the November Revolution, the capitalists consider our revolution as a curiosity? "What do we care about their Asiatic perversities," was said in an apparently derisive way. In order that the revolution attain its world historical importance, it was necessary, that in one more country a revolution should take place. Only then did the capitalists, not only the Russian, who at once called together their entire clique, but also those of all countries, convince themselves that this was a problem of international significance. Only then did the opposition of international capitalism develop its highest strength, only then did civil war break out in Russia, and all the victorious countries come to an agreement to render aid to the Russian capitalists and land-owners. Not only did the opposition of the defeated class grow after its overthrow but it even drew new strength from the relation of the proletariat to the peasantry. All who have studied Marxism ever so little, who base Socialism upon the international working class movement as the sole scientific foundation of Marxism, know that Socialism means doing away with the classes. But what does that mean? Not only must the capitalists be overthrown, but it is incumbent upon us also to remove the class difference between the workers and the peasants. The peasantry consisted of toilers who for decades and centuries had been kept under the

yoke by the landowners and capitalists, and who therefore cannot forget for a long time to come that they owe their liberation from this servitude to the workers. One could discuss this matter for decades and write great tomes about it, and this has been the reason for the formation of many party groups. But now we see that these differences of opinion had to yield to the force of facts.

The peasants remain property owners with the retaining of the commodities system. Every instance of free sale of bread, of clandestine trade and speculation, means restitution of the commodities system and consequently of capitalism, so that with the overthrow of the capitalists we simultaneously freed also the peasantry.

But the overthrow of capital as such was opposed by the petty bourgeois class, which in Russia was undoubtedly in the majority. The peasantry remained in their production as property owners and are creating new capitalistic relations. These are the fundamental traits of our economic situation, and hence originates the unwise talk of equality, freedom, and democracy, by those who do not understand the actual situation. We are conducting a class struggle, and our aim is the abolition of classes. So long as there are workmen and peasants, Socialism cannot be realized, and an uncompromising struggle develops at every step. We must consider in this situation, how, with the aid of only a single class, with support in the government, one should manage such an enormous apparatus as the power of the state with all its compulsory means; how to attract, under such circumstances, the peasant workers, and overcome their resistance or make it harmless.

Thus the class struggle continues and the dictatorship of the proletariat appears to us in a new light. It appears here to us less as an application of the compulsory resources of the entire state machinery, or as exploitation. This must be stated beforehand. To be sure, those are right who maintain that we shall not get far upon such a basis. But we have besides another aim wherein the role of the proletariat stands out as that of an organizer who carries out the capitalistic discipline. We must be able to place economy upon a new and higher foundation, and to appropriate for ourselves all the achievements of capitalism. Otherwise we shall be able to construct neither Socialism nor Communism. Not exclusively by means of state compulsion can we attract to our side the peasant when he took the field against his old we have an aim of an educational and organizational nature, but we are conscious of why it is much more difficult than the military aim. The military aim we are able to solve in some respects more easily, namely, by strenuous effort and self-sacrifice. It was easy and comprehensible for the peasant when he took the field against his old hereditary enemy, the land-owner. He did not need then to reflect upon the connection between the power of the workers and the necessity of abolishing free trade. It was easier to overcome the Russian White Guardists, the land-owners and capital-

ists, with their supporters, the Mensheviks. But this victory will be difficult for us, for economic tendencies are not to be overcome in the same manner as are military tendencies. A long road opens here before us, which must be conquered step by step. Here are required the energies of the proletariat as an organizer; here it is possible to win only after the proletariat has brought to realization its dictatorship, as the highest organized moral force for all toilers, also the toilers of the non-proletarian masses. In the measure that we have successfully solved and shall further on solve the first and most important aim: the destruction of the exploiters who openly aim at the overthrow of the Soviet Government, in that measure shall we be able to turn also to the other complex aim, namely, to bring to completion the task of the proletariat as an organizing force. We must organize a new work, we must create new forms of attracting to work, of submission to labor discipline. Even capitalism had solved this aim for decades. The greatest mistakes are made here at every step. Many of our adversaries show, on this question, a complete lack of understanding. They declared us to be Utopians when we maintained that it was possible for us to take hold of the power. On the other hand, they demand of us now that we complete the organization of labor in a few months. That is nonsense! One can, in a favorable political moment, supported by the enthusiasm of the workers, maintain power, perhaps in spite of the whole world. We have proved that. But the creation of new forms of social discipline is a work of decades. Even capitalism needed thirty years in order to transform an old organization into a new one. If one expects of us, and talks it into the workers and peasants, that we can rebuild the organization of work in a short time, this is theoretically complete nonsense and practically very harmful, for it prevents the workers from clearly understanding the difference between the old and the new aims. This new aim is first of all one of organization, and in that we are weak, considerably weaker than any great power. The ability of organization develops during a period of heavy machine industry. There exists no other material historical basis. There is no harmony between the interests of the proletariat and the peasantry. Here the difficulty starts for us.

On the other hand we have the moral aim to prove to the peasantry that it has no other way out: either it must resolutely march together with the workers and stand by the proletariat, or it will come again under the old yoke. There is no middle way, except only for the Mensheviks, but their downright folly is spreading everywhere, including Germany. The theory and the experience of the Second and Third Internationals offer the peasantry no understanding for this. These masses, who number millions, can comprehend it only as a result of their own experience and daily life. It was of fundamental importance that the peasants should understand the victory over Kolchak and Denikin. Only the contradiction made it clear to them what the dictatorship of the proletariat meant,

with which one has been frightening the peasantry and purports to frighten them even today. You may notice even now that the Mensheviki and the Social-Revolutionists scare the peasantry with it. But the peasants cannot in fact occupy themselves with theory. They only see that both lie, and they see the struggle which we are carrying on against speculation. It must be admitted that the Whites also, and the Mensheviki have made some progress in agitation, which they owe to the political division of our armies. The peasants saw the banner upon which was written, not "Dictatorship of the Proletariat", but "Constituent Assembly, Democracy", etc. But in *practice* they saw that the Soviet Government was better for them. And here is our second aim: the dictatorship of the proletariat must be a moral influence, there must be no compulsory methods with regard to the peasantry. This question will be solved by the economic antagonism within the peasantry. The two years of civil war have welded the workers together, they are consolidated, while the peasantry is falling more and more apart. The peasants cannot forget the capitalists and the land-owners, they know whom they once had to deal with. On the other hand, the present-day peasantry is of such nature as to draw the interests of its various strata apart; it is not compact. For not every peasant lives under good conditions, and there exists there in no way the right of freedom and equality. The peasants are half workers and half owners; but the realization of our aim demands a uniform will, in order that in every practical question all may work together as one man. The uniform will must not be merely a phrase or a symbol, we demand that it become a fact. The uniform will found its expression during the war in the fact that every one who put his interests, the interests of his village, or those of his group above those of the community was stigmatized as a coward and shot, and such judgment was justified because of the moral consciousness of the working class that it must obtain victory. We spoke of such executions quite openly; we said that we did not hide the compulsion, that without compulsory means against the retrogressive part of the proletariat we could not get out of the old social order. This was a uniform will which in practice had shown itself in the punishment of every deserter, in every battle and during every march in which the Communists marched ahead, as a good example. At present it is necessary to carry out this uniform will in labor, in our industry, in agriculture, at a time when we dispose of an immense field with numberless factories. By compulsion alone we cannot carry out this aim, and in the face of such a gigantic purpose it becomes clear to us what a uniform will means in everyday work. Take, for example, the writes brochures and affixes a signature, in order to become known. The thing must be thought over, it must be carefully weighed, what this slogan means in everyday work. Take, for example, the year 1918, when there was not yet such a spirit. Already then there was apparent the necessity of

individual administration, of recognition of the dictatorial plenary powers of one person for the carrying out of the Soviet idea; therefore all manner of talk about equal rights is nonsense. We conduct the class struggle not on the basis of equal rights. The proletariat wins because it consists of hundreds of thousands of disciplined men, who are animated by a uniform will.

The proletariat can overcome the peasantry, which has not the single will that welds together the proletariat of the factory. The peasantry is economically split, because it is composed in part of workers and in part of owners. Their property binds them to capitalism. "The dearer I sell the better." "And if for that reason hunger visit the land, I shall sell still dearer." The peasant worker, on the contrary, knows that the working class freed him from the yoke of the landowner. We have to do here with a struggle of two souls, generated by the economic situation of the peasantry. This must be emphasized: that we can win only if we follow a steady course. All who work will always be workers to us. But the peasant owners we must combat. If we have struck down gentlemen so highly educated as the controllers of international politics, such highly experienced and rich men who have a hundredfold more cannons and dreadnoughts than we, it would be ridiculous if we should not be able to solve the aims of our class and those of the peasantry. Here discipline and true, strong solidary will win. The will of hundreds of thousands can be embodied in one person. The Soviet system creates this uniform will. No other country in the world knows so many conferences of workers and peasantry. In this manner class consciousness develops. No empire could in generations give as much to the people as the Soviet Government has already given. And upon this broadest possible basis rests the Soviet constitution and the Soviet power. Based upon the strength of the workers and peasants, its decisions assume an unheard of authority. But this alone does not suffice us. We are materialists and do not allow ourselves to be content with mere authority. No, first of all exert yourselves to bring such decisions into reality. But here we see that the old bourgeois element is stronger than we. We must admit this openly. The old middle class habits of shifting for oneself, of free trade, all these are stronger than we. The trade unions originated out of capitalism as a means for the development of a new class. The class is an idea which forms itself during the struggle and by development. One class is separated from the other not by walls; no Chinese wall separates the workers and the peasants. When the proletariat became a class it was strong enough to take hold of the whole machinery of the state and to challenge the whole world to a fight and to conquer. Thus, all craft and trade organizations became backward. There was a time, even under capitalism, that the union of the proletariat advanced beyond the old craft and trade organizations.

It was a progressive movement: the proletariat

could not unite otherwise. It is absurd to think that the proletariat can unite at once to become a class. Such a process of uniting may take decades. No one opposed such sectarian, shortsighted views as bitterly as did Marx. The class grows under capitalism and at an appropriate moment it seizes the power of the state. All craft and trade organizations then become reactionary; they have played their role, they lead backward, not forward. Not because there are there, as it were, particularly bad men, but because bad elements and opponents of Communism find here a basis for their propaganda. We are beset with people of the petty bourgeois class who permit free trade and the capitalism of small husbandmen and owners to be born anew. Karl Marx opposed energetically the old utopian Socialism and demanded a scientific treatment of the matter. "Learn on the basis of the class struggle how the class grows and aid it in maturing." The same Marx opposes those leaders of the working class who fall into these errors. I spoke recently of the movement in England in the year 1872. The United Council censured his statement to the effect that the English leaders were bought by the bourgeoisie. Marx naturally understood this not in the sense that these or other persons were traitors. That is nonsense. He speaks of the bloc formed by a certain portion of the workers of a certain union with the bourgeoisie, the latter supporting the workers directly and indirectly and aiding them, so far as legal forms are concerned, assisting their press and bringing the workers into Parliament. The English bourgeoisie did in this respect accomplish veritable miracles, surpassing all other countries. Marx and Engels, from 1852 to 1892, for forty years, exposed this bourgeoisie. For the bourgeoisie must everywhere seek coalition by more or less new methods; but it is active in all countries. Everywhere in the world the transition of the trade unions from slavery to a creative role is revolution. Our workers cried: the increase of the work output is for us a burden, you are fleecing us. They not only maintained this, but it was their innermost conviction. We have been existing already for two years and what is the meaning of it? It means hunger for the working class. This has been statistically proved. In the years 1918 and 1919 the industrial workers all over the country received only seven poods of bread, while the peasants of the provinces, rich in grain, got seventeen poods yearly. The proletariat has won, and thanks to this victory it suffers a greater hunger than the peasant, who under the Soviet Government has much more than under the Czar, and also much more than he needs. Under the Czar the peasant had at most sixteen poods of bread; under our government he has seventeen poods. This we all know; statistics show it. Every one knows what it means when the worker hungers. The dictatorship of the proletariat condemned the latter to two years of hunger, but this hunger has proved that the worker can sacrifice not only his trade interests but also his life. And if the proletariat has been able to bear this hunger

for two years, it is for the reason that it has found support in all the toiling classes, and that it has assumed these sacrifices for the sake of the victory of the power of the workers and peasants. To be sure, the division of the workers along trade lines has continued, and there are many of the trades which were necessary for the capitalists which we cannot use. But we know that the workers of these trades suffer a greater hunger and that this cannot be changed. Capitalism is destroyed, but Socialism has not yet been built; this situation will continue for a long time, and at this point we must face all those misunderstandings which are not mere accidents. They are the outcome of the historical contradiction between the trade unions as a means of uniting along trade lines in the time of capitalism and the class union of the workers who seized the state power. Such workers take all sacrifices upon themselves because they vaguely feel and even give expression to the fact that the class interests are above the craft interests. But the workers who are not equal to such sacrifices are in our opinion traitors and are banished from the midst of the proletarians.

This is the basic problem of labor discipline and individual administration, with which the party management has been dealing. All its decisions are certainly known to you, and you will hear more details from those who address you. They all agree to the fact that the working class has grown and become strong, that it has seized power and is fighting against all, and that this struggle is now more difficult than it was before. During the war the struggle was easier, but now it behooves us to organize and to educate morally because the proletariat in our country is not very numerous. The war has effaced it. As a result of our victories the administration has become more difficult. This should be understood by all. When we speak of dictatorship, it is not a mere whim of centralists. One must admit that it is harder for us now to rule. The proletariat has decreased in numbers, while the territory conquered by us has, on the contrary, become larger. We have conquered Siberia, the Don territory and Kuban. There the proletariat represents only an infinitesimal percentage of the population. We must face the workers openly and talk to them plainly. We need more discipline, more individual administration, and more dictatorship. Without this we should not even dream of a great victory. We have an army of three million and the 600,000 of whom I spoke should be but a vanguard for those three million, who must march forward unshaken. We shall try out this labor army and the trade unions, and shall learn at every step by experience. But it must be understood that we have no other army for victory. Six hundred thousand vanguard troops and an army of three million, in which there are many *Kulaki* (village sharks), but few proletarians. It follows therefrom that a new relation must be created between proletarians and non-proletarians. The new aims are not to be solved by compulsion, but through organization and authority.

This is the basis for the firm conviction expressed at the party conference, which I wish to emphasize here once more. Our slogan is: to approximate individual administration, more labor discipline, strenuous effort, work with military resolution, steadiness, self-sacrifice, and the sacrifice of one's group, craft, and individual interests. Without that

we shall not win. But if we carry out as a man the decisions of the party with three million workers, and later on with many millions of peasants who feel the moral strength of men who have sacrificed themselves for the victory of Socialism, we shall then, together with them, be decidedly and most certainly unconquerable.

Military Review

By LT.-COL. B. ROUSTAM BEK

SEVERAL days ago I noticed in the press an order issued by Comrade Sokolnikov, the Chief Commander of the Red Turkestan Army, in which he directed a part of his troops to occupy all the passes of the Plateau of Pamir along the border of Afghanistan.

This new movement of the Red Army closer to India has a great political and strategical significance, and though it passed almost unnoticed in this country, it produced not only a great sensation in Great Britain, but even caused real alarm among British statesmen. For they know what it means!

It must be noticed that the Plateau of Pamir, the highest plateau in the world, rising 12,000 feet above sea-level, and situated in the southern part of the province of Fergana, in Russian Turkestan, lies just between Tibet, India, and Afghanistan. This part of Russian Turkestan is sparsely populated. No more than 30,000 nomads of the Kirghizian race live in the valleys of Pamir, and usually at the end of the summer they move for the winter into the valleys of Alai. For nine months Pamir is cut off from the rest of the world by snow.

Almost without vegetation, rocky and sandy, surrounded by the highest mountain chains, covered with eternal snow, which reflect their dreamy summits in numerous lakes sparsely bordered by yellow-green grass, the Pamir appears a dead, stony desert, with the wind the only master, and rightly bears the name given to it by the nations: "Bam-i-Tuniah", which means the "Top of the World".

This part of our globe became known to the civilized peoples of the west through the celebrated Italian explorer, Marco Polo, who in 1254-1323 A.D. crossed the whole continent of Asia. Henceforth, Pamir was the object of many explorations, especially by Russians. Kostenko, Fedchenko, Svertzov, and the two brothers, Groom-Grzmailo Potanin may be placed in the first rank among these explorers. The Russian Geographical Society also encouraged foreigners to develop the exploration of that mysterious country, and a German orientalist, Mittendorf, as well as the Swedish explorer, Sven Hedin, and the British Lord Berdmore were allowed to work in the Pamir.

In 1891-1895 the Russians annexed Pamir entirely, and established on the banks of the river Murghab a fort with a permanent garrison. With the outbreak of the revolution in 1917 this fort was deserted by its original garrison and was occupied by

the natives, thus opening the gates into Russian Turkestan to the British Indian army, which was in readiness to take that route from Kashmir simultaneously with their prepared movement through Afghanistan, debouching from Khayber pass as well as penetrating into Transcaspia from Persian territory. This plan failed completely, thanks to the friendly relations which Moscow succeeded in establishing with the Afghans. In the middle of 1919 the Afghan Army defeated the British aggressors, and stopped them along the whole line of the Afghan frontier, thus protecting the Soviet Turkestan Republic, which was at that time busily organizing its civil administration and military force. Finally, part of the Turkestan garrison was dispatched to the Pamir, where they reoccupied the abandoned stronghold; and the Red banner of the Soviet Republic waved over the "Top of the World", reminding the oppressed people of India of the proximity of the workers' republic.

The alliance of Afghanistan with Soviet Russia brought about the complete liberation of the Afghans from the British "protectorate". This was admitted by Lord Curzon on October 12, 1920, in his official statement at the annual dinner of the Central Asian Society, of which he is President. "We must face the fact that the expansion of the British Empire in Central Asia is at an end and rightly at an end," said this British statesman, but he did not dare complete his thought by stating that Great Britain was approaching the end of her despotic rule in Asia altogether.

The rapid growth of the prestige of Moscow among the Asiatic peoples forced the British diplomats to change their policy in Asia, and change it radically. Less than a year ago, England was on the offensive in Afghanistan, Tibet, Persia, and Turkey. Now we see that she is keeping strictly to defensive strategy in all these parts of the vast continent, and her diplomacy is attempting to establish "friendly" relations with those peoples of Asia whom it so recently was ready to put under its yoke by means of armed force.

Was this change due to the good intentions of the British rulers, or was it a result of the unbelievable consolidation of the oppressed Mohammedans of Asia with the young but powerful Russian Soviet Republic, whose good faith towards the Asiatic nations was understood and appreciated from Tibet to the Pacific, and from the Himalayas to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf?

The great victories which were so brilliantly won by the Red Army in Europe and Asia have strengthened the confidence of the proletariat of Asia in the regime newly introduced by the Russian workers and peasants; most of the Asiatic continent is now seething with agitation and burning to establish some new form of government, if not exactly the form which helped the Russian people to free themselves from their oppressors and invaders, then at least some revolutionary government which may return to them their lost independence and prosperity.

Great Britain suddenly understood that her mighty navy and her army, splendidly equipped and abundantly supplied, would be powerless to meet the Russian proletarian masses, supported by the oppressed masses of their Asiatic allies. It is now apparent that for the last twenty-five years the people of Central Asia have not only developed mentally, but also, to a great extent, have become educated politically; and that the country has ceased to be a land of mystery, and has become a land of acute political problems. These problems, when they take definite shape, have to be met immediately, and require strategical support, and such support cannot be independent of a regular army. There is never an army in an agricultural country, in a country of peaceful laborers; there cannot be officers and men who have the necessary training for this purpose; there are no brilliant strategists. There is only one method of struggle, which is the strongest in the world, and creates its own strategy, mobilizing a most powerful, enthusiastic army, which gives birth to genuine leaders—that method is revolution.

Everything is ready to serve a revolution when it comes. Revolution looks upon the armaments of its enemies as its own, it considers the rich supply of the counter-revolutionary armies also as its own. It considers even the fighting units of its adversaries as its future allies, temporarily forced by their tyrannical authorities to fight their brothers, and in this lies the incomparable strength of the revolutionary forces, no matter how badly armed and poorly supplied with ammunition and food-stuffs they may be.

This, at last, was understood by the British, and they began to talk to the rebellious people of Asia in a new and softer tongue. The real menace threatening India brought some of the British statesmen to reason, and peace negotiations were recently carried on with the Afghans. According to *The Christian Science Monitor* of December 14, 1920, the following announcement is made by the Government of India:

"As is known, the recent conversations at Mussoorie were intended to clear the ground for final negotiations between the British and Afghan governments for a permanent treaty of friendship. The Afghan delegates returned to Kabul at the end of July to lay the results of these discussions before the Ameer.

"Recently the Ameer, after full consideration of the reports of his delegates, wrote to the Viceroy in the most friendly terms, inviting a British mission to Kabul for the conclusion of a treaty, and His Majesty's Government of India to accept this invitation. The mission will con-

sist of Mr. Mobbs, Nawab Sir Shads Shah, Mr. Pears, Lieutenant-Colonel Muspratt, and Mr. Acheson. It is hoped that the mission will be able to cross the frontier in the last week of December."

In view of the fact that an alliance already exists between Afghanistan and Soviet Russia, and that part of the Russian Red Army was permitted by the Afghans to enter their country, and that the Soviet mission for a long time enjoyed the hospitality of Kabul, this news is of great importance, proving the recognition by British diplomacy of its own weakness with regard to its powerful opponent in Asia—the Soviet Republic of Russia.

It is well-known that the state of affairs in Afghanistan is such that at any moment the establishment of Soviets through the country may be expected. The Amir has practically lost his autocratic power over the people, and the annual *Durbar*, the general popular meeting of the people with their ruler, since the assassination of the late Habib-Ullah-Khan, was attended with a great deal of trouble. A kind of constitution was granted to the people by their new sovereign, but still the people are not satisfied and are asking more . . . The army in Afghanistan has reached the number of almost half-a-million men, is well-equipped, well-trained, and has a brilliant cavalry and a powerful artillery. Having been reorganized by instructors of the Red Army, the military force of the Afghans may be considered formidable, especially for a war in the mountains. We must not overlook the fact that 6,000,000 of the Afghans, the women as well as the men, are of an extremely warlike nature. I became intimately acquainted with the people during my expedition to Pamir in 1891-1892, and I had an even better chance to observe them when I crossed Afghanistan in 1901, taking the route Kelif-Balkh-Bamian-Kabul, reaching Peshawar (India) through the famous Khayber pass. The Afghans are the most freedom-loving people in Asia, but like the Russians, though revolutionists at heart, they have borne with extraordinary indifference the burden of their despotic rulers. This type of oppressed people is the most sensitive to revolutionary influence; therefore, the Afghans cannot remain indifferent to the fate of their brother Mohammedans of Turkestan, Persia, Transcaucasia, and Azerbaijan. They are anxiously watching the growth of the new revolutionary movement in Asia, and they have to follow it. It is a fact that the people themselves forced the Afghan Government to approach Soviet Russia. A series of uprisings of the warlike tribes of the Amir became so menacing to the existence of the Amir that he hurried to appease his people and sent his mission to Moscow.

There is no newspaper at the disposition of the nomads and other primitive people of Central Asia; the news about the atrocities of the Bolsheviks, issued to the press by British propaganda, could not penetrate into Afghanistan. The Afghans are still unacquainted with the dispatches of the Associated Press or others similar to them. All the news which the native population receive

is that of eyewitnesses, spread from one bazaar to another, with remarkable rapidity. This news knows no censorship, is extraordinarily accurate, and cannot be killed by the kind of propaganda which the Allies used to spread among the natives of Asia and Africa. The information which the population of Afghanistan received from their own countrymen or from the natives of Russian Turkestan was similar to the information which later reached their country from Soviet Russia, in the form of printed matter in their own language, and they accepted any news, any appeal from the Soviet Government with full confidence and respect.

Even at that time, as far back as 1901, during my sojourn in Afghanistan, I noticed among the Afghans a feeling of sympathy for the suffering Hindoo population. How often seated in their *Chai-Khanas* in a bazaar and talking politics (the Afghans are great at talking politics, especially in connection with Russian and English affairs) was I struck by the note of hostility directed by most of them against England. "The time will come," an old experienced Afghan major often said to me, "when we and the Russians will free India from its oppressors." Only one thing troubled this old warrior: that Russia might swallow his country together with India. For a new Russia, he certainly could not even dream of.

Now the time has come when the Russian workers and peasants are glad to see that their friends, the workers and peasants of Afghanistan, are ready to help their Hindustan brothers in achieving an independent and happy existence, and there is no menace for them from Russia either of conquest or of annexation.

There is a real reason for Great Britain's state of anxiety over India, which is to the British Empire what his vulnerable heel was to Achilles. Anti-British propaganda, the new method of warfare introduced by the German General Staff in the Great War, became a powerful weapon of England's enemies in Asia, against which British tanks and poison gas, as well as bombardment from the air of defenseless towns and villages are so many useless toys. The cruelty of the great murder in Punjab, by General Dyer, whose wholesale slaughter of the Hindoo population was approved by the House of Lords, which raised a large purse for him in England, while lavish praise was heaped on the Civil Governor, Sir Michael O'Dwyer, "whose iron rule in the Punjab made the iron enter into the soul of the people of that province," not only produced its due effect on the population of India, but also spread with lightning rapidity throughout the Mussulman world. The Hindoo nationalist agitators exploited these events with great success and, finally, in India the British Government for the first time frankly confessed that, in case of war with the Afghans, or worse, with the Soviet armies, there was great doubt whether the native Hindoo regiments would remain faithful to the crown. The situation was aggravated by the fact that there was no way to reinforce the Indian garrison from the home country, or to direct troops from Canada or

Australia to Hindustan. The concentration of a strong British army in India at the moment required would be, in view of the situation in Ireland, in Asia Minor, in Egypt, and in South Africa, an absolute impossibility; and without strong reserves the local Indian army would be far from sufficient to occupy the Turkish-Armenian front, the Transcaspian front, and the Afghanistan front, to operate in Pamir and in Tibet, where the political atmosphere every day is becoming more and more gloomy for Great Britain.

The British strategists certainly understand this, and they firmly insist that their diplomats will find a way to settle affairs in Asia in a peaceful manner, because British strategy is absolutely powerless to support its diplomacy, whose political plans are becoming too complicated to be carried out by British arms, even if supported by the Allies.

It is a remarkable fact that the most competent military experts of Great Britain, like General Maurice, Colonel Repington, and others, expect the clique surrounding Winston Churchill, all advocate a complete cessation of hostilities in Europe and Asia, and the establishment of peace with the Soviet Government, because without it there is no hope of peace, at least for a decade; they know that this would result in a social revolution, not only throughout Europe, but also in Asia, which would be surely followed by a loss of all the British colonies, as well as of the colonies of all the European nations. The situation is desperate, and it is rather difficult to guess how Great Britain and her imperialistic Allies will liquidate the chaos into which they have plunged the whole world.

The more I study the present conditions in the Eastern hemisphere, the more I am convinced that the old civilization of Western Europe, having attained the highest level of its cultural progress, has misused its gifts for destructive purposes, sacrificing the interests of the majority to the materialistic prosperity of the minority. There is no doubt, also, that in the East—in Russia—a new civilization has been born, and is growing rapidly. This new civilization, it seems to me, must supplant the old one, must enlarge the culture of the old effete civilization, nursed for centuries by imperialistic capitalism. Once it has been acquired, it has to be applied properly, namely, for constructive purposes only, and this will put an end to the possibility of future wars.

The peace which the imperialistic coalition has tried to establish in Europe and Asia is merely a compromise on the part of weakened and defeated imperialists, and will be of short duration. As soon as the economic condition of the world returns more or less to its normal state, wars will break out in different parts of the world.

Soviet Russia is willing to make peace with all the world. If the world has been so imperfectly organized by the League of Nations as to make the outbreak of new wars a certainty, Soviet Russia will not share the responsibility for such events, even though she be ready to live at peace with the disordered handiwork.

Russia, Ukraine, and Poland

Continuation of the Negotiations at Riga

RIGA, November 16.—On November 13, a conversation took place between the Russian and Polish Delegation, in which Yoffe pointed out that questions that had appeared solved and determined by the treaty, now seemed to be still open. The most important paragraph, paragraph 6, which deals with the armistice, had thus far not been fulfilled by Poland. There could not of course be any transactions on the proposal of Poland with regard to the Volhynian sugar factories, and on a final peace, until the armistice conditions were completely carried out. This was a cardinal question. The failure to withdraw the Polish troops to the line that had been set was a direct violation of the treaty. In spite of the armistice, Russia and Ukraine were obliged to continue military action against troops that were organized on Poland's territory, with Poland's aid and equipment, and which were attacking Ukrainian and White Russian territory. The present condition at the front could only involve a renewal of the war of Russia and Ukraine with Poland. The military actions of the Red Army against the White Guard troops, in consequence of the sojourn of Polish detachments on Ukrainian and White Russian soil, to the east of Poland's national boundary, might make collisions with such troops inevitable. During the armistice negotiations, both sides aimed at securing a real peace; but now feeling had manifestly changed, as was declared in the Polish press, which was writing about the inevitability of a new war with Russia, and also in the expressions of Polish statesmen; besides it was evident in the special treaty of peace between the Polish Government and Petlura. In spite of the treaties signed on October 12 with Soviet Ukraine, the Polish Government evidently considered it proper to recognize another Ukrainian government also, and to conclude treaties with this other Ukrainian government. The question had to be finally decided as to whether Poland was really intending to renew the war, for the armistice treaty had been violated. During the negotiations Poland expressed fears that Russia might not ratify the peace after Wrangel was defeated. Wrangel was completely defeated, and yet Russia and Ukraine were still willing to carry out an honest and complete fulfillment of all the conditions of the treaty signed with Poland. They were ready to consider favorably the question proposed by Poland with regard to the protection of Polish interests in the Volhynian sugar production, and were generally convinced that the restoration of economic and commercial relations would be the best guarantee of peace. On the other hand, Poland had created a serious and extremely dangerous front situation, which might lead to a renewal of war conditions. Should Poland desire this, let it say so openly, as was provided in that article of the treaty which requires a fourteen-day notice.

Dombiski replied that he could not agree with Yoffe on the question of a change of attitude on the part of Poland toward Russia and Ukraine. Polish public opinion, he said, was still in favor of peace; he knew of no organs of the press that were working for a renewal of the war with Russia; Article 6 of the armistice treaty did not provide for an immediate withdrawal of troops. To withdraw the troops at once, in view of the hoof and mouth disease which was raging, would be connected with great danger. It was necessary to set the time when the Polish troops should be withdrawn. Poland was ready to fulfill all its obligations, but must first create the necessary sanitary and technical conditions. Furthermore, Dombiski mentioned article 11 of the treaty, and pointed out that Poland had fulfilled all its provisions. If the troops of Petlura, Balakhovich, and others, had been pushed back on Polish territory, Poland would undertake to disarm them. More could not be asked of Poland. Dombiski was convinced that collisions between Russian-Ukrainian and Polish troops would not occur. At least Poland did not desire collisions, for it considered the war with Russia to be finally ended.

Yoffe declared he did not doubt the candor of the Polish Delegation. Yet it was clear, he said, that the attitude at the signing of the armistice conditions had been quite different from now. Yoffe recalled the occupation of Minsk by the Poles on October 12. To be sure, the Poles soon evacuated Minsk, but not at the command or order of the Polish Supreme Command, but rather because the Polish soldiers did not wish to be considered as having occupied territory that belonged to Russia by treaty. The change of attitude in Poland was unquestionably perceptible. For instance, the notion of buffer states was again making its appearance. The Russo-Ukrainian Delegation had proofs that the basis of operations of troops now proceeding against Soviet Russia was on Polish territory. In boundary questions, Russia and Ukraine had met Poland more than half-way, and yet Poland continued the occupation of White Russian territory and Ukrainian territory to the east of the boundary line. Sanitary reasons would not serve as a sufficient basis for this action. All this lead one to believe that Poland desired to continue the war, if not openly, then at least under the flag of Petlura, Balakhovich, etc. Russia and Ukraine would not, however, permit themselves to be deceived. They wanted either an open peace or an open war. In view of the present situation on the front they could not tolerate a further advance and reinforcement of White Guard formations. Even if Poland should not help these troops—although it can hardly be assumed that parents would not be willing to aid their offspring—the position of the Polish army was nevertheless impeding actions of the Red Army against the White Guard

troops and thus conjuring up the danger of a new war. Yoffe again emphasized the fact that epidemics and the question of the sugar factories did not justify a continued occupation, and that the Russo-Ukrainian Delegation, in view of the violation of article 6 of the armistice conditions, and in view of the inevitability of collisions between the Polish troops and the Red Army, must insist upon a withdrawal of the Polish troops.

RIGA, November 15.—The Chairmen of the Russian and Polish Peace Delegations, Yoffe and Dombiski, agreed as a result of their sessions of November 13 and 14 that the withdrawal of the Polish troops to Polish national territory, in all cases where this withdrawal had not yet been accomplished, should take place immediately, not later than November 19, in accordance with article 6 of the armistice treaty. In these sessions, Yoffe and Dombiski signed another protocol on the subject of the guarantee of Polish interests in the sugar factories of the Volhynia province. To compensate for Poland's expenditures in the sugar crop of 1919-1920 in the occupied region, where Polish armies are still stationed, Soviet Ukraine is to deliver 70 per cent of the sugar obtained to Poland.

RIGA, November 17.—Today at five o'clock the plenary session of the Russo-Ukrainian-Polish Peace Conference was opened. After Dombiski's opening speech, Yoffe expressed thanks for the hospitality of Riga and emphasized that he had never doubted the benevolence of the Lettish people toward the people of Russia and Ukraine. Yoffe further said:

"Finally peace negotiations with Poland are beginning. The Russian-Ukrainian Peace Delegation notes with satisfaction that all the frictions and misunderstandings that permitted doubts to arise as to the genuineness of the Polish desire for peace have now disappeared, and welcomes the declaration that has just been made that the Polish Peace Delegation has the object of pursuing the attainment of a final peace, with the same determined will that has characterized their work in the preliminary peace treaty. Russia and Ukraine, on their part, have given no cause to doubt their genuine desire for peace. If Russia and Ukraine are obliged to state categorically that they will in no way tolerate any attempts to circumvent the peace, and always will prefer an open war to a war that is waged under pseudonyms of various kinds, they nevertheless state with equal definiteness that their policy will not be influenced by the war map, and that at moments of success as well as of reverses it will remain true to its obligations. Now that the last powerful enemy of Russia and Ukraine, Baron Wrangel, has been finally destroyed and forced to capitulate, now that the Red banner is waving triumphantly over Simferopol and Sebastopol, now that the hour of the final annihilation of the mutinous bands of Petlura, Savinkov, Bala-khovich, Peremykin, and others is approaching, the peace negotiations will be conducted on our part with the same magnanimity with regard to the legal

and normal requirements of our Polish brothers with which we conducted such negotiations in the armistice treaty and the preliminary peace period. Welcoming the categorical statement that "Poland conducting an independent policy cannot be turned aside from the pursuit of peace, and will make every effort to make the peace a permanent one," I expressed the optimistic feeling that in view of the already obtained understanding in the preliminary peace treaty as to all fundamental questions, we shall surely be able to reach an agreement on economic questions, and this agreement will mean a still greater strengthening of the independence of the Polish policy, and thus very much improve the general peace situation.

"Finally the fact that the peace negotiations are being conducted on the Polish side by the same respected chairman, who in the first period of the negotiations, in spite of war conditions, succeeded in producing an attitude that made an understanding possible, the Russian-Ukrainian Peace Delegation is filled with the hope that the negotiations may proceed smoothly and swiftly, and we therefore frankly and candidly share the plea of the esteemed chairman of the Polish Delegation that our work of peace will have beneficent effects.

THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS

The Central Executive Committee of Soviets reports that the order of the day of the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which opens December 2, at Moscow, is the following:

1. Reports of the Central Executive Committee and of the Council of Peoples' Commissars, on the internal and external situation;
2. Immediate tasks of reconstruction of national economy;
3. Reconstruction of industry;
4. Reconstruction of transportation;
5. Expansion of agricultural production and advancement of peasant economy;
6. The struggle against bureaucratism;
7. The election of the new Central Executive Committee.

Bound Volumes for 1920

Volume II, of which a number of copies, splendidly bound, are still to be obtained by persons desiring them, is sold at five dollars. Check or money order should accompany order. Volume I (June-December, 1919) is sold out and will not be reprinted. Volume III will be bound, with title-page and index, as soon as the issues have all appeared (January 1, 1921). Readers may place orders now for Volume III, and should send the cost of the volume—five dollars—with their orders.

SOVIET RUSSIA

Room 304

110 W. 40th St.

New York, N. Y.

The Break with Litvinov

The official organ of the North Norway Fishermen's Association, a non-political organization, has the following to say on the failure of the negotiations between Litvinov and the Norwegian Governments. (*See Documents, pp. 642-645 of this issue.*)

It is difficult at this moment rightfully to judge who is guilty in the failure of the negotiations with Litvinov, in which the people of North Norway have been placing such high hopes. There has been altogether too much secrecy in the matter. The general public—with the exception of a few of the initiated—were not informed concerning the questions under treatment.

The onlookers were kept in a position in which they believed that everything was ready for a successful termination of the negotiations. The contracts concerning sales had been concluded and the people believed that the government would show so much understanding as to find a basis for the solution of the remaining questions, but this has not been the case.

It has been often pointed out that commercial relations with Russia—as conditions are now—are a question of life and death for North Norway. It is unnecessary for this reason to point out this phase of the matter again. Let us simply call attention to the fact that it will now be a long time before the negotiations on exchange of goods can be concluded.

But while the Norwegian Government permits the negotiations with Litvinov to come to a halt, press messages from other countries indicate that there are no longer any essential obstacles to a resumption of the trade with Russia. The blockade is therefore broken and free commercial agreements are about to be consummated.

It is therefore unfortunate that the government should assume a brusque and hostile attitude.

The demand of the executive of this organization that this matter should be placed before the public in full is a demand that should be more than met. If the government can present reasonable proofs that a breaking off of the negotiations was justified, well and good, if not, its mode of action should be subjected to further and more profound scrutiny.

As far as we can see from what has leaked out, the break was the result of political negotiations. The government from the very outset seemed to object to the personnel of the Russian Commercial Delegation. It must be that the terror of "Bolshevism" has once more been the decisive factor.

We know nothing about the men who hold the highest offices of this land, and it is therefore quite possible that they may be such weak souls as feel obliged to draw their night caps over their ears and creep in under their conjugal quilts in order not to fall victims to temptation. Even though this should be the case, it is nevertheless not proper to attribute such qualities to the whole Norwegian people. The people are healthy and sound and are not afraid of free exchanges of

views. They will not permit themselves to be misled by demagogues.

But economic collapse might force the people to do things that are desired by no one.

It is not impossible that the government's measures will have an effect contrary to their intention.

NOTE OF PROTEST TO FRANCE

MOSCOW, October 30.—The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, on October 27 sent the French Prime Minister as well as Foreign Minister Leygues the following note:

The Russian Soviet Government notes with regret that the serious desire for complete peace between Russia and Poland with which Soviet Russia is animated, as is also the overwhelming majority of the Polish people, is being repeatedly frustrated by outside influences which constitute a hindrance to an immediate and effective peace in eastern Europe. A preliminary peace and armistice treaty has been signed between Poland on the one hand, and Russia and Ukraine on the other, and these last-named powers therefore had a right to hope that hostilities would immediately and absolutely cease in accordance with the agreement that had been concluded. But the facts have unfortunately not corresponded with this hope. Petlura's troops, in spite of the fact that they constitute an integral portion of the Polish army, and are under the orders of the Polish Military Command, have not subjected themselves to the armistice agreement, and still continue, in violation of the agreement, to wage war against Russia and Ukraine. As these troops, as well as the bandits of Balakhovich and Savinkov, are not able to maintain themselves armed and equipped out of their own resources, and have not sufficient financial resources of their own for the waging of war, it is manifest that the French Government, which in spite of its repeated assurances has continued to supply the Polish army with military heads and instructors, up to the present moment, has also supplied these bands with munitions and weapons to fight against Russia; and has assigned the necessary credits to Poland with this object in view; and is continuing to support Petlura and his consorts and thus is maintaining a state of war in eastern Europe and preventing the realization of peace. The French Government, which egged Poland on to begin this war against Russia—a war that has cost the Polish people unheard of sacrifices—and which has done everything in its power to prevent the reestablishment of peace between Russia and Poland, seems now to be pursuing the object of continuing to prolong the sufferings of the working classes in eastern Europe. In protesting with indignation against this criminal procedure on the part of the French Government, which is the cause of the distress and misery prevailing among the nations of eastern Europe, the Soviet Government expresses its hope that the great masses of the French people will soon put an end to this policy with its baleful consequences for humanity and to the criminal role played by their government.



Map of Territory

as well as of the Allied Soviet Republics, showing also some of the neighboring countries included in the Federation are: Azerbaijan, Bashkiri, Bukhara, Khiva, Kiregizia, square kilometers, holding more than 120,000,000 inhabitants. This map was prepared on to follow the geographical references in the weekly Military Reviews by Lt.-Col. B. Row



in Soviet Russia

iet Russia. The heavy dotted line indicates the limits of Soviet territory. The countries Tataria, Turkestan, Ukraine, White Russia. The total area of this territory is about 18,000,000 utline recently published in "Kommunismus", Vienna. Our readers should now find it easier

SOVIET RUSSIA

Official Organ of the

RUSSIAN SOVIET GOVERNMENT BUREAU
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This weekly will print articles by members of the Russian Soviet Government Bureau as well as by friends and supporters of Soviet Russia. Full responsibility is assumed by the Bureau only for unsigned articles. Manuscripts are not solicited; if sent in, their return is not promised.

Statement of the Russian Soviet Government Bureau

*on the Concession to be Granted to Mr. Washington
B. Vanderlip*

New York, December 13, 1920.

Mr. Washington B. Vanderlip called at the Russian Soviet Government Bureau at 110 West 40th Street this morning to discuss with Mr. L. Martens, Representative of the Soviet Republic, the details of the negotiations conducted by Mr. Vanderlip, on behalf of a syndicate of Pacific Coast financiers, with officials of the Soviet Government at Moscow.

As previously announced by the Soviet Government Bureau, the concession granted to the Vanderlip syndicate comprises a sixty year lease of Siberian territory east of the one hundred and sixtieth meridian, including Kamchatka, an area of 400,000 square miles, with exclusive rights to exploit coal, oil and fisheries. The granting of this concession was confirmed in a cablegram received by Mr. Martens from Mr. George Chicherin, Commissar for Foreign Affairs at Moscow, on October 26. In addition to the concession for the exploitation of natural resources in Siberia, Mr. Vanderlip's negotiations at Moscow included another arrangement whereby the same syndicate is to become the fiscal agent of the Russian Soviet Government in America, financing all purchases made through the Soviet Government Bureau. These two arrangements are wholly separate and unrelated.

Mr. Vanderlip will have further conferences with Mr. Martens and officials of the Commercial Department of the Soviet Government Bureau, after which he will leave for the Pacific Coast to report to his associates and arrange for the further development of their plans.

YAKUTSK is a region in the extreme east of Siberia, long cut off from the world. A few months ago, the Central Bureau of Siberian Cooperatives began the work of opening up this country. A steamer was equipped and sent out along the rivers of the district, carrying manufactured products. The district possesses immense resources in skins, as well as various raw materials, which the population, in their great lack of manufactured articles, are eager to exchange for the latter. From

the ports of Ayan and Okhotsk, the goods are transported across country to the Maya, a tributary of the Aldan, which, in turn, flows into the Lena. The distance between the Ayan and the Lena is more than two hundred miles, without roads. The whole region is covered with dense forests, with trails known only to the hunters and natives. More than 100 reindeer are therefore to be used in transport work. This portion of the work is said to be the most difficult, but the cooperatives have done everything to secure completely successful operation. From the Maya, the goods are transported down the Aldan, and from its confluence with the Lena they go down the latter river to Yakutsk. The necessary river tonnage is assured through the cooperation of the Yakutsk cooperatives. Ayan and Okhotsk, as well as all the territory surrounding Lake Okhotsk, are extremely important. They are famous for their boundless supplies of fish and skins. Years ago, efforts were already made to develop these industries, and now again traces of a reawakening are to be felt in these regions so long neglected. The Siberian cooperatives, well acquainted with the needs of the country, are introducing new methods of catching fish and preparing skins. Several depots are to be established along the coast, between Kamchatka and the Amur, provided with the necessary employes and supplies, for the purpose of negotiating with the hunters and gathering game from them. These depots will also supply the population with tools and manufactured products.

The Yakutsk region is one of those covered in the great concession that has just been granted to the corporation represented by Mr. Washington B. Vanderlip, of Hollywood, California, who called at the Soviet Government Bureau, after his return to America, on Monday, December 13.

* * *

RED CROSS officials have recently been endeavoring, through reports spread to newspapers in various parts of the United States, to give the impression that Red Cross organizations are not permitted to work in Russia, that they were ordered out of the country by the Soviet Government.

The fact is, the American Red Cross was ordered out of Russia, but not by the Soviet Government or by any other authority inside of Russia. It was ordered out from at home, not from Russia. Any Red Cross official who really worked with the American Red Cross in Russia before it left that country can corroborate this statement. A number of such individuals have recently, however, been attempting to produce a contrary impression, and one of them at least had his statement printed in a recent issue of the *Davenport (Iowa) Daily Times* (November 22). This was Mr. Walter Davidson, mentioned in the *Davenport* paper as "acting manager of the central district headquarters of the Red Cross at Chicago." Among other things he said: "The Red Cross organization was operating in Russia when it was ordered out of the country. It was maintaining hospitals, doing re-

lief work, administering to the millions of suffering people, when the Soviet Government obtained control." He was answering a statement of Mr. Isaac McBride, made at a lecture given in that city, to the effect that the American Red Cross was consciously assisting every counter-revolutionary army attacking Soviet Russia, and neglecting to furnish any medical aid to the military forces of Soviet Russia.

Mr. Allen Wardwell was the last American Red Cross supervisor to leave Soviet Russia. When Mr. Wardwell returned to the United States, he gave frequent interviews to American newspapers, in which he pointed out how fully the American Red Cross had met with the cooperation of the Soviet Government. We shall not quote from any of these now rather old interviews, but reprint herewith a few short passages from a speech delivered by Mr. Wardwell, on October 16, 1920, at the Twenty-ninth Luncheon Discussion of the League of Free Nations Association, at the Hotel Commodore, New York. The subject of the Luncheon Discussion was "Peace or War With Russia?"

"It is now nearly two years since the last of the American relief organizations left Russia. Conditions then were bad enough. Most of us who were in relief organizations have been much occupied in our own affairs since and perhaps have not been able to follow closely all of the information which came from Russia, and to compare it pro and con. None the less, I think those who saw conditions in the summer of 1918 and can grasp some of the things that have been passing since, can make a fair picture of what must be the conditions there today."

After speaking of sanitary and provisions conditions in Soviet Russia, which he believes to be very bad, Mr. Wardwell continues:

"Naturally the question arises in everybody's mind, why under such conditions as that, with America taking the lead or aiding in relief in every other country in the world, and in other parts of Russia, should we neglect Soviet Russia? I should have thought that the mere statement of the conditions that exist there would have been enough to urge us on to some relief work of that kind, but I am told that that is largely sentimental bosh, and that I, as a lawyer of the New York Bar for a considerable number of years, ought not to consider such things as that."

And later, after suggesting the fact that political differences in Russia and elsewhere make persons in foreign countries desire to give no medical or other aid to Soviet Russia:

"It is this contest then, that has made people fearful of sending relief to Russia, fearful that it would aid what they considered to be the center of this propaganda, this effort to overthrow their own government. In that I believe they are wrong. It seems to me that if this challenge sent forth from Moscow is a class challenge, then it is one that is equally on in Moscow. And we must as much refrain from giving to the Bolsheviks weapons for their own usefulness there as we would if they were here. I think the withholding of relief from Soviet Russia, and particularly the large cities, have given them a weapon which they have used to the greatest advantage at home.

"Nor do I believe that the people of anti-Bolshevik tendencies—bourgeois, as we call them, who still live in Russia—would agree that relief should be withheld.

"I have heard the statement made that they are the first to say, 'We would rather suffer than see help sent to us from the outside, which would help the Bolsheviks'. I cannot credit it. I know many of them. Take the medical men—bourgeois almost to a man. Haven't they stayed in Rus-

sia and done their work? Take the head of the great Orthopaedic Hospital in Petrograd. I never heard a man use worse language in secret (Laughter) against the Bolsheviks than he did and yet he operated his hospital under them and never gave any suggestion that he wanted to leave. He worked on, working under the spur of the most bitter kind of attack from Bolshevik authorities. I understand that today he is in what used to be Tsarskoe-selo or the Czar's Village, now the Children's Village, working with the children who live in the former palace of the Czar. If they can stay there and do that, can't we help them? (Great Applause.)

"But, 'Oh', they would say, 'there are lots of other reasons why we should not do it. They will take your food away from them. They won't let you distribute it. You cannot get it in. They will steal it. They do all sorts of things.' That is pretty old talk to me. That is exactly what they said when we were there."

Mr. Wardwell then proceeds to tell a clear story of honest and just distribution of food, of non-interference by Soviet authorities. We could quote it all here, but our readers, should they wish to read Mr. Wardwell's whole speech, can obtain the stenographic report of the entire Luncheon Discussion from the League of Free Nations Association.

Our object in quoting from Mr. Wardwell at all is simply to show that Mr. Wardwell, who, being the last American Red Cross official to leave Soviet Russia, would certainly know of any ordering out of the country by the Soviet Government, says not a word about it, and rather suggests that the failure of the American Red Cross to continue operations in Soviet Russia was due to causes nearer home. It is none of our business whether the Red Cross sends aid to Soviet Russia or not—we do not ask charity—but we cannot permit the American Red Cross to "get-away" with its partiality to counter-revolutionary forces with the statement that they were "ordered out" of Soviet Russia. They may have been "ordered out", but it was not by the Soviet Government.

Thus the Red Cross is indirectly continuing to spread the impression that it is a "neutral" organization, interested in securing the advantages of medical attendance and general relief work to all the peoples and armies of the world, when as a matter of fact, it is a belligerent body supporting counter-revolution everywhere.

* * *

IN THE discussion that followed the various speeches delivered on the above occasion, a questioner, apparently convinced that the Soviet Government was preventing food from reaching non-Bolsheviks while the Red Cross was still in Petrograd, provoked an answer from Mr. Wardwell that must have set his doubts at rest. We cannot refrain from quoting, again from the stenographic report, both question and answer:

QUESTION: I should like to ask a question of Mr. Wardwell.

I have an affidavit in my office, sworn to by an American soldier who was in charge of the supply and warehouse of the Red Cross in Petrograd in 1919, in which he states that an American clergyman, the Rev. George A. Simons, Methodist minister for fifteen years in Russia, went to the Red Cross headquarters and was refused food for parishioners of his and for Christians generally who were not Bol-

sheviki who needed assistance. The food was refused because they said they had none. Now, I have a sworn statement in my office, which I can produce in a moment for anyone to see, from Lieutenant Hetzel, who works for the American Can Company on 36th Street, in which he says that there were hundreds of thousands of dollars of supplies in the warehouse of the Red Cross at the time the Rev. Dr. Simons could not get anything, but that the Bolsheviks got supplies, and that they were for sale at the Nevskyprospekt for weeks and for months afterwards.

MR. WARDWELL: I don't know that this is a question. It is rather an assertion. I have no doubt that Dr. Simons if he went direct to the warehouse in Petrograd was refused food. But Dr. Simons subsequently came to me, and I gave Dr. Simons food. I gave it for his parishioners. I have his signed receipt and his letter of thanks in my possession. (Laughter and great applause.)

* * *

GEORGIA will probably be thrown by the Allies into an unwilling war with Azerbaijan and Armenia, both of which are Soviet Republics allied with Soviet Russia, in order to make of this whole region a new operating basis for counter-revolutionary armies attacking Soviet Russia. A loan is to be advanced by England to Georgia, and Wrangel is to be transferred to conduct military operations on the new scene. A Warsaw dispatch of November 20 tells us that the following has appeared in *Rzeczpospolita*, of that city:

"Reports from Russian counter-revolutionary circles at Warsaw indicate that Wrangel intends to launch new operations against Soviet Russia in the Caucasus. The backbone of the new enterprise is to be furnished by the 20,000 men who sought refuge on Entente ships. The same very well-informed counter-revolutionists also say that the Georgian Government, which, as is well-known, is Social-Democratic, had already agreed, before Wrangel's defeat, to permit him to conduct operations against Soviet Russia with Georgia as a base."

That is to say, the Social-Democratic Government of Georgia, acting against the will of the majority of the population, who desire an alliance with Soviet Russia, consents to hand over the country to Wrangel, to use it as a base against Soviet Russia! Whether France is again to be the chief sponsor of the new enterprise, is not certain, but a Paris message of November 21 is not without interest in this connection:

"Maklakov, the leader of the group of Czarist Russians who are conducting anti-Bolshevik propaganda from the Russian 'embassy' in Paris, yesterday had a conference with the French Prime Minister, in which he made effort to learn the intentions of the French Government with regard to the defeated Wrangel. It is reported today that Leygues' answer did not reassure the 'Russian Ambassador', and that no hope was offered of any new military enterprises on the part of France, either now or later. But France's disinclination to give renewed support to adventurers opposing the Red Army must not be interpreted as a real desire for peace. There is reason to assume that the French Government will make new attempts to crush Moscow. It is already stated that a well-known general of the French Staff is preparing plans for a military expedition against Russia, in which among others French troops would take part in great numbers."

* * *

TWO weeks ago (in the issue of December 11) SOVIET RUSSIA suggested editorially that voices would not be lacking in Spain, Norway, and Sweden, which would protest against the proposed sending of troops, in even the smallest numbers,

to Vilna for the purpose of "policing" the city during a plebiscite. We then indicated the probability that this proposed "policing" was simply a means of preparing for the erection of a new line of buffer states, to consist chiefly of the Scandinavian countries. We are now in a position to provide our readers with direct statements from newspapers of the countries concerned, protesting against any such attempt to involve them in the war which the Allies have not yet ceased to wage against Soviet Russia. From *Social Demokraten* of Christiania, Norway, issue of November 25, we take the following editorial:

When the fundamental pact of the League of Nations was under discussion, the published statements indicated that one of the most disputed questions was whether the League of Nations should be equipped with any special armed forces. France was very anxious that such should be the case. But the outcome of the matter was that moral authority was to be considered as sufficient. The League did not obtain permission to conscript troops.

Let us therefore at the very outset state, whatever may be the form of the summons to the Norwegian nation, Norway has no duty, by the pact of the League, or any other treaty, or any other documents, to put a single man at the disposal of the League of Nations.

And let us make an additional statement. No Norwegian, no Norwegian soldier, is bound to obey a possible order to stand guard at Vilna. These services lie entirely outside of the conscription law.

The Norwegian Government, the Norwegian Storting, the Norwegian soldier have therefore full freedom in discussing whether we are to send 100 men to stand guard at Vilna during the impending plebiscite.

The thing looks very innocent. Only one hundred men! And only for an extremely peaceful and proper enterprise. It may look that way. But we should know how easily complications may arise either between the Lithuanians and the Poles or between the various classes and parties within the country. In fact, it will be inevitable that "the guard" will be drawn in, and before we know it, we shall be embarked in a most dangerous adventure. For we also have a "military honor" to defend.

But there is also another side to the matter, more ominous and more questionable still.

What are France and England going to do with the wretched 300 Scandinavian troops? They could of course provide them easily themselves. Is it to confer a special honor upon Norway, Sweden, and Denmark? Certainly not. No, it is with the object of pushing the Scandinavian countries into a definite policy of warfare against Russia. The thing has been tried before without much success. The new method may perhaps be better.

The relations between Lithuania, various classes and currents in Lithuania, and the Russian Government are not clear. Western Europe regards the Soviet Government, with customary arrogance, as an entirely negligible quantity in this combination. That is not the view, however, of the Russian Government. It is easy to see therefore, that it is possible that frictions may arise. Should the western powers succeed in creating a single Scandinavian front against Russia, they will obtain something that must mean a great deal in their eyes.

Government circles have said that eventually "only volunteer troops" would be sent. But whether they are volunteers or not these troops would be equipped by the Norwegian state, and their acts and destinies would be a responsibility for the Norwegian state.

Norway must choose between two paths. That which the League of Nations wants us to follow leads into the abyss.

A later issue of the same periodical advertises a great protest meeting against the sending of Norwegian troops to Vilna, to be held on Wednesday, December 1, in the Great Hall of the Christiania Workingmen's Society, which was to be ad-

dressed by Karl Johanssen and Martin Tranmael. We have not yet received details of this meeting.

On October 6, Litvinov, Soviet Russian Representative in Norway, left that country, after the negotiations he had been conducting with that country's Department of Commerce had been broken off by that Department. Evidently the powers that made the Norwegian Government send Litvinov home (see SOVIET RUSSIA for December 11, 1920, as well as the documents printed in this article), intend his expulsion to be only the beginning of a Scandinavian participation in the counter-revolutionary war.

* * *

ON THE following day, November 26, *Folkets Dagblad Politiken*, of Stockholm, printed an editorial similarly opposing participation of Sweden in this "police" duty. From this article, which is signed by Z. Hoglund, we take the following paragraphs:

"The time has come. The Council of the League of Nations has decided to summon the Scandinavian nations to take part in the maintenance of the police duty in the plebiscite district at Vilna. Each one of these states will be asked to send a detachment of 100 men. In the struggle between megalomaniac White Poland and nationalistic Lithuania, Sweden and the other Scandinavian states are to have the dubious honor of intervening with so-called 'order police', which to be sure is declared to function only in connection with the plebiscite in this region, and which is to have a very limited size, but who will guarantee that this will be the end, if once we have embarked upon the adventure? It is quite probable that the demand will gradually be increased when it turns out that the enterprise requires bigger forces than it was considered desirable to suggest in advance. The Entente imperialism, thinks, in other words, to impose upon the neutral states a portion of the military and economic burden which their own insane and criminal policy in Eastern Europe has laid upon them. And this is being done under the false pretence of an honorable international commission, conferred by the League of Nations!

"The matter becomes all the more questionable in view of a simultaneous expression by 'a representative of one of the Great Powers' to an NPC correspondent, in which the latter asks: 'Why is Scandinavia doing absolutely nothing for Armenia? If Scandinavia should send to Vilna even a very small contingent, it would show that it is in principle not opposed to making sacrifices in order to consolidate international peace.' The thing sounds very well, but actually the meaning is probably this: if we can only fool you into sending 100 men to Vilna, getting you thus to recognize in principle your duty to take part in the warlike enterprises of the Entente, under various disguises, we shall be satisfied. For once you have begun you will keep on of yourself. We will begin with Vilna and later there will be Armenia, and then Persia, India, China, Italy, and Russia—for where does the Entente not need a little troop of serfs to 'maintain order'. And why should not Scandinavia be out fighting for the continuation of the capitalist world order, which is the real task of the League of Nations?

"These are the fruits of the right wing Socialist Entente policy, which are now beginning to mature. Sweden's workers, the majority of whom have good naturedly followed this policy through thick and thin, are now obtaining a very tangible and uncomfortable lesson of what it costs to dance blindly to Branting's whistle. It would of course be foolish to expect that the Government now in session will refuse to obey the new order. But the working class of our country should absolutely refuse to accept the questionable honor of taking part in the Entente's international police guard. Let them do it themselves."

We have not gone through the Danish newspapers to find similar expressions of disapproval of the effort to include Denmark in the new military zone to be erected against Soviet Russia. But can our readers doubt that the verdict of the Danish press would be similar to that voiced in Norway and Sweden?

Chicherin to the British Government

The following radio was sent on November 26, for the London Foreign Office to Earl Curzon of Kedleston:

Answering your number 103, the Russian Government protests against the eventuality of a British occupation of Batum as suggested by wireless messages of British stations* have led the British Government to assumption that this place, which is part of independent Georgia, is in some danger. The above-mentioned British radio telegrams prove that it is really threatened by the danger of being occupied by Entente forces. As for the insinuation made by the British Government that the safety of Batum and, in general, the independence of Georgia is allegedly threatened by a danger from the Russian Government, this allegation is dictated by the same misinformation of the British Government as to Caucasian affairs which was shown by the British Prime Minister during his conference with the Russian Trade Delegation on June 7, when he expressed surprise at learning that a treaty had been concluded between Soviet Russia and Georgia on May 7. Otherwise the British Government would have known that the Russian Soviet Government was the first to recognize (in June) the independent Georgian Government, this recognition being still withheld by the Entente's Governments which try to demonstrate such interest in the fate of Georgia. As a matter of fact the whole policy of Soviet Russia in the Near East is dictated by her desire to preserve peace, and to render possible to every people to determine its own fate. There has been, on the part of the Russian Government, no act which would even remotely infringe the independence of Georgia. It has recognized its independence in the same treaty which stipulates that no alien forces shall reside at Batum, and it is loyally observing this treaty by which its action in the questions concerned is determined. A hostile occupation of Batum would mean violation of the above treaty, and from the point of view not only of its own safety, but also of the defence of this treaty against any violation, the Russian Government would not be able to remain indifferent to such eventuality. In every case, however, the Russian Government will always faithfully adhere to the recognition of Georgia's independence, and will in no case violate its sovereign rights either by occupation of Batum or otherwise.

* The text is evidently defective and should probably read, beginning with the word "Batum" in line 3: "as has been suggested. Wireless messages of British stations have led the British Government to the assumption that," etc.

Correspondence with the Norwegian Government

[On November 18 the following correspondence passing between Litvinov and the Norwegian Department of Commerce was submitted to the members of the Norwegian Storting as a printed document. We translate this document from the Norwegian in its entirety and publish it below because of the intrinsic interest attached to each of the diplomatic messages contained in it. For the present it is not necessary for us to make any comment on the nature of the documents, beyond pointing out that those emanating from the Norwegian Department of Commerce repeatedly emphasize the desire of that Department to have a veto power as to the person of the official appointed by the Soviet Government to conduct commercial negotiations with the Norwegian Government. It is unfortunate that insistence on this point by the Norwegian Department of Commerce should have led to the refusal by that Department in the last of the documents printed below, to continue its negotiations with the Soviet Government, represented by Litvinov. Litvinov had, however, before the negotiations were broken off, yielded to the Norwegian Department of Commerce on this point. The inability of the Norwegian Government to undertake any step that might appear to involve a recognition of the Soviet Government is particularly interesting (see No. II); who is behind it? Litvinov left Christiania with his secretary, Piatigorsky, on October 6.]

I. Draft of Agreement Proposed by Litvinov to the Norwegian Foreign Department on September 8

Impelled by the desire to eliminate all obstacles in the way of a resumption of trade relations between the two countries, the Government of the Russian Federative Socialist Soviet Republic and the Royal Norwegian Government have agreed as follows:

1. In anticipation of a resumption of normal diplomatic relations the contracting parties have agreed to erect a Russian Commercial Bureau at Christiania, and a Norwegian Commercial Bureau at Moscow, controlled and conducted respectively by one—or, not more than two—representatives of the Russian People's Commissariat for Foreign Commerce, or by any other institution that may represent it, and by the Norwegian Commercial Department, respectively.

2. The contracting parties guarantee free access to their respective countries to not more than fifteen Russian and Norwegian citizens, respectively, who shall constitute the personnel of the commercial bureaus mentioned in paragraph 1. The heads of the bureaus may, however, also employ citizens of their own or of any other nationality dwelling in Russia or Norway respectively.

3. The Commercial Bureaus shall have the right to appoint agents in the northern parts of Russia and Norway.

4. The official representatives (not more than two for each of the contracting parties) of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and the Commercial Department, respectively, and their secretaries (one for each representative) and agents (see paragraph 3) shall enjoy in full the customary diplomatic rights and privileges, including that of extra-territoriality.

5. The Commercial Bureaus shall have the right to send to their governments through couriers sealed packages not exceeding 10 kilograms in weight for each courier.

6. Telegraph and radio messages forwarded by the Commercial Bureaus and their agents shall take precedence in both countries over private telegrams.

7. It is understood that the contracting parties guarantee fully that the respective representatives shall abstain from any propaganda directed against the government, institutions, or social and political relations, in Russia and Norway, and from any participation in the political or social conflicts that may take place in these countries, and that they will not accept commissions for governments, persons or commercial firms other than those of their respective country.

8. The commercial representatives and their agents will be granted the right to exercise all customary consular acts and functions.

9. The Royal Norwegian Government consents to recognize as valid and legal all official documents, identification passports, certificates, grants, powers of attorney, protocols and documents of every other kind drawn up or certified by institutions and departments of the Russian Soviet Government.

10. Both the contracting parties consent to the reestablishment of postal communications between their two countries.

11. The Royal Norwegian Government consents to permit free transit through Norway of goods from and to the Russian Soviet Republic on the same condition as to and from other countries. Such goods shall, whether they are being transported through Norway or stored in Norway to be reexported, be free from all taxes.

12. The Russian Commercial Bureau as well as any other institution, organization or person belonging to the Soviet Republic shall enjoy the right to appear before the Norwegian Courts as plaintiff or defendant, in accordance with the country's laws. The Norwegian Commercial Bureau, Norwegian institutions, and Norwegian persons in Russia shall enjoy similar privileges.

13. Russian ships shall have access to Norwegian ports and Norwegian ships to Russian ports on the same conditions granted to ships of other nationalities and they shall likewise be permitted to make use of ports, quays, channels, and transportation routes, pilots, cranes, and warehouses, to the same extent to which these facilities are granted in general trade.

14. The present agreement shall go into effect immediately after it has been signed by the representatives of the contracting parties, and may be abrogated by either side on giving six months' notice.

An affirmation of which the representatives of the two countries have signed the present agreement and have affixed their seals.

II. Communication of the Norwegian Department of Commerce to Mr. Litvinov, September 11

The Foreign Department has transmitted to this Department, which has jurisdiction in negotiations on subjects touching upon trade and industry, the draft formulated by you as a regulation of the commercial relations between Norway and Soviet Russia.

The present Department has the honor to inform you that the provisions suggested by you cannot be approved by the Norwegian side, for the reason, among others, that this would actually involve a recognition of the Russian Soviet Government. As you have been already informed, the Norwegian Government does not consider itself able to grant this recognition.

The Department considers that it would be sufficient to advance our mutual trade as far as it may be established between commercial individuals in the two countries, that access should be afforded to the two countries for a provisional and experimental exchange of commercial commissioners. Their number should be limited to ten for each country, including secretaries and other assistants. Their distribution to the various localities within the country should be undertaken after a detailed agreement between the Chairmen of the Commissions and authorities appointed in the respective country for the regulation of such matters.

The authorities of the respective country appointed for such matters are given access to the commissioners as well as to the power to approve them or to revoke the approval already granted, should their mission not lead to the desired or intended results, or should they in any way carry on or participate in any propaganda which is not associated with the object of their sojourn as commercial com-

missioners, or should their sojourn in the respective country be considered undesirable for other reasons.

The authorities of the respective country shall afford opportunity to these commissioners to conduct the postal and telegraphic correspondence that may be necessary in the prosecution of their activities, including the right to receive and forward radio and other telegrams in cipher. They are also granted an opportunity to receive once a week by a special courier, to be approved in advance and to have no diplomatic quality whatever, without inspection, as well as to send out from the respective country, documents in sealed packages weighing altogether not more than three kilograms. This consignment of papers is to be supplied in each case with the necessary legitimating certificates by the authorities of the respective countries.

Contracts concluded between the parties concerned shall be subject to Norwegian law, and disputes which may arise, shall, unless it is definitely provided otherwise, be adjudicated by Norwegian courts. With this object in view, the Russian commissioners are granted the right to bring suit and appear in court to answer suit in this country, so long as their activities remain legal. They must for this purpose be supplied with the necessary powers of attorney to answer suit on their part before Norwegian courts.

For the purpose of undertaking such exports of goods as may result from the above commercial activity, Russian ships shall have access to Norwegian ports and shall be placed on an equality with the ships of other nations, provided that Norwegian ships obtain corresponding free access to Russian ports.

Attention is called to the fact that the trade which will be of particular interest to our country is the export of fisheries products.

It is understood that the regulation that may be adopted with regard to questions here touched upon will not in any way prejudice the demands on Russia for indemnification of the Norwegian nation or of Norwegian citizens. We take the liberty to anticipate your early communication as to whether you find yourself able to accept such an adjustment.

P. S. This communication has been delayed as a consequence of a telegraphic statement from the Norwegian Consulate at Archangel to the effect that certain Norwegian citizens had been denied permission by the appropriate Russian authorities to leave the city mentioned in order to return home to Norway. This matter has now been regulated.

CHRISTIANIA, September 16, 1920.

III. Communication from Mr. Litvinov, September 16

I herewith acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter of today containing certain alterations and additions proposed by the Royal Norwegian Government to my draft agreement.

I regret that I am not in a position to understand what provisions in the draft agreement, should this agreement be accepted, could in the opinion of the Norwegian Government involve recognition on its part of the Russian Soviet Government. It may be observed in this connection that representatives of the Soviet Government living in Great Britain, Sweden, Switzerland and other countries that have not formally acknowledged this government, have been granted more comprehensive rights and privileges than those that were asked by me.

If, as seems to me to be the case, objections are made to the wording of certain provisions, this matter could easily be adjusted.

I note with satisfaction that your government accepts the principle of exchange of commercial representatives. It is immaterial to me whether these representatives are to be called commercial delegates, or commissioners, as you propose. I have no objection to having the permanent staff limited to ten for each country, since any increase that might be found necessary would be provided for by further mutual agreement.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Government cannot under any conditions accept any restrictions in the choice of its representatives. Let me emphasize the fact that any representatives that may be appointed will be obliged to carry

out the instructions of their government, and that therefore there cannot be any question of personal responsibility. Each of the two governments shall, however, have the right to ask the recall of any representative who may be found guilty of meddling in the internal affairs of the country in which he is stationed, or of violation of its laws.

To judge from my experience as a member of the Russian Commercial Delegation abroad, I believe that sealed packages weighing only three kilograms would be found insufficient for commercial documents, specifications, drawings, etc., such as are commonly exchanged with Russia. Permit me therefore to propose that the weight be increased to at least five kilograms. It may also become impracticable to have parcels sent by only one courier. Each government should therefore have the right to change its couriers or to forward its parcels by any person whatever who might be able to obtain the necessary visas from the commercial representatives in the respective countries.

As to the legal position of the Russian Commercial Commission, it should be empowered to carry on trade not only in the name of the Russian Government, but also in that of other Russian institutions, and to participate in Norwegian private corporations.

I observe that nothing is said in your communication concerning paragraphs 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 14, of the draft agreement, and I therefore assume that they are approved by the Norwegian Government. Should this not be the case, I take the liberty to make the following observations upon the subject:

The commercial commissioners should, being the sole representatives of their government, be put in a position to maintain their prestige by being secured against molestation on the part of local authorities, since such molestation may become a source of constant friction and misunderstanding. Such immunity is enjoyed by the Russian Commercial Delegation in Great Britain, Sweden, and other countries. But I have no objection to having this privilege limited in its application to the head of the commission, to his assistant and secretary, and to his agents in seaport towns.

In the absence of regular diplomatic and consular employees a portion of their work will naturally have to be done by the commercial commissioners, such as passport visas, certification of documents, etc., which are drawn up by public institutions in the country in which they are stationed.

The importance of establishing postal communications between the two countries is so manifest that it requires no comment.

Any purchase in Norway will involve the Russian Government in a series of commercial transactions that may last for several months. The Russian Government can of course not enter into any such negotiations, or remit money or property to Norway, unless it has been assured that the relations that have been established will not be suddenly terminated. The agreement must therefore remain valid for a period to be determined in advance, since its nullification would require at least six months' notice from either side.

I also note that Norway is chiefly interested in the export of fisheries products. The numerous offers I have received from Norwegian firms seem to indicate that great stocks of other goods are also available within the country, which might be bought by Russia, and that Norwegian factory products are also of interest to Russia. And on its part, Russia expects to be able to forward its own goods for sale in or through Norway. As I assume that such commercial operations would have mutually advantageous results, I am unable to look upon the reestablishment of commercial relations between the two countries as a mere experiment.

Finally, I take the liberty to state that I am at your disposal if you should share my opinion as to the practicability of a personal conference to regulate the above-mentioned differences of view.

IV. Communication of the Department of Commerce to Mr. Litvinov, September 18

The Department acknowledges receipt of your communication of the 16 instant concerning the proposed regula-

tion of a mutual exchange of commercial commissioners in Norway and Russia, and takes note that the Russian Soviet Government will not under any circumstances accept any limitations in its choice of representatives.

Since, however, the Department on its part considers that it must insist, as an absolute condition, on the fact that the appropriate authorities of the two countries should reserve the right to have access to as well as to recognize the commissioners that have been sent out, and, if need be, to revoke the recognition already granted, it would appear useless to continue the negotiations as to a regulation such as we have discussed, unless the Russian Soviet Government, after a renewed and early consideration of the matter, could find itself in a position to share the Department's view.

Under these circumstances the Department considers it unnecessary for the moment to take up a discussion of the remaining points proposed in your communication, which, as we understand, are to be considered as desiderata on your part, and not as absolutely final conditions. We only take the liberty to observe that the draft regulations contained in the Department's communication of the 11 instant is intended as an exhaustive basis, and that therefore, in the above-mentioned communication, the Department has only approved those of your proposals that are actually taken up in the Department's draft regulations.

We take the liberty to await at the earliest possible moment such expression on your part as may be suggested by the present communication.

V. Communication from Mr. Litvinov, September 20

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your communication of the 18 instant, which I did not receive until this evening.

I note with regret that your Department denies the Russian Soviet Government the right to send commercial agents of its own choice. A personal objection from the Norwegian standpoint to any future commercial agents is all the more difficult to understand when I consider that Soviet Russia has not yet had any representatives in Norway, so that there is no means of conjecturing upon what considerations such objections may be based.

I further observe that you decline to discuss every point of departure between the two propositions for the agreement, and insist that I absolutely approve your proposals. You will doubtless understand me when I say that if I had foreseen that your government would be ready to resume commercial relations with Russia on what I can only designate as dictated conditions I should not have considered it necessary to come to Christiania, since a mutual exchange of ultimata could just as well have been effected with the assistance of the mails.

Not desiring to assume the responsibility for the serious consequences to both countries which would be involved in a rejection of your proposals, I have sent a radio message to my government, submitting all the details, and I am now awaiting final instructions, which I hope to receive in the course of the next few days.

VI. Communication of the Department of Commerce to Mr. Litvinov, September 22

The Department acknowledges receipt of your honored letter of the 20 instant and regrets the misunderstanding which seems to be at the bottom of your conception of our earlier correspondence.

As you will recall, you said in your communication of September 16, 1920, among other things: "The Soviet Government cannot under any conditions accept any restrictions in the choice of its representatives."

You will observe that you made it an absolute condition for the sending of commercial commissioners that your standpoint on this subject should be accepted. This the Department has been unable to do. The Department does not intend to deny the Soviet Government the right to send out commercial commissioners of its own free choice. The Department simply wishes, in pursuance of those reservations that are customary in such cases, to reserve to itself the right to acknowledge the persons that may be appointed by the Russian Soviet Government as its commercial commissioners.

The Department in its communication of the 18 instant called attention to the fact that insofar as the Russian Soviet Government should not be able to take the Department's point of view into a renewed and speedy consideration, the Department considered it not necessary for the present to discuss the other points of your communication. The observation of the Department to the effect that its draft was intended to be an exhaustive basis, had the object of removing any impression on your part that certain of the various expressions of your draft had been tacitly approved on the Norwegian side; compare your communication of the 16 instant.

VII. Communication from Mr. Litvinov, September 29

In our conference of September 21 I had the honor to place before you certain proposals that I hoped would eliminate the discrepancies between my draft agreement and your counter-proposals. I left the conference with the impression that my proposals would be submitted to your government for consideration. Up to now I have not, however, had the pleasure of receiving any communication concerning your government's decision on this point.

Meanwhile I have obtained certainty concerning the views of my own government, which coincide fully with my proposals. As I am eager to bring the negotiations to a decisive stage, I should be much obliged for your speedy answer concerning these questions, or for another early interview, should Your Excellency believe that such an interview might accelerate the consummation of the object mentioned.

VIII. Communication of the Department of Commerce to Mr. Litvinov, October 2

From your favor of 29 ult. I learn that you seem to expect an answer from this Department on the proposals submitted by you in the conference of September 21, 1920.

This Department considered its letter of the 22 ult. as an answer to your proposals and has been expecting your detailed communication with regard to your statement in your letter of September 20 ult. in which you point out that you have submitted to your government all the details and are awaiting its final instructions.

In your letter of the 29 ult. you point out that you have obtained certainty that the views of your government coincide fully with your proposals. Your proposals, include, among other things, the demand that no restrictions be imposed in the choice of representatives; compare your communication of September 16, 1920.

The Department on its part finds that it must retain the demand that the authorities in the respective countries shall have the right to approve and revoke an approval already given.

The Department must therefore observe that the negotiations do not appear to promise to lead to any result.

IX. Communication from Mr. Litvinov, October 4

I acknowledge receipt of your communication of October 2. I regret to be compelled to state that your government apparently has decided to break off negotiations for the resumption of trade relations between Russia and Norway. To avoid misunderstandings with regard to the real grounds for this breaking off of negotiations I consider it my duty to state that in our conference of September 21, I had conceded that the Russian Government, which in principle denies the right to foreign governments to impose any limitation on the choice of Russian commercial representatives abroad, nevertheless understood that its representatives and the members of their staff could not in practice come to Norway without the consent of the Norwegian Government. I therefore proposed that the present Russian Delegation in Norway—in order that an agreement might be speedily concluded and put in practice before the port of Archangel should be closed—should be put in a position to begin trade, while the question of the consent to the arrival of the first Russian commercial commission in Norway should be kept open.

I further expressed my readiness to make concessions to the Norwegian Government's wishes with regard to other points in my draft agreement, against which objections had

been made. In my letter of September 20 I indicated that my government had agreed to these concessions.

It will be clear from the above review of the facts as they have taken place, that I have done everything in my power to remove the obstacles to an understanding, and that responsibility for the unfortunate consequences to the peoples of both countries, from a possible failure of the negotiations, cannot possibly be placed at the door of the Russian Government.

X. Communication of the Department of Commerce to Mr. Litvinov, October 5

The Department has received from you a communication dated 4 inst. which, by the way, is unsigned. We assume, however, that this is due to an oversight.

As the matter now stands we consider that we may limit ourselves to the following statement:

We must first state that it is clear from your communication that you will not be able to take up in the near future the unconditional demand made by this Department that the Russian commercial commissioners who, as a consequence of the proposed commercial agreement, might be sent to Norway, should be approved in advance by the Norwegian authorities. Under these circumstances to continue the negotiations as to such an agreement appears—as we have repeatedly informed you before—to be unnecessary.

STATEMENT OF THE BUREAU ON THE DEPORTATION DECISION

New York, December 17, 1920.

Mr. L. Martens, Representative of the Russian Soviet Government, today issued the following statement regarding the decision of the Department of Labor in the deportation proceedings:

I have communicated the terms of the decision to the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs at Moscow. My action will be determined by the instructions I receive from my government.

The decision of the Secretary of Labor is plainly a political decision, dictated by the policy of the present Administration toward the Soviet Government. The order for my deportation is not based upon any alleged activities of mine, but upon the simple fact that I am the representative of the Soviet Government. The decision completely confirms my contention that I have never conducted any propaganda against the United States Government. Secretary Wilson says:

“There is no evidence to show that Martens has personally made any direct statement of a belief in the use of force or violence to overthrow the United States, nor is there any evidence that he has ever distributed or caused to be distributed any literature containing propaganda of that character.”

The Secretary of Labor also states plainly that the decision is not based upon any alleged membership in any political party or organization. The decision says “He (Martens) is not a member of or affiliated with the Russian Communist Party or the Third International.”

Thus the ground for deportation is placed squarely upon the fact that I am the accredited representative of the Soviet Government. It has always been my contention, and it was the contention of my attorneys in the deportation proceedings, that a decision of this gravity, affecting as it does the foreign relations of the United States Government, was a matter for the Department of State and not for the Labor Department. The Department of

State, however, preferred to evade the issue and has never even acknowledged the many communications in which I set forth the nature of my mission in this country and the desire of the Soviet Government to enter into commercial relations with the United States. Instead, the responsibility for this grave step has been put upon the Department of Labor, which I had never supposed to be the body to determine the foreign relations of the American Government. In effect, the decision means that so long as the present policy of the Administration prevails, no representative of the Soviet Government will be allowed to enter the United States for the purpose of establishing friendly and profitable commercial relations between the Russian and American peoples.

Of course, I do not believe that this precedent will be allowed to stand, or that it will prevent the ultimate establishment of trade relations between the United States and Soviet Russia. These relations will be established, as they are now being established between Russia and the countries of Europe. No temporary prejudice or hysterical policy will be allowed to interfere with the natural interests of the American people. The vast Russian market for manufactured goods of all kinds is the obvious remedy for the period of industrial depression and unemployment into which America is now entering. I am confident that the American people will demand a sensible reconsideration of the whole question of Russian-American relations.

The reader is referred also to the four-page Supplement accompanying this issue of SOVIET RUSSIA containing the text of the Department of Labor's decision.

WATER TRANSPORT IMPROVED

Pravda, Moscow, reports that transport by water has considerably improved in comparison with the year 1919. This is apparent from the following tables:

(The following waterways are here considered: The Volga, North Dvina, and the Maryinsky Canal route.)

The transportation amounted to (in thousand poods):

	1919	1920	Increase of %
Saline earths.....	6,899	17,227	150
Salt	8,093	14,214	75
Firewood	82,086	151,618	85
Lumber	23,485	47,387	102
Raw naphtha.....	5,923	30,017	407
Petroleum	9,984	16,739	67
Various materials.....	22,478	36,559	63
	<u>158,948</u>	<u>333,761</u>	<u>97</u>

This increase of 97 per cent is an accomplishment of the labor army, which has untiringly worked in order to improve the means of water transportation. And if there had not been so heavy a drought in the summer, which increased the difficulties in using the waterways, the result would have been even a more favorable one.

Wireless and Other News

RELATIONS WITH LATVIA

Moscow, November 18, 1920.—The Latvian Consul, Taube, having arrived at Petrograd, in a conversation with a newspaper correspondent has indicated Latvia's desire to establish most friendly relations with Russia. Latvia grants Russia the right of transit for necessary foreign goods. Very soon direct train service between Riga, Petrograd, and Moscow will be established.

TWO SOVIET NOTES

Moscow, November 18, 1920.—On November 17 the Russian Government addressed two notes, one to the British and the other to the Georgian Government concerning the information contained in British radios that the occupation of Batum by the forces of the Entente is under consideration. The Russian Government most earnestly calls the attention of the British Government to the serious consequences which would necessarily arise in case of the adoption of this measure, which would be considered a direct menace to the security of the allied Azerbaijan Soviet Republic, and of Russia herself. In the note to Georgia, the Russian Government points out that the removal from Batum of the Entente forces, which menaced the security of Russia and Azerbaijan, was a fundamental condition of the peace treaty between Russia and Georgia. Both notes point out that the creation of a new menace to the Soviet republics arising from the occupation of Batum by Entente forces would compel Russia to adopt the most effective measures of protecting the security of these republics. This act on the part of the Entente would mean the attempt to create a new front in the south, and to kindle a conflagration in Caucasia. The Russian Government expresses in these notes the hope that the British and Georgian governments will give up such a fatal step, the consequences of which would fall entirely upon their responsibility.

KAMENEV'S NEW POST

A recent issue of *Pravda*, Moscow, reports that Kamenev after his return from the southern front to Moscow again took up his position as Chairman of the Committee for the Defence of Moscow. It will be recalled that Dzerzhinsky occupied this post during Kamenev's absence. Kornyeu was elected vice-chairman.

SEMIONOV'S TROOPS IN CHINA

Moscow, November 16, 1920.—After the liquidation of Semionov's troops in Eastern Siberia, the remnants began retreating into the territory of the Chinese Republic. Chinese troops unable to cope with these bands have entreated the Red troops to help them expel the invaders. Thus, the Red Army is compelled to enter the territory of the Chinese Republic. People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, has informed the Chinese Government that Red troops sent into Mongolia enter there as friends of the Chinese people, and will withdraw

immediately after destroying the White Guard detachments.

POLES IN PETLURA'S ARMY

Moscow, November 18, 1920.—Polish officers and noncombatant soldiers are streaming in masses into Petlura's army. The middle-class element of the Polish army has found satisfaction for itself since the signing of the armistice, and is seeking such satisfaction by going into Petlura's army. All the most typical representatives of the class interests of Polish landlordism in the Ukraine are joining Petlura's cause. These elements are thus continuing their struggle against the Ukrainian working masses. Let them know that the Soviet Government of Russia and Ukraine will consider the Poles who are found in the ranks of Petlura's army as the most malignant foes of the workers, foes who under every condition will fight for the defense of the cause of the exploiters, and they will be treated as such.

RUSSIAN WAR PRISONERS

Pravda writes as follows: What profound understanding of the economic needs of the Soviet fatherland is shown by the former Russian war-prisoners can be judged from the fact that a transport returning from Germany has brought back with it medicaments collected by the soldiers and put at the disposal of the Commissariat for Public Health. The amount of the medicaments brought in was of course very small, but this is beside the point. This touching care for the needs of Soviet Russia is very characteristic of the sentiment among the prisoners suffering in foreign concentration camps.

REPATRIATION OF RUSSIAN PRISONERS

Moscow, November 16, 1920.—Two hundred and forty-five Russian citizens liberated by the English in exchange for Belgians, French, and British detained in Russia, arrived in Odessa on English transports under the guard of English warships. The majority of these repatriated citizens had spent nineteen months in jails and concentration camps at Constantinople, Egypt, and elsewhere.

PROTEST TO GERMANY

BERLIN, November 9.—Victor Kopp, Soviet Representative in Germany, has sent a protest note to the German Government on the subject of a visit paid by an inter-allied investigating commission to the Soviet ship *Subbotnik*, at Hamburg.

MURDER OF PERSIAN DELEGATES

The Petrograd *Pravda* reports: Two Persian delegates who were returning to their homes from the Congress of Eastern Nations, were murdered by Persian gendarmes on the Persian border.

PETROGRAD LABOR EXCHANGE

Moscow, November 18, 1920.—During last month at the Petrograd Labor Exchange, the demand for labor power was 75,000 workers; the supply only 7,000.

PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES

Moscow, October 21, 1920 (via Stockholm).—According to the *Viestnik*, extraordinary precautions are being instituted in Moscow. The reason for this is the growing activity of secret entente agents in Russia. The campaign of lies in the western press goes on undiminished, daily featuring new canards about so-called mutinies. This is but one token of the pernicious works and plans promoted by the great powers. The sinister factory of the allies sends its spies to Russia. But the toiling people of Russia are vigilant. The organs of security here are on the alert. The secret agents of the Entente are at the end of their hopes and those who promoted their activities will have to bear the cost of their failure. To thwart these plans strenuous measures have been taken, and the situation has been made clear to the citizens by the government.

PROPAGANDA TRAINS

The following remarks are published by *Pravda* on this subject: Two years ago a basis was laid for agitation by means of propaganda trains. Since then this arrangement has developed and spread, and now it is being used for other purposes also; for instance, for the support of local and party organizations, while they have also been performing instructions and control service. Four such trains in operation at present (the fifth was made ready a short while ago) bear the following names: *Lenin*, *The November Revolution*, *The Red East*, *Soviet Caucasia*, and one propaganda steamer, *The Red Star*. In the work of these trains during these two years 200 responsible Soviet or Party functionaries participated. Within the period from January 12 to October 1 of this year, the trains and the steamer made altogether 18 tours during which they visited 30 provinces. There were held, altogether, 1,815 mass meetings with 2,665,364 participants; 1,008 lectures with an attendance of 25,533 persons, 1,232 meetings of functionaries and 1,865 motion picture shows with 2,113,798 spectators were arranged. Of literature there were distributed 1,103,500 circulars and books sold for 1,103,500 rubles and 75 kopecs.

NEW MONUMENT IN PETROGRAD

Moscow, November 18, 1920.—A great monument to the Third Communist Internationale is being erected in Petrograd. The idea of the monument is to create a new type of monumental work combining creative principle with practical purposes. The monument will be built of glass and iron, and consist of three large glass buildings to contain offices for the Third Internationale. A model of the monument exhibited at the Arts Academy is extensively visited by the population.

BALTIC MERCHANT FLEET

Moscow, November 18, 1920.—In the Baltic merchant fleet, 322 ships need capital repairs, and 433 need ordinary repairs. These ships will be repaired before spring, partly at shipbuilding yards and partly in the harbors.

SOVIET RUSSIA'S FOREIGN TRADE

HELSINGFORS, November 15.—The Director-General of the Finnish railroads, Vuolle, says in *Dagens Press*: "If the transit trade with Russia really begins to function, the Finnish railroads can daily transport as much as 3,000 tons from west to east. New railroad cars are being continually built." He further expressed his hope that the transit trade would go by way of Finland and emphasized how important it would be to extend the loading facilities of the ports. Should the trade become very active, the tracks of the Aabo-Toijlala line could be doubled.

AMERICAN COAL CARGOES

BERGEN, November 17 (Private communication to *Social Demokraten*, Christiania, Norway).—According to the information of *Arbeidet*, a Bergen newspaper, 40,000 tons of coal are now en route from America to Russia. The cargoes are carried by eight ships, including several Norwegian. One of them, *Torbjorg*, stopped at Bergen yesterday. Another is the stranded Bergen steamer, *Morgana*. Further information printed by the newspaper states that great cargoes of coal in America are destined for northern Russia and will be sent out in the course of the winter.

THE URAL METAL WORKERS

Moscow, November 10.—The metal workers in the Ural region have begun to collect money for the Hungarian workers suffering under the yoke of Terror. The workers of the Smolensk works are working one hour overtime for the benefit of the Hungarian workers and give besides a portion of their earnings for the same purpose. The workers of Chernokholunitsk have already given a contribution in the form of one day's wages and besides they are working one hour overtime daily for the benefit of the Hungarian workers.

GRAIN AND GOLDFIELDS

Moscow, November 1, 1920.—According to *Economic Life*, grain deliveries in Omsk have now exceeded all estimates. The daily arrival of grain in Ufa averages 100,000 poods.

Important new goldfields have been discovered near Cheliabinsk.

ELECTRICAL STATION OPENED

Moscow, November 16, 1920.—The first electrical station opened in the remote district of Zaraisk was constructed by local workers without outside help or technical means.

HEMP, WOOL, AND FLAX

Moscow, November 16, 1920.—In November, nine provinces alone furnished 43,000 poods of hemp, 23,000 poods of wool, and 1,000 poods of flax.

PUBLIC FEEDING

Moscow, November 16, 1920.—By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars free feeding at all restaurants and public institutions has been established at Moscow.

OUR SPECIAL ILLUSTRATED JANUARY 1st ISSUE

OF

SOVIET RUSSIA

will Contain, Among Other Features, the Following:

1. ECHOES OF RASPUTIN IN THE NORTH, by *John S. Clarke.*
The English correspondent converses with a Russian comrade, who tells him the interesting tale of the priest-conspirator.
2. COLLAPSE AND RECONSTRUCTION IN SOVIET RUSSIA, by *Dr. Alfons Goldschmidt.*
The brilliant author of "Moscow in 1920" analyzes the course of the nationalization movement in Russia. There will be two instalments of this article.
3. WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' UNIVERSITIES IN RUSSIA.
Statistics showing what classes take advantage of the educational opportunities of the Soviet Government.
4. NEW BUFFERS FOR 1921.
Discussion of the prospects that Sweden, Norway, and Denmark will be drawn into the counter-revolutionary war.
5. THE EDUCATIONAL WORK OF SOVIET RUSSIA, by *W. McLaine.*
An interview with Lunacharsky, People's Commissar for Education.
6. *Regular Weekly MILITARY REVIEW, by Lt.-Col. B. Roustam Bek.*

AND AN EIGHT-PAGE PICTURE SUPPLEMENT ON GLAZED PAPER,
CONTAINING REPRODUCTIONS OF THE FOLLOWING
NEW PHOTOGRAPHS

(1) An interior view of a power-house blown up by Denikin; (2) Railroad station wrecked by Denikin; (3-7) Railroad bridges blown up by Denikin and reconstructed by Soviet engineers; (8) Portrait of N. Ryazanov, of the Trade Union movement; (9) A girls' class in free-hand drawing; (10) A kindergarten class, with new toys; (11) A reading circle on the "Island of Rest"; (12-14) Portraits of Yoffe, Kamenev, and Podvoisky; (15) A general group of delegates to the Fifth Congress of Soviets; (16) Portrait of Muryalov, on the Red Square, Moscow.

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