Source: Problems of the Indonesia Revolution, D.N. Aidit. Published by DEMOS - 1963
Transcribed to HTML by Ted Sprague (23 December 2011)
First of all, I should like to express my thanks to Your Honour who, as Chairman of this court which is examining my case, has directed the hearings well. To the members of the public who have come to attend this session, I also express my thanks.
I am certain that this present court session is being followed not only by us who are inside the courtroom but also by millions of people outside. It is being followed by people in the towns and the villages, by workers in the factories and on the estates, by office employees, by fishermen on our shores, by our youth and students, by our artists and intellectuals, in brief by all sections of Indonesian society.
The great interest being shown in this trial is evident from the thousands of letters and telegrams which have been sent to the Djakarta State Court, copies of which have also, been sent to the Central Committee of the CPI.
Millions of people, their hearts anxiously beating, are awaiting the court’s decision on this case which has brought me here before it.
Of course, I am neither permitted to nor do I wish to influence this court, but I must give expression to my feelings and thoughts, which are that the decisions the court will take in my case will be a measure of the justice which the Indonesian people can expect from this State Court.
Before turning to the main points in my defence plea, I feel it is necessary to bring to light some things which I consider to be strange and to which the attention of this court should be drawn.
As is already known, before I myself knew, that I was going to be called before the Djakarta State Court, several newspapers and a news agency, had printed news about this fact. I only heard about the matter on September 30th, following a letter from the court which, up to this very day, I myself have never seen. I understand that this letter was dated September 21st, 1954, and stated that I should appear before the Djakarta State Court on September 23rd, 1954. But, Your Honour, it is a strange fact that the "Antara" news agency in Its bulletin of September 11th, and the newspapers "Pedoman", "Abadi" and "Keng Po" (all opposition newspapers, Tr.) in their issues of September 13th, had already published the news that I should be appearing In court.
At first, I thought that these reports were only a part of the campaign of attack which the Masjumi (right-wing Moslem party, in opposition to the present Government, Tr.), the BKOI (liaison body of Moslem organisations under Masjumi leadership, Tr.) and the BPII (Moslem ex-servicemen's organisation also under Masjumi leadership, Tr.) were waging against the CPI, because at that time, the Masjumi and its satellite organisations and news papers were violently attacking the CPI and utilising the "Madiun Affair" as what they assumed to be an infallible weapon.
I make no accusations but, at that time, I really thought that the State Court or the Djakarta Prosecutor's Office were, either deliberately or accidentally, helping the Masjumi in its anti-communist campaign because, as I thought at that time, if not from the Djakarta State Court or the, Djakarta Prosecutor's Office then from where did the "Antara" news, agency and the newspapers mentioned above receive, the news that I was to appear before court while I myself knew nothing at all about it?
Basically, I have no misgivings about Mr. Dali Mutiara, either personally or as an attorney, but in a matter where the Masjumi is pursuing an anti-communist policy and is using foul methods to do so I cannot but suspect that Mr. Dali Mutiara is either a member or a sympathiser of the Masjumi.
I have been called to appear before court in connection with a statement issued by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPI in connection with the CPI commemoration of the Madiun Affair. Thus it is clear that the statement which led to this case is connected with the Madiun Affair. In connection with this, I want to assure you in all seriousness that it is neither a pleasant nor a happy thing for me to speak about the Madiun Affair. Were I not compelled to do so, I should not want to speak about that tragic event. In my second speech before Parliament some months ago, I said that there were two reasons why I do not find it pleasant to speak about the Madiun Affair. Firstly, because it recalls to mind my comrades and the many Indonesian people who fell victims in .this affair. Secondly, because it recalls to mind a time at which there was a very wide split in our camp of national unity.
Apart from this, I know very well that if I talk about the Madiun Affair, many people will feel uncomfortable because they will be reminded of the weak attitude they adopted at the time this event occurred, or they will be reminded of their guilt for having shortsightedly murdered comrades-in-arms and for having murdered leaders and fellow countrymen about whose guilt nothing had yet been proven. I refer here to weak-minded people; people, however, who are not devoid of feeling. I do not refer to those people who to this very day still hope for another orgy at which to make the blood of Communists flow, as happened in the Madiun Affair. I refer to the ordinary people who have feelings, particularly to our boys and our friends who were in the armed forces at the time of the Madiun Affair. I know for certain that not a few of those who took part in the "red-hunt" were only following others or were acting on orders from above.
I know that not a few of these ordinary people now regret their deeds after having been given a proper explanation about the Madiun Affair. Yes, I am happy to be able to state that, of the people who took part in this "hunt after Communists" because they did not understand what it was all about, not a few no longer have any prejudices against the CPI and have already pledged to themselves that they will never again allow themselves to become instruments of the imperialists and their lackeys in a civil war.
In short, I do not like to speak about the Madiun Affair. But, under the present circumstances in which I have been brought up before court In connection with a statement containing the CPI’s stand towards the Madiun Affair, I am compelled where necessary to speak about it. I do this not in order to hurt other people's feelings, not in order to remind people of a time when they were controlled by weaknesses, and certainly not in order to remind people of their guilt. I do this in order to defend my Communist honour, to defend my comrades who fell victims in the Madiun Affair, to defend the honour of the Indonesian people who side with the CPI over the affair. In brief, I am here defending the honour of my Party, defending the honour of the Indonesian people who have frequently been accused and slandered in connection with the Madiun Affair.
The charges against me
In the court session on November 25th last year, the prosecuting counsel, Dali Mutiara, read the indictment against me as the person responsible for the statement of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPI dated September 13th, 1953, (printed in the "Harian-Rakjat" on September 14th, 1953) which was entitled "Commemorate the Madiun Affair Internally!". I am accused of having violated Articles 134, 207, 310 and 311 of the Criminal Code. I am accused of having insulted and defamed the honour of the Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia, Mohammed Hatta.
I reject all the charges made against me because I do not feel that I did what I am accused of, nor that I had any interest in doing so. In the said statement of the Central Committee of the CPI, there was not a single word referring to the Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia, Moh. Hatta. What was mentioned was a government which, at the time the statement was issued, was no longer in office and that is the government which I called the Hatta-Sukiman-Natsir Government. Since the statement made no mention of the Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia, Moh. Hatta, it is not possible to connect it in any way with an insult of any Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia. I therefore consider that it is quite impossible to charge me with having insulted the Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia. The juridical aspects of my defence will be dealt with by my defence counsel, Mr. Suprapto.
In the court hearing on January 27th, 1955, I stated that the statement of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPI issued on September 13th, 1953, was not made with any intent to insult but was made solely in the public interest and for defence purposes. In keeping with Article 310, Paragraph 3 of the Criminal Code, I stated at the January 27th session that I was prepared to bring in witnesses to prove that the Madiun Affair was indeed a provocation and that, in that affair, the hands of Hatta, Sukiman and Natsir were covered with blood. My offer to do this which was also backed up by my attorney, Mr. Suprapto, was not accepted by the court. The prosecution raised objections to the evidence that I wanted to submit with witnesses.
As a result of these objections, the prosecuting counsel withdrew his third charge against me, namely the charge of having violated Articles 310 and 311. By so doing, I was deprived of the chance to acquit myself of all the charges against myself proving that the said statement was really issued in the public interest and for defence purposes. .
The articles of the Criminal Code which I am now accused of having violated are Articles 134 and 207. According to Article 134, I am charged with having "deliberately insulted His Majesty the King or Her Majesty the Queen" and according to Article 207, I am charged with having, deliberately, in public, and in written form "insulted a power in Holland or in Indonesia, or a public body in existence there" (Criminal Code, Balai Pustaka translation, 1950). Basically, I am accused of insult.
In the court hearing on January 27th, 1955, I stated that at the time I drew up the statement which has now led to this trial, I did not have the slightest idea that it would be regarded as an insult. I declared that the statement was made in the public interest and for defence purposes.
I say, in the public Interest because, apart from averting a provocation which was then being prepared by the Masjumi, the BKOI, the BPII and other organisations, the purpose of the statement was to explain the real facts of the Madiun Affair to the public and to repudiate the many things which the political opponents of the CPI were spreading at the time. The CPI considered it necessary for the public to hear not only the statements which the opponents of the CPI were making on the Madiun Affair but also what the CPI had to say, too. The CPI was of the opinion that the things being spread by its opponents concerning the Madiun Affair were a complete distortion of the facts, that they were all lies and slanders. For this reason, It was necessary for the public to be given a correct explanation by the CPI itself.
It was essential to issue the statement for defensive purposes because, at that time, the CPI was being attacked by its political opponents. About these attacks, I invite Your Honour to read the September 4th, 1953 issue of the "Abadi" which published, the demands of the Indonesian Islam Ex-Servicemen’s Association (BPII), Jogjakarta. In the section of this statement introduced by the words "bearing in mind", it spoke, among other things of the "CPI Communist revolt in Madiun with the proclamation of a Communist state led by Musso and Amir (Sjarifuddin, Tr.) in accordance with the instructions of Imperialist Russia", that "this revolt was a gross betrayal of and crime against the Indonesian state and people". In the section introduced by the word "decides", it said, among other things, that the BPII proposed and urged that the Government of the Republic of Indonesia "proclaim the day of the CPI Communist revolt in Madiun, September 18th, as a national day of mourning" and "that the entire people should be ordered to hoist flags at half-mast as a sign of mourning".
The September 4th, 1953 issue of the "Abadi" also reported that, on September 18th, a "demonstration of mourning" would be held in "full solemnity" to the accompaniment of the beating of drums as a sign of mourning and sorrow. ;'
In the September 7th, 1953 issue of the "Pedoman" an announcement of the BKOI Djakarta branch concerning the Madiun Affair was published which said, among other things: "Hundreds of millions of rupiahs worth of state wealth were plundered after the Communists succeeded in seizing power in Madiun, They set up a Soviet government there and carried out a purge. Incomparable cruelties were perpetrated. Innumerable Moslem ulamas (teachers of religion, Tr.), state officials, members of the Army and Moslems were inhumanly murdered." The BKOI, according to that issue of the "Pedoman", also urged the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to take the same measures as had been suggested by the BPII Jogjakarta (see the "Abadi" of September 4th, 1953).
On September 10th, 1953, the "Abadi" published an announcement made by that undemocratic body, the "League to Defend Democracy", the contents of which were basically the same as those of the statements of the BPII and the BKOI referred to above.
It is thus clear that for some days, before the statement of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPI was issued on September 13th, 1953, newspapers had been publishing attacks on the CPI, using the Madiun Affair as a stick. There were two possible consequences of these attacks. Firstly, the public could be influenced by the declarations of the political opponents of the CPI concerning the Madiun Affair. Secondly, the members and sympathisers of the CPI could be angered by these slanders and could undertake actions which the leadership of the CPI itself did not desire. It was in order to avert these two possibilities that the September 13th, 1953 statement of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPI was issued. I therefore feel that my Party acted in the public interest and for defence purposes. The explanation I shall give below will make it clear that the accusations made against the CPI and the Communists in connection with the Madiun Affair by the Masjumi, the BKOI, the BPII, etc. were absolutely false and slanderous.
I protest, if the court case against me is regarded as a criminal case. There are few clearer political cases than the one which is now being examined. This case is a political case. It is a political case seen from the fact that it concerns a political statement issued by a political party namely the CPI. This superannuated case is a political case because all the fuss about it was made and it was brought to court just at the time when the Masjumi and its satellite organisations and newspapers were busy attacking the Communists and utilising the Madiun Affair as a supposedly infallible weapon. It is a political case because it concerns the political interests of millions of Indonesian people who have expressed their thoughts on the case through thousands of letters and telegrams.
The first charge of the prosecution states that I deliberately insulted the Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia, namely Mohammed Hatta, in writing because the statement of the Political Bureau of the CPI Central Committee issued on September 13th, 1953, included among others the words provocation, cruelties, "served" (in inverted commas), bloodstained and "heroism" (in inverted commas).
Above, I have already stated that the statement was not issued in order to insult. One thing is true and that is that the statement was written in clear, convincing, harsh terms. The terms used were harsh because they described the truth. The harshness of these words will be felt all the more by all persons who do not want to admit their truth.
Apart from this, we cannot use vague and confused terms to give expression to our true feelings and thoughts about deeds which we do not like and which the people do not like. We were compelled to use harsh words against those hostile to us because they, in the first place, had acted harshly towards us. The harshness of our words is the harshness in our hearts and this is important, it is a condition of life for us in face of our enemies who are used to taking harsh and brutal measures against us.
We used the word provocation because we really meant provocation; we used the word cruelties of the Hatta, Sukiman and Natsir Government because we are of the opinion that that government really was cruel; we said that the Hatta, Sukiman and Natsir Government "served" (in inverted commas) by unleashing civil war, because they really did "serve" their group and class; we said that the hands of the Hatta, Sukiman and Natsir clique were bloodstained because we really meant that; we spoke of the "heroism" of the Hatta, Sukiman and Natsir Government in crushing the Communists and patriots because we really meant that the Hatta, Sukiman and Natsir Government were indeed "heroes" in the eyes of their group and class. We used these harsh words and phrases not in order to insult but in order to state the real facts, to state what really happened. Just as we should not say Dul if we really meant Siti Aminah so too we do not say that an action was carried out by men wearing silken gloves if what in actual fact happened was a provocation, if it was terror, and if the hands of the perpetrators were stained with blood. Is it an insult to use the name Dul when we really mean Dul? I think that, just as it would be wrong to call Dul Siti, so too it would be wrong if a provocation, a bloody act of terror, an act performed by a bloodstained hand were called the act of a person wearing silken gloves or a friendly act. No, Your Honour, the Madiun Affair was, in truth, not an act of friendship; it was in no sense the act of men wearing silken gloves. We refer to the sixth cabinet of the Republic of Indonesia which was formed in January 1948, as the cabinet or government of Hatta, Sukiman and, Natsir. This does not mean that we are unaware of the fact that persons of parties and trends other than the Hatta-Sukiman-Natsir trend were also in this cabinet. We know that this cabinet included persons from the nationalist, catholic, right-wing socialist and other parties, just as we know too that the leading role in it was played by Moh. Hatta and the Masjumi representatives (Sukiman and Natsir are both of the Masjumi party, Tr.). In essence, the sixth Indonesian cabinet was a Masjumi cabinet led by Moh. Hatta. From the time of its formation on January 29th, 1948, this cabinet pursued a completely Masjumi policy and the Madiun Provocation was the most important implementation of this policy, i.e. the policy of rounding up and murdering Communists, the policy which the Masjumi leaders still pursue right up to this very day.
The Madiun Affair was indeed a provocation
I declare that the Madiun Affair was a provocation of the government of Hatta, Sukiman and Natsir.
I still remember that, at the beginning of July 1948, that is, before the kidnappings which took place in Solo at the beginning of September 1948, the commander of the IVth Division of the TNI (Indonesian National Army, Tr.) Colonel Sutarto was murdered in a cowardly fashion by a shot from behind. Many people felt that this act of terror had been committed against Col. Sutarto because he was one of the high officers who did not agree to the so-called "rationalisation" of the Army which the Hatta-Sukiman-Natsir Government wanted to carry out at that time. There were, at the time, many officers who opposed the Hatta Government model of "rationalisation", because if implemented, it would mean eliminating the people's elements in the TNI. Up to the present day nothing is publicly known of how far the investigations made by the Hatta-Sukirman-Natsir Government into this act of terror against Col. Sutarto went. For this reason, I am not surprised that many people have drawn the conclusion that Col. Sutarto's murder was one of the special ways of implementing the "rationalisation" policy of the Hatta-Sukiman-Natsir Government.
Many inhabitants of Solo cannot forget not only the murder of Col. Sutarto but also the kidnapping of two CPI members, Slamet Widjaja and Pardijo on September 1st, 1948. In connection with the Madiun Provocation, I consider it necessary to describe certain events in Solo because, as President Sukarno stated among other things; in his speech on September 19th, 1948, the Solo affair and the Madiun affair were not separate events but belonged to one series of actions.
The kidnapping of Slamet Widjaja and Pardijo began with the visit of a certain Alip Hartojo, a person from the government intelligence department, to Slamet Widjaja’s house at 6.00 p.m. on September 1st, 1948. One of the things Alip Hartojo said to Slamet Widjaja was: "Be careful! CPI people and all left-wingers are now going to be cleaned up by the Hatta Government. I’ve got the plan in my keeping”. I found it very strange indeed that a government intelligence official should have spoken with such frankness. But I ceased to do so when I learned that Slamet WIdjaja was normally a close personal friend of Alip Hartojo’s, and when I learned of what happened afterwards. The subsequent events were quite in accord with what Alip Hartojo had said.
When Slamet Widjaja asked Alip Hartojo to show him the Hatta Government’s plan, the latter replied: “Not here. It's not safe. Let's do it at the Mien Satu restaurant (a restaurant opposite the Surakarta residency office to the west of Warungpelem road-junction, DNA). Before we go to the restaurant, I shall wait at the Warungpelem road-junction while you go to call for Pardijo at his house (in the Sudiropradjan campong, DNA). After that the three of us (i.e. Slamet Widjaja, Pardijo and Alip Hartojo, DNA) will go from Warungpelem to the Mien Satu restaurant.”
Having made this arrangement, Alip Hartojo and Slamet Widjaja left the latter's house and took a pedicab which Alip Hartojo had already ordered. After arriving at the Warungpelem road-junction, they both got down from the pedicab. Slamet Widjaja walked to Pardijo's house in the Sudiropradjan campong and from there they both went back to the place, where Alip Hartojo was waiting for them. The strange thing was that after meeting Alip Hartojo; he did not take them to the west but, holding them both round the shoulders, he took them northwards for a distance of about 50 metres to where a truck was waiting. The truck had no cover and the back was shut so that only the heads of the soldiers who were sitting inside it were visible. When they were within about five metres of the truck, the soldiers who had been sitting in it suddenly got down through the back which had previously been closed. Slamet Widjaja and Pardijo were both beaten with rifle butts, bound up tight and then thrown into the track. Meanwhile, nothing happened to Alip Hartojo, in fact, he stood there laughing away with the other kidnappers. This happened at about 6.30 p.m. on that day.
From there, Slamet Widjaja and Pardijo were taken to the Tasikmadu sugar factory where an army unit was stationed. At the army station, bound as they were, they were beaten and were coarsely asked: "So you're the champs of Solo, eh?", and "You're the head of the FDR, are you?” (FDR is the abbreviation of the People’s Democratic Front.)
At 8.00 pm on September 8th, 1948, Slamet Widjaja was taken blindfolded by about five armed, soldiers from his place, of imprisonment to another place for Interrogation. During the interrogation, he was asked: "Do you know where you are now? Tell us the composition of the executive of the CPI Solo Section Committee and tell us who are the persons in the FDR? I’m asking these questions because I know that you are a member of the executive of the Solo CPI Section Committee and also a number of the FDR Secretariat.”
The above events show quite clearly that the kidnapping of the two CPI members, Slamet Widjaja and Pardijo, was not carried out by common gangsters but by the government apparatus itself. This was not just an ordinary case of kidnapping; it was a case of political kidnapping because the victims were not only deprived of what they had in their pockets; they were also questioned about the composition of the executive of the CPI Solo Section Committee and about the Solo FDR. There possibly are some people who will say that these measures were taken by the local government machinery and the Central Government knew nothing whatsoever about it. This is pure nonsense.
The fact that Slamet Widjaja and Pardijo were kidnapped by the official government apparatus and with the knowledge of the Central Government became clearer when, on September 24th, 1948, they, together with Lieut. Col. Suharman and Prodjosudodo who was also a TNI officer, were handed over to the Jogja KMK (Town Military Command, Tr.) by the Solo KMK and put in the official government camp at Danuredjan, Jogjakarta. In the Danuredjan camp, they met other persons who had been taken prisoner by the Hatta-Sukiman-Natsir Government, and all of whom were CPI people and other left-wingers. This fact is in accordance with what Alip Hartojo said to Slamet Widjaja on September 1st, 1948, namely "that CPI people and all left-wingers are now going to be cleaned up by the Hatta Government". Further evidence which shows that they were kidnapped with the knowledge of the Central Government is the fact that, once while they were in prison, they were interrogated by someone from the Attorney-General's office.
While they were in prison, Slamet Widjaja and Pardijo and the others were allowed to write to and receive letters from their families. This and other facts refute what the Mayor of Solo, Sjamsuridjal, usually declared: "I don't know anything, and the government didn't plan any kidnappings”. Such statements were made several times to the wives of the kidnapped men when they, together with their children organised a demonstration to the Solo Town Hall to demand that Sjamsuridjal take responsibility for the kidnapping of their husbands and fathers.
I have stated the above facts In order to prove how true it was what President Sukarno said in his speech of September 19th, 1948, that the Solo Affair and the Madiun Affair were not separate events but belonged to one series of measures. I say all this so that the general public may understand why it is that we Communists call the Madiun Affair a provocation; to understand that we use the phrase "the provocation of the Hatta-Sukiman-Natsir Government" not in order to insult but in order to state what really happened.
The kidnapping and torture of Slamet Widjaja and Pardijo were followed by other similar events. On September 7th, 1948, five officers of the TNI, Major Esmara Sugeng, Captain Setarto, Captain Saparai, Captain Sapardi and Lieut. Muljono were kidnapped. They were kidnapped by Alip Hartojo and an army unit which was located in Srambatan, Solo. Up to this day, nothing is known of what happened to these five kidnapped TNI officers. The only possible conclusion which can be drawn is that they were murdered by the government apparatus which had kidnapped them. They were murdered even though the Commander-in-Chief Sudirman had ordered the Java Military Police Corps (CPM) command to carry out investigations and to try those guilty of the kidnapping.
Who was responsible for these kidnappings and murders? I think that it was not the Communists but the government that was in power at that time, namely the Hatta-Sukiman-Natsir Government. I must recall the fact that these five TNI officers and also Col. Sutarto who was the victim of such cowardly terror, had all been fighters for independence since the time of the Dutch colonial regime before the Second. World War and during the Japanese occupation and also our national revolution. They were among the best sons of Indonesia from the Javanese nationality. They were beloved by their men.
I should like to refer to yet another fact concerning these kidnappings in Solo. Lieut. Col. Suharman whose name I have referred to above, was arrested on September 9th, 1948, while carrying out the instructions of his superior officers to ask Alip Hartojo about the five TNI officers who had been kidnapped. But unfortunately for Lieut. Col. Suharman, he too was kidnapped, taken to the army station at Srambatan, Solo, and then, after going, through many, bitter and unpleasant experiences, on September 24th, 1948, he, together with Slamet Widjaja, Pardijo and Prodjosudodo was handed over to the Jogja KMK and imprisoned in the official camp at Danuredjan.
In connection with the kidnappings which took place in Solo on September 9th, 1940, the Commander-in-Chief Sudirman gave permission to Lieut. Col. Suadi who was then in command of the IVth Division in place of Col. Sutarto, to take measures in view of the chaos in Solo. On September 10th, 1948, on the basis of this permission, an ultimatum was sent to the battalion which had carried out the kidnappings to the effect that: If, by 14.00 hours on September 13th, 1948, the five kidnapped persons are not released, then an attack will be launched. This ultimatum was circulated throughout the town of Solo and was followed up by military manoeuvres under the direction of the commander of the Surakarta sector, Major Slamet Rijadi. At 12.30, before the ultimatum had run out, Major Sutarmo who had come to the army station at Srambatan on the instructions of the IVth Division to carry, out negotiations, was shot at as he alighted from his truck, as a result of which he and some of his guards died instantaneously.
The battalion concerned paid no heed to the ultimatum. As a result, at 14.00 hours on September 13th, fighting broke out between the troops under the command of the IVth Division and the kidnapping troops.
Bitter fighting raged until the evening. Suddenly, at 6.00 p.m. on September 13th, the Commander-in-Chief ordered a cease-fire. Civil and military officials were witnesses to this cease-fire order. The troops of the IVth Division obeyed the order but the other side continued its efforts to occupy Solo. As a result, at 6.00 p.m. on September 15th, 1948, another battle took place between troops under the command of the IVth Division and the kidnapping troops.
Then, a very strange thing happened: the Central Government justified the kidnapping troops and described Lieut Col. Suadi and the troops under his command as "disrupters". The Government called on the people, through the radio and via circulars, to help the troops which had carried out the kidnappings. These latter were regarded as the troops acting on official instructions and who had been ordered, to exterminate what the Government called the "disrupters" of the IVth Division. The Central Government appointed Col. Gatot Subroto Military Governor of Central Java while Lieut. Col. Suadi, commander of the IVth Division, and his troops were pursued.
That is enough about the Solo Affair. I need not continue because it reminds us of the great rift which existed in our society at that time, not only, in political circles but also in the ranks of the armed forces, the most important apparatus of our national revolution.
Although I have not spoken very much about the Solo Affair, it is sufficient for an understanding of the background of the political and military tension existing at that time, for an understanding of the background of the Madiun Provocation.
I have already stated above that the Solo Affair and the Madiun Affair were not separate events but belonged to one series of actions. The Madiun Affair was only the continuation of the Solo Affair. The sharp tension, both inside and outside the Army, which had developed as a result of the kidnappings and murders in Solo spread throughout the territory under the control of the Republic of Indonesia in Central and East Java. The Hatta-Sukirman-Natsir Government was neither able nor did it want to relax this tension.
The sharpness of this tension inside and outside the Army had been very acutely felt in Madiun ever since the terrorist murder of Col. Sutarto in Solo.
On the morning of July 28th, 1948, Wirosudarmo, a railway worker, was shot dead by a member of the Army while he was on his way to the railway station at which he worked. Wirosudarmo’s remains were interred at the village of Oro-Oro Ombo with a special tribute from the Madiun branch of the Railway Workers Trade Union (SBKA) and from many inhabitants of Madiun. At the funeral, several representatives of parties and mass organizations protested against this brutal murder.
Not long after the shooting of the railway worker, an office worker at the Madiun Town Hall was tortured by an Army officer. The Trade Union of Autonomous, Government Employees (SEBDA) demanded that the army man who had beaten up this worker should apologise. But this demand was not met and so the workers under SEBDA leadership staged a sit down strike. After this action had started, the Army troops concerned were prepared to enter into negotiations and appointed an officer to represent them, but the negotiations broke down. SEBDA turned the question over to the Madiun branch of SOBSI (Central Trade Union Federation) and the latter backed up SEBDA's demand. On SOBSI's request, negotiations were resumed as a result of which the soldier concerned was prepared to apologise.
From, the above events, we can draw the conclusion that the situation in Madiun at that time was very tense. The tension was even further increased when the news of the kidnappings and murders in Solo by army troops assisted by Alip Hartojo reached Madiun. The climax came when fighting broke out between troops within the Army itself, that is between Brigade 29 which did not agree with these brutal measures and the troops of the Siliwangi Division and the Mobrig (Mobile Brigade i.e. troops of the armed police, Tr.). This fighting occurred on September 18th beginning at 1.00 in the morning and lasting until 8.00 a.m. on the same day, at which time the Siliwangi and Mobrig troops were disarmed by Brigade 29. During the battle, Lieut. Sapari of Battalion 11, Brigade 29 and Captain Djaja of the CPM lost their lives.
During this confused situation, the head of the region, the Resident of Madiun, Samadikun, was not in Madiun; he had gone to Jogja. The Mayor of Madiun was ill at the time and therefore non-active. It became clear that the Deputy-Resident was unable to take control of the situation. Under these circumstances, the parties affiliated to the FDR and the mass organizations which supported it, urged that Supardi, the Deputy Mayor of Madiun should provisionally act as resident while the Resident was away. The reason why the left-wing parties and organisations urged Supardi to do so was that he held a position in the government, and he had at the time displayed courage enough to come forward and take control of' the situation, it became clear that Supardi's appointment as provisional resident also had the agreement of Lieut. Col. Sumantri (commander of the Madiun Sub-Territorial Command), Sidharto, the Deputy Resident of Madiun, and Purbosisworo, the Mayor of Madiun, each of whom gave their signatures as a sign of agreement. In addition, the chiefs of certain important government departments such as the departments of railways, post, telephone and telegrams, gas and electricity, etc. also gave their consent.
Apart from expressing agreement with the appointment of Supardi as provisional resident, the people's parties and organisations urged the leading persons in the Madiun regional government to report the events in Madiun to the Central Government in Jogja by first sending it a telegram with preliminary information and requesting instructions as to what should be done next. The Madiun regional government did, indeed send the telegram to the President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and also to the Minister of Home Affairs. Apart from this, the Madiun regional government also tried to send an express courier to the Central Government to take a written report of the events in Madiun.
It was this event, that is, the appointment of Supardi who was then Deputy Mayor as provisional resident in order to overcome the confusion, that was magnified by the Central Government and branded by it as a measure "to overthrow the Government of the Republic of Indonesia” a measure "to engineer a coup d'etat and establish Soviet power" and various other things. On the basis of this event and on the full responsibility of the Hatta-Sukiman-Natsir Government, President Sukarno delivered a speech on September 19th, 1948, calling upon the entire people to crush "the disruptors" by which was meant to crush the Communists, other progressives and their supporters.
In order to make it even clearer that the CPI and the FDR had no plans to carry out a seizure of power in Madiun, I must state that at the time the fighting and disarmament were going on in the Army, at the time Deputy Mayor Separdl was appointed as provisional resident, Comrades Musso, Amir Sjarifuddin, Harjono and others were not in Madiun. Just at that time, Comrade Musso together with a party of persons were on a tour on behalf of the CPI, and they were then in Purwodadi (a place some distance from Madiun, Tr.). Comrade Musso and his group only arrived in Madiun at midnight on September 18th. He came at the request of the FDR leadership in Madiun because of the tense situation. He was one of the persons who most strongly agreed that a report be sent immediately to the Central Government and that it be asked for further instructions concerning what had happened in Madiun.
From the above clarifications it is clear that what the political opponents of the CPI said to the effect that "the CPI seized power in Madiun", that, "the CPI set up a Soviet regime in Madiun" and so on, is completely untrue. For these reasons, I am quite bold enough to state that the reports published at the beginning of September, 1953 in the "Abadi", "Pedoman" and "Keng Po" concerning the Madiun Affair were falsehoods and slanders. And it was in order to counteract these falsehoods and slanders that the Political Bureau of the CPI Central Committee issued the statement on September 13th, 1953, which is now on trial.
It is quite impossible for the CPI to have carried out a coup d’etat and set up a Soviet in Madiun, not only because these two steps are contrary to Communist theory but also because they are contrary to the proposal made by Comrade Musso after he returned home from abroad, I still remember the time when Comrade Musso proposed to the CPI Central Committee that the CPI should send letters to the leading bodies of the Masjumi and the PNI in order to build up a united national front. This proposal was accepted by the CPI Central Committee and letters were sent to these two parties. The Masjumi central leadership sent a reply which was signed by Kasman Singodimedjo rejecting the CPI’s call for unity. I still remember when Comrade Musso met President Sukarno at the Palace in Jogjakarta. President Sukarno asked Musso to help reinforce the state and facilitate the smooth running of the wheels of revolution. Comrade Musso firmly replied: “Indeed, that is my task. I have come back to set things straight" (see the magazine "Revolusioner", August 19th, 1948, IIIrd year, No.14). In addition to that, I still remember the CPI Conference in August 1948 which was led by Comrade Musso himself. This conference endorsed a resolution entitled. "A New Road for the Republic of Indonesia", a copy of which I attach to this speech. Everybody can know that this resolution did not draw up a programme for a coup d'etat or for the establishment of a Soviet government.
Thus, Your Honour, the CPI had no programme nor could it have had any programme for a coup d’etat or for the establishment of a Soviet republic in Madiun. And what is more, what happened in Madiun was not a coup d'etat; it did not contain within it the seeds of a Soviet. The event which took place in Madiun the appointment of Supardi as provisional, resident, was a constructive measure taken by the left-wing groups to gain control of the situation.
The bloody Madiun Affair would never have taken place if a mountain had not been made out of a molehill, if the good intentions of the left-wing groups had not deliberately been wrongly taken by the Central Government as something which, by chance, gave it an excuse to blacken the good name of the Communists and thus have a "reason" to mobilise all the forces of the state to hunt them down and exterminate them.
There are also some people who like to link up the event in Madiun on September 18th, 1948, with what they call the "FDR programme" to "create disorders everywhere" or what they call the FDR programme “to mobilise all criminal organisations to commit assaults and burglaries night and day”. If these people want to link up the events in Madiun with the so-called "FDR programme" of such a nature, then l can state here and now that the real FDR programme was vastly different from the falsified "FDR programme" which the provocateurs actively tried to circulate. The Central Secretariat of the FDR at that time had already placed announcements in several newspapers in Jogja concerning falsifications of the FDR programme. Apart from that, the FDR Central Secretariat placed the question of these falsifications into the hands of the Jogja police and the Solo FDR Secretariat did the same in Solo, The FDR Central Secretariat had sent the FDR programme to the regional FDR’s through the .post and thus there was nothing secret about it.
It is something of which I am proud that, after the Central Government had called upon the entire state apparatus to exterminate the Communists, after the Minister of Home Affairs Sukiman had declared "civil war" on the Communists, Comrade Musso did not instruct us to flock to the offices of the Hatta-Sukiman-Natsir Government to surrender and be hanged or shot. No, in his speech replying to the Central Government, Comrade Musso commanded us to put up a heroic resistance. We did not surrender nor did we ask for mercy because we were not in the wrong. The kidnappings and murders in Solo had shown us that they wanted to suck our Mood as they had sucked the blood of the TNI officers who had been kidnapped and murdered. We did not want to be treated like that. They could suck our blood but they would have to fight us first.
That was the answer we Communists gave to the Hatta-Sukiman- Natsir Government which had already mobilised all the forces at its disposal to crush us. We were defeated in the fight because we had really had no intention of waging war on the government of the Republic of Indonesia. We had directed the people's forces which we had mobilised against the Dutch colonial army. The Hatta-Sukirman-Natsir Government had, on the contrary, mobilised all it forces to crush the Communists and it was later proved that this was welcomed and supported by the Dutch colonialists (see Van Mook's Interview to the ANP on September 21st, 1948, and Lieut. General Spoor’s interview to Reuter on September 21st, 1948, both of which are printed in the “White Book on the Madiun Affair", page 17, which is attached to this speech).
But besides suffering defeat, we educated the people to know that, however difficult the situation may be, the Communists would defend their standpoint, that they would always, side with the people who did not want to be treated in the brutal way that the TNI officers had been treated in Solo; the Communists would do this, even if it meant sacrificing their lives.
In the struggle against the measures which the Hatta-Sukiman-Natsir Government took to hunt down, and crush the Communists, Comrade Musso has become a source of lasting pride to us. As a person of Malay nationality and as a genuine son of Indonesia, I bow my head in tribute to this great son of the Javanese people, the courageous hero of the Indonesian people. Musso set an example for every Communist and for every patriot as to how a Communist and a son of the people must sacrifice to defend the aspirations of the people, to defend the truth. Happy are they who are imbued with the same great spirit and courage as Comrade Musso; they are the mountain eagles who are entitled to the highest place of all. They are human beings who will live forever in the hearts of the Indonesian people and to whom the Indonesian people can entrust their destiny.
The events in Solo such as the murder of Col. Sutarto, the kidnapping of Slamet Widjaja and Pardijo, the kidnapping and murder of the five TNI officers, the kidnapping of Lieut. Col. Suharman, the murder of the railway worker in Madiun and the torture of the Madiun Town Hall employee, clearly reveal the wide extent of the activities which the provocateurs undertook at that time. But despite this, they did not succeed in finding a legitimate excuse to hunt down and murder the Communists.
They hunted down and murdered Communists for no legitimate reason whatsoever. The only excuse which they could use was the fact that the Madiun FDR had urged the Deputy Mayor Supardi to act as provisional resident. But this is ridiculous because Supardi's appointment as provisional resident was made with the agreement of the civil and military authorities in power in Madiun at the time. There is nothing more ridiculous than to call this event an action to "overthrow the state" and it is even more ridiculous to say that it was an action aimed at “carrying out a coup d'etat and establishing a soviet government”. A Soviet is a council of the workers, the peasants and the army. It was quite out of the question for the Madiun regional government under the leadership of provisional resident Supardi to have set up a council of workers, peasants and the array as the highest organ of power. A Soviet is a people's representative council in a Socialist state, that, is, a state in, which it is no longer possible for the means of production to be in private hands. It is quite illogical to think that, at that time, the Madiun regional government which was led by provisional resident Supardi could even have had a plan for (let alone implement) the nationalisation of all the means of production.
Having given the above clarifications, I have for the time being completed the task of proving that the Madiun Affair was a provocation. It is none other than the Hatta-Sukirman-Natsir Government which, was in office at the time which was responsible for the provocative, acts such as have been outlined above.
On September 7th, 1953, the "Pedoman" published an announcement of the BKOI which stated, among other things, that "after the Communists had succeeded in seizing power in Madiun" there followed "incomparable cruelties". The announcement further stated that "innumerable Islamic ulamas, government employees, members of the Army, and Moslems were inhumanly murdered". This is an exaggeration and a complete distortion of the facts. The incomparable cruelties did not start with the so-called "Communist seizure of power in Madiun"; they started with the terroristic murder of Col. Sutarto and the kidnapping, and murder of the five TNI officers in Solo. In order to repudiate this distortion, the statement of the Political Bureau of the CPI Central Committee, pointed out that it was not the CPI which had committed cruelties but that it was the hands of the Hatta-Sukiman-Natsir clique which were stained with blood. These words are possibly unpleasant to the ears of those concerned but they are true.
When describing the Solo Affair, I spoke of the kidnapping and murder of the five TNI officers by the official Hatta Government apparatus. This bloody incident led to other bloody incidents, namely the fighting which broke out between the troops-under the command of the IVth Division and the troops who, with the help of Alip Hartojo, had committed the kidnappings.
I am not going to give many examples of what happened after the events that I have described above. I shall only speak of two examples in two places, namely the murders in Ngalijan and Magelang. It does not mean that, by mentioning only these two examples, I do not refer to the cruel murders which took place in other places such as Malang, Kediri, Pati, Blora, Rembang, Kudus, Purwodadi, Tjepu (all these are places in Central and East Java, Tr.) and elsewhere. I take these two examples only in order to save time. In addition to this, I consider these two samples as being sufficiently representative to depict the cruel acts perpetrated elsewhere by the apparatus of a government which claims to have based itself on the law.
First the incident in Ngalijan. Ngalijan is a village in the sub-district of Lalung, district of Karanganjar, residency of Surakarta (another name for Solo, Tr.). The time: midnight on December 19th, 1948. The grave which was being dug on the orders of the Army by about twenty inhabitants of the village of Karangmodjo to bury Comrade Amir Sjarifuddin and his ten comrades was not yet ready. According to the order, a grave to accommodate the bodies of these eleven people would have to be about 170 cm deep.
At the time, Comrade Amir Sjarifuddin was wearing a blue-and-white striped pyjama jacket, green trousers and was carrying some things wrapped in a sarong; Comrade Maruto Darusman was wearing a brown jacket and white trousers; Comrade Suripno was wearing a vest and a sarong; Comrade Oey Gee Hwat was wearing white trousers, a white shirt and a dirty white jacket. The other comrades there were Sardjono, Harjono, Sukarmo, Djokosujono, Katamhadi, Ronomarsono and D. Mangku.
While waiting for the grave to be finished, Comrade Amir Sjarifuddin asked a TNI captain who was there: "What are you going to do to me?"
The captain replied: "I'm a soldier. I obey orders. Discipline."
After the grave had been dug, most of the persons who had been digging were ordered to leave, only four being told to remain behind in order, so it became clear subsequently, to fill the grave in again.
Then a lieutenant said that the Military Governor, Gatot Subroto, had issued an order for the murder of these eleven men.
One of the things that Amir then asked was: "Do you really want to have me and my comrades murdered?”
The lieutenant replied: "I have only to obey orders."
Comrade Amir spoke again: "Have you thought more deeply about the matter?"
The lieutenant: "There's no need for a lot of talking."
Comrade Djokosujono came in with: "I'm not blaming you, but the state will suffer.”
The lieutenant ordered his men to load their guns.
Comrade Amir approached the lieutenant but before he got close he tripped up; then, patting the lieutenant on the shoulder, he said: "Give us time to sing for a while."
The lieutenant replied: "O.K., but be quick."
Comrade Suripno said: "May I send a letter to my wife so that she may know?"
The lieutenant: “Yes, I don’t mind."
Then. these comrades wrote letters. After they had finished, they handed their letters one by one to the lieutenant.
After handing over their letters, these eleven men together sang "Indonesia Raja" (the Indonesian national anthem, Tr.) and. The “Internationale".
After they had finished singing, Amir shouted: "Workers of the world, unite! I am dying for you!"
Comrade Suripno: "I am defending you with my life; I am for you!"
Then these eleven heroic men were shot dead one by one, first Comrade Amir Sjarifuddin, then Comrade Maruto Darusman, Oey Gee Hwat, Djokosujono and so on.
From the above incident, we know that the members of the armed forces who shot these men were acting on orders from above, in this case on the orders of the Military Governor. The responsibility for all this lies not with the soldiers who loaded the guns and shot Comrade Amir and his comrades after having been commanded to do so; the responsibility rests entirely with the government which was then in power, the Hatta-Sukiman-Natsir Government.
Up to the present time, neither the CPI nor the families of the murdered men have ever been informed of any trial and sentence passed on these eleven patriots. The only official document, and even that was not addressed individually to the families of these eleven men, was a letter from the Chief-of-Police of the residency of Surakarta dated September 20th, 1950, and signed by the Police Commissioner, Sempu Muljono, which contained the explanation that it was true that on Sunday December 19th, 1948, at 11.30 p.m. the government had carried out a military sentence passed, on these eleven men. The procedure leading to these military sentences was not explained at all.
On the basis of this letter, Mr. A, M. Tambunan (Vice-Chairman of Parliament, from the Indonesian Christian Party, Tr.) and Comrade Mrs. Mudigdio submitted the following questions to the government via Parliament on December 20th, 1950:
1) What is meant by "the government" in this letter?
2) Could the government pass a military sentence?
3) Which court tried these eleven men?
4) What are the contents, of the decision taken by the court?
5) What were the charges of the prosecution (army prosecution) and on what articles of the Criminal Code (or Army Code) were they based?
These questions were repeated in a speech delivered by Mr, Tambunan in Parliament on January 23rd, 1951 (a copy of which I attach to this speech).
I shall now turn to the bloody event in Magelang. It began with a happening on September 21st, 1948. At about 6.00 p.m. on that day, Sarbini, Commander of the Kedu Territorial Staff Command (STC) came to the military prison and .explained that he had been charged to provide protection to those who had been arrested, for a certain reason. He said that those who were to be protected need not be afraid and that he would guarantee that they would be well treated. All this was stated in front of a few prisoners because there were not many prisoners there at the time. Among the prisoners were Suprodjo, former Minister of Social Affairs, and Sukarmo, Kendal district chief.
It was indeed true that for about a week after Sarbini's statement, food, drink and cigarettes were provided. But as time went on, the, treatment got worse and worse especially after the cell in which Suprodjo and Sukarmo were imprisoned was filed by a about 75 prisoners. Guards were strengthened, food became scarcer and scarcer as a result of which protests and even hunger strikes were held. At the request of the prisoners, their families were allowed to send food to the prison.
While, they were in prison, the prisoners were asked questions such as, were they members of organisations which aimed at the overthrow of the government by force, and were they members of organisations aimed at committing crimes, These questions fitted in with the falsifications which had been made of the FDR Campaign Programme and which the FDR had already taken up with the police. These questions were answered: No! Some of the prisoners stated that they were members of the Socialist Party or other parties with a legal status.
On December 19th, 1948, the prisoners who were imprisoned in the same cell as Suprodjo and Sukarmo were ordered to gather together. The prison director told them they must be ready to move. The prisoners were, divided into three groups, group A, group B and group C. Those in group C were allowed to go home and those in group B were moved to the Mendut Camp outside the town of Magelang. Those in group A which consisted of members of the Magelang. FDR, a total of 41 persons including one woman, were moved to Magelang Prison. The examination of the cases of the persons who were moved to Magelang had not yet been completed. .
This group of 41 persons was accompanied on its journey to the prison by two young soldiers who seemed to be quite friendly. Had they wanted to escape it would not have teen difficult then. But since they felt that they were not guilty, they did not consider it necessary to do so. If the prisoners spread themselves out a bit on the road, the soldiers accompanying them did not appear to get angry. It even happened that, before arriving at the prison, Suprodjo and one other prisoner asked the soldiers accompanying them for permission to go to their homes to take leave. This request was granted and they went home without being guarded. Then after having taken leave, Suprodjo and his friend followed the others to the prison on their own. It is necessary for me to state this in order to point out that these imprisoned FDR people did not feel in the slightest degree guilty and therefore they did not harbour the slightest suspicions against the government apparatus which had arrested them.
After arriving at the prison, 40 of them excluding the woman who had come with them, were placed in two cells. Heavy guards of armed troops were placed in front of the prison and they kept a machine gun trained on the cell. At about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, four persons were seen carrying a lot of dynamite and putting it in one of the rooms. At about 6.30 p.m., the "ordinary” prisoners at the prison who consisted of thieves and other criminals, were released from the prison. At about 9 p.m., the 40 prisoners were moved to another cell in the centre of the prison.
On that night of December 19th, 1948, it was pitch dark in and around Magelang Prison. A small unit of soldiers carrying flame torches broke the darkness. They were armed with carabines. At about 9.30 in the evening, the ceil door was opened and the prisoners were pulled out one by one. Outside the cell, their hands were bound behind their backs and they were put into another cell. One of them protested while he was being bound: "We haven't been tried yet and you are already going to kill us. That's not justice.” Another person asked, as his hands were being bound finger to finger behind his back: "What are you going to do?”. The harsh reply to this question was: "Shut up!" and the persons who had asked the questions were pushed into the cell where the other friends had been collected, all with their hands bound. They were forced to sit down cross-legged facing the wall of the cell. The 40 men had been divided into three cells. At this time, some Dutch troops had already entered Magelang (part of the second Dutch aggressive action in December 1948, Tr.).
The commander of the troops was heard to say: "These men are bandits.” Then he gave the order: "Ready!" Behind each person at a distance of about 1.5 metres stood a man with a carabine. After the click of the triggers being set was heard, the commander gave the order: "In the name of the state... fire!" Thus it was that people, the examination of whose cases had not yet been completed, were executed simply with the words "in the name of the state". Most of them had their heads broken and their brains spilled out. After all of them had been shot, the jail was locked from the outside with large padlocks, but in some cases, the firing had not been accurate.
Not long afterwards, paraffin bottles were thrown in through the prison window. An attempt was made from the outside to set the prison on fire and, indeed, flames began to lick the logs which had been placed outside the prison door. But unfortunately for the fire-raisers and murderers, their work was in vain because it began to rain.
In this case, too, I shall borrow the questions put by Mr. Tambunan: Which court tried these 40 men? What was the court decision on the case? What were the charges of the prosecution (Army prosecution) against them and on which articles of the Criminal (Army) Code were these charges based?
All that is known by the people up to the present day is that they were murdered without having first been put on trial. We can say that Salamun, the Resident of Kedu, Sarbini, the commander of the STC, and Sukardjo, the Kedu-Chief-of-Police were responsible for this event but we must not forget that they were acting on orders from above. Just as in the case of the events in Ngalijan and elsewhere, the responsibility for the massacre in Magelang Prison rests with the Hatta-Sukiman-Natsir Government. It is the dominating clique in this government whose hands are stained with the blood and brains of men.
After having described the two murders which took place in Ngalijan and Magelang, it is clear that the words "blood-stained" contained in the September 13th, 1953 statement of the Political Bureau of the CPI Central Committee were quite definitely not used with the intention to insult but solely in order to describe what had actually happened. From this, it becomes clear that, in the Madiun Affair, the hands of the Hatta-Sukirman-Natsir clique were stained with blood.
Before concluding my statement about the people whose hands were stained with blood in the Madiun Affair, I must explain that the foul murders which were perpetrated in Ngalijan, Magelang, Malang, Kediri and many other places were earned out after the speech which President Sukarno delivered in November 1948 in which he declared that death sentences can only be passed by the Central Government and that every sentence must be based on a court decision. I must explain, too, that, according to the decision taken by the Executive Council of the Central Indonesian National Committee (BPKNIP), that is, our provisional parliament at that time, the full powers which had been vested in President Sukarno for a period of three months were only valid up till December 15th, 1948. The murders which described above occurred after December 15th, 1948, that is, at a time when full powers were no longer vested in the hands of the President. These two points make it even clearer that these murders were purely arbitrarily carried out and were committed on the full responsibility of the Hatta-Sukirman-Natsir Government.
One thing which must not be forgotten, Your Honour, is that these blood-curdling murders were committed on the basis of in definite reports. This becomes clear from the speech of Prime Minister Moh. Hatta in which he asked the BPKNIP for full powers. He said among other things: "There are reports - whether they are true or not, I don't know - that Musso will become President of that usurped republic and Amir Sjarifuddin will become Prime Minister." Yes, these acts were perpetrated on the basis of reports, the truth of which was in doubt, but there was no doubt about the death of the victims.
Preserve our national unity as the apple of our eye
I have now come to the end of my defence plea.
In my introductory remarks, I already stated that it is neither a pleasant nor a happy thing for me to talk about the Madiun Affair. Before this court, I have been compelled to speak about this tragic event, about the kidnappings and murders committed by a government which claimed to be acting on the basis of the law. I was forced to make this speech in order to defend my Communist honour, in order to defend the honour of my comrades who were the victims of the Madiun Affair, to defend the honour of the Indonesian people who side with the CPI over its attitude towards the Madiun Affair.
The above explanations clarify what I said in the introduction of my defence plea to the effect that the September 13th, 1953 statement of the Political Bureau of the CPI Central Committee was issued solely in the public Interest and for defence purposes. The good name of the CPI and of its leaders had been besmirched by the slanders against the CPI printed in the newspapers "Abadi" and "Pedoman" a few days before this statement was issued. It is now clear that the "incomparable cruelties" were not started by members of the CPI but began with the kidnappings and murders committed by the official government apparatus in Solo. It is now clear than the "incomparable cruelties" were perpetrated not by the CPI but against it.
For a long time already, and for many years before the Masjumi has, we have been observing September 18th every year as a day of mourning. We shall agree if the government decides that each year, September 18th should be commemorated in full solemnity and the national flag hoisted at half-mast as a sign of mourning of the entire nation.
We must mourn on every September 18th in order to recall to mind the victims who were shot dead in Ngalijan, Magelang, Kediri, Malang, Pati, Tjepu and many other places.
We must mourn on every September 18th in memory of Musso, Amir Sjarifuddin, Harjono, Suripno, Wiroreno and many more heroes of the people whose names will live for ever In the hearts and minds of all Indonesian people with genuine patriotic feelings and with the blood of the people flowing in their veins.
We must mourn on every September 18th in memory of our boys and colleagues in the armed forces who became victims of the civil war policy of the Hatta-Sukirman-Natsir -Government.
We must mourn on every September 18th in memory of all those who fell victims of the Madiun Affair.
We must mourn on every September 18th so that we may always remember that we must be vigilant and strong in face of every provocation.
We must mourn on every September 18th so that we may always remember that we do not want to be divided, and that we must guard our national unity as the apple of our eye.
If we are united, the only people who will suffer are our enemies all the colonialists.
I have said what I had to say. I have explained my thoughts and feelings. Now, I hope that you will do the same. I express this hope because I am convinced that you, too, have those two great possessions of ours, thoughts and feelings.