MIA > Archive > Cliff > Trotsky 1
The month of general slander against the Bolsheviks
Kerensky’s Bonapartism
Permanent Revolution or Permanent War?
The Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party
AFTER THE 18 JUNE demonstration the Bolsheviks still insisted that the main task was to patiently explain. On 22 June the Bolshevik press appealed to the garrison: ‘Do not trust any summons to action in the street.’ Lenin and Trotsky well knew the danger of falling into the trap of ultra-leftism. One ‘must soberly follow the actual state of the class consciousness and preparedness of the entire class (not only of its Communist vanguard) and of all the working people (not only of their advanced elements),’ wrote Lenin. [1] ‘A vanguard performs its task as vanguard only when it is able to avoid being isolated from the mass of the People it leads and is able really to lead the whole mass forward.’ [2]
On 18 June Kerensky launched a military offensive against Germany and Austria. The bourgeoisie and general staff looked to this as a way of unifying the deeply divided people behind a national purpose.
The offensive was officially announced in Petrograd on 19 June. Next day several garrison regiments of the capital received orders to be ready to move to the front. The First Machine Gun regiment was given seven days to furnish 500 machine guns, and on 21 June was presented with a ‘reorganisation plan’ according to which about two-thirds of its personnel were to be sent to the front. This enraged the soldiers, who well remembered the Provisional Government’s promise that units participating in the February revolution would not be disarmed or removed from Petrograd. The machine gunners later made it clear that they had decided ‘to go not to the German front, against the German proletariat, but against their own capitalist ministers.’
On 30 June the regiment received a further order for a particularly large transfer of men and machine guns, and there were rumours that this was a prelude to a complete disbanding of the regiment. The unit initiated a massive demonstration on 2 July. Other army units, as well as factory workers, joined the machine gunners and demonstrated on 3 July. And the demonstration continued the next day.
The demonstrators could easily have overthrown the Provisional Government, which at the time had no reliable troops in the capital. But had the Bolsheviks taken power, could they have retained it? Lenin and Trotsky argued not. The influence of the Bolsheviks in the provinces and key army units away from Petrograd was still far too small. When in October the Bolsheviks did take power, they found that the greatest difficulties occurred after the insurrection. The masses needed to be profoundly convinced that there was no alternative to Bolshevik power. In July even the Petrograd proletariat was not ready for such a trial. It was not until 31 August that the Bolsheviks became a majority in the Petrograd Soviet.
If the proletariat was not sure and steadfast, the troops were even less so. On 5 July, when the government slandered Lenin, accusing him of being a German spy, the troops in Petrograd kept their distance from the Bolsheviks. The situation was even worse in the active army where the ‘Bolshevism’ of many soldiers was spontaneous – agreeing with the Bolshevik slogan of ‘Land, Peace and Bread’, but in no way identifying themselves with the party.
By far the greatest paradox of the July Days lay in the contradictory consciousness of the masses supporting the Bolsheviks in Petrograd itself: calling for Soviet power and nursing illusions that the Social Revolutionary and Menshevik leaders might take this, which was precisely what they refused to do. This paradox was expressed in the cry of a fist- shaking worker to Chernov, the Social Revolutionary minister of agriculture: ‘Take power, you son-of-a-bitch, when it is given to you.’ [3]
This refusal of the Soviet to take power brought about an impasse for the soldiers and workers of Petrograd during the July days. As Trotsky wrote:
Running into this armed resistance from the very institution to which they wished to turn over the power, the workers and soldiers lost a clear sense of their goal. From their mighty mass movement the political axis had been torn out. [4]
Lenin and Trotsky were absolutely right in refusing to seize power in the July days – as they could easily have done. As Lenin wrote in retrospect two months after the events:
It would have been wrong if the Bolsheviks had aimed to seize power on 3-4 July, since neither the majority of the people nor even the majority of the workers at that time had yet actually experienced the counter-revolutionary policies of the generals in the army, of the landowners in the countryside, and of the capitalists in the town. [5]
Trotsky wrote many years later:
... the Bolsheviks could have seized the power in Petrograd at the beginning of July. But if they had done so, they could not have held it.’ [6]
So Lenin and Trotsky faced an awkward task during the July Days: to persuade the workers and soldiers to avoid battle while not only not dampening the revolutionary temper, but, on the contrary, sharpening it.
In the middle of the demonstrations an incident occurred that put Trotsky’s cool-headedness and decisiveness to the test: Kronstadt sailors arrested the Social Revolutionary minister Victor Chernov. When someone ran into the hall where the executive committee of the Soviet was sitting and yelled that Chernov was arrested and that the sailors were going to put an end to him, Trotsky rushed out to rescue the minister. Sukhanov describes the scene graphically:
Trotsky ... climbed up on the bonnet of a car. The mob was in turmoil as far as the eye could reach. Around the motor-car a number of sailors with rather savage faces were particularly violent. Chernov, who had plainly lost all presence of mind, was in the back seat.
All Kronstadt knew Trotsky and, one would have thought, trusted him. But he began to speak and the crowd did not subside. If a shot had been fired nearby at that moment by way of provocation, a tremendous slaughter might have occurred, and all of us, including perhaps Trotsky, might have been torn to shreds.
Trotsky said:
‘You hurried over here, Red Kronstadters, as soon as you heard the revolution was in danger! Red Kronstadt has once again shown itself to be the champion of the proletarian cause. Long live Red Kronstadt, the glory and pride of the revolution! ...’
Nevertheless he was listened to with hostility. When he tried to pass on to Chernov himself, the ranks around the car again began raging.
‘You’ve come to declare your will and show the Soviet that the working class no longer wants to see the bourgeoisie in power. But why hurt your own cause by petty acts of violence against casual individuals? Individuals are not worthy of your attention ... Every one of you has demonstrated his devotion to the revolution. Every one of you is ready to lay down his life for it. I know that. Give me your hand, Comrade! Your hand, brother!’
Trotsky stretched his hand down to a sailor who was protesting with special violence, but the latter firmly refused to respond, and moved his hand – the one which was not holding a rifle – out of reach ... they were Kronstadt naval ratings who had, in their own judgment, accepted Bolshevik ideas. It seemed to me that the sailor, who must have heard Trotsky in Kronstadt more than once, now had a real feeling that he was a traitor: he remembered his previous speeches and was confused. Let Chernov go?
Not knowing what to do, the Kronstadters released Chernov. Trotsky took him by the arm and hurried him off into the palace. [7]
A day later Trotsky was instrumental in saving the Kronstadt sailors from arrest. Lieber, the Menshevik leader, demanded the disarming of the Kronstadt sailors. Raskolnikov tells the story:
[Trotsky] advised us immediately and discreetly to send the Kronstadters home. It was decided to despatch comrades round the barracks to warn the Kronstadters of the forcible disarmament that was being prepared. Fortunately, however, most of the Kronstadters had already managed to get safely away – some of them even during the night of 4 July, but principally during 5 July, after we had visited the barracks and announced that the demonstration was over. The only ones left were those stationed in Kshesinskaya’s house [the Bolshevik headquarters] and in the Peter and Paul fortress in order to protect the party’s premises. [8]
On 5 July the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks had issued a leaflet calling for an end to the demonstration:
Comrades! On Monday you come out on the streets. On Tuesday you decided to continue the demonstration. We called you to a peaceful demonstration yesterday. The object of this demonstration was to show to all the toiling and exploited masses the strength of our slogans, their weight, their significance and their necessity for the liberation of the peoples from war, hunger and ruin.
The object of the demonstration was achieved. The slogans of the vanguard of the working class and of the army were imposingly and worthily proclaimed. The scattered firing of the counter-revolutionaries on the demonstrators could not disturb the general character of the demonstration.
Comrades! For the present political crisis our aim has been accomplished. We have therefore decided to end the demonstration. Let Bach and every one peacefully and in an organised manner bring the strike and the demonstration to a close.
Let us await the further development of the crisis. Let us continue to prepare our fortes. Life is with us, the course of events shows the correctness of our slogans. [9]
Once the mass of the soldiers and workers held an armed demonstration, even against the wishes of the Bolshevik Party, the party could not stand apart. It could not wash its hands of responsibility for the actions of the workers and soldiers. It would rather suffer defeat with them than leave them without leadership, to be slaughtered by the counter-revolutionaries. Thanks to the Bolshevik Party’s taking its place at the head of the movement, the blow struck at the masses by reaction during the July days and after, although considerable, was not mortal. The victims were counted in tens and not thousands. The working class emerged more experienced, more mature, more sober.
On 4 July the Provisional Government, with the consent of the Soviet Executive Committee, authorised General Polovtsev, Commander of the Petrograd Military District, to rid Petrograd of armed mobs, to disarm the First Machine Gun regiment, and to occupy the Ksheshinskaya mansion.
At dawn on 5 July a detachment of soldiers went to Pravda’s printing works. They wrecked the machinery and arrested the workers and soldiers on duty there. During the day patrols of officers, soldiers and Cossacks began mopping up operations. They confiscated armed trucks and disarmed suspicious looking workers, soldiers and sailors, who were prevented from escaping behind the barricades in the workers’ districts because the bridges on the Neva either remained raised or were under heavy guard.
At a late night meeting of Cabinet Ministers on 6 July it was resolved that:
Anyone guilty of inciting officers, soldiers, and other military ranks during wartime to disobey the laws in effect under the new democratic system in the army and the orders of the military authorities consistent with them is to be punished as for state treason. [10]
This decree was followed by orders for the arrest of Lenin, Zinoviev and Kamenev, and a few days later, Trotsky and Lunacharsky.
On 7 July the Provisional Government ordered the military units that had participated in the July Days to be disbanded, and their personnel distributed at the discretion of the war and navy minister. In the provinces land committees were arrested en masse. On 17 July the Menshevik Tseretelli, minister of the interior, sent out instructions for the taking of ‘quick and energetic measures to put a stop to all arbitrary actions in the field of land relations.’
On 8 July General Kornilov, Commander in Chief of the South Western Front, gave orders to open fire on retreating soldiers with machine guns and artillery. The generals realised that unless iron discipline was imposed in the army everything would be lost. The tall for the re-imposition of strict discipline became more and more strident. Thus on 11 July the Supreme Commander, General Brusilov, wrote to the minister of war, Kerensky:
Time does not wait. It is necessary to restore immediately iron discipline in all its plenitude and the death penalty for traitors. If we do not do it at once, without delay, then the army will perish, Russia will perish. [11]
On the same day the government decided to restore the death penalty at the front – reverting to the situation before 12 March, when it had been abolished. But this did not satisfy the generals. On 16 July General Denikin told a conference in the presence of Kerensky: ‘The death penalty [should] be introduced not only in the theatre of war but also in the rear where replacements are stationed.’ General Lukomskii remarked that the death penalty should also apply to ‘civilians who are corrupting the army’. [12]
Factory managers started a massive campaign of suppression of factory committees and lock-outs of workers. Up to the end of September 768 enterprises employing 165,372 workers closed down. [13] On 3 August, at the Second All-Russian Commercial and Industrial Congress in Moscow, P.P. Riabushinskii, a banking and industrial magnate, gave a particularly vitriolic speech:
... it is necessary that the long bony hand of hunger and national impoverishment seize by the throat those false friends of the people, the members of the various committees and soviets, in order that they come to their senses ...
For a month there was continuous slander against the Bolsheviks as German agents. The fact that Lenin had come to Russia in a sealed train through Germany served to fuel the story. Even Trotsky could not be saved from the accusation of being a German agent. Thus Rech, the Cadet paper, published a story that before his departure from New York Trotsky had received 10,000 dollars from German-Americans, which he was to use for defeatist agitation in Russia. Trotsky at once replied with an open letter which appeared in Gorky’s paper, Novaia Zhizn, and poked fun at Miliukov’s revelations. He remarked ironically that the Germans apparently considered the overthrow of the regime in Russia an extremely cheap affair, costing only 10,000 dollars. Then he related what really happened before his departure from New York: American, Russian, Lettish, Jewish, Lithuanian and Finnish friends had given him and three other Russian émigrés a farewell meeting at which a collection was taken for the Russian revolution. The sum collected amounted to 310 dollars, of which 100 dollars was contributed by German workers. On the following day Trotsky distributed the 310 dollars among the four emigrés. The article ends with a good-humoured confession:
To provide the necessary correction for future accusers, I feel it is pertinent for me to state, for the benefit of liars, slanderers, Cadet reporters and blackguards in general that in my entire life I have not only never had at my disposal, at one time, 10,000 dollars, but even a tenth of that sum. Such confession, I am afraid, may ruin my reputation among the Cadet public more completely than all the insinuations of Mr Miliukov, but I have long since become reconciled to the thought of living without the approval of the liberal bourgeoisie. [14]
From the July Days onwards, in public attacks on the Bolsheviks, the name of Trotsky was practically always combined with that of Lenin. As Lenin was accused of being a German agent, and was at the time in hiding, Trotsky went out of the way to make it clear that he was at one with Lenin and the Bolsheviks. Thus on 13 July there appeared in Novaia Zhizn an open letter from Trotsky to the Provisional Government which said:
Citizen Ministers,
I understand that in connection with the events of 3-4 July a warrant has been issued for the arrest of Lenin, Zinoviev and Kamenev, but not for me. I think it is necessary to bring the following facts to your attention:
1) I share the main thesis of Lenin, Zinoviev and Kamenev. I have advocated it in the journal Vpered and in all my public speeches.
2) My attitude towards the events of 3 and 4 July was the same as that of the above-mentioned comrades ...
When ... notwithstanding our effort, the demonstration did take place, my comrade Bolsheviks and I made numerous speeches in front of the Tauride Palace, in which we come out in favour of the main slogan of the crowd: ‘All power to the Soviets’, but we, at the same time, called on those demonstrating, both the soldiers and the civilians, to return to their homes and barracks in a peaceful and orderly mariner ...
3) The fact that I am not connected with Pravda and am not a member of the Bolshevik Party is not due to political differences but to certain circumstances in our party history which have now lost all significance ...
5) You can have no logical base for exempting me from the implications of the decree under which Lenin, Zinoviev and Kamenev are subject to arrest. So far as concerns the political side of the question, you can have no reason to doubt that I am as uncompromising an opponent of the general policy of the Provisional Government as the above-named comrades. My exemption only emphasises more graphically the counter-revolutionary and capricious character of the action you have taken against them. [15]
On 2 August, Trotsky, in an open letter to the minister of justice, A.S. Zarudny, protested against what he called the frame-up of the Bolshevik leaders, stating that ‘the Dreyfus case and the Beilis case are nothing compared with this deliberate attempt at moral assassination.’ [16] On 17 July, at a joint session of the two executive committees of the Soviet, Trotsky said:
An intolerable atmosphere has been created, in which you as well as we are choking. They are throwing dirty accusations at Lenin and Zinoviev. (Voice: ‘That is true.’ Uproar. Trotsky continues.) There are in this hall, it appears, people who sympathise with these accusations.
There are people here who have only sneaked in to the revolution. (Uproar. The president’s bell long tries to restore order)
... Lenin has fought thirty years for the revolution. I have fought twenty years against the oppression of the people. And we cannot but hate German militarism ... Only he who does not know what a revolutionary is can say otherwise.
Let nobody in this hall say that we are hirelings of Germany, for that is not the voice of convinced revolutionaries but the voice of villains. [17]
On 23 July Trotsky was arrested and held in the Kresty prison. Together with him in prison were Kamenev, Lunacharsky, Antonov-Ovseenko, Krylenko and the leaders of Kronstadt, Raskolnikov and Dybenko. Here were assembled the majority of the chief actors of the October insurrection and practically the whole first Bolshevik commissariat of war.
Taking time out only for quick walks, Trotsky used every minute of the day in writing numerous political pamphlets and preparing articles for the Bolshevik press. However strong the slanders against Bolshevism, whatever blows were delivered by the Provisional Government and its supporters the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries, Trotsky’s optimism was undiminished. Thus he wrote on 18 August:
Retribution does not linger. Hounded, persecuted, slandered, our party has never grown as rapidly as it is growing in recent days. This process will spread from the capital to the provinces, from the towns to the country and the army ... Without for one minute ceasing to be the class organisation of the proletariat ... our party will in the fire of persecution become the true leader of all the oppressed, crushed, deceived, and persecuted masses. [18]
The retreat of the revolution and the radical change in the balance of class forces after the July Days made it obligatory for Lenin and Trotsky to re-evaluate the situation. Both defined the regime as Bonapartist.
In an article called The Beginning of Bonapartism published in Rabochii i soldat on 29 July, Lenin wrote:
Kerensky’s cabinet is undoubtedly a cabinet taking the first steps towards Bonapartism.
We see the chief historical symptoms of Bonapartism: the maneouvring of state power, which leans on the military clique (on the worst elements of the army) for support, between two hostile classes and forces which more or less balance each other out. [19]
Trotsky, in the middle of July at a session of the Petrograd Soviet, defined Kerensky as ‘the mathematical centre of Russian Bonapartism’:
... led by politicians who are afraid of their own shadow, the Soviet did not dare take the power. The Cadet Party, representing all the propertied interests, could not yet seize power. It remained to find a great conciliator, a mediator, an arbitrator. [20]
The essence of Bonapartism is a state power rising above contending classes as an arbiter balancing between them. Trotsky went on to compare Kerensky’s Bonapartism with that of Napoleon Bonaparte himself. Kerensky had all the vices of French Bonapartism, but none its strength: he was impotent. French Bonapartism
... grew out of a struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and seeks support in the passive stability of the peasantry; the chief instrument of Bonapartism is a disciplined army. With us, however, not one of these conditions is met. The whole of society is gripped by the most tense, naked antagonisms. The struggle between workers and capitalists, peasants and landlords, soldiers and generals, oppressed nationalities and central power does not afford the latter any basis of stability ... without a complete agrarian revolution, all attempts of this ‘super-class’ dictatorship will inevitably remain short-lived.
Kerensky wants to frighten democracy with counter-revolution, and counter-revolution with democracy, and thereby sanction a permanent dictatorship which will not improve the conditions of the masses. But all this is reckoning without the true master. The revolutionary masses have not yet said their final word. [21]
For Trotsky the answer to Kerensky’s Bonapartist regime was the unfolding of the permanent revolution, so in What Next? a pamphlet published by the Bolshevik publishing house Priboi, Trotsky elaborates his concept of permanent revolution as it applied to the immediate situation:
Once it had cast off the shackles of capitalist power, the revolution would become permanent, i.e. uninterrupted: it would take state power not to strengthen the regime of capitalist exploitation, but, on the contrary, to overcome it. Its final success in that direction would depend on the success of proletarian revolution in Europe. On the other hand, the more decisively and courageously the Russian revolution overcame the opposition of its own bourgeoisie, the more powerful would be the impetus imparted to the revolutionary movement in the West. This was and remained the sole practical perspective of the further development of the revolution. [22]
The alternatives facing Russia and humanity, he said, are socialism or barbarism:
Present-day world slaughter shows that Europe has reached the limits of capitalist greed, that it can no longer live and develop on the foundation of private ownership of the means of production. This chaos of blood and destruction is a savage uprising of blind and dark productive forces, the revolt of iron and steel against the reign of profit, against wage slavery, against the vulgar stupidity of human relations. Caught up in the flames of war it had itself begat, capitalism screams to humanity from the mouths of its cannons: ‘Cope with me, or I shall bury you beneath my ruins!’
All past development, millennia of human history, class struggle, and cultural accumulations, now turns on a single question, and that is the question of proletarian revolution. There is no other solution or different way out. In that lies the Russian revolution’s gigantic strength. This is not a ‘national’, not a bourgeois revolution. Anyone who evaluates it in this way lives in a world of ghosts, of the 1 8th and 19th centuries. But the 20th century is our ‘native land in time’. The ultimate fate of the Russian revolution is directly dependent on the course and outcome of the war, i.e. on the development of the class conflicts in Europe, which this imperialist war has made into a catastrophe.
... Meanwhile the revolution has spoken only its first word. It still has great reserves in Western Europe. [23]
The fate of the proletarian regime in Russia
... will be directly and immediately dependent on the development of the revolutionary movement in Europe – first and foremost in Germany.
Internationalism for us is not an abstract idea, existing only to be betrayed on every opportune occasion (as for Tseretelli or Chernov), but is a real guiding and wholly practical principle. A lasting decisive success is inconceivable for us without a revolution in Europe. [24]
For us the struggle for power is not merely the next stage of a national-democratic revolution; no, this is the fulfilment of our international duty, in this we are occupying one of the most important positions on the common front in the struggle with world imperialism. This point of view fundamentally defines our attitude to so-called national defence. The episodic shift in the front in one direction or the other can neither halt nor deflect our struggle, directed at the very foundations of capitalism, which relies on the imperialist mutual destruction of peoples.
A permanent revolution versus a permanent slaughter: that is the struggle which determines the fate of mankind. [25]
And Trotsky, under the most trying circumstances – given when Riga fell into the hands of the Germans and Petrograd was threatened, still stuck to his internationalism. In a pamphlet, When will there be an end to this Accursed Slaughter? Trotsky writes:
The fall of Riga was a cruel blow. The fall of Petersburg would be a misfortune. But the fall of the internationalist policy of the Russian proletariat would be a disaster.
... Those 183,000 working men, working women and soldiers who voted for our party in Petersburg at elections for the City Duma form a stout bulwark for the International. The Moscow workers who carried out their protest strike at the time of the ‘State Conference’ – they too are a glorious stronghold. As long as these bulwarks exist, spread and strengthen, the revolution is not lost. All that is needed is, for us from now on to stand steadfastly at our post, beneath the banner of a new, Third International.
... The people must take power into their own hands. The people – that means the working class, the revolutionary army, the rural poor. Only a workers’ government will end the war and save our country from ruin.
Forward! Into battle! Raise high the red banner!
The day is near when not only the war, but also the capitalist system which begat it, will be smothered in the fraternal embraces of the workers of all lands. [26]
On 2 July a conference of the Mezhraiontsy 4ook place. The main item on the agenda was the question of joining the Bolshevik party. Sukhanov, who was present in the gallery, describes:
... the majority were workers and soldiers unknown to me. There was no doubt that here – despite the miniature quality of the conference – the authentic worker-soldier masses were represented.
We arrived during the ‘reports from the floor’. They were listened to with interest, and really were interesting. Party work was being feverishly carried on and its successes were perceptible to everyone. There was one hindrance: ‘What distinguishes you from the Bolsheviks, and why aren’t you with them?’ All the speakers reiterated this ... [27]
In order to hasten the fusion of the Mezhraiontsy with the Bolsheviks, which certain individual leaders of the Mezhraiontsy were trying to postpone, Trotsky published the following statement in Pravda:
There are in my opinion at the present time no differences either in principle or tactics between the Mezhraiontsy and the Bolsheviks. Accordingly there are no motives which justify their separate existence. [28]
But Trotsky met resistance. In May he had already been for joining the Bolsheviks. But the majority of the Mezhraiontsy baulked, and on their behalf Iurenev still warned against ‘the bad sectarian organisational methods’ of the Bolsheviks. Trotsky headed the minority that was for a speedy merger. He argued that coming out of clandestinity and working in the broad popular movement, the Bolsheviks had largely rid themselves of their sectarian traits. Assisted by Lunacharsky, Trotsky convinced the majority to this view [29], and the 4,000 Mezhraiontsy joined the Bolshevik party. [30] As already mentioned, Sverdlov reported that the Bolshevik Party at the time had about 200,000 members. [31]
On 26 July the joint congress – in essence the Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party – opened, and it conducted its meetings semi-legally, concealing itself in two different workers’ districts.
The Congress began with the election of Lenin, Trotsky, Kamenev, Kollontai and Lunacharsky to the posts of honorary congress co-chairmen. With Lenin in hiding, Trotsky was nominated to deliver the main speech and to present a draft resolution on ‘the current political situation’. [32] When Trotsky was arrested three days before the start of the congress, and with the other honorary co-chairmen also in prison, Bukharin was hastily called to perform the task.
Sverdlov, the actual organiser of the congress, reported:
Trotsky already before the congress joined the editorial staff of our paper, but his imprisonment prevented his actual participation. [33]
On the subject of elections to the central committee, the report of the congress reads:
The names of the four members of the central committee receiving the most votes are read aloud: Lenin – 133 votes out of 134. Zinoviev 132, Kamenev 131, and Trotsky 131. (Loud applause) [34]
Top of the page
<< Last Chapter | Next Chapter >>
1. Lenin, Works, volume 31, page 58.
2. Lenin, Works, volume 33, page 227.
3. P.N. Miliukov, Istoriia vtoroi russkoi revoliutsii (Sofia 1921), volume 1, page 244.
4. Trotsky, History, page 576.
5. Lenin, Works, volume 25, page 312.
6. Trotsky, History, page 1130.
7. Sukhanov, pages 446-7.
8. Raskolnikov, page 185.
9. Browder and Kerensky, volume 3, pages 1354-5.
10. Browder and Kerensky, volume 3, page 1358.
11. Browder and Kerensky, volume 2, page 981.
12. Browder and Kerensky, volume 2, page 1000.
13. W.H. Chamberlain, The Russian Revolution (New York 1965), page 276.
14. Trotsky, My Life, page 219; Trotsky, Sochineniia, volume 3, book 1, pages 150-4.
15. Trotsky, Sochineniia, volume 3, book 1, pages 165-6.
16. Trotsky, Sochineniia, volume 3, book 1, page 203.
17. Trotsky, Sochineniia, volume 3, book 1, pages 169-70.
18. Proletarii, 18 August 1917; Trotsky, Sochineniia, volume 3, book 1, page 256.
19. Lenin, Works, volume 25, page 220.
20. Trotsky, Sochineniia, volume 3, book 1, pages 226-7.
21. Trotsky, Sochineniia, volume 3, book 1, pages 231-2.
22. Trotsky, Sochineniia, volume 3, book 1, page 223.
23. Trotsky, Sochineniia, volume 3, book 1, pages 247-8.
24. Trotsky, Sochineniia, volume 3, book 1, page 249.
25. Trotsky, Sochineniia, volume 3, book 1, page 252.
26. Trotsky, Sochineniia, volume 3, book 1, pages 267-9.
27. Sukhanov, page 420.
28. Trotsky, History, page 811.
29. Trotsky, Sochineniia, volume 3, book 1, pages 145-9.
30. Iurenev’s Report to the Sixth Congress of the Bolshevik Party, in Shestoi Sezd RSDRP, page 49.
31. Shestoi Sezd RSDRP, page 36.
32. Shestoi Sezd RSDRP, page 7.
33. Shestoi Sezd RSDRP, page 7.
34. Shestoi Sezd RSDRP, page 252.
Last updated on 19 July 2009