

VOLUME 2

LATEST DIRECTIVE OF NATIONAL PEASANT ASSOCIATION

13 June 1927

[Text] Because of the overly fast development of the peasant movement in the past, it has not been perfect organizationally. Coupled with the fierce counterattack of the local despots and evil gentry, this caused the rural struggle to become more and more severe. Unorganized actions have occurred whenever the superior organs failed to point out all possibilities. This association has instructed the peasant associations at all levels to make rectifications, so that the peasants in all places could, under the direction of the Peasant Association, continue to struggle against the reactionary feudal forces of all local despots and evil gentry with organization and planning, to fulfill the responsibility of overthrowing the economic base of the imperialist exploitation in the countryside and the political base of the warlords' domination in the revolution. It has also been pointed out that the present struggle goal should be to establish rural self-government by the peasants everywhere. According to reports from all quarters, the attack by local despots and evil gentry in the three provinces of Hunan, Kiangsi and Hupeh has been most vicious, as more than 10,000 party members, peasants and workers have been killed. A sinister plot to incite revolutionary soldiers against the peasants is being pushed. They have often fabricated facts by calling a deer a horse, and exaggerated things in the hope of provoking the soldiers to clash with mass organizations, thereby alienating the army and the people, splitting the united front and sabotaging the Three Great Policies, in order to overthrow the party and the country. They would have no regret even though this would aggravate the agonies of the people and bring about national destruction. In the meantime, the corrupt bureaucrats have connived with the local despots and evil gentry in smearing the peasants, hoping to alienate the government from the people. For instance, the Peasant Association of Huang-kang has never tried to destroy tobacco crops, but the corrupt bureaucrats made a false report to the Central Government which disbanded the association. This is a case in point. Now, the Military Affairs Committee of the National Government has learned of the vicious plan of imperialism, warlords, corrupt bureaucrats, local despots and evil gentry, compradores and all the reactionary forces to unleash a concerted attack on the National Government just as our armies

are launching the northern expedition against the Fengt'ien armed forces. It has therefore issued a directive to all armed comrades that they should not listen to false accusations and exaggerated propaganda. In order not to fall into a trap of the reactionaries, they should limit their actions to making investigations only. Nonetheless, the slaughtering of peasants by local despots and evil gentry in conjunction with bandits and stragglers in the various cities have become more and more serious recently. Numerous instances have occurred in which conspiracies were hatched by corrupt bureaucrats to undermine relations between the government and the people. The various organs have received several cases of false accusations against peasants everyday. Under these circumstances, the peasant associations at all levels should request that the National Government (1) issue a directive to protect workers' organizations, workers' pickets, and the peasants self-defense army, and punish the reactionaries that slaughtered workers and peasants and sabotaged the rear, in order that such revolutionary organs as the trade union, peasant association and CP may have complete freedom to rally the revolutionary forces and to launch an anti-Chiang expedition; (2) liquidate the local despots and evil gentry in the various counties in Hupeh who connived with enemy soldiers and bandits to slaughter peasants and workers, and severely punish Chiang Kai-shek's agents and all reactionaries who spread divisive rumors in order to consolidate Wuhan; (3) issue a directive to punish Hsu K'o-hsiang [6079 0344 4382], Ch'ou Ao [0092 7663], P'eng Kuo-chun [1756 0948 6874] and Hsiao Yu-k'un [5618 5038 2492] and dissolve such reactionary organs as the Party Salvation Committee and Party Purification Committee, restore the Hunan Provincial Government, Provincial Party Committee, Provincial Trade Union and Provincial Peasant Association as well as all revolutionary organizations that have been destroyed, accept the petition of the Hunan Petition Group, and instruct T'ang Sheng-chih [0781 3932 2535], chairman of Hunan provincial government, to take immediate action to suppress the reactionaries in Hunan; and (4) issue a directive to stop all actions in Kiangsi to oust the CP and worker and peasant leaders, as well as to severely punish the reactionaries who slaughtered the masses. It is incumbent on the Peasant Association itself to redouble its efforts to rally the peasants, tighten up the organization, and carry out armed self-defense in order to resist the armed attacks of local despots and evil gentry as well as to suppress the provocations by all reactionary and feudal forces. This is necessary because if the local despots and evil gentry are not suppressed, it will be impossible to establish rural self-government and democratic power, nor the realization of economic construction, while the foundation of the National Government will never be consolidated.

This directive is issued by the standing members of the Provisional Executive Committee of the National Peasant Association of China: T'an Yen-k'ai [6223 1693 7065], T'an P'ing-shan [6223 1627 1472], Teng Yen-ta [6772 3348 6671], Mao Tse-tung and Lu Ch'en [7120 3089], 13 June.

2077
CSO: 4005

LETTER FROM HUNAN TO CENTRAL COMMITTEE

20 August 1927

[Text] (3) A certain comrade who has arrived in Hunan said that the Comintern has issued a new directive suggesting that the worker-peasant-soldier soviet be implemented immediately in China. We have been very heartened by this news. Although objectively speaking, China has reached the 1917 era, we deemed before that it was still in 1905, which was a great mistake. The soviet of workers, peasants and soldiers is completely in keeping with the objective conditions. We should have the resolve to set up a worker, peasant and soldier soviet regime in the four provinces of Kwangtung, Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi. With the establishment of such a regime, we must, henceforth, rapidly achieve nationwide victory. We hope that the Central Committee will unhesitatingly accept this Comintern directive and implement it immediately in Hunan.

In view of the fact that this new directive of the Comintern is bound to affect our attitude toward the Kuomintang, as soon as we set up the soviet regime of workers, peasants and soldiers, we can no longer carry the Kuomintang flag. We should hoist high the flag of the Chinese Communist Party vis-a-vis the Kuomintang flag that has been hoisted by such warlords as Chiang Kai-shek, T'ang Sheng-chih, Yen Hsi-shan and Feng Yu-hsiang. The Kuomintang flag has been the flag of warlords for some time now and so only the communist flag is the flag of the people. When we were in Hupeh, we did not understand this too well. But after being in Hunan for a few days, we have seen how the people regard the provincial party headquarters under T'ang Sheng-chih, thus realizing that we really cannot fly the Kuomintang flag any longer or we are bound to be defeated. Previously, we have failed to seek actively the Kuomintang's leadership power, but allowed Wang Ching-wei, Chiang Kai-shek, T'ang Sheng-chih, etc., to seize it. Now, we should return this flag to them, because it has become a black flag completely. On our part, we must resolutely fly the red flag. As for the petty bourgeoisie, we must keep them under the leadership of the red flag, and objectively, they must be placed entirely under the leadership of the red flag.

(4) Land Problem: From my recent investigation on peasant problems in the two rural areas of Ch'ing-t'ai-hsiang, in Changsha and Shao-shan, in

Hsiang-t'an (from where five peasants have come to the provincial capital), I realize that it is the consensus of peasants that their agrarian problem must be resolved completely. Yesterday, I talked with several peasant comrades from the countryside to consult their views. As a result, I have drafted the following outlines:

- (a) Confiscate all land, including [that belonging to] small landlords and owner-peasants, and nationalize it. Land would then be redistributed to all country people who wish to obtain land equitably on these two standards by the peasants association; in accordance with "working ability" and "consumption" (that is, in keeping with the actual amount of consumption by each family).
- (b) In redistributing land, the district peasants association should order the township peasants association to compile a census register, to be handed over to the district association for redistribution of land accordingly.
- (c) In redistributing land, the district, rather than township, should be used as the unit; in a township where there is greater population than land, it can be transferred to a township where there are fewer people but more land. It is only thus that redistribution will be equitable. Temporarily, it won't be possible for people to move from one district to another.
- (d) After the land has been confiscated, measures must be provided to settle the families of landlords (whether they are big landlords or not) in order to pacify the people. There should be four classes: class 1, 4 percent collection; class 2, 3 percent collection; class 3, 2 percent collection, and class 4, 1 percent collection.

This draft proposal has been discussed at the provincial committee meeting yesterday. We must canvass the views of more peasants before we will ask you to make the final decision. The draft is submitted to you for references of discussion. (abridged) 20 August

CHUNG-YANG TUNG-HSIN, No 3, 30 August 1927

2077

CSO: 4005

LETTER FROM HUNAN PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE

30 August 1927

[Text] Brother X X:

Your letter of Character Hsiang No 5 has been received. Concerning the two points of error mentioned therein, what you have said is not in keeping with either fact or theory. We wish, therefore, to reply to you as follows:

(1) From the standpoint of the revolutionary significance as a whole, to capture Changsha and to stage the Autumn Harvest uprising are both for the purpose of promoting agrarian revolution. The Changsha uprising and the Autumn Harvest uprising are the same thing. Whereas the Changsha uprising serves as the starting point of the Autumn Harvest uprising, the Autumn Harvest uprising is to unleash an agrarian revolution in order to seize political power. In our plan to capture Changsha, the main fighters are workers and peasants. The purpose of transferring the two X and X regiments to attack Changsha is to supplement the insufficiency in strength of the workers and peasants. They are not the main force, but are deployed to serve as a cover for the development of the uprising, and so they are not the only important element of the uprising. Your committee has deemed that this is a military adventure here, ordering that the plan for the Changsha uprising be canceled. This shows your ignorance about the conditions here, and it is a contradictory policy in which no attention is paid to military affairs, but in the meantime, it calls for an armed uprising on the part of the masses.

(2) You have said that we have been paying attention here only to our work in Changsha, and neglected the other places. This is not true. It is true that we have been amiss in reporting to you the situation in other places where considerable preparations have been made (please see the plan on the uprising in central Hunan). In regard to the problem of our work in southern Hunan, we must also explain that making Changsha the starting point of the uprising does not mean that we have given up southern Hunan. The reason why we have not made Heng-yang the second starting point is because our strength is only sufficient to stage uprisings in central Hunan. If there should be uprisings in the various counties, our strength will be so diffused that it will be impossible to implement the plan of uprising

in central Hunan. That is why we decided against making Heng-yang the second starting point. Nonetheless, where plans for uprising have been made and preparations are underway in the various counties in southern Hunan, we have already issued orders to them to carry out the uprisings effectively. As soon as the Changsha uprising begins, it will be unleashed simultaneously in the other counties. 30 August

CHUNG-YANG TUNG-PAO No 5, 20 September 1927.

2077

CSO: 4005

REPORT OF THE CHING-KANG MOUNTAINS FRONT COMMITTEE TO CENTRAL AUTHORITY

25 November 1928

[Text] To the Central Committee in care of the Hunan Provincial Committee:

(1) Concerning the Letter From Central Committee

The 4 June letter from the Central Committee, after passing through the Kiangsi Provincial Committee and the Chi-an County Committee, only arrived at the Ching-kang Mountains on 2 December. Very well written, this letter has rectified many of our mistakes and resolved many controversial problems here. Upon its receipt, this letter was forwarded to the army committee as well as to local committees at all levels. On 6 November, the units heading toward Sui-ch'uan were concentrated at Ching-kang Mountains, and some 30 persons including members of the Special Committee and the army's and local active elements (such as Chu Teh, Ch'en I, Ho T'ing-yin [0149 2185 7336], Ho Ch'ang-kung [0149 7022], Yuan Wen-ts'ai [5913 2429 2088], Wang Tso [3769 0146], T'an Chen-lin [6223 7201 2651], Teng Kan-yuan [6772 1626 0337], Li Chueh-fei [2621 6748 7236], Ch'en Cheng-jen [7115 2973 0066], Wang Tso-nung [3769 0146 6593], Hsiao Fang-hsia [5618 5502 0704], Liu Hui-ch'ing [0491 6540 7230], Hsieh Ch'un-piao [6200 2504 2871], Liu Ti [6491 2420], Hsiung Shou-ch'i [3574 4388], Yang K'ai-ming [2769 7030 2494], Ts'ao Shuo [2580 7007], Teng Chiu-t'ing [6772 0036 6599], Mao Tse-tung, Sung Ch'iao-sheng [1345 0829 3932], P'eng Fu [1756 4375], and Yuan Te-sheng [5913 1795 3932] representing the Hunan Provincial Committee) attended a meeting held by the Special Committee to discuss the letter from the Central Committee. The consensus was that with the exception of one or two specific points (such as the guerrilla area being too broad and the abolition of the party representative system), all principles and policies are practicable and should be carried out accordingly. The highest organ of the party is also the front committee. According to the letter, when the front committee is in Kiangsi, it is under the direction of the Kiangsi Provincial Committee, and when it is moved into Hunan, it should be then under the director of the Hunan Provincial Committee. What is regrettable is that among the four attached documents in the Central Committee letter, we have translated only

the two documents on "Confiscation of Land To Set Up Soviets" and "The February Resolution of the Comintern," while the two on "Military Works" and "Organizational Problems" cannot be translated. The last two items are urgently needed. Please tell us about the method of translation or send us another copy.

(2) Border Regimes and the August Defeat

China is the only country in the world today where one or more small areas under a Red Regime have emerged in the midst of a white regime encircling them. When we analyze the cause of this phenomenon it will be seen that it is due to the continuous conflicts and wars among China's compradores and powerful gentry. As long as the conflicts and wars between these two classes continue, the existence and development of the armed entrenchment by workers and peasants will also continue. Where there are continued conflicts and wars between compradores and the powerful gentry, the existence and development of a soviet regime must have the following prerequisites: (1) excellent masses, (2) a sound party, (3) a large, strong Red army, (4) terrain favorable to waging war, and (5) economic power for self-sustenance.

Moreover, the strategy adopted by the border areas vis-a-vis the surrounding ruling classes should vary, depending on whether the political power of the ruling class is stable or in a state of disruption. For instance, when there was disruption in the ruling class, such as during the war between Li Tsung-jen and T'ang Sheng-chih in Hunan and Hupeh, and the war in Kwangtung between Chang Fa-k'uei and Li Chi-shen, we could be more venture-some in our military strategy, and the area of our military occupation could be expanded. Nonetheless, attention must be paid to setting up a firm bastion in the central areas to serve as an impregnable bulwark when the White terror descends on us. Where the ruling class is (comparatively) stable, such as in the southern provinces since April of this year, we should follow a strategy of gradual advance. Militarily, what is most undesirable is to divide the forces for adventurous advances; in mass work (such as distribution of land, establishment of soviets, organization of party and local militia), what is most undesirable is the diffusion of manpower, instead of paying attention to lay a sound foundation for the central areas. The defeat of the small soviets in China has been due either to the lack of objective prerequisites or to subjective errors in tactics. The reason why there have been errors in subjective tactics is because of the failure to differentiate the two different stages of the ruling class--when their regime is stable, and when their regime is in disruption. When the political power of the ruling class is stable, some advocate that the armed forces be divided to make adventurous advances; they even advocate that the Red Guards alone be deployed to defend extensive soviet regime areas, as though ignorant of the fact that the enemy, apart from utilizing the house-to-house levies, is also capable of using regular forces for concentrated operations. In mass work, no attention was paid to laying a firm foundation in the central areas, and, disregarding the potentials of our capacity, they attempted unrestricted expansion. If anyone advocated a policy of gradual military advance, and the concentration of manpower in the mass work in order to set up a solid

foundation in the central areas, to achieve an invincible position, it would be dubbed "conservatism." This is the basic reason for the August defeat in the border areas and the failure of the Red Army in Hunan.

The border area work started in October last year. At the beginning, there was no party organization whatsoever in the various counties, and the local militia consisted only of some 60 old rifles possessed by Wang Tso and Yuan Wen-ts'ai each in the vicinity of the Ching-kang Mountains. The rifles of the peasant Self-defense Corps of the four counties of Yung-hsin, Lien-hua, Ch'a-ling and Ling-hsien have already been surrendered to the powerful gentry, with the result that the revolutionary ardor of the masses has been suppressed. By February of this year, county committees had been set up in Ning-kang, Yung-hsin, Ch'a-ling and Sui-ch'uan; a special district committee was created in Ling-hsien. Party organization has also been under way in Lien-hua, which has developed relations with the Wan-an committee. Except for Ling-hsien, all the counties had a few local armed forces. In Ning-kang, Ch'a-ling, Sui-ch'uan and Yung-hsin, especially in the two counties of Sui-ch'uan and Yung-hsin, considerable work has been done in unleashing the masses in guerrilla uprisings to kill the landlords, with much success. During this stage, the agrarian revolution has not yet been intensified, and the names used for the organs of political power were "Workers, peasants and soldiers' representatives' committee" and the "people's committee." They were known simply as the Government of the Workers, Peasants and Soldiers, without the title of soviet. Soldiers' committees were organized in the army, and salary system abolished. When guerrillas were on active duty, action committees were organized to direct them. These simple measures have been adopted partly by improvisation, and partly on the basis of the announcement (such as the people's committees) of the 11 December uprising in Kwangtung which was reported in the newspapers. This is because we have lost contact with the provincial committee since November, thus becoming completely uninformed about all party policies. It was only in April this year that the resolution of the enlarged conference of the Central Committee in November which was so significant in China's revolutionary history was brought from Hunan to the border areas by Comrade Chu Teh and others. It was also then that the impact of the resolution has reached the party organization in the border area. The leading organ then was the Front Committee (of which Mao Tse-tung was secretary) appointed by the Hunan Provincial Committee during the Autumn Harvest Uprising. Early in March, the Front Committee was abolished at the suggestion of the Hunan Special Committee and reorganized as the Divisional Committee (with Ho T'ing-ying as secretary). It thus became a party organ for the army only and had no jurisdiction over the local party and was fraught with shortcomings. Meanwhile, at the suggestions of the Southern Hunan Special Committee, Mao Tse-tung's units were transferred to Hunan, and for more than a month the border area was abandoned. At the end of March came the defeat in Hunan. The units of Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung, as well as the peasant troops in southern Hunan, retreated to Ning-kang in April, thereby reoccupying the border area.

After April, occupation of the Hunan-Kiangsi border area was effected at a time when the ruling power in the southern provinces was enjoying comparative stability. They were able to send out any time some 8 to 9 regiments and sometimes as many as 18 regiments from Hunan and Kiangsi for their suppression campaign. Yet, with fewer than four regiments of our own troops, we engaged the enemy for 4 months, while the occupied areas expanded, the agrarian revolution was intensified, the soviet organization was promoted, and the Red Army and Red Guards grew in number and strength steadily. The reason for this is that the policy of the party in the border area (both local party and army party) was correct. At that time, the policies of the Border Special Committee (with Mao Tse-tung as secretary) and the Army Committee (with Ch'en I as secretary) were: To struggle resolutely against the enemy in order to establish political power in the middle section of Lo-hsiao Mountains and to oppose any defeatist flightism; to intensify agrarian revolution in the occupied areas; the army's party organization should help develop the local party, and the regular army should help develop the local militia forces; to be on the defense in Hunan where the ruling power is stronger, and to be on the offense in Kiangsi where the ruling power is weaker; devote great effort to develop Yung-hsin in order to create a regime of the masses, and to prepare for a protracted struggle; to concentrate the Red Army with a view to attacking the enemy confronting them at the proper time, and to oppose dispersion of armed forces in order to avert the danger of being destroyed individually; to adopt the tactic of expanding the areas under the regime by wave-like advances, and to oppose the policy of adventurist advance. Thanks to the correctness of these tactics, coupled with the topography of the border area which was most favorable to our struggle, as well as the fact that the attacking troops from Hunan and Kiangsi were badly coordinated, we were able to win military victories during the 4 months from April to July and insure the expansion of the masses' regime. Although the enemy outnumbered us by several times, he failed to destroy the regime which was expanding steadily. The impact of the regime was increasingly felt in the two provinces of Hunan and Kiangsi. The August defeat was due solely to our ignorance of the fact that it was a time when the ruling class was relatively stable. We adopted the kind of policy that was geared to a ruling class facing disruption. Thus, in dividing our armed forces to make adventurous advance in southern Hunan, we incurred defeats in the border area and in southern Hunan as well. Tu Hsiu-ching [2629 0208 4842], representative of the Hunan Provincial Committee, and Yang K'ai-ming, secretary of the Special Committee appointed by the Hunan Provincial Committee, carried out perfunctorily the orders of the Hunan Provincial Committee, taking advantage of the absence of such persons as Mao Tse-tung and Wan Hsi-hsien [5502 0341 2009] who were then in Yung-hsin and had objected to the orders strongly, without canvassing the situation then and disregarding the resolutions of the joint conference of the Army Committee, Special Committee and Yung-hsin County Committee which differed from the views of the Hunan Provincial Committee. They also endorsed the action of the 29th regiment (I-chang peasants) to abandon the struggle to return home. The result was to bring about defeat both in the border area and in southern Hunan, thus making a tremendous mistake.

In the middle of July, the Eighth Army mounted an attack on the Kiangsi border, but it was unsuccessful. As the bulk of the Red Army launched an offensive against Ling-hsien and Ch'a-ling, and was changing its plans to turn to southern Hunan, five regiments commanded by Wang Chun [3769 0971] and Chin Han-ting [6855 3351 7844] in Kiangsi, and six regiments under Hu Wen-t'ou [5170 2429 2435], of the 6th Army, 11 regiments in all, laid siege to Yung-hsin. We had only one regiment (commanded by Mao Tse-tung) in Yung-hsin which, shielded by the broad Red masses and resorting to guerrilla tactics on all sides, succeeded in pinning down these 11 enemy regiments within 30 li of the city for 25 days. Finally, the enemy probed our weakness and captured Yung-hsin by a fierce assault, and its loss was followed by Lien-hua and Ning-kang. At that time, some internal bickering flared up in the 6th Army, which withdrew suddenly and engaged Wang Chun's units at Chang-shu. Only five Kiangsi regiments were left, and, panicked, they withdrew into the city of Yung-hsin. Thus, if our main force had not gone to southern Hunan, it would undoubtedly, with the help of the masses, have routed this enemy force, and extended the regimes areas to include Chi-an, An-fu and P'ing-hsiang, and linked it up with P'ing-chiang and Liu-yang. But as the main force was away and the one remaining regiment was too exhausted and worn out, we decided to keep part of it to defend the Ching-kang Mountains, together with the two units under Yuan Wen-ts'ai and Wang Tso, while ordering Mao Tse-tung to lead one battalion to Kuei-tung to meet the main force and escort it back. By that time, the main force, which had started toward southern Hunan, was retreating to Kuei-tung, and the forces joined at Kuei-tung on 23 August.

The 8th Army under Wu Shang [0742 1424] had invaded Ning-kang and again advanced into Yung-hsin. Our enemy from Hunan was anxious to fight but could not (as our army missed his troops when we attacked from a side road). Fearing harassment by our masses, his army then retreated to Ch'a-ling by way of Lien-hua. Just one day later, 11 regiments of our Kiangsi enemy moved into Yung-hsin. At that time, the main force of the Red Army (led by Chu Teh) was attacking Ch'a-ling and Ling-hsien from Ning-kang. Upon reaching Ling-hsien, the soldiers of the 29th Regiment, seized by deep homesickness, demanded to go back to Hunan and refused to take orders. Another segment of our army was opposed to going back to southern Hunan, because they wanted to go to southern Kiangsi, and were also unwilling to turn to attack the enemy in Yung-hsin. Their agitation was aided by Tu Hsiu-ching, and even the Army Committee was helpless in averting this unfavorable turn of events. Consequently, the main force set out from Mien-tu in Ling-hsien on 17 July, moving toward Ch'en-chou via Tzu-hsing. On 24 July a battle was fought against Fan Shih-sheng's [5400 4258 3932] units at Ch'en-chou. Initial success was followed by defeat. It was dusk when we withdrew and we took the wrong road. The 29th Regiment hurried toward I-chang; a part of it was annihilated by Hu Feng-chang's [5170 7685 4545] men at Lo-ch'ang, while another part was scattered and lost in I-chang and Ch'en-chou. Only some 100 rifles were recovered and assembled that night, though fortunately the loss sustained by the main force was small.

Kuei-tung was occupied on 18 August. On 23 August Mao Tse-tung and others arrived from the Ching-kang Mountains, and it was decided to return to Ning-kang. That afternoon, two regiments of Wu Shang's troops in Ling-hsien launched a sharp attack on Kuei-tung and a hard fight lasted until the morning of the ensuing day. Our losses were heavy (though the enemy lost even more heavily). We had to retreat into Kiangsi. When our army was moving into southern Hunan from Mien-tu, the original Army Committee was abolished, and the Front Committee appointed by the Hunan Provincial Committee was organized, with Ch'en I as its secretary. After the defeat at and retreat from Kuei-tung, the Front Committee was abolished, and the Action Committee was organized to command it, with Mao Tse-tung as its secretary. On 8 September we arrived at the Ching-kang Mountains via Ch'ung-i, Shang-yu and Sui-ch'uan.

The causes for the failure of our assault on Ch'en-chou were six-fold:

- (1) Some officers and men were homesick, thus losing their fighting morale, and some of them were unwilling to go to southern Hunan, thus running counter to mass psychology;
- (2) it was a hot summer and the soldiers were exhausted;
- (3) after marching several hundred li from Ling-hsien, we lost contact with the border area and became isolated;
- (4) the worker and peasant masses of Hunan have not been mobilized and so it became a simple military venture;
- (5) we were ignorant about the enemy situation;
- (6) preparations were inadequate, and our officers and soldiers did not understand the significance of the war.

After the rout, one infantry company and one artillery battery under battalion commander Yuan Ch'ung-ch'uan [5913 1504 0350] rebelled. Although these two units were eventually recovered, the regimental commander, Wang Erh-cho [3769 3643 3820], was killed, which was of course a serious loss.

On 30 August four regiments of Wu Shang's Hunan troops and Wang Chun's Kiangsi troops mounted a fierce attack on the Ching-kang Mountains, taking advantage of the fact that our forces had not yet arrived after their defeat at Kuei-tung. We had less than a battalion, but relying on the natural barriers of Huang-yang-chieh (the path of the Ching-kang Mountains from Ning-kang), we fought bitterly for a whole night, repulsing the enemy and killing many of them. This campaign has enabled us to preserve our last bastion, and to frighten the enemy badly. This was one of the famous battles in the border area.

When the Front Committee was in Hunan, it organized two county committees in Kuei-tung and Ju-ch'eng which, together with the original county committees in Tzu-hsing and Ch'en-chou, were placed under the direction of a Special Committee, with Tu Hsiu-ching as its secretary and located Yu-ch'i Shih-erh-tung in Tzu-hsing. A Red Guard corps was formed for Tzu-hsing, Kuei-tung and Ju-ch'eng which received 80 rifles. Ch'en-chou had a Red Guard corps located at Yao-ling, possessing some 40 or 50 rifles. The conditions in Lai-yang and Yung-hsing were unclear. The 30th and 33d regiments of the Peasant Army which returned to southern Hunan in May had long been dispersed, and most of their arms, some 300 to 400 rifles, had been surrendered to the enemy. The broad masses that had been mobilized

by the Red Army during the spring also were totally suppressed by the enemy. When the Red Army was passing through Tzu-hsing, Ju-ch'eng and Kuei-tung, some of the local masses were mobilized to set up soviets. The sand fields in Kuei-tung were distributed, though their present status is unknown. Because of the barriers of communication, no letters have arrived from the newly organized Southern Hunan Special Committee.

(3) Status of Border Independent Regime From September to Present

Since April of this year, the independent regime's areas have been extended steadily. Following the battle at Lung-yuan-k'ou (on the border between Yung-hsin and Ning-kang) on 23 June and the routing of the enemy in Kiangsi for the fourth time, the border areas have reached their zenith [of development] comprising all three counties of Ning-kang, Yung-hsin and Lien-hua, small portions of Chi-an and An-fu, the northern part of Sui-ch'uan, and the southeastern part of Ling-hsien. Most of the land has already been distributed, and the remainder is being distributed. District and township soviets have been set up universally. There are county soviets in Ning-kang, Yung-hsin, Lien-hua and Sui-ch'uan, and a Border Area soviet has also been established. In the villages, worker and peasant insurrection corps armed with spears have been organized. At the district and county levels, Red Guards have been organized, armed with rifles. In July, the enemy from Kiangsi attacked, and in August enemies from Kiangsi and Hunan joined forces to attack Huang-yang-chieh, with the result that all the county cities and plains have been occupied by the enemy. The Peace Preservation Corps (armed with rifles) and the levies (armed with spears) acted as their vanguards. They ran amok, spreading the White terror into both towns and the countryside. Most of the party and government organs have disintegrated while the rich peasants and opportunists in the party have become undependable. As a result of the battle at Huang-yang-chieh on 30 August, the enemy realized that it was impossible to destroy the natural barriers of the Ching-kang Mountains. The enemy from Hunan began to retreat to Ling-hsien, while the enemy from Kiangsi began to entrench itself in the county towns, and in the towns and villages on the plains. Nevertheless, they could not do anything to us in our strongholds such as the western and northern districts of Ning-kang, the Pei-hsiang T'ien-lung district of Yung-hsin, as well its Hsiao-hsi-chiang and Nan-nien-shan districts, the Shang-hsi district of Lien-hua, the Ching-kang Mountains district of Sui-ch'uan, and the Ch'ing-shih-kang Ta-yuan of Ling-hsien. During July and August, scores of battles were fought by one regiment of the Red Army and by the Red Guards corps in various counties. Although we were defeated, we lost no more than 30 rifles. Finally, we withdrew deep into the mountains. The enemy deployed its entire force to attack. They combined the armed forces of Kiangsi and Hunan to attack our bastion in the Ching-kang Mountains, but they withdrew dismally. On 30 August we won a victory over the suppression armies at Huang-yang-chieh; on 8 September our southern expeditionary force returned to the Ching-kang Mountains, thus opening up a new situation after September.

As our army was marching to the Ching-kang Mountains through Ch'ung-i, Shang-yu and Sui-ch'uan, the Independent 7th Division of western Kiangsi under Liu Shih-i [6491 1102 3015], taking advantage of our defeat, sent five battalions to pursue us to Sui-ch'uan. On 13 September we deployed four battalions to attack Liu's units, routed them at the city of Sui-ch'uan, captured 250 rifles, a battalion commander and a company leader, 34 platoon leaders and some 200 soldiers. The remnants withdrew to Kan-chou. The Action Committee which directed the army (with Mao Tse-tung as secretary) and the Sui-ch'uan county committee collaborated in guiding the masses of Sui-ch'uan and in canvassing supplies for the army. Guerrilla action was conducted in the countryside, divided into four routes, each directed by an action committee. When the eastern route committee reached Wan-an, it made contact with the Wan-an County Committee. On 24 September Li Wen-pin's [2621 2429 2619] Kiangsi regiment came from T'ai-ho, while the Independent 7th Division came from Kan-chou to attack the city of Sui-ch'uan. As our force was not concentrated, we could only deploy two battalions for the battle. We were defeated, but morale remained intact. Our main force returned to the Ching-kang Mountains on 26 September. On 1 October we engaged the 27th regiment of Chou Hun-yuan's [0719 3268 0037] brigade under Hsiung Shih-hui [3574 1709 6540] in a battle at Ning-kang, capturing one battalion commander, one company leader, two platoon leaders, 100 soldiers and 110 rifles. Remnants of the enemy units retreated to Yung-hsin and the entire county of Ning-kang was recovered. While we were attacking Ning-kang, the regiment under Li Wen-pin's command reinforced the enemy forces via T'ai-ho and Yung-hsin from Sui-ch'uan, leaving only the Independent 7th Division (which was the weakest) in Sui-ch'uan. There was thus considerable hope for us to mobilize the masses in Sui-ch'uan, and moreover, we were faced with the urgent problem of seeding the army. We, therefore, reoccupied Sui-ch'uan on 13 October, as the Independent 7th Division took flight without a fight. The Action Committee of Sui-ch'uan (with Chu Teh as secretary) collaborated with the County Committee there to carry out guerrilla tactics in five routes, distributing land, setting up soviets, developing party organization, and collecting funds. At that time, the 3d Division of the Eighth Army under Yen Chung-hsing [7051 0112 5887], with 126 rifles, had defected to our army and been reorganized as a special service battalion commanded by Pi Chan-yuan. On 2 November Sui-ch'uan was again attacked by two regiments of the 21st Brigade of Kiangsi troops commanded by Li Wen-pin as well as the Independent 7th Division. With a view to avoiding any hard battle, we evacuated Sui-ch'uan, trying to make a blitz attack on Ning-kang and Yung-hsin where the enemy forces were weaker, in order to break one side of the siege. On 9 November we routed the 27th Regiment of Chou's brigade at the city of Ning-kang and Lung-yuan-k'ou, capturing 160 rifles, killing one battalion commander and scores of soldiers. We captured two deputy battalion commanders, a company commander and a platoon leader, and more than 100 soldiers. Next day, we advanced to Yung-hsin to attack the 28th Regiment and the remnants of the 27th Regiment of Chou's brigade until 3 o'clock in the afternoon. We defeated the enemy and our vanguards occupied the city of Yung-hsin. However, unexpectedly, the enemy 35th Brigade arrived from Hung-t'ien-ho as reinforcement. We had to withdraw

to Ning-kang in the face of this adverse situation. Although there were heavy casualties to the enemy, we also suffered scores of dead and wounded. This was the biggest battle since our return to the border area. Red Guards and insurrection corps fought in both battles, though they did not do too much. The status now in the border area is: Chou Hun-yuan's 14th brigade and Liu Shih-i's 15th brigade are now stationed in the Kiangsi border, both of which have been defeated and are being reorganized; the 21st brigade under Li Wen-pin and the 35th brigade are crack troops; the 8th Army under Wu Shang is entrenched in the three counties of Cha-ling, Ling-hsien and Kuei-tung on the Hunan border. The area of Red power extends from Sui-ch'uan and the southern foot of Ching-kang Mountains in the south to the borders of Lien-hua in the north, including the entire county of Ning-kang, parts of Sui-ch'uan, Ling-hsien and Yung-hsin, and forming a narrow strip from north to south. The Shang-hsi District in Lien-hua, T'ien-lung District in Yung-hsin, and the Wan-nien shan area are not contiguous, though they have also been occupied by Red power. The enemy is attempting to surround this unbroken bastion by both military attack and economic blockade in order to wipe out this "Communist bandit lair." A hard struggle is bound to be waged with the passage of time, and they will never give us any respite.

(4) Current Problems

A. Military Question

(1) The Military Stage: Since the struggle in the border area has become exclusively military, both the party and the masses must be militarized. How to deal with the enemy and how to fight have thus become important items on the daily agenda of the army and local party organs at all levels. The so-called independent regime must be armed; that is, where there is no armed force, or an inadequately armed one, or though armed, the tactics are wrong, then it will be, instead, captured by the White armed forces immediately (White army, peace preservation corps and levies). This kind of struggle is bound to become more violent every day, and so the problems will also become more complex and aggravated.

(2) The Sources of the Red Army: They may be divided into the following six categories: (a) units formerly under Yeh T'ing and Ho Lung at Swatow; (b) the Guards Regiment at Wuchang; (c) peasant armies of Liu-yang and P'ing-chiang; (d) peasant armies of southern Hunan and the workers of Shui-k'ou-shan; (e) soldiers captured from the units under Hsu K'o-hsiang [6070 0344 4382], T'ang Sheng-chih, Pai Chung-hsi, Chu P'ei-teh, Wu Shang and Hsiung Shih-hui; and (f) worker and peasant elements from the various border counties. The first four types are the main force. However, after more than a year of fighting, the old units of Yeh and Ho the Guards Regiment, and the peasant troops of Liu-yang and P'ing-chian have lost two-thirds of their strength, leaving only one-third intact. Even the Red Army of southern Hunan has also suffered terrific losses after 8 months of fighting. Thus, the first four categories, because of their excellent quality, have remained the basic strength of the 4th Red Army, but are outnumbered by the last two categories. Of the last two categories,

captured soldiers form the majority. Without this replenishment, it would have been impossible to fill up the 4th Army. Moreover, its quality has also suffered considerably. The increase in men has not kept up with the increase in rifles. Rifles are not easily lost, but soldiers are wounded, killed, fall sick or desert (during a defeat). Among peasants in the border area, very few were willing to enlist. With the distribution of land, most of them have gone out to plant the fields. At present, the number of worker and peasant elements is extremely small in the 4th Army in the border area. Thus, the problem is still rather serious. The Hunan Provincial Committee has promised to send us workers from An-yuan and we hope this will be done soon.

(3) Composition: One portion consists of worker and peasant elements while the other is formed largely of the vagabond proletariat (the Hunan Provincial Committee has alleged that they are all vagabond proletariat, but this is not true). This vagabond proletariat portion must be replaced by worker and peasant elements, though it is difficult to find them. The vagabond proletariat elements seem to be excellent in combat and, as the war goes on every day casualties have been heavy. Thus, the vagabond proletariat are indispensable, but it is not easy to find replacements from among them. Under these circumstances, we must intensify political training in order to improve their quality.

(4) Character: The majority has been converted from mercenary forces but the mercenary system is abolished as soon as they join the Red Army. There has never been any pay, but there there is rice money and petty cash for miscellaneous expenses. In regard to land distribution among the Red Army officers and men, with the exception of those soldiers in various counties in the border areas whose families are given land as a rule, it is rather difficult for officers and men from remote places to obtain land. This is because, first, there is very little land in the occupied area which is mountainous. Moreover, peasants have complained that the land distributed to them is insufficient, and so there is no surplus land. Secondly, because of the constant changes in the fortunes of war, the occupied area is very unstable. The land distributed by Red power yesterday could be easily taken away by White power today, in which case one must pay rent to the landlord. Thus, it is not only the officers and men in the Red Army who are wary toward the concept of land distribution; even among the peasants, many are aware of the uncertainties of the situation. This is due to the fact that the White power is too strong, and the struggle between White and Red has been too recurrent and too severe. Nonetheless, that the Red Army officers and men should receive land is an irrevocable principle, though the methods of implementation remain to be discussed.

(5) Political Training: The Red Army soldiers have learned class consciousness and such essentials as distribution of land, the establishment of soviets, the arming of workers and peasants, etc. They realize that they are fighting for themselves and the workers and peasants. Because of this, they have not complained even though they have had to endure hardships in the midst of this bitter struggle. There is a soldiers' committee at the company, battalion and regimental levels whose duties are to supervise the officers, represent

the interests of soldiers, participate in army administration, undertake political training internally (in the army) and launch mass movements externally. With a sound soldiers' committee, it may not be necessary to have a political department. The working personnel can be incorporated into the soldiers' committee, which is better than maintaining a political department separately. Before April this year, there was a political department in all army units here, but it has been abolished because the results have not been too satisfactory. With the political department, there was a feeling on the part of the officers, soldiers and masses that political work could be done by a few people of that department, and so they deemed that the duty of the remaining people was limited to fighting. But after its abolition, everybody realized that they not only have to fight, but also must undertake political work (political training and mass movement). This has resulted in breaking the simple military-minded tradition. Based on past experience, it has been held that the party representative system should not be abolished. Party representatives at the army and divisional levels, however, could be abolished (there being no divisional level here, while the regiment is directly under the army). Party representatives cannot be abolished at the regiment, battalion and company level, particularly at the company level at this time. This is because the party branch is built upon the company. The party representative of a company has the duty of supervising the soldiers' committee to carry out political training and to direct mass movements, and he is also the branch secretary in the party. As it has been borne out by facts, where the company's party representative is better, that company will also be better. Among the lower echelon cadres, it often happens that because of the heavy casualties, some of the enemy soldiers captured only yesterday would be promoted to serve as platoon or even company leaders today. Among those enemy soldiers that were captured in February and March this year, some have become battalion commanders. It seems rather absurd to think that just because ours is now called the Red Army, there is no need to have party representatives. When Chu Teh's units were in southern Hunan, the system of party representatives was abolished. Later, he felt that it was not too good, and so when he came to the border area, the system was restored. If the name is changed to "director," this would be confused with the directors of the Kuomintang, whom most of the captured soldiers detest. Moreover, any change of name will not change the nature of the system. Hence, it has been decided that there should be no change. There have been too many casualties among party representatives. It is hoped that apart from conducting training classes, the Central Committee and the two provincial committees will send us at least 30 persons who could serve as party representatives.

(6) Military Training: It usually takes other people from 6 months to 1 year to train their soldiers before they can fight: our soldiers might have entered the army yesterday, and required to fight today with no time for training at all. Consequently, among some middle and lower echelon cadres and many soldiers, the military technique is rather poor. Their only advantage in combat is courage, and this is very dangerous. Since it is impossible to have long periods of rest and training, the only thing is to try to avoid fighting in order to gain the necessary time for training. We

have established a training corps of 150 members and we intend to continue this practice. We hope that the Central Committee and the two provincial committees will send us at least 30 more officers at the company and platoon level, to the border areas as soon as possible.

(7) The Problem of Supplies: The Hunan Provincial Committee has asked us to pay attention to the material life of the soldiers to make it at least a little better than the average worker and peasant. At present, however, army life is just contrary to that, and we feel that no one else lives so badly as the Red Army soldiers. Because of the shortage of silver dollars, we have found it difficult to continue to give each person 5 fen for their food (rice is supplied locally) each day. The soldiers' adage that "down with the capitalists, as we can eat pumpkin every day" is an indication of their distress. They can endure hardships; no others can endure hardships better than the 4th Army. They need only money for food--all other expenses have been curtailed, and even this requires some 10,000 silver dollars a month. They can get this money only by making the local despots pay. But first, wherever they have been, there are no more local despots from whom to collect it; second, as the siege of the enemy is so tight, unless one side of it has collapsed, it would be impossible to venture out too far to strike at the local despots; and third, the enemy threat being so serious, it is impossible for one or two battalions of soldiers to go out to look for funds, and if you want to get more, you have to have more soldiers. This is no simple problem. Now, although we have the cotton for winter clothing for the 5,000 soldiers of the entire army (regular Red Army), we are still short of cloth, and do not know when this can be solved. It is already so cold now, but many soldiers are still wearing two layers of thin clothing. Fortunately, they are used to hardships, and they are equally poor regardless of who they are. From the army commander down to the cook, each person gets 2 fen uniformly for their food. When the expense money is 20 fen each, they would all get the same amount, and when it is 40 fen, they would all get 40 fen each. Because they all understand this is "suffering hardships for the proletariat," they do not complain. Although this is so, the economic problem remains rather serious.

(8) The Problem of Wounded and Sick Soldiers: After each engagement, there are some wounded soldiers. Because of the lack of nutrition, the cold, and other causes, there are many sick. The Red Army's hospitals are built in the Ching-kang Mountains. They treat patients with both Chinese and Western medicine, but both drugs and doctors are in short supply and the problem is grave. In September there were more than 200 wounded and sick soldiers, and this number has increased since the recent battle at Yung-hsin. There are now more than 800 patients in the hospitals, including some nursing staff. Morale will be affected if the wounded are not given proper care. But to do this requires adequate equipment and supplies which are unsatisfactory and difficult to obtain. The Hunan Provincial Committee has promised to send some medicines, but no delivery has been made so far. We hope that the Central Committee and the two provincial committees will loan us a few doctors [trained in] Western medicine and some iodine.

(9) Democracy in the Army: Although the material life of the Red Army is poor and although there have been incessant engagements, it has managed to maintain its morale. Apart from the role played by the party, this is due largely to the thorough implementation of democracy. The officers do not abuse their soldiers; officers and men receive equal treatment: they eat the same food and dress alike. The soldiers enjoy freedom of speech and assembly. All formalities and protocol have been abolished and economic management is open; the representatives of the soldiers can look into the budget and accounts. They also manage their own mess, and though each person gets about only 5 fen for their mess, they could still put aside 60 or 70 coppers a day for personal expenses. These measures have proved to be most satisfying to the soldiers. This is especially true for the newly captured soldiers who realize how different their new army life is from their old army life, so much so that they seem to be two different worlds. Although they may feel that the material life of the Red Army is not as good as that of the White, their spirit is liberated and they get along well. Although they are the same soldiers, they did not fight so bravely for the enemy as they do now for the Red Army, and this is due to the influence of democracy. The Red Army is like a melting pot in which captured soldiers can be melted as soon as they come over. This is a fact. In China, there is great need for democracy not only among the worker and peasant masses, but also for the army, and even more urgently. To practice democracy thoroughly in the army constitutes an important policy to destroy China's feudalistic mercenary armies. This is because the life of soldiers in China's feudal mercenary army is simply intolerable.

(10) Party Organization in the Army: There are now four levels in the party organization of the army: the company branch, battalion committee, regimental committee and army committee. The party branch is established in each company; and a small group is established in each squad. An important reason why the 4th Army has remained intact after so many battles is due to the fact that "the party branch is organized on the company basis." Two years ago, our party organization in the Kuomintang army failed to grasp the soldiers, and even in Yeh T'ing's units, there was only a party branch in each regiment, which was most absurd. Now, the ratio between party members and nonpartisans in the army is one to three, which means there is a party member in every four persons. Recently, we decided to develop more party members among the combat soldiers so that the number of party members and nonpartisans will attain a fifty-fifty ratio. There is now a shortage of good secretaries in the company branches. Therefore, we are asking the Central Committee to send more active elements who find it difficult to stay in their respective localities to come here to serve as company party representatives. Among the working staff who came from southern Hunan, almost all of them are doing party work in the army (and they do political work simultaneously). In August we lost some of them in southern Hunan, and so it is even more difficult now to spare them. Since the Army committee (Army party committee) was elected by the first army representatives conference at Ning-kang in April, six army party representatives conferences have been held in the past 7 months, the last on

14-15 November. This conference was held after receipt of a letter from the Central Committee. Thus, decisions have been adopted on political, military, organization and propaganda affairs, and it was a better conference than all previous ones. The conference elected an army committee of 23 members, with Chu Teh as secretary (designated by the Central Committee). It is the highest party organ in the army and is under the jurisdiction of the Front Committee. Externally, this is the military council of the border area soviet, commanding the Red Army and local militia forces. The party organization in the army has been set up with considerable success, and some party members are very determined in their revolutionary outlook, though the majority of them do not have a good education. We must pay more attention to this later.

(11) Local Armed Forces: The local forces consist of the Red Guards and the worker and peasant insurrection corps. The insurrection corps is armed with spears and shotguns. It is based on the village as the unit, each village having one detachment, whose strength is based on the size of the village. Its duty is to suppress counterrevolutionaries and to protect the village regime. When the enemy comes, the insurrection corps will help the Red Army or the Red Guards in combat duties. A secret organization used to launch uprisings, the insurrection corps was founded in Yung-hsin. Later, it seized the political power of the entire county, thus becoming an open organization. This system has since been extended in the border areas, and retains its original name. The arms of the Red Guards corps consist of five-, nine- and single-shot rifles, with five-shot ones in the majority. The numbers of rifles in the various counties are as follows: 140 in Ning-kang, 220 in Yung-hsin, 43 in Lien-hua, 50 in Ch'a-ling, 90 in Ling-hsien, 130 in Sui-ch'uan and 10 in Wan-an, for a total of 683. Most of these have been supplied by the Red Army, while a small portion has been captured from the enemy. Most of the Red Guards units have been fighting constantly with the peace preservation corps and the levies of the big gentry in the various counties and as a result their ability to handle weapons and their fighting capability have increased steadily. Before the Ma-jih (21 May) incident, the number of rifles held by the peasant self-defense corps in the various border counties was as follows: 300 in Yu-hsien, 300 in Ch'a-ling, 60 in Ling-hsien, 50 in Sui-ch'uan, 80 in Yung-hsin, 60 in Lien-hua, 60 in Ning-kang (Yuan Wen-ts'ai's units) and 60 in the Ching-kang Mountains (Wang Tso's units), totaling 970. After that incident, with the exception of the Yuan and Wang units, which remained intact, only 6 rifles were left in Sui-ch'uan, 1 in Lien-hua, all the remaining rifles having been seized by the big landlords. As a result of the opportunist line, they were unable to hold on to their rifles. Now, the Red Guards units in the various counties are still short of rifles, and the big landlords possess far more rifles than the Red Guards. This is why the Red Army must continue to supply rifles to the various counties, and where it will not impair the Red Army, everything must be done to help arm the local militia forces so that they can be strengthened steadily. The Red Army conference has stipulated that the four-company system be adopted, with 75 rifles in each company (when this number is added to the rifles of the special services company, machine-gun company, mortar company and the battalion and regimental headquarters, each regiment should have 1,075 rifles). Moreover, weapons

captured from the enemy should have been distributed as much as possible to the local militia forces of workers and peasants. The officers of the Red Guards corps should be trained at the training corps maintained by the Red Army. Hereafter, the number of officers commanding Red Guards who have been sent by the Red Army must be curbed gradually. In the meantime, Chu P'ie-teh has also been massively arming the peace preservation corps and the levies, and the number and combat strength of the armed forces equipped by the big gentry in the border counties are also formidable. Thus, expansion of the Red local militia forces in the border area cannot be delayed any further.

(12) The Strategy of Red Army and Red Guards: In addition to recognizing guiding principles (that where the enemy is small in number, it should be eliminated immediately by superior force, and where the enemy is numerous and strong, mass war strategy should be adopted instead of fighting a hard battle), the Red Army should concentrate its strength while the Red Guards should disperse its strength. Now, the bourgeois regime is comparatively stable, the enemy is in a position to deploy an enormous number of troops against the Red Army. Thus, it would be most inimical for the Red Army to disperse its strength. In our experience, we have almost always suffered defeat when our strength was spread thin. But we have invariably won when we have concentrated our forces to attack enemy forces that were smaller than ours, equal to ours, or slightly larger than ours. The area of guerrilla warfare as prescribed by the directives of the Central Committee covers thousands of li in length and breadth. This is too extensive and was due probably to the over-estimation of our military strength. (Since the number of rifles in the 4th Red Army is known to the Hunan Provincial Committee, we have asked Comrade Yuan Teh-sheng to make a report orally, and so it is not listed here.) In regard to the strategy of the Red Guards corps, it would be better to disperse their strength. This method is being adopted by Red Guards in the various counties.

(13) Military Organization: We are still following the old Kuomintang method of organization. We are unable to decode the Central Committee's "Resolution on Military Work." Also we cannot surmise what was the military system of the T'ai-p'ing regime. Please send these documents again so that we may discuss them.

(14) Propaganda Aimed at the Enemy: The most effective propaganda is to release captured soldiers and to give medical treatment to wounded enemy soldiers. When enemy soldiers and enemy battalion company and platoon commanders are captured, they are, after some propaganda work on our part, divided into those who want to stay and those who wish to go. We should allow those who want to leave to get their wish and give them the necessary traveling expenses. This kind of propaganda will shatter the enemy allegation that "Communist bandits kill anyone in sight." As a result of this policy, the "Ten-day Bulletin of the 9th Division" issued by Yang Chi'ih-sheng said that our method is "sinister." The officers and men of the Red Army are most enthusiastic in welcoming and comforting captured enemy soldiers. At each "rally to bid farewell to new brothers," the captured soldiers responded with warm gratitude in their speeches. Medical

treatment for the wounded enemy soldiers also has a great effect. Some clever enemy (such as Li Wen-pin) have imitated our method by not killing our captured soldiers and by treating our wounded soldiers. However, after our men have been captured by the enemy, they often bring their rifles back with them at the next engagement. Such incidents have occurred twice. Very few Red Army soldiers have been captured by the enemy in the border area. This is because the Red Army has rarely lost any battle there. Additionally, we have also done much in written propaganda, such as slogan-writing. Whenever we reach a new place, we cover the walls with our slogans. We are, however, short of persons who have drawing skills and so we hope the Central Committee and the two provincial committees will send us some.

(15) Military Strongholds: The first stronghold is the Ching-kang Mountains located at the juncture of the four counties of Ning-kang, Lin-hsien, Sui-ch'uan and Yung-hsin. Its northern foot is Mao-p'ing, in Ning-kang, and its southern foot is Huang-pa in Sui-ch'uan, a distance of 90 li between them. Its eastern foot is Na-shan in Yung-hsin and its western foot is Shui-k'ou in Ling-hsien, 180 li apart. It has an area of 550 square li, extending from Na-shan and Lung-yuan-k'ou (in Yung-hsin) to Hsin-ch'eng, Mao-p'ing and Ta-lung (in Ning-kang), to Shih-tu, Shui-k'ou and Hsia-ts'en (in Ling-hsien), and then to Ying-pan-yu, Tai-chia-pu, Ta-feng, Tui-tzu-ch'ien, Huang-ao, Wu-tu-chiang, and Ch'e-ao (in Sui-ch'uan). In the mountains are located such places as Ta-ching, Hsiao-ching, Shang-ching, Chung-ching, Hsia-ching, Tzu-p'ing, Hsia-chuang, Hsing-chou, Ta'ao-p'ing, Pai-ni-hu and Lo-fu where paddy fields and villages are scattered. These places have been historically the lairs for bandits and stragglers. The population is less than 2,000, and the grain crop is under 10,000 piculs and so all the grain for the army must be supplied from Ning-kang, Yung-hsin and Sui-ch'uan counties. All strategic passes in the mountains are defended by heavy fortifications. Located in the mountains are the Red Army hospitals, clothing shops, arsenal and the rear offices of the various regiments. Foodstuffs are now being hauled to the mountain bastions from Ning-kang, and if we can get sufficient supplies (grain and cash, the most important being cash), it will be impregnable. There is a defense committee in charge of local defense, with Wang Tso as its director. The second stronghold is Chiu-lung, located at the juncture of the four counties of Ning-kang, Yung-hsin, Lien-hua and Ch'a-ling. This base is not as important as the Ching-kang Mountains, but is fortified and serves as the rearmost base for the local militia forces of the four counties. Surrounded by White regimes on all sides, a military bastion with strong natural barriers is indispensable for the existence of the Red regime. Because of the fact that it is surrounded by the enemy, it is necessary to defend every side, and so natural barriers are important in reinforcing the inadequacy of human resources. However, when the bourgeois political power is stable, protracted Red occupation will be difficult.

(B) Agrarian Problem

(1) Agrarian Status in Border Area: Generally speaking, over 60 percent of the land is controlled by landlords, and less than 40 percent is in the hands of peasants. Individually speaking, land ownership is most concentrated in Sui-ch'uan in the Kiangsi border, where 80 percent is owned by

landlords, Yung-hsin comes next, with 70 percent owned by landlords. In Wan-an, Ning-kang and Lien-hua there are more rich peasants. With the exception of Wan-an where no direct investigation has been made, although we say that there are many rich peasants in Ning-kang and Lien-hua, landlords still own more land there--the ratio being 60 : 40. In Ch'a-ling and Ling-hsien on the Hunan border, conditions are similar, as some 70 percent of land is owned by landlords.

(2) The Problem of the Intermediate Class: Under these circumstances, it would seem that confiscation of all lands and redistribution of them would be supported by the majority. However, there are roughly three classes in rural areas, namely, the big gentry consisting of big and medium-sized landlords, the intermediate class of small landlords and rich peasants, and the poor peasants. In the intermediate class, the rich peasants often align themselves with the interests of the small landlords. Although the land owned by the rich peasants is a small percentage of the total, if combined with the land owned by the small landlords, the amount is sizeable. This situation seems to be prevalent throughout the country. The policy in the border areas has been to confiscate all the land and then to distribute it thoroughly. Thus, both the big gentry and the intermediate class have been attacked in the areas of Red power. Although this is the policy, it has been hampered by the intermediate class during its implementation. In the early days of the revolution, the intermediate class capitulated to the poor peasants superficially, but in reality conspired to use their former social status and their clannishness to spread rumors intimidating the poor peasants, thus delaying the distribution of land. When they were pressured to such an extent that no further delay was possible, they either concealed the actual extent of their land, or kept the rich land for themselves and reported the poor land to the authorities. During that period, because of the protracted persecution and the uncertainty of revolutionary victory, the poor peasants were deceived by the intermediate class and did not dare to take positive action. It is only when the revolution has become resurgent and seized political power in one or several counties, when the reactionary army has been defeated repeatedly, and when the prowess of the Red Army has been demonstrated effectively that positive action has been taken in rural villages against the intermediate class. For instance, the southern section of Yung-hsin has the largest intermediate class. It has also been most stubborn in delaying redistribution of land and in concealing landholdings. But it was only after the Red Army won a huge victory at Lung-yuan-k'ou on 23 June, and the district executed several people who tried to postpone land redistribution, that land was actually redistributed. Nonetheless, in almost any county, the feudal system of family organization is prevalent; usually one single family dominates one village or even several villages. The result is that it could take a long time before class splitting in the village is realized and the clan sentiment overcome. In rural villages dominated by family organizations, it is not the big gentry but the intermediate class that creates the biggest problem.

(3) Defection of the Intermediate Class Under the White Terror: As the intermediate class had been under attack during the revolutionary upsurge,

it immediately defected as soon as the White terror came. The small landlords and rich peasants of Ning-kang and Yung-hsin led the reactionary troops in burning down the houses of the revolutionary peasants there. Pursuant to the directions of the reactionaries, they proved to be most courageous in burning houses and arresting people. When the Red Army again reached Ning-kang (in September), several thousand peasants of Hsin-ch'eng, Ku-ch'eng and Lung-shih, persuaded by the propaganda of the reactionaries that "the Communists would kill them," followed the reactionaries to Yung-hsin. It was only after we proselytized to them that "peasants who had defected would be killed" and that we "welcome peasants who had defected back to reap grain" that many peasants slowly returned.

(4) When the revolution is at a low ebb in the nation, the most difficult problem in the occupied areas is that the intermediate class cannot firmly be held. The main reason for the betrayal by this class is that it has been dealt heavy blows by the revolution. However, if the poor peasants are undaunted during the revolutionary upsurge, the intermediate class might be scared and not dare to run amok. When the war between Li Tsung-jen and T'ang Sheng-chih spread to Hunan, the small landlords in Ch'a-ling tried to make peace with the peasants, some of them even sent pork to peasants as a New Years gift (At that time, the Red Army evacuated Ch'a-ling to go to Sui-ch'uan). After the conclusion of the Li-T'ang [action], such incidents have also disappeared. Now that the counterrevolution has reached its high tide in the whole country, the intermediate class that has been under attack has become completely subservient to the big gentry in the White areas, and the poor peasants have become an isolated force. This is a rather serious problem.

(5) The pressure of daily life as an influence on the intermediate class to defect: Red occupation and White resistance have created two enemy states. Because of the enemy's stringent blockade and because of our mishandling of the petty bourgeoisie, trade has been completely stopped between the two areas. The shortage and the high prices of salt, cloth and medicine as well as other daily necessities, and the difficulty of exporting such items as timber, tea and oil have affected the people in general. It has also curbed their income. Although the poor peasants can endure hardship the intermediate class cannot and will go over to the gentry when conditions become intolerable. This economic problem is most serious. Thus, unless the splits and wars between the big gentry and the warlords of China continues, and unless the national situation moves forward, the small independent Red regimes will be gravely threatened economically, and the protracted existence of the regimes will become a problem. This is because such economic pressure is not only intolerable to the middle class, but also unendurable to the worker and peasant classes as well as to the Red Army. Both Yung-hsin and Ning-kang have no salt to eat, and the supply of cloth and medicine, not to mention other things, has been completely disrupted. Salt is now sold, but at an exorbitant price, and there are still no cloth and medicine. In Ning-kang and the western part of Yung-hsin as well as the northern part of Sui-ch'uan (which are still occupied areas at present), it

is still impossible to export timber, tea and oil which form their staple products. There is an acute shortage of money, and if captured local despots refuse to deliver money, there is no money to spend. That is why the problem is very grave.

(6) The Standard for Land Redistribution: The township serves as the unit for redistribution. Where it is mountainous and there is very little farmland, such as the Hsiao-chiang District in Yung-hsin, three or four townships form a single unit for redistribution, though such cases are very rare. In regard to human standards, then land is redistributed equally among all persons regardless of age and sex. Now, however, in keeping with the new measures prescribed by the Central Committee, the labor force is used as the standard; those who can work receive twice as much as land as those who cannot.

(7) The Question of Concessions to the Owner-peasants: This problem has not yet been discussed in depth. The rich owner-peasants have suggested that the standard of redistribution be based on productivity, that is, those who have more labor and capital (farm implements, etc.) should be given more land. The rich peasants feel that neither equal distribution nor distribution according to the labor force are to their advantage. They indicate that they are willing to work harder which, coupled with their capital, would enable them to raise more crops. If they are given land on an equal basis, it would be tantamount to ignoring (and negating) their special efforts as well as their surplus capital, and so they are unwilling. The measures prescribed by the Central Committee have been carried out here accordingly, but the problem must be discussed further, and a report will be made as soon as conclusions are drawn. On the other hand, we request the Central Committee and the two provincial committees to inform us as soon as possible the measures adopted by Soviet Russia to treat its kulaks (rich peasants), and especially what measures had been adopted by the Soviet Government within the White regime during the time of its democratic revolution. As to the question of not confiscating the land of rich-peasants, where the land has been completely confiscated in the occupied border areas, it of course will not arise again. However, as the area is expanded, the policy of nonconfiscation will be applied during initial stages in order to enable the rich-peasants to strike against the big gentry and to help the poor peasants.

(8) Land Tax: In Ning-kang, the tax is 20 percent, which is about 5 percent higher than that prescribed by the Central Committee. Since collection is now under way, it cannot be changed, but could be reduced next year. In Sui-ch'uan, Ling-hsien and Yung-hsin, the terrain is mountainous and the peasants are so poor that it is inadvisable to collect tax from them. The funds for the government and the Red Guards must be obtained from the local despots in the White areas. The rice for the sustenance of the Red Army can be obtained for the time being from the land tax in Ning-kang, while cash has also been obtained from squeezing the local despots. As a result of guerrilla operations in Sui-ch'uan in October, some 10,000 yuan have been collected which may last for some time, and we will try to look to some other means after this money is gone.

(C) The Question of Soviets

(1) Soviets of County, District and Township Levels: Soviets on all levels have been organized in the border area, but more in name than in reality. Among the worker and peasant masses, and even among party members, the meaning of "soviet" is not widely understood. In many places, they do not have the so-called workers, peasants and soldiers representatives conference. The executive committee of the soviet at the district and township levels, and even at the county level, is usually elected at a mass rally. It can neither discuss problems, nor give political training, though it can be easily manipulated by intellectuals and opportunists. This is due to the fact that they do not understand what constitutes a soviet, that the representatives of workers, peasants and soldiers form the highest permanent organ of political power, while the executive committee is merely an administrative organ during the recess of the representatives' conference. This is the biggest mistake of many localities in the border areas regarding the organ of political power. In some places there are representatives conferences, though they also merely regard the conference as an ad hoc elected organ vis-a-vis the executive committee. After the election, the power is controlled by the executive committee, and the conference will not even be mentioned. This does not mean that there are no bona fide soviet organizations, though the number is extremely small. This is due to the woeful lack of propaganda and education on this new political system of soviets. The evil habits of dictatorship and dogmatism during the feudal era have become steeped in the minds of the masses and even party members. They still cannot eradicate these habits. They are prone to follow the easy course, and dislike the complex democratic system. In order that democratic centralism may be applied to mass organizations, its efficacy must be demonstrated in the revolutionary struggle. This will enable the masses to understand that this kind of organizational method is most conducive to mobilizing the strength of the masses, and most beneficial to struggle. Only after they have gained this understanding will it be universally and truly established. We are now enacting detailed organic laws for soviets at all levels (based on the outlines of the Central Committee) in order to correct some of the previous mistakes. The soldiers soviet (soldiers' representatives conference on all levels) in the Red Army is also being established regularly. This would also rectify the mistake of having only soldiers' committees but no regular soldiers' conferences.

(2) The Executive Committee on All Levels: The masses now generally understand the "soviet government of workers, peasants and soldiers" at all levels, to be the "ai government," so dubbed by the masses of Ning-kang ("ai" meaning "us" in the local dialect, and so this means "our government"), or the "su government" dubbed elsewhere, both referring to the committee. This is because they have not understood the powers of the representatives conference, thinking the committee is the only authority. This kind of executive committee does not have the backing of a sound representatives conference and is apt to deviate from the views of the masses when decisions are made. This is often manifested by its wavering and compromise in the

redistribution of land, its recklessness and corruption in economic affairs, its fear of the White Terror, and its lack of resoluteness in the struggle. Very few plenary meetings are held, and there are also very few standing committee meetings on the district and township government level. Matters are decided by the chairman, secretary, treasurer or Red Guards commander (or insurrectionary leader). As a result, the practice of democratic centralism even among government members has not become uniform.

(3) The government committee is dominated by the bourgeoisie. During the early stage, especially in government committees on the township level, small landlords, rich peasants and intellectuals vied with each other in seeking power. They pretended to be enthusiastic, wearing red ribbons, and wormed their way by deceit into the government committee to play dominant roles, while poor peasant members were relegated to secondary roles. It was only after they were unmasked during the course of struggles and the peasants rose up that it became possible to get rid of them. Although this state of affairs has not been universal, it has occurred in many places.

(4) The Relation Between the Party and Organs of Political Power: Although there is no such thing as the party issuing orders to the government organs, this does not mean that the government is independent. The party still enjoys very great prestige among its members and the masses, while the prestige of the government is much less. This is because the party, for the sake of convenience, has often handled matters directly, paying no regard to the government. This kind of mistake has been recurrent in many places. In some government organs there are no party or corps organizations; in other places, they have not been used efficiently. Hereafter, the party must be the master behind the scene; the party's policies and measures, with the exception of propaganda, must be carried out through mass organizations. We must avoid the Kuomintang's mistake of interfering with the government directly.

(5) The Supreme Soviet: The shingle of the "Worker-Peasant-Soldier Soviet of the Hunan-Kiangsi Border Area" was hung out in May. Nonetheless, it has been established hurriedly and is rather imperfect. It is now decided to reorganize the border soviet government and its committee as the supreme organ of political power in the border areas.

(C) The Status of the Party in the Border Areas

(1) History of Struggle Against Opportunism: About the time of the Ma-jih (21 May) incident, all party organizations in the counties in the border areas may be said to have been opportunistic. For this reason, they did not wage a resolute struggle when the counterrevolution set in. When the Red Army (the 1st Regiment of the 1st Division of the 1st Army of the Worker and Peasant Revolutionary Army) arrived in the border counties in October last year, there remained only a few party members in hiding, and the party organizations had been totally destroyed. The period from November to April this year was one of rebuilding the party and the period since May one of great expansion. In the past year, the phenomenon of opportunism within the party has been found everywhere. Some of the party members, lacking the will to fight, laid in ambush (by hiding themselves deep in the mountains when the enemy came); others were more active, but they

became idealistic adventurists as a result of their bourgeois mentality. This situation diminished after an extended period of training and struggle within the party. In the meantime, even in the Red Army, this kind of petty-bourgeois restiveness has also lasted a considerable length of time. When the enemy came, they would put up a fight, or they would take flight. This kind of ambivalence was often found in the same person and on the same issue. This has been gradually rectified only after prolonged inner-party struggle and through lessons learned from actual events (for instance, from losses incurred in reckless battle and defeats suffered during flight).

(2) Localism: The economy of the border area is not only an agrarian economy, it has remained in the age of the hand pestle (the wooden hand pestle is used in the mountains, while in the plains there are many stone mills). The social organizational unit is the clan, consisting of people with the same name. The party organization in the villages consists usually of one clan of the same surname living close together, forming one branch. So the branch meeting is tantamount to a family meeting. Under this circumstance, it is of course very difficult to have a "fighting Bolshevik Party." To say that the Communist Party does not have any national or provincial demarcations is, of course, also incomprehensible to them. They do not even understand that there are no county, district or township differences. There is localism to a serious extent among the various counties, and is strong even in the different districts and townships in the same county. Reasoning is only partially successful in overcoming localism and it takes White oppression--which is not localized--to gradually convince the people to abandon their localism for common interests and struggle (for instance, such as joint suppression by two provincial forces). Localism is declining considerably as a result of a series of objective lessons.

(3) The Question of Native Inhabitants and Outsiders: There is another unique thing in the border area, namely, the rift between the native residents and the outsiders who have settled down there. There is a great rift between the native population and the immigrants from Kwangtung and Fukien who arrived several centuries ago. Historically, there has been a deep enmity between them which has become almost a "national" struggle. These outsiders comprise a few million people, from the Kwangtung border, to the borders of Hunan and Kiangsi, and even to southern Hupeh. The outsiders, who live in the mountains, have been traditionally oppressed by the native residents on the plains and have never had any political power. The outsiders have welcomed the national revolution in the last 2 years, thinking it was the prelude of better fortune for them. But the revolution became a counter-revolution, and the outsiders have been repressed by the native population as before. Within the border area, such as Ning-kang, Sui-ch'uan, Ling-hsien and Ch-a-ling, the problem of natives and outsiders is very serious, especially in Ning-kang. Last year and the year before, the indigenous revolutionaries and the outside settlers of Ning-kang joined forces under the leadership of the Communist Party to overthrow the rule of the native gentry, thereby seizing political control throughout the county. In June of last year, Chu P'ei-teh's government launched a counterrevolution,

and in September the local gentry led Chu's troops in an attack on Ning-kang which continues to the present. In theory, this kind of rift should not extend to the exploited workers and peasants, much less to the party, but in point of fact, because this has been a historical relic, there is still a big gap between the native inhabitants and the outside settlers. For instance, following the border defeat in August, the native gentry led troops back to Ning-kang, announcing that the outside settlers would massacre the indigenous residents. As a result, the native peasants began to change their allegiance by wearing white ribbons and acting as guides to the troops to search the mountains and burn down houses. When the Red Army routed the White troops in October and November, the native peasants fled with the latter, while the outsider peasants confiscated their cattle and belongings. When this situation is reflected in the party, it often leads to meaningless controversy. To deal with this situation, we must tell the masses that "peasants who have defected will not be killed" and that "they will be given land when they return," thereby inducing them to desert the local gentry and to return home without fear (many of them have already returned). In the meantime, the county soviet ordered the settler-peasants to return the confiscated cattle and belongings to their original owners, and posted notices that the native peasants will be protected. Efforts have also been made within the party to eliminate the causes of friction as well as to intensify education so that there will be greater unity.

(4) Defection of Opportunists: During the revolutionary upsurge in June, many opportunists wormed their way into the party, with the result that the number of party members in the border area grew to more than 10,000. Responsible persons in the party branches and in the district committees consisted largely of new members, so good inner-party education was impossible. As soon as the White terror arrived, the opportunists defected. They frequently helped the reactionaries to arrest our comrades. Thus, most of the party organizations in the White area have collapsed.

(5) Party Purge and Establishment of Secret Organizations: After September, a stringent purge has been enforced in the party, imposing strict limitations on the composition of membership. In Yung-hsin and Ning-kang, all party organizations were dissolved and a new registration was implemented. Registration in Yung-hsin has already been completed, while registration in Ning-kang will be completed soon. Though the number of party members has been diminished greatly, combat strength has been bolstered. Whereas the party organization was open to the public before, thus losing any secrecy, since September, all organizational work has been undertaken secretly. In the meantime, the party has been able to extend its influence into the White area, so that it can play an effective role there. However, there is as yet no foundation in the towns. This is due, first, to the fact that the enemy is stronger in the towns, and second, we have done too much damage to bourgeois interests in the towns, where business is slack and the handicraft industry disrupted. As a result, we have no foothold in the towns. We are now rectifying our former errors and are trying to set up our organizations in the towns, though the results are still small.

(6) The Guidance Organs on All Levels: The branch executive has been renamed the branch committee; above the branch is the district committee, and above the district is the county committee. Because of certain unique conditions, a special district committee is formed between the district committee and county committee, such as the Pei-hsiang special district committee and the southeastern special district committee in Yung-hsin. There are five border area county committees, namely: Ning-kang, Yung-hsin, Lien-hua, Sui-ch'uan and Ling-hsien. There used to be a county committee in Ch'a-ling, but because it was difficult for our work to expand there, a number of the organs set up last winter and this spring have been destroyed by the White forces. During the past half year, party work has been done only in the mountainous regions near Ning-kang and Yung-hsin, and so the county organization has been changed to a special district committee. To carry out our work in Yu-hsien and An-yuan, it is necessary to pass through Ch'a-ling. We tried to send some people there, but it was abortive. In January the Wan-an county committee held a joint meeting with the Front Committee in Sui-ch'uan but since then, it has been cut off by White forces for more than 6 months. We did not resume contact with Wan-an until September, when the Red Army conducted guerrilla operations there. According to a letter from the Wan-an county committee, there used to be nine district committees in Wan-an, but their 120 rifles have all been lost. We still have our organization in the Police guards there, and our comrades have some rifles. One battalion of the guerrilla units of the Red Army has reached the vicinity of Wan-an city, but our men there failed to come out to contact us. Nonetheless, some 80 revolutionary peasants followed us to the Ching-kang Mountains, and were organized as the Wan-an Red Guards, with 10 rifles. An-fu has no party organization. The Chi-an county committee has only contacted us twice, though it is a neighboring county of Yung-hsin. They have not given us any help at all, which is rather strange. In the Sha-t'ien district in Kuei-tung, land was redistributed in March and again in August. There, a party organization was set up under the jurisdiction of the Southern Hunan special committee with its center at Shih-erh-tung in Lung-ch'i. Above the various county committees is the Hunan-Kiangsi border area special committee. On 20 May the first border area congress was held at Mao-p'ing in Ning-kang. It elected 23 members of the first committee, with Mao Tse-tung as secretary. In July, the Hunan provincial committee sent Yang K'ai-ming over as acting secretary. Yang became ill in September, and was replaced by T'an Chen-lin. When the main force of the Red Army went to southern Hunan in August and the border area came under heavy pressure from the White forces, an emergency conference was held in Yung-hsin. When the Red Army returned to Ning-kang in October, the second congress was convened at Mao-p'ing. Beginning on 4 October, the congress met for 3 days. It adopted resolutions on political problems, the tasks of the party in the border area, and propaganda, organization and agrarian problems. It elected 19 members of the second special committee (namely: T'an Chen-lin, Chu Teh, Ch'en I, Lung Ch'ao-ch'ing, Chu Ch'ang-k'ai, Liu T'ien-ch'ien, Yen P'an-chu, T'an Szu-ts'ung, T'an Ping, Li Chueh-fei, Sung I-yueh, Yuan Wen-ts'ai, Wang Tso-nung, Ch'en Cheng-jen, Mao Tse-tung, Wan Hsieh-hsien, Wang Tso, Yang K'ai-ming and Ho T'ing-ying). Five of them were elected to the standing committee, with T'an Chen-lin (a worker) as secretary, and Ch'en Cheng-jen (an intellectual) as deputy

secretary. On 14 November, the 6th plenary conference of the Red Army was held, electing an army committee of 23 members, with a standing committee of five members, with Chu Teh as secretary. The special committee and the army committee are under the jurisdiction of the Front Committee. On 6 November the Front Committee was organized which, pursuant to the directive of the Central Committee, comprised of five members, namely: Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, the secretary of the local party committee (T'an Chen-lin), a worker comrade (Sung Ch'iao-sheng) and a peasant comrade (Mao K'o-wen), with Mao Tse-tung as secretary. For the time being, the Front Committee has set up a secretariat, a propaganda section, an organization section, a trade union movement committee and a military affairs committee (which has been elected by the above-mentioned Red Army conference). The Front Committee is placed in charge of the local party organizations in the various counties. Because the Front Committee sometimes must move with the army, it is still necessary to keep the Special Committee.

The problem of proletarian ideological leadership in the party is extremely important. The party organizations in the various border area counties, which can be said to be a party of peasants, will go astray unless they accept the leadership of the urban proletariat. Besides rectifying the previous errors and paying close attention to the trade union movement in the various counties and towns, it is also necessary to increase workers' representation in the soviets. It is extremely important for the workers, poor peasants and soldiers of the party to participate in the local party organizations and in the guidance organs of the party in the army. We have concentrated on this point for the past year, with the result that the number of workers and peasants has been increased in local party organs at all levels. Although in the Red Army, participation of soldiers in organs on all levels has been satisfactory such participation must be further increased, and attention must be paid to the quality of the participants so that they will be able to undertake "practical leadership," gradually eliminating bourgeois ideology completely.

(D) The Question of Revolutionary Character

(1) We completely subscribe to the Communist International's resolution on China: China is still at the stage of bourgeois-democratic revolution. The thorough completion of democratic revolution in China includes, externally, the overthrow of the imperialist special privileges in order to achieve national liberation and unification, and, internally, the elimination of the influences of compradores in the cities, the eradication of feudal relations in the countryside, completion of the agrarian revolution, and the toppling of the warlord system which has served as another kind of political organization for the big gentry. It is only by such a democratic revolution that it will be possible to lay a true foundation of a workers' regime and then advance to socialist revolution. Based on our experiences of fighting in various places during the past year, we are keenly aware that the revolutionary tide has steadily declined. Although Red political power has been established in a few small areas, there are as yet no democratic rights in

the nation as a whole. The workers, peasants and even the bourgeois democrats have no right of speech or assembly, and the worst crime is to join the Communist Party. The Red Army has met with apathy everywhere it has gone; it is only after propaganda work has been done that the masses come out slowly. The Red Army has to fight hard battles, there being few or no instances of enemy defection or mutiny. This is also true with the 6th Army, which recruited the most "hooligans" following the Ma-jih (21 May) incident. This is merely fighting for the sake of fighting, and this method will not be conducive to victory. This is so because there a nationwide revolutionary upsurge is completely lacking. Under the ruthless feudal rule of the big gentry, the broad strength of the oppressed classes has not yet been mobilized, and consequently we have had to fight desultorily. We are keenly aware of our isolation and hope that it will end soon. In order for the revolution to reach its upsurge throughout the country, it will be necessary to launch and consummate political and economic democratic revolution which includes the bourgeoisie. Thus, the resolution of the Comintern is most correct.

(2) Policy Toward Petty Bourgeoisie: Up to February this year the work in the border area was done fairly well. In March, Chou Lu, a representative of the Southern Hunan special committee, arrived at the border. He said that we did not do enough killing and burning, and had failed to carry out the policy of "converting the petty bourgeoisie into the proletariat, and then forcing them into the revolution," as a result of which the policy has been changed. After the entire Red Army reached the border area in April, although there was still not much killing and burning, rigorous measures were carried out to confiscate the property of urban middle merchants and to squeeze the rural small landlords. The slogan of the Southern Hunan special committee of "All factories to the workers," has also been proselytized vigorously. This policy of striking excessively at the petty bourgeoisie has resulted in driving the majority of them to the side of the big gentry. They put on white ribbons to oppose us. Recently, this policy has been changed gradually, and conditions have improved somewhat. Salutory effects have been achieved in Sui-ch'uan particularly where the small merchants in the county and townships no longer tried to avoid us, and some even said good things about the Red Army. Some 20,000 people are drawn to the market fairs in K'o-lin and Shang-feng (the fair is held every 3 days at noon) which is unprecedented. This proves that our policy has changed. Previously, taxes were levied on all kinds of agricultural produce in transit, and heavy taxes were imposed by the pacification corps in Sui-ch'uan. From Huang-ao to Ts'ao-lin, a distance of only 70 li, there were five toll stations. We abolished such exploitation by the feudal gentry and our action has been endorsed by the peasants and small merchants.

(3) Since the Central Committee has asked us to promulgate a policy platform that includes the interests of the petty bourgeoisie, we suggest that the Central Committee enact a democratic revolutionary program which encompasses the interests of the workers, agrarian revolution and national liberation, as well as a list of slogans for guidance in the border area.

(4) A unique characteristic of the Chinese revolution is that it is based on agriculture as its principal economy and uses armed forces to promote insurrections. We suggest that the Central Committee exert great effort to develop the military movement. This movement should be launched primarily in the enemy forces, with the development of the Red Army being secondary.

(E) The Question of the Area of the Independent Regime

The area from the Kwangtung border to the Hunan-Kiangsi border, and even to southern Hupeh all belongs to the Lo-hsiao mountain range geographically. After traversing the entire Lo-hsiao mountain range, we have found out that, comparatively speaking, the mid-section of the range which centers on Ning-kang is most suitable for our occupation. The terrain in the northern section is not as good as the middle section, which can be used for both offensive and defensive purposes. Moreover, it is too close to some of the big political centers. Unless plans are under way for the rapid seizure of Changsha or Wuhan, it would be rather dangerous to station large forces in such places as Liu-yang, Li-ling, P'ing-hsiang and Tung-ku. Although the terrain in the southern section is better than that of the northern, its mass foundation is not as good as the middle section, and its political impact on Kiangsi and Hunan is smaller. On the other hand, any action in the middle section can have a tremendous impact on the lower river valleys of Hunan and Kiangsi.

A stocktaking of the advantages of the middle section reveals: (a) there is a mass foundation that has been built up for more than a year; (b) the foundation of the party is strong; (c) local armed forces with rich fighting experiences which has reached its present scope after more than a year of building up; this force, supplemented by the 4th Red Army, cannot be annihilated by any enemy; (d) an ideal military bastion in the Ching-kang Mountains, and each county with its own armed bastions elsewhere; (e) it can influence Hunan and Kiangsi, and the lower river valleys of these two provinces which, compared to southern Hunan and southern Kiangsi which can influence only one province or the upper river valley and the remote areas at that, is very different in political significance. The setback of the middle section is that because it has been occupied for a long time, it is confronted with enormous enemy forces of suppression, and its economic problems, especially the problem of cash, are very serious.

The policy of the southern Hunan special committee toward us here was changed three times during a few weeks in June and July. First, a message was delivered by Yuan Teh-sheng which endorsed a plan to set up a government in the middle section. Then, Tu Hsiu-ching and Yang K'ai-ming came with the message that the Red Army should without any hesitation move toward southern Hunan, leaving only 200 rifles behind to protect the border area in conjunction with the Red Guards corps. The letter also said that this policy is "absolutely" correct. After only 10 days, Yuan Teh-sheng returned with the message that the Red Army march for eastern Hunan which was also described as an "absolutely correct" policy. The letter, besides scolding us at some

length, also wanted us to go "without any hesitation." This rigid directive has placed us in a great predicament, because if we should disobey it, it would be disobedience on our part, and if we should observe it, it would mean certain defeat. When the second message came, a joint meeting of the special committee, army committee and the county committee of Yung-hsin was held. The consensus was that it would be dangerous to go to southern Hunan, and we decided not to obey the views of the provincial committee. A few days later, Tu Hsiu-ching and Yang K'ai-ming insisted that the view of the provincial committee should be carried out. The 29th Regiment which was composed mostly of recruits from southern Hunan, used the directive of the provincial committee as its excuse to pull the Red Army along to mount an attack on Ch'en-chou. This resulted in a disastrous defeat to the Red Army and the border area. About one-half of the Red Army was lost, while countless houses were destroyed and many people were slaughtered in the border area. Other counties fell into enemy hands successively, and they have not been recovered even now. In regard to eastern Hunan, before there is disruption in the political power of the big gentry in the three provinces of Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi, it is also inadvisable to send the main force of the Red Army there. Had it not been for the march toward southern Hunan in July, it would have been possible to avert the border defeat in August, and, taking advantage of the fighting in Chang-shu between Ch'eng Ch'ien's [4453 3383] 6th Army and Wang Chun's [3769 6874] forces, to smash the enemy at Yung-hsin, thus engulfing Chi-an and An-fu and enabling the vanguards to reach P'ing-hsiang to link up with the 5th Army in the northern section. Even so, our general headquarters should still have been in Ning-kang, and only guerrilla units should have been sent to eastern Hunan. Since fighting among the big gentry had not yet erupted, and there were large enemy forces in P'ing-hsiang, Ch'a-ling and Yu-hsien on the Hunan border, when our main force turned northward, it would have been overwhelmed by the enemy. The Central Committee has deemed that it would be perilous to march either toward eastern Hunan or southern Hunan. Although we have as yet had no experience in eastern Hunan, our experience in southern Hunan has borne out that once a wrong move is made, the entire game is lost. Contact was lost between the border area, southern Hunan and the 5th Army stationed in P'ing-chiang and Liu-yang, whole losses were also suffered at An-yuan. This painful experience should be borne in mind at all times.

At present, the big gentry has not yet been broken up. There are now 10 or more enemy regiments surrounding the border area. If we can continue to find some cash resources (the problem of food and clothing is not too serious), then, with what foundations we have already built up in the border area, it will be possible for us to cope with the existing enemy forces or even more. For the sake of the border area, if the Red Army should depart, then the kind of trampling that happened in August may recur immediately. Although they might not be able to completely annihilate our Red Guards units, the foundation of the party and the masses will be seriously damaged. Although it might be possible to preserve some mountain strongholds in the manner of bandits, in the plains we would have to go underground as in August and September. But if the Red Army should determine

to stay, it will be possible, with its existing foundations, to gradually expand to the surrounding areas, and the future will be bright. For the sake of the Red Army, in order to bring about this expansion, a protracted struggle must be waged in the environs of the Ching-kang Mountains (namely: the four counties of Ning-kang, Yung-hsin, Ling-hsien and Sui-ch'uan) where we have a mass base. In this situation, we can take advantage of the conflict of interest between the enemies in Hunan and Kiangsi which render it impossible for them to concentrate their forces against us. We must also adopt some profitable strategy so that when we go out to fight we must be able to win, and with victory there will be captives which can be used to enlarge the Red Army gradually. Thus, with the preparations made by the masses from April to July, if the Red Army had not gone to southern Hunan, it would have greatly expanded itself in August. Although the mistake had been made, now that the Red Army has returned to the border area where the terrain is favorable and the people are friendly, the prospects are still good. It is, therefore, necessary for the Red Army to be resolved to struggle and to have the stamina and patience in fighting before it can augment its arms and train good soldiers. There is no other easy way than this.

The red flag has been hoisted in the border area for more than 1 year. Although this has aroused the hatred of the big gentry in the three provinces of Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi, and even throughout the nation, nonetheless, this has also aroused the hopes of the workers, peasants and soldiers in the neighboring provinces. Consequently, "bandit suppression" in the border area has been regarded by the warlords as an important event. As has been said by Lu T'i-p'ing [7627 3321 1627], "one year of bandit suppression has cost a million dollars," and by Wang Chun, "though they claim to be 20,000 soldiers, they have only 5,000 rifles." Such laudatory propaganda like this has gradually attracted the attention of enemy soldiers and the enemy's lower-echelon officers, and more and more will defect to our ranks. This provides another source for the expansion of the Red Army. Moreover, the fact that the red flag has flown over the border area consistently shows not only the strength of the Communist Party, but also proves the bankruptcy of the ruling class, and it is fraught with political significance nationally. Thus, we deem that unless we have reached a dead end economically so that we will not be able to maintain ourselves unless we go to southern Kiangsi, we must not take such a course. Maybe we will go to southern Kiangsi when it comes to the end of the ropes, but this will be for economic reasons, not political reasons. Politically, we have always deemed that the policy of establishing and expanding political power in the middle section of Lo-hsiao mountain range both most necessary and entirely correct.

(F) Communications and Others

(1) Establishing of communication organs is extremely important. We have handed over to comrades Yuan and Hsiao 200 yuan (4 ounces of gold) and asked them to assume full responsibility in setting up the organ. We will continue to be responsible for the funds. The location should be at P'ing-hsiang. A communications organ should also be set up at Chi-an, which will be handled by the Kiangsi provincial committee.

- (2) When this letter was about finished, we received a letter from the Central Committee. The letter from Hunan contains circular No 47 (on the problem of secret organization), though we are still without the resolution on military work. Besides, there is the letter from Comrade Yung-hsien dated 15 August which said the letter and the circular from the Central Committee had not been received, and the three poems also cannot be found.
- (3) We have been able to get newspapers and so we are much happier than before when we did not see a newspaper for 2 or 3 months. We still hope that you will keep us posted on political conditions and analyses.
- (4) In regard to Tu Hsiu-ching's error, the representatives' conference of the southern expeditionary forces which reached Sha-t'ien in Kuei-tung in August has decided to request the provincial committee to punish him because Tu represented that committee.
- (5) The Front Committee has completely endorsed Mao Tse-tung's letter to the provincial committee as well as his long letter to the Central Committee which will be forwarded thereto by Comrade Yuan.
- (6) Comrade Yuan Teh-sheng has just returned to the provincial committee because he has had to wait for the discussion of and reply to the letter of the Central Committee.
- (7) Hereafter, when you give any direction to us, please refer to our reports instead of basing unilaterally on the reports of inspectors. The report made by Inspector Tu Hsiu-ching to the provincial committee in June contains views that are entirely wrong (such as, if the Red Guards have 200 more rifles, they will be able to defend the border area, and the Red Army was conservative, etc.). The provincial committee has made decisions on the basis of such reports, thus causing our defeat. Moreover, when you give any directions on military movements in the future, they must not be too rigid. The Central Committee's letter asked us to make our own choice in accordance with the environment, which is more flexible and so very proper. During last winter and this spring, the Hunan provincial committee and the southern Hunan special committee listened to the rumors of Su Hsien-chun, a regimental commander who was dismissed from the party and later made secret charges which resulted in Kuo Liang's arrest, and Ho Chieh, a chief of staff who later was responsible for arson and murders in Chen-chou. This is even more dangerous, and please don't listen to irresponsible rumors and allegations.
- (8) Yang K'ai-ming is seriously ill, and Wan Hsi-hsien has important assignment here, and so they cannot go to eastern Hunan.
- (9) The status of the Youth League will be reported to the provincial committee by the league's special committee.

(10) This letter is written in three copies; one being forwarded to the Central Committee care of the Hunan provincial committee; one being forwarded to the Kiangsi provincial committee through the Hunan provincial committee; and one being forwarded by the Chi-an county committee to the Kiangsi provincial committee, and then to the Central Committee. One of these is bound to be delivered duly.

Mao Tse-tung, secretary of the Front Committee

2077

CSO: 4005

NOTICE OF THE FOURTH ARMY HEADQUARTERS OF THE RED ARMY

January 1929

[Text] The principle of the Red Army is to prosecute the revolution for the people's rights. The fame and prestige of the army in western Kiangsi spreads far. The plan this time is to advance in separate groups. The officers and soldiers must obey orders. Fair buying and fair selling, let the facts be the proof. Indiscriminate burning and killing are strictly prohibited. Oppression is excessive in all areas in the nation. The workers and peasants are extremely miserable. Local tyrants and evil gentry lord it over the towns and villages. Everyone is angry over the high interests and rents. The soldiers of the White army suffer hunger and cold. The petty bourgeois are overburdened by taxes and levies. Foreign commodities crowd out domestic merchandise. There is no one who does not hate imperialism. The Kuomintang, a bandit party, is completely reactionary. What they say is not what they think, and they cannot be very tough. Sleeping in the same bed, Chiang [5592], Kuei [2710], Feng [7458] and Yen [7051] dream different dreams. The conflicts have arisen and the warlords are encountering bad luck. Like rice which satisfies hunger and medicine which cures illness, the principles of the communist party are extremely just. The peasants will take over and cultivate the land of the landowners. No debt will be repaid nor rent delivered. The wages will be increased and the bosses will be responsible. Work will be limited to 8 hours. The treatment of the soldiers will be improved. They will have a share in land division. We will accept enemy officers and soldiers, and ask no questions of their prior behavior. The progressive method of taxation is the most suitable, and all harsh taxes and levies will be swept clean. The urban merchants save their dimes and nickels. As long as they follow our principles, we will not inquire into their past activities. We must be strict toward the foreigners. Industrial plants and banks will be confiscated. We will not recognize foreign capital and foreign debts. We will not allow foreign soldiers and foreign ships on our soil. Knocking down the foreign powers, everyone is happy. Ousting the warlords, we must be thorough in eliminating all evil. The whole country will rejoice when China is united. The Manchurians, Mongolians, Mohammedans, and Tibetans will have their own laws. The rascals of the National Government must be eradicated and their chaotic politics cleansed. The workers and peasants of the entire nation must arouse themselves, and the day of seizing political power is

drawing near. The success of the revolution depends on the masses. This notice is published everywhere so that everyone will rise and give attention.

Army Commander Chu Teh
Party Delegate Mao Tse-tung

January 1929, Western calendar

° "Notice of the Fourth Army Headquarters of the Red Army," Exhibition
Hall of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's Memorabilia

6080

CSO: 4005

HSING-KUO COUNTY LAND LAW

April 1929

[Text] 1. All public land and land belonging to the landlord class are confiscated and made into the property of the Hsing-kuo Worker-Peasant-Soldier Delegates' Conference Government, to be allocated to peasants who own little or no land, for their cultivation and use.

2. After confiscation of all public land and land belonging to the land-owner class and allocation by the Worker-Peasant-Soldier Government, no land may be bought or sold.

3. The criteria for land allocation are:

a. Use the population as the criterion and equally divide the land among the male and female, old and young. b. Use the labor force as the criterion and allocate twice as much to those who can labor than those who cannot. Of the above two criteria, the first should be followed, and the second is only for areas under special conditions. The reasons for adopting the first criterion are:

a. Before the facilities for caring for the old and the young are completed, if the land allocation to them is too little, they will not be able to maintain a living.

b. It is simpler and more convenient to use the population as the criterion to divide the land.

c. Very few households are without old and young members. Meanwhile, though the old and the young do not have the ability to farm, the government may, after land allocation, assign them certain public service tasks, such as communication work.

4. The criteria for this area of land allocation are:

a. Use the township as the unit in land allocation. b. Combine several townships as the unit in land allocation (such as the Hsiao-chiang area in

Yung-hsin. c. Use the district as the unit in land allocation. Of the above three criteria, the first should be followed, and the second and third may be used under special conditions.

5. The methods of dividing hills and woods are:

a. The division of tea hills and firewood hills follows the method of land division--equal division with the township as the unit.

b. Bamboo hills belong to the soviet, but the peasants may have the use of the bamboo with its permission. For less than 50 stalks, permission of the township soviet is required; for less than 100 stalks, that of the district soviet is required; and for over 100 stalks, that of the country soviet is required.

c. All bamboo is marketed by the county soviet, and the proceeds are handled by the superior soviet.

6. The levy of land taxes is as follows:

a. Land taxes are divided into three categories according to the production situation: (1) 15 percent; (2) 10 percent; (3) 5 percent. Of the three categories above, the first one should be followed. The second and third may be applied under special conditions with the approval of the supreme soviet.

b. In case of natural disaster or other special conditions, application for land tax exemption may be submitted to the superior soviet for its approval.

c. Land taxes are collected by the county soviet and transmitted to the superior soviet.

7. Rural handicraft workers may, if they so desire, receive a half share of the allocation to the peasants.

8. The officers and soldiers of the Red Army and Red Guards, and the personnel of the government and other public organs will receive land allocations in the same amount as the peasants, and the soviet will hire people to cultivate the land for them.

Note: This version of the land law was promulgated when the Red Army arrived at Hsing-kuo in southern Kiangsi from the Ching-kang Mountains in the 4th month after the formulation of the previous land law. One important revision in the contents was to change "the confiscation of all land" to "the confiscation of public land and land belonging to the landlord class." It was a fundamental change. There was no other change. Changes were not made until 1930. Both land laws are kept to show the development of our understanding of the land struggle.

o "Rural Survey," Liberation Press, July 1949

RESOLUTION OF THE NINTH CCP CONGRESS OF THE RED FOURTH ARMY

West Fukien Ku-t'ien Conference, December 1929

[Text] I. Rectification of Incorrect Tendencies Toward Non-Proletarian Ideas in the Party

The many kinds of non-proletarian ideas in the party in the Fourth Army exert an extremely powerful influence and constitute a great obstacle to the implementation of the party's correct line. If not thoroughly rectified, the Fourth Army will definitely not be able to shoulder the tasks assigned it by China's extensive revolutionary struggle. The source of such incorrect ideas naturally lies in the fact that the foundation of the party organization is largely built on peasants and other petty bourgeois elements; yet the failure of the party's leading organs to wage a concerted and determined struggle against such incorrect ideas and to educate the party members along the correct line is also an important cause for their existence and growth. This Congress, in accordance with the spirit of the September letter of the "Central Committee", now points out the sources and manifestations of the incorrect tendencies of the many non-proletarian ideas in the party in the Fourth Army and the methods of rectification and calls on the comrades to eliminate them thoroughly.

A. The Purely Military Viewpoint

1. The origin of the purely military viewpoint:

a. A low political level. Those with this viewpoint fail to understand political leadership and the fundamental difference between the missions of the Red Army and the White army.

b. The mercenary concept. This is especially so in the numerous prisoners of war captured in the various campaigns who joined the Red Army and brought with them a strong mercenary concept, thus laying a foundation for the purely military viewpoint in the lower level.

c. From the two above factors arises the third, over-confidence in military strength and lack of confidence in the strength of the masses.

d. The party's lack of active attention and discussion of military work is also a factor for the purely military viewpoint of some of the comrades.

2. The purely military viewpoint is unusually widespread among a number of comrades in the Red Army. Its manifestations:

a. They regard military affairs and political work as opposed to each other, and fail to recognize military work as only one of the tools to accomplish the political tasks. Some even declare: "When military work is well done, political work is naturally done well; when military work is not well done, political work cannot be well done either." This is to go one step farther and regard military work as leading political work.

b. They regard the task of the Red Army as similar to that of the White army--merely fighting. They fail to recognize the fact that the Red Army is an armed force for carrying out the political tasks of the class. In its work, especially in China today, the Red Army definitely does not exist merely for the sake of fighting. Besides fighting, it must also shoulder such important tasks as agitating, organizing, arming and helping the masses, and building political power. The Red Army does not fight merely for the purpose of fighting. It fights in order to agitate, organize, arm and help the masses and build political power. Apart from such objectives, fighting loses its meaning and the Red Army the reason for its existence.

c. Therefore, organizationally, they subordinate the political work organ to the military work organ and propose the slogan that "the army headquarters deals with the public." If this idea continues to develop, it may lead to estrangement from the masses, to usurpation of political power by the army, and to a departure from the class position--similar to the path followed by the Kuomintang army.

d. Meanwhile, they overlook the importance of the propaganda team in propaganda work and ignore the soldiers' council and the worker-peasant masses in mass organization work. As a result, both propaganda and organization work are abandoned.

e. They are conceited when a battle is won and dejected when one is lost.

f. They subscribe to departmentalism of the Fourth Army, approaching everything in the interest of the Fourth Army without understanding that to arm the local masses is one of the Red Army's important tasks. This is an enlarged form of cliquism.

g. Limited by the immediate environment in the Fourth Army, a small number of comrades think that no other revolutionary force exists, resulting in the extremely deep-rooted idea of conserving its strength by avoiding action. This is a remnant of opportunism.

h. Disregarding the subjective and objective conditions, they suffer from revolutionary impetuosity, are unwilling to perform detailed and careful mass work, and only want to do big things, filling their mind with illusions. This is a remnant of adventurism.

3. The methods of rectification:

a. The political level of the party must be raised by means of education, and the theoretical source of the military viewpoint eradicated. The remnants of opportunism and adventurism must be eliminated, and the departmentalism of the Fourth Army broken down.

b. The political training of the officers and soldiers must be intensified, especially the education of the captive elements during the period of their induction. Meanwhile, local political power organs must select, as many as possible, worker and peasant elements with struggle experiences to join the Red Army, in order to weaken and eliminate the source of the simple military viewpoint organizationally.

c. Local party units must be activated to criticize the party in the Red Army and mass political power organizations (soviets) encouraged to criticize the Red Army, in order to influence the party and the officers and soldiers of the Red Army.

d. The party must actively pay attention to military work and hold discussions on it. All tasks, after discussion and decision by the party, must be implemented through the mass line.

e. Rules and regulations must be formulated, clearly defining the tasks of the Red Army, the relations between the military work and political work organs, the relations between the Red Army and the masses, and the powers and functions of the soldiers' council and its relationship with the military and political organs.

B. Ultra-Democratization

1. After the party in the Red Army accepted the directives of the Party Central, ultra-democratization has definitely diminished considerably. That party resolutions are better implemented, and that such slogans as "democratic centralism from the bottom to the top" and "discussion at the lower level first before decision by the higher level," for instance, are no longer heard are facts. Nevertheless, such diminution is only superficial, and ultra-democratization definitely has not been fundamentally eliminated from the mind of the party members in general. In other words, the poison roots of ultra-democratization still lie deep in the minds of many comrades. The reluctance in carrying out resolutions is one of the instances.

2. Methods of rectification:

a. The roots of ultra-democratization must be eradicated. First of all, it should be pointed out that its danger lies in the tendency to damage and even completely destroy the party organization, to undermine and even completely wipe out the party's fighting power, and to incapacitate the party from shouldering its fighting tasks, thereby causing the failure of the revolution and prolonging the counterrevolutionary life of the ruling class. Next, it should be pointed out that the source of ultra-democratization lies in the nature of the petty bourgeoisie (small farm production and urban small capital)--its individualistic aversion to discipline. Such nature, having found its way into the party, manifests itself politically and organizationally as the idea of ultra-democratization. Such idea is basically incompatible with the fighting tasks of the proletariat. Objectively, it is actually one of the counterrevolutionary ideas. If not vigorously rectified, and if permitted to develop, those with such idea will inevitably follow the counterrevolutionary path.

b. Organizationally, the democratic way of life under centralized guidance must be strictly enforced. The line for this is:

(1) The party's leading organ must provide a correct line of guidance and find solutions when problems arise, in order to establish itself as a leading center.

(2) The higher level organ must understand the conditions of the lower level organs and the life of the masses, in order to secure the social source of correct guidance.

(3) The party organizations of all levels must not make decisions without due deliberation. Once a decision is reached, it must be firmly implemented.

(4) All decisions of any importance made by the party's higher level organs must be promptly transmitted to the lower level organs and the membership masses. The method for doing so is to call activists meetings, party branch meetings, or even party membership mass meetings in the columns (when circumstances permit) and to assign men to make reports at such meetings.

(5) The lower level organs of the party and the membership masses must discuss in detail the directives from the higher level in order to understand their significance thoroughly and decide on the methods of implementation.

C. The Non-Organizational Viewpoint

The non-organizational viewpoint in the party in the Fourth Army is manifested in many aspects. The most apparent are the following three categories:

1. The minority refusing to obey the majority:

If a proposal is rejected, the individual concerned becomes extremely dissatisfied and is insincere in implementing the party's resolution. This is one of the instances.

The methods of rectification:

a. At a meeting, all the people should be made to voice their opinions fully. They must understand that the right and wrong sides over a controversial issue must be clearly established without compromise or equivocation. Anything that cannot be settled at one meeting can be discussed at another (provided no work is affected) in order to reach a clear-cut conclusion.

b. Party discipline requires, among other things, that the minority obey the majority. The minority, after their proposal has been rejected at a meeting and before the holding of the next meeting, must support the decision of the majority. Besides bringing it up again at the next meeting, they must not show any opposition in their action.

2. Non-organizational criticisms:

a. Inner-party criticism is a weapon to re-enforce the party organization and increase the party's fighting power. Yet many in the Red Army do not understand this significance and erroneously use inner-party criticism for personal attacks. As a result, it damages not only the individuals but the party organization. This is a manifestation of petty bourgeois individualism. The method of rectification is to make the party members understand that the significance of criticism is to re-enforce the party's fighting power in order to attain victory of the class struggle and that it must never be used as a tool for personal attacks.

b. Many party members make their criticisms not inside the party but outside it. This is because of the failure to implant the political significance of the party organization into the concept of the party members in general; therefore, they do not understand the importance of the party organization (meetings, etc.), finding no difference between criticizing inside or outside the organization. This may also result in leading the party to destruction. The method of rectification is to implant the political significance of the party organization into the concept of the party members in general. Only thus will all the irresponsible non-organizational criticisms giving the masses an unfavorable influence be wiped out.

3. Elitism of some party members:

On ground of being busy, some party members are actually unwilling to associate with the masses and fear their criticisms; therefore, they do not attend the party branch mass meetings and cell meetings. When they do attend, they do not make work reports. In everything, they differentiate themselves from

the general party members. As a result, they are severed from the masses, from the party. On this point, the responsible persons of the party branch have not only failed to rectify the situation, but seemed to fear such elite party members.

The creation of this situation is due to the following reasons:

First, the Red Army has always made a serious error: The party organ seldom pays attention to the discussion of military affairs; therefore, it has not urged the responsible comrades of the military affairs organ to make reports on military plans (such as training, management and combat plans) at party conferences. As a result, party discussions are separated from military affairs, and the responsible military affairs comrades forget that they must accept party guidance and make reports to the party. In consequence, the military affairs work of the Red Army becomes a special part not understood by the party organ and the general party members. Thus, it not only greatly hampers the task of the militarization of the party members, but also severs the party from military affairs, endangering the party's leadership of the army. Next, due to the serious error of the party in its tasks discussed above, some of the responsible military affairs comrades have become an elite group in the party. Meanwhile, the responsible comrades in charge of other work have also become elite individuals who are unwilling to attend meetings or to express themselves at meetings. This is one reason for the party branch of the Red Army to become so abnormal and unsound.

The methods of rectification are: First, the meetings of all levels of the party (from the party branch to the Front Committee) must include the plans and reports of military affairs work in their daily agenda for discussion and decision. Next, regardless of their functions, party members must attend party branch mass meetings and cell meetings and make work reports. They must not be absent without cause.

D. Absolute Equalitarianism

1. At one time, absolute equalitarianism in the Red Army developed to a very serious extent. After many struggles, it has certainly diminished considerably, but some dregs still remain, such as objecting to different allowances to the wounded soldiers according to the extent of the injury but insisting on equal amounts, denying the necessity for officers to ride horses in performing their duties but regarding riding as an inequality, demanding absolutely equal distribution of supplies and objecting to larger allotments to special cases, demanding equal assignment for all persons in carrying rice, regardless of age or physical condition, demanding equal space in billeting and even condemning the headquarters for occupying larger quarters, demanding equal assignment of duties and refusing any extra work, and even abandoning both wounded men when there is only one stretcher rather than carrying only one of them. All such instances indicate that absolute equalitarianism among the Red Army officers and soldiers has not been fundamentally eradicated from the mind of the masses. Whatever that has been eradicated is merely partial or superficial.

2. Similar to ultra-democratization in politics, absolute equalitarianism is a product of the handicraft and small peasant economy, except that one is manifested in the political aspect and the other in the material aspect.

3. The method of rectification is as follows: It must be pointed out theoretically that not only is absolute equalitarianism merely an illusion of the peasants and petty bourgeois in the days before the disappearance of capitalism but, even in the period of the socialist economy, material distribution must be adjusted to the needs of the individuals and the tasks. There definitely cannot be absolute equality. The maximum equality in material distribution in the Red Army should be attained, such as equal pay and equal rations for the officers and men, because it is the need of the struggle in the current environment. But absolute equality beyond reason must be opposed, because it is not the need of the struggle. On the contrary, it will hamper the struggle.

E. The Idealist Concept

1. The idealist concept is extremely serious among party members in the Red Army, and it constitutes an extremely great obstacle to political analysis, work guidance, and the party organization. The inevitable accompanying result of idealist analysis of politics and idealist guidance of work is either opportunism or adventurism. As for the idealist critical spirit inside the party, random talk not based on evidence, or mutual suspicion, it often leads to controversies in the party not involving principles and without significance and to disruption of the party organization.

In regard to the issue of inner-party criticisms, besides the idealist critical spirit, we should also mention the non-political critical spirit. The major function of criticism is to point out political errors. Pointing out organizational errors comes next. As for defects in personal life and minor technical mistakes, if they are not closely connected with political or organizational errors, it is not necessary to be so censorious as to place the comrades concerned in a quandary. Moreover, once technical criticisms develop, the attention of the party may become entirely diverted to commonplace technical trivialities, and everyone may become cautious and timorous, thereby forgetting the party's political tasks. This is the greatest danger. Similar to the unscientific idealist critical spirit, the inner-party technical and non-political critical spirit in the Red Army will inevitably produce (and has already produced) the worst result.

2. The only method of rectification is to raise the political and scientific levels of the party members in their thinking and inner-party life. To attain this goal, it is necessary to: a. Educate the party members to make political analysis and class strength assessment with the Marxist method, in order to replace the idealist method of analysis and assessment. b. Make the party members pay attention to survey and study of the social economy as a basis to determine the struggle strategy and work method, so that the comrades know that, apart from practical survey, they will fall into the abyss

of fantasy and adventurism. c. Eliminate the idealist and technical spirit in inner-party criticism, basing all statements on evidence and giving attention to the political significance when discussing work.

F. Individualism

1. The individualist tendency in the party in the Red Army manifests itself as follows:

a. Vindictiveness: After being criticized inside the party by a soldier comrade, the individualist will seek a chance to retaliate outside the party--beating or scolding is one way of retaliation. There are many such instances. Sometimes, retaliation is sought inside the party: You attack me at this meeting, so I shall retaliate by finding fault with you at the next. There are also many instances of such. Such vindictiveness proceeds solely from the personal viewpoint. The individualist is ignorant of class interest or party life as a whole. He only knows himself. His target is not the enemy class but other individuals in his own ranks. It is a corrosive which can weaken the organization and its fighting power.

b. Cliquism: On the surface, it is an expanded individualism, but underneath, it is still the narrow individualism. It also produces a strong corrosive and centrifugal effect. In the Red Army, cliquism has all along been rampant; although it has now become less serious as a result of criticism, its remnants still exist and further struggle is needed.

c. The mercenary concept: A person with a mercenary concept fails to recognize that the party and the Red Army are the tools to implement the class tasks, and that he, himself, is a member thereof. He fails to realize that he, himself, plays a main role in the struggle, but feels that the struggle has nothing to do with himself, and that he is responsible only to the superior officers of the Red Army or the party organ, not to the revolution. Such mercenary concept of revolution is rather widespread in the Red Army. It is the reason why there are not many unconditional, enthusiastic, and positive activists. If the mercenary concept is not eliminated, the number of positive activists will not increase, and the heavy burden of revolution will always rest on the shoulders of a few, much to the detriment of the struggle.

d. Hedonism: In the Red Army, there are also quite a few whose individualism finds expression in hedonism. They constantly hope that the troops will march to the big cities. They want to go there not to work but to enjoy themselves. What they dislike most is to work in the Red areas where life is hard. The result of hedonism is thinking of personal interest only, without consideration of the entire revolution or group action.

e. Passive slowdown: With the least bit of dissatisfaction, an individual with this tendency becomes passive and slows down in his work. Though the basic reason is individualism, because he has not accurately recognized his

own class tasks, there are also objective reasons such as improper handling of incidents, work assignments, or enforcement of discipline in the party and the army.

f. The desire to leave the army: The number of people who ask for transfer from the ranks to local work is on the rise. This is not entirely due to subjective individualism, but also to (1) the material hardships in the Red Army; (2) exhaustion after a long struggle; and (3) objective environmental reasons of improper handling of incidents, work assignments or enforcement of discipline.

2. The origin of individualism is the influence of the small peasant and bourgeois ideologies in the party. The method of rectification is mainly through education, rectifying individualism in thinking. Next, the handling of incidents, work assignments and enforcement of discipline must be proper. In addition, measures must be taken to improve the material life of the Red Army, utilizing all opportunities for rest and rehabilitation, in order to better the objective conditions.

G. The Idea of Roving Insurgents

1. The origin of the idea of roving insurgents in the Red Army is as follows: a. Homeless proletarians constitute the majority of the Red Army. This is the immediate cause. b. The remote cause is the existence of large groups of vagrants throughout the country, especially the southern provinces. With these two causes, the political thinking and action with the idea of roving insurgents are created in the Red Army. However, in today's China under imperialist control, especially with the import of advanced weapons (grenades, steel cannon, machine guns, etc.), advanced communication methods (military telephones and radios), and advanced transport means (motor vehicles, steamships, railways), the large-scale roving insurgent actions in the style of Huang Ch'ao, Li Ch'uang or Hung Hsiu-ch'uan are no longer feasible; therefore, the idea of roving insurgents naturally cannot become the final and effective idea of the Red Army in its actions. Nevertheless, its influence, as manifested in the various aspects, is still very strong, such as: a. being unwilling to help the masses build political power by strenuous work for the purpose of expanding political influence, but thinking only of accomplishing the purpose by the mobile guerrilla method; b. in the organizational line of expanding the Red Army, following not the line of expanding the local Red Guard, the local units of the Red Army, or even the non-local units of the Red Army, but the line of "recruiting soldiers and buying horses" and "recruiting captives and accepting rebels"; c. being impatient to wage a hard struggle together with the masses, but only hoping to go to the big cities to eat and drink. All such manifestations of the idea of roving insurgents seriously hamper the Red Army in performing the momentous tasks assigned it by the revolution. Thus, the elimination of this idea is indeed one of the important goals of the inner-party ideological struggle in the Red Army.

2. The methods of rectification:

a. Change the incorrect ideas in the party coming from the vagrant elements through education in order to eliminate the idea of roving insurgents.

b. Intensify the anti-vagabondism education of the current basic troops of the Red Army and future captives.

c. Recruit active elements among the workers and peasants with struggle experiences to join the current ranks of the Red Army in order to change its components.

d. Raise new troops from the struggling worker-peasant masses.

H. Remnants of Adventurism

1. The party in the Red Army has exerted a great effort in the struggle against adventurism but not yet to the full extent. Therefore, remnants of adventurism still exist in the Red Army even though much of the adventurist idea and action has been overcome. Adventurism comes from a combination of the lumpen proletarian ideology and the petty bourgeois ideology. Its manifestations are: a. Blind action without regard of the subjective and objective conditions. b. Inadequate and irresolute implementation of urban policies. c. Slack military discipline, especially when suffering a defeat. d. Setting fire to houses without consideration of the mass foundation, which is a misconduct to varying extents in all the units. e. The practice of executing deserters and of corporal punishment which are partially due to adventurism.

2. The methods of rectification: a. Eliminate adventurism theoretically. b. Rectify adventurist actions by systems and policies.

II. Organization of the Party

The issue of the party organization in the Red Army has reached a very critical stage, especially the inferior quality of the party members and the slack organization, which affect the leadership of the Red Army and the implementation of policies. The Congress has made a careful analysis of the issue and come to a decision. The comrades must follow the spirit of the Congress and strive to reform the party organization, in order to enable it to truly shoulder the party's political tasks. Only then can we consider it successful.

A. The Party's Organizational Line

1. The combat soldiers are the main objectives in the development line of party members. Meanwhile, the noncombatants, such as porters and orderlies, must not be neglected.

2. A party branch must be organized in every company and a cell in every squad. This is one of the important principles of party organization in the army. In units where the number of party members is too small and a cell cannot actually be organized, the platoon may be used temporarily as the unit to organize a cell and its members must be assigned systematically to the squads. But it must be understood that this is only a transitional measure.

3. The current organization method of cells in the Red Army, i.e., the method of mixing the cadre and general elements and the intellectual and laboring elements is correct, but those with different occupations and different abilities must also be systematically and successfully mixed when organizing. Hereafter, more attention must be given to this point. As for simply organizing the cadres into cells, it is undesirable.

B. The Slack Organization of the Party

1. The current situation of the party organization in the Fourth Army:

a. Enrollment is too easy. Many without the proper qualifications are also dragged into the party, especially officers, who do not have to satisfy any requirement to join the party. Therefore, the quality of the party has become very inferior.

b. The party units of the various levels solve the problems in their work but forget the task of educating the comrades. There are very few training meetings, such as activists mass meetings, joint meetings of secretaries and propaganda sections, joint meetings of committees, party branch mass meetings, column or detachment party members' mass meetings.

c. Discipline in general is lax. This is especially true in regard to individuals in charge of important work and who are irreplaceable. Their mistakes are often overlooked, and discipline is not enforced. When one person is treated this way, others have to be treated the same way. Thus, discipline in general is slackened.

d. All the officers are party members. As a result, all those working in military affairs and political organs pay little attention to their social occupational work, feeling that social occupational work is party work and failing to distinguish the two. The military affairs work conferences and the political work conferences of the various levels are almost never held. They think that, whatever it is, once it is decided by the party, that is the end of it. That the party member produces a nucleus effect in social occupation is never discussed.

e. The higher and lower levels do not have a close relationship. The higher level seldom comments or makes instructions on the reports of the lower level, and it seldom sends men to attend the meetings of the latter. While this is due to the lack of soundness of the organization of the higher

level, the lack of positivity in its work attitude is also one of the reasons for the absence or inadequacy of its guidance of the lower level. This is especially true in regard to directing practical work, such as the lack of detailed instructions to units embarking on guerrilla work. In some units, even rough guidance is almost nonexistent.

f. Many party branch mass meetings and cell meetings are not held on time.

2. The line of rectification:

a. The old foundation must be thoroughly overhauled. Those with erroneous political concepts, smoking opium, making illegal profits, or gambling, and refusing to reform after many warnings, be they cadres or not, must all be expelled from the party.

b. The requirements for new party members hereafter:

- (1) No mistake in political concept (including class awareness).
- (2) Honesty.
- (3) Possessing the spirit of sacrifice, and able to work positively.
- (4) No desire for illegal profits.
- (5) Abstinence from opium and gambling.

Only those meeting all five requirements will be introduced into the party. The introducer must verify in advance whether the introduced truly satisfies the requirements, and the necessary procedure of introduction must be followed. After joining the party, the new member must be informed in detail the party branch life (including secret work) and the important points to be observed by party members. The introducer must shoulder certain responsibilities toward the introduced. The party branch committee must assign someone to interview the membership applicant and ascertain his qualifications.

c. In addition to solving problems and directing practical work, the party units of the various levels also have the tremendous task of educating the comrades. They must systematically hold all kinds of training conferences and other modes of training, such as training classes and discussion meetings.

d. Discipline must be strictly enforced, and the practice of merely paying lip service to discipline stopped.

e. The natures of the party members' social occupation and their party work must be distinguished. Each and every party member must undertake a social occupation, and perform the work assigned him by the party in his social occupation (except those responsible for important functions or specialized tasks in the party who are professional revolutionaries).

f. The work attitude of the party units of all levels must become more positive than ever before. The lower level must make detailed reports to the higher level, and the latter must discuss and reply to such reports in detail and, whenever possible, assign men to attend the meetings of the lower level. It must not borrow the excuses of shortage of personnel, inadequate work capacity, and insufficient time to cover up its own lack of enthusiasm and negligence in work.

g. The party branch committee and the party units above it must systematically decide on the material for discussion at the party branch mass meetings and cell meetings every month, determine the meeting schedules, and strictly enforce the holding of meetings.

C. How to Make the Meetings Interesting

1. The reasons for the party members' lack of interest in attending meetings:

a. They do not understand the significance of meetings. The important significance of the party branch meeting is primarily to solve problems. All struggle and internal problems must be solved by concentrated discussion at the meetings. If a party member does not attend, or if he does not actively express his opinions when attending, it will indicate his failure to understand the political significance of the meeting and his lack of interest in struggle. Anyone with a positive feeling toward struggle will attend the meetings enthusiastically and express himself eagerly. The next significance is to educate the comrades. Meetings not only solve problems but, in the process of solving problems, the circumstances of the problems must be investigated and the instructions of the higher level studied, thus activating the mind and talent of the comrades. As the meetings become political and practical, the mind of the comrades also become political and practical. Then, the party's fighting power is increased. This is the educational significance of meetings. The failure of the party members of the Red Army to understand such significance constitutes the first reason for their nonattendance or lack of interest.

b. When resolutions are not implemented or inquiries to the higher level are not answered for a prolonged period, the party members lose interest in the discussions.

c. The responsible persons fail to make proper preparations in advance, to formulate an agenda, to clarify the contents and circumstances of the problems, or to form some opinions ahead of time on the solution of the problems.

d. The chairman often interrupts at will a party member. When a statement is slightly off the subject under discussion, the chairman will immediately stop him, and the party member becomes discouraged and keeps quiet. If there is any mistake in the statement, the chairman will also ridicule him in addition to stopping him.

e. The feudal style order of meeting is inflexible and stereotyped, and attending a meeting is similar to sitting in jail.

2. The methods of rectification:

First, the meetings must become political and practical. Second, the comrades must constantly be reminded of the important significance of meetings, especially in regard to new members and members who are not positive in their work. Third, resolutions must not be passed lightly. Once a resolution is passed, it must be firmly implemented. Fourth, the higher level must be prompt in answering the questions of the lower level. It must not delay too long, causing the lower level to lose its fervor. Fifth, the responsible persons must prepare the agenda in advance. They must make the agenda concrete, clarify in advance the contents and circumstances of the problems, and give some prior thought to the solutions. Sixth, the chairman must handle the meeting skillfully and channel the current of discussion toward the topic on hand. However, should there be any development of important significance beyond the topic, he must not only refrain from interrupting the speaker and discouraging him, but must carefully seize upon the development, introduce it to everyone, and form a new topic of discussion. Only then will the meeting become interesting, the problems truly solved and the educational significance of the meeting truly realized. Seventh, the feudal order of meeting must be abolished. The meeting of communist party members must reflect the positive, lively and joyful spirit of the proletariat and incorporate it into the order of the meeting.

D. Youth Organization in the Party in the Red Army and Its Work

1. The interests of the youths and adults in the troops cannot be separated, and the league has no special work objectives. Moreover, only when the party cell is built with the squad as the unit will it benefit the struggle. Therefore, there is no necessity to establish league cells in the party branch.

2. As the youths among the party members possess different feelings from the adults, besides general party training, they must receive a special youth education. Furthermore, in view of the fact that fighting for the young worker-peasant masses is one of the party's important tasks, there must be a special organization to handle it. Therefore, young party members in the party under 20 years of age (except those under special conditions, such as being in charge of the party's important work) must be assigned to form a youth work conference. In regard to such conferences, besides regular and systematic meetings with the battalion as the unit, the detachments and columns must also deliberate on the time and call meetings.

3. For the purposes of planning the education of youth party members, devising means to fight for the young worker-peasant masses, and directing the youth work conference, five-member youth work committees must be formed in the Front Committee and column committee, and youth commissars appointed in the detachment committee and party branch committee, under the guidance of party units of the various levels.

E. Relationship Between the Political Commissar and Inner-Party Work

Party secretaries of battalion and detachment levels must not, in principle, also serve as political commissars. However, in units with personnel shortage, they may temporarily serve in both capacities. In regard to political commissars who do not also serve as party secretaries, the higher level party unit must study the situation and, under suitable circumstances, assign them as special emissaries of the party with the duty of directing the party work of their levels.

F. The Highest Party Organization of Directly Subordinate Units

The directly subordinate units of the army and the columns must organize directly subordinate unit committees as the highest party organizations, consisting of five to seven members.

G. The Question of Establishing Party and Youth League Organizations in Soldiers' Associations

No party or youth league organizations should be established in soldiers' associations at the battalion level, and the work of these associations should be guided by the party branch committees concerned; but party and youth league organizations should be established in soldiers' associations at the column level, and the work of these organizations should be guided by the party committees of the columns concerned.

III. Inner-Party Education

A. Significance

Education must be considered the most urgent issue in the party in the Red Army. For the purpose of improving and expanding the Red Army and enabling it to shoulder the struggle tasks, we must start from inner-party education. If the political level in the party is not raised, if the many biases are not eliminated, we definitely cannot improve and expand the Red Army, nor enable it to shoulder the momentous struggle tasks. Therefore, carrying out planned inner-party education and correcting the unplanned and laissez-faire situation of the past constitute one of the important tasks of the party. The Congress has decided to educate the party members with the following materials and methods. The leading organs of the party must hold more detailed discussions to implement the task.

B. Materials

1. Political analyses.
2. Discussion of documents from higher level leading organs.
3. Organization knowledge.
4. Rectification of eight erroneous ideas in the party in the Red Army.
5. Discussion of anti-opportunism and the opposition faction against Trotskyism.

6. Strategy and technique of mass work,
7. Survey and study of the social economy of guerrilla areas,
8. Study of Marxism-Leninism,
9. Study of social economics.
10. The current stage of the revolution and its future.

Of the 10 items above, except for a portion (such as the study of social economics) which actually is limited to the cadres, they are all suitable for the general party members.

C. Methods

1. Party newspapers.
2. Brief political reports.
3. All types of pamphlets for educating the comrades.
4. Training classes.
5. Planned reading assignment.
6. Reading of books and newspapers to illiterate party members.
7. Individual conversations.
8. Criticisms.
9. Cell meetings.
10. Party branch meetings.
11. Joint meetings of party branch committees and cells.
12. Activists' mass meetings of cell leaders and above with each column as a unit.
13. Activists' mass meetings of party branch secretaries and above of the entire army.
14. Party members' mass meetings with each column as a unit.
15. Joint meetings of secretaries, propagandists, and organization officers of all levels with each column as a unit.
16. Joint meetings of secretaries, propagandists and organization officers of the detachments and above of the entire army.
17. Political discussion meetings.
18. Suitable assignment of party members to practical work.

IV. Propaganda Work of the Red Army

A. Significance of the Propaganda Work of the Red Army

The goal of the propaganda work of the Red Army is to expand our political influence and fight for the broad masses. Only when this goal is realized will the general goal of the Red Army, such as organizing the masses, arming the masses, building political power, eliminating the reactionary forces, and promoting the revolutionary high tide, be realized. Therefore, propaganda work is the foremost task of the Red Army. Overlooking it is abandoning the main task of the Red Army and equivalent to helping the ruling class undermine its power.

B. Current Situation of the Propaganda Work of the Red Army

1. Defects of the propaganda contents:

a. No concrete political outline has been published. (The political outlines published before, such as the four-word announcements, were not concrete.)

b. Propaganda and encouragement of the daily struggles of the masses are overlooked.

c. Winning of the urban poor is overlooked.

d. Propaganda to the women masses is overlooked.

e. Propaganda to the youth masses is inadequate.

f. Propaganda to the lumpen proletariat is inadequate.

g. Propaganda against the armed organizations of the landowner class (Civil League, Ching-wei League, etc.) is very little.

h. There is no proper choice of time and place in propaganda.

2. Defects of the propaganda technique:

a. The propaganda team is not sound.

(1) The number of propagandists has been reduced from five per battalion to three, or even down to one or two, or none.

(2) The quality of the propagandists is too inferior. They include captives, cooks, grooms, opium smokers, suspected deserters who are disarmed, those who failed as clerks, and cripples unwanted by other work units. Today's propaganda team has actually become a receiving station and is completely incapable of performing its duties.

(3) Almost all the officers and soldiers reject the propaganda team (partly because of the inferior quality of the propagandists and their lack of achievement, resulting in the dissatisfaction of others). "Loafers" and "fake medicine peddlars" are the nicknames given them.

(4) The propaganda teams do not have adequate funds.

(5) The training of the propagandists is not systematic, nor the supervision of their work adequate. Therefore, the work of the propaganda team is very sketchy, and no one pays any attention whether it does anything or not.

b. The handbills, announcements and declarations are outmoded and stale, and distribution and mailing are not properly handled.

c. There are very few wall bulletins; the brief political reports are too simple in content and too few; and the characters are too small and too hard to read.

d. There is practically no revolutionary songs.

e. Only a few pictorials have been published.

f. There is no costumed propaganda.

g. Clubs with the double significance of recreation for the soldiers and association with the worker-peasant masses have not been organized.

h. Verbal propaganda is too little and too inferior.

i. The discipline of the Red Army is a practical propaganda to the masses. Now discipline is more lax than before; therefore, it produces an unfavorable impression on the masses.

j. Putting up the gate boards, bundling rice straw, sweeping the floor, friendliness in conversation, fair buying and selling, returning intact borrowed things, and reimbursing for losses all constitute a kind of the Red Army's propaganda work, but now they are not fully performed.

k. Mass meetings are seldom held, and not successful when held.

l. The method of propagandizing to the White soldiers is not good.

C. The Lines of Rectification

1. Propaganda contents:

a. A concrete political program should be published, and be called the "Red Army Political Program."

b. Propaganda must be compatible with the struggle sentiments of the masses. Besides the general riot slogans, there must also be slogans on daily life, in conjunction with the riot slogans, in areas where the struggle sentiments of the masses are still low, in order to activate the daily struggles.

c. The urban poor (middle and small merchants and students) constitutes a considerable strength in the civil rights revolution. Overlooking this strength is equivalent to presenting it to the big business bourgeoisie. Hereafter, in regard to the urban middle and small merchant and student masses, intensive propaganda work must be performed in order to win them over.

d. Women constitute half of the population. The economic position of the laboring women and the extreme oppression suffered by them not only indicate that they are in urgent need of revolution but also that they will constitute

a determining force of the revolution. Hereafter, there must be effective slogans and extensive propaganda toward them.

e. The toiling youth masses constitute over 30 percent of the population, and they are also the bravest and firmest in struggle. Therefore, propaganda to win the youth masses is an important task in the entire propaganda program.

f. In regard to China's broad lumpen masses, if they take the side of the revolutionary class, they will become an instrument of the revolution; if they take the side of the reactionary class, they will become an instrument of the counterrevolution. Therefore, winning them over from under the influence of the reactionary class is one of the party's propaganda tasks. When performing propaganda work, attention must be given to the life and nature of the different groups of vagrants and appropriate propaganda measures adopted.

g. The destruction of the armed organizations of the landlord class and the winning over of their masses constitute one of the conditions for the victory of the rural land revolution. Hereafter, special attention must be given to the propaganda work on the membership masses of the civil defense and pacification units.

h. The propaganda and agitation slogans must be adapted to the particular areas, and different slogans must also be created according to the different times (such as fall harvest, year-end, the Chiang [5592]-Kuei [2710] war period and the Wang [3076]-Chiang [5592] war period).

2. Propaganda technique:

a. The propaganda team:

(1) Significance: The Red Army propaganda team is an important tool of its propaganda work. If the propaganda team is not well organized, a large part of the Red Army's propaganda task is wasted. Therefore, the reform and training of the propaganda team is one of the tasks at present requiring the party's re-enforced endeavor. The first step is to correct, from the theoretical aspect, the contempt felt by the officers and soldiers for propaganda work and propaganda teams. Such odd nicknames as "loafers" and "fake medicine peddlers" must be deleted hereafter.

(2) Organization:

(a) Take each detachment as a unit; the detachments directly subordinate to the army and column command will each form a unit. Each unit will organize a propaganda team composed of a commander and a deputy commander, 16 propagandists, 1 porter (carrying propaganda materials), and 2 orderlies. The propagandists of each company are divided into a number of subunits (the number of subunits to be decided according to the number of battalions or other troop units and organs), and each subunit has a leader and three propagandists.

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(b) The detachment propaganda team is under the command of the detachment political commissar. When the battalions proceed separately to perform guerrilla work, each battalion must have attached to it a propaganda subunit under the command of the battalion political commissar. The propaganda teams of the columns are under the command of the propaganda section of the column political department. The army propaganda team is under the direction of the propaganda section of the army political department.

(c) The funds of the propaganda teams are disbursed by the political department; they must be adequate.

(d) In regard to improving the quality of the propagandists, besides requesting the local governments to select progressive elements to join the Red Army propaganda team, the superior elements among the soldiers in the various units must be selected (excluding the squad leaders wherever possible) to serve as propagandists. The political department must regularly formulate training plans for the propaganda team, specify the training material, method, time and instructors, and actively improve the quality of the propagandists.

b. In regard to the propaganda documents, such as handbills, announcements and declarations, the existing ones should be reviewed, and new ones drafted promptly.

The suitable and effective distribution of propaganda material is an important item in the technique of the propaganda team. The political work organs must give attention to such means as sending propaganda by mail, enclosing propaganda material among other matters through the mail, or printing propaganda and agitation slogans on postal matters, and they must do so successfully.

c. Wall bulletins are one of the important means of mass propaganda. The army and the columns must each run a wall bulletin, to be handled by the propaganda section of the political department and named "Current Affairs Brief Report." The contents are: (1) International and domestic political news; (2) the mass struggle situation of guerrilla areas; (3) the work condition of the Red Army. There must be at least one issue a week, written on large pieces of paper, not mimeographed, in as many copies as possible. Attention must be given to the following: (1) The production must be prompt; (2) the contents must be rich; and (3) the calligraphy should be fairly large and clear.

d. The various political departments must collect and compile revolutionary songs expressing the sentiments of the masses, and the editing and compiling committee of the army political department has the responsibility of supervision and inspection.

e. The art unit of the propaganda section of the army political department must be reenforced. It must publish lithographed or mimeographed pictorials. To reenforce the military art unit, all those with talent in painting and drawing in the army must be gathered together.

f. Costumed propaganda is one of the most concrete and effective means of propaganda. All the propaganda teams of the detachments and directly subordinate units must organize costumed propaganda subunits, responsible for creating and directing costumed propaganda to the masses.

g. Take each battalion as a unit, clubs must be organized in the soldiers' associations.

h. Verbal and written propaganda subunits must be organized in the propaganda teams, for the purpose of studying and directing verbal and written propaganda techniques.

i. The three disciplinary rules must be strictly enforced.

j. The political departments and the propaganda teams must, with organization and planning, call all types of mass meetings. They must decide in advance the order of meeting, the speakers, the topics and the time.

k. Propaganda aimed at the soldiers and lower level officers of the White army is extremely important. Attention must be given to the following methods hereafter:

(1) The text of the propaganda must be short and concise, so that it can be read at a glance. It must be skillful and clever, so that it will leave an impression.

(2) Besides systematically displaying many slogans appropriate to the particular units along the road traveled by the enemy, handbills must be stored with the party units and mass organizations along the road, so that they can be ingeniously distributed when the enemy soldiers pass through.

(3) The names of the enemy officers and soldiers and the identity of their unit must be ascertained from the captives and through mail inspection, so that propaganda material or letters can be sent to them.

(4) Preferential treatment of captives is an effective method of propagandizing to the enemy force. Preferential treatment includes the following methods: The first is to refrain from searching them for money and things. In the past, the conduct of the Red Army soldiers of searching captives for money and things must be firmly stopped. The second is to welcome captives with great warmth, so that they will feel a spiritual happiness. Insulting them by word or deed must be opposed. The third is equal material treatment of the captives, same as the old soldiers. Fourth, after propaganda, those who do not wish to remain will be issued travel expenses and released for them to return home, so that they will spread the influence of the Red Army in the White army. Forcing the unwilling ones to remain just to satisfy the desire for more soldiers must be opposed. Except under special conditions, the above are suitable for all captured officers and soldiers alike.

(5) Giving medical attention to the enemy wounded is also an effective method of propaganda. The medical treatment and monetary allowances to wounded enemy soldiers must be exactly the same as wounded Red Army soldiers. All possible opportunities must be utilized to return wounded enemy soldiers who have received medical attention and monetary allowances, to the enemy army. This principle applies to wounded enemy officers.

V. Political Training of Soldiers

A. Material

The following items must be artistically incorporated into textbooks to serve as training material for soldiers:

1. Current political analysis and the tasks and plans of the Red Army.
2. All aspects of the land revolution.
3. The armed organization and its tactics.
4. The reasons for the three articles of discipline.
5. Slogans for morning and evening roll calls.
6. Literacy movement.
7. How to do mass work.
8. Individual explanation of Red Army slogans.
9. Rectification of the many biases.
10. The Red Army of Soviet Russia.
11. The current stage of the revolution and its future.
12. Comparison of the Red Army and the White army.
13. Comparison of the Communist Party and the Kuomintang.
14. Revolutionary stories.
15. Stories of social progress.
16. Hygiene.
17. The geography and the political and economic knowledge of the guerrilla areas.
18. Revolutionary songs.
19. Pictorial news.

B. Method

1. Political classes;

a. Political classes are divided into regular, special and cadre classes. Regular classes are further divided into two types: When a detachment is together, classes are held with each detachment as a unit. For instructors, the detachment political commissar serves as the instructor in charge, and battalion political commissars are responsible for the various subjects separately. Besides combat soldiers who are required to attend, messengers, orderlies, porters, grooms and cooks must all attend. The goal of the regular class is basic political knowledge for soldiers in general.

b. With each detachment as a unit, the special class, through selection and examination, consists of 50 soldiers from the battalions who can

read some and have some political knowledge. The detachment political commissar serves as the instructor in charge, and the battalion political commissars are responsible for the various subjects separately. The goal of the special class is to create personnel with political knowledge one level higher than the regular class, in preparation for promotion to lower level cadres in the future.

c. The column is the unit for the cadre class, and the directly subordinate unit of the army forms another unit, organized with battalion commanders and deputy commanders, company commanders and deputy commanders, military aides of the various levels, and other designated personnel. The goal is to raise the political level of the current lower level cadres, so that they can lead the masses, in preparation for promotion to middle level cadres in the future. The political commissar, political department chairman, and commander of the column and others with suitable qualifications serve as the instructors.

d. The political training committee must be organized with each detachment as a unit, to include the political committee members of the detachment and qualified military officers. The detachment political commissar serves as chairman. The function of the committee is to discuss the various problems on the political training of the soldiers in the detachment.

e. The political training of the directly subordinate units of the army and columns is handled by the political training committee organized by the political propaganda sections of the army and columns.

f. Method of instruction:

- (1) Heuristic method (abolishing the cramming method).
- (2) From the near to the far.
- (3) From the elementary to the advanced.
- (4) Lecturing in colloquial style (explaining new terms in colloquial).
- (5) Clarity in lecturing.
- (6) Lectures must be interesting.
- (7) Lecturing supplemented with gestures.
- (8) Review the idea of the previous session at the current session.
- (9) Outline must be brought out.
- (10) Discussion method should be used in the cadre class.

2. Lectures at morning and evening roll calls:

a. Limited to a maximum of 30 minutes each time.

b. Material:

- (1) Reporting of political news.
- (2) Criticisms of daily life.
- (3) Explanation of the weekly political slogan.

3. Assembly lectures:

a. Once a week for the detachment; once every half month for the column; no set schedule for the army.

b. For each lecture, the political work organ (political commissar of the detachment), together with the military work organ, systematically specifies the contents of the lecture, designates the lecturer and schedules the time.

c. Except for the orderlies, everyone must attend the lectures.

d. The lower level political organ must report to the higher level the contents of each lecture and the influence on the masses.

4. Individual conversation:

a. Individual conversations must be held with the following categories of people:

- (1) Those with biases.
- (2) Those receiving punishment.
- (3) The wounded.
- (4) The sick.
- (5) New recruits.
- (6) Captive soldiers.
- (7) Those dissatisfied with their work.
- (8) Those wavering in ideology.

b. Before the conversation, the psychology and circumstances of the objective must be investigated.

c. During the conversation, one must take the attitude of a comrade and talk with sincerity.

d. After the conversation, the important points of the conversation and its effect must be recorded.

5. Recreation:

a. With the battalion as the unit, the soldiers' association club must be reenforced and the following types of recreation included:

- (1) Hide-and-seek game.
- (2) Soccer.
- (3) Music.
- (4) Martial arts.
- (5) Flower drum tunes.
- (6) Old drama.

b. A costumed propaganda group will be organized under each propaganda team.

c. The funds for recreational equipment are paid out of the public funds (funds for the battalion to be approved by the column political department).

6. Improvement of treatment:

a. Corporal punishment must be abolished firmly.

b. Verbal abuses must be abolished.

c. Wounded and sick soldiers must receive preferential treatment.

d. The system of issuing 0.40 yuan per person per month for straw sandals must be resumed.

7. Special education of new recruits and captives:

a. Explain to them the life and habits of the Red Army, such as (1) equality of officers and soldiers (There is only the distinction of functions between officers and soldiers, but no distinction of classes. The officers are not the exploiting class, nor the soldiers the exploited.); (2) the three disciplinary rules and the reasons; (3) the significance and effect of the soldiers' association; (4) the economic system in the Red Army (the source of revenue, the management organization, the principle of keeping accounts open to the public, and the system of inspection by the soldiers); (5) management of the battalion mess by the economic committee; (6) abolition of corporal punishment and verbal abuses; and (7) preferential treatment of prisoners of war.

b. Lectures on the brief struggle history of the Red Army.

c. The principles of the Red Army: (1) The difference between the Red Army and the White army--detailed explanation of this point to the prisoners of war; (2) the difference between the Red Army and bandits; and (3) the three great missions of the Red Army.

d. Lectures on the organizational system of the Red Army.

e. Common political knowledge, such as (1) the Kuomintang and the Communist Party; (2) the invasion of China by British, Japanese and American imperialists; (3) how the warlords of the different factions fight everywhere under the direction of imperialism; (4) land division; (5) the soviet; (6) the Red Guard, etc.

VI. Special Education of Youth Soldiers

A. The political departments of the columns are responsible for compiling youth literacy texts (using the Commercial Press elementary school texts, People's 1,000-word Vocabulary text and Lung-yen Cultural Press texts as references).

B. Each column must organize a youth soldiers' school, divided into three or four classes, one class for each detachment and one for each directly subordinate unit, with a maximum of 25 students per class. The chairman of the political department serves as the principal and the propaganda section chief as the dean. Each class has an instructor in charge. One semester consists of 90 hours.

C. Stationeries are paid by public funds and distributed to the students.

VII. Abolition of Corporal Punishment

A. The Effect of Corporal Punishment in the Red Army

In the units where corporal punishment is more severe, there are more dissatisfied soldiers and deserters. There were the following most apparent instances: A certain officer of the 8th detachment of the 3d column liked to punish by flogging. As a result, not only almost all the messengers and cooks, but even the supply sergeant and aides, fled. During one period, a battalion commander who liked to flog people was assigned to the 25th battalion of the 9th detachment. The masses nicknamed him "Ironsmith." In consequence, the soldiers felt hopeless and utterly dissatisfied. They only became liberated when the commander was transferred. The result of flogging in the 3d battalion of the special service detachment was the desertion of 4 cooks, 1 special service chief and 2 squad leaders who had struggled for a long time. One of them, Hsiao Wen-ch'eng [5618 2429 2052], left a letter, explaining that he was not counterrevolutionary, but deserted because he could not stand the oppression. When the 4th column was first organized, the officers transferred from the 1st, 2d and 3d columns beat the soldiers savagely. As a result, the soldiers deserted one after another. Finally, this group of officers themselves could not stand their ground, and they had to leave the 4th column. The 2d column has more deserters than any other column. Though there are many reasons, the habit of flogging intensively practiced by its lower level officers is one of the most important ones. There were three suicide incidents in the 2d column (1 platoon leader and 2 soldiers). This is the biggest stigma of the Red Army, and the significance is extremely serious. It cannot but be considered an outcome of flogging practiced intensively in the 2d column. Currently, the outcry of the common soldiers in the Red Army is: "Officers do not beat the soldiers; they merely flog them to near death!" Such expression of the indignation and wrath of the masses truly deserves our serious attention.

B. The Origin of Corporal Punishment and the Reason for Its Abolition

To maintain its exploitation, the feudal class had to resort to the most cruel punishment as a tool, in order to suppress the resistance and revolt of the exploited. This was the reason that corporal punishment was created in the feudal era. When economic development progressed to the capitalist system, it became necessary to introduce liberalism in order to encourage the individuality of the worker-peasant masses, enhance their labor and fighting capacities, and create the conditions for the development of capitalism. Therefore, the bourgeois nations generally have abolished corporal punishment, and the monstrosity of flogging has disappeared in the troops. When the economic development reached the stage of socialism, with the aggravation of the class struggle, the worker-peasant class, for the purpose of overthrowing the power of the ruling class and eliminating the exploitation based on such power, must activate the strength of the broad masses of its own class before it can win the victory of the struggle. The soviet political power is the political power of the most progressive class, and no remnant of the feudal system may exist under it. Therefore, in Soviet Russia, corporal punishment is not only no longer in existence in its Red Army, but the use of corporal punishment is strictly prohibited in its laws in general. The Red 4th Army was created in a China where the feudal system had not been completely eliminated, and its main components mostly came from the troops of the feudal warlords. The thinking and habits of the feudal system remain strong in the officers and soldiers in general, and therefore, the habit of flogging and the saying of "no fear without flogging" are the same as in the troops of the feudal warlords. Though the slogan that the officers must not beat the soldiers and the provision that the soldiers have the right to express their grievances have long been proposed, they are not effective at all, resulting in the alienation between the officers and soldiers, the low morale of the officers as well as the soldiers, the growing number of deserters, the atmosphere of dissatisfaction in the troops, and even incidents of suicide. This situation is completely contrary to the fighting tasks of the Red Army. If it is not promptly rectified, the danger is beyond description.

C. Methods of Rectification

1. Firmly abolish corporal punishment.
2. Launch a movement to abolish corporal punishment. This campaign must aim at both the officers and the soldiers, and spread the meaning that "only the abolition of corporal punishment will benefit the struggle" generally in the officer and soldier masses. Only then will the officers realize that the abolition of corporal punishment not only will not make it impossible for them to command the troops, but will benefit management and training. On the part of the soldiers, not only will they not become more intractable, but, because of the abolition of corporal punishment, they will enhance their fighting morale. With the disappearance of the alienation between the officers and soldiers, they will consciously accept control, training and general discipline.

3. After corporal punishment is abolished, certain temporary undesirable phenomena may appear due to historical reasons. But the situation will only serve to intensify our responsibilities. We must vigorously promote the spirit of persuasion and the conscious observance of discipline to overcome the most evil feudal system contrary to the struggle tasks. We must never use the undesirable phenomena as an excuse to defend the practice of flogging. All those opposing the abolition of corporal punishment under the excuse of the temporary undesirable phenomena, or slacking off on the movement to abolish corporal punishment, are objectively blocking the development of the revolutionary struggle and thereby helping the ruling class.

4. The legal procedure to abolish corporal punishment in the Red Army is:
a. The penal regulations of the Red Army must be revised. b. The supreme military and political organs' conference must jointly issue a general order abolishing corporal punishment and promulgate the new penal regulations of the Red Army. c. After the general order is issued, the military and political organs must call a meeting of officers to explain in detail the reasons for abolishing corporal punishment, so that they will support the momentous reform embodied in the general order and implement it diligently in the troops. d. Meanwhile, the soldiers' council must call a meeting of soldier delegates, explaining that, besides supporting the reform, they must hereafter consciously observe discipline and make stringent mass disciplinary sanctions, in order to obtain the desired result of abolishing corporal punishment.

VIII. Preferential Treatment of Wounded Soldiers

A. The Misery of the Wounded and the Sick and Its Influence

1. The health organs of the various units are unsound. Medical officers, drugs and stretcher facilities are inadequate, and the personnel are insufficient and not well organized. Therefore, many wounded and sick soldiers sometimes cannot even obtain basic care let alone full treatment.
2. The military and political organs of the army do not give sufficient attention to the wounded and the sick. For instance: a. In regard to the soundness of the health organs, the authorities have not only failed to make maximum effort, but actually paid no attention to it. The issue of health is rarely discussed at the various meetings. b. The officers are not doing all they can to comfort the wounded and the sick. Such practice as bringing tea to the patients, covering them at night, and visiting them are almost nonexistent in the Red Army. The officers take the attitude of indifference, or they even find the patients annoying. c. When marching, the officers, and even the soldiers, show no sympathy toward the wounded dropping out of rank, refusing to help them, cursing them or driving them on ruthlessly.
3. The seriously wounded and sick do not have adequate supplies and allowances. Wounded soldiers do not have a change of clothes 7 or 8 days after being wounded. Sick officers receive recuperation allowances, but not the sick soldiers.

4. The defects of Chiao-yang Hospital are: a. Being disorganized. b. Shortage of medical officers and drugs. c. Medical officers selling private medicine. d. Lack of cleanliness. e. Inadequate cold weather clothing and bedding. f. Shortage of medical attendants. g. Inferior food. h. Cramped quarters. i. Bad relationship with the local people. As a result, the wounded and the sick regard the hospital as a jail and are unwilling to remain in the rear.

The ill treatment of wounded and sick soldiers has produced the following effect: a. The soldiers become dissatisfied with the Red Army. "While the Red Army is good, one must not become wounded or sick." Such opinion is widespread among all soldiers and the lower level officers. b. The dissatisfaction of the soldiers and the officers further aggravates the alienation between the officers and soldiers. c. The soldiers and lower level officers are afraid of being wounded. Therefore, the combat power of the Red Army is reduced. d. There are many deserters. e. The worker-peasant masses are less eager to join the Red Army.

B. Methods of Rectification

1. The military and political organs must not remain indifferent to the issue of health. It must be fully discussed at the various meetings.
2. The organization of the health units must be improved. Qualified personnel must be assigned to work in such units, instead of packing all those not needed elsewhere into the medical teams. Moreover, the personnel must be increased, so that the patients will have adequate attention. The shortages of physicians and drugs must be remedied wherever possible. In regard to physicians, they must be urged to be more careful in diagnosing, instead of being so indifferent.
3. Officers, especially company officers in contact with the soldiers, must visit the patients from time to time, bring them tea, and cover them up at night. If the patients are cold, the officers must find the means to help them, such as borrowing from others, or putting more clothes on them. Such means of caring for the patients must be made into a system, followed by everyone, because it is the best way to win the masses.
4. In regard to the wounded dropping out of rank when marching: a. No one is permitted to revile or ridicule them. b. When the wounded or sick are required to yield the way, they must be asked politely, instead of being pushed aside roughly. c. Regardless of which unit or organ, whenever a soldier drops out of rank due to injury or illness, be he a combatant or noncombatant, someone must be immediately assigned to look after him. If the injury or illness is serious, all means must be exhausted to have him carried. d. When marching, the rear guard must patiently help the wounded and the sick who are out of rank, and carry their weapons for them when necessary.

5. Allowances for incidental expenses must be issued to the patients. Those seriously wounded or ill must receive more than those not seriously wounded or ill. In regard to those extremely sick or wounded, appropriate recuperation allowances must be issued without distinction of officer or soldier.

6. In regard to the clothing and bedding of the patients, while the army must do its best to provide them, donations must be solicited among the officers and soldiers of all the units. It will not only increase the incidental allowances of the patients, but also serve as a good means to stimulate the spirit of mutual help in times of need.

7. The many defects of the Chiao-yang Rear Hospital must be rectified systematically. In addition, a campaign for donations (clothing, bedding, cash, grain) must be launched among the worker-peasant masses in western Fukien, in order to bring closer the relationship between the worker-peasant masses and the Red Army.

IX. The Relationship Between the Military and the Political Commands of the Red Army

A. Before the high level local political organ is organized, the political and military organs of the Red Army, under the leadership of the Front Committee, perform their work in a parallel manner.

B. The Relationship Between the Red Army and the Masses

1. In all matters affecting the entire army, such as the promulgation of political programs, the military and political commands will promulgate them jointly.

2. Before the local political organ is organized, the direction and supervision of mass work, such as propagandizing to the masses, organizing the masses, building political power, down to confiscation, trial, punishment, soliciting donations, raising funds, and relief, are the functions of the political department.

3. In all areas where an administrative organ has not yet been set up, the Red Army political department serves in its place, until the time when it is. In all areas where it has been set up, the principle that the local administrative organ handles all matters independently in order to gain the confidence of the masses must be followed. Only when the local administrative organ is not yet soundly established, in matters concerning the Red Army and the local area, the method of joint handling by the local administrative organ and the Red Army political department may be resorted to.

4. Helping the local militia stabilize and develop is the responsibility of the political department; helping it in peacetime military training and wartime combat direction is the responsibility of Headquarters. Nevertheless, whenever possible, it should be done through the local administrative organ, and direct handling should be avoided as much as possible.

- C. In regard to the personnel and administration of the Red Army, the military and political commands each has its independent line. In matters concerning both, such as mutual transfers of personnel, mutual transmission of information, etc., they are handled through official communications.
- D. In regard to etiquette and discipline, the military and political commands follow the principle of class subordination. There must be no disrespect or insubordination on ground of different commands.
- E. In regard to supplies, health, marching, combat and encampment, the political command must accept the direction of the military command. In regard to political training and mass work, the reverse is true. But such direction can only be issued to the subordinate organs (general affairs section or the adjutant section) of the other command.
- F. The direction of matters relating to Red Army fund raising and the decision and disbursement of political work allocations are to be made by the political department, and the military affairs organs may not interfere. (Funds are drawn directly from the quartermaster's office by the political department.) Allocations to the party units are made by the political department.
- G. All orders of the military affairs organ, except those which have to be cosigned by the political commissar, require no endorsement by the political department director. All orders of the political organs are singly handled by the political department without having to be endorsed by the political commissar.

Editor's note: This document is one of the earliest and most important records written by Comrade Mao Tse-tung on the army and party building of the Chinese Communist Party. Its standpoint and basic content are completely applicable today. The many kinds of non-proletarian biases, i.e., manifestations of warlordist and petty bourgeois biases, pointed in the first part of the resolution are the fundamental problems of the 8th Route Army and New 4th Army today as well as the Red Army at that time. Our troops exist for the people; therefore, the three great missions of the Red Army at that time were "fighting," "raising funds," and "doing mass work." This document is extremely forceful on the mass work viewpoint of the Red Army. Today's 8th Route Army and New 4th Army still have three great missions, except that "fund raising" has been developed to "production." The decisions on abolishing corporal punishment (not beating people) and the propaganda and education work of the troops in this document deserve our serious attention today. In general, as our troops are founded on peasants and other petty bourgeois elements and situated in an environment of prolonged dispersed rural guerrilla warfare and in the midst of mercenaries and counterrevolutionary enemies, such counterrevolutionary enemies, traitors and secret service agents, old army officers, war prisoners, lumpen proletarians, old peasants, petty bourgeois intellectuals, and the various dogmatist and

sectarianist factors corrode us from the inside as well as the outside. Therefore, to make our troops truly into the troops completely belonging to the people under the leadership of the proletarian ideology, we must wage a constant anti-bias struggle. Currently, ours are the best troops in the nation supported by the people. There has been a great improvement since 1929. However, in recent years, certain defects still remain in the relations between the army and the party and government, between the troops and the people, between the officers and the soldiers, between the lower and higher levels, between military affairs and political work cadres, and among military units. The main ones among the defects are the warlordist biases of severance from the masses and require the intensive examination and rectification by our military affairs and political work cadres in the rectification movement and the support-government-and-love-people movement. Meanwhile, this document starts from the masses and gives considerations to the civilian and soldier masses everywhere. Therefore, it furnishes us with an effective weapon on this point. In the political education of our troops, this document was not publicized for many years, and, when it was publicized, it was not used to launch self-criticism, thereby re-committing an error long solved by this document. This is one loss. Now, the Central has decided to make this resolution a document for the rectification of the military cadres and a text for the education of the entire army.

° "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung," Vol 3, 1944 edition

"Resolution of the Ninth CCP Congress of the 4th Army of the Red Army,"
New Democracy Publishing House (Hong Kong), January 1949

6080

CSO: 4005

LETTER TO COMRADE LIN PIAO

5 January 1930

[Text] Comrade Lin Piao:

The new year has been here several days, but I have not yet replied to your letter. First, because I have some business which keeps me busy. Second, because after all, what could I write to you about? What was there that was good which I could offer you? I cudgeled my brains, but could not think of anything suitable. Hence the delay. Now I have thought of something. I do not know whether it is appropriate after all to your situation, but this matter of mine is in fact an important question in the present struggle. Even if it is not appropriate to your individual situation, it is nevertheless an important question. Hence I bring it up.

What is the question that I am going to bring up? It is a question of appraisal of the current situation and our actions ensuing from it. I used to feel in the past and still feel that your appraisal of the current situation has been relatively pessimistic. This view of yours was most apparent at the conference in Jui-chin on the evening of 18 May last year. I knew that you believed that a revolutionary upsurge would come inevitably, but you did not believe it possible that it would come soon, so you disapproved of action on the plan to seize Kiangsi within a year and favored only guerrilla activities in the three border areas between Fukien, Kwangtung and Kiangsi; and as you had no profound notion about establishing a Red political power in these three areas, you had no profound notion of promoting a nationwide revolutionary upsurge through intensification and expansion of this Red political power. Since you believe in the XXX-style policy of mobile guerrilla warfare, you seem to think that, since the revolutionary upsurge is still far away, it will be labor lost to attempt to build up our political power by hard work. Instead, you want to extend our political influence by lighter, mobile guerrilla means and, when the masses throughout the country have been won over, or won over to a certain degree, to launch a nationwide uprising which, with the forces of the Red Army thrown in, would become a great, nationwide revolution. Your theory of first winning over the masses and then establishing political power on a nationwide scale, including all regions, is in my view not suitable to

the Chinese revolution. According to my observation, this theory of yours stems mainly from your failure to understand clearly that China is a semi-colony contended for by many imperialist powers. If you clearly understand this, then first, you will understand why in China alone in the world there is such an unusual thing as a prolonged strife within the ruling classes, why the fight intensifies and expands day by day, and why no unified political power has ever come into being. Second, you will understand how important the peasant problem is, and consequently why rural uprisings have developed on such a nationwide scale as at present. Third, you will understand the absolute correctness of the slogan of a workers' and peasants' democratic political power. Fourth, you will understand another unusual thing which corresponds to and arises out of the first that only in China is there a prolonged strife within the ruling classes, and that is the existence and development of the Red Army and guerrilla troops, and, together with them, the existence and development of small Red areas (soviets) that have grown amid the encirclement of the White political power (no such unusual thing is found anywhere except in China). Fifth, you will also understand that the formation and development of the Red Army, the guerrilla units and the soviet areas is the highest form of peasant struggle in a semi-colony, a form which peasant struggle in a semi-colony will inevitably take. Sixth, you will understand that they (the Red Army and peasants' soviets) undoubtedly are the most important allied forces (which the proletariat must come forward to lead) of the struggle of the proletariat in a semi-colony, and that undoubtedly they are an important factor in accelerating the revolutionary upsurge throughout the country. Seventh, you will understand that the policy of purely mobile guerrilla activities cannot accomplish the task of accelerating the nationwide revolutionary upsurge, while the kind of policy adopted by Chu [Teh]-Mao [Tse-tung], Ho Lung, Li Wen-lin and Fang Chih-min is undoubtedly correct--policy such as establishing base areas, building up political power according to plan, close cooperation between Red Army guerrillas and the broad peasant masses, their organization and training in struggle, deepening of the agrarian revolution, expanding armed forces by developing first township uprising forces, then district Red Guards, then county Red Guards, then local Red Army units, all the way up to the regular Red Army, and expanding political power by advancing in a series of waves. Only thus can we win the confidence of the revolutionary masses throughout the country, just as the Soviet Union has done throughout the world. Only thus can we create tremendous difficulties for the reactionary ruling classes, shake their very foundations and precipitate their internal disintegration. And only thus can we really create a Red Army that will be one of our important instruments in the coming great revolution. In short, only thus can we accelerate the revolutionary upsurge.

I wish to speak once more now about the reason why you make a relatively pessimistic--to my way of thinking--appraisal of the current situation. Your appraisal, I think, is exactly the opposite of that made by a group in the party who suffer from revolutionary impetuosity. Comrades who suffer from this malady unduly overestimate the subjective forces of the revolution and underestimate the objective forces. Such an appraisal stems largely from subjectivism. In the end, it will undoubtedly lead to the path of adventurism.

You have not made such a mistake. But you seem to have a fault in another respect, and that is, you underestimate somewhat the subjective forces and overestimate somewhat the objective forces. This is also an inappropriate appraisal and will inevitably produce another kind of bad result. You admit the weakness of the subjective forces and the strength of the objective forces, but you do not seem to understand the following important features:

1. Although the subjective forces of the revolution in China are weak, so are all organs (government, armed forces, parties, organizations, etc.) of the ruling classes with their foothold on the backward and fragile social and economic structure of China. This explains why revolution cannot break out at present in the countries of Western Europe where, although the subjective forces of revolution are much stronger than those in China, the forces of the ruling classes there are also many times stronger than those in our country. The subjective forces of the revolution in China are weak, but because the objective forces are also weak, the revolution will certainly move toward an upsurge more quickly in China than in Western Europe.
2. Since the defeat of the Great Revolution, the subjective forces of revolution have indeed been greatly weakened. The force that remains is to all appearances very small and this naturally makes some comrades (who judge by appearances) feel pessimistic. But it is a quite different thing if we look into the essence of the matter. Here the old Chinese proverb, "A single spark can start a prairie fire," is applicable. In other words, although the force is only a small one at present, it will rapidly develop. In China, as things stand, its development is not merely a possibility but a necessity. This was fully proved in the 30 May Movement and the Great Revolutionary Movement which followed. In studying an event, we must examine its essence and treat its appearance merely as a guide to the threshold of the essence. Once we have crossed the threshold, we must grasp the essence and put aside the appearance that serves as the guide. This alone is the reliable and scientific method of analysis which has revolutionary significance.
3. Similarly, in estimating the objective forces, we must never look merely at their appearance, but must study their essence. In the early period of our independent regime on the Hunan-Kiangsi border, a small number of comrades seriously believed in the incorrect appraisal made by the Hunan Provincial Party Committee of that time and regarded our class enemy as not worth a rap. The two phrases, "extremely shaky" and "exceedingly panicky," which have been passed on as standing jokes even to this day, were precisely the description used at that time (from May to June 1928) by the Hunan Provincial Party Committee in sizing up Lu-Ti-p'ing, the ruler of Hunan. Political adventurism necessarily ensued from such an appraisal. But during the approximately 4 months from November 1928 to February 1929 (before the war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords broke out), when the largest third joint expedition pressed forward to Ching-kang Mountains, a section of comrades raised the question, "How long can the Red flag be kept flying?" As a matter of fact, the struggle in China between Britain, the United States and Japan had by then become quite open, and the situation was taking shape for a fight between Chiang Kai-shek, Feng Yu-hsiang and the Kwangsi warlords.

In reality it was just the time when the counterrevolutionary tide began to ebb and the revolutionary tide to rise again. But during this very period not only was a pessimistic view found in the Red Army and local party organizations, but the party center was more or less perplexed by surface conditions and became pessimistic in its tone. The February letter from the Central Committee furnished proof of the pessimism shown by the party in its analysis at that time.

4. The present objective situation may still easily perplex those comrades who observe only the appearance of the existing conditions but not their essence. Those of us working in the Red Army, especially when defeated in battle, encircled on all sides or pursued by strong enemy forces, often unwittingly universalize and magnify what after all are only momentary, particular and local conditions, as if the whole situation in China and throughout the world was dark and gloomy, and the prospect of victory of the revolution dim and remote. They neglect the essence in making such an observation because they have not made a scientific analysis of the general situation. If it is asked whether the revolutionary upsurge will arise soon in China, we can give a definite answer only after studying carefully whether the contradictions leading to the revolutionary upsurge are really developing. Since contradictions are developing internationally between the imperialist countries, between the imperialist countries and their colonies, and between imperialism and the proletariat in these countries, the imperialists feel all the more urgently the need to contend for China. As the imperialists' contention for China intensifies, both the contradiction between the imperialist powers and the whole Chinese nation and the contradiction among the imperialists themselves develop simultaneously in China, a daily expanding and intensifying strife thus ensues between the various cliques of rulers in China and the contradictions between them develop daily. From these contradictions between the various cliques of rulers--the strife between the warlords--ensues an increase of taxation; thus the development of the contradiction between the broad masses of taxpayers and the rulers is accelerated with every passing day. From the contradiction between imperialism and Chinese capitalism, that is, the failure of the Chinese bourgeoisie to obtain concessions from imperialism, ensues an immediate intensification of the contradiction between China's bourgeoisie and the Chinese working class: the Chinese bourgeoisie must now intensify their exploitation of the working class. From the imperialist commodity aggression, the inroads made by Chinese merchant capital, and increase of taxation by the government--all of which are contradictory to the interests of the landlord class, ensues the sharpening of the contradiction between the landlords and the peasants, that is, exploitation by landlords in the form of rent and usury becomes heavier. Because of the pressure of foreign goods, the exhaustion of the purchasing power of the broad masses of workers and peasants, and increase of taxation by the government, dealers in domestic products and independent small producers are forced daily further on the road to bankruptcy. Because of the unrestricted expansion of [government] troops without sufficient provisions and funds to support them and the steady spread of war, the masses of soldiers constantly find themselves suffering from cold, hunger, exhaustion and

casualties. Because of the increase of taxation by the government, the mounting burden of rent and interest demanded by landlords, and the daily extension of the horrors of war, which leads to widespread famine and banditry throughout the country, the broad masses of peasants and the urban poor are brought to such a pass that they can hardly survive. Because funds are lacking for keeping schools open, many students are worried that they may not be able to continue their education. Because of the backwardness of production, graduates have little hope of obtaining employment. Once we understand all these contradictions, we shall see how desperately precarious the situation is, and how chaotic the state in which China finds herself. We shall also see how inevitably and soon the revolutionary upsurge against the imperialists, the warlords and the landlords will arise. China is littered all over with dry firewood which will soon be kindled and become a conflagration. The proverb, "A single spark can start a prairie fire," appropriately describes how the current situation will develop. We need only look at the nationwide development of workers' strikes, peasant uprisings, soldiers' mutinies, and strikes by merchants and students to see that it is no longer merely "sparks" but will undoubtedly not take long for these "sparks" to become "a prairie fire."

The gist of what is said above was given in a letter from the Front Committee to the Central Committee, dated 5 April 1929. It reads in part:

"The letter of the Central Committee (dated 9 February last year) gives too pessimistic an appraisal of the objective situation and our subjective forces. The [Kuomintang's] three campaigns of 'encirclement' against the Ching-kang Mountains marked the height of the counterrevolutionary tide. But there it stopped, and since then the counterrevolutionary tide has gradually receded while the revolutionary tide has been gradually rising. Although our party's fighting capacity and organizational strength have been weakened even to the extent described by the Central Committee, they will recover rapidly with the gradual ebbing of the counterrevolutionary tide and passivity among cadres in the party will also soon disappear. The masses will certainly come over to us. For not only has the [government] policy of massacre been 'driving the fish into deep water' but even reformism no longer appeals to the masses. It is certain that the illusions of the masses about the Kuomintang will quickly evaporate. In the situation that will arise, no party can compete with the Communist Party in winning over the masses. The political line and the organizational line laid down by the Party's 6th National Congress are quite correct: the revolution at the present stage is democratic and not socialist; the immediate task of the party is to win over the masses and not to stage immediate uprisings. But the revolution will rapidly develop, and in making propaganda and preparations for armed uprisings, a positive attitude should be adopted. In the great chaos of the current situation, only by putting forward positive slogans and by taking a positive attitude can we lead the masses. It is also certain that only by adopting such a positive attitude can the party recover its fighting capacity. We think that the party made a putschist mistake before, but that in some respects it now has a tendency toward abolitionism.... Proletarian leadership is the sole key to the victory of the revolution. The laying of the party's proletarian basis and establishment of the party branches in industrial enterprises in

key districts are the important organizational tasks of the party at present. But at the same time the development of struggles in the countryside, the establishment of Red political power in small areas, and creation and expansion of the Red Army are also main conditions for helping the struggle in the cities and accelerating the revolutionary upsurge. Therefore, it is the biggest mistake to abandon the struggle in cities and be immersed in guerrilla activities in rural areas. But in our opinion it is also a mistake for any of our party members to fear the development of the power of the peasants lest it become stronger than that of the workers and hence detrimental to the revolution. For the revolution in semi-colonial China will fail only if the peasant struggle is deprived of the leadership of the workers, and it will never suffer just because the peasants, through their struggle, become more powerful than the workers."

The letter also contains the following reply to the question of the Red Army's line of action:

"To preserve the Red Army and arouse the masses, the Central Committee wants us to divide up our forces into very small units and disperse them widely over the countryside, and that Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung leave the ranks so that the major targets will be hidden from the enemy. This is an idealistic way of thinking. To divide up our forces into company or battalion-size units, each operating on its own; to disperse them widely over the countryside; to arouse the masses through guerrilla activities; and to avoid becoming the enemy's target--all these we planned and tried on numerous occasions ever since the winter of 1927, but they all proved failures. The reasons are: (1) Most of the soldiers in the main force of the Red Army came from the outside and are different from the local Red guardsmen in their origin. (2) With small dispersed units, the leadership will become so weak as to be unable to cope with adverse circumstances, hence we shall be liable to suffer defeat. (3) Small units are easy for the enemy to crush separately. (4) The more adverse the circumstances, the greater becomes the need for the forces to be concentrated and for the leadership to conduct resolute struggle, for only thus can we achieve internal unity against the enemy. Only in favorable circumstances can the forces be divided for guerrilla operations, and it is only then that the leaders need not stay with the ranks all the time, as they must do in adverse circumstances..."

The defect of this passage is that the reasons given against the division of forces are of a negative character, and that is far from adequate. The positive reason for concentrating our forces is this: only concentration will enable us to wipe out comparatively large enemy units and occupy cities. Only after wiping out comparatively large enemy units and occupying cities can we arouse the masses on a large scale and build up a unified political power over a number of adjoining counties. Only thus can we arouse the attention of the people far and near (i.e., "expanding our political influence"), and make a material contribution toward accelerating the revolutionary upsurge. For instance, both the regime we created on the Hunan-Kiangsi border in the year before last and that created in western Fukien last year were the result

of our policy of concentrating the troops. This is the general principle. Are there, however, not times when the forces should be divided up? Yes, there are. The letter to the Central Committee from the Front Committee speaks of the Red Army's guerrilla tactics, including the division of forces within a short radius:

"The tactics we have worked out during the last 3 years in the course of the struggle are indeed different from any employed in ancient or modern times, in China or elsewhere. With our tactics, the struggles of the masses are daily expanding and no enemy, however powerful, can cope with us. Ours are guerrilla tactics. They consist mainly of the following points: "Disperse the forces to arouse the masses and concentrate the forces to deal with the enemy." "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy halts, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue." "In an independent regime with stabilized territory, we adopt the policy of advancing in a series of waves. When pursued by a powerful enemy, we adopt the policy of circling around in a whirling motion." "Arouse the largest number of the masses in the shortest possible time and by the best possible method." These tactics are just like casting a net. We should be able to cast the net wide or draw it in at any moment. We cast it wide to win over the masses and draw it in to deal with the enemy. Such are the tactics we have applied in the past 3 years."

Here, "to cast the net wide" means to divide up our forces for a short term. For example, when we first captured the county town of Yung-hsin on the Hunan-Kiangsi border, we divided up the 29th and 31st Regiments within the boundaries of Yung-hsin. Again, when we captured for the third time the county town of Yung-hsin, we divided our forces by dispatching the 28th Regiment to the border of An-fu, the 29th to Lien-hua and the 31st to the border of Chi-an County. And again, in April and May last year our troops were divided up in the counties of southern Kiangsi, and in July they were divided up in the counties of western Fukien. All these were appropriate examples. As to the dispersion of forces over a wide area, this is possible only under two conditions: when circumstances are comparatively favorable and when the leading body is comparatively sound. For the aim of dividing up our forces is to render ourselves more capable of winning over the masses, of deepening the agrarian revolution and establishing political power, and of expanding the Red Army and the local armed forces. It is better not to divide up the forces if it is impossible to attain these aims, or if division of forces could only lead to defeat and a weakening of the Red Army, as in August of the year before last when our forces were divided up on the Hunan-Kiangsi border for an attack on Ch'en-chou. If the two above-mentioned conditions are present, we should undoubtedly divide up the forces, because then division will be more advantageous than concentration. As for the division of forces under emergency circumstances to preserve our strength and avoid concentration of target for the enemy, I am opposed to that in principle. This is made clear in the letter from the Front Committee to the Central Committee quoted above. In addition, will there be a time when work should be done by dividing the forces because economic conditions do not permit concentration? That is possible, but I cannot make a positive conclusion, because we have not yet had concrete experience in this respect.

The February letter from the Central Committee was not written in the right spirit, and has exerted a bad influence on a number of comrades in the party in the 4th Army. Even you seemed to have been affected too. The Central Committee also issued at that time a circular stating that war between Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords might not break out. Since then, however, its appraisals and directives have in the main been correct. It has already issued another circular to correct the one containing the inadequate appraisal (as in fact it was only part of a larger circular). Although it did not make any formal correction as to the letter to the Red Army, its subsequent directives were entirely not tainted with such pessimism and its views on the Red Army's movements now completely agree with ours. Yet that letter remains a bad influence on a number of comrades. The Front Committee's reply to the letter of the Central Committee was made public within the party together with the Central Committee's letter, but it does not seem to have had a considerable influence on this section of comrades, because the letter from the Central Committee exactly suited their convictions. Meanwhile, many subsequent correct directives from the Central Committee on its appraisal of the current situation might not have been heeded by this section of comrades, or even if they have heeded them, they are still unable to erase completely the former impression given them. Thus I feel that even now it is still necessary to give some explanation on the question.

The plan to seize Kiangsi within a year was also proposed by the Front Committee to the Central Committee in April last year, and a resolution was subsequently passed at Yu-tu. I record as follows the reason given then in the letter to the Central Committee:

"The troops of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi warlords are drawing near each other in the environs of Chiu-chiang, and big battles will take place presently. The Kuomintang rule will consequently disintegrate and the revolutionary upsurge will arrive soon. In preparing our work in these circumstances, we feel that, so far as the southern provinces are concerned, the military forces of the compradors and landlords in Kwangtung and Hunan are too strong, while in Hunan, because of the party's putschist mistake, we have moreover lost almost all our mass following outside as well as inside the party. In the three provinces of Fukien, Kiangsi and Chekiang, however, the situation is different. First, the enemy's military strength there is at its feeblest. In Chekiang, there are only a small number of provincial guards under Chiang Po-ch'eng. In Fukien, though there are altogether 14 regiments under 5 commands, Kuo Feng-ming's brigade has already been smashed; the troops under the respective command of Ch'en Kuo-hui and Lu Hsing-pang are bandit forces of small fighting capacity; the two brigades of marines stationed along the coast have never seen action and certainly cannot have great fighting capacity; Chang Chen alone is comparatively able to fight; but even he, according to an analysis made by the Provincial Committee of Fukien, has under his command only two regiments of some fighting capacity. In addition, Fukien is now entirely in a state of confusion and disunity. In Kiangsi there are altogether 16 regiments under two commands--that of Chu P'ei-te and that of Hsiung Shih-hui; the military strength there is

superior to that of either Fukien or Chekiang, but still far inferior to that of Hunan. Secondly, we have committed fewer putschist mistakes in these three provinces. With the exception of Chekiang, where the situation is not quite clear to us, the party's organizations and mass following in both Kiangsi and Fukien are better than those in Hunan. Take Kiangsi for instance. There we still retain a fairly adequate basis in Te-an, Hsiu-shui and T'ung-ku in northern Kiangsi. In Ning-kang, Yung-hsin, Lien-hua and Sui-ch'uan in western Kiangsi the party and the Red Guards are still powerful. In southern Kiangsi the situation is even more hopeful, as the 2d and 4th Regiments of the Red Army tend to grow every day in counties like Chi-an, Yung-hsin and Hsing-kuo, and the Red Army under Fang Chih-min is by no means wiped out. All this places us in a position to close in on Nan-chang. We propose to the Central Committee that during the period of prolonged warfare between the Kuomintang warlords, we contend with both Chiang Kai-shek and the Kwangsi clique for Kiangsi and at the same time for the western parts of both Fukien and Chekiang. In these three provinces the Red Army should be expanded and an independent regime of the masses created. We set the time-limit at 1 year for accomplishing this plan. Within this year proletarian bases for struggle should be established in such places as Shanghai, Wusih, Ningpo, Hangchow, Foochow and Amoy, in order to provide leadership to the peasant struggles in the provinces of Chekiang, Kiangsi and Fukien. The Provincial Committee of Kiangsi must be made healthy and strong. An effort must be made to build workers' bases of Nan-chang, Chiu-chiang, Chi-an and the Nan-chang-Chiu-chiang Railway."

The above proposal to seize Kiangsi in 1 year erred in setting the time-limit mechanically at 1 year. The proposal to seize Kiangsi was based, in my opinion, on the consideration that the nationwide revolutionary upsurge would arise soon, apart from the conditions in the province itself. For if we had not been convinced of this, we could not possibly have arrived at the conclusion about the seizure of Kiangsi in a year. The only defect in the proposal was setting the time-limit mechanically at 1 year, thereby affecting the meaning of the word "soon" in the statement that "a revolutionary upsurge will arise soon" and making it smack more or less of mechanism and impetuosity. But you do not believe in the seizure of Kiangsi in a year, because you overestimate the objective forces and underestimate the subjective forces. Consequently, you do not believe in the arrival of the revolutionary upsurge soon, and hence your conclusion. As to the subjective and objective conditions in Kiangsi, they will deserve our attention. Apart from the subjective conditions as stated above to which I have no new opinion to add, three things concerning the objective conditions can now be clearly pointed out: First, the economy in Kiangsi is chiefly an economy of feudal vestiges, i.e., one of exploitation through land rent; the power of the merchant bourgeoisie is relatively weak; and the armed forces of the landlords are stronger than those in any other southern province. Second, Kiangsi has no troops of its own. It has always been garrisoned by troops from other provinces. Sent there for the "annihilation of Communists" or "annihilation of bandits," these troops are not very enthusiastic because they are unfamiliar with local conditions and do not feel such personal concern as native troops do.

And third, Kiangsi, unlike Kwangtung which is close to Hong Kong where almost all things are under British control, is comparatively free from the influence of imperialism. Once we have grasped these three points, we can explain why rural uprisings have been more widespread and the Red Army and guerrilla units more numerous in Kiangsi than in any other province.

I have now said roughly all I want to say to you. I have perhaps said too much, like a chatterbox. But I think our discussion of the question is good. If this question which we are discussing is really correctly settled, the influence on the action of the Red Army will be great. So I have written this with great pleasure.

Lastly there are still two points which need making clear. First, how to interpret the two words "arise soon" in the phrase "a revolutionary upsurge will arise soon" is a common question among many comrades. Marxists are not fortune-tellers. Of future developments and changes he should and can only point the general direction; he should not and cannot mechanically fix the day and the hour. My statement that the revolutionary upsurge in China will arise soon emphatically does not refer to something utterly devoid of significance for action, to a tantalizing phantom, which, in the words of some people, "may arise." It is like a ship on the sea whose masthead is already seen in the horizon by people standing on the shore. It is like the morning sun which, rising with radiant beams in the east, is already seen from afar by people standing on the top of a mountain. It is like an almost fully formed child stirring in its mother's womb. Second, when I say you want to extend our political influence by lighter, mobile guerrilla means, I do not mean that you have a purely military viewpoint and the mentality of a roving bandit. Obviously, you have neither, because neither has any idea of winning over the masses, while you advocate "winning over the masses without reservation." You not only advocate it, but are actually doing it. What I do not approve is your lack of a profound notion about establishing a [Red] political power, as a result of which the task of winning over the masses to accelerate the coming of the revolutionary upsurge will certainly not be satisfactorily accomplished as you wish. The principal purpose of my letter is to make clear this point.

Please correct me where I am wrong.

^o "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung," 1947 edition, Mao Tse-tung, Ku-t'ien, Shang-hang.

CSO: 4005

QUESTION OF RICH PEASANTS AFTER LAND DISTRIBUTION (Situation at Yung-hsin and in the Northern Party)

October 1930

[Text] Exploitation by the rich peasants of the Red area of Yung-hsin is done by (1) hoarding of grain to raise its price and (2) selling of industrial products. Hoarding of grain is in turn done by two methods: one, hoarding of their own surplus grain and two, buying of grain from poor peasants at very low prices, causing this year's serious spring famine. Because they wanted to hoard grain and raise its price, and as the maximum price of grain was set by the government, the rich peasants concealed all their grain, so that poor people and workers in the town had to subsist on thin gruel for a whole week. Even farm hands and poor peasants in rural villages, unable to buy grain, had to fight with starvation. Later, the county soviet led a spring famine struggle, waging a resolute fight against the rich peasants without making any concession, in a determined bid to hold down grain prices. The party acted in all districts and villages, leading Young Pioneers in throwing open storerooms and uncovering large amounts of grain concealed by the rich peasants in wine barrels, double walls, barns and under brick-covered yards and beds. As a result, there was enough grain for all and to spare. And when new grain was harvested, the rich peasants all brought their old grain to the town to sell. In selling industrial goods and doing small business the rich peasants make extraordinarily large profit. They deal mainly in salt, imported stockings, handkerchiefs, sugar and soap. They have money and various old social connections. They can buy in quantity what the poor peasants and farm hands cannot buy. (The above is reported by Wang Huai [3769/2037]; the following is by Ch'en Cheng-jen [7115/2973/0086])

The situation prevails not only in Yung-hsin, but also in the northern parts, where a spring famine struggle was also waged this year. There the rich peasants do business and make money like their counterparts in Yung-hsin. There is Chiu Ju-t'ang in Fu-t'ien which is smalltime capitalist. When there is a shortage of salt in the north, it goes to buy salt in Nan-chang. When supplies of printing ink and paper run short, it also buys them from Nan-chang. Consequently, it has friendly contacts with the leader of the Kuomintang lookout squads as well as old social connections. Chiu Ju-t'ang

sells salt and other goods at a very high price. In June-July it sold salt at 1 string and 600 coppers a catty. It owns two sewing machines and is opposed by all tailors and dressmakers of Fu-t'ien, as it takes away work from them. Because it sold goods at too high prices, the Fu-t'ien town soviet, acting on demands by the masses, had the proprietor of Chiu Ju-t'ang arrested and fined him 1,000 yuan. After the fine, he continued to do business in Fu-t'ien. After the capture of Chi-an, his business has grown even more. During the spring famine in the north, the rich peasants sold their grain in White areas. The spring famine struggle was to stop grain from flowing to White areas, permitting such flow only between Red areas.

CSO: 4005

INVESTIGATION IN TUNG-T'ANG AND OTHER AREAS

8 November 1930

[Text] On 30 October 1930, the Red Army Front Committee decided at Lo-fang on a policy of luring the enemy deep into our territory. On 6 November the Red Army moved from Hsia-chiang, crossed Kan-chiang and marched toward Yung-feng and Nan-ch'eng, while I went from Hsia-chiang to Chi-an to make arrangements for a withdrawal. On 7 November I passed the night at Tung-t'ang, arriving at Chi-an the following day. On the way I made some summary investigations. My investigations at Li-chia-fang have enabled me to know clearly the organization and activities of village and township level soviets in the agrarian struggle in these places. Prior to these investigations, my ideas of the situation were vague. These investigations have enabled me to find out the serious character of land distribution based on each village as a unit. Land is already distributed in several dozen counties in southwestern Kiangsi. The land law promulgated by the superior level government makes the distribution based on each township as a unit, and all personnel of superior-level organs presume that distribution is made with each township as a unit. The actual situation is quite different. Distribution is generally made with each village as a unit. Only in a few instances has it been made with each township as a unit. Such distribution based on each village--advantageous to the rich peasants but disadvantageous to poor peasants--should be changed.

I. Investigations in Tung-t'ang

Tung-t'ang village of the 15th township, T'ung-shui Ch'u, Chi-shui County.

The township consists of 1,000 families of 3,000 persons.

Land is distributed with each village as a unit.

The population of this village is 290.

The village government has a chairman and a secretary, both of whom provide their own food.

Land distribution is made at 1 tou 3 sheng per capita, yielding about 2.5 tan of grain. (1 tou of land yields 2 tan of grain.)

In some other villages the distribution is 1.5 tou per capita or 2 tou, which is the maximum. Distribution never exceeds 2 tou in this township.

Hu Te-shun, 48, is secretary of the village government and concurrently a teacher at the Common People's School. Eight persons eat in his house: he himself, his five children, his wife, and the wife of his eldest son. The eldest son, 25, is a tailor but also tills the land. The second son, 19, is learning to be a carpenter. He has gone to Yung-feng County to serve as an apprentice and has no money to send home. The third son, 14, is learning to do wickerwork. He too, being still an apprentice, has no money to send home. The fourth son, 7, goes to school. The fifth son is only 3 years old. The family had 1 shih 3 tou and 8 sheng of land in the past, yielding 27 tan of grain a year. When there was not enough grain to eat, the family lived on sweet potatoes and kept pigs for sale. The eldest son already earned some money and tilled the land besides. They owed a debt of 300 strings of copper cash. The eight-member family receives a total of 1 shih and 4 sheng of land as a result of the recent land distribution, but the land is divided and 3 tou and 4 sheng is taken out of it.

For 70 or 80 li round from Chi-antown to Chin-t'an, T'ung-shui and Fu-t'ien, almost all female members of families weave cloth. The output is considerable. Yarn (foreign yarn) is provided the peasant families by merchants, rich peasants and landlords. The process of capitalists undermining household side-occupation has not yet ended.

II. Investigations in Ta-ch'iao

This belongs to the 9th township of Chint'an Ch'u, Chi-shui County. It is 50 li from Chi-an.

The Ch'u is divided into 13 townships.

This township is divided into 5 villages.

This village is Tach'iao Village.

Chairman of the township government is Sun Hsiu-en.

The population of Liu-chia of Kao-k'eng is 570. Distribution of land is 9 lo or 4.5 shih per capita. The population of T'ang-chia of Kao-k'eng is 110, with each person also receiving 9 lo. Each of the 50 persons of Wu-chia of Kao-k'eng also receives 9 lo. The three villages of Liu, T'ang and Wu have one government in common. The distribution is 9 lo per capita in all three villages.

The Kuo clan of Ta-ch'iao village, with 1,027 persons, receives 8 lo per capita, or 2 tou of land, yielding 4 tan of grain. The Lo clan of Shen-chiang Market, with a population of 210 in two villages under one government, receives 8 lo per capita.

The two villages of Kuo and Lo receive 8 lo per capita, because the land here is better. The distribution in the three villages of Liu, T'ang and Wu is 9 lo per capita, because the land here is poorer. The average per capita consumption of grain is 10 lo (5 tan) a year.

Late crop rice can be grown on one-third of the land of each village. This cannot be done in the remaining two-thirds of the land because of lack of water. The two kinds of land, that which can grow late crop rice and that which cannot, are mixed in distribution, so that each person receives some of each kind. The 8 or 9 lo refers to the combined yield of early and late crops. As the per capita consumption is 10 lo a year, he who receives 8 lo is 2 lo short and he who receives 9 lo is 1 lo short. The shortage is made good in two ways: One is working at the crafts, such as cloth dyeing, rice processing, carpentry, blacksmithing, tailoring, etc. Over 300 persons have gone to other places to work. Of these, 170 or 180 have gone to Kanchow, mainly as millers, tailors and small merchants. About 100 persons have gone to Chi-an, mainly to work at rice milling and cloth dyeing. All these persons receive their share of land at home. The township does not produce coarse grain. Two are weaving cloth. The female members of every family weave cloth. Each "piece" of cloth is over 12 chang or 130 ch'ih long and is worth 400 copper cash in wages. A worker who is fast takes 10 days to weave one piece and will get 1,200 copper cash a month in wages. A worker who is not fast, or who has to look after small children besides, will not be able to finish one piece in 10 days. The rich peasants and small-time merchants bring foreign yarn from Chi-an and allot it to the villagers and families. Those whose work is not satisfactory are paid 300 coppers a piece or even as little as 200. Some even have to pay for the yarn spoiled. In addition to the cash payment, a worker receives also 2 taels of yarn for every piece of cloth woven. The yarn is enough for 2 ch'ih of cloth, and each ch'ih is worth 100 to 110 coppers. It is this extra payment in yarn that provides the peasants with clothing. The 120-copper a month is enough for cooking oil and salt. Working at crafts and weaving cloth together constitute the main source of income that makes up for the grain shortage. At present there is not much work to do either in weaving or the crafts. The workers who have gone to Kanchow have not yet returned. Of the 100 men who went to Chi-an, 50 or 60 have come back.

This township has not yet set up a school.

A recent order from this Ch'u will have 20 volunteers for the Red Army from each township. Eighteen have responded, all voluntarily. A rally was held today at Wu-kang Ch'u Government to send them off.

III. Investigations in Li-chia-fang

Li-chia-fang is the 19th township, Ju-fang Ch'u, Chi-an. (About 40 li from Chi-an)

This township has nine villages under six village-level governments.

Of the nine villages, six are large and three small.

The six large villages are Li-chia-fang, Shang-chao-t'ang, Ts'ang-hsia, Hsu-yuan, Chin-pi and Chou-yuan. The three small ones are Yen-chia-fang, Hsiao-li-chia-fang and Yang-p'ing-chou. The three small villages and Li-chia-fang are under one government, while each of the remaining five large villages has its own government.

The village government of Li-chia-fang is run by four persons: one chairman, one secretary, one officer in charge of land and grain, and one in charge of communications and concurrently cooking. The chairman, secretary and communications officer who is concurrently the cook live and work in the government building and eat at public expense. The officer in charge of land and grain administration lives in his own home and eats his own meals. He is provided with meals only when he works at the government office.

The village government's expenses are: (1) Regular meals for three plus meals for an average of two persons a day. At 10 cents per person each day, it comes to 15 yuan a month. (2) Office expenses for lamps, oil, paper and pens, 3 yuan. (3) Every time Red Guards and Young Pioneers are sent out on a mission they are paid expenses for straw sandals, haircut, cigarettes. Sometimes they are paid 500 and other times 1 string of coppers (Actual expenses are defrayed; overpayment is returned, underpayment is made up for.) In the nine attacks on Chi-an, they sometimes went on a mission for a month before returning. These pocket expenses amounted to 3 yuan a month on the average in the past. In the past, the village government had also to pay for their food. Later, the township government paid for their food and the village government gave them pocket expenses. These three items amounted to a total of 21 yuan.

In the past nine persons worked for the village government. There were the chairman, secretary, finance officer, procurement officer, land officer, grain officer, judge, communications officer and the cook. All nine worked in the government office and were provided with board.

The revolutionary force was in control from early in the 1st month this year to the 19th of the third month, and again from the fourth day of the sixth month to the fourth day of the ninth month. In the period from the 20th of the third month to the third of the sixth month when the reactionary force was in control, the village government was abolished and the responsible persons fled to Fu-t'ien. From the fifth day of the ninth month up to the present, only four persons work regularly in the government. More money was required when nine persons worked in the office.

In the period from the tenth of the first month to the 19th of the third month, and again from the fourth of the sixth month to the fifth of the ninth month, the township government comprised the chairman, a secretary, buyer, treasurer, cultural officer, lang officer, grain officer, judge, communications officer, a cook, three women officers, three Young Pioneers (the leader, the deputy leader and an instructor and concurrently secretary), and one leader of the Children's Corps, a total of 18 [sic] persons. They were all provided with board by the government. From the sixth of the ninth month up to the present

the number of officers has been reduced to seven: the chairman, a secretary, an officer in charge of land and grain, a cultural officer, the chairman of the Woman's Committee, the leader of the Red Guards who doubles for the cook, and another secretary who is the "Confiscations Commissar" and concurrently the officer who "goes to the villages to do propaganda on the expansion of the Red Army." These seven persons regularly live and have their meals in the government offices. The four members of the Woman's Committee eat their meals at the government office when they have official work to do, otherwise they stay at home. The work of these four women members consists of going to the villages to organize working women to serve as Red Guards, comforting squads and washing squads, and doing propaganda to get the men to serve in the Red Army.

In the second month this year eight men from this township went to join the Red Army. During the second attack on Chi-an on the 18th of the sixth month, two men from each village or a total of 18, went to join the Red Army. During the seventh attack on Chi-an in the seventh month, another seven men went. After the ninth attack on Chi-an on the 13th of the eighth month, another 46 men went. These have been placed in the Independent Regiments and are receiving training at the command post of the 2d Independent Regiment at Ta-t'ang. Altogether 80 persons from this township have gone to join the Red Army. They all did so after being agitated. But of the last batch of 46, 4 or 5 were unwilling to join up and wept. They went reluctantly.

This township comprises nine villages: Li-chia-fang (of the surname of Hu, over 220 persons), Hsiao-li-chia-fang (surname of Li, 30 persons), Yeh-chia-fang (surname of Yeh, 45 persons) and Yang-p'ing-chou (surname of Tung, 24 persons); these four villages have a population of 327 (155 male and 172 female). Shang-chao-t'ang, (surname of Liu, 200 persons); Ts'ang-hsia, surname of Yen, 315 persons (150 male and 165 female); Hsu-yuan, surname of Chou, 300 persons; Chin-pi, 190 persons; and Chou-yuan, 372 persons (176 male and 196 female). The nine villages have a total population of 1,404.

The four villages headed by Li-chia-fang have altogether 921.1 mou of fields. In Li-chia-fang each person receives 2.7 mou, yielding 7 tan of grain. In Yeh-chia-fang each person receives 3 mou, yielding 6 tan of grain. In Hsiao-li-chia-fang each person receives 2 mou, yielding 5.5 tan of grain. In Yang-p'ing-chou each person receives 2.5 mou, yielding 5.5 tan of grain. Of the remaining 17.9 mou of Li-chia-fang, 6 mou has been transferred to Hsiao-li-chia-fang and another 6 to Yeh-chia-fang. Only 5.9 mou remains "communal property." After distribution in Yang-p'ing-chou, 2.3 mou remains "communal property." This remainder after distribution is difficult to divide up again. So it is public land of the village government, which rents it out at a rate of 60 percent of the yield. This rent in kind helps to defray public expenses.

Shang-chao-t'ang Village has 820 mou of fields. Each person receives 2.4 mou, yielding 2.5 tan of grain. After the distribution, 29.2 mou remains "communal property."

Ts'ang-hsia Village has 690.3 mou of fields. Each person receives a share that yields 7.8 tan of grain.

Hsu-yuan has over 820 mou of fields. Method of distribution: Each person who stays in the village receives 3.5 mou. The land is good, each mou yielding 5 lo (2 lo make 1 tan), so that 3.5 mou yields 17 lo. Each worker receives 1.75 mou, or half of what a peasant gets. Each person who has left to work elsewhere receives 1.4 mou.

Chin-pi Village has 489 mou of fields. Each person receives 2.7 mou, yielding 6 lo of grain. Those who have left to work elsewhere get nothing.

Chou-yuan Village has 510.5 mou of fields. Each person receives 2.2 mou and gets 6 lo of grain from it. Those who have left the village get nothing.

After the Red Army captured Chi-an, four members of the reactionary lookout squad--the leader, his deputy, the secretary and a platoon leader--were taken prisoner in Chi-an. They were sent under escort to T'ung-shu-p'ing Ch'u Government and executed. All ordinary members of the squad joined in the revolution in this township and no one went to Chi-an. Three platoon leaders and 10 group leaders who stayed at home were not executed. They were permitted to join in the revolution.

Yen Ch'un-wen, chairman of the township government, owned 8 mou of fields, yielding 24 lo of grain at only 3 lo a mou, and supporting a family of four. At the first distribution of land in the seventh month, when both those at home and those who had left to work elsewhere received a share, Yen's family had 1.2 mou taken away from him, so that he now owned only 6.8 mou, capable of yielding 20 lo of grain or 5 lo for each member of the family. After the capture of Chi-an in the eighth month another distribution was made. This time those who had left and found work elsewhere received nothing. Only those who stayed behind and those who had left but could not find work elsewhere were given a share of 2.2 mou. Since the family already had 8 mou, it received 0.8 mou. The family owed a debt of 500 strings of coppers in the past. A daughter (7 years old) was sold in Chi-an (the buyer was from Kanchow, but operated a money-lending shop in Chi-an called Ho Mao) for 100 yuan. This the family paid the creditor, but another 200 strings of coppers was still outstanding. Another daughter (newly born) was given away to the Catholic Church in Chi-an, for which the family received nothing.

IV. Investigations in Hsi-i-t'ing

This is one of the villages of the 23d township of Ju'fang Ch'u of Chi-an. It is 15 li from Chi-an.

Ju-fang Ch'u comprises over 30 townships.

There are nine village governments in this township.

Hsi-i-t'ing Village has a population of about 600.

The village government is run by five persons; the chairman, a secretary, grain officer, land officer and a woman officer. They all provide their own meals, as the village government does not provide board. But when they gather together for some business (such as a conference), the village government will provide them with meals.

Public funds of the ancestral temple and other religious pools are combined for the use of the village government.

The village government's expenses consist of payments to Red Guards and Young Pioneers who are sent out on missions (as in the attacks on Chi-an and in attending conferences) and to soldiers of the Independent Regiments for their meals (10 cents a day for each man). This is the only payment. No money is given for straw sandals, haircuts or cigarettes.

Nineteen persons work for the township government: one chairman, two secretaries (one works for the township government and the other for the Red Guards), a cultural officer, buyer, grain officer, land officer, Red Guards officer, social insurance officer, two women (one chairman of the Women's Committee, one in charge of organization), a cook, a communications officer, one leader of Red Guards brigade, three leaders of Red Guards teams, one Red Guards instructor, and one Young Pioneer leader. This township government began working on the ninth day of the sixth month. It was unstable, because the reactionaries of Chi-an often came to this township to arrest people, and when the enemy came the government moved out. It was only after the capture of Chi-an that township work began to develop. The reactionaries took away 10 people, two of them were executed. After the capture of Chi-an, the eight prisoners were released, and over 20 reactionaries from this township were seized in Chi-an. Of these, six of the more brutal were executed, a number was released after paying a fine, and the remaining were sent under escort to T'ung-shup'ing Ch'u Government. The government is very busy now distributing land and grain, opposing debts, and setting up a school.

Land distribution is being made right now in this township. Distribution is already made in five villages, taking each village as a unit. But an order has come from the superior level, stating that distribution should be made on the basis of taking each township as a unit, so that distribution has got to be made again. The opinion of the various villages is that distribution should be made on the basis of taking each village as a unit where the land owned by the village is extensive and each township as a unit where the land owned by the various villages is small. Of the nine villages of this township, eight want the distribution based on village as a unit, only one wants it based on township as a unit.

The five villages where distribution is already made are Ting-t'ang, Pan-chi-k'ang, T'a'shui, Hsin-t'ang and Hsia-shang. In Ting-t'ang the distribution is 2 mou (yielding between 4 and 5 lo) per capita. In Pan-chi-k'ang it is 2.5 mou per capita. In T'ashui and Hsiashang it is also 2 mou per capita, but in Hsin-t'ang it is only 0.8 mou per capita. Hsin-t'ang has little land and wants distribution based on the township as a unit. Though the land of

Hsin-t'ang, with a population of about 200 all surnamed Huang, is small, it is all good land (with no flooding disasters), some high, some low.

Chi-an has been captured for more than a month, but distribution of land is not yet accomplished in this township. It will take another 5 or 6 days to complete.

The anti-debts struggle means creditors are required to surrender the promisory notes they hold, so they may be destroyed. Of the nine villages, only Kuan-t'ien has so far surrendered all promisory notes to the township government, but they are not yet destroyed.

The chairman of the township government has been dismissed by the Ch'u Government. Wang Yu-t'ang, the new chairman, has been here only 5 days.

Liu Ch'uan-sheng, the previous chairman, is a carpenter. His family of three owns 1.8 mou of land. He was made chairman in the sixth month.

Ju-heng and Fang-k'uo were formerly two districts, but are now combined into one under the name of Ju-heng Ch'u. The new chairman if this township government comes from Ju-heng, but this township formerly belonged to Fang-k'uo Ch'u. Wang Yu-t'ang, a carpenter, owns 5 mou of land which yields 18 lo of grain for his family of four. Besides being a carpenter, Wang also tills the land. Over 70 men from this district have joined the Red Army. Of these, over 40 are Young Pioneers, teenagers who are very brave.

The District Government is situated in T'ung-shup'ing. Its chairman, Ch'en Chun-pin, is a rice miller.

o "Rural Surveys," Liberation Press, July 1947

8564
CSO: 4005

LAND DISTRIBUTION IN WESTERN KIANGSI

12-15 November 1930

[Text] These are delegates' reports made during the expanded conference of the western Kiangsi Mobile Commission held on 12 November 1930 and the expanded conference of the Provincial Mobile Commission held on 15 November. I made brief notes during the conferences, and, although they are very sketchy, from them one can see a small part of the land struggle in southwestern Kiangsi.

1. Distribution of Fields

Ch'un-hua: Townships are separated by as much as 10 li. In one township the good and the bad [fields] were grouped for even distribution. The first distribution took place in December of last year (1929). The second distribution took place in March of this year, taking the original tiller as the basic unit and taking from those with more to compensate those with less. Now the third distribution is taking place, using the fertile [land] to compensate for the infertile. Distribution is beginning, and will take over 10 days to complete.

Ju-yen: In December of last year (1929), the fields of the bad gentry and landlords were distributed, but public fields and the fields of wealthy farmers had not yet been distributed. In March of this year, all [fields] were confiscated and distributed in accordance with productive capacity. In May, all [fields] were confiscated for the third time and distributed according to physical labor. Yet it was not thoroughly equal in that some fertile land was taken from those with more fertile land while some infertile land was taken from those having more infertile land. Equalization has not yet been accomplished by division into three classes, A, B and C. The majority used the village as the basic unit.

Shui-tung: The township was used as the basic unit for all three distributions. During the first, in January of last year, land was taken from those with more to compensate those with less. During the second, in June, fertile land was taken to compensate for the infertile, but it was still incomplete

and many persons were dissatisfied with it. The third distribution is now in process. Land committee members of the various townships were concentrated at district level and land commissions were organized for mutual assistance in distribution, and to carry out the taking of fertile land to compensate for the infertile. When Chi-an was opened, over 1,000 people returned from the city and received land in the same manner as others. On completion of this distribution, distribution will have been completed in 13 out of 17 townships.

Western District: Two distributions have been made. During the second one in August of this year, although distribution was made in three classes, upper, middle and lower, with the good and the bad [fields] distributed equally, it was actually not complete. The township was the basic unit. The township is too big, with the district fields being as much as 6 or 7 li away and unwanted by the farmers.

Recently the District Commission announced that the third distribution would be complete, taking fertile land to compensate for infertile land, and burning tax records and land titles, with five inspectors dispatched by the district to assist in the distribution.

Ju-fang: The first [distribution] was in January of this year, with the good and the bad [fields] distributed equally. It was incomplete--public fields remained. In some cases the township was the basic unit and in some cases the village was the basic unit. The second was in May, when the masses took the defector leaders' fields and distributed them to the poor people (those receiving distributed land for the first time). In the third (the current one), equal distribution was made to the upper, middle and lower classes. Territory newly seized in the three or four townships in the Nan-yu-miao area has not been completely distributed. Distribution is complete in Hsi-yi-t'ing, where the township was the basic unit.

An-fu: Distribution has not yet been made in places where there have been no defectors--distribution was made first in places where there had been defections, with 10 days to complete distribution which was to be totally equal. Distribution is half complete in seven districts, two-thirds complete in five districts, and has not yet been done in the remaining turncoat places. Among the nine districts in the county, the First District is not turncoat at all, one-third of the Second District is not turncoat, half of the Third District is not turncoat, one-third of the Fourth District is not turncoat, three-fifths of the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Districts is not turncoat, half the Eighth District is not turncoat, the Ninth District--the city--is completely turncoat, as is the 30-li area around the city. The reason some areas are not turncoat is that they border on the red areas of Yung-hsin, Lien-hua and Yuan-chou. All non-turncoat places are "weak and small minority peoples" who have been oppressed by the large villages. Distribution of fields has been completed in all such places, taking from those with much to compensate those with little, but not yet taking the fertile to compensate for the infertile land.

Tung-ku: The township was the basic unit. Land was distributed in July of last year (1929), taking fertile land to compensate for the infertile, and equalizing by division into three classes: A, B and C. The second distribution has not yet taken place. Later, because those serving in the Red Army had returned their land to the government, such land in the various villages was given to the villagers to till. The masses of the people clamored, so the fields were evenly divided in July of last year under the slogan "Group for evenness."

Hsia-chiang: In the first distribution which took place in January and February of this year, the fields of the local tyrants and evil gentry were divided. Public fields were divided during the second distribution held in March. Fields of wealthy farmers were divided in the third distribution held in April and May, completing the distribution by taking the fertile to compensate for the infertile [fields]. Taking the village as the basic unit, there were unwanted fields because there was much land and few people. Two distributions have taken place in the newly developed areas. The first distribution was carried out in haphazard fashion 2 weeks ago. The second and current distribution must be completed in 5 days. The good and the bad [fields] are being combined for even distribution.

Shui-han: The first was made in March of this year, taking from those with much to compensate those with little. For the second distribution carried out during August along the border of the White areas, land was taken from those with much to compensate those with little, but the fertile were not taken to compensate for the infertile. In the remainder, fertile [land] was taken to compensate for the infertile. Special distribution of good fields, however, was made to responsible members of the party headquarters and the farmers were directed to help work such fields.

Ju-lin: The first distribution took place in March of this year, taking from those with much to compensate those with little. In May the entire district defected. In June the guard units were overthrown, and the second distribution of fields took place, with the fertile taken to compensate for the infertile in several townships, but in the great majority of townships distribution was performed in name only. This was because the AB group was in control there. The township was the basic unit with the village being the basic unit only under special circumstances.

Yung-hsin: In the Northwestern Special District, the old, young, and crippled who had no tilling capability received an additional half-share. It was also so resolved at the first County Delegates' Plenary Conference, in addition, it was resolved to add to those receiving the additional half-share those "working personnel" whose dependents did not have a tilling capability. This was carried out in part of the Northwestern Special District, but was rejected by the Special Western Route Working Committee, because it stemmed from a charitable view, and was derided by some as the "Orphan and Widow Line." In Yung-hsin land distribution was performed twice throughout the county, the first after Lung-yuan-k'ou was opened, the second was carried out in September after being decided upon by the Western Route Working Committee in June. Distribution has still not been completed

in one-fifth of the county: the entire First District (city), half of the Fourth District (Nan-hsiang), and the entire Fifth District (Tung-hsiang). The farmers of Yung-hsin wished to use production capacity as the standard for the distribution of fields, and this was accepted at the County Delegates Plenary Conference.

Chi-shui: County seat and Feng-shui fields have been distributed; [fields in] Chin-t'an have not.

"Distribute to people who can be seen." "Group good with bad." "Distribution was poor at the outset."

The "Honan Fellows" are a difficult problem. In the township of Ku-ts'un, each person received only 2 tan worth of land [production capacity].

Wan-an: The village was the basic unit. By the second distribution, the fertile were taken to compensate for the infertile.

Fen-yi: Fields distributed with the village as the basic unit. Division was by [amounts of] grain, not by field. Over 2,000 houses were burned by the counterrevolutionaries, and for more than 20 li there were no old houses.

2. The Barren [Fallow] Field Situation

Tung-ku: Each person received a minimum of 16 tan of grain (a tan is about 80 catties); many fields were uncultivated. A large portion of the hills were fallow because it cost too much to harvest peaches; nor were the hills dug up.

Ch'un-hua: Fields capable of producing 400 or 500 baskets lay fallow because (1) the March distribution occurred when farming was busy, the farmers had no family property, furniture or equipment, the land distributed was poor and distant, and (2) manpower was inadequate because of the elder sons serving in the Red Army and working outside (that is to say 2,700 or 2,800 persons).

Shui-tung: Several li were fallow. This was because Lin-shui at the Red-White border was frequently harassed by the reactionaries of Chi-an city. Several hundred guards were required daily. Three lines of guards were posted, and were frequently killed by the enemy at night.

Shui-nan: Fields [capable] of [producing] several hundred tan of grain lie fallow because, when public fields are reserved, the farmers are unwilling to rent them for tilling. "Having received distribution of fields [capable] of [producing] several tan of grain, I have enough to eat, and am unwilling to till public fields."

Ju-lin: Fields of several thousand tan of grain lie fallow, with no one to harvest the ripe grain. This is because the fields belonged to the

guards of the reactionary landlords and wealthy farmers, and when these people fled, the government did not distribute the fields to the farmers, so the farmers had no responsibility to till or harvest them (Ju-lin is a district near the city of Chi-an).

An-fu: Fields of 6,000 tan of grain lie fallow in the Tao-p'u and Ch'ung-wen Districts, because reactionary farmers are afraid to return to their homes in view of revenge-ism for slaughter. It was also because the distribution of fields was not thorough, having been on the basis of numbers only. Both reasons stemmed from the mischief-making led by the wealthy farmers. An-fu has much land and few people. Most of the people from Hunan, Yung-hsin and Honan work fields in An-fu. If you will only pay their taxes to the government, they will give you their fields to work. Why are there so few people? It is because many die because of poor sanitation.

Hsin-yu: Fields of several hundred tan of grain lie fallow in three Red districts because part of the people left to serve in the Red Army. Some [fields] are also fallow near the Red-White border.

Fen-yi: Fields of several tans of grain lie fallow.

Yung-hsin: Generally speaking, no fields are fallow, with total fields of less than 100 tan of grain lying fallow.

Kung-nan: Much land lies fallow in all Red-White border areas.

3. The Problem of Distributing Land to Workers

The farmers of Yung-hsin opposed the sharing of land equally with the workers, but the Yung-hsin Delegates Plenary Conference did not accept this view.

In one district in Tai-ho the wages of workers were reduced after the distribution of land to them, but the wages were later restored.

In Chi-an, workers who worked for less than a half-year received their distribution of land accordingly, whereas those who worked for more than half the year received a half-share of land.

4. The Problem of Distributing Hills

The Yung-hsin Delegates Plenary Conference resolved that the township would be the basic unit in tea-producing hills, with equal distribution made according to population.

The Chi-an Delegates Plenary Conference (October 1930) resolved that bamboo-covered and tree-covered hills would not be divided but would be controlled by the township soviet and used by the farmers. Those needing bamboo or wood must get the government's permission to cut [bamboo or trees]. Reeds and grass may be freely cut and taken from hills.

Tea-oil hills in Yung-hsin, Hsia-chiang, Yen-fu, Ju-hsing, Tung-ku, T'ai-ho and the Western District have all been equally divided. Ju-fang and Ch'un-hua have no hills producing tea and oil. The hills of Wan-an have not been divided.

Fen-yi: On 5 November of this year (1930), the Provincial Mobile Commission dispatched Liu Lin-tung to participate in the County Mobile Commission, which passed by the County Workers Farmers and Soldiers Plenary Conference. The method was: "Hills worth over 300 yuan will be turned over to the soviets. Hills worth less than 300 yuan will be controlled by the original owners." In May and June of this year (before the 2d Plenary Conference), however, because of the receipt of orders from higher authority (the Fourth Expanded Conference of the Northern Route Mobile Commission), the township had already been taken as the basic unit in equal distribution of hills, although no meeting had been held in this county. This decision was reversed in November, and the farmers were very dissatisfied.

There are seven types of hills: (1) lumber [producing], (2) miscellaneous food, (3) raw material, (4) bamboo and wood (large and small), (5) firewood (reed and grass hills and firewood hills), (6) mines and (7) barren hills.

o Investigations of Farming Villages, Liberation Press, July 1947.

CSO: 4005

MISTAKES IN LAND STRUGGLE IN KIANGSI

14 November 1930

[Text] On 14 November 1930, the Kiangsi Provincial Committee met in Chi-an. After the reports of Comrades Ch'en Yi, Ch'en Cheng-jen, and Ma Ming, I spoke as the representative of past committee members, pointing out that the line continually followed within the Western and Southern Kiangsi Party after the "Second Plenary Conference" of cancelling land reform had been discussed in conference, and all acknowledged that a determined struggle must be carried out against this incorrect line. The following are a few important points which I recorded during the reports of Comrades Ch'en Yi, Ch'en Cheng-jen and Ma King, and only I can understand many of them.

Ju-lin District: Wash away loyal comrades, leaving the homogeneous AB group.

Red areas: Wealthy farmers control the economy.

Yung-hsin: Wealthy farms control the food. The government's policy of suppressing wealthy farmers is correct.

District Committee secretaries do not visit townships to inspect.

The views of the Central Committee and higher authority are not transmitted to lower levels.

"Kill all wealthy farmers and landlords."

"Must divide firmly."

Use the White Terror in discussing the policy of wealthy farmers cheating poor farmers, "White Symbol."

When the line is not clearly specified, the wealthy farmers will encircle and deceive, as was the case in the Fourth District Committee of Yung-hsin (Ma Ming is the secretary).

Distribution of the fields of the Eastern Route has not been completed at all.

In the Southern Route, distribution has only been completed in the Hsing-kuo and Kung counties.

Tseng is a superior man.

Eighty percent of the Jui-chin Party is landlords and wealthy farmers; over 80 excellent party members, over 30 landlords and wealthy farmers including the head of the counterrevolutionary guard unit. No fields have been distributed in 2 months. The grain of the local tyrants remnants has been taken away.

The youth of the masses of the East Route are brave, the Youth Corps is cowardly.

Women have not struggled.

"Everything must be divided, this is the farmers' consciousness."

There [are] many wealthy farmers but few poor farmers in the tea hills. Failure to divide tea hills is to the benefit of the wealthy farmers.

Village peoples' schools are also benefits of the wealthy farmers, inasmuch as the children of poor farmers have to work, so few of them attend school.

Wealthy farmers order the masses to fight to protect the interests of the wealthy farmers. The officers of the Hsin-feng Red Guards are all wealthy farmers. "Seize names," "adjust fields," "fight butchers," "fines."

With the slogan of protecting Red areas, the wealthy farmers of the north-western townships of Hsin-feng incite Red troops to desert and return home. The wealthy farmers are an obstacle to the expansion of the Red Army.

The problem of preferential treatment for Red Army dependents. In Yung-hsin, preferential treatment was not afforded to Red Army volunteers, and no assistance was provided in tilling their fields. The dependents of those dispatched by the government were treated preferentially.

Hsin-feng: Those members of local Red defense units killed or wounded in action were treated preferentially. Those killed or wounded in action in the 22d Army were ignored. The wealthy farmers played tricks.

Only wealthy farmers opposed freedom of marriage. Saying "The farmers oppose it" is a lack of differentiation.

At the Second Plenary Conference, eliminate farmers, cancel land reform.

Li Wen-lin went to the Southern Route on 24 August. He did not make a specialized report on land reform. There was no specialized discussion.

At the Southern Route Expanded Conference of 15 July, Ch'en Yi put forth eight principles such as immediate distribution of fields and harvesting of grain, taking from those with much to compensate those with little, taking the fertile to compensate for the infertile, unconditional distribution of housing, division of hills and woods, division of ponds, and so on, which were promulgated by the Southern Kiangsi Revolutionary Committee.

The wealthy farmers of Jui-chin and Yu-tu [7184 6757], citing Article 14 of the "Western and Southern Kiangsi Land Law"--the original tiller should be the owner--spoke loudly of not violating the land law, but their violation was counterrevolution, even to the extent of "fighting." The Revolutionary Committee had to issue this official announcement.

There was some interaction between the two cooks at the Expanded Conference. "It's hereditary, so now he wants to be chairman too?"

Afraid that the communists "won't talk, just chop off heads."

"Even if you paid your rent in years past, this field can't be worked!"

Red Army wives and freedom of marriage.

"Will you serve in the Red Army? If you serve in the Red Army, I cannot marry you." "If people report that you have been killed in the Red Army, must I still observe the festivals for you?" "Eight yuan for 80 catties of meat." "Yesterday I went to him, today I go to the Chairman. That's freedom." "Reporting to the West River Combined Conference, Ch'en Chi-chung washed away the atmosphere of Ch'en Yi (After 9 days of meetings, Ch'en Yi had resolved a detailed land law. Arriving on the tenth day, Ch'en Chih-chung cancelled it.)

"Confiscation of the land of the landlords and dividing it equally is only a temporary measure rather than an objective, nor will it develop a land law of proletarian consciousness."

Hsieh Han-ch'ang transmitted the message in the Northern Route: "Using labor is the standard in the poor farmers' consciousness."

The body strength of poor farmers does not equal that of wealthy farmers (poor farmers have nothing to eat); nor are the sons of poor farmers strong.

Li Tui-ts'ung said, "At the Second Plenary Conference no one had a grasp [of the subject], so the land question could not be discussed."

In the Western Route the message was transmitted (by Chou Kao-ch'ao): "To divide everything is the poor farmers' consciousness."

On 28 October an expanded conference was held at Hsin-feng by the Southern Route Mobil Commission, at which Kuo transmitted the message: "Take the fertile to compensate for the infertile, make thoroughly equal distribution." Yet after a day and a half of meetings, it had not been discussed, and there was no resolution.

The two lines of Southern Kiangsi (as stated by Ch'en Yi):

"Yung-hsin is not the wealthy farmers' line. I oppose," said Ma.

"I don't agree with entering deeply into land reform," Tuan Liang-pi said to Ch'en Cheng-jen.

"To expand and deepen simultaneously is the total farmer consciousness.

"To fail to attack Chi-an, and to attack Kiu-kiang later, will irrevocably lose the high tide of the Chinese revolution," so reported the Special Committee to the Central Committee.

o Investigations of Farming Villages, Liberation Press, July 1947.

CSO: 4005

HARVEST DISTRIBUTION AND RENT PROBLEMS

15 November 1930

[Text] On 15 November 1930, the Kiangsi Provincial Mobile Committee held an expanded conference at Chi-an. Besides members of the Provincial Committee and the Standing Committee, those attending the conference included the chairman of the Yung-hsin, Chi-an, T'ai-ho, Wan-an, Chi-shui, An-fu, Fen-yi and Hsia-chiang soviets as well as Comrade Ch'en Yi of the 22d Army. I participated in this conference as the representative of past committee members. The special feature of this conference was the discussion of two problems: harvest distribution and rent. With regard to harvest distribution, I brought up the mass basis of support for harvest distribution. With regard to the renting of land, the previously prevalent leftist but actually wealthy farmer theory of "Rent should not be collected in soviet areas" was overthrown. In addition, the Chiang Han-po [3068 3352 3134] method of distribution according to labor was opposed by pointing out that its error lay in helping wealthy farmers while it was contrary to the interests of poor farmers. This conference broke up prematurely because reactionary troops had already reached Hsia-chiang, and those responsible for the various counties had to return to prepare to deal with the enemy. Therefore such questions scheduled for discussion as "Mountain forests," "Ponds," "Housing," "Fallow Fields," "Unemployment," and "Debt" were not discussed. A serious enemy offensive and the Fu-t'ien Incident occurred after the conference. So for this reason the resolutions of the conference have still not been promulgated. What follows is a brief record made by me during the day's conference. I retained it because it contained some important material.

1. Distribution of Fields in Ch'un-hua With the District as the Basic Unit

The third distribution of fields in Ch'un-hua District (October 1930) had progressed to using the district as the basic unit, taking a census of population and production capacity to determine how much land each person should receive. Then distribution was made within the scope of the township, "shifting fields where possible and shifting people where fields could not be shifted." Now the more than 30,000 persons in Ch'un-hua District have each received an equal amount of land (each person received land capable of producing 11 shih of grain, with each shih equal to 44 catties).

2. Deficiencies of Distribution of Fields With the Village as the Basic Unit

The deficiencies in using the village as the basic unit are: (1) large villages are unwilling to give up fields to small villages; (2) with too many basic units, it is not easy for district and township governments to press [the program], so many concealed deficiencies developed; and (3) within a single village, it was easy for the masses to be hoodwinked through the use of surname-ism by landlords and wealthy farmers and not thoroughly divide land evenly, nor thoroughly combat local tyrants. This view is worth noting.

3. The Land Struggle Cannot Be Deepened at a Stroke

In the distribution of land, no matter how many times the land is divided, the wealthy farmers always conceal the good land the first time, making it impossible to investigate and to classify the land into the three grades: upper, middle and lower. Wealthy farmers and middle farmers always lead the first time, while the poor farmers have no authority. "After some period of unrest, the proletariat will arise." This view is correct.

4. Yang Ch'eng-fu's [2799 2052 5346] Plan for "The Socialization of Agriculture"

Yang Ch'eng-fu, chairman of the Chi-an County Government (originally chairman and secretary of Ch'un-hua District Committee), was determined to achieve common tilling and expenditure of [the proceeds of] the land in three steps: the first was to distribute land with the district as the basic unit, the second was to organize cooperatives and the third was to share in the tilling and expenditure. This is completely erroneous.

5. The Chiang Han-po [3068 3352 3134] Style of Distribution According to Labor

The deficiency of using labor as the basis for distribution of land is that orphans, widows, the elderly, infants, women with small [bound] feet, and all people unable to till the land, would not have enough to eat. Even poor farmers of great laboring capacity are no match for wealthy farmers because poor farmers do not have the oxen, farming implements and capital of the wealthy farmers. In addition, wealthy farmers can lease the land of the orphaned, widowed, elderly, infants, women with small feet, and others. Therefore, using labor as the basis for distribution is of benefit only to wealthy farmers.

The "Chiang Han-po Method" using labor as the basic unit was carried out in the "border areas" along An-fu's boundary with Chi-an and Fen-yi as well as in Yen-fu Township in Chi-an. It was also carried out absolutely, regardless of age, distribution was made to those with the capacity for labor and not to those without it. Distribution was made to vagrants. Those with no capacity for labor would receive food from the farming of those with the capacity for labor. A member of the Political Committee of the Third Army Group who came to Chi-an said to Wang Huai [3769 2037] that the land

distribution method on the border of Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi took labor as the basic unit, with those with no capacity for labor receiving a half-share, and with nothing furnished by the government.

When labor is used as the basic unit for distribution, the wealthy farmers, with much land, need to use their oxen, plows and harrows themselves, so the poor farmers cannot even borrow them. It is only by equal distribution that poor farmers will be able to borrow the excess farming implements of the wealthy farmers, therefore the poor farmers demand equal distribution.

6. Harvest Distribution Problems

Part of the farmers of Jui-chin and Yu-tu [7184 6757] upheld the slogan of the Ting-chou [3060 1558] Conference: "Unconditional distribution of the harvest"; while others upheld the slogan of the Pi-t'ou [7095 7333] Conference: "Do not distribute green young sprouts"; and the pretext was: "Do not break the Land Law."

Land was distributed in the county of the Northern Route in May of this year. Compensation was provided for capital and for original tillers at the rate of 600 cash per shih of grain [capacity]. In Fu-t'ien the wealthy farmers were not compensated for their land while poor farmers received a string of cash per tan of grain for their land.

Land was distributed in Ch'un-hua in March, at which time no planting had been done, plowing had been done only once and fertilizer had been spread in a few cases. After distribution no compensation was paid for capital.

On the Northern Route, compensation of 600 cash or a string of cash was paid for capital on each shih of grain. Before May, the county had resolved that the price of grain would be 4 strings [of cash] per shih, with compensation paid at the rate of one-sixth or one quarter. Land had not yet been distributed at the time, and it was a period of famine, so prescribing the price of grain at 4 strings was intended to help the poor farmers by equalizing the price of grain. After the harvest, however, the price was still fixed at 4 strings per shih. "This is incorrect."

In Yung-hsin during the fifth month of the old calendar last year, the government of the Fifth District of the Northwestern Special Area prescribed that land distribution would take place when the early grain crop was about to ripen. Persons entering land would compensate those leaving the land 1 yuan "big money" for every 2 tan of grain (200 catties, which is a shih of land). Rice is harvested once a year. In May, when the seedlings have just been transplanted, the rice is still not fully grown, so persons leaving the land were compensated a string of cash for each shih of land (2 tan of grain). The County Committee had decided that land would be received without compensation, but because of restricted communications, the Fifth District did not receive the direction of the County Committee, and therefore proceeded according to its own decision.

The wealthy farmers in the eastern townships of Yu-tu and the northwestern part of Kung County requested compensation of 2 yuan "small money" (worth 4 strings) for each piece of land producing a shih of grain (actually only 8 tou). The party prohibited this and land was received without compensation.

A legitimate policy should be: "To receive land without compensation, and to divide both land and harvest." Equal distribution would be made for uniform application to family members of landlords. Assessments should be made separately against landlords who have much money. Vagrants should receive equal distribution because they work hard. The wealthy farmers' opposition to vagrants' sharing the harvest is wrong. Middle farmers, not having much land to be distributed, would not be affected. Although the "top layer of poor farmers" which tills much land would be affected, there will be other benefits to compensate them. The broad masses of the low level poor farmers, manual laborers and tenant farmers support this method 100 percent. After the distribution of the harvest, those not having the strength to cultivate their land would be permitted to follow the rental method.

7. Consolidating Original Tillers for Equal Distribution

In the past, using the "village" and "family" as the basic unit and the original tiller as the criterion for equal distribution, resulted in benefit for the wealthy farmers but not for the poor farmers. The legitimate way should be: taking the township as the basic unit according to the total population of the township divided by the total of the original tillers of land in the entire township (total township population is the total of those who originally tilled land in the village as well as those who originally tilled land in other villages), taking from those with much to compensate those with little, taking the fertile to compensate for the infertile, shifting land when it can be shifted (villages with more land would give part of their land to villages with less land). When land cannot be shifted, move people (when distances are great, there is no way to shift land, so people must be moved). This method is called "Distribution by Consolidating Original Tillers."

8. The Non-laboring Population and the New Land Rental System

When people without the capacity for labor rent their land to those with laboring capacity to farm, the tenant hands over grain as rent to the owner. In Ch'un-hua, Wan-an and Hsin-yu four-tenths was handed over; in Fen-yi and Ning-tu five-tenths was handed over; and in Yung-hsin one-third was handed over. The land in Fu-t'ien (a district of Chi-an) was divided into three classes--upper, middle and lower. For the upper class four-tenths was handed over, for the middle class three-tenths, and for the lower class two-tenths was handed over. This appears to be comparatively reasonable.

In Ch'un-hua, An-fu, T'ai-he, Hsin-yu, Fen-yi and Hsia-chiang, those without the capacity for labor who wish to rent their land comprise about 20 percent of the population. In Ning-tu they comprise over 20 percent because of the number of women with small [bound] feet. In Yung-hsin they comprise only 5 percent because the women all have big [unbound] feet, and the renters are mostly widowed, orphaned, crippled, aged, very young or engaged in revolutionary work. The above refers only to that portion of the population in which the entire family lacks the capacity for labor and must rent its land. There are even more of the population who do not have the capacity for labor but who have family members who can farm the land, and thus do not have to rent their land. Generally speaking, 75 percent of the entire population does not have the capacity for labor, that is, only one out of every four persons is a young man strong enough to till the land--this is China's big problem. This so-called lack of laboring capacity, however, refers to actual tilling of the land. About half of them have a partial capacity for such labor as tending cattle, chopping wood, cooking rice, washing clothes and preparing food. Statistically:

- 25 percent--have full capacity for labor
- 37.5 percent--have half-capacity or some capacity for labor
- 37.5 percent--have no capacity at all for labor.

The "Renting Land for Grain" in all the above-mentioned areas is the so-called "Grain Distribution System" except for Ch'un-hua's, which is the "Rental System." The deficiency in the grain distribution system is that those renting land [from others] emphasize their own land, and invest effort and fertilizer haphazardly in the landowner's land. When the grain is ripe, it is shared according to the amount harvested, equally, or on a four-to-six or other ratio. This system is not beneficial to the owner of the rented land. With the rental system, the rent is fixed without regard to the amount harvested. Therefore the tenant is attentive to the expenditure of effort and fertilizer, which is of benefit to both production and the owner of the land.

The deficiencies of the rental system are:

- (1) Fixed rent is detrimental to the tenant in disaster years.
- (2) It is also detrimental to the tenant when Red Guard units are called out for many farming days and farming is reduced.

In summary, the grain distribution system is of benefit to the wealthy farmers, while the rental system is of benefit to the poor farmers.

A legitimate policy would be as follows:

- (1) Should poor farmers, tenant farmers and the unemployed lack oxen, farming implements or capital after receiving land, the government should distribute surplus oxen, farming implements and other items confiscated

from wealthy farmers and landlords to the tenant farmers, poor farmers, the unemployed and others for their own farming. At the same time, the collective use of such implements should be rewarded, and some items confiscated from wealthy farmers and landlords given to cooperatives. Yet another method is for individuals to borrow oxen and farming implements temporarily from wealthy farmers for support, with the government controlling those wealthy farmers who wilfully fail to lend their things, so as to help the poor farmers, tenant farmers and the unemployed.

(2) Those totally unable to till the land should be permitted to rent their land to wealthy and middle farmers to till under the following conditions:

(a) Abolish the grain distribution system, prescribing a fixed rental, with no reduction for disasters.

(b) Prescribe the minimum rental (50 percent) to preclude excessive exploitation of poor and tenant farmers by wealthy farmers.

(c) Do not permit wealthy farmers to use the pretext of farming only their own land and not that of others. Should a wealthy farmer be willing to rent land, the township government should take all land which must be rented and distribute it among the wealthy and middle farmers of the township, forcing them to farm it.

9. The Problem of Unemployed Workers From Cities Requesting Land

Over 200 unemployed masons and carpenters in the city of T'ai-he [3141 0735] requested that land be distributed to them, but received none. They were from outside counties and the farmers of the city area would not permit land to be distributed to them. The sugar cane workers from outside Nan-men City also requested the distribution of land. This problem also occurred in Hsing-kuo [5281 0948].

This problem deserves careful and deliberate consideration.

o Investigations of Farm Villages, Liberation Press, July 1947.

CSO: 4005

INVESTIGATION AT MU-K'OU VILLAGE

21 November 1930

[Text] On 18 November 1930, the Red Army abandoned Chi-an. On the 19th I went with Comrades Ku Pai [0657 2672] and Hsieh Wei-chun [6200 0787 0193] from Chi-an to Heng-t'ien [5899 3944], which belongs to Yung-feng [3057 6265], to meet with the Main Force of the Red Army. Passed through Shui-nan [3055 0589] to Pai-sha [4101 3097], ate lunch at Mu-k'ou [2606 0656] Village, and investigated the composition of the members of the village government and the reactionary elements killed in this village. This investigation proved that, in the equal distribution of land, the middle farmers not only do not lose but even gain; and that wealthy farmers and small landlords, in the intense struggle of the farmers, will go over to the counterrevolutionary camp.

Mu-k'ou Village of the 8th Township, Shui-nan District, Chi-shui [0679 3055] County

There are 200 people in the entire village.

There are 46 able-bodied adults, all of whom have been enrolled in Red Guards units.

The village government is established in the ancestral hall.

There are nine functionaries in the village government: Chairman, Secretary, Committee Member for Land, Committee Member for Social Insurance, Committee Member for Red Guards, Committee Member for Food, Committee Member for Adjudication, Committee Member for Women, and Committee Member for Youth.

Chairman Liu Hsing-nan [0491 5281 0589] (small landlord), two persons to feed, has 56 shih of land (each shih of land produces 3 baskets of grain and each basket of land 10 catties). Farms over 10 shih and rents 40 shih. Because of his liking for gambling, he has no money to lend. During this distribution of land, most of his land was given up. Secretary P'eng Chia-fa [1756 1367 4099] (middle farmer) eight persons to feed, has land for 48 shih of grain and rented [from others] over 20 shih more [of land], has enough to eat, and has no debts. By this distribution each person received

7 shih and 8 tou, totaling 64 shih; thus he received 16 shih in the distribution, proof that middle farmers receive land in the distribution. Committee Member for Land Liu Hsing-wen [0491 5281 2429] (poor farmer), three persons to feed, land for 10 shih of grain, and not enough to eat. He received 14 shih in this distribution, and in the past had debts of 60 yuan. "Committee Member for Social Insurance" Wu K'ai-lien [0124 7030 6647] (poor farmer), has four persons to feed, 16 shih of grain land, not enough to eat, and rented over 20 shih from others. He received 15 shih and 2 tou in this distribution, and had debts in the past. Committee Member for Red Guards P'eng Chia-hsiung [1756 1367 0338] (middle farmer), one person to feed in the past, 12 shih of grain land, sold 6 shih to repay high-interest debts, leaving 6 shih which gave him enough to eat. He also worked as a day laborer, had no wife, and could not feed pigs. Liking to gamble, he had debts of 30 yuan. After the revolution, he "acquired" a wife. The wife brought with her a 13-year-old son and a 13-year-old daughter-in-law. Now, with four people to receive distribution of land, each person receiving 7 shih and 8 tou, they receive a total of 31 shih and 2 tou. Speaking in terms of the individual, originally having only 6 shih and now receiving 7 shih and 8 tou, an increase of 1 shih and 8 tou, is another proof of middle farmers receiving land from the distribution. Committee Member for Food Hsu Chuan-chang [1776 0278 4545] (poor farmer), one person to feed, had only 2 shih of grain land, which was not enough and he had to work as a day laborer. Now he has received through the distribution 5 shih and 8 tou, and still does not have a wife. Chairman P'eng [sic] Hsing-nan also serves as Committee Member for Adjudication. Committee Member for Women Yang Chiu-ying [2799 0046 5391] (middle farmer), five persons to feed, has 50 shih of grain land. With her husband and her father farming, there is enough to eat but no excess, and she has no debts. From this distribution, she received 6 shih of grain land--another proof of middle farmers receiving land through distribution. Of the above seven functionaries of the village government, one a small landlord, three middle farmers and three poor farmers, all middle farmers received land through the distribution.

Revolution began in this village the year before last, and land was distributed in January of this year (distribution was from Tung-ku [2639 0942] District--this village previously belonged to Tung-ku). All members of the village government feed themselves, and the revolution came along without arousing violent opposition.

A total of seven reactionaries have been killed in this village: P'eng Chia-kuang [1756 1367 0342], P'eng Chia-shan [1756 1367 0810], P'eng Chia-chun [1756 1367 0193], P'eng Pei-chun [1756 0971], P'eng Ch'ang-lung [1756 2490 7127], P'eng Ch'ang-hsi [1756 2490 4406], and Wen Chih-kuei [3306 1807 6311]. P'eng Chia-kuang (small landlord), three persons to feed, had over 30 shih of grain land, was proprietor of a cloth shop in Shui-nan, rented his land to others to farm and collected the rent. Business was bad in the shop, which lost money every year. Handled the collection of taxes of the 38th Tu and sought profit in so doing. Smoked opium, a scholar and a very villainous member of the gentry. P'eng Chia-shan (wealthy

farmer), younger brother of Chia-kuang, five persons to feed, had over 40 shih of grain land, and had money to lend. Saddened because of the cancellation of debts, he joined with Honan bandits, and was captured and killed along with his elder brother in July of last year. P'eng Chia-chun [1756 1367 0193] (vagrant), three persons to feed, had no land and owed debts to others. Joining the revolution, he served as adjutant in the Tung-ku guerrillas. He also served as executive officer and quartermaster. Later he deserted, acquired three guns and became a bandit, preying on local tyrants. He was captured last year and killed. He liked to play cards. P'eng P'ei-chun (wealthy farmer), four persons to feed, had 120 shih of land, which he employed two old persons to farm, and also rented one-half to others to farm. He had money to lend. When the masses divided the land and burned [land] titles, he was unwilling and was killed. P'eng Ch'ang-lung (small landlord), four persons to feed, had 60 shih of land, all of which was rented to others to farm. Lent peppermint oil money, lent jute money. A scholar, taught school in Chi-shui County. Went with the Honan bandits, was captured on the front line and killed. P'eng Chang-hsi (small landlord), three persons to feed, P'eng Chang-lung's younger brother, 60 shih of land, lent peppermint oil and jute money, receiving three baskets of grain in return for each yuan lent, killed in March the year before last. Wen Chih-kuei (wealthy farmer), seven persons to feed, 30 shih of grain land, rented over 100 shih, besides his own labor, he hired an old person and many day laborers, did not lend money, but engaged in small business carrying ducks and oil seeds to sell. He plotted with the Honan bandits to leak information of the revolution and was killed. (The so-called Honan bandits were part of the Honanese who had moved to Chi-shui County in Kiangsi, some of whom became bandits.)

The above seven reactionary elements who were killed--three small landlords, three wealthy farmers and one vagrant--proved that, when land reform deepens, many small landlords and wealthy farmers will move in the direction of counterrevolution. Whether every one of these seven persons should have been killed, however, is a question.

o Investigations of Farming Villages, Liberation Press, July 1947.

CSO: 4005

LAND ADMINISTRATIVE PROGRAM--1930

[Text] 1. Overthrow the bureaucratic regime of the evil gentry and landlords, disarm the counterrevolutionary forces, arm the workers and farmers and establish a regime of farmers delegates conferences in villages.

2. Confiscate without compensation the property and land of the evil gentry and landlord class, turn it over to the farmers delegates conferences (soviets) for disposition, to distribute it to landless farmers, and farmers with little land, for their use.

3. Real property of ancestral halls, temples and churches, as well as other public property and government-owned fallow land, or ownerless fallow land and sandy fields, should all be turned over to farmers delegates conferences (soviets) for distribution to farmers for their use.

4. A portion of the state-owned land in provincial areas will be provided to the soviet governments for population movement for reclamation and for distribution to soldiers of the workers' and farmers' army to be put to economic use.

5. Announce that all high-interest loan agreements are null and void.

6. Burn all land titles of the government of the evil gentry, as well as other contracts which exploit the farmers (includes written and oral ones).

7. Cancel all taxes proclaimed by warlords and local yamen [governments], cancel the monopoly tax system and cancel the likin [tax], establishing a single agricultural economic progressive tax.

8. The state will assist the agricultural economy:

- (1) To manage land construction projects,
- (2) To improve and expand water conservation,
- (3) To prevent natural disasters,
- (4) By statement management of population movement,

- (5) By providing low-interest loans through agricultural banks, trusts, etc.
 - (6) By [establishing] a single currency system and a single system of weights and measures.
 - (7) By placing all forests and waterways under the control of soviet governments.
- o Collection of Red Bandit Reactionary Documents, Volume 3, 1935.

CSO: 4005

LAND LAW PROMULGATED BY CHINESE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COMMISSION (1930)

[Text] Chapter I. Confiscation and Distribution of Land

Article 1. After rising up and overthrowing the regime of the evil gentry and landlord class, all private and group-owned--ancestral halls of the evil gentry and landlords, temple [religious] institutions and wealthy farmers--land and fields, mountains and forests, ponds and houses, must immediately be confiscated and turned over to public ownership by the soviet governments for distribution to farmers with little or no land and other poor people who need it for their use. In areas where there are only farmers' associations, where soviets have not been established, the farmers' associations may also carry out the confiscation and distribution.

Article 2. After investigation by the soviets, family members of evil gentry and landlords and reactionaries will be permitted to live in the villages, and those with no other means of making a living may receive distribution of an appropriate amount of land.

Article 3. Distribution of land will be made according to regulations to officers and soldiers serving in the Red Army as well as to those engaged in revolutionary work. The soviets will also assign people to assist their family members in farming.

Article 4. Those in industry and commerce in villages who can make their living will not receive land. Those who cannot make a living will receive an appropriate amount of land limited to that necessary to compensate for the deficiency and permit them to make a living.

Article 5. Land must be distributed to tenant farmers and unemployed wanderers who wish to have land distributed to them. Those wanderers who receive land, however, must break themselves of opium, gambling and other evil addictions, otherwise the soviets will recover their land.

Article 6. Those living away from their home villages will not receive land.

Article 7. The township shall be the basic unit for the distribution of land. The farmers of a township will put together for common distribution all land tilled by them in their own township as well as in neighboring townships.

Should there be three or four adjoining townships in which some townships have more land and some less, they will be considered a single township for distribution. Those townships with so little land as to be incapable of maintaining their livelihood, and which have no other means of production to maintain their livelihood, may combine three or four townships into one unit for distribution, but the township soviet must request and receive authorization from the district soviet.

Article 8. To meet the demands of the majority, and to expedite the receipt of land by farmers, men, women, old and young should receive equal distribution according to village population. The distribution method based on labor as the criterion should not be adopted.

Article 9. In principle, city merchants and workers will not receive land. When possible, however, appropriate amounts of land will be distributed to unemployed workers and poor people from cities who request it.

Article 10. To seek speedy destruction of feudal influences and to attack wealthy farmers, the distribution of land should be in accordance with the principle of taking from those with much to compensate those with little and taking the fertile to compensate for the infertile. Landlords and wealthy farmers should not be permitted to conceal land, not reporting it, nor to monopolize fertile land. After the distribution of land, wooden signs prescribed by the soviets will be erected in the fields, with the amount of production from the field and the present tiller inscribed thereon.

Article 11. All deeds covering land of evil gentry and landlords, wealthy farmers, and ancestral halls and temples shall be handed over within a limited period to township soviets or to township or district farmers' associations, and burned publicly.

Article 12. After the distribution of land, county soviets or district soviets shall issue farming certificates.

Article 13. Whenever anyone in a township dies, changes his occupation, or departs, the land distributed to him shall revert to the soviet for redistribution. When anyone arrives from outside the township or is born in the township, the soviet should find a way to distribute land to that person, but subsequent to the harvest.

Article 14. When land is distributed after an uprising and it is after planting by farmers, the production from the field shall be harvested by the farmer receiving the field, and the original tiller may not keep it [the production or harvest].

Article 15. Vegetable gardens, dams and fallow land (where miscellaneous grains can be planted) must be distributed. Large ponds not suitable for distribution shall be operated by the soviet or rented for a fixed price.

Article 16. Bamboo [producing] and lumber [producing] hills should be divided for calculation purposes into fields according to their production and combined with fields for distribution. Those with the characteristics of industrial capital [plant or equipment], employing labor, establishing factories and manufacturing, however, may be rented as entities and need not be distributed.

Article 17. Pine, fir and other mountain forests will be managed or rented by the soviets. When authorized by the soviet, however, and when the people of the township need to use wood for repairing embankments, constructing public facilities and houses, and for repairing buildings burned by the reactionaries, they may take wood from the forests.

Article 18. Hills producing firewood will be managed by the soviet governments for public use.

Article 19. To meet the requirements of poor farmers, all confiscated land should be distributed to them, and it need not be retained by the soviets. Under certain conditions, however, that portion of the land which cannot be completely distributed may be used to establish model farms or be rented temporarily. At the same time a portion of such buildings should be retained for public enterprises.

Chapter II. Cancellation of Debts

Article 20. All debts owed by workers, farmers and poor people to the evil gentry and landlords and rich peasants shall not be repaid, and all bonds and loan agreements shall be handed over to the soviets or farmers' associations for burning.

Article 21. All debts new and old owed by the evil gentry and landlords and merchants to the government or to workers, farmers or poor people must be repaid in full.

Article 22. Old trading accounts owed by workers, farmers and poor people to merchants prior to the uprising, irrespective of whether they were commercial or high-interest, or whether they were personal accounts, shall not be repaid.

Article 23. In principle, with respect to accounts incurred by workers, farmers and poor people among themselves, what was borrowed prior to the uprising shall not be repaid. This excludes only no-interest loans made with the objective of friendly assistance, and which the borrower is willing to repay.

Article 24. Wherever workers, farmers and poor people have pawned or mortgaged articles or houses to evil gentry and landlords, wealthy farmers or pawn-brokers, the items given as security shall be recovered unconditionally.

Article 25. Financial associations and grain associations shall all be disbanded.

Article 26. Under the soviet regime, high-interest loans are prohibited. County soviets will prescribe appropriate interest rates according to the monetary situation in the local area. The rates should not, however, exceed that received from ordinary capital under the general economic conditions in the area.

Chapter III. Land Tax

Article 27. To meet requirements for overthrowing the counterrevolutionaries (such as to expand the Red Army and Red Guard units, to support governmental organizations, etc.), and requirements to further the interests of the masses (such as establishing schools and dispensaries; aiding the crippled, the aged and infants; repairing roads and embankments, etc.), the soviets may levy land taxes on farmers.

Article 28. In keeping with the principle of protecting poor farmers and joining with middle farmers to attack wealthy farmers, land taxes may be levied only after soviets have been established, the masses have realized practical benefits, and the higher-level soviet has approved.

Article 29. Land taxes will be levied by classes according to the annual harvest of grain from the land distributed to the farmers.

1. Each person who received distributed land who harvests less than 5 tan of grain shall be exempt from land taxes.
2. Each person who received distributed land who harvests 6 tan of grain will be taxed 1 percent.
3. Each person who received distributed land who harvests 7 tan of grain will be taxed 1.5 percent.
4. Each person who received distributed land who harvests 8 tan of land will be taxed 2.5 percent.
5. Each person who received distributed land who harvests 9 tan of grain will be taxed 4 percent.
6. Each person who received distributed land who harvests 10 tan of grain will be taxed 5.5 percent.
7. Each person who received distributed land who harvests 11 tan of grain will be taxed No percentage listed.
8. Each person who received distributed land who harvests 12 tan of grain will be taxed 8 percent.

For each additional tan of grain harvested, an additional 1.5 percent in land taxes shall be collected,

Article 30. Income and expenditures from land taxes must be centralized at the high-level soviet government. Lower-level governments may not collect and disburse freely. Expenditure standards shall be determined by the high-level government according to the amount of revenue and the urgency and significance of the requirements of the governments at various levels.

Chapter IV. Wages

Article 31. Wages of handicraft industry workers and tenant farmers in farming villages which have been too low in the past should be raised. Henceforth, wages shall be determined by the soviets according to two standards--the rise or fall of prices of commodities and the abundance or paucity of farmers' income. County or provincial soviets must approve wages prescribed by township soviets.

o Collection of Red Bandit Secret Documents, Chapter 5. Edited and printed by Organization Section, 1st Bandit Extermination Propaganda Division, General Headquarters of the Army, Navy and Air Force. 10 September 1931.

* Collection of Red Bandit Reactionary Documents, Volume 3, 1935.

8174
CSO: 4005

INVESTIGATIONS IN HSING-KUO COUNTY

26 January 1931

[Text] In September 1930 the Red 1st Army returned to Kiangsi following its attack on Changsha. In early October after breaking through Chi-an it entered the Yuan River Valley where many peasants came from Hsing-kuo to join the ranks of the Red Army. I took this opportunity to conduct an investigation of the 10th (Yung-feng) District in Hsing-kuo County. I got together and held fact-finding meetings with eight persons, namely, Fu Chi-t'ing, Li Ch'ang-ying, Wen Feng-chang, Ch'en Chen-shan, Chung Te-wu, Huang Ta-ch'un, Ch'en Pei-p'ing and Lei Han-hsiang. The investigation was undertaken at the end of October 1930 with Lo-fang, Hsin-yu County as the meeting place where a series of fact-finding meetings were held for a full week. Yung-feng District is situated at the intersection of three adjoining counties of Hsing-kuo, Kan-hsien and Wan-an. It is divided into four townships, of which the old Ling-yuan District is the 1st, Tung-chiang the 2d, Shan-k'eng the 3d and Chiang-t'uan the 4th, with Yung-feng-yu of the 2d township as the political and economic center of this district. The distribution of population is as follows: the 1st township has 3,000 people, the 2d 800, the 3d 3,000 and the 4th 4,000, so the total population of this district is 8,800. Because this district is bounded by the three counties of Hsing-kuo, Kan-hsien and Wan-an, so if the situation in this district is well understood, there is not much difference in that of the other two counties. In fact, conditions of struggle for land are not much different in the whole region of southern Kiangsi. Practical policy must be determined on the basis of actual conditions. Things which you sit around the house imagining about or which you read from sketchy written reports are definitely not those based on actual conditions. It is dangerous to base decision of policy on reports which were either unrealistic or "believed to be true." In the past many mistakes were made in the Red areas because the leadership of the party had not been in keeping with actual conditions. It is, therefore, most essential to make detailed scientific investigations based on actual conditions. Generally speaking, this investigation is still not penetrating enough even though it is more so compared with those made on previous occasions. First, I have made an investigation of eight families, something which I have never attempted before. The truth is that without

this kind of investigation it is impossible to have basic ideas about the rural areas. Second, I have tried to find out the manifestations of land struggle among various classes of people in Hsun-wu but my investigation is not complete. The shortcomings of this investigation are that I have not included in it the situations of the children and women, the situations of exchange and comparison of commodity prices, the situations in farm production after the land distribution, and the cultural situations. All these aspects were intended to be investigated had it not been for the enemy attack on Lo-fang. Because the Red Army had decided on the policy of luring the enemy deep into our area, we were forced to conclude our fact-finding meetings. The data given below was gathered in this way: I drew in an outline of investigation, then everyone was asked questions followed by a discussion; all conclusions were submitted by me; after they were agreed to by the eight comrades I put them down in writing. On some points no conclusions were reached, but their answers were described. Our fact-finding meetings had been lively and interesting. Two or three meetings were held every day with some lasting into the late night but they did not feel tired. For this we should be deeply grateful to these comrades. Some participants are members of the Communist Party but the majority of them are not.

I. A Survey of Eight Families

1. Fu Chi-t'ing

A native of the 1st township of the 10th District. He runs a small butcher shop but has no capital. There are five persons to be fed. He has a rice field of 23 shih (piculs) on which 3 shih must be paid as rent leaving him with a balance of 20 shih. Now each of the five persons eats 7 shih totaling 35 shih resulting in a shortage of 15 shih which must be made up by the business in his butcher shop. He can make a profit of about 1.30 yuan for each pig slaughtered (there are no more large pigs to be killed so he can only earn about 0.50 yuan per pig killed). The five persons are: father, 80 years old; wife cooks, raises pigs, makes firewood, washes and mends clothes, but tills no field; son, 5 years old; daughter, 1 year old; and himself, 39, tilling field and slaughtering pigs. In addition to his own, he rents another field of 5 shih but has to hire someone to help him till it for 1 month every year. His mother died 5 years ago. He spent over 100 yuan for her burial. Apart from his brother's contributing share, he has to go into debt for 50 small yuan which with compound interest added had already come to 150 yuan this year. Out of the 23 shih of rice field, 17 shih were owned by himself, and 6 shih were "t'ui-chiao-t'ien" belonging to the public lands of Chung-wu in Pai-lu (a subdivision of Kan-hsien, 10 li from the 1st township of the 10th District). For 6 shih of this public field he had to pay 6 small yuan per shih totaling 36 yuan as mortgage money. In addition, he must deliver 3 shih as land rent every year (at the rate of 50 percent).

In March last year when the revolution failed, he fled into the hills of Chun-ts'un helping people repair them. In September he returned home with the arrival of the Red Army in Hsing-kuo when the jackals of the Pacification Corps ran away into the hills. There was no land distribution then.

In February (March by solar calendar) the Red Army attacked Kan-chou and in the same month land was distributed. Although he did not get any land, he was relieved from the payment of his rent of 3 shih and his debt of 150 yuan. At the same time he did not get back his mortgage money of 36 yuan. From February he served for 3 months as chief of land section in the town government assisting in distributing land to the people. In April he became a company commander of the Red Guards equipped with spears but no guns. He served for 3 months. On 15 June he led his unit in one attack against the jackals of the Pacification Corps in Hsing-kuo County. From June the Red Guards were reorganized into a reserve contingent of the Red Army in which he became a platoon leader. A month or so later he was made a company commander. At this time two companies were formed in the 1st township. In August he led his unit to attack Ch'i-fang and won a victory. During the march (in October by solar calendar) on Hsin-yu he served as a battalion commander. Because he was unable to leave production and because his meat accounts were not collected so that he could pay back to others, he wanted to go home and did not wish to serve in the Red Army.

He had a schooling of 6 years and can barely read newspapers.

2. Li Ch'ang-ying

A native of P'ang-wu-t'ung in the 1st township of the 10th district.

There were six persons. He himself, 48, tills fields. His wife, also 48, has aching heart, cooks, washes clothes and feeds pigs. His son, 20, tills fields but is stupid and unable to read. His daughter-in-law, 20, makes firewood daily but cannot till fields. His daughter, 12, was married off in June this year to someone in Wu-wa, 40 li away. His second son, 3, died in April this year. There are only four persons to be fed.

He himself is owner of 30 tan (piculs) of rice fields. From his younger brother Li Ch'ang-feng he borrowed another field of 20 tan. Because Li Ch'ang-feng's field was of poor quality and did not yield enough to meet his expenses he went to T'ai-ho and Lo-k'ang to farm for others. Li Ch'ang-ying's own field of 20 tan could yield only 13 tan of rice because water could not be pumped into it but he had to pay 9 tan of rent. Li Ch'ang-feng owed a debt of 120 yuan and 9 tan of rice as rent. He paid interest on them for Ch'ang-feng. As for his own 30-tan field, he could only reap 17 tan because it was a hilly land situated on a broken cliff. Coupled with Ch'ang-feng's actual yield of 4 tan, his total harvest came to 21 tan. Besides they were all paddy rice (rough rice) which when converted into dried rice at a 30 percent discount totaled 15 tan, at best 17 tan in a good harvest year. Six persons need 40 tan of rice a year. Thus there was a shortage of more than one-half which must be made

up by his sweet potato harvest of 30 tan or so a year. He fed a pig until December when he sold it for money with which he bought oil and salt for home use. No meat can be had in ordinary times. It is bought and served only during festive occasions such as Ch'ing-ming (Tomb-sweeping festival, 40 cents), Shih-t'ien (Planting crops, 1.5 yuan), Tuan-wu (Dragon boat festival, 30 cents), Chi'ih-hsin (Eating new rice, 1 yuan), Ch'ih-yueh-pan (the 15th day of the 7th moon, a ghost festival, 20-30 cents), Chung-ch'iu (Mid-moon festival, 20-30 cents), Ke-ho (Harvesting festival, 2 yuan), and Kuo-nien (New Year festival, 3 yuan). During Ch'ih-hsin 1 yuan's worth of meat has to be served because field hands must be hired to plant sweet potatoes. During Shih-t'ien and Ko-ho helping hands must be hired, totaling 20 man-days a year. Father and son, apart from working in their own field, must help younger brother Ch'ang-feng till his 20-tan field. This would cost him every year 80 man-days of hired labor (for each tan of rice a good field needs 3 man-days of hired labor while a poor one, 4). The death of his younger brother Ch'ang-feng left his wife a widow. She adopted his (Ch'ang-ying's) second son as her own. As these 80 man-days of labor cannot be paid for, he has to work his own as well as his sister-in-law's fields so that there is no time left for him to work for other people.

He owed a debt of 120 yuan to the public granary for which he must give 7.50 shih of rice as interest (for each 160 yuan borrowed 1 shih of rice must be paid as interest valued at 2.4 yuan). At the end of each year he sold pigs for 20 or more yuan. Out of this sum he spent 6 or 7 yuan to buy oil and salt and the balance was paid to the public granary after conversion into rice as interest. The old and new public granaries of this village each have 30 or more shih of rice totaling 70 shih.

In March this year land was distributed with each of the six persons getting 7 shih totaling 42 shih. All of Ch'ang-feng's land was awarded to Ch'ang-ying. Ch'ang-feng's old debt on which Ch'ang-ying had paid interest was erased. His own debt of 120 yuan to the public granary was also erased. The 42 shih of rice field is infertile and can only reap a harvest of 40 percent totaling 25 shih or so. This coupled with his sweet potato crop is barely sufficient to keep the family fed.

In August this year the authorities of southwest Kiangsi ordered a re-distribution of land on the principle of taking out some fertile land to compensate for the barren. In his family a son died and a daughter had been married off. Only four persons are left now and each is given 6 shih 1 t'ung (4 t'ung make 1 shih). Some of his barren lands were given to others while he got some fertile ones owned by others. On this occasion land was divided equally and evenly. In March each person was awarded 7 tan whereas in August he was only given 6 shih 1 t'ung. Why? The reason is that following the victory of the revolution 12 of the P'eng-wu-t'ung peasants who went to T'ai-ho to farm land earlier had come back by this time. There was then no revolution in T'ai-ho. When they heard about the revolution in Hsing-kuo and its land distribution they all came back. This is why the people were given less land in this village than in others on a per capita basis.

P'eng-wu-t'ung has only four family surnames of Yi, Li Ch'iu and Cheng, numbering 130 or more people. It has no village government.

Li Ch'ang-ying did little work in the town government. His son Li Ch'uan-po was in charge of weapons (spears, bird guns, swords, etc.) in the town government. His son took part in attacks on Hsing-kuo and Liang-k'ou. He himself participated in attacks on Ch'i-fang and Nanchang. He is willing to serve in the Red Army but must ask for 1 month's leave so that he can go home and buy a calf to help till his field. On 27 June his ox died from a fall. He bought it 2 years ago for 23 yuan. After his ox died he sold it for beef and got 10 yuan. In June he spent 12 yuan to buy another calf but in July it also died from a fall. He sold it for beef for 8 yuan (which he had not yet collected). He must buy another calf to help him till his field. This is why he must ask for 1 month's home leave before he can come back to serve in the Red Army.

"Thanks to the kindness of the Red Army," an ox for which one had to pay 70 yuan can now be bought for 20 yuan. "Thanks to the kindness of the Red Army," prices on everything are reasonable now. In the past edible oil cost 23 yuan for 1 tan (100 chin), now it is only 10 yuan per tan. Rice used to cost 4 yuan per shih, now it costs 1 yuan per shih (3 coppers can buy 1 sheng of rice). Firewood used to sell for 20 coppers per chin, now it only costs 8 coppers per chin. Meat which had been sold for 530 coppers per chin before is now sold for 320 coppers per chin. Only the price of salt and cotton cloth has become very high. Salt was sold for 320 coppers per chin, now it is 800 coppers per chin. White cotton cloth used to sell for 140 coppers per ch'ih, now it costs 320 coppers per chi'ih.

3. Wen Feng-chang

A native of the 4th (Hou-ching) township of the 10th district; it has a population of over 300 and a township government.

There are four persons to feed.

Father, 56, has aching feet and cannot do any work. Mother, 46, cannot see anything or do any work except feeding pigs. He himself, 22, tills fields. In March this year he served as a platoon leader. In June he became a member of the finance committee in the town government. In October he set out to attack Nanchang as acting commander of a company of the Red Army reserve detachment. His wife, 16, makes firewood, cooks, looks after cattle, but tills no fields.

He himself owned 8 shih of "t'ui-chiao-t'ien." He did not know for how much his father had mortgaged it but he must deliver 2.50 shih of dried rice as rent per year. His 8 shih is paddy rice field and because it is a good field it can reap 8 shih of dried rice. Four persons need 28 shih of rice a year, thus short of 20 shih. He leased a 120-shih rice field from his landlord who demanded no mortgage money but rent in kind. As this is all inundated

field, it can only reap 90 shih of paddy rice (only one harvest a year) which when converted into dried rice at a discount of 20 percent totals 72 shih. Out of this he must deliver 55 shih of dried rice as rent in kind (rent is 75 percent), leaving a balance of 17 shih which is not enough to feed the family. Harvest time is from June to July. After harvesting crops, paying rent in kind and paying last year's rent on borrowed new rice, they soon found themselves without anything to eat. In August and September they had to borrow new rice again from rich peasants. For every shih of new rice borrowed he had to pay 3 lo (basket). Every year he must borrow 10 or more shih of new rice. With regard to the 12 shih of new rice he borrowed last year, "thanks to the kindness of the Red Army," he does not have to repay them any more. He owed big landlord Liu Hua-jang a debt of 60 yuan, on which an interest was charged at 1 shih of rice for each 10 yuan due, that debt he does not have to pay back now. Fortunately he is able to harvest 40 tan of sweet potatoes, 3 tan of which equal 1 tan of rice, so the total would be equivalent to 13 tan of rice.

In March this year, four persons were given a total of 32 shih of rice fields. After deducting his own 8 shih of "t'ui-chiao-t'ien," he was actually awarded 24 shih. The method of distribution was as follows: out of the 128 shih originally tilled by him (120 shih leased from landlord, 8 shih tilled by himself), 96 shih were shoveled out to others while he kept the remainder of 32 shih. What had been shoveled out were mostly poor land; what had been kept were mostly good land. In August when land was re-distributed, it was found that he had more and better land than he should have, so he had to shovel out 2 shih more and kept the balance of 30 shih. Some of his good land was shoveled out in exchange for poor land from others. "Land was fairly distributed by the town government."

In the past when he tilled his 120-shih fields, he had to work himself almost to death. During seasons of rice planting, rice harvesting and sweet potato planting, he had to hire hands to help: rice planting required 6 or 7 man-days of hired labor, rice harvesting 30 or more man-days of hired hands, sweet potato planting another 30 or more (for early and late crops), a total of 70 or more man-days of hired hands. This did not include exchanges of labor (that is, you and I help each other with labor) during rice harvest and sweet potato planting which came to another 10 or more man-days. Now he only tills 30 shih so he needs no more hired hands or exchanges of labor. If he used to work 3 times as hard, he now labors one-third as much. Because he has more time on hand, he manages finances and does some other work in the town government. When attacks were launched against Hsing-kuo, Liang-k'ou, and now Nanchang, he took part in all of them.

He had a schooling of 4 years, reads half of the posters, and can keep accounts.

4. Ch'en Chen-shan

A native of the 2d (Chih-ko-ssu) township of the 10th district.

The 2d township has 800 people with the town government established at Yung-feng-yu.

There are seven persons to be fed: three brothers, three wives and one daughter of the eldest brother. The eldest brother, 29; Ch'en Chen-shan, the second of the three, 24; and the youngest brother, 18. The eldest set up a street stall in front of another man's store selling edible oil and salt. He borrowed 120 yuan as capital, lost it, and "joined the revolution as an expediency." He did not have to pay his debt but could not operate his street stall anymore. He is now a soldier in the Red 20th Army.

Ch'en Chen-shan had a schooling of 8 years. Before 19 he tended cattle at home. At 19 he started to learn to farm land and worked for 5 years. He became a propagandist in the town government. During the current march he became a company political commissar. The youngest brother had been a bamboo-splinter apprentice for 3 years. He is now a soldier in the Red 20th Army. The eldest brother's wife cooks, makes firewood and plants vegetables. His (Chen-shan's) wife joined her in these chores. She now serves as a unit commander of the Women's Red Guards. The wife of the youngest brother is only 9 years old. The daughter of the eldest brother is 2.

He owned a rice field of 12 shih. In addition, he leased another 10 shih to be managed by his elder brother (a rent in kind of 5 shih must be paid). Embankment work is usually done 1 day out of 3 on the Yung-feng-yu dike. On such a day his elder brother went out there selling oil and salt and came home later to till his field. Apart from his own tilling, his elder brother must hire 80 hands to help him every year.

He owed a debt of 130 yuan on which he must pay 10 shih of rice as interest. He had a harvest of 30 shih of rice a year. After paying interest of 10 shih on his debt and rent in kind of 5 shih, he had a balance of 15 shih left. Among the seven persons, the youngest brother was away from home working as a bamboo-splinter worker for some other people, so there were six persons consuming 42 shih a year, thus leaving a shortage of 23 shih. This deficit had to be made up by his elder brother selling oil and salt and by his earning from land farming. During the period of his apprenticeship, his youngest brother earned no money.

In February last year he and his elder brother joined the revolution. His elder brother served as chief of the food and grain section of the peasant association while he himself worked as a propagandist. The wives were all in favor of the revolution because they were frequently hard pressed by their creditors for debt payment and thus unable to observe the New Year. They were delighted when they heard about resisting payment of rents, taxes, grains and debts. This is why they were in favor of their husbands joining the ranks of the revolution. The youngest brother is a simple fellow; he would do what others have told him. He did not join the revolution at this

time. In April when the revolution had failed the jackals of the Pacification Corps came here. His elder brother fled to Chung-ts'un where he helped others repair hills. He himself went to Kuan-ch'ao in T'ai-ho where he made 70 or 80 yuan as a farm helper. In December last year the Red Army re-took Hsing-kuo. He and his brother came home and re-joined the revolution. During the period of failure of the revolution the jackals of the Pacification Corps had burned down six rooms of his house.

In March this year land was distributed. In addition to his own 20 shih, his family was given 29 shih more, thus totaling 49 shih with each person getting 7 shih. When the wives witnessed the division of land without having to pay rents and debts they were overjoyed. So his wife cheerfully went to the town government to serve as a unit commander of the Women's Red Guards. In the March distribution they got all good land. In August when land was divided again, it was evenly exchanged this time between the good and the bad. They had to give up one-half of the good land and take in one-half of the bad, but the total remained 7 shih per person. The wives were still delighted because they themselves were government workers and kept telling others that they should even up their land between the good and the bad. So when it came to even up their own land they were also in favor of it.

All three brothers including himself and his wife have left home to do revolutionary work. Only three women stayed home: his elder sister-in-law and her daughter, and his youngest sister-in-law, none of whom were able to till fields. So the two on government sent people to till their fields; those who were sent had more labor to spare; they first tilled those of the Ch'en family and then their own; and the tilling was well done. The tillers who were sent to till the fields of the Ch'en family eat at the Ch'en's home. Because four out of the seven persons eat away from home, each of them saved 7 shih a year. This is sold for money to buy oil, salt and cotton cloth.

5. Chung Te-wu

A native of the 3d (Shan-k'eng) township of the 10th district.

This family has 11 persons. He himself, 28, had a schooling of 7 years, and worked as a bookkeeper in Wang's grocery store in Pai-lu (30 li from Shan-k'eng) at an annual salary of 60 yuan. From apprentice to bookkeeper he had worked a total of 13 years. In March last year he followed the Red Army when it entered Pai-lu and stayed home. His mother, 57, is getting old and looks after children. His elder brother, 31, tills fields. His sister-in-law, 32, cooks, makes firewood, washes clothes, but tills no fields. He has two nephews, one, 9, going to school, and the other, 3. His wife, 28, cooks, makes firewood, and feeds pigs. He has two sons, one, 7, going to school, and the other, 2. His elder nephew is married to a girl of 9 who looks after children. He also has a niece of 2. The above totals 11 persons. Only his elder brother tills fields while he himself is engaged in business, the rest all lacking productive capability.

He owned 30 shih of rice field and rented another 36 shih totaling 66 shih. On his leased field he must pay rent in kind at the rate of 60 percent, that is, 21 shih 6 tou (peck) which was converted into money so he could keep his rice. He reaps 40 or more tan of sweet potatoes a year. The 11 persons need 77 shih of rice a year. Another 20 or more shih were needed to raise chickens, feed pigs, make wine, hire labor, entertain guests, etc. Thus he required a total of 120 or more shih a year and was short of over 20 shih on balance. The whole family needed 150 to 160 yuan a year to pay for salt, cotton cloth, workers' wages, borrowed rice and entertaining expenses. Among these items salt cost 20 to 30 yuan, cotton cloth 30 or more yuan, borrowed rice of 25 to 26 shih at 3 yuan per shih totaling over 70 yuan, and entertaining for 20 or more yuan. The source of this 150 to 160 yuan came from: his salary earned from the store in Pai-lu amounting to 60 yuan plus a bonus of 20 yuan, 10 or more yuan from his miscellaneous crops such as beans, 10 or more yuan from selling surplus pork after feeding themselves, and 10 or more yuan from selling pine firewood, thus totaling about 120 yuan a year. Every year he owed a debt of 30 to 40 yuan. His family owed a debt of 200 or more yuan covering all the previous years.

In the past he had owned 46 shih of rice fields. He sold 7 shih 10 years ago at 10 yuan per shih. He sold another 9 shih 2 years ago at 12 yuan per shih. Now he has only 30 shih in all. Tilling by his elder brother alone was not enough so a hired hand of 120 days was needed every year; labor cost 240 coppers a day so the total amount of wages came to 28 strings of coppers a year.

In February (March by solar calendar) this year following the success of the revolution each person was given 5.50 shih of rice field. The 11 persons got a total of 60 shih 1 lo (including 30 shih of his own). Because land in this township had not been evenly divided between the good and the poor, another distribution became necessary but so far it has not been carried out. There are more people than land in this township. Each person given 5.50 shih has not enough to live on. In the past his family needed about 120 shih of rice plus an expenditure of 150 to 160 yuan per year. As a result of the land distribution they were given 60 shih 1 lo. This was 6 shih less than what they used to have before the revolution. However, they need not pay the rent in kind of 21 shih (converted into 60 or more yuan). Nor do they have to pay the interest of 40 yuan (at the rate of 20 percent) on their debt of 200 yuan. This is the good side. The bad side is that with the collapse of Wang's store in Pai-lu he is left without a job. Thus he has lost his income of 80 yuan a year (60 yuan as salary, 20 yuan as bonus). By comparison, the situation is about the same as it was before the revolution. However, since the revolution living expenses have been greatly reduced. In making wine some expense of hired labor is still necessary but it is reduced to some extent. Less cotton cloth is needed because of sparing use. Although it is still necessary to borrow rice to make up the shortage, the price of rice is greatly reduced to 0.70 yuan per shih. Entertaining has correspondingly decreased so that miscellaneous expenses which used to require 150 to 160 yuan can now be reduced to about one-half, totaling 80 yuan a year (in Hsing-kuo money is counted in terms of yuan).

In March land distribution "was based on existing land ownership, taking from those who have more to compensate those who have less." Each village was used as a unit of land distribution. Because this village has more people than land, existing land ownership has not been changed. In the present re-distribution some land was taken from other villages so that everyone could get about 7 shih of rice field. When this is done, there would probably be enough rice to go around.

In May Chung Te-wu worked in the land section of the town government in charge of distributing forest land (he was a member of a four-man committee) and completed its distribution in the 3d township. The way it is done is by resolution of the town people's congress after which he sets out to various villages where mass meetings are held and lands actually distributed. Those who were given more forest land get less on the plains and vice versa. There were cases in which some got land on the plains but no forest land, but no one got forest land without also getting some land on the plains. In May he served as a company commander of the Red Guards reserve detachment. In June he became a propagandist of an independent regiment. During the current march to Hsin-yu he again served as a propagandist. He took part in the 7th and 8th attacks on Chi-an. He is willing to work as a propagandist in the Red Army.

6. Huang Ta-ch'un

A native of Ch'a-kan-ts'un (village) of the 1st township of the 10th district.

This village has 390 or more people.

There are four persons to be fed. He himself, 36, makes firecrackers for others. His mother, 54, has been sick for 9 years and cannot do any work. His wife, 31, chops and carries firewood on a shoulder pole to market in Pai-lu (Ch'a-kan is 10 li from Pai-lu), buys rice with the money she earned, cooks, plants vegetables and washes clothes, working extremely hard. His younger brother, 32, is a bamboo-splinter worker. Since March last year he had gone to serve in the 2d Regiment of the Red Army and was not heard from.

His family owned 5 shih of rice field tilled by himself. He rented no field from other people.

He makes firecrackers for others as a hired hand earning 0.14 yuan a day. If he works every day, he can earn 4 yuan a month. As a bamboo-splinter worker his younger brother makes 0.10 yuan a day, enabling him to smoke yellow tobacco and make some clothes, but has no money to save.

After the revolution he could make no more firecrackers. His younger brother gave up bamboo-splintering to become a soldier.

In the past he depended on making firecrackers and his wife selling firewood for a living. They worked hard all year around and still had not enough to

eat. After land was divided, they had enough to feed themselves. He owed rich peasant Ch'en a debt of 40 yuan for which he had to mortgage his 5 shih of rice field. This rich peasant was very bad; he was killed by the masses during the revolution. In March last year Huang Ta-ch'un organized a secret peasant association in Ch'a-kan-ts'un village. It had 50 or 60 members and he served as its liaison officer. In November last year he became a unit commander of the Red Guards. In April this year he worked as a land clerk; in June he served as a platoon leader of the Red Army reserve unit; and in August he was made a company commander of the Red Army reserve unit. He led his unit in the current march to Hsin-yu.

In March land was distributed. Each person was only give 6.50 shih which was all poor land. Moreover, because the original tiller had already planted seeds in his field, he was entitled to share 60 percent of the harvest while the new owner could only get 40 percent. In July (August by solar calendar) land was distributed again with each person getting 7.50 shih, of which one-half was good land.

He was a firecracker worker but now is without a job. His brother used to be a bamboo-splinter worker but is now a soldier. This entitles them to their land. Other workers with jobs also got their land in about the same amount as peasants. The reason for this is that a worker even with a job now has no security and is always fearful of losing it so he wants to have a share of the land. Moreover, as a worker cannot till his field and must hire someone to till it for him, he wants to get the same amount of land as given to others. At first, the peasants only allowed the workers to get one-half share of their land, but the workers said that in that case they would raise their wages. Then the peasants said: "We will let you have your full share of our land but you will not raise your wages."

After the workers have got their land, they do not have oxen so they must borrow them from their relatives and friends. As they do not have plows and hoes, they must borrow them too. They find it hard.

He had no schooling and can only keep accounts.

7. Ch'en Pei-p'ing

A native of the 3d (Shan-k'eng) township of the 10th district.

There are 11 persons: three brothers, three wives, two nephews, one father, one mother and one grandmother. The eldest brother, 38, is a mason. The second elder brother, 31, tills fields. The youngest, Ch'en Pei-p'ing himself, 24, had a schooling of 6 and one-half years, studied at a primary school for 1 and one-half years, and taught for 5 years at a countryside primary school. Father is 65. Mother is 62. The three wives stay home to cook, chop wood, plant vegetables and wash clothes, but till no fields. Two nephews are 2 and 3 years old. Grandmother is 92.

They owned 32 shih of rice field and leased another 20 shih from others for which they had to pay 10 shih as rent in kind. Two out of the 11 persons eat away from home; the elderly and the young eat less. For this reason they should have enough to eat if they had 60 shih a year. However, their harvest only totaled 42 shih, thus leaving them with a shortage of about 20 shih a year.

In addition, there were miscellaneous expenses such as that incurred in wine-making, artisan labor, and purchase of oil, salt, cotton cloth, sundry articles, gifts for marriage, funeral and seasonal festivals, etc., which amounted to 120 yuan or so a year. The eldest brother earned 50 yuan or so in wages; his teaching salary came to 50 yuan or so; and an income of about 20 yuan accrued from selling coil palm, firewood, bamboo, lumber, etc., from their hill. Their cow gives birth to a calf every year, which sells for 20 yuan or so. All these added to a total of 140 yuan or so which was used to defray miscellaneous expenses and make up their shortage of rice.

He owed a debt of 80 yuan.

Last year his mother, his eldest sister-in-law, and two nephews died, leaving the three brothers, two wives of the two younger brothers, and the mother-in-law of his eldest brother. There are six persons to be fed.

In March land was distributed on the basis of nine persons (at that time there were one new-born son, one new-born nephew, and one newly married sister-in-law, but they all died in the latter half of this year) with each given 5.50 shih totaling 50 shih 5 tou. This included his own 32 shih; he was awarded 18 shih 5 tou which was all poor land. At present, land was being distributed again. Investigations have been completed but actual re-distribution remains to be carried out.

With the fall of landlords and rich peasants, no more houses were built. The eldest brother, being jobless, turned to till his field. Although he could still teach at the newly established village people's school, he earned only 0.1 yuan a day as food money but no salary, the same as all government workers. In March he, Ch'en Pei-p'ing, became a political commissar in the standing detachment; in April he served as a propagandist in the town government; in May he was chief of cultural section in the town government; in June he became secretary of the town government; and in the intercalary month of June he returned home to teach school. In September he became political commissar of the 2d Company of the Red Army Reserve in the march to Hsin-yu.

The two elder brothers took part in attacks against Wang-t'ang and Lang-ts'un.

8. Lei Han-hsiang

A native of the 3d (Shan-k'eng) township of the 10th district.

There are five persons to be fed: three brothers, one mother and one elder sister-in-law. The eldest brother, 43, spent one-third of his time as a hired tiller and two-thirds to till his field. The second elder brother, 39, spent two-thirds of his time as a hired tiller and one-third to till his field. Lei Han-hsiang, 25, the youngest of the three, worked as an apprentice mason for 2 years, then came home to be a hired tiller. Mother is 70. His eldest sister-in-law, 34, cooks, makes firewood and plants vegetables.

He owned 7.50 shih of rice field and leased another 44 shih from the public hall on which he must pay rent in kind of 60 percent.

He owed a debt of 120 yuan at an interest rate of 20 percent. He borrowed it from rich peasant Lei Tsu-yung in the same town.

The two elder brothers worked on odd jobs for others. When they worked at home, the eldest brother took two-thirds of his time while the youngest only one-third. He himself spent almost all of his time to do off jobs for others. The eldest brother was the head of the household.

His own 7.50 shih of rice field could only reap 6 shih in a year of poor harvest. The 44 shih of public hall field could reap 70 percent of the harvest totaling 30 shih. While harvest is reduced, rent cannot be reduced: he must still deliver 26 shih of rice as rent in kind of 60 percent on the 44 shih of the public hall field. From the latter he had only 4 shih for himself. This coupled with his own 6 shih came to a total of 10 shih. This was far from enough to feed the family. Besides he must pay 24 yuan as interest on his debt. Thus the whole family became extremely impoverished.

This was the way to sustain their livelihood. First of all, the two elder brothers and especially he himself the youngest of the three were relied on to bring home their wages. He did about 220 days of odd jobs a year, his eldest brother did 30 or 40, and his second elder brother did 170 or 180, thus totaling 420 to 430 days of odd jobs a year. These odd jobs normally earn 200 coppers a day while reaping crops and picking wood earn 500 coppers a day so that the wages come to a total of 40 yuan a year. Second, planting sweet potatoes can reap 40 or more tan equivalent to 10 or more shih of rice. Third, cultivation of late rice crop can yield 10 or more shih on which no payment of rent is required. However, this makes it impossible to raise coarse crops. Fourth, raising pigs at the rate of two a year can earn over 20 yuan per pig totaling 40 yuan or more. If they eat one-half, they still have a balance of 20 or more yuan.

According to the calculation given above, the family had an income of 30 or more shih of rice and a cash of 60 or more yuan a year. On the side of the outlay, only three persons ate at home (two of the three brothers ate away from home, only one man and two women eating at home to make a total of three persons). To this was added 24 yuan or 240 mao as payment of interest, thereby leaving a small balance which could be used to buy oil, salt and

other sundry articles. They should not feel too hard pressed. Why, then was his family still very impoverished (all year around they simply had nothing good to eat, eating daily sweet potato strings mixed with rice, and nothing good to wear)? The first reason was that all three brothers were fond of gambling, in which the second brother in particular always had losses. The second reason was that the eldest sister-in-law was gluttonous and lazy, turned the house upside down, made the three brothers loath to work, and beat the pigs to death. The third reason was that two oxen died in a row, one died from drinking nitric acid water and the other died from a fall. His family fortune had turned bad against the times. For these three reasons, his family always remained impoverished.

In March land was distributed. Each person was given 6.50 shih totaling 32.50 shih. That is, out of their originally tilled land of 51.50 shih (their own 7.50 shih and 44 shih leased from others), 19 shih were taken out to be given away to others while they kept the remainder to themselves. However, the 19 shih which were given away were mostly hill-side barren land reaping only one crop a year while what remained was all good land yielding two crops a year.

Land was to be distributed again. Investigations had been completed but actual re-distribution remained to be carried out.

In March when land was divided, 19 shih was taken out to be given away to the new owner. Because this field was then tilled by the new owner, he was entitled to the full share of the harvest of 19 shih. In dividing land of other families, a part of the harvest was taken out with the original tiller getting 60 percent and the new owner getting 40 percent. That is to say, the new owner had nothing to do with the planting of the current crop and left the work of fertilizing and sowing the field to the original tiller. Accordingly, at harvest time the new owner would let the original tiller take 60 percent of the harvest while the latter would give 40 percent to the new owner. This is like the original tiller paying the new owner 40 percent of the harvest as rent in kind.

The eldest brother became a soldier in the Red Guards detachment of this township. He took part in the attacks against Chi'i-fang and Wang-t'ang. The second eldest brother served as a squad leader of the Red Guards detachment. He himself at first was a soldier in the Red Guards detachment, later became a platoon leader; and in the current march to Hsin-yu he was made a company commander.

II. The Old Land Relationship in This District

1. Land Distribution

With regard to land in the 10th district, namely, the area of Yung-feng-yu, the old distribution of land was as follows:

Landlords	40 percent	
Kung-t'ang [Public Hall]	10 percent	(jointly owned by landlords and rich peasants)
Rich peasants	30 percent	
Middle peasants	15 percent	
Poor peasants	5 percent	

2. Composition of Population

In general, the composition of population in the 10th district of Hsing-kuo County is as follows:

Landlords	1 percent
Rich peasants	5 percent
Middle peasants	20 percent
Poor peasants	60 percent
Hired peasants	1 percent
Handicraft workers	7 percent
Small merchants	3 percent
Vagabonds	2 percent

According to the above description, the real exploiting class (landlords and rich peasants) constitutes not more than 6 percent of the population but they hold 80 percent of the land. Out of this amount rich peasants take up 30 percent and substantial portions of public hall land were under their control. Thus if the lands of rich peasants were not evenly distributed, it would be difficult to solve the question of land shortage faced by the majority of the people. Middle peasants comprise 20 percent of the population but they only hold 15 percent of the land. Because of their insufficient holdings, it is necessary for them to share in the equal distribution of land which will result in an increase and not a decrease of their holdings. Those who allege that equal distribution would hurt middle peasants are wrong.

In analyzing the composition of population in this district, the family, not the individual, is used as the unit. The 1 percent of hired peasants refers to pure and simple hired peasants; those who are both poor and hired peasants are not included in this category although their number is considerable. Small merchants refer to full-time small merchants; those who are part-time peasants and part-time merchants are not included in this category. The 2 percent of vagabonds refers to the group of people who are totally unemployed and make their living as gamblers and bandits; those who are partially unemployed are not included in this category.

Why landlords only constitute 1 percent of the population? This is because the majority of the land-holding landlords of this district live in Pai-lu and T'ien-ts'un districts of the neighboring county and in the urban area of this county. If they were included in this count, the landlord class would generally make up 2 or 3 percent of the population.

3. Conditions of Exploitation

Type 1: Exploitation by Rent

In the 1st (Ling-yuan-li), 2d (Yung-feng-yu), and 4th (Hou-chin) townships, land rent is 50 percent. In the 3d (Shan-k'eng) township, it is 60 percent in some areas and 50 percent in a small area. Because of floods and drought in the 1st, 2d and 4th townships, harvests are frequently poor so rent is lower. There is neither flood nor drought in the 3d township so rent is higher.

Why are there floods and drought in the 1st, 2d and 4th townships and not in the 3d? Because land is mostly poor in the former three townships where the hills are full of shifting sand and devoid of trees. When the sands from the hills were dashed by clashing water into the river, thereby raising the riverbed higher than the farm land year after year, and when the dike bursts open, the result is flood by inundation. On the other hand, drought comes when there is no rainfall in a long time. In the 3d township land is mostly on the hills and higher than the river. Although land acreage is small, there is no fear of flood in case of rain and no drought in case of a long dry spell.

There is no way to plant trees on shifting sandy hills.

In this district there is only one planting of fields in a year. Less than 5 percent of the people plant late rice crops. No rent is collected on small late rice crops and miscellaneous crops.

Type 2: Exploitation by Usury

1. Money usury: This can be divided into two periods. Before 1927 interest on money was 30 percent (annual interest of 30 yuan on 100 yuan). However, not everyone could get this kind of loan; he had to mortgage his land, hill or house to get it. Since 1927 "the world has changed," There were few money lenders.

Very few pure landlords lived in this district. Most of them lived in the districts of Pai-lu and T'ien-ts'un in Kan-hsien County although their lands were held here. However, many rich peasants lived here. For this reason, there was no instance of poor peasants borrowing money from landlords and 80 percent of their loans were obtained from rich peasants and 20 percent from public hall lands. Middle peasants did not need loans and hired peasants could not get them. The only people who needed and could get them were the poor peasants because they had the collaterals. On the other hand, those who were in the business of lending money were mainly rich peasants. Thus the struggle between the poor and rich peasants in the land revolution would doubtless be very intense. Rich peasants sometimes also borrowed money from landlords in amounts of several hundred or 1,000 yuan, at a lower rate of interest ranging from 15 to 18 percent. The money thus raised by

the rich peasants were in turn lent to peasants in smaller amounts of less than 100 yuan each while they received mortgaged property and squeezed high interest. In this way the rich peasants acted as the middle man in the exploitation of poor peasants by the landlords. By the same token, the interests of the rich peasants are inseparable from those of the landlords.

Most of the public hall lands were controlled by the evil gentry of this district. The majority of this type of local gentry owned some land but not enough to support himself. He is neither rich peasant nor landlord; he is evil gentry. Because he had not enough to eat, he wanted to control the public hall lands to exploit the poor in the process. In the 1st, 2d and 4th townships, 60 percent of the public hall lands were in the hands of the evil gentry and 40 percent in the hands of the rich peasants. In the 3d township, most of these lands were controlled by the evil gentry prior to 1912 because at that time only those who were endowed with official rank or academic degree could gain their control. During the Republican era the rich peasants had controlled most of them. In contrast with the situation prevailing in the 1st, 2d and 4th districts, 60 percent of the public hall lands in the 3d district were controlled by the rich peasants and 40 percent by the local evil gentry. When poor peasants borrowed from the public hall, the loan interest was a little cheaper than that charged by rich peasants: the latter charged 24 percent while the former charged 20 percent. A loan from the public hall required a mortgage as collateral just the same. Collection of debt was even harsher by the public hall than by the rich peasant. If interest on the loan was not paid when it became due, the creditor would resort to hauling cattle and pigs and reaping crops from the field. If the debtor failed to pay the loan interest when due, he could still talk to the rich peasant by agreeing to pay it next year in compound interest or he could sub-lease his mortgaged land to be tilled by someone else and collect the rent to pay his interest. Since the rich peasant is aimed at making money, he is able to compromise on the term of maturity.

The harshest form of interest on money is interest by the month. This kind of loan is made to rascals for gambling purposes. Its term is 1 month; for 1 yuan the debtor pays 2 when due. But this is not often.

2. Rice usury: Borrowing rice is called "producing rice." It is borrowed from the rich peasant at very high interest; if it is borrowed from the public hall or public granary, the interest is lower. When a rich peasant lends rice to a poor peasant, regardless of whether it was lent in November or December last year, or in January, February or March this year, when he reaps his rice crop in July, he pays the rich peasant a uniform interest rate of 50 percent, that is to say, he must pay 3 lo (basket) as interest for 1 tan of rice borrowed. It was less than 1 year from November when it was borrowed to next July when it was to be repaid; it was only half a year from January or February to July; and it was only 4 months from April to July. Why was such a high rate of interest charged (30 percent higher than interest on money loans)? This was because in winter and spring the price of rice was very high, 100 percent higher than in autumn; if it was

1.50 yuan per shih in autumn, it would often be 3 yuan per shih in winter and spring. For this reason, the rich peasant would add interest on the rice he lent in order to compensate for the loss resulting from the lower price of his rice. He would rather buy rice than lend it. Even if he had charged an interest rate of 50 percent, it would still be more profitable for him to sell his rice in winter and spring. So it would be a great favor to the poor peasant if he could get a rice loan from the rich peasant. Out of 100 shih of rice owned by the rich peasant, more than 90 percent would be sold and less than 10 percent lent. In Ch'a-kan (1st township) when poor peasant Huang Ta-ch'un wanted to borrow rice from rich peasant Ch'en Feng-ming, he was refused. However, when Huang asked to borrow money from Ch'en in order to buy rice from him, Ch'en was willing to loan him the money.

Eighty percent of the money loans were borrowed by poor peasants from rich peasants; only 20 percent of such loans were made by public halls and public granaries; and no loans were made directly by landlords. In the case of rice crop loans, poor peasants obtained 90 percent of them from the public halls and public granaries, only 10 percent from the rich peasants. Thus it can be seen that the rich peasant is an out-and-out exploiter while some sense of compassion is shown by public halls and public granaries.

In the main the public hall is also an exploiter. In the 1st township, the public halls sold 80 percent of their rice and only lent 20 percent. In the 2d 3d and 4th townships, practically all of the rice was sold and almost none was for loan. Only the rice crops owned by the public granaries were totally for loan and none for sale. In this district every township has its public granaries. There are four in the 1st township (population 3,000) with a total of 800 shih of rice. The 2d township (population 800) has five with 500 shih. The 3d township (population 3,000) has six with 400 shih. These three townships have a total of 20 public granaries with 1,700 shih of rice. Practically every village has a public granary. The 4th township (population 4,000) alone has only one public granary with 100 shih of rice. In this district the poor peasants relied completely on the public granaries to lend them rice to tide over the lean months; it was hopeless to borrow rice from the rich peasants.

Although public granaries charged a lower interest of 30 percent than that charged by rich peasants on rice loans, their requirements of pledges for security were quite strict; iron implements (plows and hoes), pewter-ware, silver ware, cotton blankets, mosquito nets, clothes, etc., could all be used as pledge. Only in Yang-fang-ts'un village of the 1st township, however, pledges were not required on rice crop loans by the public granary. It would do if the borrower could get his neighbor to write a "note of subrogation" guaranteeing the payment of principal and interest. The rice crops of the public granaries were collected from contributions by landlords, rich peasants and middle peasants. They collected rice to set up a public granary for the purpose of giving relief to the poor people during periods of famine and starvation. This was a deceptive reform policy used to pacify the revolt of the people. Yet those who were ignorant of the truth were

prone to sing the praises of their benevolence and virtue. Except for the landlords, rich peasants and middle peasants who cannot and need not borrow it, rice in the public granary may be borrowed by all poor peasants, hired peasants, workers and vagabonds if they can put up their pledge or get someone to write a "note of subrogation."

If "producing (borrowing) rice" is harsh enough, "picking money on new rice" is even harsher yet. In the months of February, March, April and May when the poor peasant had nothing to eat, he wanted to pledge his new rice for money from the rich peasant. During that period the price of rice was usually 3 yuan per shih, but the poor peasant only got 1.50 yuan per shih for his pledged new rice. When it was time to deliver the new rice in June or July, its price was usually 2 yuan per shih. Based on the market price of rice at this time, this was not such a terribly harsh deal but the crux of the question lay in the fact that the poor peasant had already delivered his new rice at its lower price and he would just see the rich peasant selling it for a much higher price by next spring and summer. The rich peasant bought the new rice at 1.50 yuan per shih and he sold it for 3 yuan per shih. Thus he made a profit of 100 percent which was 50 percent higher than what was made out of "producing rice." Was not this even harsher yet?

3. Pig usury: None in this district.

4. Cow usury: This practice was in existence in all townships but not prevailing. The rich peasant lends his cow to the poor peasant who feeds and works her in the field; he gives the rich peasant 1.50 tan (3 baskets) of rice per year as interest; and if the cow bears a calf, each shares one-half. In the 1st, 2d and 4th townships, 3 out of 10 rich peasant families lent out their cows in this manner. In the 3d township, only 1 out of 10 rich peasant families lent out their cows. As the cow may die of disease or from a fall, this kind of interest is not earned with safety so the rich peasant has not made any effort to deal in it. He is afraid that the poor peasant might not keep the cow well fed, make her thin, or work her too hard or she might be stolen by thieves. So if the poor peasant could borrow a cow from the rich peasant, it would be a big favor to him.

5. Oil usury: Some poor peasants were engaged in the cultivation of oil-bearing crops. Between May and June when they ran out of rice, they had to borrow money from the rich peasants to buy rice by pledging to sell new oil. During these months the price of oil was 25 yuan per tan but they could only get 12 yuan, sometimes even 10 yuan per tan in the deal. They must deliver the new oil in September without shortage. In other words, when they borrowed 12 yuan from the rich peasants in June, they pledged to deliver 1 tan of oil in September. In September the price of oil was always 17 or 18 yuan per tan, sometimes even 20 yuan, the lowest being 15 yuan per tan. Now suppose they borrowed 12 yuan in June and the price of oil was 18 yuan in September, then the balance of 6 yuan would be counted as interest for 4 months or at an interest rate of 50 percent. Suppose the price of oil in September was

20 yuan, then the interest would be 8 yuan or at a rate of 80 percent. The rich peasant collected his oil in September, hoarded it and waited until the following April to August when oil was in short supply, then transported it down river to Chiang-k'ou and Kan-chou-fu where it could be sold at least for 25 or 26 yuan per tan, sometimes even as high as 40 yuan per tan. Two years ago in June peasants of the 1st township went to Pai-lu to buy oil, they paid 1 yuan (10 mao) for only 1 chin (catty) 12 liang (ounce). Although this was retail price but if it was added up it would take 57 yuan to buy 1 tan of oil. In June last year it took 1 yuan (10 mao) to buy 2.5 chin of oil which was equivalent to 40 yuan per tan. Calculating on the basis of this example, in June this year if a poor peasant borrowed 12 yuan from the rich peasant for which he pledged to sell 1 tan of his new oil, by June of the following year he would have lost as much as 28 yuan while the rich peasant would have made a profit of more than 200 percent. This type of usury was not only heavy but also quite safe. From September to December the poor peasants would engage in oil extraction. The rich peasant who was not afraid of finding the poor peasant "delinquent" would wait for him to deliver the oil to his home. If he were afraid, he would go to the peasant's home waiting for the oil to be extracted in order to take the oil home in person.

Such is the type of oil usury. Speaking from the side of the poor peasant, it is called "picking money on new oil"; from that of the rich peasant, it is called "lending money on new oil." The rich peasant seldom lent oil (not lending money on new oil) but this was done occasionally. For example, in December this year the poor peasant borrowed 1 tan of oil from the rich peasant and sold it for 20 yuan. By next year when the oil price was high, he had to return 1 tan of oil or repay it with money at the market price but without interest. This would be tantamount to having the poor peasant keep 1 tan of oil for the rich peasant and thus could not be regarded as vicious usury. A poor peasant could borrow this kind of oil only if he was favored by the rich peasant and could be relied on to repay it by the following year. The poor peasant borrowed this kind of oil because his parents died, or he was about to get married, or he had other urgent expenses to be met. Then he would ask the rich peasant with whom he was on friendly terms to lend him the money. The rich peasant told him that he had no money but he had oil (or rice). In this way oil or rice was borrowed from the rich peasant to meet the urgent need of the poor peasant. By the following year when the oil price was high, if the creditor wanted oil, the debtor would have to buy it at the market to make the delivery. If he wanted money, the debtor would convert his oil into money at the market to make the payment. This type of borrowing oil is called "hauling oil."

6. Pawnshop usury: There are two types of pawnshops: big pawnshops and small ones. Big pawnshops are not found in this district but in T'ien-ts'un and Pai-lu. The rate of interest is 5 percent per month. If you pawn off anything to get 100 coppers, you pay 5 coppers per month as interest; if you get 1,000 coppers, you pay 50 coppers per month as interest; if you get 1 yuan, you pay 5 fen per month as interest. Money is counted in terms of hsiao yang [small yuan]; the period of maturity is 10 months; if a pawn is not redeemed when it matures, it is extended for 1 month after which it

becomes irredeemable as dead pawn. If interest is charged at 5 percent per month, it is 60 percent a year. This kind of exploitation is extremely harsh. Many poor peasants, hired peasants, workers and vagabonds go to pawnshops. Among these four types of people, 60 out of 100 families enter pawnshops. Pawned articles which were desired included iron implements, pewter-ware, silverware, mosquito nets, blankets and clothing. Many people in this township went to pawnshops in Pai-lu; they made up 60 percent of the poor masses. In Pai-lu the pawnshop owners were natives of Hsing-kuo County. When pawned articles became irredeemable as dead pawn after 11 months, they were carted off by their owners to Hsing-kuo to be sold at public auction. If an article was pawned off for 1.50 yuan, it was worth 3 yuan. However, the aim of the pawnshop owners is to make money on interest and not to auction off pawned articles.

Every township in this district has small pawnshops. They were run by rich peasants without a store front and not as a regular business. Whenever poor peasants and workers were really hard up, they carried articles to the homes of rich peasants to be pawned off for a little money. This happened not too frequently. Out of 100 families of poor peasants and workers only 10 went to small pawnshops. Why, then, do more people go to big pawnshops and less to small ones? Because small pawnshops were run with a bad reputation. In addition, local people were known to each other only too well. When an article was taken in, the poor pawner always wanted to beg for a little more money and the rich peasant found it hard to argue too much about it. Thus he was rather reluctant to do this sort of business. Small pawnshops charged the same rate of interest as big ones but the period of maturity was much shorter and determined by the rich peasant to be 1, 2, 3 or 4 months beyond which a pawned article became irredeemable as dead pawn.

Of the eight persons who came to the fact-finding meetings at this time, the families of Ch'en Pei-p'ing, Chung Te-wu, Fu Chi-t'ing and Ch'en Chen-shan had not been to pawnshops at all. The other four families of Wen Feng-chang, Lei Han-hsiang, Huang Ta-ch'un and Li Ch'ang-ying had all been to pawnshops. Wen Feng-chang had to go there once a year; between April and May he had to pawn off something to buy rice. In April last year, he pawned off one iron hoe and two wine kettles at Heng-hsing Pawnshop in Pai-lu and got 2.40 small yuan with which he bought 1 shih of rice. In December they were redeemed back by him. The family of Lei Han-hsiang must pawn every year. To say nothing of the two elder brothers who were pawners, Lei Han-hsiang, the youngest of the three, pawned off in January last year his unlined long jacket for 1 yuan and two hoes for 6 mao (0.60 yuan); neither was redeemed. In June he pawned off one mason's knife for 3 mao and one "yang-t'ou-tzu" for 5 mao (both were his masonry tools); neither was redeemed. Up to 2 years ago Li Ch'ang-ying had never been to a pawnshop. In February last year when the revolution broke out, he went to work in the guerrilla battalion. When the White bandits came, he fled to Pai-lu. His wife had nothing to eat at home, so she pawned off her cotton jacket for which she got 1.20 yuan. When the revolution broke out again, she did not redeem it. Before last year Huang Ta-ch'un had never been to a pawnshop. In May last

year when there was no market for firecrackers and nobody wanted to make them, he had nothing to eat so he pawned off one cotton blanket for which he got 1.50 yuan. This cotton blanket was pawned to rich peasant Chung K'uei-tzu of this village. In July this year the revolution broke out throughout this county. When the Red guerrilla detachment arrived in this village from Pai-lu, the poor people rose in revolt, arrested Chung K'uei-tzu and had him killed in Pai-lu, and returned the blanket to him. The father of Chung K'uei-tzu was a good man willing to give relief to the poor so he was not killed by the masses. Chung K'uei-tzu operated a firecracker store in T'ang-chiang and learned to be a skillful fighter. He could fight off a score of people. When he was killed, everybody cheered. His land was distributed and his family fined three times amounting to several hundred yuan.

7. Salt usury: This is very harsh because all the salt in Hsing-kuo came from Kwangtung. Many poor peasants were engaged in salt business as a side-line trade. Out of 100 poor families, 10 took to carrying salt on their shoulder-pole for sale as a sideline occupation. As they had no capital, they had to borrow it from rich peasants. They collected young chickens and carried them to Chia-ying-chou (Mei-hsien County, Kwangtung Province) for sale: they went with one pole-load of chickens and came back with one pole-load of salt. For every yuan borrowed, they had to repay with 1 chin of salt as interest. Each trip took no more than 20 days or 1 month; 1 chin of salt was worth 1.20 or 1.30 mao. In other words, 1 yuan of principal must be repaid with 1.20 or 1.30 mao as interest. After 1927 as more and more revolutions broke out everyday, interest rate came down to 24 percent so no more money could be made out of interest on salt.

Type 3: Exploitation by Taxes

In this district there were no direct taxes levied on peasants except taxes and rents on farm lands.

Each 3 shih of rice field is the equivalent of 1 shih of "seedbed field" on which a farm land tax of 4 fen 4 li (0.044 tael of silver) must be paid. For tax purposes 1 tael of silver is converted into 3.60 big yuan; 4 fen 4 li into 0.1584 big yuan. This is the amount of the farm land tax on 1 shih of "seedbed field." One shih of "seedbed field" equals 3 shih of the existing ordinary field. Therefore, on 1 shih of ordinary rice field a land tax of 0.0528 big yuan must be paid. Last year the price of rice in this district was 3 small yuan per shih converted into 6 strings of coppers. One big yuan is converted into 2.80 strings of coppers; 0.0528 big yuan is converted into 148 coppers which can buy 2.50 sheng of rice or less. This is to say that at present 1 shih of rice field in Hsing-kuo must pay a land tax of 2.50 sheng of rice. However, in this area 1 shih of rice field can only reap 7 tou of rice (harvest of 70 percent). Thus for every 7 tou of rice a land tax of 2.50 sheng must be paid or 3.50 percent of the harvest.

Although there were no other forms of exploitation than taxes on farm lands, those who traveled to Kwangtung for the salt trade were subjected to various

types of taxes and levies all along the way. Middle or poor peasants who were engaged in the salt trade collected 70 chin of young chickens in this village at 0.32 yuan per chin. They shouldered one pole-load of chicken to Chia-ying-chou. In terms of silver, 1 chin of chicken used to be worth 3 ch'ien (0.3 tael of silver) sometimes 4 ch'ien. This year the price had gone even higher at 4.8 ch'ien per chin. Each 7 ch'ien 4 fen of silver is converted into 1 big yuan; 4 ch'ien 8 fen is converted into 0.65 big yuan or 0.91 small yuan. After deducting 0.32 yuan as capital, a profit of 0.59 small yuan could be made per chin. So 70 chin would yield a profit of 41.3 small yuan. Why is the price of chicken in Chia-ying-chou so high this year? Because of the revolution fewer chickens were brought there from various counties in Kiangsi so prices rose sharply.

Out of the gross profit of 41.3 yuan as mentioned above, various items of expenses incurred on the road must be deducted. The first item was wages. During prior years it only took 10 days to Chia-ying-chou from here. But now because the Red sector is separated from the White Sector, it is necessary to make detours in many places, thus requiring at least 15 days to make the trip. Wage is 0.25 yuan a day so it totals 3.75 yuan for 15 days. The second item included food, yellow tobacco, tea and strawsandals for a minimum of 0.45 yuan a day totaling 6.75 yuan for 15 days. The third item covered feed grain for the chickens with 70 chin of them eating 0.30 yuan a day totaling 4.50 yuan for 15 days. The fourth item was likin tax. From Hsing-kuo to Meng-ling no levy was made. At Meng-ling likin must be paid at the rate of 1 big yuan (converted into 1.40 small yuan) per tan. In the past no likin was levied at Meng-ling. The fifth item included expenses for collecting chickens requiring 3 days of wages, food and buying chicken baskets totaling 2 yuan. The above four items of expenses came to 19.4 yuan. Deducting 19.4 yuan from the gross profit of 41.3 yuan, the net profit per tan of chicken is 21.9 yuan.

Going with 1 pole-load of chicken and coming back with 1 pole-load of salt. This year 1 yuan can buy 18 chin of salt in Chia-ying-chou; in the past it could only buy 14 chin; even last year that was so. Price is counted in big yuan. This year the development of the revolution has slowed down the market for salt and thus brought down its price to a reasonable level. Carrying 1 pole-load of salt at a cost of 4.50 big yuan (converted into 6.30 small yuan), the salt trader brought it to Hsing-kuo where there was a severe shortage of salt between May and June this year. Thus the price rose sharply, and 1 small yuan could only buy 2.50 chin. Based on this price, 80 chin of salt could be sold for 32 small yuan and after deducting the cost of 6.30 yuan a gross profit of 25.70 small yuan could be made.

However, from the above gross profit of 25.70 yuan must be deducted expenses on the road. First, wages came to 3.75 yuan for 15 days. Second were food, yellow tobacco, drinking tea and straw sandals totaling 6.75 yuan. Third was likin tax. There were six places: Chi-t'an, Meng-ling, Pai-fou, Tiao-yu-t'an, Hui-ch'ang and Hua-ch'iao. In Meng'ling alone likin tax must be paid. In the other five places, a ticket inspection was required. Formerly payment of likin tax was 0.60 or 0.70 yuan per tan, now it is

1 yuan per tan. Ticket inspection in five places cost 0.20 small yuan each totaling 2 big yuan (converted into 2.80 small yuan). The above three items of expenses came to 13.30 yuan. Deducting this from the gross profit of 25.70 yuan leaves a net profit of 12.40 yuan.

One pole-load of chicken on the going trip would make 21.90 yuan, and 1 pole-load of salt on the return trip would make 12.40 yuan so the total profit came to 34.30 yuan. The period of time was 1 month. In the past the profit in chicken and salt had not been as great as it is now, but it was more dependable and did not require making detours. A roundtrip would only take 20 days. At present, although greater profit can be earned, the road is not safe for travelers. Local posse and elements of the Pacification Corps frequently searched and robbed travelers of their money (only a small amount of money from selling chickens was used to buy salt with the greater portion being carried on their person). They did not want salt but they often grabbed chickens for food; and the only thing they did not do was kill people. Nevertheless, the number of such traders have not decreased.

In May and June the price of salt was high at 1 yuan for 2.50 chin. Now (in October) it has become cheaper at 1 yuan for 3 chin 12 liang. This is because the breakthrough at Chiang-k'ou and Ta-hu-k'ou has facilitated the transport of salt from Kan-ch'ou to this area. Compared with the pre-revolution period the price is still very high. Before the revolution 1 yuan could buy 6 chin 4 liang of salt. It was cheaper almost by 100 percent compared with the present (in October). It was cheaper almost by 200 percent compared with May and June this year.

III. The Classes in the Struggle

1. Landlords

The landlords of the first township all lived in Hsing-kuo City or Pai-lu, not in the township itself. The rents were delivered to Hsing-kuo City or Pai-lu. Four or five landlords resided in Pai-lu, each collecting over 1,000 tan of rice as rent. Some operated stores in Pai-lu; others worked in Nan-ch'ang or Kan-chou. One lived in Hsing-kuo City; collected 1,000 tan as rent; operated the Heng-ch'un-hao imported goods store in the city and a store in Kan-chou.

The second township had three landlords, each collecting over 300 tan as rent, all residing in the township. Liu Yueh-lin did not farm; collected 300 tan of rent. Two members of his family were killed during the revolution, the first and third sons of [Liu] Yueh-lung, who were both commanders of the pacification force. The family still had 10 mouths to feed after the revolution. Land was allocated to them, and they obeyed the government. Tu Hsi-yu, with over 20 members in his family, farmed 200 ku [6253], of land and collected 300 tan as rent. In his 40's, he joined the revolution in the second lunar month last year. When the Red Army arrived in the second month this year, he was the first to surrender voluntarily the deed to his

land to be burned. His farm was divided. He now works in the government as a propagandist. Hsieh Wen-lin, with 30 members in the family, farmed 500 ku of land; collected 100 tan as rent; is related to Tu Hsi-yu; voluntarily burned his deed and divided the land; now serves as chief of the finance section in the government. Of the six brothers in his family, five farmed; hired four employees; was the richest in the township, no one literate in the family; very honest. (Hsieh Wen-lin was actually a rich peasant.)

The third township had two landlords. Tseng Hsi-ch'un's family was divided into five households, totaling over 20 members; collected over 1,000 tan of rice as rent; did not farm themselves; well-known big landlord; counter-revolutionary. All the men fled, leaving behind five or six women and children. Each was allocated land. Houses were burned down. No one was killed in his family, but two of those of his clan serving as his henchmen were. Hsieh Yuan-hsiang collected over 400 tan as rent; did not farm; over 20 members in the family; counterrevolutionary; fled; no one killed.

In the fourth township, Wang Jun-lan [3769 3387 5695] was a big landlord; collected 400 tan as rent; farmed 200 ku of land; owned many oil-bearing crop hills, all tended by himself; counterrevolutionary, commander of the pacification force; killed many workers and peasants and burned their houses; fled. Liu Chia-hung owned 300 ku of land, farming 100 himself and renting out 200; five members in the family; counterrevolutionary; organized the pacification force together with Wang Jun-lan and Tseng Mei-hsi. Liu Chia-hung and his sons were all killed. Tseng Mei-hsi collected 100 tan as rent and farmed over 100 ku of land himself; a rich peasant; five members in the family; assistant commander of pacification force; killed many workers and peasants. The ghost of one of his victims, poor peasant Kao Lao-kou "made trouble in his house, and he and his father were both haunted to death." Hsieh Ch'uan-chen collected 300 tan as rent; did not farm; five or six members in the family. He was arrested by the third district and delivered to the government for detention; not yet killed; his assets were confiscated.

2. Rich Peasants

First township: 12 rich peasants, 7 among them counterrevolutionary. Heads of two families killed; male adults of remaining five families fled. Family assets of those who fled were confiscated, even including the cooking pots of some of them. Assets of the two families with the heads of household killed were not confiscated. Women, old people, and children of all seven families remained behind; received land allocations. Some women remarried. Liu Shu-yao, son of Liu Neng-ch'ang and now in his 20's; joined the revolution; was sent to Hsin-yu as a squad leader. The other head of household that was killed was Ch'en Feng-ming; his house burned. Five of the 12 families not against the revolution; donated money; divided their land; joined the Red Guards; performed revolutionary work diligently. Hsu Ch'ang-han, one of them, owned 400 ku of land, mostly farmed by himself, renting out a small portion; over 10 members in the family; loaned out much money; was

fined 700 yuan by the guerrillas; household assets not seized; grain not divided up; farm divided. Age 26, he joined the revolution in the second or third month last year; served as a director of the Young Pioneers since the third month this year; subsequently went to work for the Southwest Kiangsi Government (kind of work unknown); returned in the eighth month and again served as a director of the Young Pioneers in the district government; was accused as a member of AB League; detained. Ling Yueh-po owned 400 ku of land, all farmed by himself; 12 members in the family. His son Ling Lei-han is a "graduate"; served as secretary in the village government; was fined over 100 yuan, but still served as secretary; was accused as a member of AB League; detained in the district government for more than 2 months; was permitted to confess and released. Hsieh Chung-chieh owned over 200 ku of land, mostly farmed by himself and a part rented out; eight members in the family; was arrested by the township government recently; fine is considered; not yet released. Of the 12 rich peasants, 7 were active counterrevolutionaries. Though the remaining five joined the revolution on the surface, two belonged to the AB League which conspired to resist the revolution, and one of the remaining three was arrested.

Second township: nine rich peasants: Ch'en Hsien-wei, Mei Chia-sheng, Yang Tsu-lien, Hsieh Chung-yu, Hsieh Wen-lin, Ch'en Kun-wei, Wang Cheng-k'o, Tsou Hsiang-ch'un, and Hsieh Liang-tz'u. Ch'en Hsien-wei owned 200 ku of land, farming 120 himself and renting out 80; had money to lend; over 10 members in the family; very exploitative; counterrevolutionary. He fled; all three sons killed; family assets confiscated. Mei Chia-sheng was actually a small landlord; rented out all his more than 100 ku of land; had money to lend; dealt in fabrics; counterrevolutionary; a commander of the pacification force. He, his mother, and a permanent employee were killed by the guerrillas; family assets seized. Yang Tsu-lien farmed half of his 100 ku of land and rented out the other half; counterrevolutionary; assassination team leader of AB League; killed by the district government in July. Hsieh Chung-yu, also a small landlord, rented out all his land; had money to lend; counterrevolutionary; a commander of AB League; evil gentry; killed by the district government on the 16th day of the 8th month. Hsieh Wen-lin farmed 500 ku himself and rented out 100; 30 members in the family; five of the six brothers farmed; also hired permanent help; the richest peasant in the township; was a big rich peasant; related to Tu Hsi-yu; voluntarily burned the deed and divided the land; no literates in the entire family of over 30 people; rather honest; now serves as finance section chief in the township government. Ch'en Kun-wei farmed half of his 200 ku and rented out the other half; had money to lend; 20 members in the family; joined the revolution; was accused, in the 8th month, as belonging to the AB League; arrested by the district government. Wang Cheng-k'o farmed most of his 200 ku of land and rented out very little; counterrevolutionary; belonged to the pacification force; killed in the 5th month this year. Tsou Hsiang-ch'un rented out 100 of his 160 ku of land and farmed 60 himself; seven members in the family; joined the revolution. His son Tsou Li-tung serves as cultural section chief in the district government; rather honest. Hsieh Liang-tz'u rented out his 40 ku of land; ran a variety goods store in Yung-feng Market; joined the revolution at first; in charge of finance in

the second township government and embezzled over 80 yuan; fired from his job and fined 150 yuan. One day, at a mass meeting, he made use of the pen and ink belonging to someone else and wrote two reactionary slogans: "The AB League Reorganization Faction is needed to consolidate the soviet political power"; "The AB League Reorganization Faction is needed to capture Kan-chou and Chi-an." Was arrested and interrogated; confessed that he was a secretary of the AB League; executed on the 17th day of the 8th month. Of the nine rich peasants (including three small landlords and one merchant) seven were counterrevolutionary; only two were revolutionary.

Third township: nine rich peasants: Hsieh Chiu-chang, Mao Shih-chi, Lei Yung-hsia, Ch'en Feng-ming, Chiang T'ao-shu, Ch'iu Fu-t'ien, Ch'iu Shih-li, Ch'iu Chih-k'uei, and Hsien I-hsing. Hsieh Chiu-chang farmed over 200 of his more than 400 ku of land and rented out 200; eight members in the family; made high interest loans; counterrevolutionary; a village tyrant and local bully; entire family fled the revolution. Mao Shih-chi farmed his entire 200-odd ku of land himself; lent money; had 23 members in the family; now divided into four households. Grandson Mao Chang-p'ing, age 22, a middle school student; a commander of the AB League; was arrested. Lei Yung-hsia farmed 50 of his over 200 ku of land and rented out more than 100; had money to lend; went away before; township government assessed him a donation of over 200 yuan. He returned; was asked by the township government to attend the Red Army school, but failed the entrance examination. The township government then asked him to join the instructors' team of Hsing-kuo County. He is 21, a senior elementary school graduate. Ch'en Feng-ming farmed all his 100-odd ku of land; seven members in the family; had no money to lend, because his son studied in Kan-chou and needed the money; counterrevolutionary; secretary of AB League; was killed; family assets confiscated. Chiang T'ao-shu farmed his entire 100-odd ku of land himself; had a little money to loan out; five members in the family; counterrevolutionary; fled alone; wife went with someone else. Ch'iu Shih-li farmed 40 of his 130 ku of land and rented out 90; smoked opium; had no money to lend; counterrevolutionary; fled alone; wife was asked by the township government to remarry; house turned into the office of the township government. Ch'iu Chih-k'uei farmed his 150 ku of land himself; had money to lend; six members in the family; joined the revolution; son was assigned to the Red Guards; was assessed a donation of 60 yuan. Hsien I-hsing farmed half of his 200 ku of land and rented out the other half; had money to lend; 12 members in the family; member of AB League; was arrested. His fourth son fled; he still has three sons home. Of the nine rich peasants in the third township, six were counterrevolutionary, and only three not yet counterrevolutionary.

Fourth township: two rich peasants: Liu Chia-hung and Tseng Mei-hsi, both counterrevolutionary. (See section on landlords)

Of the four townships in this district, 9 out of the 12 rich peasants in the first, 7 out of the 9 in the second, 6 out of the 9 in the third, and the 2 in the fourth were counterrevolutionary. The four townships had a total of 32 rich peasants, and 24 of them were counterrevolutionary. Though the remaining eight are currently not counterrevolutionary, what will happen in the future is unknown.

The farms of the rich peasants were very good, just as good as those belonging to the landlords and the courts [kung-t'ang 0361 1016]. When they bought land from the poor peasants, they always wanted to buy the good farms, and the poor peasants had to sell. If the poor peasants sold the poor farms, it would take several mou to make up the price of 1 mou of good land. When the rich peasants loaned money to the poor peasants, they always asked for the good farms as security. Therefore, the good farms gradually were concentrated in the hands of the rich peasants.

When the revolution first started, such as the second or third month this year, many of the rich peasants became opportunists and joined the revolution. The rich peasants and their henchmen occupied 30 percent of the posts in the township and district soviets. During the anti-rich peasant propaganda week in the 4th and 5th months, they were thrown out. Currently, only two rich peasants serve in the district (Hsieh Wen-lin serves as finance section chief in the second township; Tsou Li-tung serves as cultural department chief in the district government.)

3. Middle Peasants

The middle peasants benefited in the land revolution. First, not only suffering no loss in land, most of them gained in the land division. The middle peasant population of this district constituted 20 percent of the total, while their land was only 15 percent. Therefore, most of them acquired additional land. Though some of them had their land reduced, it was a very small minority.

Second, in the past, it cost around 200 yuan to get a wife, almost equivalent to the entire family assets of a middle peasant. Therefore, it was difficult for a middle peasant to marry, and many of them were in debt due to marrying. If the wife died, it would be extremely difficult to marry again. Now, there is freedom of marriage, costing not 1 penny. This is a great advantage.

Third, in the past, when an aged member died in a middle peasant family, the funeral would cost at least 50 yuan, or as much as 100, or more. In the past, very often a middle peasant became indebted or bankrupt due to the death of a parent. Today, superstitious habits have been abolished. If someone dies, it only requires burial, without wasting any money.

Fourth, in the past, when the family cow died, the middle peasant would sell the beef for 8 or 10 yuan. He must then add 10 yuan or more to buy another cow. Now, though he will only get 8 or 10 yuan for a dead cow, he only has to put up 3 or 4 yuan to buy another one.

Fifth, now that the power of the landlords and rich peasants has been knocked down, the rites abolished, and superstition abolished, it is no longer necessary to give gifts or burn incense, and some expenses are saved.

Sixth, besides the above five economic advantages, there is also the political advantage, which is the major one. In the past, under the control of the landlords and rich peasants, the middle peasants had no "right to speak," and must abide by the decisions of others. Now, together with the poor peasants and hired help, they have the right to speak. Approximately 40 percent of the middle peasants have responsibilities in the township and district soviets. Among the middle peasants, those owing no debt at all constituted 10 percent, and those owing a little debt but still able to manage the household 30 percent.

The middle peasants were very brave in the revolution. Same as the poor peasants, they "sallied forth" (assigned to the Self-Defense Army, at times they had to sally forth to do battle), performed patrol duty and held meetings.

In regard to the middle peasants of the district, their population constituted 20 percent of the total, and their land 15 percent. Though their land was of better quality than that of the poor peasants, it was far inferior to that of the rich peasants. Generally speaking, it was good and bad--half and half.

4. Poor Peasants

After the revolution, the poor peasants gained the following advantages:

- (1) Land was allocated to them. This is their fundamental interest.
- (2) Hills were allocated to them. In the past, the poor peasants rarely owned any hills. Among the poor peasants of the first and second townships, 30 households had hills, and 70 had none. As there are many hills in Chin-chun Village (Shan-k'eng) in the third township, 70 poor peasants had hills, while 30 had none. The hills there are mostly oil-producing hills. Of the 100 poor peasants in the fourth township, half of them had hills and half had none. Among the poor peasants in the townships having hills, the area per household was very small. As the hills in the first and second townships are mostly sandy, the landlords only wanted farms, not hills. The rich, middle and poor peasants each owned a part of the hills. The distribution in the first township was: 40 percent owned by the rich peasants; 40 percent by the middle peasants; 20 percent by the poor peasants. The distribution in the second township was: 50 percent owned by the rich peasants; 30 percent by the middle peasants; 20 percent by the poor peasants. As there are more oil-producing hills in the third township, which are more productive, the landlords wanted them, but it was still the rich peasants who owned most of the hills. The distribution was: 15 percent owned by the landlords; 50 percent by the rich peasants; 20 percent by the middle peasants; 15 percent by the poor peasants. It was stated before that 70 poor peasant households in the third township had hills, but what they owned constituted less than 20 percent of the total, each household owning only a very small area. The distribution in the fourth township was: 20 percent owned by the landlords; 20 percent by the rich peasants; 50 percent by the middle peasants; 10 percent by the poor peasants. Owning little or no hills

was a big difficulty of the poor peasants. First, they had little or no firewood, and had to gather straw from hills belonging to others. Second, they could not chop firewood to exchange it for oil and salt at the market; they could only gather straw in exchange for oil and salt, and it took three loads of straw to make up for one load of firewood. Third, they had no lumber to build houses or make tools. Fourth, owning none or little oil-producing hills resulted in having little or no oil for food. Now that the hills have been divided, according to the number of people in the household similar to the division of land, every household owns hills. Though the number of hills in the various townships varies and the people in some have more while others have less, everyone has a little even in the townships which have less hills and the difficulties of the poor peasants are solved. Because of the need, the poor peasants firmly advocated the division of hills. For the sake of production, the hills had to be divided. In the past, due to the lack of manpower, those households with more hills left some of them untended, while the large masses of poor peasants with adequate manpower had to remain idle. Now that the hills have been divided, the poor peasants can devote their effort to their own hills, and production will greatly increase.

(3) At the beginning of the revolution, the grain belonging to the landlords and counterrevolutionary rich peasants was divided, and the poor peasants had their shares free of charge. The grain in Pai-lu (where the big landlords concentrated) was evenly divided among the people, and the poor peasants did not finish eating it even at harvest time.

(4) Debts incurred prior to the revolution did not have to be repaid. When the revolution first started in the third month, the higher authorities instructed that debts owed to merchants, to collective funds and among the poor workers and peasants themselves must be repaid. In the middle part of the 6th month (July by Western calendar), an official communication came from Southwest Kiangsi (the Southwest Kiangsi soviet) instructing that all debts were cancelled. Actually, since the third month, no debt was paid, which was a fact, but the three kinds of debts described above still had to be paid, according to principle (a theory). After the 6th month, even that principle was abolished. The poor peasants fully supported the move. Why did they want to cancel even the three kinds of debts? First, in regard to debts owed to merchants, most of the big merchants had fled. (Ten big merchants among the 35 stores in Pai-lu had fled.) As for the small merchants (such as the 25 small stores in Pai-lu), though the workers and peasants owed them money for goods, most of them were in debt to the big merchants, landlords and rich peasants. If the poor workers and peasants did not repay them, nor did they have to repay the landlords and rich peasants. When the two were compared, it was still advantageous to the small merchants, because they owed more to the big merchants, landlords and rich peasants than what the poor workers and peasants owed them. Second, in regard to collective fund debts, which were incurred for the purpose of marrying or paying debts, the poor workers and peasants asked their relatives and friends to set up a fund and borrowed from it. Such

relatives and friends were either middle or rich peasants, and cancelling the debt did not hurt them. Though such funds were set up to render friendly aid, it was the poor peasants who borrowed from them and, as the poor peasants could not pay, it was proper to cancel the debts. Even if the second and third funds were borrowed by the rich peasants, it was also reasonable to cancel them, because the rich peasants, after borrowing the money, loaned it out to other poor peasants for interest, and now the poor peasants did not have to pay them back. Furthermore, the entire assets of the rich peasants were either confiscated or donated, and there was nothing left. Therefore, it was proper to cancel the debt. As for the funds borrowed by the landlords and rich peasants for the purpose of exploiting the poor workers and peasants, there was no such incident in this district. Third, in regard to the mutual debts among the poor workers and peasants, "as you are poor, and I am also poor, how do I pay you?" Thus, the question was answered. Therefore, it was most proper to cancel all debts.

(5) They enjoyed inexpensive rice. In the 1st and 2d months this year, the cost of grain was 4.60 yuan per tan. The revolution started in the 3d month, and it dropped to 2 yuan per tan. From the 6th month to now (9th month lunar calendar), it was .70 yuan per tan. By comparing .70 yuan with 4.60 yuan, it was 6.5 times cheaper. When the grain was cheap, naturally it was unfavorable to the poor peasants who had received land allocations and cultivated and harvested, but it was favorable to them during the several months after the beginning of the revolution and prior to harvesting.

(6) Greater freedom to get a wife. (The peasants of Kiangsi turned the term "freedom to marry" into a verb, to distinguish it from the coerced and mercenary marriages of the old days; the term is commonly used among the peasants in the entire soviet area.) In the past, one must have money to get a wife; therefore, many poor peasants could not get married. Or, even if they did, it was either a child bride or someone very advanced in years. Should the wife die, it was most difficult to remarry. Now, such difficulties no longer exist.

(7) It is no longer necessary to spend money when there is a death in the family. All one has to do is to bury the dead.

(8) The cost of cows is cheap. It is easy to buy or replace a cow. The poor peasants are very short of draft animals. Take 100 poor peasant households in the district: only 15 have 1 cow per household, 40 have 1 cow per 2 households, 10 have 1 cow per 3 households, 5 have 1 cow per 4 households and 30 have none. Under this situation, the cheap cost of cows is favorable to the poor peasants.

(9) Social obligations are abolished and superstition eliminated, and the expenses for them are no longer necessary.

(10) There is no longer opium smoking or gambling, or theft. Even if the door is not closed at night, nothing is stolen.

(11) With the division of land, every household can raise hogs. Not just to sell them for others to eat, but the poor peasants can eat the meat themselves. In the past, very few poor peasants bought meat from the butcher shops, but now more of them are buying meat.

(12) This is the most important point: The acquisition of political power. The poor peasants are the main force of the rural political power and the leading class of the village. The poor peasants can be divided into five strata according to the number of cattle as discussed in item (8) above.

5. Hired Help

Similar to the poor peasants, the hired help also received land allocations, because, as the landlords and rich peasants have been overthrown, no one will hire permanent help though temporary help is still needed. Though they now have the land allocated to them, they do not have draft animals or farm tools, and it is difficult for them to farm the land. This problem is not yet solved. Instead of allocating the animals and farm tools confiscated from the landlords and rich peasants to the hired help, the district and township governments sold them.

Fu Chi-t'ing's nephew, Chu Ta-hsi, was hired help. He has three brothers, two parents and a wife (a grown up child bride). He is the eldest, age 22, and the boy next to him is 19 years old. He worked as permanent help for rich peasant Chung, at an annual wage of 39 yuan, small currency. His 19-year-old brother was a cowherd, earning an annual wage of 10 yuan. Their total income of 49 yuan was enough to buy 16 tan of grain, sufficient for 2 and a half persons. They relied on their mother and his wife to gather and sell straw for food, eating two meals in winter time. He owed over 30 yuan; had no house of his own; lived in a mountain shed belonging to a landlord and took care of the latter's hills. His father, now over 60 years of age, had also worked as hired help.

The hired help in this district could draw 15 pays per year, reporting for work after the 15th day of the 1st month of the year; no customary meals of meat on the 1st and 15th days of the 1st month; bedding supplied by the boss, but no clothes; paying for their own medicine; no wage deduction due to illness of less than 3 days, but wages were deducted beyond 3 days. Their wages were paid piecemeal. They worked from dawn to dark. Besides the time spent on meals and rest, they worked at least 10 hours a day. In winter time, they peeled mu-tzu [2606 1311] and potatoes in the evenings.

Ninety-nine percent of the hired help had no wives. They were the most miserable class in the rural village. Not only did all landlords and rich peasants have wives, but some of them had several. Ninety percent of the middle peasants had wives and 10 percent did not. Seventy percent of the poor peasants had wives and 30 percent did not. Seventy percent of the

handicraft workers had wives and 30 percent did not. Ten percent of the vagrants had wives and 90 percent did not. Even the vagrants were better off than the hired help, as 99 percent of the latter had no wife. In the 7th month (8th month lunar calendar) [sic], the government issued an order that the unmarried men and women must get married as soon as possible by free choice. Thus, the number of marriages by the free choice of the parties suddenly rose. In the 2 months since the 7th month, most of the formerly unmarried middle and poor peasants have been married, and there are very few single men or women. It is more difficult for the hired help. The women object to the lack of utensils and articles for use in the hired help's home and his long absences. Therefore, it is difficult for the hired help to solve the wife problem. In Yang-fang Village in the first township where Fu Chi-t'ing lives, of the four hired help (two sets of brothers belonging to two families), only one acquired a wife by free choice. Actually, another one could have acquired a wife also, but the social security section chief of the township government refused to register them on ground of their illicit relationship in the past. As a result, the woman married someone else, and the man is still single. In the vicinity of Yung-feng Market in the second township, four of the six hired help acquired wives by free choice. In Hou-ching Village in the fourth township where Wen Feng-chang resides, the one and only hired help is still single.

After land division, there is no longer any permanent help, and only 30 percent of part-time help is left. Wages have not gone up, nor have the hired help asked for a raise. "There is not even any work, let alone a raise!"

Now we discuss the issue of draft animals and farm tools after the hired help acquired land. Of the two hired help in Yang-fang Village, the Ch'en family has two brothers, both working as hired help. The elder brother was a permanent employee of rich peasant Ch'en, earning 33 yuan a year. The younger brother worked for rich peasant Chung as a permanent employee, earning 42 yuan. Their father, deceased, was a tenant farmer. Their mother took them around begging after their father died. Grown up, they became hired help. Their mother died. The older brother is now 29 and the younger 23. They have a house and cooking utensils, but no furniture. The farm tools of the past were sold. After land was allocated to them in the 2d month, both brothers returned home. The younger one acquired a wife by free choice. They had no capital. The younger brother once had over 100 yuan, but he lent it to poor peasant Chung. He could not collect it as all debts were cancelled, and the poor peasant debtor had no way to repay him anyway. Luckily, their uncle, a middle peasant, loaned them a draft animal and tools. The three of them were allocated a total of 16.2 shih of farmland. After receiving land allocation in the 2d month, they immediately farmed the land and kept the entire harvest. Harvesting the first crop, they cultivated a second one, which is growing well. With a cow, one person can farm 100 ku of land, yet the two brothers together only cultivate over 10 ku. Therefore, they have much spare time, and they do odd jobs for others, work as porters, and earn some money.

The Chung family of Yang-fang Village also consists of two brothers. Their parents were deceased. They live with their uncle (Chung En-chiang), uncle's wife, their two sons, a daughter-in-law, and two granddaughters, totaling nine members in the family. The uncle and his two sons were tenant farmers. They owed money and could not make enough to live on. The two brothers worked as hired help. The older brother, Chung Sheng-p'o, in his 40's, worked for rich peasant Chung as a permanent help. The younger brother, Chung Sheng-huai, age 36, worked for middle peasant Chung, also as a permanent help. After land division in the 2d month, they farmed their own land. Formerly they leased a cow from middle peasant Chung Lung-t'an, and the cow threw two calves. After the revolution, Chung Lung-t'an wanted to collect one of the calves. The township government told him: "We must wait and see how the other townships handle such matters. Only if they permit the original owners to do so will you be able to collect a calf. At present you cannot do so." Therefore, the cattle still remained with Chung En-chiang. After the two brothers received land allocations, draft animals and tools were no problem, because their uncle had them.

Here we will discuss middle peasant Chung Lung-t'an. He is in his 30's, his mother in her 60's, and his wife in her 20's, a total of three mouths to feed. He owned over 10 ku of land and leased 30 or 40 from others. After paying the rent, he had more than enough for the family, and he sold the surplus. He leased three cows to three poor peasants, collecting 1.5 tan of grain per cow per year as rent. The calves were divided half and half. He had money to loan out. In the land division in the 2d month, his family of three received a total of 24 ku of land (6 tan per person) [sic], which was more than what he owned before, but he was not permitted to lease land from others. Therefore, he had no surplus grain to sell. The cows leased out by him and the money loaned out were all cancelled and gone. He is very honest. He does not oppose the revolution, but nor has he undertaken any important work. He now works as a cook in the Red Army reserve in his home village.

The hired help have not gained political power after the revolution. The middle and poor peasants always find them "illiterate, inarticulate, unenlightened, ignorant of official affairs," and incapable. No hired help is among the committee members of the district and township governments, and only one serves as a team leader of the township Red Guards.

6. Handicraft Workers

Handicraft workers in the district included carpenters, masons, tailors, iron workers, barbers, bamboo workers, mill workers, coir workers, stone workers, painters, tin workers, weavers, silversmiths, dye workers, trough workers, lacquer workers, kiln workers, and paper workers, a total of 18 categories. Carpenters, masons, tailors and bamboo workers were more numerous; barbers, iron workers and trough workers (fetching oil) next; and the remaining categories the least in number. The district did

not have coppersmiths, cotton ginnerers, shoemakers or tanners. The first township had one oil trough; the second, two; the third, 11, and the fourth, 12, each trough attended by one trough worker.

The wages per man-day of labor in the past were: carpenter 0.20 yuan, mason 0.20 yuan, tailor 0.15 yuan and bamboo worker 0.15 yuan. The barbers in the first, second and fourth townships received 1 peck of grain per year per person, in the third township they were paid 0.15 yuan per year per person, and all meals were provided free by the boss. Iron workers were paid 0.25 yuan. In regard to trough workers, they are paid 10 coppers for each catty of oil produced in the second township, 3 coppers each catty in the third, and 2 catties of oil for each picul (100 catties) produced in the fourth. The situation in the first township, which produced less oil, was not clear. The oil in the third township was the cheapest because of the large output. In regard to mill workers, each mill was 0.60 yuan, requiring 3 man-days of labor. Coir workers were paid 0.22 yuan, and stone workers 0.45 yuan. Painters were paid according to the pictures. They painted the portraits of rich gentry and landlords and images of gods. Tin workers were paid according to the tin utensils. Weavers were paid 0.10 yuan for every 10 feet of summer or spring cloth. (Summer cloth is hempen fabric; spring cloth consists of 80 percent hemp and 20 percent cotton.) The district had no cotton textile weaver. Silversmiths were paid according to the silver utensils, "suffering a big disadvantage." The situation of the dye workers was unknown. Lacquer workers were paid by the piece, and so were the kiln workers. Paper workers were paid 0.15 yuan (making durable paper from mulberry bark, only in the third township).

In the past, carpenters, masons, tailors and bamboo workers performed from over 100 man-days of work to 200 per year. After the revolution, the work days of the masons and tailors have been greatly reduced, amounting to only about several dozen man-days per year. Carpenters and bamboo workers are doing a little less work than before, but not noticeably so. Barbering is more popular than before, because the women have all cut their hair. After the revolution, tin workers, painters, lacquer workers, and paper workers have all disappeared, because there is no more need for them. (Paper workers made fuses for firecrackers used in celebrations. Now that such firecrackers are not used, there is no longer need for paper workers.)

The "order from above" provided that handicraft workers would receive a half-share of land, but the handicraft workers demanded a full share, on ground that they were either unemployed or their work was reduced and insecure, and that only by getting land would they have security. The peasants said: "The order from above provides that you get half a share." The workers said: "If so, then wages will have to be raised." The peasants did not want the wages to increase, because the poor peasants and hired help needed to employ the workers to make farm tools to farm their land. The rich and middle peasants already owned farm tools; therefore, they had no need to employ the workers. Only the poor peasants had such need; therefore, they opposed higher wages. The poor peasants said: "Alright, you can have the land, but you must not raise the wages." The workers said that, after receiving their land allocations, if they still performed 100 man-days of work a year, they would be willing to give 2 tan of grain

to the public. The barbers were not allocated land, because they stayed with others all day long and had their meals free. The workers of Kan-hsien received land and had their wages decreased. The wage of masons was reduced from 0.20 yuan to 0.15, and that of bamboo workers from 0.15 yuan to 0.12.

Seventy percent of the handicraft workers had wives, and 30 percent did not. After the revolution, most of the single men acquired wives by free choice. As the handicraft workers have a wide contact, possess a special skill and are relatively intelligent and articulate, and many among them are literate, they are in a better position than the hired help.

The handicraft workers have a general labor union in the district, branch unions in the townships and branch departments in the villages. The 20 or more workers of various occupations in Ling-yuan in the first township, for instance, have organized a branch union.

Rural handicraft workers always farmed on the side while pursuing their major occupation of handicraft. There were very few of them who did not farm at all--less than 10 in 100.

Eighty percent of the handicraft workers were in debt.

7. Merchants

Merchants in the district operated grocery and variety goods stores, rice and fruit stores (further divided into several dozen categories), tea shops, restaurants, butcher shops, beancake shops and opium dens. Those who operated small stores exclusively without farming on the side constituted 3 percent of the population (three families in 100).

Among the four townships in the district, there were, in the past, only three small merchants with 500 yuan in capital, all located in Yung-feng Market, and none in other townships. The small stores in the district were distributed as follows: five in the first township, 35 in the second (all in Yung-feng Market), six in the third and none in the fourth, totaling 46. Out of the 46 small stores, four had capital of 500 yuan. (Three of them were in Yung-feng Market: A medicine store, owned by someone from Chang-shu, and two imported goods stores, branches from Hsing-kuo City. None of the owners was a landlord in the district. They all fled when the revolution started. The stores were seized and the goods given to the poor. The fourth store was in Shan-k'eng, owned by a landlord of the township. The whole family fled, and the store was boarded up.) One store had a capital of 400 yuan. (Located in Shan-k'eng, it was a variety goods store, operated by two partners, Han Li-t'ao, who farmed 20 shih of land, and Han Li-tung, who farmed 60 shih. After the revolution, Han Li-t'ao fled. Han Li-tung infiltrated the revolution, served as the land section chief in the government, and was accused of belonging to the AB League and detained by the district government.) Three stores had capital of 300 yuan. (All were located in Yung-feng Market: two were variety goods and fabrics stores, operated by individuals from Hsing-kuo City. Both were counterrevolutionary, and both fled. The stores were converted into tea shops. One was

a butcher shop. The owner also had 60 ku of land. He joined the revolution; continues in business; serves as chairman of the village government; is honest). Two stores had capital of 100 yuan. (One was in Shan-k'eng, selling variety goods and serving also as an inn. The owner had no land; counterrevolutionary; was killed; the store closed. The other is in Hsi-chiang, selling variety goods and also making silverware. The owner farms several ku of land; not counterrevolutionary; store still in business). Two stores had capital of 50 yuan. (Located in the third township, the one in Chu-k'eng is a medicine store. The owner has 20 ku of land; not counterrevolutionary; store still in business. The other, located in Shang-ching-yao, was also a medicine store. The owner had land; counterrevolutionary; fled; the store closed.) There were 24 stores with capital of 20 yuan. (Two in Wu-niang-miao and two in Chiao-t'ien-chiang, totaling four in the first township; 20 in Yung-feng Market in the second township.) There were 10 stores with capital of 10 yuan. (Nine in Yung-feng Market in the second township; one in Chi'i-ling-ai in the third township.) The above specialized in small stores, without any sideline.

There were many people in the villages whose main occupation was farming, with commerce as a sideline (deriving 80 percent of their income from farming and 20 percent from commerce), constituting about 40 percent of all the households (40 households in 100). The majority of them were poor peasants and a minority were middle peasants. As they did not have sufficient income for their living, they did some porterage to supplement it, such as going to Chiang-k'ou, Han-chou and Hu-k'ou-mien and carrying along some oil as capital to bring back salt. Or, they might carry eggs to sell in Chia-ying-chou (Mei-hsien) and bring back salt.

Merchants in the district with capital of 50 yuan or more numbered 12. Of the 12, 9 were counterrevolutionary and 3 were not.

Among the 12, only the 4 with capital of 500 yuan hired clerks, 3 of them hiring 1 each and the remaining one hiring 2. The 8 remaining ones did not hire any help.

There were 34 stores with capital of 20 yuan or less. Those operating them are called store owners, but actually poor people; therefore, there is no counterrevolutionary among them. All the stores are still in business [except the opium dens].

The 34 so-called "stores" with capital of 20 yuan and 10 yuan included:

- 9 inns (4 in the first township; 5 in the second, all located in Yung-feng Market).
- 4 opium dens
- 2 candy stores
- 4 butcher shops
- 4 rice shops
- 1 woodenware shop
- 1 ironware store
- 4 variety goods stores (above all in Yung-feng Market)
- 5 tea shops (4 in Yung-feng Market; 1 in the third township).

In the land division this time, except those who were killed or who had fled, merchants with capital of 50 yuan or more whose stores were sealed or closed were given land. Only three stores whose owners are not counterrevolutionary are still in business. One is a butcher shop in Yung-feng Market with an original capital of 300 yuan. The owner was assessed a donation of 220 yuan, leaving him only 80 yuan. He has 15 mouths to feed and is not counter-revolutionary. Originally he owned 60 piculs of land. In the land division, the owner, Chi'en Shao-lin received half a share and the 14 members of his family each received a full share. Thus, he has a little more land now than before. His brother Ch'en Shao-ying served as a company commander in the Third Army (formerly the Second Regiment); therefore, his family is revolutionary. He serves as the chairman of the village government. The second establishment is a medicine store in Chu-k'eng with a capital of 50 yuan. The owner received half share of land and the members of his family each received 1 share. The third is a variety goods and silverware store in Hsi-chiang with a capital of 100 yuan. The owner is not counter-revolutionary. The township government assessed him a donation (amount unknown). The owner received half share of land and his family members each received one share. In regard to the 34 small stores belonging to the poor, as the business of the four inns in the first township and one candy store in the third township has always been bad and the owners have always relied mostly on farming for their living, they and their family members each received a full share of land. As for the 29 stores in Yung-feng Market, in the past, the owners had no land but operated their small business exclusively. After the revolution, aside from the four opium dens which closed down, the candy, butcher, rice, woodenware, ironware, variety goods and tea shops, and the inns have not only continued in operation, but the business has not dropped. Even so, they still received land allocations, the owners getting half shares and their family members full shares. Those without draft animals or farm tools borrow them from relatives.

In general, that the stores with capital of 50 yuan or more (actually they were mostly small stores) suffered severely in the revolution was a result of the excessive leftist policy of the area. The poor operating stores with capital of 10 or 20 yuan were greatly benefited. Besides receiving land allocations, they have reduced the expenses for social obligations, can acquire a wife easily, do not have to spend money on the dead, and have gained political recognition. All these benefits are the same as the poor peasants. Such poor people and small peddlers belong to the same class as the poor peasants. Therefore, the benefits gained by them are not much different.

8. Vagrants

There were the following categories of vagrants in the district.

(1) Gamblers: About 50 or more in the entire district, including about 10 in the first township, about 20 in the second, all in Yung-feng Market, 6 in the third and about 20 in the fourth. In the past, 9 out of 10 gamblers smoked opium, but they do not do so anymore. There is not one counter-revolutionary among the 50 or more gamblers in the district. When they

heard about knocking down the local tyrants and dividing the land, they were very pleased. In the past, they had no clothes in cold weather and were dressed in rags, but now they have good clothes to wear. In the past, they would have fish and meat when they had money but starve when the money ran out, but now, though they do not have delicacies, they can eat rice every day. Eight out of 10 of them had no family. Now, with the land allocated to them, they borrow draft animals and tools from their relatives to farm the land. As gamblers were always generous, it is easy for them to borrow things now. Among the 10 in the first township, one of them originally served as a finance committee member in the fourth township government. He was an honest gambler, had good credit and performed well as a finance committee member after the revolution. Among the 20 in the second township, four of them are working in the township government: T'ien Shang-jen serves as propaganda department chief in the district government; had a house; no family; joined the revolution the year before last; house burned down by the pacification force. Ch'en Kun-t'ung joined the revolution the year before last; served as judge in the district government; subsequently became commander of the Third Company in the Reserve Army. Yang Ta-hu joined the revolution the year before last; became chairman of the township government in the revolution in the 2d month this year; performed well; subsequently joined the district government. Ch'en-Shao-chi'i joined the revolution the year before last; became land section chief of the township in the 2d month this year. Among the six in the third township, Lei Yung-huang has a family; used to gamble and sell opium; joined the revolution in the second month this year; serves as finance section chief in the township government; very loyal and honest.

(2) Beggars: There were four beggars in the first township, five in the second, four in the third and four in the fourth, totaling 17. They were people entirely without a future. Most of them had no family; only 4 out of the 17 had families. The entire families of these four begged. Now, after receiving land, they borrow draft animals and tools from their relatives. None of them has done any government work after the revolution.

(3) Water-pipe tobacco sellers: There were two in the second township and one in the fourth, totaling three. The two in the second township both had wives and sons. Their wives leased farms from others to farm, but they themselves did not pursue any proper occupation. They sold water-pipe tobacco in gambling dens. The one in the fourth township had no family and did not farm. Now they have all been allocated land. None of them has worked in the government since the revolution.

(4) Horoscopists: There was only one in the fourth township; no family; did not farm; specialized in fortune-telling; received land allocation.

(5) Kuan-yin [Goddess of Mercy] pickers: There was one in the first township; land was allocated to him.

(6) Taoist priests: three in the first township; all had families; did not farm; performed religious work; two in the second township; neither had family; did not farm; one in the third township; had family; did some farming. All six priests were allocated land. Tseng Yun-chang was a priest; joined the revolution the year before last; no family; no farm; became general commander of Hsing-kuo-Kan-hsien-Wan-hsien guerrilla force in the 2d month this year; "most resourceful; able; never defeated in battle"; now assigned to the 22d Army.

(7) Monks: Two in the fourth township, each occupying a temple; collected rent to live on. Originally from Kao-hsing Market. After the revolution, they returned to Kao-hsing Market where land was allocated.

(8) Entertainers: They gave puppet shows. One in the third township; had family; farmed; now serving with the 20th Army. Two in the fourth township; had families; farmed; now working in the village government. All three were allocated land.

(9) Fortune-tellers: One in the first township; single; has brothers; joined the revolution last year; has been serving as propaganda section chief in the township government since the 2d month this year. Two in the second township; one of them blind; both had families. Their wives farmed and they told fortunes. Land was allocated to them. Blind man Ch'en Hsin-po was "a famous fortune-teller." For his accuracy in telling the fortune of a magistrate, the magistrate gave him 10 yuan." As he was blind, he received a double-share of land--14 ku. There were four fortune-tellers in the third township; all had families. Three of them farmed and one did not. The families did the farming while they told fortunes. Now, three of them work in the government. Tseng Ch'ing-lung, one of them, joined the revolution in the 2d month last year, "most articulate," has been serving as land section chief in the district government and performing well. He formerly had several ku of land which he rented to his uncle; unmarried. Chi'iu Ta-yang, the second one, joined the revolution in the 2d month this year; no farm nor family; now serving as judge in the third township government; very honest. The third one, Ch'iu Po-ch'eng, had several shih of land; married; joined the revolution in the 2d month this year; now serving as propaganda officer in the township government. There were 17 fortune-tellers altogether.

The nine categories of vagrants discussed above, totaling 90 persons, generally welcomed the revolution. Not only did none of them resist the revolution, but 10 of them have joined the district or township government in leadership work and one has become a guerrilla commander. This is noteworthy.

The vagrants have gained many benefits in the revolution. Aside from the nine categories discussed above, the district has no other vagrants.

IV. Current Condition of Land Division

6. Division of Farmland

(1) Unit of division: All four townships used the village as the unit to divide the farmland. As the townships are large and have many mountains, it would have been difficult to take each township as one unit, because the great distances would make it impractical to farm. The peasants preferred to get a little less land in their own village rather than going to another village. In villages where the farmland was less and the hills more, each person received a little less farmland and a little more hills, and vice versa. The result was "not much difference."

(2) Method of division: The "order from above" was to complete the division in 3 days. Actually, it was completed in the first and third townships in 7 days, and the second and fourth in 8 days. (The time was too short.)

The first township has 15 villages, the second and fourth 7 villages each, and the third 8 villages. At the beginning of the division, the district government sent propaganda officers to the villages to hold mass meetings. Notice was given half a day in advance to call the people together. The men came, but not the women and children under 10 years of age. The propaganda officers explained to the people the benefits and methods of burning the deeds and dividing the land. One propaganda officer could hold mass meetings in two different villages in a day. At that time, the reaction of the people attending the meetings was: "It certainly sounds good, but we don't know whether the regulations are stable or not." Some said: "The documents (contracts) are burned; the debts are cancelled. While land division, thanks to the Red Army, is good, it may not be reliable. Now that the land is divided, most likely we will have to pay rent." At the mass meetings, a village government chairman, a secretary, a finance section chief, a land section chief and two executive secretaries, an organization section chief, a propaganda section chief, a grain section chief, a military affairs section chief, and a communications officer were elected. The Yang-fang village government of the first township was elected at the mass meeting in the forenoon of the 25th day of the 2d month, lunar calendar. The propaganda officer left for another village. The masses (60 or 70 out of the total population of over 180 in the village attended the meeting) adjourned for lunch. Returning in the afternoon, the village government called a meeting. Chairman Chung En-ming (an independent laborer; no farm; worked as cook; made beancakes to sell; made rice candies to sell at shows in other areas) served as chairman of the meeting. The following items were decided on:

(a) Ask the wealthy families for donations for use as village government expenses. This matter to be handled by the finance section.

(b) No grain may be shipped out of the village. This matter to be handled by the grain section.

(c) Concentrate all weapons of the village. This matter to be handled by the military affairs section.

(d) Make land surveys and divisions. This matter to be handled by the land section.

The 4 days between the 26th and the 29th were devoted to land survey. Land section chief Fu Chi-t'ing (a member of the survey committee) led land executive secretaries Chung En-sheng and Chung En-jen (both poor peasants) and the four unit chiefs (the village was divided into four units, every 10 households per unit) to check the farmland by households and record the locations and sizes of the farms. The survey was completed in 4 days and the total area of farmland ascertained. Dividing the total by the number of population in the village, they obtained the area per person. Fu Hua-lung owned 230 tan of land, completely farmed by himself; 10 mouths to feed; owed over 300 yuan in debts; hired one cowherd; had one large buffalo. His land was inferior; actually could only harvest over 140 tan. He needed half of that to feed the 10 members of the family, leaving the remaining half as surplus. After paying interests on the debts and rent on the land (a part of which was not very productive) amounting to over 40 tan, he had around 30 tan left over. He was, therefore, a middle peasant with some surplus. Chung Hsien-hui farmed his own 70-odd tan of land, feeding three. In the past, he had money to lend, but last year he used up his money to build a house. He hired a regular help for 6 months out of the year. Besides feeding his family, he had a surplus of over 30 tan every year. He was also a middle peasant. He had four brothers, not living together. Besides him, one of them could make a living, but the remaining three had a hard time. Now, Fu Hua-lung and Chung Hsien-hui complained that the survey was unfair, and that their farms were over-rated. The several dozen poor peasants, hired help, and workers all objected to their complaint and declared the survey of the land section correct. The three rich peasants at the meeting all obeyed the dispositions and kept quiet. Everyone approved the results of the survey and immediately wanted to "shovel out" so much from a certain household to be given to a certain other household and to "shovel in" so much by a certain household from a certain other household. Those households which had to surrender land decided on the part to be surrendered; therefore, they surrendered the inferior portions. As the struggle was not yet intensive at that time, those who obtained inferior land were so pleased to get land at all that they did not complain. The meeting on that day did the work of "taking the surplus to supplement the shortage." After division, the village government secretary recorded it in books, without posting. From the 25th day of the 2d month to the 1st of the 3d month, the land division was completed in 7 days.

After division, "immediate transfer" or "fall transfer" became a struggle between the poor and rich peasants. At the time of land division in the 2d month, it was after seeding, before transplanting and in the midst of plowing. Most of the transfers were done immediately. However, some rich peasants wanted to see which way the wind blew and hoped that the pacification force would return and nullify the division. They told the poor

peasants: "I have already fertilized and plowed. Let us not transfer this year. Let me harvest before transfer, and I will give you 40 percent of the harvest." Some of the poor peasants accepted the proposal, feeling that it was a good deal to get 40 percent without doing anything. Some of the hired help and workers actually could not immediately take over the land to farm. Therefore, about 10 percent in the district followed the "40 percent" method and did not take an immediate transfer.

2. Division of Hills

Land was divided between the end of the 2d month and the beginning of the 3d month. The hills were not divided until the end of the 5th month.

In Yang-fang Village, the hills began to be divided on the 27th day of the 5th month, because the order from above did not arrive until then. (Note how great is the effect of the order from above!) The township government sent propaganda officer Liu Ta-lun (intellectual; eager in work; but was discovered, on the 17th day of the 8th month, to be secretary of the AB League; killed by the district government; 11 persons of the AB League were killed on that day. Probably a mistake to kill someone like Liu Ta-lun) to the village to hold a mass meeting and propagandize the method of dividing the hills. Seven new land executive secretaries were elected and hill division was decided on. On that day, the propaganda officer reported on the matter of the poor people's loan office. It was decided that it would be carried out.

Hill division was even more difficult than land division. As there were big and small hills, more or less firewood, big or small trees, or no tree at all, it was difficult to divide. The land section chief and the seven executive secretaries went out together, covered all the hills in the village, and decided on the method. Instead of dividing by area, the hills would be divided according to the amount of oil-bearing tea plants therein contained. One tan of "t'ao" (1 tan of tea-seed worth 2 strings of coppers, is known as 1 tan of "t'ao") was taken as the unit. Thirty big plants, 60 medium ones, or 120 small ones were considered as 1 tan of "t'ao." The hills of the entire village were converted into "t'ao," then evenly divided among the population and marked by stakes. In Yang-fang Village, it took 4 days to divide the hills clearly. The eight men of the land section had the authority to do the division, "not according to the opinions of the individuals, because the matter would never be settled if everyone had his say."

In Ch'ang-chiao Village in the third township, the village government issued 2.10 yuan to the five men of the land section (one chief and four executive secretaries) for meals, and it took them over 30 days to complete the division. "One can see how difficult it was!"

Though the hills were divided, only the branches of the trees could be cut, not the trunks. Government approval was required to cut down trees.

3. Division of Ponds

With the village as the unit and according to the size of the ponds, the people were formed into teams to stock the ponds with fingerlings. Five households formed one team for a big pond and three households for a small pond. One team took charge of one pond. All the households would do the stocking at the same time with the same number of fingerlings, and the fish, when caught, would be divided evenly. Water for the ponds in the district was no problem; the problem was fish. Some few mountain ponds had a water problem. Thus, mountain ponds which could support fish were divided according to the above method. For those which could not, they were assigned along with the farms, and whoever owned the farm owned the pond.

The fingerlings stocked before the revolution would not be divided when grown and caught, but belonged to the persons stocking them. When the ponds became dry in the winter this year, the original owners would catch the fish. Only then would the new owners stock the ponds.

4. Division of Houses

In principle, houses should be divided. Many poor peasants with families of 10 or more members lived in two or three rooms. Generally speaking, the housing of 60 percent of the poor peasants was inadequate; the good houses were all occupied by the rich peasants. The poor peasants all clamored for division of houses, but the government said: "No official communication from above." So, the poor peasants did not dare to go and live in the rich peasants' houses. At the mass meeting in Yang-fang Village, the poor peasants demanded division of houses. The land section chief said: "Those with more rooms should give up a few to those not having enough." But there was no resolution. The rich peasants refused to yield, and the poor peasants did not dare to force the matter. (One can see the importance of "communication from above!")

The division of houses should be done with each village taken as a unit. For adjacent houses, those with more rooms should give some to those with less rooms.

In the district, only the houses of landlords, rich peasants and unscrupulous merchants who had been killed or expelled due to their reaction--if such houses had not been burned (burning was not right)--were occupied by the poor peasants, but there was no formal allocation. As for those who had not been killed or expelled, even if they had extra rooms, such rooms were not given to those with less rooms.

In regard to the houses of counterrevolutionary landlords and rich peasants which were burned (burned by the guerrillas), there were 1 in the first township, 2 in the second, 5 in the third and 4 in the fourth, altogether 12, including the houses of three landlords and nine rich peasants. In regard to houses of revolutionary workers and peasants which were burned

(burned by counterrevolutionaries), none in the first township, 7 in the second, 8 in the third and 8 in the fourth, altogether 23, including the houses of 1 middle peasant, 20 poor peasants, 1 small merchant and 1 vagrant.

5. Public Land

In the land division in the 2d month, public land was reserved in every township and every village. In the first township, over 10 tan of land were reserved in Yang-fang Village and over 30 in Ch'an-kan Village. In the second township, 11 tan were reserved in Chih-ko Village. In Ch'ang-chiao Village of the third township, as land was scarce and 16 persons had not been allocated land, no public land was reserved. All other villages reserved public land. In Hou-ching Village in the fourth township, over 100 tan of land were reserved, the entire parcel suffering from flood. Why was public land reserved? First, the remainder after division was hard to dispose of; thus, it was reserved. For example, if everyone received 7 tan, with a remainder of 10-odd tan, if divided, it would not be enough to let everyone have 1 t'ung [2729] each; therefore, the remainder was reserved as public land. Second, it helped pay government expenses. Third, it was in anticipation of sons to be born next year. There would be a re-division in the 8th month, because official communication from above ordered thorough division, including the public land.

Actually, it would have been better not to reserve public land. First, as there are deaths as well as births, there is no worry of giving birth to a son without a farm. Second, the government will get its revenue by land taxes; it does not have to rely on public farms for its expenses. Furthermore, as shown by the examples in the 2d month, all the public land reservations are inferior and not very useful. Therefore, it is better to divide all the land so that the peasants can get greater benefit.

6. Amount of Land Distribution

The villages varied. In Yang-fang Village of the first township, for instance, each person received 5-6 tan of land (8 tan in the 2d month, but actually only 5-6 tan of grain could be harvested). In Ch'a-kan Village, each person received 8 tan. In Chih-ko Village in the second township, each person received 7 tan. In Ch'ang-chiao Village in the third township, the amounts in the 2d and 8th months were different. In the 2d month, there were four different allocations, 7 tan, 6 1/2 tan, 5 1/2 tan, and 4 tan 1 t'ung. The division was initially done on the basis of surnames. and people with more land refused to yield their land to people of different surnames. Not until the 8th month was the land divided with each village considered as one unit, each person receiving 6 tan. In Hou-ching of the fourth township, each person received 8.5 tan in the 2d month. When the land was re-divided in the 8th month, inferior land which was previously counted as 2 tan but produced 1 tan was considered as 1 tan only. There were also people returning from out-of-town. As a result, each person received only 7.5 tan.

Hsing-kuo produces only one crop a year. According to the amount of land discussed above, there was barely enough for everyone. By planting miscellaneous grains and raising pigs, the people could supply themselves with oil, salt, cloths and sundry goods.

The major miscellaneous grain of the district is sweet potato, constituting 40 percent of the staple food of the people. The first township produces relatively less sweet potato, because of the soil. It constitutes only 20 percent of the staples. The second and third townships are entirely different, the percentage of sweet potato consumed by the people as staple food amounts to from 50 to 70 percent. Shredded potatoes mixed in rice are eaten all year round. The people of the fourth township eat an average of 40 percent sweet potatoes.

V. Land Tax

Known as "public welfare fund," land tax began to be collected at the beginning of the 8th month (lunar calendar): 1 percent on 6 tan of land (6 sheng per person), 1.5 percent on 7 tan of land, 2.5 percent on 8 tan of land (2 tou per person), and 3.5 percent on 9 tan of land (3.15 tou per person). No one in the district has 9 tan of land; therefore, the highest rate of public welfare fund is 2.5 percent.

Yang-fang Village of the first township has a population of over 180, each allocated 8 tan of land (according to the figures of land division in the 2d month). At 2.5 percent, the total collection was 36.4 tan. The 397 population of Ch'a-kan Village each received 8 tan of land, and the total tax collection was 79.4 tan. No tax was collected on the 5.5 tan of land per person in Ch'ang-chiao Village in the third township. (Tax was collected on 6 tan of land or more.) This year the district will probably collect around 1,000 tan in taxes.

The taxes collected in the 8th month are mostly deposited in the villages. A portion was delivered to the township government, but none to the district government. During tax collection in the 8th month, the county government, in its official communication, permitted the people to pay in grain or cash by converting grain into cash at the conversion rate of 30 wen [2429] for 1 catty of grain. As the market price at that time was only 20 wen per catty, no one wanted to pay in cash.

When the public welfare fund was first collected, 10 percent of the people objected to it. When the officials came to their houses, they said: "You said before that we were to resist rents and taxes, but now you are collecting taxes again!" When collecting the public welfare fund, the order from above was very urgent, allowing 3 days to deliver the grain to the township government. The township government summoned the land section chiefs of the villages for a meeting. The first township was divided into nine Red Guards brigades, and one member of each brigade (land section chief) attended the meeting. It was decided that the

responsible persons of the villages should hold meetings and collect the taxes after the meeting. No mass meeting was held. Each brigade was taken as a unit for tax collection. The 8th brigade, for instance, was organized by Yang-fang, Ling-yuan and Li-yao villages. The brigade leader, land section chiefs, three team leaders and nine unit leaders proceeded to the three villages and collected household by household (each village constituting a team). They measured the grain at each household, at 90 catties per tan, and the particular household delivered the grain to the township government. The brigade collected almost 400 tan of grain in public welfare fund. In Ch'a-kan Village of the 1st township, written notices were sent to the households 2 days in advance, requesting them to deliver the public welfare fund to the public granary. On due date, the households carried the grain to the granary (formerly known as the public granary), and it was received by the responsible person (five men) of the township. It took them less than a day to complete the job, receiving a total of more than 70 tan of grain. It was announced in advance that whoever did not deliver the grain on time would have to be responsible for the meal expenses of the five responsible persons. To avoid such expenses, everyone delivered his grain on time.

VI. Soviets

1. District Government

Committee members of the district government (2d to 6th month):

Chairman Liu Shao-piao: From the second township; did not farm; studied Chinese boxing; could read a little; worked as a tailor but subsequently quit; professional gambler; joined the revolution the year before last; house burned by the pacification force; became judge when chairman was replaced in the 7th month.

Military Affairs Officer Hsiao Chih-ch'un: From the second township; did not farm; traveled to Kwangtung to sell eggs; gambled; caretaker at ancestral hall; no house; could not read much; joined the revolution the year before last; became chairman of district government in the 7th month.

Treasurer Hou Li-hsin: From the second township; tailor; literate; became district labor union committee chairman in the 7th month.

Organizer Liu Shao-ming: From the second township; a doctor; no other occupation; well-to-do in the past, but subsequently the four brothers separated; worked as doctor; owed debts; joined the revolution the year before last; house burned by the pacification force; became treasurer in the 7th month.

Propagandist Tsou Li-san: From Kan-hsien; rich peasant; six brothers; middle school graduate; served as propaganda section chief; left for Kan-hsien in the 7th month.

Wang Chen-jen: From the second township; alias T'ien Shang-jen; no occupation; lived by gambling; joined the revolution the year before last; house burned by the pacification force; still serving as propaganda officer in the 7th month.

Fang Kung-shu: From the 11th district; a scholar; occupation unknown; house burned by the pacification force; returned to 11th district in the 7th month.

Hsiao Chih-ch'eng: From the second township; professional gambler; could read a little; joined the revolution the year before last; suffered at the hands of the pacification force; still with the district government in the 7th month, position unknown.

Ch'en Fang-pao: From the second township; tailor and gambler; illiterate; joined the revolution the year before last; arrested in the 8th month on suspicion of belonging to the AB League.

Judge Tseng Li-pang: From the second township; Taoist priest; no other occupation; family poor; joined the revolution the year before last; general commander of Hsing-Kan-Wan Guerrillas; now assigned to the 22d Army.

Culture Officer Tsou Li-tung: From the second township; once owned 600 tu of land; sold most of it for studying, leaving 100-odd ku; owed over 300 yuan in debts; a bankrupt big landlord; college graduate; joined the revolution last year; still in charge of culture after reorganization in the 7th month.

Secretary-General Hsieh Ying-shan: From county seat; scholar; 50 years old; remained in same position after reorganization in the 7th month.

Youth Vanguard Political Commissioner Hsiao Shao-wen: From the second township; professional gambler; could read a little; joined the revolution the year before last; left for southwest Kiangsi after reorganization in the 7th month.

Youth Vanguard Director Ch'u Ch'ang-han: From the first township; rich peasant; a "graduate"; last year the guerrillas assessed him a donation and he joined the revolution; arrested in the 8th month on suspicion of belonging to the AB League.

Huang Kuan: Scholar; background unknown; whereabouts unknown after reorganization in the 7th month.

Ch'en Kun-t'ung: From the second township; father was a local rascal, deceased; middle peasant and gambler; illiterate; joined the revolution the year before last; farm seized by the pacification force; remained in government after reorganization in the 7th month.

Yang Ta-ch'eng: From the second township; was once a tailor, but subsequently became a professional gambler; joined the revolution the year before last; slightly literate; served as propaganda officer in the second township government after reorganization in the 7th month.

Women Section Chief Liu Ch'ao-ying: From the first township; laboring woman; illiterate; left for southwest Kiangsi after reorganization in the 7th month.

Of the 18 persons above, there were 6 professional gamblers (2 were previously tailors), 1 tailor and gambler, 1 tailor, 1 doctor, 1 Taoist priest, 1 bankrupt big landlord, 2 rich peasants, 1 middle peasant, 3 scholars of unknown background and 1 laboring woman of unknown background.

Among the 18, Liu Shao-piao, Hsiao Chih-ch'un, Liu Shao-ming, Wang Chen-jen, Hsieh Ying-shan, Ch'en Kun-t'ung, Tsou Li-tung and Tseng Li-pang were most authoritative and powerful.

The district government is located in Yung-feng Market.

Between the 2d and 9th months, there were held over 20 district mass meetings and 2 district delegates' meetings (delegates elected at mass meetings of the villages). There were few district mass meetings before the 6th month. After the 6th month, as the struggles became intensified, many mass meetings were held. After the 4th month, women and children all attended the mass meetings.

2. Township Government

Government of the first township as an example:

Chairman Hsieh Chin-ming: Poor peasant and porter; owned very little land.

Treasurer Chung Kuo-ch'un: Middle peasant.

Military Affairs Officer Yang T'ing-jung: Poor peasant; owned very little land.

Propaganda Officer Hsieh Chung-k'ai: Poor peasant; owned land but in debt.

Propaganda Officer Hsieh Chung-mei: Owned land; farmed; made business trips to Kwangtung; middle peasant.

Propaganda Officer Hsieh Hua-huan: Rich peasant; graduate of Hsing-kuo county school.

Propaganda Officer Ch'en Fang-po: Poor peasant; tenant farmer; fortune-teller.

Secretary I Yung-hung: Father was a barber; impoverished; studied.

Judge Ch'en Yu-shu: From Lien-t'ang; studied.

Fu Chi-t'ing: Poor peasant.

Of the 10 persons above, there were 6 poor peasants, 2 middle peasants, 1 rich peasant and 1 scholar from outside.

Mass meetings in the township were much less frequent than the district--less than 10 times.

Before the 4th month, women and children did not attend meetings, but they did after the 4th month.

Some six or seven township delegates' meetings were held, attended by 30 to 40 persons per township, with one to two delegates from each village. Some non-delegates from villages near the township government also attended. Each meeting lasted 3 to 4 hours. The delegates expressed themselves quite fully. The chairman was elected pro tempore.

3. Village Government

There were village governments between the 2d and 5th months, because they were needed for land division. Once the land was divided, it was no longer necessary to have a village government. Furthermore, money would be needed to run a government. Even if no meal was provided, there had to be some operation expenses. After the revolution intensified and the land divided, every 10 households were organized into a group, and there was also the Red Guards brigade. Therefore, it was alright not to have a village government.

4. Shortcomings of Government Personnel

(1) The first is bureaucraticism, putting on airs, and aversion to associating with the masses. When the people ask for information in the government, the officials will say something when they feel like it, but when they don't, they will ignore them altogether, or even accuse them of "making trouble."

(2) They sell the things belonging to the reactionaries which have been confiscated instead of giving them to the poor. People without connections in the government cannot buy them; only those with contact and who are articulate can buy them. Furthermore, as the things are for sale, only people with some money can buy them, and the hired help and extremely poor peasants naturally have no share.

(3) They assign women to work in the government, always one or two in the township government, and three or four in the district government. It is a good thing for women to work in the government, but the choice is not proper. If a woman is not pretty, even if she is articulate and capable, she is not selected. On the other hand, if she is pretty, even if

inarticulate and incapable, she is selected. It is the same when the officials of the township government go to the villages to hold meetings. They will talk to the pretty women and ignore the plain ones.

(4) This is the major point. It is the violation of the people's will. Government committee members are decided by a few, and elections at the delegates' meetings are mere formalities. In one instance, the chairman asked the people to raise their hands if they approved of a certain person. Some people did not raise their hands, and the chairman accused them of belonging to the AB League. Another time, the chairman glared at those not raising their hands and demanded to know why. Furthermore, only communist party members may work in the government. The non-members, even if they are mass leaders, cannot work in the government. (I told the people attending the meeting that such bad things only happened in the early stage of the land revolution, that one of the reasons was that the components of government were not very good, and that there would be changes in the future, because such bad things were not right.)

VII. Rural Militarization

1. Red Guards

There were nine brigades in the first township, three in the second, four in the third and four in the fourth. The method of organization was as follows: 8 to 12 persons constituted a unit, 3 units a team and 3 teams a brigade. Generally, a brigade consisted of 80 to 90 persons in the townships of this district. The 8th brigade in the first township, for instance, included the 1st team of Yang-fang, the 2d team of Ling-yuan and the 3d team of Li-yao, totaling over 90 persons.

Members of the Red Guards were between the ages of 23 and 50.

All members of the Red Guards were men.

At the beginning, it was divided into regular and reserve Red Guards. Subsequently, they were combined, without distinction of regular or reserve.

The tasks of the Red Guards were patrolling day and night in every village. A patrol shed was required at the main entrance to every village. In ordinary times, the Children's League and Young Pioneers patrolled in the day time. The regulation called for five persons in one day, two from the Girls' League, two from the Boys' League, and one from the Young Pioneers doing the checking. The Young Pioneers must be literate, able to read the passes. A pass was required of everyone, regardless of who, and it was required even for traveling from village A to village B. Night patrol was handled by the Red Guards, generally four persons a night, two persons per shift, one shift taking the first half of the night and the other shift the second half. When the situation became tense (as when the pacification force advanced close to Chun-ts'un on the 7th day of the 7th month), the Red Guards patrolled both day and night, and additional personnel were

assigned patrol duty. Though still 4 or 5 in day time, they were increased to 10 or more, or even 20 or more, at night.

Each Red Guards brigade had a commander, who must be the most earnest person in the township and had some knowledge of military affairs, and a political commissar, who must also be the most earnest person in the township and able to read official documents.

Drills were previously required of the Red Guards. After organizing the Red Army reserve in the 7th month, they were abolished.

The Red Guards was divided into men's and women's Red Guards. The 8th brigade jointly organized by Yang-fang, Ling-yuan and Li-yao villages in the first township, for instance, consisted of men's Red Guards 8th brigade and women's Red Guards 8th brigade. The age limits for women were the same as for men, but there were fewer members, because the number of women was smaller than men, and the pregnant and nursing women were excluded. Generally, each consisted of 40 persons (the third brigade of the second township) to 50 persons (the 8th brigade of the first township; the 3d brigade of the third township). Sometimes, it could be less than 40 or more than 50. Women Red Guards ordinarily did not perform patrol duty. In emergencies when the men Red Guards sallied forth (going out on combat duty was called "sallying forth"), the women would handle the patrolling. The women Red Guards must also drill, once a month, lasting 2 or 3 hours. The brigade leader and political commissar were both women. Drilling was conducted by a member of the men's Red Guards. When the able-bodied men in the Red Guards were organized into the Red Army reserve in the 6th month, leaving some 10, 20 or 30 old weak per brigade, drilling was abolished. For the men's Red Guards, there were a commander and a political commissar in each township. They were not stationed in the township government, but remained in their own homes. When the occasion arose, they were assigned wherever needed. They must attend the township-wide drills. The Red Guards of the various townships had held township-wide drills twice.

2. Young Pioneers

Wherever there was a Red Guards brigade, there was a Young Pioneer brigade. The members included both male and female, age 16 to 23. There were a brigade commander and a political commissar. Each brigade consisted of three teams, and each team three units. But the number of members was less than that of a Red Guards brigade, ranging from 20 (Chi-ko village in the second township, 30 (Ch'ang-chiao village of the third township), to 50 to 60 (the 3 villages in the first township including Yang-fang). Groups of 20 to 30 were called teams; groups of 50 to 60 were called brigades. Since the 6th month, courageous elements were selected and organized into the Red Army reserve and the district Special Service Battalion. The remaining members of the pioneers still had to drill, twice a month. Only the men's Red Guards no longer had to drill since its able-bodied elements were organized into the Red Army reserve.

After the pioneers were organized into the Red Army reserve and district Special Service Battalion, very few members were left. Some places did not have a Young Pioneer at all (such as the three villages in the first township, including Yang-fang; and Chih-ko village of the second township).

3. Children's League

There was no distinction of male or female. The age limit was 8 to 15.

Where there were Red Guards and Young Pioneers, there was a laboring Children's League. Each village had a league leader, none in the townships but one in the district.

The work of the Children's League was first, patrolling, next, checking on opium smoking and gambling, and last, eliminating superstition and knocking down buddha idols. The Children's League was most ruthless in checking on opium smoking and gambling and in knocking down idols. They gave no quarter, "truly handling public affairs in a public way." They attended mass meetings. Their weapons consisted mainly of wooden guns, with a few lances.

All members of the league were students of the people's school. The people's school was started in the 7th month, five in the first township, three in the second, seven in the third and one in the fourth, totaling 16. The district government provided for three such schools in every township and paid for the food of three teachers, 0.10 yuan, large currency, per day, and 2 yuan, large currency, for expenses per month, totaling 5 yuan, large currency, per month. As the area of the first township was large, it was permitted to have five schools. The third township had many hills, and three schools were not enough; therefore, they had four additional ones, totaling seven, but the expenses were still limited to 15 yuan, averaging 2.10 yuan per school. The number of enrollment ranged from 20 or more to 120, usually over 40. The people's school jointly established by Yang-fang, Ling-yuan and Li-yao villages of the first township, for instance, had over 120 children between the ages of 8 and 15.

The housing was insufficient, and one teacher could not handle all of them; therefore, many could not attend school. Only around 60 of the 120 were in school. Originally, the three villages wanted to have three schools, but they had no teachers in the villages, nor did they have the money to pay for outside help. Therefore, they could not have three schools. The school in Chu-chao-an Village in the third township had only 21 students.

Every village had a people's night school. Each school had one teacher, who was someone in the village who could read a little. He received no pay, pursuing his own occupation at home during day time and teaching at night. Fu Chi-t'ing of Yang-fang and Chung Te-wu of Ch'ang-chiao were both night school teachers. The number of students varied. The school in Yang-fang had 40 students. The students were of all ages, old, adult and young.

Most of the night schools had women students, about one-third. Some did not have women students, such as Ch'a-kan Village of the first township and Hou-ching Village of the fourth township. The Children's League was drilled three times a week, under the direction of the people's school, "drilling well."

4. Picket Units

The Picket Unit was organized by workers, one company per township, with a company commander and a political commissar. The Picket Unit of the second township consisted of 105 men. Yang-fang, Ling-yuan and Ch'a-shih (Ch'a-kan) villages of the first township together had one platoon, consisting of 26 men.

5. Red Army Reserve

The Red Army reserve was organized from the strong and courageous elements in the Red Guards and the Young Pioneers, two companies per township, totaling eight companies in the district. Each company consisted of several dozen to over 100 men. The two companies in the first township had over 100 men each. For the Hsin-yu campaign this time, all the eight companies of the 10th district participated. After its formation in the 7th month, the reserve was responsible for the advances on Ch'i-fang, Lang-ch'uan and Kan-chou, and on Hsin-yu this time. When the reserve was away on a campaign, the Red Guards, the Young Pioneers, and the Children's League were responsible for village patrolling. Upon its return, the reserve again joined the patrol. The eight companies of the district formed a regiment, with a regiment commander and a political commissar. In ordinary times, there was no battalion. The 1st and 2d companies belonged to the first township, the 3d and 4th companies to the second township, the 5th and 6th companies to the third township, and the 7th and 8th companies to the fourth township. For the Hsin-yu campaign this time, three battalions were formed, with the 1st, 2d and 3d companies as the 1st battalion, the 4th, 5th and 6th companies as the 2d battalion, and the 7th and 8th companies as the 3d battalion, led by battalion commanders and political commissars. Each company had four porters, eight cooks, one to two messengers, one orderly, one bugler (unable to bugle), but no horse. Each company also had two propaganda officers, with the duties of talking and writing slogans. The battalion headquarters had no propaganda officer, aide or messenger. The regimental headquarters had three propaganda officers, one aide and two messengers. Members of the three battalion headquarters lived together with those of the regimental headquarters, sharing their meals. Weapons were lances and shotguns.

6. District Special Service Battalion

It consisted of three companies, beginning to be organized in the 7th month, also selected among the Red Guards and Young Pioneers. Organized from the younger and more courageous elements, it was better than the Red Army Reserve. The members had organization and training, but were not regularly concentrated. Ordinarily they remained at home pursuing their own occupation. Three large drills were held every month, on the 2d, 12th and 22d days.

When needed, they were mustered to go out on campaigns. Currently, the 1st and 3d companies were out fighting in Lang-ch'uan; the 2d company remained at home. Their weapons were mainly shotguns, native rifles, native cannons, some lances, but no regular rifle. The battalion headquarters was at the district government. The battalion had a commander and a political commissar.

7. Red Army Independent Regiment

Hsing-kuo organized a total of three independent regiments, all presented to the Red Army. Also selected among the Red Guards and the Young Pioneers; they were the same in excellency as the Special Service Battalion. They were all young people and volunteers. Each regiment consisted of over 1,000 men. The regiments, battalions and company all had commanders and political commissars. The regiments underwent concentrated training at the county seat, and the members awaited assignment to the Red Army. They were all unarmed.

o "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung," Vol 1, 1947 edition

* "Rural Survey," Liberation Press, July 1949

Footnote: This article "Rural Survey"
Page 186 At the end of the Introduction in "Rural Survey," there
is the following notation: Mao Tse-tung, 26 January 1931, at Ning-tu
Hsiao-pu-yu, recorded after editing.

6080

CSO: 4005

DUTIES OF GENERAL POLITICAL DEPARTMENT AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE RED ARMY POLITICAL DEPARTMENTS AND COMMISSARS

Order No 6 of the Revolutionary Military Commission, 17 February 1931

[Text] To organize a revolutionary war, a war to destroy the warlords, is currently the central task of the revolution. To carry out this task, we must create an iron Red Army, and win over the broad masses of the people; accordingly the strengthening of political education in the Red Army, so that commanders and fighters will understand their tasks and resolutely carry them out, and at the same time intensified propagandizing and organization of the masses, and mobilization of the broad masses within the war zone to arise and struggle, have become our most pressing tasks. These tasks are performed by the Red Army's political commissars and political departments. To oversee these tasks for Red Army units in all areas, a General Political Department is necessary. At present the Red Army units throughout the country have made great progress; but unifying and strengthening their political direction have become a pressing need. To meet this need, we have set up a General Political Department in this Commission under the chairmanship of Mao Tse-tung. Out of practical necessity, this Commission's General Political Department will also serve temporarily as the First Front Army's General Political Department.

The General Political Department will direct the Red Army's political departments and guide the political work of the political commissars. The Red Army political departments must give absolute obedience to the General Political Department's orders. Orders relating to political work must likewise be accepted and obeyed by the political commissars. Every Red Army political department must make reports to the General Political Department regularly and through channels. Political commissars may make reports to political commissions at higher levels, but in addition they must make reports on political work to the political department at the next higher level. Organizationally, the Red Army political departments and political commissars have their own individual organization systems, but in their work the lower-level political departments take orders from the upper-level political departments, and at the same time they must also follow the orders of the political commissars at the same level; the

lower-level political commissars take orders from the upper-level political commissars, but in political work they also follow the orders of the upper-level political department.

Chairman Hsiang Ying

Vice-Chairmen Chu Teh, Mao Tse-tung, 17 February 1931

o Collected Documents of the Red Bandits (8)

Printed at office No 2, Nan-Ch'ang Military Headquarters of the Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, People's Government April, 1934

8480

CSO: 4005

NO INVESTIGATION, NO RIGHT TO SPEAK, NO PROPER INVESTIGATION AND NO RIGHT TO SPEAK

Notice of General Political Department on Social Investigation No--2 April 1931

[Text] All Red Army Political Departments and Local Governments at All Levels

We have now drawn up population and land investigation forms. In the main, these call for statistics on the proportions of land and population by class, so as to answer more concretely and with ironclad facts many of our current questions.

In the past, investigation of the actual facts was frequently scorned in many localities, and work plans were drawn up and used to direct the work of lower levels merely on the basis of things thought up out of thin air. As a result the plans could not be carried out and leadership went wrong.

If we can now fill in these forms with correct statistics, arrived at by close attention to reality, we will be able to solve many of our problems. In particular, there are a number of practical land distribution problems in connection with which we hope that Red Army political departments will carefully fill in information for all localities and local governing organs will fill in information for each township. We especially hope that every responsible person in the Red Army and the government will at all times and places perform these investigations and do these statistics.

Just what is needed to make the data from these investigations really correct?

First, it is necessary to have a deep understanding of this work and a clear idea of its importance before one can undertake it in earnest.

Second, it the investigators must investigate a village painstakingly; they must seek out the records of population and land surveys made for land distribution; they must seek out the members of the land committee that carried out the land distribution and people who are well acquainted with the situation in the village; they must begin by clearly distinguishing the class nature of each family and each field (whether it belongs to a landlord, rich peasant, middle peasant or poor peasant...), and then calculate things out strictly, filling in the form with the actual numbers.

Third, the comrades sent out by the higher government levels to direct the survey, or the responsible persons of the political departments, must explain clearly to the persons assigned the investigation work the content of the two forms and the points for attention when investigating. In particular they must explain that: the standard for a rich peasant is that he depended upon exploitation for a sizeable part of his income; those who are engaged in extending credit or lending money to others are still classed as middle peasants, and those who were hired laborers (before the revolution) and have rented some land to cultivate are poor peasants; those none of whose family does any farming but who rely upon their independent labor (tailors, carpenters, etc.) to make a living are called independent laborers; those who do some farming and some artisan work are classed as poor peasants, middle peasants and rich peasants according to their economic status; free tradesmen and vagrants are distinguished by the fact that free tradesmen practice some specific trade (as doctor, teacher), while vagrants have no fixed occupation or mode of life, but all do a good deal of mischief.

If all of these items are not clearly understood during the investigation, the investigators will not know how to do their jobs properly, and will surely get the class composition wrong and get wrong values in the statistics.

When these two forms, for land and population, are filled out in close coordination, care should be taken that the individual or group fills them out correctly. They should then be mailed directly to the General Political Department of the Central Military Commission. Our slogan is:

1. No investigation, no right to speak;
2. No correct investigation, also no right to speak.

Chairman, General Political Department, Central Military Commission,
Mao Tse-tung 2 April 1931

o Direction on Social Investigation Notice--2 April 1931

8480
CSO: 4005

QUESTION OF OPPOSING RICH PEASANTS

Notice Number 2 of Central Revolutionary Military Commission, 1931

[Text] 1. Reasons for Opposing the Rich Peasants

First, rich peasants are rural semi-landlords and capitalists, and an exploiting class. They support feudal power and want to be capitalists, and are entirely in opposition to the interests of the workers, hired farm laborers, poor peasants and the mass of middle peasants. In order to guard the interests of the workers, hired farm laborers, poor peasants and middle peasants, we must oppose the rich peasants.

Second, the rich peasants are an exploiting class. They are constantly in close collusion with reactionary power in an attempt to undermine the revolution. To consolidate the soviet governments and protect the victory of land reform, we must oppose the middle peasants.

Third, the rich peasants are taking the capitalist road. We are taking the socialist road. Therefore, they are completely opposite to us, and in order to make the revolution advance to the road of socialism we must intensify the struggle to oppose the rich peasants.

2. Errors in Opposing the Rich Peasants

In an examination of opposition to the rich peasants in the past, four major errors appear:

First, opposition to exploitation was not taken as the test, and opposition to the rich peasants was treated as a special form of fund-raising. Rather than exploitation, possession of money was used as the test. Money tests, in which for example people with less than 100 yuan were not beaten, but those with more than 100 yuan were beaten, were used by brigades, and in a minority of places it got to the point that people with more than 20 cash or an old sow got beaten, which terrified the masses and made them think the revolution was to make everybody poor instead of making everybody rich and improving their lives.

Second, there were encroachments on the middle peasants. The second fault, of encroaching on the middle peasants' interests, grew out of the first fault. Middle peasants are those who have enough land and enough food and are not exploited by anyone, but also do not go out and exploit anyone else. Not only should these people not be encroached upon, but we should link up closely with them instead and all oppose the rich peasants together. Since the middle peasants will only join a revolution led by the proletariat, our revolutionary power can only reach its full force and the revolution can only develop rapidly when we unite with them.

Third, the rich peasants' lands were not thoroughly redistributed. In many places the land distribution was conducted just by taking away excesses and making up deficiencies rather than by taking away from rich lands and compensating poor lands. When the rich peasants held such things as good lands, woodland, dwellings and ponds, these were not thoroughly distributed. As a result the rich peasants were in a favored position economically and got hold of political leadership. The soviets' governments and the revolutionary groups were captured by the rich peasants, who then used their political and economic power to exploit and oppress and impoverish the peasant masses.

3. The Correct Method of Opposing the Rich Peasants

a. Politically

First, consolidate proletarian leadership. The soviet governments and Red Army and Red Guards units should prevent rich peasants from acting as committee members in the soviet governments or representatives to the soviet assemblies. They should elect leaders of the workers, farm laborers and poor peasants and the most activist elements of the middle peasants to deliberate and take action; they should also organize poor peasants' associations and unite the broad masses of poor peasants and the middle peasants in a good alliance to oppose the rich peasants. All those who have encroached on the middle peasants' interests or fined them or taken money from the poor peasants must make restitution, and the lawless exactions of brigands, which have no class nature and are divorced from the masses must be opposed. If these things continue to happen, they will assuredly be punished by the authorities.

Second, put down rich peasant reaction. The rich peasants are an exploiting class, and are sure to use every available means to oppose and subvert the revolution. Accordingly, in the soviet areas, constant and strict attention should be paid to preventing rich peasant reaction; as soon as any rich peasant counterrevolutionary organization, such as the Ya-pi-t'uan, etc., is found conspiring with the White bandits, plotting reactionary activity, trying to subvert the revolution, etc., the government must punish it strictly as being counterrevolutionary. The rich peasants will be allowed to live and pursue their livelihood only if they obey all laws of the soviets and refrain from counterrevolutionary conspiracies or activities.

b. Economically

First, oppose exploitation by the rich peasants. At present, opposition to the rich peasants is not destruction of the rich peasants, but chiefly a resolute opposition in the economic sphere to all their exploitative activities, because these activities have increased the hardships of our workers and poor peasants. The rich peasants will be allowed to hire laborers, so long as they treat them in accordance with the Laws for Protection of Labor. They may not treat them harshly. They may also engage in business, but will not be allowed to hold back on buying or selling or to lend money at high interest. These more specific methods should be determined by the county government and preferably by the county assembly, in accordance with local conditions. A program of this sort is not meant to eradicate capitalism but to oppose cruel exploitation by capitalists and to stimulate the vigorous development of social economics. In the cases where exaction of money from the rich peasants is unavoidable, this should be done only for revolutionary needs. The rich peasants should bear what they can afford. But at present we are not eradicating the rich peasant economy. As to the rich peasants' lands, they should all be distributed evenly.

Second, an economic policy should be carried out. The limiting of rich peasant exploitation discussed above is still a passive method. But merely passive opposition to poor peasants is not enough; we must also carry out an economic policy, in accordance with the social situation, to actively oppose the rich peasants. For instance, the government should lead the masses in running loan cooperatives that lend money to the impoverished masses at low interest, in running production cooperatives to develop products, and in running trade cooperatives so as to lessen the exploitation carried on between businessmen and rich peasants. Such organizations actively oppose exploitation by rich peasants. If we help the broad impoverished masses take this step toward liberation, we are preparing social economics to develop toward socialism.

4. Guard Against Lingering Evils

Our earlier pointing out of errors in opposing middle peasants, and the statement that we are not now eradicating the rich peasants, should not lead people to take opposing the rich peasants lightly. On the contrary, everyone should understand the policy of opposing the rich peasants and should oppose them even more intensely. In rectifying policies, we should prevent rich peasant elements and their helpers hidden in the revolution from easing up on the work of opposing the rich peasants. Even more important, the rich peasants should be prevented from taking the opportunity to oppose the government.

Chairman Hsiang Ying

Vice Chairmen Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, 1931

9 Secret Red Bandit Documents, Correction # 5

Printed by Organization Department of First Bandit Extermination Propaganda Office, Army and Navy GHQ.