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A MONTHLY ORGAN OF REVOLUTIONARY MARXISM



# THE NEW INTERNATIONAL

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## For the Man on the Planet Without a Visa

A few months ago the French authorities made a raid on the residence of Leon Trotsky and immediately thereafter issued an order for his deportation. The reactionary press of France unleashed its pack of journalistic hounds to bay for Trotsky's prompt removal from the soil of France, if not his removal from the realm of the living. Having little to fear as yet from the Fourth International as an organization, the Fascists nevertheless had cause to be disturbed by the ideas of the new International of Communism and its leader.

Trotsky to the door! has become a watchword of the reaction in France. The Stalinist spokesmen, determined to find a spot on the name of Communism which they have not yet covered with shame so that they might promptly blacken it, took every precaution to let the world know that they were not in the least interested in the fate of Trotsky. Taking the hint, the Fascists aim to see to it that whatever the fate, it will be a horrible one.

*They are planning the assassination of Trotsky!*

A recent issue of the *New Leader* of London prints an account from a Paris correspondent which we reproduce in its essential parts:

"The French Fascists have discovered that the ex-Soviet War Commissar is still in France. The following note in the organ of M. Chiappe, the former Chief of Paris police, is regarded as the

opening of a campaign to secure Trotsky's assassination:

"H. Sarraut not only protects the killer Bonnefoy-Sibour. He also protects Trotsky.

"One fine morning we read in the papers that the revolutionary agitator had gone to Switzerland. The news was incorrect. Trotsky is still in France. He lives in a little village where he continues to dream of civil war.

"What is the Minister of the Interior waiting for to execute the order of expulsion? Or must we call upon the ex-servicemen themselves to conduct Trotsky to the frontier?"

"Trotsky's whereabouts is at present a close secret. During the past week, however, widespread efforts have been made to extract the name of the village from police officials. At the same time, Fascist organizations in the provinces have been instructed to do their utmost to locate Trotsky."

The truth of the matter is, of course, that the present French government is as anxious to be rid of Trotsky as are the Fascists. Its only difficulty in executing the deportation order has been the want of a country to send him to. All efforts made up to the present time to obtain a visa for Trotsky, have failed. And assuming that a reactionary assassin does not murder Trotsky in the meantime—and this is becoming increasingly likely with the passage of time—the French authorities intend to put into effect the

plan they have been harboring in their minds:

*To deport Trotsky to a living death on a French island colony off the south-easternmost shores of Africa!*

Never before has his life—to say nothing of his work—been so imminently endangered as at present. Every effort must be made to prevent the execution of the sinister plans of the French reaction.

In this country it is an elementary duty of every progressive-minded person to insist that Leon Trotsky be granted a visa, the right to asylum for a political refugee on American soil. The right of asylum was once jealously cherished not only by the radical revolutionist in the United States, but even by every liberal.

We are in a position to state that Trotsky would welcome the opportunity to come to the United States, if the legal arrangements were effected, to live here, to study, and to do his literary work, placing himself, of course, under the obligation to observe the laws of the country of his refuge.

A committee of noted persons is at the present moment being constituted for the purpose of bending efforts to obtain the necessary visa from the United States authorities at Washington. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL urges all its readers and friends to give unstinting assistance to this committee as soon as they are called upon.

Trotsky is now living on a planet without a visa. Let us help get one for him.

# THE NEW INTERNATIONAL

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## America and the War in the Pacific

**C**APITALIST peace is an armed truce constantly threatened with being disrupted by the under-handed or overt acts of aggression of one or the other of the imperialist powers. The incident that finally precipitates war is merely the indication that diplomacy, as an instrument for peaceful expansion of the robber interests of finance capital, is powerless when faced with a problem of fundamental contradiction between two national capitalist states. Such a situation has now been reached in the Far East; at any moment the volcanic pressure of productive forces clamoring for expansion in a capitalist world will bring a violent explosion. Whether the next war, for which all countries are feverishly preparing, breaks out in the Pacific zone of conflict first—as seems most probable—is of little consequence, for it will inevitably become world-wide in its scope.

From the point of view of imperialism, the problem of the Pacific is reducible to quite simple terms. On one side of this vast ocean stands the most powerful capitalist nation on earth, the United States, with its tremendous resources and its supreme technique of production. On the other side lies a continent with more than half the world's population, just beginning to develop, offering a fabulous market for commodities and for capital investment. But in between lies Japan, also seeking, as a matter of life and death for its capitalism, sources of raw materials, markets for its finished goods, fields for investment of finance capital. Japan threatens to subjugate entirely for its own purposes the greatest market still undivided, to make of China a colony, to close the door in the face of United States imperialism. A problem of such vast and profound importance to both these capitalist powers can only be "solved" by war. That has been clear to the ruling classes of both America and Japan ever since the victory of Japan in the Russo-Jap War. It was perfectly clear to Lenin when in October 1920 he granted (what he did not possess) to the American adventurer Washington Vanderlip a seventy-year lease to four hundred thousand square miles of territory, including Kamchatka, to exploit its rich oil, coal and fishery resources. Let the imperialist dogs fight over the bone and leave the Soviet Union alone!

A long history of conflicts between the two Pacific powers leads up to the present situation. It took thirty years for Japan to wrest Manchuria from China and completely shut out all other rivals. America felt this loss keenly. Back in 1906 U. S. Special Agent Clark, sent to Manchuria, reported: "Manchuria is a very important market for American flour, oil, tobacco, etc. and especially for American cotton piece goods. It is the only section of China in which American piece goods practically monopolize the market. . . . The trade of Manchuria is of more importance to the U. S. than to any other nation, with the possible exception of Japan." It was the Japanese success in closing this trade to the U. S. that led to the Hays' formulation of the Open Door policy, the only method at the time by which American capitalism could oppose Japanese penetration. Needless to say, American imperialism would be the first to violate this policy if it secured the upper hand. The Japanese capitalists consistently bow to this policy in words, the better to violate it in deeds by the methods of railway rebates to Japanese business, by the prompt delivery of Japanese goods and the holding up of foreign goods on the railroads, by the forgery of trade marks, by the opening of mail and cables, by the use of diplomatic pouches to dodge taxes,—in short, by all the tricky methods taught by American and world capitalism.

The ousting of American business from Manchuria raised a storm of obloquy in the American press against all things Japanese. In San Francisco Japanese children were excluded from the ordinary schools and were forced to attend special schools for Orientals. Japanese resentment over this caused Theodore Roose-

velt to send the U. S. fleet into the Pacific in 1908 for a "tour" of the world, in precisely the same fashion as the present Roosevelt sent the fleet to Hawaii recently upon the final seizure of Manchuria. The friction over immigration finally resulted in the "Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1912 by which the Japanese agreed to withhold passports from laborers on condition that no exclusion law were passed. But the U. S. violated this agreement when the California Alien Land Law of 1920, preventing Japanese from owning land, and the Supreme Court decision shutting the Japanese out from becoming citizens, led up to the Exclusion Law of 1924.

The conflict over loans and railways in China presents a Gordian knot in the economic battle for supremacy in the Far East. The American railway magnate, Harriman, tried to purchase the South Manchurian railway in 1905. This attempt proving futile, Secretary Knox then tried to "neutralize" Manchuria by making its railways "international", a move the only result of which was to bring about a secret partitioning of Manchuria between Czarist Russia and Japan. In 1913 came the attempt to grant an international loan to China for the purpose of building a rival railway to the South-Manchurian in Shantung. The State department in 1919 approved the "consortium" for loans to China. In every case, however, Japan has outmaneuvered United States imperialism in this sphere.

The World War intensified the struggle for mastery of the Pacific. The United States opposed the infamous 21 demands forced by Japanese imperialism on China in 1915, and the attempt of Japan to seize the Siberian Maritime Provinces in the 1918-1921 intervention. Owing to American cable and wireless interests the United States opposed the ceding of the Island of Yap to Japan as a "mandate" after the war. American militarism saw with dismay the handing over to Japan of the strategic Caroline and Marshall Islands and there has been constant friction over the secret building of naval bases in these islands.

The Washington Conference of 1921-2 served to emphasize the American policy of watchful waiting and of slow retreat before the aggressiveness of Japanese militarism. The purposes of American diplomacy at that conference were to limit naval armaments, particularly Japanese, to bring about the cancellation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance then up for renewal, to attempt a settlement of troublesome Pacific Island questions and to obstruct Japanese imperialism in China and Siberia. Although Japan retreated from Siberia and yielded on the 5-5-3 capital ship ratio, she forced the U. S. to forego fortification of the Pacific possessions beyond Hawaii and virtually forced a recognition of accomplished facts in China. Thus the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway, seized by Japan in Shantung in 1915 and giving complete control to that province, remained in Japanese hands with a promise, never kept, to return it when "redeemed". Japan has never repudiated, and recent events have demonstrated this amply, the 21 demands that would make China completely a colony.

Has the Anglo-Japanese Alliance actually been broken? England entered into this alliance in 1902 because of the rise of industrial Germany and the naval race with German imperialism. Threatened with a German fleet in the North Sea and at the same time with a Czarist Russian thrust toward India in Asia, England was forced to concentrate her fleet in home waters and to permit the Japanese fleet to police the Pacific for her. In return the Japanese ruling class was given a free hand in North China. But with the post-war developments, Japan has become as much a threat to England as Germany or America. The Japanese Monroe Doctrine for Asia applies no less to England than to America. The British do not forget such statements as "the greater the

consideration paid by Japan to India, the more should be the British concessions to Japan as regards China" in the Japanese press (Nippon-Ayobi-Nipponjin) or the famous statement of Colonel Misumachi to the Canadian missionaries in Chier-tao in which he warned them that Japan might give aid to the non-coöperation movement in India. To England mastery of China by either America or Japan means as a next step breaking of England's strangle-hold on South China and loss of India.

The British colonies, Canada, South Africa, New Zealand and Australia, understand and fear this fact. England is faced with the dilemma that aid to Japan against the U. S. in order to save her colonies from the American colossus may result in desertion by those very colonies—always outspoken against the Anglo-Jap Alliance. Thus D. Massey, when Prime Minister of New Zealand, declared that a war between England and the U. S. would "smash the Empire into smithereens". Similarly Hughes, as Prime Minister of Australia, stated that "he greeted with joy every battleship laid down in an American shipyard". These alarmists of the Yellow Peril are themselves the greatest menace to the masses as the White capitalist Peril at home. But England has taken precautions and, on the advice of Admiral Jellicoe, has established the most powerful naval bases in the South China Seas, notably at Singapore and Colombo. Japanese diplomacy has aimed recently at balancing the U. S. with England when the Japanese armies finally move on Siberia. In view of the intense rivalry in trade of Japanese capitalism with the English textile interests and the threat to British possessions by either victorious power, it is possible that England will remain neutral and attempt to capture the world's trade during the conflict just as America and Japan did in the last war.

Even before America entered that last World War the U. S. ruling class was already engaged in preparations for the next conflict, with Japan. Having captured the world market, American capitalism intended to maintain its hegemony after the war. Hence arose the Big Navy propaganda in 1916 when the U. S. Congress inaugurated its three-year plan for building the largest navy in the world. President Wilson spoke for "incomparably the most adequate navy in the world". In 1920 the Report of the General Board of the Navy stated the aim of creating "a navy equal to the most powerful maintained by any other nation in the world". Japan was at the same time engaged in a naval race. The budgets of both countries set aside naval appropriations vastly in excess of any the world had hitherto seen. The Washington Conference arrested this race for a few years in its acutest form, but the present naval programs indicate that a "crisis" has arrived and that no more limitations will be acceptable.

Why has this "crisis" taken so long to mature? Why has not the U. S. with its incomparably superior technology, come to grips sooner with its Japanese rivals? The answer lies in the immense distances involved in warfare in the Pacific. Unlike the World War, decided mainly by armies entrenched on land, this war concerns navies and naval strategy. The U. S. could not send millions of soldiers overseas, nor could it support them if they could be sent. Unlike England, America has no first class naval base on the mainland of Asia. The radius of battle for the complex mechanism of a modern navy is dependent on the distance from such fueling and repair bases. In the last war this radius was five hundred miles and the U. S. has no base nearer than five thousand miles from the scene of conflict,—Pearl Harbor in Honolulu. The Philippine Islands have several naval bases not very strongly fortified but even if well fortified the Japanese navy could very quickly seize these islands before the U. S. could send sufficient forces to defend them. Even so the American militarists will hardly abandon the Philippines to be taken over immediately by Japan. The proposed "independence" of the islands is put ten years hence—and a good deal will happen in those ten years. Meantime the strategy of Japan has been directed towards complete control of all the sea lanes of the Western Pacific with the double view of exercising complete mastery of Chinese trade and of making enclosed, well-protected inland seas of the waters adjacent to Japan and China. By keeping the route to Manchuria open, and to China, Japan can secure all that she needs in foodstuffs, coal and iron ore, etc. On her own soil the Island Kingdom is almost completely lacking in raw materials that are absolutely essential to the conducting of

war for any protracted period. The cutting of communications with Manchuria and China would be fatal to Japanese militarism, just as it would prove fatal for any Japanese armies left stranded in Manchuria without supplies from the home country.

It is precisely these reasons that caused the U. S. to recognize the Soviet Union. Only an ally, a strong ally on the mainland, can assure victory to the United States, either through weakening Japan in preliminary warfare, or through a combined attack. Siberia would offer excellent air bases for raids on Japanese industrial centers such as Yawata Arsenal, so essential to Japanese militarism. The United States navy, following the northern route from Alaska along the Aleutians, could escape the submarine perils that would beset it along 2,000 miles of its course if it followed the lane parallel with the secretly prepared Caroline and Marshall Islands, veritable Japanese submarine nests. Soviet submarines could in turn threaten the Japanese lines of communication. From every point of view, as Radek pointed out long ago, American imperialism needs the aid of Soviet Russia. The Soviet Union, defending itself against imperialist attack, could utilize the contradictions in the camp of its imperialist enemies. The Japanese imperialists, faced with the threat of an alliance between two such enemies, was forced immediately to postpone its impending attack on the Maritime Provinces and Siberia.

But further postponement means further endangering the possibility of Japanese success. For Siberia is being rapidly colonized and built up into a very strong agrarian-industrial unit. Just as the Japanese were forced to take steps to seize Manchuria because of the tremendous influx of Chinese, thirty million of them, into a land that Japan hoped to use for colonization by her own people, so she will now be forced to act in Siberia before it is too late. But the U. S. too can no longer afford to put off staking its fortunes on the sword. The vast surplus of commodities and of capital piled up by the most advanced capitalism in the world must seek an outlet beyond the national boundaries. The contradiction of overproduction by rapidly expanding forces of production, U. S. capitalism hopes to solve in the world market by a redivision of that market. The crisis drives America, the hardest hit and the slowest to recover, inevitably on this adventurist road. Thus history may show the "combined" development of imperialist war between capitalist powers with a war of intervention against the Soviet Union starting in the East. But such a war will inevitably precipitate out all the contradictions between all the capitalist countries, and resolve also the fundamental contradiction of our epoch, that between a socialist system of society and the capitalist system. That solution depends, however, not on the desires of the imperialist bandits of capitalism, but on the masses of all countries.

The epoch of imperialism is the epoch of the deadline of capitalism, the era of wars and revolutions. The fierce competition in a world of ever more restricted markets means above all an unbearably intense exploitation of the masses of workers and farmers, a sharp lowering of the living standards of the toilers and the petty bourgeoisie. The largest war budgets are loaded on the backs of the toilers even while they starve, even while tens of millions are unemployed and unable to secure adequate relief. To carry through the program of imperialist war and plunder abroad requires a régime of reaction at home to suppress all opposition to the murderous schemes of big business. Bonapartism and Fascism are the inevitable concomitants of a régime of reactionary finance capital. The preparations at home for the program of imperialism abroad are not only technical, the mobilization of all industry for the war machine, but social in that all the elements of democracy, bourgeois and proletarian, must be suppressed to assure a smoothed path for dictatorial capitalism. In truth, far from "solving" any problem of livelihood for the masses, war means that they have everything to lose.

The way out of the all-embracing contradictions of modern capitalism is not along the road of imperialist war and its consequent redivision of the world, but by the advance of civilization to a new and higher plane through the hegemony of the proletariat. War is as much an attack on the working class at home as on the "enemy" abroad by the home bourgeoisie. If civilization is not to be destroyed in flames, if the masses are not to sink back into barbarism, then the machinations of the imperialist scoundrels must be resisted by the workers and farmers. The imperialist war must

be turned into civil war! The working class must be taught to distrust all forms of justification for war, all manoeuvres to bring about "civil peace" before and during war. The first aim of the class struggle today must be to resist by mass action all attacks on workers' democracy, on the trade unions, on the working class parties, because these Fascist blows mean the prelude to incalculable misery for all toilers, because they are the first step towards imperialist war. On the other hand, war itself will be used to further the interests of reactionary capitalism by giving greater impetus to the Fascist program.

Japanese capitalism and American capitalism rest on the volcano

of the social crisis. At the first touch of war the Japanese peasants led by the workers may rise up against intolerable oppression, for Japan resembles nothing so much as Czarist Russia before the revolution. But in America, too, the masses face intolerable conditions, becoming ever more oppressive. The way out is not through war but through the dictatorship of the proletariat leading all the oppressed. We revolutionary workers of America greet our Japanese brothers; we shall extend our hands across the sea to the oppressed of Japan even during the war that inevitably approaches. Long live the solidarity of the international working class!

Jack WEBER

## A New Turn to the United Front

**U**NDoubtedly the most important event in the international labor movement of recent times is the consummation of a united front agreement between the Socialist and Stalinist parties of France, the official text of which is reproduced elsewhere in this issue. For the bureaucracies of both parties, the step represents a brusque turn-about-face from the position held by both of them only yesterday. Its consequences may be of the most far-reaching significance for the working class movement of the entire world.

The German catastrophe gave most striking confirmation of the idea that the vanguard party which is incapable of uniting the bulk of the working class behind it against the extreme reaction of Fascism, is crushed together with the proletariat itself. The Austrian events a year later provided proof of the indispensable complement of this idea: that the unity of the working class (which existed to the highest degree, under the banner of the social democracy), is an invincible weapon *only* when the proletariat has at its disposal a determined revolutionary party. The working class of France, which is now confronted with the same problem as the proletariat of Central Europe a couple of years ago—the struggle against Fascism is now the first point on the order of the day in the Third Republic—can solve it only by drawing upon the experiences of the recent defeats.

"Everything has changed in the twinkling of an eye," wrote M. Léon Blum in the socialist daily on July 8. Up to a few weeks ago, the French socialists adhered to the policy of all the parties of the Second International in rejecting the united front. Such a step was either regarded as a sinister manoeuvre of the communists, or else positive action was predicated upon a preliminary international agreement. The Stalinists, on the other hand, continued to cling feverishly to the dogma of "social-Fascism" and the "united front only from below". One papal bull after another thundered forth from the Stalinist secretariat, excommunicating and consigning to eternal flames those traitors, counter-revolutionists and followers of the "social-Hitlerite" (i.e., Trotsky) who made the outrageous proposal that the Communist party should "sit down at a table with Wels and Renaudel" for the purpose of working out a fighting minimum agreement against the Fascist marauders. How, indeed, is it possible to join in a compact against Fascism with its "twin brother", social democracy? And, moreover, what interest can the Stalinists have in defending the democratic rights of the proletariat—a sinister term invented by Trotskyism for the purpose of misleading the workers into the camp of social democracy!—when the thirteenth plenum has put the immediate struggle for Soviet power at the top of the agenda? The very pact that has just been signed in Paris is pervaded with the odor of the expulsion from the C. P. of Jacques Doriot, who proposed—poor Doriot!—nothing that the Stalinists have not just put their signatures to.

The change of front of the social democracy is not difficult to understand. The tremendous wave of sentiment in the ranks is universally acknowledged. The French socialist proletariat has learned more from the events of the past two years than its leadership, and it does not want to bow to Fascist servitude without a militant fight. "It was morally impossible for them to decline," says Vandervelde about Léon Blum and Co.'s acceptance of the united front, and even Longuet understood "the impossibility of abstaining without condemning ourselves to death". In the second

place, as the Paris organ of the bourgeois Radicals points out, "in their rapprochement with the communists, no doctrinal concession has been agreed to. Those who claim that the socialists allowed themselves to be manacled by Moscow, are making a complete travesty of the reality of the facts. All the concessions—absolutely all—have been made by the communists, they have driven abnegation to the uttermost limits by renouncing what constituted after all, the whole originality of their propaganda" (*L'Information Sociale*, July 26, 1934).

The Stalinist somersault in policy is not determined by the equally powerful urge for the united front which undoubtedly exists in the communist ranks. The bankrupt bureaucracy snaps a contemptuous finger at what its followers may think or want. It was ready to break with its most powerful local organization, St.-Denis, rather than undertake a change in course from the idiotic dogma of "social-Fascism". If it has tacitly buried it—at least for the day—the hero of the funeral is not Thorez, nor yet Cachin, but the Honorable Maxim Litvinov, Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. With a cynicism which is unfortunately not unwarranted, Léon Blum almost approaches the truth when he writes: "Faced with the danger of war in the Far East, the Soviet government knows that in the rear it will have to contend with Hitlerism. And, consequently, the instinct of self-preservation dictates to the Bolsheviks a new orientation both in the field of its class, or proletarian, policies and in the realm of diplomacy and international politics. Soviet Russia has now come closer to the French government and therefore is fishing for popular support among the French masses."

The Stalinist theory of "socialism in one country", subverting the communist movement into a border patrol for the Russian Soviets, is incompatible with a consistent revolutionary policy. We have argued this on more than one occasion. Proceeding from this theory, the Stalinists made a united front in China with the bourgeois nationalists and helped the counter-revolution to triumph, aiding neither the Chinese masses *nor* the Soviet Union. With the same motivation, which *separates* the interests of Soviet defense from the interests of the world revolution, the communists were subjected to the yoke of the British trade union bureaucracy which was going "to protect Russia from intervention", and thereby the Third International became a silent partner to the betrayal of the general strike of 1926.

Now in France too the Soviet Foreign Office has intervened to impose a similar policy upon the French Stalinists. The inauspicious omens attending the birth of the united front in France (it exists now in the Saar too, and efforts are being made to extend it to other countries; what a picture it gives of the Third International today—Litvinov accomplishes with a turn of the wrist what Manuilsky has been damning for years to choral accompaniments by Heckert, Thorez, Browder and other choir boys!) render its future more than dubious.

At the very outset, it is instructive to compare the text of the united front pact finally adopted with the original proposals made by the Stalinists on July 2. Article II of the latter specified that "The campaign against the decree-laws shall be conducted by the same means [meetings and demonstrations in the street], but also by bringing to bear the methods of agitation and organization appropriate for leading to a realization of a broad strike action against these decree-laws". The socialist bureaucrats, brothers-

under-the-skin of the German capitulators, obdurately opposed the reference to strike action, and the Stalinists withdrew their point.

Article IV of the original Stalinist text read: "Doctrinal controversies, the comparing of tactical methods, far from being proscribed by the realization of unity of action, remain necessary for the elevation of the political level of the masses and for the development of the class consciousness of the masses." Blum and Faure, who make joint agreements and "united fronts" by the yard with the bourgeois Radicals without demanding a non-aggression pact, without demanding the suspension of criticism (they have little to fear from the Right), fought against Article IV as well (they have more than a little to fear from the Left), and the Stalinists withdrew it.

Article V of the original Stalinist draft read: "In the interests of the success of the joint action, each party reserves to itself the right of denouncing those who, having undertaken clearcut engagements, seek to evade their application, as well as those who in the course of the action take an attitude or commit deeds which may do damage to the success of the undertaken action." Here the Stalinists were mildly seeking to reserve to themselves the right of criticizing those in the camp of the Socialist party (and of course granting the reciprocal right to the socialists) who betrayed the interests of the struggle against Fascism. But on this score also they backed water, and adopted instead the text (Article IV in the accepted draft) which gives the Socialist party the "right" to discipline *its* own flock, and the Communist party the "right" to criticize *its* own flock—but nothing more. The distinction is palpable: M. Blum reserves to himself—and to nobody else!—the right to check M. Blum, and in exchange is ready to concede that M. Thorez—and nobody else—should be empowered to examine into the conduct of M. Thorez.

The two bureaucracies have thus formed a joint protective association with mutual amnesty as its capital stock, and with anything else as its goal except the mobilization of the masses for an active and effective struggle against Fascism. Especially at the present junction in France, the Fascists cannot be eliminated as an increasingly imminent danger by means of meetings in the *Palais d'Hiver* or demonstrations at the *Bois de Vincennes*.

The temper of the elders dominating the present united front movement is adequately indicated by the incident of July 8. The Fascist Croix de Feu demonstrated at the *Arc-de-Triomphe*, an impudent mob of a few thousand gilded youth. The joint committee of the S. P. and C. P. proposed a counter-demonstration—not at the *Arc-de-Triomphe*, god forbid! That would not only be a bit audacious for revolutionary working class Paris united under a common banner, but it would have put the Doumergue régime in the crotch of the fork—but miles away at the *Place de la Nation*. Even this distance was considered insufficiently remote by the police, and at the order of the Préfecture, the Parisian working class was meekly directed by its leaders to demonstrate in the *Bois de Vincennes*—as far away as you can get from the *Arc-de-Triomphe* without taking a train out of Paris.

While the Fascists are feverishly engaged in arming themselves, and in launching those experimental sallies upon workers and workers' gatherings which are preliminary to more extensive assaults, the French proletariat is intoxicated with the *illusion of imposing parades*. Indeed, the Stalinists now devote themselves to violent attacks upon the French Bolshevik-Leninists for proposing a program of disarming the Fascists, organizing the workers into a Workers' Militia, and preparing the general strike to oust the would-be Bonapartist régime of Doumergue.

It is a united front of inaction! If one looked with a microscope for one aspect of the old Stalinist position on the united front that had an iota of validity, it might be found in their demand for a "united front of action". To the extent that this was counterposed to the social democratic conception of unity or united front for purely decorative and consolatory purposes, for parade ground meetings, for anything but active struggle—it was indubitably correct. But the measure of Stalinism is given by the fact that at each startling revolution of the kaleidoscopic wheel of its policies, it throws off that miniscular point which lent an ounce of sense to yesterday's course and adopts in its stead something new, something senseless, something equally if not more

deleterious to the proletariat than the whole policy which it just dropped so suddenly. Indeed a united front of inaction!

Not the least important aspect of the latest turn in French labor politics, however, is the growing trend towards *organic unity*, that is, towards merging the two existing organizations into a single party. At first blush, the very idea may seem preposterous. Yet, it is so, it is a fact. Not only socialist leaders, but Stalinists like Thorez and Cachin as well, have more than merely intimated that the united front is but the first substantial step towards an organic fusion into a single party. Of at least equal significance is the fact that among the masses following both parties there has arisen a widespread enthusiasm for the amalgamation of the two parties into one.

Without attempting to exhaust the question, or to express a conclusive and categorical opinion on the dispute which is dealt with on another page, one can agree from the very start with at least one salient idea from each contender. For the leaders of either (in this case, of course, both) of the two parties to speak of organic unity is an implicit avowal of the bankruptcy of their respective organizations, an admission that there never has been, or at least that there is not now, any fundamental difference in principle warranting the maintenance of an independent social democratic party or an independent communist (read: Stalinist) party. In this there is a sound heart of truth. Both Stalinism and present-day social democracy represent varieties of Centrism, often enough sharply antagonistic to each other, but varieties of Centrism nevertheless. The facility with which the former fused with Chiang Kai-Shek, with A. A. Purcell, with Pilsudski (a good 80 percent, at any rate), with the petty bourgeois pacifists of the Barbusse movement, etc., etc., is sufficiently indicative of its political nature.

Examining the problem from the opposite pole, the conclusion is evident that so far as the masses are concerned, their demand for organic unity is, at least in good part, a vote of non-confidence in both existing parties. The social democracy by itself—no. The Stalinist party by itself—no. The two together, forming a single, *a new*, party—yes. By this the masses are expressing in a still badly articulated manner, vaguely, uncertainly, their desire for a *new revolutionary* party different from those which exist, which breathe and poison the atmosphere with the defeats they pile upon the back of the proletariat.

To our mind, the Marxists can have but one view of the problem posed now in France and elsewhere tomorrow. "Organic unity" is not the solution to the burning problems of the proletariat. Even if there were no sound theoretical guiding lines, the crumpling up of the Austrian social democracy would be empirical evidence enough. In Austria, a "perfect organic unity" existed: one party, one trade union, one coöperative, one youth, one military movement—all under one roof and one banner. What was lacking was the *revolutionary* party, capable of *uniting* the masses and their organizations upon a revolutionary program. Its absence proved nothing less than fatal. Were one to go back further in history, it would be well to remember that the proletarian unity that existed before the war was shattered in and after the war.

Revolutionists cannot remain in the same party with reformists. The champions of the workers' revolution and dictatorship cannot remain in the same party with the champions of bourgeois democracy. The proponents of class struggle are the mortal enemy of the practitioners of class collaboration.

A merger in France, were it to take place, would be of the briefest duration: 1934 is not 1904. Thrusting upward through the crustified bureaucratic combination at the top would inevitably come the revolutionary ferment at the bottom, breaking through irresistibly and settling down into a new party, the party of international revolutionary Marxism.

The working class progresses, too often alas! by devious routes, and the revolution has more than once had to pay for the crimes of others. But even if it is compelled to retrace a step here and another there, the new party of Marxism will make its way. It is necessary only to hold firm to convictions and to fight for victory against all obstacles, under all conditions, and with unbroken ranks.



# Bonapartism and Fascism

THE vast practical importance of a correct theoretical orientation is most strikingly manifested in a period of acute social conflict, of rapid political shifts, of abrupt changes in the situation. In such periods, political *conceptions* and *generalizations* are rapidly used up and require either a complete replacement (which is easier) or their concretization, precision or partial rectification (which is harder). It is in just such periods that all sorts of *transitional*, *intermediate* situations and combinations arise, as a matter of necessity, which upset the customary patterns and doubly require a sustained theoretical attention. In a word, if in the pacific and "organic" period (before the war) one could still live on the revenue from a few ready-made abstractions, in our time each new event forcefully brings home the most important law of the dialectic: *The truth is always concrete.*

The Stalinist theory of Fascism indubitably represents one of the most tragic examples of the injurious practical consequences that can follow from the substitution of the dialectical analysis of reality, in its every concrete phase, in all its transitional stages, that is, in its gradual changes as well as in its revolutionary (or counter-revolutionary) leaps, by abstract categories formulated upon the basis of a partial and insufficient historical experience (or a narrow and insufficient view of the whole). The Stalinists adopted the idea that in the contemporary period, finance capital cannot accommodate itself to parliamentary democracy and is obliged to resort to Fascism. From this idea, absolutely correct within certain limits, they draw in a purely deductive, formally logical manner the same conclusions for all the countries and for all stages of development. To them, Primo de Rivera, Mussolini, Chiang Kai-Shek, Masaryk, Brüning, Dollfuss, Pilsudski, the Servian king Alexander, Severing, MacDonald, etc., were the representatives of Fascism. In doing this, they forgot: a) that in the past too capitalism never accommodated itself to "pure" democracy, now supplementing it with a régime of open repression, now substituting one for it; b) that "pure" finance capitalism nowhere exists; c) that even while occupying a dominant position, finance capital does not act within a void and is obliged to reckon with the other strata of the bourgeoisie and with the resistance of the oppressed classes; d) that, finally, between parliamentary democracy and the Fascist régime a series of transitional forms, one after another, inevitably interposes itself, now "peaceably", now by civil war. And each one of these transitional forms, if we want to go forward and not be flung to the rear, demands a correct theoretical appraisal and a corresponding policy of the proletariat.

On the basis of the German experience, the Bolshevik-Leninists recorded for the first time the transitional governmental form (even though it could and should already have been established on the basis of Italy) which we called Bonapartism (the Brüning, Papen, Schleicher governments). In a more precise and more developed form, we subsequently observed the Bonapartist régime in Austria. The determinism of this transitional form has become patent, naturally not in the fatalistic but in the dialectical sense, that is, for the countries and periods where Fascism, with growing success, without encountering a victorious resistance of the proletariat, attacked the positions of parliamentary democracy in order thereupon to strangle the proletariat.

During the period of Brüning-Schleicher, Manuilsky-Kuusinen proclaimed: "Fascism is already here"; the theory of the intermediate, Bonapartist stage they declared to be an attempt to paint over and mask Fascism in order to make easier for the social democracy the policy of the "lesser evil". At that time the social democrats were called social-Fascists, and the "Left" social democrats of the Zyromsky, Marceau Pivert, just type passed—after the "Trotskyists"—for the most dangerous social-Fascists. All this has changed now. With regard to present-day France, the Stalinists do not dare to repeat: "Fascism is already here"; on the contrary, they have accepted the policy of the united front, which they rejected yesterday, in order to prevent the victory of

Fascism in France. They have found themselves compelled to distinguish the Doumergue régime from the Fascist régime. But they have arrived at this distinction as empiricists and not as Marxists. They do not even attempt to give a scientific definition of the Doumergue régime. He who operates in the domain of theory with abstract categories is condemned to capitulate blindly to facts. And yet it is precisely in France that the passage from parliamentarism to Bonapartism (or more exactly, the first stage of this passage) has taken on a particularly striking and demonstrative character. It suffices to recall that the Doumergue government appeared upon the scene between the rehearsal of the civil war by the Fascists (February 6) and the general strike of the proletariat (February 12). As soon as the irreconcilable camps had taken up their fighting positions at the poles of capitalist society, it wasn't long before it became clear that the adding machine of parliamentarism lost all importance. It is true that the Doumergue government, like the Brüning-Schleicher governments in their day, appears at first glance to govern with the assent of parliament. But it is a parliament which has abdicated, a parliament which knows that in case of resistance the government would dispense with it. Thanks to the relative equilibrium between the camp of counter-revolution which attacks and the camp of the revolution which defends itself, thanks to their temporary mutual neutralization, the axis of power has been raised above the classes and above their parliamentary representation. It was necessary to seek the head of the government outside of parliament and "outside the parties". The head of the government has called two generals to his aid. This trinity has supported itself on its Right and its Left by symmetrically arranged parliamentary hostages. The government does not appear as an executive organ of the parliamentary majority, but as a judge-arbiter between two camps in struggle.

A government which raises itself above the nation is not, however, suspended in air. The true axis of the present government passes through the police, the bureaucracy, the military clique. It is a military-police dictatorship with which we are confronted, barely concealed with the decorations of parliamentarism. But a government of the saber as the judge-arbiter of the nation—that's just what *Bonapartism* is.

The saber by itself has no independent program. It is the instrument of "order". It is summoned to safeguard what exists. Raising itself *politically* above the classes, Bonapartism, like its predecessor Cæsarism, for that matter, represents *in the social sense*, always and at all epochs, the government of the strongest and solidest part of the exploiters; consequently, present-day Bonapartism can be nothing else than the government of finance capital which directs, inspires and corrupts the summits of the bureaucracy, the police, the officers' caste and the press.

The "constitutional reform" about which so much has been said in the course of recent months, has as its sole task the adaptation of the state institutions to the exigencies and conveniences of the Bonapartist government. Finance capital is seeking legal paths that would give it the possibility of each time imposing upon the nation the most suitable judge-arbiter with the forced assent of the quasi-parliament. It is evident that the Doumergue government is not the ideal of a "strong government". More suitable candidates for a Bonaparte exist in reserve. New experiences and combinations are possible in this domain if the future course of the class struggle is to leave them enough time.

In prognosticating, we are obliged to repeat what the Bolshevik-Leninists said at one time about Germany: the political chances of present French Bonapartism are not great; its stability is determined by the temporary, and at bottom unsteady equilibrium between the camps of the proletariat and Fascism. The relation of forces of these two camps must change rapidly, in part under the influence of the economic conjuncture, principally in dependence upon the quality of the proletarian vanguard's policy. The collision between these two camps is inevitable. The measuring time

of the process will be calculated in months and not in years. A stable régime could be established only after the collision, depending upon the results.

Fascism in power, like Bonapartism, can only be the government of finance capital. In this *social* sense, it is indistinguishable not only from Bonapartism but even from parliamentary democracy. Each time, the Stalinists made this discovery all over again, forgetting that *social* questions resolve themselves in the domain of the *political*. The strength of finance capital does not reside in its ability to establish a government of any kind and at any time, according to its wish; it does not possess this faculty. Its strength resides in the fact that every non-proletarian government is forced to serve finance capital; or better yet, that finance capital possesses the possibility of substituting for each one of its systems of domination that decays, another system corresponding better to the changed conditions. However, the passage from one system to another signifies the *political crisis* which, with the concurrence of the activity of the revolutionary proletariat, may be transformed into a social danger to the bourgeoisie. The passage of parliamentary democracy to Bonapartism itself was accompanied in France by an effervescence of civil war. The perspective of the passage from Bonapartism to Fascism is pregnant with infinitely more formidable disturbances and consequently also revolutionary possibilities.

Up to yesterday, the Stalinists considered that our "main mistake" was to see in Fascism the petty bourgeoisie and not finance capital. In this case too they put abstract categories in place of the dialectics of the classes. Fascism is a specific means of mobilizing and organizing the petty bourgeoisie in the social interests of finance capital. During the democratic régime capital inevitably attempted to inoculate the workers with confidence in the reformist and pacifist petty bourgeoisie. The passage to Fascism, on the contrary, is inconceivable without the preceding permeation of the petty bourgeoisie with hatred of the proletariat. The domination of one and the same super-class, finance capital, rests in these two systems upon directly opposite relations of oppressed classes.

The political mobilization of the petty bourgeoisie against the proletariat, however, is inconceivable without that social demagoguery which means playing with fire for the big bourgeoisie. The danger to "order" of the unleashed petty bourgeois reaction, has just been confirmed by the recent events in Germany. That is why, while supporting and actively financing reactionary banditry, in the form of one of its wings, the French bourgeoisie seeks not to push matters to the point of the political victory of Fascism, aiming only at the establishment of a "strong" power which, in the last analysis, is to discipline the two extreme camps.

What has been said sufficiently demonstrates how important it is to distinguish the Bonapartist form of power from the Fascist form. Yet, it would be unpardonable to fall into the opposite extreme, that is, to convert Bonapartism and Fascism into two logically incompatible categories. Just as Bonapartism begins by combining the parliamentary régime with Fascism, so triumphant Fascism finds itself forced not only to enter into a bloc with the Bonapartists, but what is more, to draw closer internally to the Bonapartist system. The prolonged domination of finance capital by means of reactionary social demagoguery and petty bourgeois terror, is impossible. Having arrived in power, the Fascist chiefs are forced to muzzle the masses who follow them by means of the state apparatus. By the same token, they lose the support of broad masses of the petty bourgeoisie. A small part of it is assimilated by the bureaucratic apparatus. Another sinks into indifference. A third, under various banners, passes into opposition. But while losing its social mass base, by resting upon the bureaucratic apparatus and oscillating between the classes, Fascism is regenerated into Bonapartism. Here too the gradual evolution is cut into by violent and sanguinary episodes. Differing from pre-Fascist or *preventive Bonapartism* (Giolitti, Brüning-Schleicher, Doumergue, etc.) which reflects the extremely unstable and short-lived equilibrium between the belligerent camps, *Bonapartism of Fascist origin* (Mussolini, Hitler, etc.), which grew out of the destruction, the disillusionment and the demoralization

of the two camps of the masses, distinguishes itself by its much greater stability.

The question "Fascism or Bonapartism?" has engendered certain differences on the subject of the Pilsudski régime among our Polish comrades. The very possibility of such differences testifies best to the fact that we are dealing not with inflexible logical categories but with living social formations which represent extremely pronounced peculiarities in different countries and at different stages.

Pilsudski came to power at the end of an insurrection based upon a mass movement of the petty bourgeoisie and aimed *directly* at the domination of the traditional bourgeois parties in the name of the "strong state"; this is a Fascist trait characteristic of the movement and of the régime. But the specific political weight, that is, the mass of Polish Fascism was much weaker than that of Italian Fascism in its time and still more than that of German Fascism; to a much greater degree, Pilsudski had to make use of the methods of military conspiracy and to put the question of the workers' organizations in a much more circumspect manner. It suffices to recall that Pilsudski's *coup d'état* took place with the sympathy and the support of the Polish party of the Stalinists. The growing hostility of the Ukrainian and Jewish petty bourgeoisie towards the Pilsudski régime made it, in turn, more difficult for him to launch a general attack upon the working class.

As a result of such a situation, the oscillation between the classes and the national parts of the classes occupied and still occupies with Pilsudski a much greater place, and mass terror a much smaller place, than in the corresponding periods with Mussolini or Hitler; there is the Bonapartist element in the Pilsudski régime. Nevertheless, it would be patently false to compare Pilsudski to Giolitti or to Schleicher and to look forward to his being relieved by a new Polish Mussolini or Hitler. It is methodologically false to form an image of some "ideal" Fascism and to oppose it to this real Fascist régime which has grown up, with all its peculiarities and contradictions, upon the terrain of the relationship of classes and nationalities in the Polish state. Will Pilsudski be able to lead the action of destruction of the proletarian organizations to the very end?—and the logic of the situation drives him inevitably on this path—that does not depend upon the formal definition of "Fascism as such", but upon the true relationship of forces, the dynamics of the political processes taking place in the masses, the strategy of the proletarian vanguard, finally, the course of events in Western Europe and above all in France.

History may successfully inscribe the fact that Polish Fascism was overthrown and reduced to dust before it succeeded in finding for itself a "totalitarian" form of expression.

We said above that Bonapartism of Fascist origin is incomparably more stable than the preventive Bonapartist experiments to which the big bourgeoisie resorts in the hope of avoiding Fascist blood-letting. Nevertheless, it is still more important—from the theoretical and practical point of view—to emphasize that *the very fact of the regeneration of Fascism into Bonapartism signifies the beginning of its end*. How long a time the withering away of Fascism will last, and at what moment its malady will turn into agony, depends upon many internal and external causes. But the fact that the counter-revolutionary activity of the petty bourgeoisie is quenched, that it is disillusioned, and that it is disintegrating, that its attack upon the proletariat is weakening, opens up new revolutionary possibilities. All history shows that it is impossible to keep the proletariat enchained with the aid merely of the police apparatus. It is true that the experience of Italy shows that the psychological heritage of the enormous catastrophe experienced maintains itself among the working class much longer than the relationship between the forces which engendered the catastrophe. But the psychological inertia of the defeat is but a precarious prop. It can crumble at a single blow under the impact of a powerful convulsion. Such a convulsion—for Italy, Germany, Austria and other countries—could be the success of the struggle of the French proletariat.

The revolutionary key to the situation in Europe and in the entire world is now above all in France!



# The Testament of Lenin

TOWARDS the end of 1921 Lenin's health broke sharply. On December 7, in taking his departure upon the insistence of his physician, Lenin, little given to complaining, wrote to the members of the Political Bureau: "I am leaving today. In spite of my reduced quota of work and increased quota of rest, these last days the insomnia has increased devilishly. I am afraid I cannot speak either at the party congress or the Soviet congress."† For five months he languishes, half removed by doctors and friends from his work, in continual alarm over the course of governmental and party affairs, in continual struggle with his lingering disease. In May he has the first stroke. For two months Lenin is unable to speak or write or move. In July he begins slowly to recover. Remaining in the country, he enters by degrees into active correspondence. In October he returns to the Kremlin and officially takes up his work.

"There is no evil without good," he writes privately in the draft of a future speech. "I have been sitting quiet for a half year and looking on 'from the sidelines.'" Lenin means to say: I formerly sat too steadily at my post and failed to observe many things; the long interruption has now permitted me to see much with fresh eyes. What disturbed him most, indubitably, was the monstrous growth of bureaucratic power, the focal point of which had become the Organization Bureau of the Central Committee.

The necessity of removing the boss who was specializing in bitter dishes became clear to Lenin immediately after his return to work. But this personal question had become notably complicated. Lenin could not fail to see how extensively his absence had been made use of by Stalin for a one-sided selection of men—often in direct conflict with the interests of the cause. The general secretary was now relying upon a numerous faction, bound together, if not always by intellectual, at least by firm ties. A change of the heads of the party machine had already become impossible without the preparation of a serious political attack. At this time occurred the "conspiratorial" conversation between Lenin and me in regard to a combined struggle against Soviet and party bureaucratism, and his proposal of a "bloc" against the Organization Bureau—the fundamental stronghold of Stalin at that time. The fact of this conversation as well as its content soon found their reflection in documents, and they constitute an episode of the party history undeniable and not denied by anyone.

However, in only a few weeks there came a new decline in Lenin's health. Not only continual work, but also executive conversations with the comrades, were again forbidden by his physicians. He had to think out further measures of struggle alone within four walls. To control the back-stage activities of the Secretariat, Lenin worked out some general measures of an organizational character. Thus arose the plan of creating a highly authoritative party center in the form of a Control Commission composed of reliable and experienced members of the party, completely independent from the hierarchical viewpoint—that is, neither officials nor administrators—and at the same time endowed with the right to call to account for violations of legality, of party and Soviet democratism, and for lack of revolutionary morality, all officials without exception, not only of the party, including members of the Central Committee, but also, through mediation of the Workers and Peasants Inspection, the high officials of the state.

On January 23, through Krupskaja, Lenin sent for publication in *Pravda* an article on the subject of his proposed reorganization of the central institutions. Fearing at once a traitorous blow from his disease and a no less traitorous response from the Secretariat, Lenin demanded that his article be printed in *Pravda* immediately: this implied a direct appeal to the party. Stalin refused Krupskaja this request on the ground of the necessity of discussing the question in the Political Bureau. Formally this meant merely a day's postponement. But the very procedure of referring it to the Political Bureau boded no good. At Lenin's direction Krupskaja turned to me for coöperation. I demanded an immediate meeting

\*The first half of this essay appeared in the July issue. †This, like many other letters

quoted in the present article, is reproduced from documents in my archives.—L. T.

of the Political Bureau. Lenin's fears were completely confirmed: all the members and alternates present at the meeting, Stalin, Molotov, Kuibyshev, Rykov, Kalinin and Bukharin, were not only against the reform proposed by Lenin, but also against printing his article. To console the sick man, whom any sharp emotional excitement threatened with disaster, Kuibyshev, the future head of the Central Control Commission, proposed that they print a special issue of *Pravda* containing Lenin's article, but consisting of only one copy. It was thus "fervently" that these people followed their teacher. I rejected with indignation the proposal to hoodwink Lenin, spoke essentially in favor of the reform proposed by him, and demanded the immediate publication of his article. I was supported by Kamenev who had come in an hour late. The attitude of the majority was at last broken down by the argument that Lenin in any case would put his article in circulation; it would be copied on typewriters, and read with redoubled attention, and it would be thus all the more pointedly directed against the Political Bureau. The article appeared in *Pravda* the next morning, January 25. This episode also found its reflection in due season in official documents, upon the basis of which it is here described.

I consider it necessary in general to emphasize the fact that since I do not belong to the school of pure psychologism, and since I am accustomed to trust firmly established facts rather than their emotional reflection in memory, the whole present exposition, with the exception of specially indicated episodes, is conducted by me on the basis of documents in my archives and with a careful verification of dates, testimony and factual circumstances in general.

## *The Disagreements Between Lenin and Stalin*

Organizational policy was not the only arena of Lenin's struggle against Stalin. The November plenum of the Central Committee (1922), sitting without Lenin and without me, introduced unexpectedly a radical change in the system of foreign trade, undermining the very foundation of the state monopoly. In a conversation with Krassin, then People's Commissar of Foreign Trade, I spoke of this resolution of the Central Committee approximately as follows: "They have not yet taken the bottom out of the barrel, but they have bored several holes in it." Lenin heard of this. On the 13th of December he wrote me: "I earnestly urge you to take upon yourself at the coming plenum the defense of our common view as to the unconditional necessity of preserving and enforcing the monopoly. . . . The previous plenum took a decision in this matter wholly in conflict with the monopoly of foreign trade." Refusing any concessions upon this question, Lenin insisted that I appeal to the Central Committee and the congress. The blow was directed primarily against Stalin, responsible as general secretary for the presentation of questions at the plenums of the Central Committee. That time, however, the thing did not go to the point of open struggle. Sensing the danger, Stalin yielded without a struggle, and his friends with him. At the December plenum the November decision was revoked. "It seems we captured the position without firing a shot, by mere manoeuvres," Lenin wrote me jokingly on December 21.

The disagreement in the sphere of national policy was still sharper. In the autumn of 1922 we were preparing the transformation of the Soviet state into a federated union of national republics. Lenin considered it necessary to go as far as possible to meet the demands and claims of those nationalists who had long lived under oppression, and were still far from recovering from its consequences. Stalin, on the other hand, who in his position as People's Commissar for Nationalities directed the preparatory work, was conducting in this sphere a policy of bureaucratic centralism. Lenin, convalescing in a village near Moscow, carried on a polemic with Stalin in letters addressed to the Political Bureau. In his first remarks on Stalin's project for the federated union, Lenin was extremely gentle and restrained. He was still hoping in those days—towards the end of September 1922—to adjust the question through the Political Bureau and without open conflict. Stalin's answers, on the other hand, contained a noticeable irritation. He thrust back at Lenin the reproach of "hastiness", and with it an accusation of national "liberalism"—that is, indulgence

to the nationalism of the outlanders. This correspondence, although extremely interesting politically, is still concealed from the party.

The bureaucratic national policy had already at that time provoked a keen opposition in Georgia, uniting against Stalin and his right hand man, Ordjonikidze, the flower of Georgian Bolshevism. Through Krupskaja, Lenin got into private connection with the leaders of the Georgian opposition (Mdivani, Makharadze, etc.) against the faction of Stalin, Ordjonikidze and Dzherzhinsky. The struggle in the borderlands was too keen, and Stalin had bound himself too closely with definite groupings, to yield in silence as he had on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade. In the next few weeks Lenin became convinced that it would be necessary to appeal to the party. At the end of December he dictated a voluminous letter on the national question which was to take the place of his speech at the party congress if illness prevented him from appearing.

Lenin employed against Stalin an accusation of administrative impulsiveness and spite against a pretended nationalism. "Spite in general," he wrote weightily, "usually plays the worst possible rôle in politics." The struggle against the just, even though at first exaggerated, demands of the nations formerly oppressed, Lenin qualified as a manifestation of Great Russian bureaucratism. He for the first time named his opponents by name. "It is necessary, of course, to hold Stalin and Dzherzhinsky politically responsible for this whole downright Great Russian nationalistic campaign." That the Great Russian, Lenin, accuses the Georgian, Dzughashvili, and the Pole, Dzherzhinsky, of Great Russian nationalism, may seem paradoxical: but the question here is not one of national feelings and partialities, but of two systems of politics whose differences reveal themselves in all spheres, the national question among them. In mercilessly condemning the methods of the Stalin faction, Rakovsky wrote some years later: "To the national question, as to all other questions, the bureaucracy makes its approach from the point of view of convenience of administration and regulation." Nothing better could be said.

Stalin's verbal concessions did not quiet Lenin in the least, but on the contrary sharpened his suspicions. "Stalin will enter a rotten compromise," Lenin warned me through his secretary, "and afterward he will deceive us." And that was just Stalin's course. He was ready to accept at the coming congress any theoretical formulation of the national policy on condition that it should not weaken his factional support in the center and in the borderlands. To be sure, Stalin had plenty of grounds for fearing that Lenin saw through his plans completely. But on the other hand, the condition of the sick man was continually growing worse. Stalin coolly included this not unimportant factor in his calculations. The practical policy of the general secretariat became the more decisive, the worse became Lenin's health. Stalin tried to isolate the dangerous supervisor from all information which might give him a weapon against the secretariat and its allies. This policy of blockade naturally was directed against the people closest to Lenin. Krupskaja did what she could to protect the sick man from contact with the hostile machinations of the secretariat. But Lenin knew how to guess a whole situation from accidental symptoms. He was clearly aware of the activities of Stalin, his motives and calculations. It is not difficult to imagine what reactions they provoked in his mind. We should remember that at that moment there already lay on Lenin's writing table, besides the testament insisting upon the removal of Stalin, also the documents on the national question which Lenin's secretaries Fotieva and Gliasser, sensitively reflecting the mood of their chief, were describing as "a bomb against Stalin"

#### *A Half Year of Sharpening Struggle*

Lenin developed his idea of the rôle of the Central Control Commission as a protector of party law and unity in connection with the question of reorganizing the Workers and Peasants Inspection (*Rabkrin*), whose head for several preceding years had been Stalin. On the 4th of March, *Pravda* published an article famous in the history of the party, "Better Less and Better." This work was written at several different times. Lenin did not like to, and could not, dictate. He had a hard time writing the article. On March 2 he finally listened to it with satisfaction: "At last it seems all right." This article included the reform of the guiding party institutions on a broad political perspective both national and inter-

national. Upon this side of the question, however, we cannot pause here. Highly important for our theme, however, is the verbal estimate which Lenin gave of the Workers and Peasants Inspection: "Let us speak frankly. The People's Commissariat of Workers and Peasants Inspection does not enjoy at the present moment a shadow of authority. Everybody knows that a worse organized institution than the institution of our Workers and Peasants Inspection does not exist, and that under present conditions you can ask nothing of this People's Commissariat." This extraordinarily biting allusion in print by the head of the government to one of the most important state institutions, was a direct and unmitigated blow against Stalin as the organizer and head of this Inspection. The reason for this should now be clear. The Inspection was to serve chiefly as an antidote to bureaucratic distortions of the revolutionary dictatorship. This responsible function could be fulfilled successfully upon condition of complete loyalty in its leadership, but it was just this loyalty which Stalin lacked. He had converted the Inspection like the party Secretariat into an implement of machine intrigues, of protection for "his men" and persecution of his opponents. In the article "Better Less and Better" Lenin openly pointed out that his proposed reform of the Inspection, at whose head Tziurupa had not long ago been placed, must inevitably meet the resistance of "all our bureaucracy, both the Soviet and the party bureaucracy". "In parenthesis, be it remarked," he adds significantly, "we have a bureaucracy not only in the Soviet institutions, but in the institutions of the party." This was a perfectly deliberate blow at Stalin as general secretary.

Thus it would be no exaggeration to say that the last half year of Lenin's political life, between his convalescence and his second illness, was filled with a sharpening struggle against Stalin. Let us recall once more the principal dates. In September Lenin opened fire against the national policy of Stalin. In the first half of December he attacked Stalin on the question of the monopoly of foreign trade. On December 25 he wrote the first part of his testament. On December 30, 1922, he wrote his letter on the national question (the "bomb"). On January 4 he added a postscript to his testament on the necessity of removing Stalin from his position as general secretary. On January 23 he drew up against Stalin a heavy battery: the project of a Control Commission. In an article on the 2nd of March he dealt Stalin a double blow, both as organizer of the Inspection and as general secretary. On March 5 he wrote me on the subject of his memorandum on the national question: "If you would agree to take upon yourself its defense then I could be at rest." On that same day he for the first time openly joined forces with the irreconcilable Georgian enemies of Stalin, informing them in a special note that he was following their cause "with all my heart" and was preparing for them documents against Stalin, Ordjonikidze and Dzherzhinsky, "With all my heart"—this expression was not a frequent one with Lenin.

"This question [the national question] disturbed him to an extraordinary degree," testifies his secretary, Fotieva, "and he was getting ready to speak on this at the party congress." But a month before the congress Lenin finally broke down, and without even having given directions in regard to the article. A weight rolled from Stalin's shoulders. At the seniority caucus of the twelfth congress he already made bold to speak in the style characteristic of him of Lenin's letter as the document of a sick man under the influence of "womenfolk". (That is, Krupskaja and the two secretaries). Under pretext of the necessity of finding out the actual will of Lenin, it was decided to put the letter under lock and key. There it remains to this day.

The dramatic episodes enumerated above, vivid enough in themselves, do not in the remotest degree convey the fervor with which Lenin was living through the party events of the last months of his active life. In letters and articles he laid upon himself the usual very severe censorship. Lenin understood well enough from his first stroke the nature of his illness. After he returned to work in October 1922 the capillary vessels of his brain did not cease to remind him of themselves by a hardly noticeable, but ominous and more and more frequent nudge, obviously threatening a relapse. Lenin soberly estimated his own situation in spite of the quieting assurances of his physicians. At the beginning of March, when he was compelled again to withdraw from work, at least from meetings, interviews and telephone conversations, he carried away

into his sick room a number of troubling observations and dreads. The bureaucratic apparatus had become an independent factor in big politics with Stalin's secret factional staff in the Secretariat of the Central Committee. In the national sphere, where Lenin demanded special sensitiveness, the tusks of imperial centralism were revealing themselves more and more openly. The ideas and principles of the revolution were bending to the interests of combinations behind the scenes. The authority of the dictatorship was more and more often serving as a cover for the dictations of functionaries.

Lenin keenly sensed the approach of a political crisis, and feared that the apparatus would strangle the party. The policies of Stalin became for Lenin in the last period of his life the incarnation of a rising monster of bureaucratism. The sick man must more than once have shuddered at the thought that he had not succeeded in carrying out that reform of the apparatus about which he had talked with me before his second illness. A terrible danger, it seemed to him, threatened the work of his whole life.

And Stalin? Having gone too far to retreat, spurred on by his own faction, fearing that concentrated attack whose threads all issued from the sickbed of his dread enemy, Stalin was already going headlong, was openly recruiting partisans by the distribution of party and Soviet positions, was terrorizing those who appealed to Lenin through Krupskaya, and was more and more persistently issuing rumors that Lenin was already not responsible for his actions. Such was the atmosphere from which rose Lenin's letter breaking with Stalin absolutely. No, it did not drop from a clear sky. It meant merely that the cup of endurance had run over. Not only chronologically, but politically and morally, it drew a last line under the attitude of Lenin to Stalin.

Is it not surprising that Ludwig, gratefully repeating the official story about the pupil faithful to his teacher "up to his very death", says not a word of this final letter, or indeed of all the other circumstances which do not accord with the present Kremlin legends? Ludwig ought at least to know the fact of the letter, if only from my autobiography, with which he was once acquainted, for he gave it a favorable review. Maybe Ludwig had doubts of the authenticity of my testimony. But neither the existence of the letter nor its contents was ever disputed by anybody. Moreover, they are confirmed in stenographic reports of the Central Committee. At the July plenum in 1926, Zinoviev said: "At the beginning of 1923 Vladimir Ilych in a personal letter to Stalin broke off comradesly relations with him." (Stenographic report of the plenum, No. 4, page 32). And other speakers, among them M. I. Ulianova, Lenin's sister, spoke of the letter as of a fact generally known in the circles of the Central Committee. In those days it could not even enter Stalin's head to oppose this testimony. Indeed, he has not ventured to do that so far as I know, in a direct form, even subsequently.

It is true that the official historians have in recent years made literally gigantic efforts to wipe out of the memory of man this whole chapter of history. And so far as the Communist youth are concerned, these efforts have achieved certain results. But investigators exist, it would seem, exactly for the purpose of destroying legends and confirming the real facts in their rights. Or is this not true of psychologists?

#### *The Hypothesis of the "Duumvirate"*

We have indicated above the sign-posts of the final struggle between Lenin and Stalin. At all these stages Lenin sought my support and found it. From the speeches, articles and letters of Lenin you could without difficulty adduce dozens of testimonies to the fact that after our temporary disagreement on the questions of the trade unions, throughout 1921 and 1922 and the beginning of 1923, Lenin did not lose one chance to emphasize in open forum his solidarity with me, to quote this or that statement from me, to support this or that step which I had taken. We must understand that his motives were not personal, but political. What may have alarmed him and grieved him in the last months, indeed, was my not active enough support of his fighting measures against Stalin. Yes, such is the paradox of the situation! Lenin, fearing in the future a split on the line of Stalin and Trotsky, demanded of me a more energetic struggle against Stalin. The contradiction here, however, is only superficial. It was in the interests of the stability of the party leadership in the future, that Lenin now wished to condemn Stalin sharply and disarm him. What restrained me was

the fear that any sharp conflict in the ruling group at that time when Lenin was struggling with death, might be understood by the party as a casting of lots for Lenin's mantle. I will not raise the question here as to whether my restraint in that case was right or not, nor the broader question as to whether it would have been possible at that time to ward off the advancing danger with organizational reforms and personal shiftings. But how far were all the actual positions of the actors from the picture which is given us by this popular German writer who so lightly picks the keys to all enigmas!

We have heard from him that the testament "decided the fate of Trotsky"—that is, evidently served as a cause of Trotsky's losing power. According to another version of Ludwig's expounded alongside of this with not even an attempt to reconcile them, Lenin desired "a duumvirate of Trotsky and Stalin". This latter thought, also doubtless suggested by Radek, gives excellent proof that even now, even in the close circle around Stalin, even in the tendentious manipulation of a foreign writer invited in for a conversation, nobody dared assert that Lenin saw his successor in Stalin. In order not to come into too crude conflict with the text of the testimony, and a whole series of other documents, it is necessary to put forward *ex post facto* this idea of a duumvirate.

But how reconcile this story with Lenin's advice: remove the general secretary? That would have meant to deprive Stalin of all the weapons of his influence. You do not treat in this way the candidate for duumvir. No, and moreover this second hypothesis of Radek-Ludwig, although more cautious, finds no support in the text of the testament. The aim of the document was defined by its author—to guarantee the stability of the Central Committee. Lenin sought the road to this goal, not in the artificial combination of a duumvirate, but in strengthening the collective control over the activity of the leaders. How in doing this he conceived the relative influence of individual members of the collective leadership—as to this the reader is free to draw his own conclusions on the basis of the above quotations from the testament. Only he should not lose sight of the fact that the testament was not the last word of Lenin, and that his attitude to Stalin became more severe the more closely he felt the dénouement approaching.

Ludwig would not have made so capital a mistake in his appraisal of the meaning and spirit of the testament, if he had interested himself a little bit in its further fate. Concealed by Stalin and his group from the party, the testament was reprinted and republished only by Oppositionists—of course, secretly. Hundreds of my friends and partisans were arrested and exiled for copying and distributing those two little pages. On November 7, 1927—the tenth anniversary of the October revolution—the Moscow Oppositionists took part in the anniversary demonstration with a placard: "Fulfill the Testament of Lenin." Specially chosen troops of Stalinists broke into the line of march and snatched away the criminal placard. Two years later, at the moment of my banishment abroad, a story was even created of an insurrection in preparation by the "Trotskyists" on November 7, 1927. The summons to "fulfill the testament of Lenin" was interpreted by the Stalinist faction as a summons to insurrection! And even now the testament is forbidden publication by any section of the Communist International. The Left Opposition, on the contrary, is republishing the testament upon every appropriate occasion in all countries. Politically these facts exhaust the question.

#### *Radek As a Source of Information*

Still, where did that fantastic tale come from about how I leapt from my seat during the reading of the testament, or rather of the "six words" which are not in the testament, with the question: "What does it say there?" Of this I can only offer a hypothetical explanation. How correct it may be, let the reader judge.

Radek belongs to the tribe of professional wits and story-tellers. By this I do not mean that he does not possess other qualities. Suffice it to say that at the seventh congress of the party on March 8, 1918, Lenin, who was in general very restrained in personal comments, considered it possible to say: "I return to comrade Radek, and here I want to remark that he has accidentally succeeded in uttering a serious remark. . ." And once again later on: "This time it did happen that we got a perfectly serious remark from Radek. . ." People who speak seriously only by way of exception have an organic tendency to improve reality, for in its



raw form reality is not always appropriate to their stories. My personal experience has taught me to adopt a very cautious attitude to Radek's testimonies. His custom is, not to recount events, but to take them as the occasion for a witty discourse. Since every art, including the anecdotal, aspires towards a synthesis, Radek is inclined to unite together various facts, or the brighter features of various episodes, even though they took place at different times and places. There is no malice in this. It is the manner of his calling.

And so it happened, apparently, this time. Radek, according to all the evidence, has combined a session of the council of seniors of the thirteenth congress with a session of the plenum of the Central Committee of 1926, in spite of the fact that an interval of more than two years lay between the two. At that plenum also secret manuscripts were read, among them the testament. This time Stalin did actually read them, and not Kamenev who was then already sitting beside me in the opposition benches. The reading was provoked by the fact that during those days copies of the testament, the national letter of Lenin, and other documents kept under lock and key, were already circulating rather broadly in the party. The party apparatus was getting nervous, and wanted to find out what it was that Lenin had actually said. "The Opposition knows and we don't know," they were saying. After prolonged resistance Stalin found himself compelled to read the forbidden documents at a session of the Central Committee—thus automatically bringing them into the stenographic record, printed in secret notebooks for the heads of the party apparatus.

This time also there were no exclamations during the reading of the testament, for the document was long ago too well known to the members of the Central Committee. But I actually interrupted Stalin during the reading of the correspondence on the national question. The episode in itself is not so important, but maybe it will be of use to the psychologists for certain inferences.

Lenin was extremely economical in his literary means and methods. He carried on his business correspondence with close colleagues in telegraphic language. The form of address was always the last name of the addressee with the letter "T" (*Tovarishch*: comrade) and the signature was "Lenin". Complicated explanations were replaced by a double or triple underlining of separate words, extra exclamation points, etc. We all well knew the peculiarities of Lenin's manner, and therefore even a slight departure from his laconic custom attracted attention.

In sending his letter on the national question Lenin wrote me on March 5: "Esteemed Comrade Trotsky: I urgently request you to take upon yourself the defense of the Georgian affair at the Central Committee of the party. The thing is at present under 'prosecution' at the hands of Stalin and Dzherzhinsky, and I cannot rely upon their impartiality. Indeed, quite the opposite. If you would agree to take upon yourself its defense, then I could be at rest. If you for some reason do not agree, then return the whole thing to me. I will consider this a sign of your disagreement. With the best comradely greetings, Lenin. March 5, 1923."

Both the content and the tone of this slight note, dictated by Lenin during the last day of his political life, were no less painful to Stalin than the testament. A lack of "impartiality"—does not this imply, indeed, that same lack of loyalty? The last thing to be felt in this note is any confidence in Stalin—"indeed quite the opposite"—the thing emphasized is confidence in me. A confirmation of the tacit union between Lenin and me against Stalin and his faction was at hand. Stalin controlled himself badly during the reading. When he arrived at the signature he hesitated: "With the best comradely greetings"—that was too demonstrative from Lenin's pen. Stalin read: "With Communist greetings." That sounded more dry and official. At that moment I did rise in my seat and ask: "What is written there?" Stalin was obliged, without embarrassment, to read the authentic text of Lenin. Someone of his close friends shouted at me that I was quibbling over details, although I had only sought to verify a text. That slight incident made an impression. There was talk about it among the heads of the party. Radek, who at that time was no longer a member of the Central Committee, learned of it at the plenum from others, and perhaps from me. Five years later when he was already with Stalin and no longer with me, his flexible memory evidently helped him to compose this synthetic episode which stimu-

lated Ludwig to so effective and so mistaken an inference.

Although Lenin, as we have seen, found no reason to declare in his testament that my non-Bolshevik past was "not accidental", still I am ready to adopt that formula on my own authority. In the spiritual world the law of causation is as inflexible as in the physical world. In that general sense my political orbit was, of course, "not accidental", but the fact that I became a Bolshevik was also not accidental. The question how seriously and permanently I came over to Bolshevism, is not to be decided either by a bare chronological record or by the guesses of literary psychology. A theoretical and political analysis is necessary. This, of course, is too big a theme, and lies wholly outside the frame of the present essay. For our purpose it suffices that Lenin in describing the conduct of Zinoviev and Kamenev in 1917 as "not accidental" was not making a philosophical reference to the laws of determinism, but a political warning for the future. It is exactly for this reason that Radek found it necessary, through Ludwig, to transfer this warning from Zinoviev and Kamenev to me.

#### *The Legend of "Trotskyism"*

Let us recall the chief sign-posts of this question. From 1917 to 1924 not a word was spoken of the contrast between Trotskyism and Leninism. In this period occurred the October revolution, the civil war, the construction of the Soviet state, the creation of the Red army, the working out of the party program, the establishment of the Communist International, the formation of its cadres, and the drawing up of its fundamental documents. After the withdrawal of Lenin from his work in the nucleus of the Central Committee, serious disagreements developed. In 1924 the spectre of "Trotskyism"—after careful preparation behind the scenes—was brought forth on the stage. The entire inner struggle of the party was henceforth carried on within the frame of a contrast between Trotskyism and Leninism. In other words, the disagreements created by new circumstances and new tasks between me and the epigones, were presented as a continuation of my old disagreements with Lenin. A vast literature was created upon this theme. Its sharp-shooters were always Zinoviev and Kamenev. In their character of old and very close colleagues of Lenin they stood at the head of "the old Bolshevik guard" against Trotskyism. But under the pressure of deep social processes this group itself fell apart. Zinoviev and Kamenev found themselves obliged to acknowledge that the so-called "Trotskyists" had been right upon fundamental questions. New thousands of old Bolsheviks adhered to "Trotskyism".

At the July plenum of 1926 Zinoviev announced that his struggle against me had been the greatest mistake of his life—"more dangerous than the mistake of 1917". Ordjonikidze was not entirely wrong in calling to him from his seat: "Why did you befool the whole party?" (See the already quoted stenographic report). To this weighty rejoinder Zinoviev officially found no answer. But he gave an unofficial explanation at a conference of the Opposition in October 1926. "You must understand," he said in my presence to his closest friends, some Leningrad workers who honestly believed in the legend of Trotskyism, "you must understand that it was a struggle for power. The whole art of the thing was to combine the old disagreements with the new questions. For this purpose *Trotskyism* was invented. . . ."

During their two year stay in the Opposition, Zinoviev and Kamenev managed to expose completely the back-stage mechanics of the preceding period when they with Stalin had created the legend of "Trotskyism" by conspiratorial methods. A year later, when it became finally clear that the Opposition would be compelled to swim long and stubbornly against the current, Zinoviev and Kamenev threw themselves on the mercy of the victor. As a first condition of their party rehabilitation it was demanded that they rehabilitate the legend of Trotskyism. They agreed. At that time I decided to reinforce their own previous declarations on this matter through a series of authoritative testimonials. It was Radek, no other than Karl Radek, who gave the following written testimony: "I was present at a conversation with Kamenev to the effect that Kamenev was going to tell at a plenum of the Central Committee how they [that is, Kamenev and Zinoviev] together with Stalin, decided to use the old disagreements between Trotsky and Lenin, in order after the death of Lenin to keep Trotsky out of the party leadership. Moreover, I have often heard from the

lips of Zinoviev and Kamenev how they 'invented' Trotskyism as an actual slogan. K. Radek, December 25, 1927."

Similar written testimonies were given by Preobrazhensky, Piatakov, Rakovsky and Eltzin. Piatakov, the present director of the State Bank, summed up Zinoviev's testimony in the following words: "Trotskyism was thought up in order to replace the actual disagreements with pretended ones, that is, with disagreements taken from the past having no significance now, but artificially galvanized for the aforesaid purposes." This is clear enough, is it not? "No one—" wrote V. Eltzin, a representative of the younger generation, "no one of the Zinovievists present at the time objected. They all accepted this communication from Zinoviev as a generally known fact."

The above-cited testimony of Radek was submitted by him on December 25, 1927. A few weeks later he was already in exile, and a few months later on the meridian of Tomsk he became convinced of the correctness of Stalin's position, a thing which had not been revealed to him earlier in Moscow. But from Radek also the powers demanded as a condition *sine qua non* an acknowledgment of the reality of this same legend of Trotskyism. After Radek agreed to this, he had nothing left to do but repeat the old formulæ of Zinoviev which the latter had himself exposed in 1926 only to return to them again in 1928. Radek has gone farther. In a conversation with a credulous foreigner he has amended the testament of Lenin in order to find in it support for this epigonist legend of "Trotskyism".

From this short historic record, resting exclusively upon documentary data, many conclusions may be drawn. One is that a revolution is an austere process and does not spare its human vertebræ.

The course of subsequent events in the Kremlin and in the Soviet Union was determined not by a single document, even though it were the testament of Lenin, but by historical causes of a far deeper order. A political reaction after the enormous effort of the years of the insurrection and the civil war was inevitable. The concept of reaction must here be strictly distinguished from the concept of counter-revolution. Reaction does not necessarily imply a social overturn—that is, a transfer of power from one class to another. Even Czarism had its periods of progressive reform and

its periods of reaction. The mood and orientation of the ruling class changes according to circumstances. This is true also of the working class. The pressure of the petty bourgeoisie upon the proletariat, tired from the tumult, entailed a revival of petty bourgeois tendencies in the proletariat itself and a first deep reaction on the crest of which the present bureaucratic apparatus headed by Stalin rose to power.

Those qualities which Lenin valued in Stalin—stubbornness of character and craftiness—remained of course, even then. But they found a new field of action, and a new point of application. Those features which in the past had represented a minus in Stalin's personality—narrowness of outlook, lack of creative imagination, empiricism—now gained an effective significance important in the highest degree. They permitted Stalin to become the semi-conscious instrument of the Soviet bureaucracy, and they impelled the bureaucracy to see in Stalin its inspired leader. This ten year struggle among the heads of the Bolshevik party has indubitably proved that under the conditions of this new stage of the revolution Stalin has been developing to the limit those very traits of his political character against which Lenin in the last period of his life waged irreconcilable war. But this question, standing even now at the focus of Soviet politics, would carry us far beyond the limits of our historic theme.

Many years have passed since the events we have related. If even ten years ago there were factors in action far more powerful than the counsel of Lenin, it would now be utterly naïve to appeal to the testament as to an effective political document. The international struggle between the two groups which have grown out of Bolshevism long ago outgrew the question of the fate of individuals. Lenin's letter, known under the name of his testament, has henceforward chiefly a historic interest. But history, we may venture to think, has also its rights, which moreover do not always conflict with the interests of politics. The most elementary of scientific demands—correctly to establish facts and verify rumors by document—may at least be recommended alike to politician and historian. And this demand might well be extended even to the psychologist.

TRANSLATED BY MAX EASTMAN

PRINKIPO, December 31, 1932.

Leon TROTSKY.

# The Second International in the War

"To forget is counter-revolutionary."

—OSKAR KANEHL.

"IF OUR resolution does not foresee any specific method of action for the vast diversity of eventualities," said Jean Jaurès in urging the adoption of the famous anti-war resolution of the Second International at its special conference in Basel on November 24, 1912, "neither does it exclude any. It serves notice upon the governments, and it draws their attention clearly to the fact that [by war] they would easily create a revolutionary situation, yes, the most revolutionary situation imaginable."

So the resolution did. The unanimous vote cast for the memorable document of Basel marked the highest point ever reached by the Second International. It was a solemn warning, not one syllable of which nurtured the illusion of "national defense", that the allied socialist parties of the entire world would reply to an imperialist war as did the Parisian masses in 1871 after the Franco-Prussian war and the Russian workers in 1905 after the Russo-Japanese war.

The great betrayal of socialism in 1914 by the Second International consisted in trampling in trench-mud the Basel anti-war resolution and the whole of revolutionary socialist tradition. The main parties of the International had become so closely interwoven with the fate and interests of the capitalist fatherland that the declaration of 1912 was little more than a heroic echo of a revolutionary past. The vast institutions they had built up, the trade unions they had expanded, the steady growth of their parliamentary strength—all these conjured up in the minds of the socialist parties an idyllic picture of the coöperative commonwealth gradually emerging out of capitalist society without serious disturbances

or convulsions. That a war would actually break out, seemed a remote prospect. How to combat it if it actually supervened, was a problem about which few cudged their brains. When the International made its last impotent gesture by a special Bureau session at Brussels hastily convened after the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, "it is remarkable," wrote Kautsky six later years, "that the thought never occurred to anyone of us who was there to bring up the question of what to do if the war breaks out before then [before the special congress which was called for August 9]? What position would the socialist parties have to adopt in this war?"

The fact is, as the Austrian chauvinist Karl Seitz pointed out, "The world war caught us unprepared." Unprepared to act like revolutionists against the imperialist war, but thoroughly prepared to support it with jingo enthusiasm. Nor was the bourgeoisie unaware of the inclinations of its respective social democracies. Quite the contrary. And these inclinations were part of the calculations of the warmongers who were driving towards action at a terrific speed in those crucial days.

"I never had any doubts about the patriotic sentiments of the social democracy in the event of war," read the memoirs of Victor Naumann, the intimate of the later Chancellor, Hertling, "and never understood the Berlin policy which constantly brought up the fearful question: will not the conduct of the social democracy, at the outbreak of a great war, produce severe conflicts in the interior which would be disastrous for the conduct of the struggle?"

In Berlin, six days after the ringing manifesto of the party leadership had proclaimed its opposition to the war which was clearly impending, the undeceived "war ministry released at 8

o'clock, July 31, with Nr. 64gg A 1 the following communication to the General Command: According to reliable information, the Social Democratic party has the firm intention of conducting itself in a manner becoming to every German under the present conditions." (See the memoirs of General Wrisberg.)

The assurance of the War Ministry was better than well-founded. The dominant group in the party leadership and in the Reichstag fraction had already determined to support the fatherland in the war—to support it regardless of whether this view was supported by the majority or not. Hermann Mueller had been dispatched to Paris to feel out the French socialists. The Austrians and Russians had already announced their mobilization orders. Mueller proposed not to vote for war credits in the Reichstag if the Frenchmen would act similarly. "That we shall vote for the war credits, I consider out of the question." Renaudel and his confrères were agreeable—unless "France is attacked"; then the party would vote like a man for credits. Mueller returned empty-handed.

The Reichstag fraction met with the party executive; Kautsky, among others, was invited to attend. The chauvinists prevailed. Kautsky could not summon enough courage to advocate a vote against the war credits; he proposed abstention. Neither the Left wing nor the Right would listen—so he proposed to vote for the credits with a "demand" upon the government for certain assurances! Out of several score votes cast, Liebknecht and his friends rallied a bare 14. By fraction discipline they were forbidden to vote against the credits in the Reichstag.

On August 4 the horrible tragedy occurred. Three days before the Kaiser had already pardoned his former opponents: "I know no more parties—I know only Germans." In his throne speech he addressed himself to his minions: "Looking upon you today, honorable gentlemen, is the whole German people, rallied around its princes and leaders. Arrive at your decisions unanimously and speedily—that is my innermost wish."

Amid applause from the Junker reaction such as had never before been vouchsafed it, the German social democracy replied to a man. Hugo Haase rose in the afternoon session of the Reichstag on August 4, the only speaker on the list, and read off the statement of the fraction which had previously been submitted for approbation to Chancellor Bethmann-Holweg! "Now we are making good what we have always stressed: in the hour of danger we do not leave the fatherland in the lurch." The hall rang with tumultuous *Bravos*. For the first time in German history, the social democracy joined in the frenzied *Hoch der Kaiser!*

The Austrian social democracy, already up to its ears in the chauvinist swamp, cheered effusively. Austerlitz wrote "*Der Tag der deutschen Nation*", his infamous editorial in the Vienna *Arbeiterzeitung* of August 5: "Man by man the German social democrats voted for the loan. Like the entire international social democracy, our Reichs-German party, that jewel of the organization of the class conscious proletariat, is also the most vigorous opponent of war, the most passionate supporter of concord and solidarity of the people. . . . Never did a party act more grandly and loftily than this German social democracy which proved its worth at this extremely serious moment."

For others it was harder to believe that the classic party of the Second International had committed so heinous a crime. Even Lenin, whose illusions were few enough about the German social democracy, could not bring himself to believe the report. "It cannot be, it must be a forged number," he told Zinoviev when the first copy of the Berlin *Vorwärts* arrived in his Galician exile. "Those scoundrels, the German bourgeoisie, have especially published such a number of the *Vorwärts* in order also to compel us to go against the International."

In Bucharest, the organ of the Rumanian social democracy, *România Muncitoare*, condemned the report that Haase had approved war credits in the Reichstag as a "monstrous lie", and to substantiate its view, proudly reprinted the anti-war speech which "Bebel's successor" had delivered in Brussels only the week before. As late as August 13, it still wrote: "As to the *Arbeiterzeitung*, if it still exists, it must have passed into the camp of the Austrian officialdom in order to disseminate the government's lies about the socialists." Only at the end of the month did it accept as truth

what was truth; it reprinted Haase's declaration with a bewildered, stupefied comment.

"The war burst asunder the International, it was its first great victim," wrote Friedrich Adler dejectedly. "The Second International is dead, the Third must be built," said Lenin; and at that moment there were only two others to hear him, Zinoviev and Krupskaja. The International was dead—not just the German social democracy.

On July 29, 1914, the peerless Jaurès was still saying at Brussels: "As for us French socialists, our duty is simple; we have no need of imposing a policy of peace upon our government. It is practising one. . . . I have the right to say that at the present hour the French government wants peace and is working for its preservation." Jaurès—Jaurès who had been second to none in laying bare the base diplomatic intrigues between France and Russia, but who could not elevate himself to an understanding of the motive forces of imperialist politics! As the words fell from his eloquent lips, the Russian ambassador at Paris, Izvolsky, was sending a telegram in code to Sazonov in St. Petersburg to inform the Czar that Viviani had given renewed assurances of the determination of France to act in full harmony with the Russians. Everything was ready for the European war, and Jaurès was in the toils of illusion. Three days later he was murdered by the assassin Raoul Villain as he sat with his friends in a restaurant.

On August 4, the French Chamber of Deputies also rang with an unprecedented unity. The whole socialist fraction joined in the vote for all the government measures, for war credits, for proclaiming a state of siege, for the suppression of free press and free assemblage. "It is a matter today of the future of the nation, of the life of France. The party has not hesitated," exclaimed the manifesto of the party. "Spontaneously, without waiting for any other manifestation of the popular will, he [the head of the government] has appealed to our party. Our party has replied: Here!"

"On July 14," read the cynical memoirs of L.-O. Frossard, patriot in 1914, Socialist party secretary in 1920, Communist party secretary in 1921, and patriot all over again now, in 1934, "we voted the resolution of Vaillant: *Rather the insurrection than war!* On July 31, we grabbed a rifle and ran to the frontiers crying: *Vive la France!*"

On August 27, Marcel Sembat entered the cabinet of the Sacred Union as minister of public works, and Jules Guesde—Guesde the Master, the orthodox Marxist!—as minister without portfolio. Later Albert Thomas became under-secretary of state of munitions. Marcel Cachin took the place of Jaurès at the head of *l'Humanité*, and like the German chauvinist Suedekum who represented the Kaiser in flying trips to Italy, Rumania and Sweden, he was sent to persuade the Italian socialists to help the Entente; they gave him a cold reception, but he boasted on his return that the King of Italy had helped him on with his overcoat.

Vaillant, the old Blanquist whose articles in *l'Humanité* became so violently jingoist that even the editors felt constrained to eliminate them little by little, until he was completely silenced by death in 1915, wrote when the war began: "In face of the aggression, the socialists will fulfill their whole duty for the fatherland, for the republic and for the revolution." "More than that," answered the satisfied editor of *Le Temps* on August 4, "we do not ask of M. Edouard Vaillant and his friends."

Each social patriot sought to outdo his fellow, and the bourgeoisie itself. "Come generals! We are giving you men, give us victories!" cried Compère-Morel. "We promise to fulfill our duty completely, as Frenchmen and as socialists faithful to the International," came the pledge made at Jaurès' grave by Marcel Cachin, who later fulfilled his duty just as completely under Stalin. "When seven French departments are invaded, when cities in the army zone, like those from which I write these lines, live under the constant menace of German cannon, it is impossible to say, be it only seemingly, to those who are fighting: we refuse you the means of defending yourselves," wrote Frossard. "Cruel as the sacrifices for it are, the war must and will be pursued to its liberating finish. The finest, the most heroic army that France has ever had, seconded and supported by the firm resolve of the nation, will give her the victory that will be her salvation, the salva-



tion of Europe, the salvation of the peoples, the salvation of democracy and socialism in the entire world," were the prophetic words of Vaillant. "Who then is fighting against the work of national defense? Who then is disinterested in the fate of the country? Is there then any incompatibility between the International and the fatherland?" asked the same Paul Faure who in 1934 pledges himself so glibly to lead the French proletariat in the struggle against war. And Hervé who clamored at the Limoges congress in 1906 for a resolution declaring the need of replying to every declaration of war with a military strike and an insurrection, who exclaimed "We detest our fatherlands, we are anti-patriots!", wrote a demagogic plea to the Minister of War on August 2, 1914, begging as a special favor to be sent to the front with the first infantry regiment "in spite of my myopia and my forty-three years"; in 1915 he changed his *La Guerre Sociale* into the chauvinist *La Victoire*.

The Belgian socialists took the same road. With the blessing of the party, Emile Vandervelde joined the reactionary clerical cabinet of his most august majesty, Albert, king of the Belgians and butcher of the Congo. Louis de Brouckère, who had served a term of six months in his youth for an anti-militarist article, quit the editorship of *Le Peuple* to join the aviation corps. Into the same nationalist wave plunged the young "radical", Henri de Man, who enlisted in the army with the same enthusiasm with which he now seeks to enlist the radical Belgian proletariat for his equally treacherous "plan".

In England, the Labour party was enthusiastically bellicose. Arthur Henderson, John Hodge, Brace and Roberts joined the government of National Defense. The Independent Labour party adopted a pacifist position, but its members in the Parliament never voted against the war budget. Ramsay MacDonald, who gained a reputation for opposition to the war, nevertheless wrote the mayor of his constituency, Leicester, endorsing the recruiting drive and spoke at the I.L.P. conference in 1916 against expelling the chauvinists Clynes and Parker because he "was not going to say that men who had participated in the recruiting campaign should be turned out of socialist organizations"! H. M. Hyndman, who had advocated preparedness, together with Robert Blatchford, long before the war, turned bitter-end patriot and wrote: "Everybody must eagerly desire the final defeat of Germany." His party split in two, one wing forming the internationalist British Socialist party. H. G. Wells left his utopias to swim lustily in the jingo pool and kept shouting for Germany to be put to the sword. Bernard Shaw cut a pitiful figure throughout: "We shall punch Prussia's head all the more gloriously if we do it for honor and not for malice. Then, when we have knocked all the militarism out of her and taught her to respect us, we can let her up again."

In Bulgaria, the leaders of the Right wing "Broad" socialists, Sakasoff, Pastukoff and Dsidroff concluded a civil peace with their bourgeoisie and entered the cabinet, first of Malinoff and then of Theodoroff. In Poland, the split in the ranks of the International was more favorable to the Left wing than in many other countries. After having denounced the reactionary Polish Club of the Austrian chamber as the "Shlakhzizenklubs", the leader of the Polish Social Democracy in Austro-Hungary, Daszinsky, together with the other Austro-Polish social democrats, joined it in a burst of national enthusiasm. Together with the reactionary Polish Socialist party, they made open and common cause with the Hapsburg monarchy, established the Supreme National Committee of patriots, formed the Polish Legion with Josef Pilsudski at its head and fought for Polonia Irredenta. The Social Democracy of Poland and Lithuania (the party of Rosa Luxemburg and Jogisches), joined with the Left wing of the P.P.S. and the Bund in an anti-war position and proclaimed: "The proletariat declares war upon its governments, its oppressors!" In Holland, all the Right wing socialists voted for military credits "for the protection of neutrality"—while the group of Gorter, Pannekoek, Roland-Holst and Wijnkoop (the Tribunists) took a militant internationalist stand. In equally neutral Sweden, the social democrats, allies of the tools of French imperialism, sent Hjalmar Branting and three other party leaders into the Eden cabinet; Branting later became president of the council. In Denmark, the social demo-

crats, here the allies of the tools of German imperialism, permitted Stauning to accept a ministerial post in the bourgeois cabinet.

Treachery, opportunism, conservatism, chauvinism—these were the victors of the day. And not even the revolutionary traditions of the Russian movement rendered it immune from them.

Plekhanov, the scintillating Marxist, the godfather of the whole Russian party, the man with whom others broke but never ceased to admire, sank to the level of drummer-boy to czarist imperialism. "The marauders are at the borders of my country and are ready to rob and murder." "Make your reservations," he urged the Duma deputy Burianov, "—this is absolutely necessary—but vote for the credits. The rejection of the credits would be a betrayal [of the people] and abstention would be cowardice, vote for the credits!" The old man was for the imperialist war, for saving the French bourgeoisie in the name of the revolution of 1789, against the barbarism of the German Junkers. Together with such Bolsheviks-turned-patriot as Alexinsky and Liubimov, he joined hands at Lausanne in 1915 with turncoat Social Revolutionists like Avksentiev, Bunakov, Voronov and Argunov to launch the chauvinist paper *Priziv*.

The Mensheviks, those abroad in particular, under Martov's leadership, took up an internationalist position, but they never strayed far from the Centrist camp of Kautsky. Trotsky, with a group of Bolsheviks and Left wing Mensheviks, took over the Parisian *Nashe Slovo*, fought for a revolutionary internationalist position until deported to Spain, but did not reconcile himself with the Bolsheviks until after the March revolution. Lenin and Zinoviev, speaking for the Bolshevik Central Committee abroad, in Switzerland, were like a voice crying in a mad, war-devastated wilderness for their far advanced, consistent revolutionary position.

Names which once commanded nothing but respect in the Russian movement were now associated with service in the camp of czarist imperialism. Parvus, as an exception, joined the service of German imperialism. Plekhanov, Alexinsky who later passed openly into the camp of czarism, Potressov, Mazlov, Cherevanin, Vera Sassulich, Ida Axelrod, to say nothing of the prince-regent of the anarchists, Kropotkin, all became social patriots. In Russia especially, the Mensheviks took an ambiguous Centrist position, or else became semi-pacifist, semi-collaborationists in the war. Outside of Russia, nobody could be found to support the drastic thesis of Lenin in favor of revolutionary defeatism, for a thoroughgoing break with the Centrists of all shadings—nobody. And even in the Bolshevik party itself, very few, certainly in the first period of the war, were those who stood by the Swiss exiles.

Hundreds of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks enlisted in the French army, fearing that a German victory would mean the end of European civilization. Another Bolshevik group, centered around Lunacharsky, published *Vperiod* in Switzerland, confining its program to the demands for peace without annexations or indemnities, general disarmament, and a United States of Europe. In the leading circles in Russia, matters were still worse. There the distinction between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks was often difficult to discern—at times for cause. In the August 8, 1914 session of the Duma, convened by the Czar to demonstrate the national unity of the Russians, the Menshevik Khaustov read a joint declaration of the deputies from both social democratic fractions, which declared their refusal to vote war credits. But, it added, in order to show that their refusal did not breathe the spirit of support for the Central powers, they would abstain on the vote—a position which instead breathed the spirit of support for Kautsky's position. (The socialist deputy Manikov, who did vote for war credits and "civil peace", was immediately expelled from the Menshevik fraction.)

In November 1914, the Bolshevik deputies, Badayev, Petrovsky, Samoilov, Shagov and Muranov, together with the representative of the Central Committee, Kamenev, were arrested at a secret meeting where Lenin's startling theses on the war were just being considered. At the trial of the six, they declared that the theses were a draft from abroad, but that they themselves were not in agreement with it. In their appeal against the verdict, all the defendants declared themselves expressly against points 6 and 7 in Lenin's theses because they "contradicted the declaration which was read in the name of the two fractions on August 8" and moreover "were not shared either by social democratic deputies or by

the central instances of the party". Point 6 dealt with revolutionary defeatism as the lesser evil for the proletariat; point 7 dealt with the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war against the bourgeoisie! Yaroslavky's history euphemistically dismisses the whole affair with the judgment: "It is true that not all the accused adopted an equally worthy attitude."

In the United States, the party also divided into two main camps. With the war in its third year, the American Socialist party called an emergency convention in St. Louis at which the famous majority resolution was adopted, taking a militant attitude against the impending war. Except for Debs, Coldwell and a few dozen others, none of the leaders of the party outside of the militant Left wing, organized but tiny, ever allowed the majority resolution to leave the paper it was written on. The semi-patriotic, semi-pacifist minority resolution, signed among others by John Spargo, George H. Goebel, Cameron H. King, Charles Edward Russell and the present party chairman, Leo Krzycki, really represented the course pursued by the authoritative party leaders in action—the legend of the St. Louis resolution to the contrary notwithstanding.

The extreme Right wing split off from the party, and with Phelps Stokes, Henry Slobodin, William English Walling, Charles Edward Russell, A. M. Simons, Alexander Howat, Louis Kopelin, John Spargo and several other patriots—many if not most of whom had but yesterday been the most insubmersible phrase-revolutionists—they formed the Social Democratic League and, together with the A. F. of L. bureaucracy, the American Alliance for Labor and Democracy. Upton Sinclair, Haldemann-Julius, Leroy Scott and Robert Rives La Monte, who bemoaned the fact that he was too old to shoulder a musket, turned proper jingo.

The official party promptly forgot the St. Louis resolution. Meyer London, its lone Congressman, conducted himself disgracefully, never used the floor to attack the war, and confined his anti-war activity to voting in favor of or not voting against practically all the war measures and appropriations. The socialist aldermen in New York City voted for Liberty Bonds and a Victory Arch. The ousted New York state assemblymen protested their patriotism with a piteous earnestness that would have wrung tears from rock. Hillquit announced in 1917: "I do not advocate an immediate separate peace, a withdrawal by America. Nothing that I have ever said or written could justify such a sweeping assertion. . . . I want America to act, not to withdraw." The National Executive Committee issued a manifesto in the same year saying: "We are not discouraging enlistments. We are not obstructing the conduct of the war." And while Debs went to prison, the party's struggle against war was entirely submerged and dissolved into the pacifist People's Council—the League against War and Fascism of its day.

It seemed that the whole International had turned delirious with war fever. All the hidden jingoism of the socialist leaders came to the surface as the flames of war burned off the thin veneer of their Marxian phraseology.

The French and Belgians and English became the most inflamed "*jusqu'au boutistes*"—bitter-enders. In Austria, Pernerstorfer took care to explain that the tiny anti-war minority was composed not merely of academicians, but of Jews. Austerlitz wrote blood-curdling leaders—"On to Paris"—in the *Arbeiterzeitung*. The *Reichenberger Vorwärts* under Joseph Strasser, the only paper in the dual monarchy to take a revolutionary position, was suppressed by the government and its place taken by a Right wing organ which outdid its Viennese model.

In Germany, social democrats went from patriotism to open imperialism. Heilmann, who demanded the conquest of the Baltic, shouted: "Let the eternally vacillating figures suddenly desire to play the strains of the 'International'—as for me, I go to Hindenburg!" Meerfeld claimed that the rejection of annexations was un-Marxian. Landsberg explained that the annexation of Poland up to the Narev line was still far from a wild annexationist policy.

Not only the old opportunists, but many who had but yesterday distinguished themselves by a fiery oratorical or literary revolutionism overnight became just as fiery patriots—a somersault which was psychologically explained by Friedrich Adler, and not so wrongly, as "*Kriegsbegeisterung also Ueberkompensation der In-*

*surrektionsgelüste*"—war frenzy as an over-compensation of lust for insurrection. Heinrich Cunow, who signed the original anti-war protest of the *Vorwärts* editors, quickly leaped to the right, was later rewarded with Kautsky's post as editor of *Die Neue Zeit*, and propagated the theory that imperialism was an inevitable and progressive stage of capitalism against which nothing could be done. Paul Lensch, another of the radicals who voted against war credits on August 3 in the fraction, soon occupied himself with proving by Marxism that the fraction could not have acted otherwise than it did. Konrad Haensch, another of yesterday's wordy radicals, described his own transformation in a rapturous paean which should never be forgotten:

"Not for everything in the world would I live again through those days of inner struggle! That impulsive ardent yearning to fling yourself into the vast stream of the general national flood-tide, and from the other side, the terrible fear of the soul to follow this yearning relentlessly, to surrender entirely to the mood which roared and raged all around you and which, did you but peer into your heart, had already long ago taken possession of your very insides! That fear: shall you not become a scoundrel to yourself and your cause—should you too feel the way your heart commands? Until at last—I shall not forget the day and hour—the terrific tension suddenly snaps, and you dare to be what you really were; until—despite all petrified principles and wooden theories—for the first time (the first time for almost a quarter of a century!) with swelling heart, with clear conscience, and without any fear of thereby becoming a traitor, you join in the tempestuous storm-song: *Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles!*"

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To swim against this stream—no, not a stream, a torrent!—how many were there? Internationalism was submerged, and true internationalists could be found only with the greatest difficulty. Only those with the stoutest hearts, only those inspired with the most deep-rooted conviction, believed that the International—the new International—could and would be rebuilt, that the social revolution would rise triumphant from the blood-soaked trenches. And they were completely isolated!

Whatever opposition to the war manifested itself in the first period was for the most part pacifist, vacillatory, cowardly—in a word, Kautskyan. And even this tendency made little headway until it became clear that the prevalent optimism—"The war will last only three months!"—rested on self-deception. The Independent Labour party was overwhelmingly pacifist in its policy; the Communist movement finally emerged out of such tiny revolutionary anti-war groups as the British Socialist party, the Socialist Labour party, the Shop Stewards' movement. In France, the predominant anti-war tendency was for a long time that led by Longuet and his friends, for whom Woodrow Wilson was the new Messiah. Even the French Zimmerwaldians did not all stay with the revolution to the end. Of that little group which was so heavily influenced by Trotsky, few remained with the revolutionary movement. Merrheim, the most popular of the Zimmerwaldians, turned Wilsonian, and then became a violent enemy of Communism and the Soviets; Bourderon soon returned to the bosom of the social democracy; Brizon, who also became a Wilsonian, returned from Kienthal with the report that he had had "to defend France inch by inch against Lenin" and his thesis on defeatism; Monatte returned to syndicalism, and Loriot died as a Communist who withdrew to the position of syndicalism; Rosmer outlasted most of them, and then retired from active political life.

In Germany, the brave internationalists assembled around immortal Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht constituted only a handful, and even here it required all the persuasiveness at Rosa's command to convince Liebknecht of the imperative need of breaking openly the discipline of the social patriots. The main stream of proletarian anti-war sentiment flowed in the channels of Centrism, and was vitiated by Kautsky and Bernstein. "We too wanted to bring about the speedy termination of the war," wrote the former, "but not by means of a revolutionary rising, which seemed to us improbable. . . ."

In Italy, where the Socialist party took a militant anti-war position, where the patriots like Bissolati, Cabrini and Bonomi, had already been expelled in 1912 for supporting the Tripolitan war

adventure (expelled on the motion of Benito Mussolini!), the most authoritative leaders were unable, for years, to bring themselves to a separation from the Right wing and Centrist elements which would have permitted the speedy—the timely!—growth of a strong revolutionary party.

Only in a few parties did the revolutionary Marxists find support: among the Russian Bolsheviks, the courageous Servian socialists, the Rumanians, the Bulgarians, some of the Swiss and Scandinavians, the Hollanders, and very few others. As for the rest, the imposing idea of transforming the imperialist war into the war for the social revolution, took their very breath away. The thesis of revolutionary defeatism as the lesser evil for the proletariat, far from meeting with a favorable response, encountered savage attack. And most fantastic of all appeared the idea in which was concentrated the most urgent need of the revolutionary proletariat of that period: the irrevocable break with the Second International and the founding of the Third International. Even those who would acknowledge that the former had failed, would not agree that it was bankrupt and had to be discarded. For the first years of the war, Lenin and the consistent Marxists were practically alone, and few, very few.

Twenty of history's most amazing years have passed since the colossal tragedy of August 4, 1914. The working class is at the conjunction of three crucial processes: the Second International has succeeded in regaining if not its lost progressive character then at least the grudging support of millions of workers; the Third International has lost both its progressive character and

the support of the masses who flocked to it in the early years after the war; the world is plunging with terrifying speed into the abyss of a new world war.

And because war is not merely inevitable under capitalism, but is actually impending as this is written. Because the Stalinist International is even less capable of leading the struggle against the new imperialist carnage than it was of leading the struggle against Hitlerism. Because the Second International remains true to itself and to its past, true to its bourgeois fatherlands, because tomorrow it will enter the service with the war-cry of "Democracy versus Fascism!" as it did twenty years ago with the war-cry of "Democracy versus Kaiserism!" or "Kultur versus Czarism!"—we in turn have raised the war-cry of "For the proletarian revolution to end imperialist war!" "For the Fourth International to lead the proletarian revolution!"

What the slogan of the Third International was in the last war, the watchword of the Fourth International shall be in the next: the rallying banner of all that is alive and vigorous in the proletarian movement, the avenger of the exploited and oppressed and martyred, the executor of the testament of our death, the intrepid challenger and deadly enemy of the ruling class and all class rule. And it will have among its mottoes the stirring inscription on Schiller's symbolic clock:

*Vivos voco, mortuos plango, fulgura frango.*

I summon the living, I mourn the dead, I shatter the thunderbolts!

Max SHACHTMAN

# The Crisis in Fascism

## I. The Events in Germany

ALL who resisted have been shot, some have committed suicide. Without the ceremony even of a drumhead court martial, the souls of Roehm and his staff were dispatched to Valhalla amid farewell accusations of sodomy. Partisans of due process of law protest that there was no evidence of overt conspiracy, that Hitler's Reichstag oration was "an accounting without vouchers" by one who was prosecuting attorney, witness, judge and executioner. But conspiracies, like convenient "assassinations", can always be invented. What Hitler-Goering-Goebbels faced was the much more deadly fact of a condition. In the historic social crisis of a falling rate of profit and mounting class antagonisms, Capital had decided that the only alternative to socialization was the forcible degradation of wages to the barest level of subsistence. The end entailed the complete destruction of all the barriers of proletarian organization; its instrumentality was the "anti-Marxist" mobilization of the petty-bourgeoisie, a victim itself of monopolist expropriation. The working class, criminally divided and betrayed, virtually capitulated without a struggle; the trade unions, the social democracy, and the communists were crushed. Intoxicated by its easy triumph, the middle class mistakes the illusion of power for its substance; it attempts to function as an independent social force. At this point, the reality of Fascism clashes with its demagogic form. The Jacobin petty-bourgeoisie, which saved a great revolution from feudal reaction, had finally to cede command of the state to Big Business. The Brownshirt creatures of the capitalist twilight could not succeed where the Red Bonnets of the capitalist dawn had failed. The plebeian phase of German Fascism is liquidated.

The blood-purge of the Storm Troops was a preventive *coup d'état* against the elements of the "second revolution". Stripped of its nebulous flights into ethics and metaphysics, von Papen's Marburg address was the unmistakable handwriting on the wall. This hero of the *Herrenklub*, by the side of whom Judas Iscariot was positively a saint, knew first-hand as intermediary between embezzling Junkers and Ruhr industrialists, that Hitler was a product of capitalist subsidy no less than of middle class misery. Had Marxism been suppressed, he now asked, so that national Bolshevism would be instituted in its place? It was plainly nec-

essary that the Fighting League of the Trading Middle Classes and its military counterpart, the S. A. be taught the limits of the totalitarian state. Hitler preferred to be the agent rather than the victim of this necessity.

When in 1926 he declared the Nazi program "unalterable", Hitler intended by that no more than his Italian prototype who at a similar stage favored the abolition of the monarchy, the dissolution of joint stock corporations, and transfer of large estates to the peasants' coöperatives. Once the March on Rome was accomplished (a single regiment of regulars could have dispersed it) and the Facta government had by secret agreement delivered over the power, Mussolini set about trampling down all in his own party who had taken his demagogy at its face value. Except for the brutal reality of the Fascist syndicates, the "corporate state" remains a petty-bourgeois fantasy on paper. So, too, Hitler came not to destroy German capitalism but to fulfill neo-German imperialism. The program of nationalization of the trusts, confiscation of the land, and abolition of "interest-servitude" was like the whole propaganda of anti-Semitism designed as bait for the lower middle class. The Aryan capital of the Krupps, Thyssen and Siemens was pronounced "creative" and sacrosanct. The autarchy which Hitler advocated is to be understood in the context of his published view that the "mere restoration of the German frontiers of 1914 is a political lunacy and a crime". The Alfred Rosenbergs are no less aware than any Marxist that the productive forces have outgrown the boundaries of the national state, that Ruhr coal cannot be permanently divorced from Lorraine iron-ore without dire consequences for German economy. A scientific anthropologist like Boas misses the point that the Nordic racial ideology is the Nazi pseudonym for the new imperialism.

In this light, those who have profited from the Hitler régime are easily distinguished. There are first the Junkers whose estates despite the "unalterable program" remain intact and who have been accorded higher tariffs. The industrialists who invested so heavily in Hitler have received about one billion dollars worth of returns in the form of tax reductions, subsidies and wage cuts. The upper middle class, the social base of the black-shirted *Schutz Staffel*, has profited from openings created by the ostracism of Jews and liberal office-holders of the Weimar régime. But the lower middle classes, dazzled with the heralded prosperity of the Third Reich, have been given a stone. The processes of rational-



ization and centralization continue their grind. The economic crisis grows acute. An increasingly unfavorable trade balance with shrinking reserves of gold and foreign exchange foster projects for the devaluation of the mark and a moratorium of foreign payments. Except for the heavily subsidized armament industries, unemployment has not decreased; it is merely concealed. Real wages have sunk to their lowest level in half a century. Expenditures on the social services have been cut by nearly half a billion marks. Such soil could not but nourish hopes of a "second revolution" to bring the Nazi masses into their own. Man does not live by bread alone but the most immaculately conceived Aryan and lineal descendant of Hermann the Cheruscan cannot live on glory alone.

Captain Roehm and his circle of military desperadoes had but small interest in the National-Bolshevist ideas of a Strasser, but they were prepared to utilize the disaffection of the petty bourgeois masses as their base of operations for the control of the Reichswehr. The command of the Reichswehr, on the other hand, was quite as resolved as had been the Royal Italian Army to allow no parvenu weakening of its monopoly or plebeian dilution of the ranks by fusion with the S. A. The military question involved the whole complex of political and economic orientation. Hitler always viewed the Storm Troops with distrust as a menace to his exclusive control of the party. He had been dangerously embroiled with them at the time of the Berlin mutiny of Captain Stennes, which only the treacherous services of Goebbels helped him put down. The proposed reduction of the Storm Troop numbers aimed a direct and telling blow at the plans and ambitions of Roehm. In killing him, Hitler disposed of one of the most influential of Nazi originals and its ablest military organizer. The simultaneous killing of von Schleicher bears the familiar earmarks of the "amalgam". Any contact the "social" General may have had with Roehm would have been quite casual; their respective points of support and perspectives were fundamentally dissimilar. But the murder of von Schleicher, removed as it were, a "Bonapartist" pretender, and cushioned the shock of annihilating so many Nazis. The death of von Hindenburg and Hitler's assumption of the added presidential powers, completes the concentration of all

sovereignty, of every organ of legislative and executive authority in the hands of finance capital. Having settled accounts with the turbulent petty bourgeoisie, its pawn against the proletariat, Fascism now assumes the form of a bureaucratic military and police dictatorship.

The working class did not intervene. Wedding, formerly the reddest district of Berlin, was deserted. That is the tragic measure of the catastrophe of 1933. Only that department of the Stalin press dedicated to sowing apocalyptic illusions represented Germany as on the verge of a proletarian revolution. A truer index of Stalin's appraisal of the situation is Litvinov's *Realpolitik*, his adoption of the French imperialist thesis of "security before disarmament" and endless regional pacts. A direct transition from Fascist dictatorship to Soviet power is theoretically not inconceivable. But the pre-requisite for that would have to be the lever of a powerful communist party. None such is available. The Stalinist party, which, planless and headless, capitulated without struggle when Hitler ascended to the Chancellery, is scarcely recognizable in the panegyrics and embellishments of the official and semi-official Comintern propagandists. A party which cannot distinguish victory from defeat, is of no greater actual service to the proletariat than a party which directly betrays it. But while in the circumstances there could be no revolutionary intervention of the working class, conditions have been created for its infusion with fresh confidence. The change in the relations of the petty bourgeoisie to monopoly capital as the lessons of the blood-purge seep in, must inevitably draw the middle classes closer to the proletariat. If only the latter displays the necessary revolutionary clearheadedness a change in the balance of forces will follow. It was the inability of the proletariat to solve the social crisis, and the failure of its parties to give decisive leadership that alienated the petty bourgeoisie, sending it into the camp of capital. The greatest step forward that the German proletariat could take today and the guarantee so far as that is possible of its victory tomorrow would be to digest the lessons of its own defeat of 1933 and from that to form the cadres of the party of the Fourth International.

Maurice SPECTOR

## 2. How It Happened in Italy

THE longer German Fascism prevails, the more it reveals at every important stage of its development an essential resemblance to its Italian precursor. The analogy is so striking in all important aspects that it is now possible to record a set of evolutionary laws ruling the life's span of Fascism. If in external manifestations the German development takes on more convulsive and sensational forms, and are more concentrated in point of time, this general accentuation does not invalidate the comparison with Italy. It only indicates that the unfolding of the Nazi movement is taking place in a country where class formations and antagonisms are sharper and more clearcut, where the social and economic structure is far more developed, and where the foreign political situation is vastly more complicated and critical.

Fascism differs from every other form of capitalist dictatorship in that it commenced as a vast popular movement of a middle class turned desperately reactionary. Its essential nature as an instrument of finance capital brings it inexorably to the point where this broad social foundation, having served its purpose in eliminating the working class as an organized political factor, is itself likewise eliminated.

The recent events in Germany make this ineluctable trend dramatically apparent. Were moral depravity and military ambition the only sins of Captain Roehm, neither he nor his coadjutors would have been dispatched to join their ancestors. After all, the homosexual predilections and military talent of Friedrich II never aroused much indignation in his time, either. The social offense of the Roehms and Strassers in the eyes of the real ruling class in Germany, was their insistence upon playing too long with the thoroughly inconvenient aspirations of the parvenu middle class. The attempt to dilute the compact Reichswehr with Storm Troopers, symbol of the whole program of a middle class imperiously

demanding payment on the promissory notes of Fascist demagoguery, was given the only reply which real, and not apparent, class relations had prepared for it.

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The first *Fascio Italiano di Combattimento* was formed by Mussolini in Milan in March 1919 and was very quickly duplicated in all the principal centers of northern Italy. "These Fasci by no means had a reactionary character, they appeared much rather as a subversive 'revolutionary' movement," on whose banner was inscribed the "struggle for the revolutionary fruits of the revolutionary war". The first regular Fascist congress adopted a platform remarkable in its middle class radicalism. Women's suffrage, the lowering of the voting age, proportional representation, the abolition of the Senate, an economic parliament by the side of the political, a national assembly to consider constitutional reform, legislative guarantee of an eight-hour day, minimum wage for all workers, invalid and old-age insurance, a form of workers' control of production, a steep and progressive income tax tantamount to outright confiscation in many cases, confiscation of war profits up to 85%, the confiscation of clerical wealth, the abolition of the standing army and the establishment of a defensive people's militia with short-term training periods, nationalization of all arms and munitions plants—these were the outstanding planks in the original Fascist platform. They enabled it to rally not only wide strata of the middle class but many workers as well.

The fact that big agrarians and industrialists guided and financed the Fascists in their murderous assaults upon every labor organization and institution, that following Facta's resignation Mussolini was asked by the king to form a cabinet only after the telegraphic demand of the *Confederazione Generale dell'Industria*, is quite well known. Not less contestable, however, is the equally important fact that hundreds of thousands of middle class and proletarian masses looked to Fascism in power for an amelioration if not a solution of their lot. They were quickly undeceived.

The promised proportional representation in elections not only was not introduced, but even the mild form of it established in 1919 was abolished and its place taken at first by an outrageously inequitable "majority system" aimed at drastically reducing the representation of the non-Fascist parties. The woman's suffrage put into effect was so circumscribed that it was actually confined to the members of the upper classes. Senate and constitution remained without modification in the direction originally indicated. The eight-hour day was "guaranteed" in such a way that the exception became the rule. Wages were reduced to such a point that the League of Nations could recently register Italy at the bottom of the European list. Pensions and insurance were practically abolished. Instead of control of production by the workers, the factory councils were suppressed. Taxation took a course directly opposed to the old pledges. Luxury, automobile and inheritance taxes were completely abolished; a tax on wages was introduced, and indirect taxation assumed monstrous dimensions. The clergy's wealth remained undisturbed, but religious instruction in the schools, voluntary in Italy for fifty years, was reestablished. Military service was increased from eight to eighteen months; instead of the popular militia, a Fascist Prætorian Guard of half a million men was organized; veterans' pensions were reduced while vast subsidies were granted war industries and big orders placed for cannon and airplanes.

The proletarian, and above all the petty bourgeois, rubbed his eyes in rueful bitterness and astonishment at the reality of the first year of Fascist sovereignty. The fruits of their revolution were not for them. A tardy disillusionment set in.

"I was an apostle of the first program of the Fascists," read an open letter written to Mussolini in 1923 by Edoardo Frosini, one of the "Fascists of the first hour" who presided over the first Fascist congress. "At that time there were not yet any Blackshirts. You, however, still wore our insignia: a red cockade over the tricolor. . . . With the passage of time you altered the program of 1919 in such a manner that you are protecting those whom original Fascism promised primarily to combat. You have flung yourself into the arms of those whom you wanted to crush and Fascism has become synonymous with reaction in the service of the bourgeoisie and the monarchy. . . ."

And how like the latter-day insurgent Nazis just put to death by Hitler does it sound when one reads an eleven-year-old article by Farinacci about the "small clique which keeps Mussolini under its spell"; or the speeches of the Fascist under-secretary of state, De Vecchi and the deputy Albanese who openly attacked the government; or the declaration of Cesare Forni in favor of the "second march on Rome"—the equivalent in those days of the "second revolution" in contemporary Nazi Germany. All that has happened there in the last three months is like a thunderous echo of the events in Italy a decade ago!

The petty bourgeoisie clamored for the fulfillment of the alluring promises that had fascinated them from 1919 to 1922. And open civil war broke out in the Fascist party. No city but witnessed a crisis, easily as severe as the Bavarian boudoir interlude of Roehm and Hitler. In Rome, the two contending factions into which the party was split twice marched against each other with bombs and machine guns, and a violent collision was averted only by the intercession of the most prominent party personalities. In Leghorn the dissidents broke into the Fascist militia's barracks, seized banners and trophies and then occupied the party headquarters. In Turin, Genoa and elsewhere fighting took place between the rival Fascist groups. In Savona, the opposition occupied the city hall, the sub-prefecture, the headquarters of the party and the trade unions. As late as 1926, Triest witnessed two days of street fighting and a state of siege had to be proclaimed; in Rome an attempt was made to seize police headquarters.

Even if less spectacularly than in Germany, the bourgeoisie clubbed the duped middle classes into submission with no less energy and resolution. The "constructive period" of Fascism, said Mussolini a few months after the march on Rome, requires different methods than the "destructive period"—which meant that the petty bourgeoisie had been useful in destroying the labor movement but was now superfluous and even dangerous.

"Since certain sporadic episodes of recent date, which are to be

characterized as entirely unjustified acts of violence, give grounds to fear that there are still some elements who have not quite grasped the new situation of Fascism," warned Mussolini's personal organ, *Popolo d'Italia*, less than a year after his triumph, "we have reason to believe that the government is determined to enjoin an absolute respect of the laws upon all—especially also upon the leaders and soldiers of Fascism. . . . Every disturber of the peace is an enemy, even if he carries a membership book of the Fascist party in his pocket."

The dictator himself declared in the *Corriere Italiano* in September 1923: "Should we be unable radically to rejuvenate the Fascist party, then it would be better to destroy it and to permit the healthy and fresh forces which live and work within it to merge powerfully into the freer and broader national stream."\*

As with the Reichswehr, the attempt to pack the Italian army with Fascist upstarts was a complete failure. The original plan, directed by General Di Giorgio, was to clear the garrisons, send regiments to the frontiers, and fill their places, above all in the large cities, with Fascist battalions. But almost to a man the army generals led by Marshal Cadorna, speedily defeated the plan. And if Di Giorgio did not meet the same fate as Captain Roehm, he was nevertheless sacrificed by Mussolini, who promised the high command that no reform of the army would be undertaken without consulting the military.

The party itself was beaten to an amorphous, voiceless pulp. Mussolini first had to suspend provincial congresses by telegram for fear of the opposition. Later, the elective principle was abolished. Mussolini took over the power to appoint the general secretary of the party, who in turn appointed the provincial secretaries, who thereupon appointed the local secretaries. Both national and provincial party congresses were completely abolished, and party policy became the exclusive prerogative of the Grand Fascist Council appointed by Il Duce. "The slogan is," Mussolini made it clear in 1926, when the last remnant of active middle class and proletarian opposition was driven under ground, "absolute submission!"

The comparison holds even down to the detail of Der Führer dropping his pilots. "The revolution devours its children." Of the "Fascists of the first hour", there are few who did not meet with essentially as cruel a fate as Hitler's early cronies. The "extremist" Farinacci, replaced as general party secretary by Augusto Turati, met with disgrace in 1926 when it was revealed that he had blackmailed support for his personal organ, *Il Regime Fascista*, from the wealthy and that he had been mixed up in the financial scandals surrounding the collapse of his friend Count Lusignani's Agrarian Bank of Parma. Cesare Rossi, the former press chief—the Goebbels of Mussolini—went into exile, as did the deputies Massimo Rocca, Carlo Bazzi and others. The head of the Fascist federation of Rome, Calza Bini, was imprisoned; so was Mussolini's confidante, Amerigo Dumini, the assassin of Matteotti. The notorious Italo Balbo, who murdered the priest Minzoni and invented the castor oil treatment of anti-Fascists, was sent off to Libya. Filippini, who had been disbarred from the practise of law in Milan for his swindles, is not heard of today. Another of the Fascist "originals", Umberto Pasella, was eliminated even earlier. Libero Tancredi, who took women, boys, politics and his comrades' money with equal light-mindedness, also disappeared from the Fascist horizon.

I. C. H.

\*Compare this with the following excerpts: "The Berlin NSBO numbers more than 400,000 members today; we shall now slowly have to take inventory. Perhaps we shall have to throw out some 80 to 100 thousand. But better a quarter of a million fighters who know why they are fighting and what they're here for, than a half a million who are nothing but a wild mob." (Herr Goebbels's *Angriff*, May 22, 1933.) "Instead of these newly accepted mem-

bers seeing their task in working and proving their worth to the party, they who in past years never thought of being radical, they want to outbid us in radicalism. So they come with the party program and the Hitler book, *Mein Kampf*, and ask: Why isn't this carried out yet? Why aren't the banks socialized yet? And they think they can impress us by that." (Herr Goebbels, *Vossische Zeitung*, May 20, 1933.)

# On the Slogan of "Disarmament"

IN A whole series of countries, particularly in the small ones and in those not participating in the present war, for example, in Sweden, Norway, Holland, Switzerland, voices are being raised in favor of replacing the old point in the social democratic minimum program: "militia", or "an arming of the people", with a new one: "disarmament". The organ of the international youth organization, *Jugend-Internationale* prints in its No. 3 an editorial on disarmament. In the "theses" of R. Grimm on the war question, which were drawn up for the congress of the Swiss Social Democratic party, we find a concession to the "disarmament" idea. In the Swiss periodical, *Neues Leben* of 1915, Roland-Holst comes out to a certain degree for a "conciliation" of the two demands, in reality, however, for the same concession. In the organ of the international Left, *Vorbote*, there is an article in No. 2 by the Dutch Marxist, Wijnkoop, in favor of the old demand for an arming of the people. The Scandinavian Left, as can be seen from the articles printed below,\* accepts "disarmament", although they often acknowledge that this demand contains an element of pacifism.

## I

One of the chief arguments in favor of disarmament, is the not always expressed thought: we are against war, against any war at all, and the most definite, clearest, most unambiguous expression we can give of this view is the demand of disarmament.

We have dealt with this erroneous argument in the article on the Junius pamphlet, to which we refer the reader. Socialists cannot be opposed to all wars, without thereby ceasing to be socialists. One must not permit himself to be blinded by the present imperialist war. Typical of the imperialist epoch are just such wars between the "great powers", but also democratic wars and uprisings, for instance, of oppressed nations against their oppressors, for their liberation from oppression, are by no means impossible. Civil wars of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, for socialism, are inevitable. Wars are possible between a socialism victorious in one country, against other, bourgeois or reactionary, countries.

Disarmament is the ideal of socialism. In the socialist society there will be no wars, which means that disarmament will have been realized. But he is no socialist who expects the realization of socialism *without* the social revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Dictatorship is state power which rests directly upon force. In the epoch of the twentieth century—as generally speaking in the epoch of civilization—force is neither the fist nor the club, but the *army*. To adopt "disarmament" into the program is equivalent to say: we are opposed to the use of arms. There is exactly as little Marxism in that, as if we were to say: we are opposed to the use of force!

We wish to observe that the international discussion on this question has been conducted mainly, if not exclusively, in the German language. And in German, two words are employed, the difference between which it is not easy to render in Russian. The one is "*Abrüstung*" and is employed, for instance, by Kautsky and the Kautskyans in the sense of a reduction of armaments. The other is "*Entwaffnung*" and is used chiefly by the Left wingers in the sense of the abolition of militarism, of any military (army) system whatsoever. We speak in this article of the *second* demand, prevalent among certain *revolutionary* social democrats.

The Kautskyan preaching of "disarmament", which is deliber-

*First published in this country in 1918, in an inadequate translation, Lenin's article on the slogan of disarmament is much too little known today in proletarian circles. The volume of his collected works of which it is a part, has not yet appeared in the English edition. Our readers will find his trenchant attack upon the disarmament illusion to be of the highest topical importance. Not only in view of the continued advocacy of this nostrum by avowed social democrats, but also because of the fusion of the Stalinists with the petty bourgeois pacifists in a "league against war" in which the former have committed themselves to the support of the disarmament slogan. Lenin's article, which originally appeared in No. 2, the December 1916 issue of Sbornik Sotsialdemokrata, Bolshevik periodical published during the war in Switzerland, is presented here in a revised translation.—ED.*

ately addressed to the present governments of the imperialist great powers, is the most hackneyed opportunism, bourgeois pacifism, which in reality serves only—in spite of the "pious wishes" of the slushy Kautskyans—to divert the workers from the revolutionary struggle. For such preaching inoculates the workers with the thought that the present bourgeois governments of the imperialist powers are *not* entangled in thousands of threads of finance capital and dozens or hundreds of corresponding (i.e., predatory, murderous, prepatory to imperialist wars) *secret treaties* between themselves.

## II

An oppressed class which does not strive to gain a knowledge of arms, to become expert in arms, to possess arms, deserves nothing else than to be treated as a slave. We

cannot, without degrading ourselves to the level of bourgeois pacifists and opportunists, forget that we are living in a class society, and that no escape from such a society is possible or conceivable except by the class struggle and the overthrow of the power of the ruling class.

In every class society, be it based upon slavery, serfdom, or as at the present moment, on wage slavery—the oppressor class is armed. Not only the standing army of the present day, but also the present-day militia—even in the most democratic republics, for example, in Switzerland—means an armament of the bourgeoisie *against* the proletariat. I do not believe it necessary to prove this elementary truth; it is sufficient to mention the use of troops (including the republican-democratic militia) against strikers, a phenomenon common to all capitalist countries without exception. The arming of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat is one of the greatest, most cardinal, most significant facts of present-day capitalist society.

And in the face of this fact, the revolutionary social democrats are expected to set up the "demand" of "disarmament"! This would be a complete renunciation of the standpoint of the class struggle and of any thought of revolution. We say: arm the proletariat for the purpose of defeating, expropriating, and disarming the bourgeoisie—this is the only possible tactic of the revolutionary class, a tactic prepared by, grounded in and taught by the *whole objective evolution* of capitalist militarism. Only *after* having disarmed the bourgeoisie, can the proletariat, without betraying its world-historic mission, cast all weapons to the scrap-heap, which it most certainly will do then—but not before.

And if the present war calls forth, among reactionary social-priests and whining petty bourgeois, *only* terror, only fright, only an aversion to any use of arms, to death, to blood, etc., we on the contrary say: capitalist society always was and always will be *a terror without end*. And if now this most reactionary of all wars is preparing to put *an end to the terror*, then we have no cause to despair. The preaching, the "demand"—or still better: the dream—of disarmament, is objectively nothing but a counsel of despair—at a time when it is clear to all eyes that the only legitimate and revolutionary war, the civil war against the imperialist bourgeoisie, is being prepared by this bourgeoisie itself.

To him who regards this as "gray theory", as "mere theory", we answer by recalling two world historical facts: the rôle of the trusts and of factory labor of women, and second, the Commune of 1871 and the December days of 1905 in Russia.

It has been the function of the bourgeoisie to develop trusts, to drive children and women into factories, there to torment them, to corrupt them, to condemn them to unutterable misery. We do not "support" this development, we do "support" no such thing, we struggle against it. But *how* do we struggle? We declare: the trusts and the factory labor of women are progressive. We do not wish to return to handicraftsmanship, to pre-monopolistic

\*Articles published in the same issue of *Sbornik Sotsialdemokrata* by two Scandinavian Left wingers, Karl Kilbom on "The Swedish Social Democracy and

the World War, and Arvid Hansen on "Some Points of the Present Labor Movement in Norway".—ED.



capitalism, to the domestic labor of women. Forward, beyond the trusts, etc., and through them to socialism!

The same consideration, which takes into account the objective course of evolution, is applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to the present militarization of the people. Today, the imperialist bourgeoisie is militarizing not only the whole people but also the youth. Tomorrow, for ought I know, it will militarize the women. To that we answer: So much the better! All the greater speed ahead—the faster the pace the closer to the uprising against capitalism. How can social democrats allow themselves to be alarmed or discouraged at the militarization of the youth, etc., unless they forget the example of the Commune? For this is no “theory”, no dream, but fact. And there would really be cause to despair were the social democrats, contrary to all economic and political facts, to begin to doubt that the imperialist epoch and the imperialist wars must necessarily, inevitably lead to the repetition of these facts.

It was a bourgeois observer of the Commune who wrote in May 1871 in an English paper, “If the French nation consisted only of women, what a frightful nation it would be!” Women, and youth from the age of thirteen, fought in the Commune by the side of men, and it will not be otherwise in the coming combats for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie. The proletarian women will not look on passively, while a well-armed bourgeoisie shoots down the poorly-armed or unarmed proletarians. They will take to arms again, as in 1871, and out of the present “frightened” or discouraged—more correctly: out of the present labor movement disorganized more by the opportunists than by the governments—there will most certainly arise, sooner or later but most assuredly, an international league of “frightful nations” of the revolutionary proletariat.

At present, militarization is permeating all of public life. Imperialism is a fierce struggle of the great powers for the division and the redivision of the world—it must therefore lead to a further militarization of all countries, including the neutral and the small countries. What should the proletarian women do against this? Merely execrate all war and everything military, merely demand disarmament? Never will the women of an oppressed class that is revolutionary be content with such a shameful rôle. Rather will they say to their sons:

“Soon you will be a man, you will be given arms. Take them and learn well everything military—this is necessary for the proletarians not in order to shoot at your brothers, as is now being done in this bandits’ war, and as the betrayers of socialism are advising you to do—but in order to fight against the bourgeoisie of your ‘own’ country, in order to prepare the end of exploitation, poverty and wars, not by pious wishes, but by defeating the bourgeoisie and by disarming *them*.”

Unless one carries on such, and just such, a propaganda in connection with the present war, he had better stop using all the big words about the international revolutionary social democracy, about the social revolution, about the war against war.

### III

The advocates of disarmament are opposed to the arming of the people, among other things, because this demand is supposed more easily to lead to concessions to opportunism. We have examined the most important point: the relation of disarmament to the mass struggle and to the social revolution. Let us now examine the question of its relation to opportunism. One of the most important reasons for the unacceptability of the demand for disarmament is precisely that, together with the illusions it inevitably arouses, it will weaken and emasculate our struggle against opportunism.

Beyond doubt, this struggle is on the order of the day in the International. The fight against imperialism, unless it is inseparably connected with the fight against opportunism, is an empty phrase or a deception. One of the main mistakes of Zimmerwald and Kienthal, and one of the principal causes for the possible fiasco of these embryos of the Third International, lie precisely in the fact that the question of the struggle against opportunism has not been put openly, to say nothing of its being decided in the sense of the inevitable break with the opportunists. For a certain time, opportunism has triumphed within the European labor movement. In all the bigger countries there have developed two main shadings of opportunism: first, the frank, cynical and therefore less danger-

ous social imperialism of the Plekhanovs, Scheidemanns, Legiens, etc., Albert Thomas and Sembat, Vandervelde, Hyndman, Henderson, etc.; second, the veiled Kautskyan variety: Kautsky-Haase and the “Social Democratic Working Group” in Germany, Longuet, Pressemane, Mayeras, etc., in France, Ramsay MacDonald and other leaders of the “Independent Labour Party” in England, Martov, Chkheidze, etc., in Russia, Treves and the other so-called Left reformists in Italy.

Outright opportunism works openly and directly against the revolution and against the incipient revolutionary movements and outbreaks, in direct alliance with the governments, however the forms of this alliance may differ: from participation in the government to participation in the War Industry Committees (in Russia). The veiled opportunists, the Kautskyans, are much more harmful and dangerous to the labor movement, because they conceal and make plausible their defense of the alliance and of “unity” with the former by high-sounding “Marxian” phrases and “peace” slogans. The struggle against both forms of predominant opportunism can only be carried on in every field of proletarian policy: parliamentary activity, trade unions, strikes, military questions, etc.

Wherein lies the distinguishing mark of *both* these forms of the prevalent opportunism?

In this: that they keep silent, or hush up, or “reply” only as the police will permit to the concrete question of the *connection between the present war and the revolution, and other concrete questions of the revolution*. And this in spite of the fact that immediately before the war, the connection between this very impending war and the proletarian revolution was pointed out quite unambiguously a countless number of times unofficially, and in the Basel manifesto officially.

And the main error of the disarmament demand is also that it evades all the concrete questions of the revolution. Or are the advocates of disarmament perhaps in favor of an entirely new variety of disarmed revolution?

### IV

Further. We are absolutely not opposed to the struggle for reforms. We do not wish to ignore the unpleasant possibility that in the worse case, humanity may be obliged to live through a second imperialist war, if the revolution is not born out of this war, despite the numerous explosions of mass ferment and mass indignation, and despite our exertions. We are advocates of a reform program as shall be directed *also* against the opportunists. The opportunists would be delighted were we to leave to them alone the fight for reforms while we sneaked off to the cloud-lands of “disarmament” to escape evil reality. For “disarmament” means flight from squalid reality, not a fight against it.

By the way, one of the chief defects in the way certain Left wingers pose the question, for example, of the defense of the fatherland, is the insufficiently concrete reply. It is theoretically far more correct, and from a practical standpoint immeasurably more important to say, that in *this* imperialist war, the defense of the fatherland is a bourgeois reactionary swindle, than to set out a “general” thesis of opposition to “any” defense of the fatherland. The latter is both untrue and does not hit the immediate enemy of the workers within the workers’ parties: the opportunists.

As to the militia, we would say, mindful of the need for a concrete and practical answer: we are not in favor of a bourgeois militia, but only of a proletarian militia. Therefore, not a man and not a penny either for the standing army or for the bourgeois militia, even in such countries as the United States, Switzerland, Norway, etc., all the more so as we see, even in the freest of the republican states (for instance, in Switzerland), an increasing Prussianization of the militia, especially since 1907 and 1911, and their prostitution to military service against strikes. We can demand: election of officers by the troops, the abolition of all military tribunals, equality of rights of foreign and native workers (especially important for imperialist countries which, like Switzerland, shamelessly exploit foreign workers in increasing number and deprive them of their rights), further, the right of every hundred, let us say, inhabitants of the country, to form voluntary associations for the learning of the military arts, the free selection of instructors, their payment out of government funds, etc. Only thus could the proletariat learn everything military for itself and not for its slaveholders, which lies absolutely in its interests. And

every success, be it a partial success of the revolutionary movement—for instance, the conquest of a city, or an industrial locality, of a part of the army—will necessarily—and the Russian revolution also demonstrated this—lead to the victorious proletariat being *compelled* to realize just this program.

Finally, opportunism cannot be defeated by programs alone, but only by inflexibly driving for the carrying out of the programs in reality. The greatest and most disastrous error of the collapsed Second International lay in the fact that words did not correspond to deeds, that hypocrisy and revolutionary phrases were unscrupulously advanced (see the present relation of Kautsky and Co. to the Basel manifesto). Approaching the disarmament demand from this angle, we must first of all inquire into its objective significance. Disarmament as a social idea, i.e., as an idea produced by a certain social environment, and capable of affecting a social environment, and not merely the whim of an individual, manifestly arises out of the narrow and exceptionally "peaceful" conditions of a few small states which live off the bloody world-highway of the war, and hope to continue to live there. Consider the argumentation of the Norwegian disarmament advocates: We are small, our army is small, we are powerless against the great powers (and therefore also powerless against being violently drawn into an imperialist *alliance* with one group or another of the great powers . . .), we want to remain peacefully in our little corner and to pursue corner-politics, we demand disarmament, compulsory arbitration, "permanent" neutrality (somewhat like that of Belgium?), etc.

The desire of small nations to stand aside, the petty bourgeois aspiration to keep away from the great world combats, the utilization of their comparative monopoly position for narrow-minded passivity—this is the *objective* social environment which may assure the idea of disarmament a certain degree of success and a popularity in some of the small nations. Of course, such an aspiration is illusory and reactionary, for imperialism will, in one way or another, drag all the small states into the vortex of world economy and world politics.

Let us elucidate with the example of Switzerland. Its imperialist surroundings objectively prescribe *two* lines of the labor movement. The opportunists, in league with the bourgeoisie, aspire to make of Switzerland a republican-democratic association for deriving profits from the tourists of the imperialist bourgeoisie, and to preserve a "peaceful" monopolistic position most sweetly and serenely. Practically, this is a policy of alliance between a thin, privileged stratum of the workers of a small country in a privileged position, with the bourgeoisie of its own country, *against*

the masses of the proletariat. The real social democrats of Switzerland endeavor to utilize the comparative freedom and the "international" position of Switzerland (the proximity of culturally highly developed countries), further, the fact that Switzerland, thank God! speaks not her "own language" but three universal languages, for the purpose of extending, consolidating, strengthening the *revolutionary* alliance of the revolutionary elements of the European proletariat. Let us help our bourgeoisie to maintain as long as possible its position of monopoly in peaceful trading with the charms of the Alps, then perhaps a few coppers will fall to our share—that is the *objective* content of the policy of the Swiss opportunists. Let us help the alliance of the revolutionary proletariat of France, Germany and Italy, for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie—that is the objective content of the policy of the Swiss revolutionary social democrats. Unfortunately, this policy is still being carried out quite inadequately by the "Left" in Switzerland, and the fine decision of their party congress at Aarau in 1915 (the recognition of the revolutionary mass struggle) has remained for the time being more or less on paper. But that is not the point now.

The question before us now is this: Is the "disarmament" demand consistent with this tendency in social democratic work? Obviously not. Objectively, disarmament expresses the opportunistic, narrowly national, circumscribed small country line in the labor movement. Objectively, disarmament is the most national, the specifically national program of the small states, and not an international program of the international revolutionary social democracy.

P.S. In the last number of the English periodical, *The Socialist Review* (September 1916), the organ of the opportunistic "Independent Labour Party", we find on page 287 the resolution of the Newcastle conference of this party: a refusal to support *any* war, waged by *any* government, even though it should "nominally" be a "defensive war". And on page 205, we find the following declaration in an editorial: "We do not approve the Sinn Fein rebellion" (the Irish uprising of 1916). "We do not approve any armed rebellion, any more than we approve any other form of militarism or of war."

Is it still necessary to prove that *these* "anti-militarists", that *such* advocates of disarmament, not in a small country, but in a large one, are the worst kind of opportunists? And yet, they are theoretically entirely right in considering the armed uprising as "one of the forms" of militarism and war.

SWITZERLAND, October 1916.

N. LENIN.

## Diplomacy in the World War

**T**HE Communists have invariably maintained, and continue to maintain, that at times when international politics appear to be covered with an icy sheet of perfect quiet, the preparations for war are being carried on with the greatest intensity.

It is precisely at such times that the general staffs and the spies are working most intensely! The archives of czarist diplomacy revealed by the revolution, every fresh document brought out of the dust of the records, prove this.

The appended material, published for the first time, from the Central Administrative Records of the Soviet Union, adduces documentary proof contained in the second, third, and following volumes of the complete work: *International Relations in the Epoch of Imperialism* (Commission for the Publication of Documents on the Epoch of Imperialism, appointed by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union), that long before the shots were fired at Sarajevo, the machine for the preparation of imperialist war was running at full speed.

Valuable information is furnished by a letter sent to the Russian ambassador in Belgrade, Hartwig, by the Servian prime minister, Pashich, on the sending of munitions and cartridges (Hartwig passed the letter on to Petersburg on June 2, 1914).

This interesting and instructive document is worded as follows: "To the Ambassador, Dear Sir,

"Re the note which I had the honor of handing over to his Excellency Sazonov, home secretary for Russia, on January 26

(February 8), I beg your Excellency to inform the government of the Russian Empire that in the opinion of the Servian general staff Serbia requires the following as rapidly as possible:

"120,000 rifles with 1,500 cartridges each, 24 large field guns 10 cm. calibre with 500 shells each, 43 mountain guns of the latest model with 2,000 each.

"The Royal Servian government expressly begs the government of the Russian Empire to place these arms at its disposal as rapidly as possible at cost price, and the Royal Servian government undertakes to pay the sum incurred as soon as it possibly can. In the above mentioned note sent through his Excellency Sazonov, I had the honor of emphasizing the extreme *urgency* of this request and since then this urgency has *become greater*, now that the neighboring countries have completed their armaments. The Royal Servian government will be extremely grateful to the government of the Russian Empire if it replies in the affirmative to this request, and thereby helps to complete armaments in these hard times. Pashich."\*

The rifles, cannon, guns and munitions here referred to are those afterwards used in the first conflicts on the Austro-Servian frontier. Pashich's request was the result of a lengthy and intense course of provocation work carried on by the czarist government in Belgrade. A glance at the secret letter sent by Savinski to

\*The emphasis is mine. G.V.

Sazonov at February 4, interpreting Hartwig's "idea" ("to set Servia on Austria") will convince the reader:

"February 4 (January 22), 1914.

"Sergei Dmitriyevitch, Dear Sir,

"I permit myself to write you the following lines, which are intended solely for your personal information\*, since they must contain a number of questions which are of a personal nature, always very difficult to mention, and which I should avoid did I not think it my duty to raise them.

"During my sojourn in Belgrade I had repeatedly long conversations with Hartwig, who had obviously hoped that you would call him to Petersburg when the Servian crown prince and Pashich arrived there. He is disagreeably surprised at not hearing from you, I asked him what he was particularly anxious to discuss in Petersburg. He replied that there are a great many things he wanted to speak about, especially about the sending of guns and ammunition to the Servians, and that for this reason he wanted to meet the ministers of finance and war. In the course of further conversation I became convinced that Hartwig's idea was to set Servia on Austria.

"Naturally it is not my business to judge of the dangerousness of such a policy at the present juncture, and I deem it my duty to inform you of the above."

In Sofia nobody knew what was going on in Belgrade, but Petersburg was well informed. It is not for nothing that this letter from the czarist ambassador in Sofia was preserved in an especially secret portfolio of the ministry for home affairs.

Hartwig's efforts were "successful". When the news arrived of the culmination of his activities, the murder of the Austrian crown prince in Sarajevo, the immediate impetus for the world war, Hartwig was so overcome with joy that he succumbed to heart failure.

The documents referring to the war preparations often appear pale in comparison with the present preparations, and all the facts which they adduce insignificant as compared with all that is being done at present to prepare for the intervention against the Soviet Union and for new imperialist wars. It must, however, be remembered that *the documents of the last war throw light on the practices of the imperialists*. The spoor left by the criminals of yesterday leads us on the track of those who are preparing the bloodbath of tomorrow. . . .

Another document is appended: a letter from the deputy Klofač, the present leader of the Czechoslovakian National Socialists. This document reveals one of the methods of war preparations.

In this letter (dated 1914 in Prague) Klofač offers to put his party at the service of the Russian espionage service. He recommends his goods as follows:

"Where the National Socialist Party agitates, where it applies the extensive means at its disposal, there the spirit is to be found which the Slav nationality needs. . . . It is in the interests of Russian policy to support the National Socialist party, in order that its agitation may penetrate where Slav feeling is still weak. This is the case in East Moravia and in Silesia, among strata of the utmost importance for Russia in case of war. Russia must devote special attention to these. It is impossible to send agents to these people; even now they would be seized. Work must be done cautiously, inconspicuously, and exactly. . . . This task can be carried out by the National Socialist party, which is opening up new secretariats in the above-named districts. This is the manner in which Austria has worked, and still works, against Russia in Russian Poland.

"Each secretariat would need 1,000 rubles yearly; including the newspapers, about 10,000 rubles would be needed yearly. The results of the whole action would be both rapid and effectual."

Thus Klofač sold his party to the Russian espionage department for ten thousand rubles yearly. It must be commented that Klofač did not estimate his party very highly. . . . He certainly underestimated its espionage capabilities.

Are not similar transactions being concluded, or at least negotiated, in all the lobbies and antechambers of the general staffs of the imperialist states today? The trial of the Industrial party, the trial of the Mensheviks, showed us how and where such transactions are carried on.

\*The emphasis is mine. G.V.

Among the documents of the second and third volumes there is an extremely characteristic telegram from the czarist ambassador in Tokio, dated May 25, 1914. This states that the economic rapprochement of Japan and England "on Chinese soil, is especially desirable to the Japanese" . . . "Will England agree to such a combination, [asks the czarist ambassador Maljevski-Malevitch] and will it be prepared to bell the cat for the Japanese? The near future will show."

The future showed that England is ready to bell any amount of cats for anybody, including Japan in Manchuria, so long as the Americans are not permitted to get any advantage from it. . . .

A characteristic document on war preparations is furnished by the report of the czarist military agent in Germany, Colonel Bazarov:

"Military agent in Germany.

"February 11 (24), 1914.

"No. 93, Berlin. Strictly Confidential.

"To the Quartermaster General of the General Staff.

"Report.

"A few days ago I spoke to the French military agent here, Colonel Serret, and became fairly friendly with him.

"Colonel Serret is of the opinion that it is of paramount importance to prepare public opinion among the broad strata of the French people on the probable course of war events on the Eastern and Western frontiers of Germany in the case of a joint advance on the part of Russia and France against Germany.

"General Serret stated his ideas as follows:

"There is no doubt that Germany will deal its first blow against France, concentrating at least 20 to 22 field corps on her, for France is its most dangerous enemy. Hence decisive conflicts may take place within two weeks of the announcement of the general mobilization.

"For various reasons, entirely comprehensible to the French general staff, and perhaps to other informed persons, but not likely to be comprehensible except to a few people, the concentration of the Russian army on the German frontiers will take place much later than the concentration of the French army.

"Decisive conflicts between the main forces of the Russian army and Germany troops can scarcely be expected earlier than four weeks after the declaration of war. Hence it is comprehensible that the majority of the French population will become extremely impatient on receiving no news from the Polish scene of war. When the general excitability of the French is remembered, it may be easily imagined that if public opinion is not properly prepared beforehand—this necessary preparation must consist in teaching the public to form a correct estimate of the totality of circumstances, and to understand the possible if only partial failures of the French troops—if this necessary preparation is omitted, then there will be expressions of dissatisfaction in France, and especially in Paris, with regard to the allies, leading to very disagreeable assumptions, which might very easily become exaggerated under the conditions of nervous strain among the people.

"Therefore I deem it advisable to prepare public opinion to a certain extent in time of peace, and to inform it as to the probabilities of the order of succession of war events on the East and West scenes of war.

"In any case, decision on the question of the extent to which and the manner in which the people can and should be prepared for the modern peoples' war in which the people take an immediate part, and have naturally the most vital interest in the events deciding these wars, which may decide their whole future fate, is subject to the joint decision of the general staffs of Russia and France.

"Indubitably this question deserves the most serious attention, and must be solved at once.

"General Staff Colonel Bazarov."

On the margin there is a pencil note: *More than has been done cannot be done. Sh.* (Shilinski, head of the czarist general staff.)

On February 24, 1914, six months before the outbreak of the world war, a consultation took place in Berlin between the two military agents, the Russian and the French. Here the events taking place after the mobilization were stated beforehand. Would this have been possible if the plan of war had not been prepared in every point by the Russian and French general staffs on the one



hand and by the German and Austrian general staffs on the other? Six months before the outbreak of the war the military agents consult on how "public opinion" is best to be prepared by the press for the first period of the war. And how often do the Serrets and Basarovs of today consult on the slander campaigns to be undertaken in the press against the Soviet Union, in order to work up feeling in favor of war?

The documents now published, revealing the crimes of the past, give the clues to the path taken by the imperialists in preparing fresh crimes, fresh wars and interventions.

These clues lead to the international social democracy. Below we append the viewpoint of a fairly resolute man, the czarist ambassador in Paris, Izvolsky. In his telegram to the minister for foreign affairs, No. 914 of August 29, 1916, he reports:

"As is known to you, three members of the Socialist party, Guesde, Sembat and Albert Thomas, take part in the present French government. All three belong to the majority of this party, which recently announced its patriotic feelings at the congress of the national council of the French socialists, and opposed the renewal of relations with the Germany socialists. Of these A. Thomas has distinguished himself by special energy and successful activities; he manages the armament affairs. The presence of these three socialists in the cabinet has so far not only not hindered the unity of the activities of the government, but on the contrary, has imparted to this a special value and therewith special firmness—for instance, as the dangerous campaign of M. Briand commenced in parliament."

Not bad! The socialists Guesde, Sembat and Thomas are pre-

ferred to even such a protector of imperialism as Briand, who is known to have inclined for a time to a separate peace with Germany.

Another secret telegram from the Russian ambassador in Belgium, Nelidov, dated April 25, 1917, reports:

"Yesterday the minister for foreign affairs gave me reliable information that in the near future the minister Vandervelde is to travel to Russia in order to establish contact with our socialist circles, and in order to come forward as an enthusiastic patriot against the strivings of some Russian social democrats who desire peace with the Germans; he is also to deal with the questions of the Armenians and of the Straits. The minister will pass some time in Stockholm, but will carefully avoid meeting the German emissaries; this has been impressed on him as a duty by his party. Today Vandervelde himself confirmed this information to me personally, and emphasized that he is traveling not only as a representative of his party, but as a member of the Belgian government and with the approval of the ministerial council."

What can be added to this exhaustive characterization of the leaders of social democracy by the officials of czarism? The characterization is as fitting today as it was at that time.

Especially careful study should be given to the preparations made for the last war, in order that all the motive forces and methods may be discovered. The documents of these records not only bear witness to the past, they show what is going on in the present and what will be done in the future by world imperialism and social democracy.

G. VASSILKOVSKY

## The Stalinists and Pacifism

ON THE twentieth anniversary of the beginning of the first world war, the conquest of power by the Russian proletariat stands out as the only achievement of the epoch. From this highest point humanity has traversed half of a new cycle to its lowest depth, to the conquests of the Fascist counter-revolution.

This is the stark reality of today. Instead of the victorious development of the revolution of 1917 on a world scale, the new epoch has witnessed a series of defeated revolutions culminating in the smashing of the German and the Austrian proletariat. As a most immediate consequence of these terrible calamities the capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union is more tightly drawn, the mortal danger to its existence increases daily, and humanity faces the volcanic eruptions of new imperialist wars.

At the approach of these new stormy developments, the Soviet Union finds itself right in the danger zone next door to the main stage of the coming imperialist world conflict for the possession of China and India. In the West it faces the most consistent organizers and inspirers of national aggression in control of a chain of Fascist and semi-Fascist states.

The diplomatic relations between the two antagonistic systems, the Soviet Union and the capitalist powers, is of necessity a compromise relationship dictated by historical circumstances. In no sense can it be conceived as a stable equilibrium. One or the other must finally assert its supremacy and the present compromise relationship is therefore essentially a question of relationship of forces. But this relationship of forces cannot be determined merely on the basis of two solid entities as represented by the nations or their respective governments. In the determination of this question must be taken into account, on the one hand, the forces within the Soviet Union that are weakening its proletarian basis and, on the other hand, not only the elements of conflict among the capitalist powers, but above all the forces within capitalism antagonistic to its system.

To illustrate the point it is well to take an example from the everyday process of the class struggle. The working class is compelled to enter into constant compromise relationships with capitalism. Only its victorious revolution changes this situation. At one moment one section of the class is able to forge ahead and strengthen its position while another may be forced to retreat. At no time is there a lasting, stable equilibrium. The relationship of

forces decides which side may advance. But here it is necessary to add that at no time is this decided merely by the relationship of the separate sections, but primarily by the position of the conflicting classes as a whole. And so long as the accumulation of capital remains the economic law of motion of modern society the class existing on the appropriation of surplus values will remain the aggressor.

On the international arena this question of relationship of forces of the classes as a whole is even more decisive in its importance. From this flows the inescapable conclusion that the relations between the proletarian Soviet republic and the capitalist powers is constantly influenced by and in the final analysis determined by the strengthening or the weakening of the position of either class on a world scale. We are therefore compelled to proceed in our estimate today from the fact that the proletariat has suffered catastrophic defeats in one country after another, with the result that the Soviet Union today stands badly isolated. Its most important allies are crushed. In view of this situation the foreign policy pursued by the Soviet Union has become a question of fundamental importance.

During the time of Lenin this foreign policy proceeded as an integral part from the basic strategy of the world revolution. Even its main measures of execution were worked out by the revolutionary general staff. But the policy of the Comintern of Lenin is no longer the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. On the contrary. The Soviet foreign policy of the Stalin bureaucracy is the policy of the Third International today. It flows from the theory of socialism in one country and means in actuality the abandonment of the world revolution and the ignoring of all of its problems. This theory assumes that the capitalist and the communist systems can coexist peaceably. Thus the compromise relationship which was necessitated by historical circumstances, due to the feebleness of the world revolution, which in turn due to a great extent to the previous mistakes and blunders of the Stalinist régime, shifting constantly to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union, is being raised into a universal system of international relations. It is called the peace policy of the Soviet Union.

Naturally the proletarian republic desires peace and strives for peace; it is the only power capable of conducting a peace policy. But in a world of capitalist relations this question of war or peace,

of the offensive or the defensive, must be determined by revolutionary criteria, which means that it must be determined by the interests of the strengthening of the proletarian republic and not by the interests of the maintenance of the imperialist *status quo* as defined by national boundaries artificially imposed by force. Moreover, the strengthening of the proletarian republic, nay, its very life and existence, is bound up with the question of the extension of the revolution. Universal peace in a world of capitalist relations is a utopia and it can not, of course, be secured at all through diplomatic pacts signed by the capitalist robber nations. Such a policy represents an adaptation to the methods of the enemy class. The course through the diplomatic pacts to the joining in the deceptive cry for disarmament—under capitalism—and the equally deceptive cry for mutual rejection of aggression, has proceeded in pace with the disastrous defeats inflicted by capitalism upon the world proletarian forces. With each new defeat, greater illusions are created in the inviolability of the pacts with capitalism. So long as this policy prevails, paralysis of the proletarian allies, the debilitation of their parties, the preparation of new defeats on a more colossal scale, isolation and encirclement of the proletarian revolution within the national framework of the U.S.S.R. and, without the victory of the proletariat in the leading countries, doom to failure all the successes of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R.

The fatal concept that the two systems, capitalism and communism, can coexist peaceably emanates from the highest source, from the infallible General Secretary. In his interview with Eugene Lyons, published in the New York *Telegram* on November 24, 1930, Stalin said: "It is possible, and the best proof is that they have lived peacefully side by side since the conclusion of our civil war and the intervention period." In a second interview, given to Walter Duranty and published in the New York *Times* on December 1, 1930, Stalin added dryly: "They have not fought for ten years which means they can coexist." And while pointing out that all the bourgeois powers would "readily crush a weak enemy if it could be done with little or no risk", Stalin intimated that the risk was now too great: "They might have tried it against the U.S.S.R. five or six years ago," he said, "but they waited too long. *It is now too late.*"

In this period capitalism has not been strong enough to launch an armed attack against the Soviet Union in the same sense that the international proletarian revolution has not been strong enough to conquer. Meanwhile, however, the capitalist powers in Europe, directly aided by the failure of the parties of socialism and with the direct assistance of Fascism, proceeded to decimate the most important sections of the proletarian forces and violently to exterminate their parties and trade unions. Alongside of this devastating slaughter, the armaments race has increased at a furious pace. All of the capitalist nations are today armed to the teeth. While Germany under the Weimar republic fell behind, it is now, under Fascism, feverishly making up for lost time.

The exponents of the pacifist foreign policy of the Soviet Union, instead of rallying to the support of the proletarian allies and mobilizing all their forces to smash Fascism before it could destroy the German proletariat, capitulated to Hitler and sacrificed its proletarian allies. In the strategic line of a revolutionary world general staff, the fact of this changed situation, so overwhelming in its importance, would of necessity mean the retracing of a number of steps; but not so to the directors of present day Soviet diplomacy. In the career of Litvinov, this policy is focused upon his exploits in Geneva and elsewhere. In 1931 he proposed complete disarmament if acceptable or partial disarmament if more practicable. Neither could be a road to peace among capitalist powers whose industrial technique can always provide for rapid rearmament, nor could it be acceptable to them. Such proposals, presented as means to peace, can serve only to mislead the workers and create illusions among them for the sake of a common front with petty bourgeois pacifists. These illusions are further broadcast from the Soviet Congress. The proud body that once accepted the new revolutionary power in its name listened to Litvinov reporting his achievements at its session December 29, 1933.

The question of the United States recognition granted by the Roosevelt administration, held the center of Soviet diplomacy. Litvinov reported his appraisal as follows: "We must say in jus-

tice to the clearheadedness of President Roosevelt, that soon after he assumed office, and perhaps even before that, he had realized the fruitlessness of further struggle against us on behalf of capitalism, and saw the benefit to American state interests and the interests of world peace, of the establishment of relations with us."

Evidently this sort of appraisal by the epigones is handed down to the proletariat as a compensation for the heavy defeats suffered; but it is treacherously deceptive. The real situation presents an entirely different picture. We are not concerned here with the accomplishment of the United States recognition itself, but purely with the appraisal made by the directors of Soviet diplomacy. And it is not difficult to discern that the motive force in recognition by the American imperialists, for whom Roosevelt is now the official spokesman, were not at all those stated by Litvinov. For them the unbridled advance by the Japanese in Manchuria posed in a sharper form than before the question of the struggle for supremacy in the Pacific, and thereby hastened the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Washington government and the Soviet Union. Behind these diplomatic relations the American imperialists will seek to provoke the conflict between the U.S.S.R. and Japan at the opportune moment in order to weaken both and to prepare for itself a territorial base in China so as to raise the question of the "liberation" of India at the next stage. The peaceful motives attributed to Roosevelt in reality furnish the cover for military aggression on a colossal scale by the United States which is seeking to restore its economic equilibrium on a far more extensive world base. Soviet diplomacy can naturally have no interest in furthering such plans, but an appraisal that declares this to mean gains to the cause of world peace shows the frightful degeneracy of Soviet diplomacy. It is reduced to the level of petty bourgeois pacifism. This appraisal was not a mere slip of the tongue for in the attitude of the butcher of the Italian proletariat Litvinov found similar qualities. He reported on the conclusion reached by Signor Mussolini and himself "after exchanging opinions on questions of current politics and the best methods of preserving peace. Our desire simultaneously to support and develop relations with all the big countries is no small contribution to the cause of universal peace".

In passing it might be mentioned that Litvinov, in his report on Soviet diplomatic relations throughout the world, found no occasion to mention Soviet China. He said: "Unfortunately, China is still suffering both from foreign invasion and from profound internal discord. While strictly adhering to the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China, we are watching its struggle for independence and national unity with the greatest sympathy." National unity under what banner? Oh, our innocent opponents may argue: This was reported to the Soviet Congress and not to the Third International; you know that is not the same thing. No, this is the essence and content of Soviet foreign policy within the framework of which the Third International vegetates in a miserly existence.

The Soviet government is now in the process of changing its course with regard to the League of Nations. Stalin in his interview with Duranty, published in the New York *Times* of December 25, 1933 said that "if the League is even the tiniest bump somewhat to slow down the drive toward war and help peace . . . it is not excluded that we shall support the League despite its colossal deficiencies". Litvinov added in his report to the Soviet Congress: "it may be assumed, however, that that tendency which is interested in preserving peace is gaining ground in the League of Nations and this, perhaps, explains the profound changes which are taking place in the composition of the League". Surely the composition and position of the League of Nations fluctuates, but essentially it remains as characterized by the Third Comintern Congress, the League "of victorious states for the exploitation of the vanquished and the colonial peoples". To consider it today or in the future as an instrument of peace is to poison the minds of the masses.

Almost seventeen years after the conquest of October the Soviet Unions finds it necessary to seek a rapprochement with the League, demonstrating the substitution of conservative criteria for revolutionary criteria that has taken place within its leadership. But, when we use the formula—finds it necessary—this needs be ex-

plained, and the explanation is, that this is the result of the defeats and the weakening of the international proletarian revolution and the international position of the Soviet Union itself. Within the capitalist world, in the case of war, one cannot exclude in advance the possibility of the Soviet Union making a combination with one or the other of the conflicting powers, equally hostile to it in essence, if necessitated as a means of self-preservation. And it is not this or that step of rapprochement that is exclusively to be condemned; but the whole policy which has helped to bring the Soviet Union to its present weakened position.

The dangers of a new world war are manifest. The causes of these dangers are inherent in capitalism and have been bared by Marxism in irrefutable fashion. To revert to or to hide behind pacifism in the face of this menace, regardless of whichever brand, idealist, social democratic, petty bourgeois or purely imperialist pacifism, is the most dangerous political poisoning of the masses and means in reality to give up the struggle against war. Yet, this is what is being practised by Soviet foreign policy in its international relations and in relations with the world proletariat. The Third International in its "struggle" against war has capitulated to the pacifists, to the shady types as well as to the honest types among them, and has given them the initiative in what became anti-war masquerade conferences, composed mostly of indi-

viduals, groups and organizations without social weight or influence. The abdication of the Third International as the organizer of international revolution is virtually acknowledged by formal renunciation. Its sections are transformed into mere pacifist frontier guards for the defense of the Soviet Union. The very first consequence of the transformation of the original policy of the Comintern into its dialectic antithesis is reflected in the relations between the Soviet government and the Third International as they exist under the Stalin régime. The Third International itself has become transformed into an appendix to suit the needs of the Soviet foreign policy of Stalin.

We repeat, a workers' state has every right and even a duty to utilize for the benefit of the proletariat the differences existing among the various bourgeois groups and powers; it has every right to effect compromises with them as traders, even to the point of concluding defensive alliances when necessary. But this must be subordinated to revolutionary politics on the international arena, to the life and death necessity of weakening the class enemy and strengthening the proletarian forces. Above all, the revolutionary parties must be built up independently of these alliances or combinations and remain free to perform the mission assigned to them by history.

Arne SWABECK

## Six Months of the Doumergue Regime

THE Doumergue government continues, even though it is strongly shaken. The *Union Nationale* must continue, declares the official press, in order to finish saving the country from the danger which the Cartelist stewardship holds over its head.

What was the task allotted to the National government? At the end of 1933, the economic crisis sharpened, the position of all strata of the population became worse, the budget was not balanced, unemployment was on the increase, taxation was insufferable, the relations with other countries were disturbed, scandals were bursting everywhere. Wrath rumbled. The reaction was able to exploit it in order to eliminate the parliament by a stroke of force on February 6. The Doumergue government was installed for the purpose of putting things into order again and of mollifying the population.

What measures has it employed?

Let us leave aside the commissions against the high cost of living in which the two "friends", Tardieu and Herriot, had a pretext for whiling away the time. One word marks the program of the government: *deflation*. It has been systematically pursued at the expense of the toiling masses: the decrees-laws of April 6 reducing the number of functionaries by ten percent (without touching the army, the navy and the aviation corps), reductions in salaries, pruning the retirement pensions; reduction of the pensions of war veterans; the reorganization on April 13 of the railroads with a reduction in wages and in retirement pensions included, as well as the disbanding of personnel after the closing down of lines and stations; in the field of education, the dismissal of 5,000 teachers, the shutting down of schools. The state as an employer has blazed the trail for all the employers of the country.

As another measure, the fiscal reform which, under the pretext of simplifying and alleviating the taxation system, consists essentially in substantial tax reductions for the rich; but for the poor the recasting of taxation is barely a drop of syrup to dissipate the bitterness of the re-

ductions in retirement pensions or wages.

In order to combat unemployment, a glittering plan for large works is being talked of; the possibility of employing a few tens of millions of arms is being cleverly exploited by the big press which conceals, on the one hand, the difficulties (how is the money to be found) and on the other hand, the real beneficiaries (the large railway lines in particular).

For agriculture, the Doumergue government has done nothing save confirm the unapplied law on the minimum market price for grain, unapplied even by the state since the public treasury, when it proceeds to sell grain, operates with it at market prices lower than the taxed price; further than this the government has only taken a few measures of detail. All told, they have not succeeded, nor could they, in altering the situation in the countryside to any degree.

In order to supplement, in order to impose the economic measures, it is necessary to mention among the governmental steps the bureaucratic and police measures: the reform of the *Sûreté*, which has become a national *Sûreté* [detective force], and also the Mallarmé degree against the right of functionaries to organize into unions.

What are the results of six months of the Doumergue government? In the field of foreign policy, French imperialism has incontestably made headway. But let us see what it has obtained in the economic and social field which, in the last analysis, will have no less effect in determining the political orientation of the various strata of the population.

"We are reascending the slope," declared the doddering old idiot of Tournepuille in one of his broadcast speeches over the radio. The figures are at hand rudely to attest the opposite.

The indices of industrial activity show a constant decline:

Middle of 1933.....	107
February 1934.....	105
March 1934.....	104
April 1934.....	103
May 1934.....	101

The automobile, mechanical, metallurgical,

textile and other industries are in clear decline as compared with last year. The "Paris Week" was a mess, and did not give to tourism or to the industry of articles of Paris the vitality which they have lost.

The trade balance is positively wretched. Is the deficit declining? To be sure, but under what conditions? Less is imported and less is exported. When it reaches zero, the trade balance will no longer show a deficit! The reality of the matter is that commercial activity has fallen off more than thirty percent, as the following figures show:

	1933	1934
Imports.....	12,699,000	7,537,000
Exports.....	10,651,000	7,348,000

Unemployment increases steadily; the official figures which everybody consults only in order to have an estimation of the trend of unemployment and not its real extensiveness, indicates nearly 25 percent more out of work than in 1933. Part-time unemployment has also increased, according to the abstract of the Inspection of Labor.

The cost of living doesn't diminish at all. It is established for Paris as follows:

1933, first quarter.....	523
1933, second quarter.....	516
1933, third quarter.....	516
1933, fourth quarter.....	526
1934, first quarter.....	526

Trade is not spared, the number of insolvencies being nearly 40 percent larger than in 1933.

Tax receipts the government no longer dares to indicate; the last cut of the national lottery was a failure.

Finally, one of the best indices of the position of the middle peasantry is supplied us by the movement of the savings accounts: during the first semester of 1934 there was an excess of withdrawals of funds greater than half a billion francs.

\* \* \* \*

"We are reascending the slope." Senile smiles cannot conceal the reality from anybody. The Doumergue government is worn out. The bourgeois groupings no longer



give it a particle of hope. Even the timid Radicals declare that they have had enough. And on the Right is emerging clearly a combat formation, with André Tardieu and Paul Reynaud. In place of deflation, it orients itself towards inflation, a more convenient method for lowering wages and for substantially expropriating the middle classes. And, of course, a strengthening of the state, military and police apparatus.

\* \* \* \*

The initiative in the fall of Doumergue, we shall tirelessly repeat, must be taken by the working class. We have said, and we shall say it over again: The general strike must be prepared for the overthrow of Doumergue. This is the objective that must be fixed for the united front.

But, we are asked, what do you want to replace the Doumergue government with? We are not yet in a position to replace it with the Soviet power, the working class is not at that point, including many of those influenced by *l'Humanité* which cries for "Soviets everywhere!" but contents itself meanwhile with asking Doumergue, just as does the socialist leadership, for new elections. Then what is Doumergue to be replaced with? To this question, the program of the Communist League of France replies:

"A one-chamber assembly must concentrate in its hands the executive power and the political power. Its members should be elected for two years, by universal suffrage starting with the age of 18, without distinction of sex or of nationality. The deputies should be elected on the basis of local assemblies, constantly revocable by their constituents, and for the period of their exercise of the mandate, they should receive the wages of a skilled worker.

"This is the only measure that would draw the masses forward instead of repelling them to the rear. A broader democracy would facilitate the struggle for the workers' power."

Since the broad masses still stand on the ground of democracy and not of the dictatorship of the proletariat, we do not run away from it. But we tell them that in order to regain the ground lost on February 6, it is not possible to stand by the democracy of the Third Republic; inspiration should be drawn from that of the Great French Republic.

The idea of a Constituent, of a Convention, is in the air. Members of the Radical party disseminate it, other representatives of the petty bourgeois tendency also. The content which they give it is more often than not vague, ambiguous, dangerous. The

working class should not follow the petty bourgeoisie. But its vanguard must understand the situation and exploit all its possibilities to the limit. By overthrowing the pre-Bonapartist government, by replacing it with a single-chambered assembly whose rôle is not to chatter while a government governs, but to legislate and to govern, we would be installing a far broader régime of democracy in which the working class and the toiling masses would undergo their experiences much more rapidly and would prepare themselves much more easily for the workers' power.

No worker can have confidence in the Doumergue ministry assuring loyal elections after having dissolved the Chamber, no worker can have any illusions about a new Chamber, even if it is strongly inclined to the Left, after the capitulation of February 6. The workers, the toiling population, can have confidence only in themselves. That is why the general strike which we are urging for the purpose of sweeping away the government of the reactionary mutiny, must have as its aim to substitute for the "strong" power of the police and the army, a truly democratic power, genuinely emanating from the broad masses of the population.

PARIS, August 3, 1934.

## Murder for Profit: El Gran Chaco

SAID Bernard Shaw: "The wise man looks for the cause of war not in Nietzsche's gospel of the Will to Power, or Lord Robert's far blunter gospel of the British Will to Conquer, but in the custom-house." And the Chaco War, with Chile backing Bolivia for American interests, and the Argentine acting for British money in Paraguay, is a pat illustration of that observation. In Bolivia's financial and economic set-up, as far back as 1920 is to be found the explosive directly determining the Chaco War. For Bolivia as she was at the end of the World War, the Chaco slaughter was almost inevitable; hence also for Paraguay.

Bolivia, 506,467 square miles of mountain, plateau and jungle, is inhabited by three million people, of whom over half are Indians, over a third mixed-breeds, and the remaining 10 to 15% whites, mostly creole Spanish. It is rated as the third richest mineral country in America, the United States and Mexico coming first and second. Before the World War, Bolivia was a typically agricultural semi-feudal country. The Indians were bound to the land, and estates were—and still are—valued, not by area but by the number of serfs upon them. Transportation was carried on almost entirely by human portage, a system taken over by the Spanish conquerors from the native pre-conquest rulers, and by mule and llama caravans, and this is still the system except for mining import-export, and a few other industrial needs, since the few railroads, built by the government in partnership with private monopolies, are too costly except for the use of large capitalists. Communications between Bolivia's three zones: mountain, plateau, and jungle are extremely difficult, and Bolivia has no ports, using the Chilean ports of Antofagasta and Arica on the Pacific. These ports, however, are available only for western Bolivia, since the Andean range cuts

down the middle of the country and isolates the eastern half, in the southern part of which is the Chaco Boreal, largely cattle-plains.

The secret of Bolivia's wealth, and of Bolivia's troubles, is one metal: tin. In Spanish-colonial days a great amount of gold and silver was mined here, and the famous Potosí mines, which became a synonym for fabulous wealth, produced much of it. But tin, which is to be found in large quantities only in Bolivia and in Java and the Malay States, is in these industrial days a precious essential product. Especially for war purposes, tin must be had, and because of the War, therefore, Bolivia became suddenly a vast tin-mine, so that at the end of the war tin had become 70% of Bolivia's exports, and provided about half the national revenue.

Like Cuba and the Caribbean countries, Bolivia became a one-product country and an extremely important spot in world economy. To exploit tin-wealth, the capitalists found it necessary to dislodge the "free" Indians from their communal lands, for in view of the scanty population the mine lords must either import labor and pay somewhere near a living wage, or else kidnap, expropriate and enslave the unbound peasants. They took, of course, the latter alternative, arguing that only Indians could work at the high altitudes necessary (10 to 15,000 feet)—and "they need so little"!

For these measures it was necessary to control the government, and then began a struggle between the great landlords and the mining capitalists, acting for, and in partnership with, American and British interests: Patiño Mine and Enterprises, (National Lead Co. and the Bolivian Simon Patiño, controlling about 80% of the output); the Guggenheims, controlling most of the rest, and a few small companies, chiefly American-backed.

The tin mined in Bolivia is not smelted there. There is no coal; hence a premium on oil exploitation, and also electric power. British interests monopolize Bolivian tin-smelting, but once smelted, it is consumed chiefly by the United States, over half of the British smelting output being bought by United States Steel. Thus tin ore is American property, smelted tin becomes British, and the metal ready for the making of cans, is bought back by American firms. Plenty of fuel in Bolivia might do away neatly with the British smelting business, and with the metal smelted in Bolivia itself, or in Chile or the Argentine, the tin supply the United States will need when war comes, is in the bag.

Enter the Standard Oil, with seven and a half million acres of holdings, spread down the middle of Bolivia and overlapping the western end of the Chaco Boreal. To ship this oil to the Pacific would mean sending it over the Andes, an impossibly costly undertaking. On the other hand, a pipe-line run through the Chaco to the Paraguay River, and oil shipped down that river through the middle of Paraguay to the Plata and Buenos Aires, there or en route to be refined and either shipped back or sent on into the Atlantic is a feasible undertaking. So the old dispute over the ownership of the Chaco, which in itself would never have caused a war, is revived. To Bolivia, it means a possible oil-port; to Paraguay it means Bolivian ships travelling through the heart of the country, and puts the capital itself at their command. Furthermore, there is oil in Paraguay and in the Argentine too, controlled by Dutch Shell (British) which of course is not anxious to see Standard open up vast new fields.

In 1920, Bolivia was rated a wealthy country. The production of tin had climbed steadily, reaching its peak in that year, and the government had borrowed

some \$8,000,000 (beginning 1909) for railroads, sanitation, and "administrative expenses". In 1920 Bolivia's credit was excellent. Her revenues had climbed, tin was high, and she was building roads in the direction of the Chaco. In 1921 the production of tin, which had increased in steady parallel as the price went up, began to drop, while the price continued to climb. In 1921-22 the price of tin was very high, but production had gone down to below the 1907-11 level, and since the revenue comes from production, the government was in a jam financially. It issued oil concessions to the Richmond Levering Company, at the same time passing a law placing the government royalty on oil at twelve and a half and fifteen percent. In July of that year, a "revolution" overthrew this government and put in power Bautista Saavedra, who took the royalty down again to eleven percent, and the Richmond Levering concession passed over to Standard Oil (\$2,500,000).

In the year 1922 the Chaco War is clearly forecast. The Saavedra government, having borrowed \$1,000,000 from Stifel-Nicolaus, with an option on future loans for three years granted the bankers, needs money badly, and is forced or bribed into taking a \$33,000,000 loan at 8%, redeemable not before 1947 from a combination of Stifel-Nicolaus, Equitable Trust and Spencer Trask Co. Purposes: to refund previous loans (Morgan, Chandler and Co., Equitable Trust) some at lower rates than 8%; to cover short-term Customs Notes; for railroad building and "improvements" (Chaco roads and munitions); for "administrative expenses"; for bankers' commissions and expenses. This loan, which is one key to the entire Bolivian situation, was secured as follows:

1. Controlling shares in the National Bank of Bolivia.
2. All revenues representing dividends upon said shares.
3. Taxes on mining claims and concessions.
4. Revenues from the alcohol monopoly.
5. 90% of the revenues from the tobacco monopoly.
6. Taxes on corporations other than mining and banking.
7. Tax on net income of banks.
8. The tax on mortgage interests.
9. Tax on the net profits of mining companies.
10. All import duties.
11. Surcharge on import duties.
12. All export duties.
13. Mortgages and liens on all railroads "constructed or to be constructed from Villazon to Atocha and from Potosí to Sucre, including their franchises, concessions, equipment and other appurtenances, and upon the net income of such railroads. . . ."

To superintend the collection of national revenues, a Fiscal Commission of three, two of the three "nominated" by the bankers, was appointed. One of the members was put in charge of Bolivia's finance, the other was made director of customs. One of these two also functioned as a director of the Bolivian national bank. Expenses to be paid by the Bolivian government. If at any time the national revenues dropped to less than one and one-half the sum needed for the service of the loan, Bolivia was to pledge all other revenues, *except taxes and revenues from oil and oil development*, and

these were to remain pledged until the revenue was triple the amount needed for the loan service. Furthermore, if the railroads were foreclosed, bondholders would have the option to purchase them, pay in bonds, and were to be granted 99 year concessions.

After 1922, tin production did not increase, and in 1925 the government was again in a jam. It was overthrown by a *coup d'état* and the new Dictator, Siles, negotiated a loan (Dillon Read) of \$14,000,000. In 1927 Prof. Edwin Kemmerer was called in to overhaul Bolivia's finances. The price of tin reached its high in 1926 and then very gradually began to slide. In 1928 the Chaco dispute flared up, there were some skirmishes, but the League of Nations put the fight to sleep. In 1930 the price of tin collapsed. Bolivia's revenues went well under the amount needed for the loan service, and taxes were laid on thickly. A threatened revolution was aborted and a militaristic government under General Blanco Gallindo took power. In his cabinet were the lawyers of the Standard Oil and of the tin interests. In 1931 a tin-production control agreement was made which cut Bolivia's share to 35% under the 1930 amount, and in September of that year fighting again broke out in the Chaco. In that year Bolivia defaulted on her bonds. By that time Bolivia's income was less than half the 1929 amount, and in the summer of 1932, under the "elected" Daniel Salamanca government (representing the imperialist interests) the Chaco War began.

Thus a government under the thumb of foreign interests, being used by them to bleed the national treasury, bankrupt and desperately in need of income, with all national resources *except oil* mortgaged, and all finances in the hands, openly, of American bankers, undertook to seek a new source of wealth in the Chaco. Where did the money for the war come from? Well, take a look at the slick-paper magazine, *Bolivia*, issued by the New York Consulate of that country. Page 1: full-page ad of Curtiss-Wright Osprey, who recently were allowed to ship over a million dollars' worth of airplanes and war supplies, on the pretext (Hull!) that the order had been placed before the embargo. Page 2: half-page ad, General Motors; half-page, Colt's revolvers. Page 3: half-page, Ford; quarter, Federal Laboratories, Pittsburgh; quarter, Granwell Corporation. Page 4: half-page, Webster & Ashton, advertising "commission agents and representatives"—of the American Armament Corporation, as can be seen by another half-page in the back of the book. And a half-page, Tide Water Oil, represented by the same agents as General Motors. In the back: half-page, Bolivian Bank ("Formerly Bolivian National Bank"); half-page, Grace Lines; another half, Webster & Ashton, advertising Remington Dupont, and on the next page American Armament. Below, General Electric. On the next page, Goodrich Tires, and below, Webster & Ashton again, for International Motor Trucks.

Meanwhile, let it be noted that Chilean-American interests have a big share in Bolivian tin and oil enterprises. In fact, economically and financially the two countries are interlocked, and moreover, Bolivia does all her importing-exporting through Chile. Hence, Chile now makes the first under-cover manoeuvres to enter the war, if necessary, since if Bolivia loses it means

a tremendous loss to American bankers, oil and tin boys, and munitions merchants, and Chile is American controlled via Guggenheim, Standard Oil and other interests. On the other hand, Paraguay stands in the same relation to the Argentine as Bolivia to Chile; so Chile cannot fight without a grave danger of the Argentine being involved, as British-Argentinian interests have been financing Paraguay.

In the early part of the war, the Bolivian Indians fought in American uniforms, "bought cheap", and from which they even "forgot" (!) to remove the scream-eagle buttons. In Paraguay, the economic pressure of the war is so great that everything is taxed to the hilt, and even so Paraguay has threatened to kill Bolivian prisoners, now used in forced labor, to save the cost of their upkeep. At present boys fifteen and sixteen are being sent to the front, Indians are being kidnapped from over Brazilian territory, and the Paraguayan press is full of shrill denunciation of the war-profiteers, getting fat on sugar-monopolies and other food-pools.

It seems hardly likely that this war can be settled unless Bolivia gets her port, or until all the men are dead (as happened once when Paraguay fought the ABC powers) but it seems more possible that it will spread to involve Chile at least. Chile has a strongly organized, militant labor movement, which may perhaps succeed in mobilizing the Bolivian proletariat, and together with it, lead a victorious workers' revolution that even the Standard Oil could not crush.

Jean MENDEZ

## Banned!

ENCLOSED in a letter from the Department of National Revenue of Canada, addressed to the publishers of THE NEW INTERNATIONAL to inform them that our periodical has been banned in that country, is the following Memorandum of the Customs Division of the department, dated Ottawa, August 7, 1934, and addressed to "Collectors of Customs and Excise" throughout the Dominion:

### "Prohibited Publications

"Referring to Memorandum No. 1515-B, you are advised that the following publications are prohibited importation into Canada under the provisions of Section 13 and Item 1201, Schedule 'C' of the Customs Tariff, viz:—

"THE NEW INTERNATIONAL, Published monthly by the New International Publishing Association, New York, U. S. A.

"*The Ukrainian Daily News*, A newspaper published in the Ukrainian language by the Robitnyk Publishing and Printing Co. Inc., 17 East 3rd St., New York, U.S.A.

"Chas. P. Blair

"Ass't. Commissioner of Customs."

The publishers of THE NEW INTERNATIONAL are determined to make every effort to obtain a revocation of the order of the Canadian Customs authorities, so that the review, which to our knowledge, is now being permitted legal entry into every other part of the British Empire, may be available to Canadian readers. A Canadian attorney has been advised of the prohibition order and the next necessary measures are now being taken.

# DOCUMENTS and DISCUSSION

## The Question of Organic Unity in France

### The Pact

APPROVED on July 27, 1934 by the delegates of the Permanent Administrative Commission of the Socialist party and by the Political Bureau of the Communist party on the other, the agreement for the united front of the two French parties reads as follows:

Yesterday, at the *Maison des Coopérateurs*, there met the delegates of the Socialist party and the Communist party.

Namely: Thorez, Gitton, Jacques Duclos, Soupe and Martel for the Communist party,

And Severac, Lebas, Lagorgette, Descourtrieux, Just, Blum, Zyromsky for the Socialist party.

They arrived at an agreement on the pact whose text follows:

The Central Committee of the Communist party and the Permanent Administrative Commission of the Socialist party are animated by the will to beat Fascism.

It is clear that this goal can be attained only by the common action of the toiling masses for clearcut objectives of struggle. The interests of the working class therefore demand that the Socialist party and the Communist party organize this common action against Fascism.

In face of the danger which Fascism represents to the toiling population, attacks organized by armed bands against the proletariat, the Communist party and the Socialist party recognize the necessity of conducting the resolute action by common agreement and hereby specify its modalities and conditions:

I. The Socialist party and the Communist party sign a pact of unity of action by which they engage themselves to organize in common and to participate with all their means (organizations, press, militants, elected representatives, etc.) in a campaign throughout the land, having as its aim:

a) To mobilize the whole toiling population against the Fascist organizations, for their disarmament and their dissolution;

b) For the defense of the democratic liberties, for proportional representation and the dissolution of the Chamber;

c) Against the preparations for war;

d) Against the decree-laws;

e) Against the Fascist terror in Germany and in Austria, for the liberation of Thälmann and of Karl Seitz, and of all the imprisoned anti-Fascists.

II. This campaign shall be conducted by means of joint meetings in the greatest possible number of localities and enterprises, by means of demonstrations and counter-demonstrations of the masses in the street, by insuring the self-defense of workers' gatherings, of demonstrations, of organizations and of their militants; and by being always watchful that the psychological, material and moral conditions for investing them with the maximum scope and power shall be brought together.

If, in the course of this common action, members of the one or the other party come to blows with Fascist adversaries, the adherents of the other party shall lend them

*The united front pact between the Socialist and Communist parties of France has engendered a tremendous discussion. One of the salient points in it revolves around the problem of "organic unity" of the two parties for which a number of spokesmen of both sides have already declared. Because the fusion of these two parties into one would have incalculable international consequences, we are reprinting three documents here for information and discussion purposes. One is the text of the united front pact. The other two are taken from a recent issue of La Vérité, weekly organ of the Communist League of France, which present opposing views on the question involved. As additional material of interest and weight appears, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL will publish it in its columns.*

—ED.

aid and assistance.

III. During the course of this common action, the two parties shall abstain reciprocally from attacks and criticisms upon the organisms and militants participating loyally in the action.

### Towards Organic Unity?

ONE of the most characteristic manifestations of the present crisis can be found, without doubt, in what is happening within the "proletarian" parties. Here it is hardly two months since the two bureaucracies—the Stalinist and the social democratic—vowed a mortal hatred of each other. Every means, every pretext was good for tearing each other apart and what is much worse, for mobilizing the various sections of the proletariat against each other to the exclusive benefit of reaction and Fascism. In order to evade the joint action imposed by the offensive of the class enemy, the social democratic bureaucracy first denounced the weapon of the united front as a pure "manœuvre" and proposed in its stead organic unity. Then it thought it necessary to use this "manœuvre" itself, by proposing the united front to the C. I. and by subordinating every circumstantial agreement upon national soil to an international agreement. At the end even this pretext fell away, and we see the social democratic bureaucracy of France signing a pact directly with the Stalinist bureaucracy.

The contortions of the latter have not been fewer. Just the contrary, armed with the theory of social Fascism and convinced that social democracy and Fascism were nothing but twin brothers, it refused any united front of organizations and against it proposed the so-called united front from below. And as it was well guaranteed of its positions, all those who denounced its "theory" as gibberish, inconsistent and pernicious, were treated (the Bolshevik-Leninists know something about that!) as the spearhead of the counter-revolution. And today, this same bureaucracy which accused Doriot on February 12 of having made a bloc with the "social-Fascists" of Saint-Denis, itself makes a bloc with the social democratic bureaucracy, a bloc whose

However, outside of the common action, each party shall retain its complete independence in order to develop its propaganda, without insulting or abusing the other party, and in order to assure its own recruitment.

As to the joint demonstrations of action, they must be dedicated exclusively to the common object and not be transformed into contradictory debates touching upon the doctrine and the tactic of the two parties.

IV. Each party engages itself to curb the defalcations and omissions that might take place within the ranks of its own organizations with reference to the common action engaged in.

A committee of coördination composed of seven delegates from each of the two parties is constituted to settle upon the plan in its entirety and the character of the joint demonstrations. This committee shall have laid before it the disputes and conflicts which may arise. The decisions of this committee shall be recorded in minutes of proceedings, jointly edited and brought to the attention of the workers.

essential characteristics are the absence of any criticism and a mutual respecting of the two bureaucracies, with meetings and parades as the solitary weapons of struggle against reaction and Fascism. Still more: this same bloc is already considered, it appears as a first, but a decisive step towards the organizational fusion of the Stalinist party and the Socialist party, that is, towards organic unity.

It is impossible to assert, at this moment, whether this organic unity will or will not be an accomplished fact a few months hence. It is strongly probable that the two bureaucracies will encounter no little resistance along this path, resistance which will be all the greater the more the objective situation demonstrates that something besides palaver is needed to defend the bread and the liberties of the proletariat and to break the back of reaction. At all events, the mere fact that the problem is put should permit us certain considerations and certain perspectives.

The first consideration to make is the following: After 15 years of the existence of the Communist International, it seems to be hastening to put over the portals of its surviving section, the most important one, the French section, the inscription: Going out of business. It is the most striking avowal of the political, ideological and organizational bankruptcy of Stalinism. Bankrupt in every realm, the Stalinist bureaucracy is seeking its own safety not in a return to the Leninist policy, to which Soviet diplomacy in particular is opposed, but in a still narrower conjunction with the socialist bureaucracy. The irony of history pushes it to wanting to become the Siamese brother of the "twin brother" of Fascism! If the "spirit" of the Pact, as everything leads one to believe, will be what presides over the "organic unity"

## Organic Unity? Yes!

(and without this spirit it would be impossible), it would not only be the materialization of twelve years of defeats, but would become a factor for new defeats of the proletariat. Indeed, the conjunction of the two bureaucracies will not occur and cannot occur on the ground of the consistent development of the struggle, but upon that of its limitation, within the framework which will suit Soviet diplomacy, on the one side, and French "democracy" on the other. If, up to yesterday, the revolutionary current found difficulties in expressing itself and in penetrating into the masses, the day on which the organic conjunction of the two bureaucracies will be an accomplished fact, these difficulties, from this aspect, will not be diminished. It is not, therefore, by staking upon organic unity that the revolutionary current can develop, but by staking upon the action of the masses. This action will be dictated by the whole situation which is opening up before us.

Without believing, as do certain comrades, in decisive interventions of the antagonistic forces (workers and reactionaries) in the coming weeks, it is certain that the present "equilibrium" cannot last for long. But the action of the masses will be able to develop itself only to the extent that it will succeed in breaking the barrier of the two conjoined bureaucracies.

What are the means best calculated to aid the masses in breaking the bureaucratic barrage? At bottom, that is the problem to resolve. A certain number of comrades think that at the present hour, organic unity is progressive, because it blows up the old bureaucratic crystallizations and particularly the Stalinist bureaucracy, and this will better permit the revolutionary current to make its way. As a result, they draw from it the conclusion that it is necessary to get to the head of it in order not to be eliminated from the movement. We, on the contrary, think that organic unity will be the last intrenchment of the two bureaucracies which are in a fair way of being inundated.\* That is why, instead of converting ourselves into partisans of this unity, we should denounce it right from the start, as well as the dangers which it permits of. The salvation of the revolutionary current does not lie, to our mind, along the road indicated by these comrades, but in the combination of our means in the following sense: 1. the maintenance of our independent organization which, now more than ever, needs to be able to express itself with full clarity in order to point out the road to the masses and in order to denounce unsparingly the certain betrayals of the social democratic and Stalinist bureaucracies; 2. the penetration—systematic, firm, and by all means—into the ranks of the social democratic and Stalinist political formations and into the other workers' organizations with the aim of finding the necessary organic contacts in order to facilitate the evolution of the Centrist currents towards us and in order to draw them into action at the opportune moment.

### LA VÉRITÉ

THE problem of organic unity stands before us again in France. It is no longer the P.U.P. [Party of Proletarian Unity] alone, sheltering the miserable appetites of an electoral arrivism under this promising demand; it is the two parties speaking for the working class which declare openly that their division is an obstacle to the proletarian struggle, who recommend the creation of a single party which Thorez [C. P. leader] calls the "decisive weapon of the laboring masses".

The sincerity of a certain number of the leaders of the French section of the Labor International and the French section of the Communist International, seems to us, on this question, to be well debatable, the wish to manoeuvre of certain of them is obvious; in any case, the fact is there: *these two parties with two different phraseologies affirm their respective inexistence as parties of the proletarian victory.* The will to unity of the masses is intervening in this evolution of the two formations with the same weight that it intervened for the realization of the united front; its aspiration is an expression of how limited is the confidence of the masses in the existing parties, "unity" is in a confused way for the masses "that other party" which it needs in order to triumph.

Those who have followed the evolution of the Internationals and the parties in the last ten years, who have participated in the regrouping of a Marxian vanguard, draw from this avowal of impotence on the part of the French sections of the Second and Third Internationals, the justification for their struggle for a new party, a new International. To be sure, they survey the road traveled since Tours.\* The party which was to express and realize the historic will of the proletariat made the first steps at Tours, the degeneration of the C. I.—(not consequent upon the principles of its formation, Doriot, but upon the abandonment of these principles, an abandonment whose champion you were more than once in China and elsewhere)—has deprived the French Communist party of its development as such, has reduced its attractive capacity and its rôle, has permitted the Socialist party to survive its bankruptcy of 1914, solemnly registered at Tours, to rally strata of young workers who have their experience to go through, evolving rapidly towards consistent fighting positions and now compelling their leaders to submit to this evolution.

The Communist International has left without revolutionary leadership broad sections of workers of whom the most conscious part, under the blow of Hitlerite Fascism, has confusedly understood the errors of the Second and Third Internationals in Germany. This pressure is one of the decisive causes of the turn of the S. P. and C. P. towards the united front; it is the distrust of the masses for these parties which constrains them, in large measure, to a gleaming hope for a Single party (I write: one of the causes, the foreign and domestic policy of the U.S.S.R.

being another factor which it will be fitting to examine).

Thus does the debate for organic unity become the debate for a new party, a new International which is not to be the totalization of the mistakes, but whose programmatic basis is the expression of the understanding of these mistakes. It is not progress as compared with Tours, nor with the conference of the two Internationals in Berlin in 1923, but it may be the end of the blind alley in which the French labor movement has been for all the years of the degeneration of the C. I. It is the road opened to a broad regrouping on a basis which must be precise and in the course of which our program will find living contacts with the masses. Of course, in this debate, in this battle, the conservative currents of the two parties will try to transform the organic unity into a "last intrenchment", but this will to organic unity does not come from their brains, it is the function of a profound evolution of the working class strata in an unprecedented economic, social and political crisis, and the regroupings will take place not according to the pattern of a bureaucrats' mutual protective association but according to the capacities and the progress of a revolutionary vanguard expressing the true interests of the proletariat.

To declare, as does the present majority of our Central Committee in the article "Towards Organic Unity?", that it is necessary to denounce organic unity and to remain independent in principle even if it is realized, is to substitute for the necessity of the Bolsheviks *being connected with the working masses, following their evolution step by step, facilitating the development of their experience*—A JOURNALISTIC ULTIMATUM. It means also a failure to understand that our present weakness is one of the causes why the question of the new party is being posed by way of the question of organic unity. If our connections in the working class were different, we would have been able to play the rôle of decisive attractive pole; not to understand this, *is obviously to change nothing and, by means of a splendid isolation, to promote the manoeuvre of the bureaucracies to limit the organic unity to a mutual protective association.*

The political evolution of the masses is realized in action; this evolution can be immediately negative or positive for the broad masses. A united front of inaction can create profound disillusionment as to the proletariat's capacity to struggle, a confused and impotent organic unity can ruin for a long time to come the very idea of a party. The masses develop rapidly in such periods as these; a disillusionment does not impel the whole of them towards the Marxist core which "awaits them"; a defeat produces an ebb-tide. . . . In France, the ebb-tide would mean *the passage of the petty bourgeois and the watchfully waiting peasant strata towards Fascism, the beginning of darkness for a whole period in Europe and the world.*

By this token, the present hours are decisive ones. Our task consists in giving the aspiration towards organic unity a genuinely propulsive content. A whole period of the labor movement is at a close, the one in which the organic unity meant

\*The manoeuvres of the two bureaucracies striving towards organic unity do not express the will to action of the masses, but pervert it and aim at breaking it by draining it off into an impasse.

\*At its Tours congress in 1921, the French Socialist party affiliated with the Communist International by majority vote, thus founding the Communist party of France. The minority retained the old name.—ED.



# ~ BOOKS ~

## Soule's Revolution

THE COMING AMERICAN REVOLUTION. By GEORGE SOULE. 314 pp. New York. The Macmillan Co. \$2.50.

Mr. Soule and Bruce Bliven control the *New Republic*; and Mr. Soule is its chief spokesman on social and economic policy. Hope for an enlightened capitalism, envisioned as a form of Jeffersonian Democracy, was the early orientation of the *New Republic*. This ideal has, however, become so completely fantastic, that in recent years the *New Republic* has shifted to an ideal of enlightened capitalism guided by governmental control and checked by the power of organized labor, professions, and that mythical entity, "consumers". The theory of the "New Deal", as enunciated on paper, came close to that envisioned by the *New Republic*. With true liberal caution, to be sure, the pro-Roosevelt editorials of the honeymoon were given a quota of ifs and buts, to which the *New Republic* now points whenever accused of being taken in by Roosevelt. Soule himself added to his editorials a book which appeared early this year describing the possibilities of social planning under capitalism.

At long last the *New Republic* sadly discovered that the NRA's principal accomplishment, the code authorities, was a charter to monopoly capitalism. That belated realization was recorded in a lachrymose editorial, "Roosevelt Turns Right". But ever and anon come editorials to the effect that If Roosevelt Would Only . . .

When Mr. Soule's present book appeared, only some six months or so after the earlier optimistic dithyrambs on social planning, the capitalist reviews reported that Mr. Soule had abandoned his hope in capitalist planning and was dedicating himself to the revolution. I confess to have felt some skepticism as to the nature of the transformation in Mr. Soule. He is an intellectual *entrepreneur* for strata of the middle class who can in no serious sense be expected to move independently. A mass revolutionary movement sweeping along triumphantly will drag along in its wake many for whom Mr. Soule speaks; but today it is to be expected that they remain dreamers of capitalist utopias.

It was no surprise, therefore, to find that Mr. Soule's *Coming American Revolution* was merely a sorrowful reaction to the realities of the Roosevelt régime, with a

the dissolution of the revolutionary party into the reactionary party. THE REVOLUTIONARY CLASS PARTY NO LONGER EXISTS. We are faced with formations of a Centrist character having different origins. We must conduct the struggle for organic unity with intransigence, in order that this slogan of unity shall not be a synonym for a manoeuvre in which the hope of the masses would be led astray.

Organic unity is to us a synonym for a new congress of Tours where, after the experience and the blows of history, all those who want to smash capitalism would assemble again in a single party.

LINIER

consequent radicalization of phraseology. The phraseology goes a long way; so far, indeed, that only by close attention to the progress of the argument is one aware of the intricate manoeuvres by which Mr. Soule comes out at the end at his usual place of business. Or, to put it more accurately, Mr. Soule ends up doing business at the old stand, but his wares have new names: the process is similar to the Centrist shift in the Socialist party.

Mr. Soule is, no doubt, an honest man according to his lights; but his book reminds me of nothing so much as of a game called three card monte (also known in variations as the old army game, the shell or pea game). The gambler shows you three or more cards, one of which is an ace. Facing them down on the table separately, the gambler pushes them about. Your eyes carefully follow the card which you know is the ace. The gambler asks you to point to the ace. You do. He turns it over and it isn't the ace.

Mr. Soule starts out by showing us, not one but a flock of aces. With much scorn for the "literary radicals", who don't know what a real revolution is, he lays out on the table a flock of fundamental principles of revolutions. Among these are:

"1. The old régime never is in danger from the popular violence which attacks it from without until it has been weakened from within.

"2. What touches off insurrection is hope, not lack of it, rising confidence, not bleak suffering."

(This second point is the only one on which Mr. Soule is justified in criticizing the "literary radicals", who follow the Stalinists in hailing every intensification of mass misery as a further step to revolution.)

"3. When a shift in power actually occurs, it is usually begun . . . with reforms . . . caused, not by sudden violence, but by the irresistible pressure of events.

"4. Those newcomers who seize authority at the end of a successful revolution are not chance members of an insensate mob, but highly intelligent men with solid organizations back of them, men confident of their own ideas and abilities. . . .

"6. The most serious revolutionary violence—and there often is a great deal of it—occurs after the new régime has seized power, and must defend itself against reaction in civil or foreign war. Even the domestic 'terror' usually occurs some time after the seizure of power itself."

These principles, while none too well put, are satisfactory enough for a beginning; and Mr. Soule's application of them, rather rapidly and superficially, to the French, American, English and Russian revolutions, which makes the first section of the book, is equivalent to the first move: we are still looking at the real aces, faces up.

Then the aces are faced down, and the game begins. They aren't pushed around too rapidly and much that we see is quite genuine. Parts II and III, describing the economic developments leading up to the New Deal and then giving the steps until now made by the Roosevelt régime, are the larger half of the book, and are well

worth reading for their marshalling of the facts.

It is only in reading the last section, Part IV, that one realizes that ace No. 1 has really been slipped off the table somewhere during Parts II and III. We realize, then, that ace No. 1 wasn't very clear. We had taken it for granted that by "the old régime . . . weakened from within" Mr. Soule meant the capitalist method of production, convulsed by the contradiction between it and the developing forces of production which it has fostered. But, retracing our steps, we find that Mr. Soule has looked for the weaknesses of "the old régime", not at all at the point where the Marxist looks.

The Marxist finds the basic weakness at the point of production. He knows that today's socio-economic form of production, which is what we mean by "capitalism", has been the main factor responsible for technological development. The pursuit of profit has had this social value, that it has made possible improvements in productivity. Today, of course, this increased productivity menaces the stability of capitalism, which is unable to find sufficient markets, and wonderful inventions are bought up and suppressed by corporations because their use would involve the scrapping of present investments. On the other hand, further increases of productivity—thereby cutting costs of production—still remain one of the means of "getting out" of crises. In either case, the very fact that the socio-economic form of production (capital) can foster or suppress technological aspects of production, shows that one cannot talk intelligently about the possibilities of technology today without talking about the socio-economic form of production. Hence, it is at the point of the socio-economic form of production, *how production is carried on*, that the Marxist seeks the solution of social organization. The Marxist says the remedy lies where the illness is: at the point of production.

The non-Marxist "radical" proceeds very differently. He isolates the machine from its private ownership and gives the development of technological productivity an independent life of its own. Completely misunderstanding the dominating rôle of the socio-economic form of production, he seeks for the solution of society's ills anywhere except at the right place, the point of production. This fallacy generally takes the form of discovering a "problem of distribution". A typical example of this is Stuart Chase, who talks about capitalists automatically disappearing, says "the problem of production is solved", and seeks the solution of the "problem of distribution" by providing purchasing power for the masses while leaving the whole system of production in the hands of capitalists.

Mr. Soule is not as crude as Chase, but at bottom he comes to the same position. He criticizes the usual loose talk about indefinite governmental spending as a means of transforming society; but his criticism is limited to the difficulties of prying the money loose from the capitalists. At no point is he aware that increase of purchasing power by governmental expenditures cannot mean anything but priming the capitalist pump; that "aids to distribution", so-called, can never be anything but aids to capitalist production, for so long as productive means are owned by capitalists, they will run only at a profit. So that, while

Mr. Soule does not follow the usual naïve solutions of the "problem of distribution" by way of expanding purchasing power, he does stand with the "new economics" in seeking for the fundamental solution at the point of "distribution". Thus, he says: "It is obvious that the main problem arises, not from the mere existence of the machine, but from the way the goods are distributed" (p. 87).

Like all reformists, therefore (including those reformist socialists who claim to be Marxists and even use the slogan "production for use instead of profit", but render it meaningless by their actions), Mr. Soule sees higher wages, and shorter hours, restrictions on price-raising, and easy credits—typical aspects of the "problem of distribution"—not as issues primarily important for rallying the masses to build powerful organizations and for heightening their class-consciousness, while these concessions momentarily ease their conditions; but, in line with looking at the point of distribution for the solution, Mr. Soule sees these as "requirements of successful social planning". He says, "capitalism must in the end give way to the rise of the working classes and socialism" but you will search his book high and low and fail to find any suggestion of the taking over by the working classes of the means of production. If higher wages, etc., are "social planning", then to say that capitalism "must surrender to social planning" apparently comes down to meaning that capitalism must surrender to higher wages, price-raising restrictions, etc. So this is the revolution!

To show that I have not misunderstood what is handled so cautiously and ambiguously in his book, I quote an editorial from the *New Republic* of August 22, written by Mr. Soule, on "Mr. Roosevelt's intentions".

"Will the President continue to yield on the chief issues to dominant industrial and financial groups? Or will he take the advice of John Maynard Keynes and others, and try once more to push out government money in large enough quantities to furnish a backlog of consumer purchasing power? . . . If the New Deal is to be kept new, and if it is ever to be made over into that newer deal which this country so urgently needs, it is imperative that every force of public opinion be marshalled in support of such a development."

Here we see that Mr. Soule, in an unguarded moment, reveals with a baldness equal to that of Stuart Chase, his fallacious belief that social planning can be arrived at by way of the "problem of distribution", leaving the capitalist system of production untouched.

So the first ace that Mr. Soule showed us turns out, after a little sleight-of-hand, to be nothing but a deuce. After which the other aces disappear with very little manoeuvring.

The word "insurrection", in No. 2, and the phraseology in No. 6—"seize power" etc.—turn out to be just phraseology. Based on Trotsky's undeniably true observation, that the most violence occurs after the seizure of power, it is reinterpreted, at the conclusion of the book, to mean that it is possible for a "revolution" to occur in America, not by seizing power, mind you, but by winning an elective majority.

Ace No. 4, referring to the real revolutionists who follow the stop-gap reformers,

disappears without a trace! This is achieved almost inconspicuously, by a little phrase: Mr. Soule says that communist or similar parties in futurer evolutions will have their rôle at a late stage in the proceedings, "if at all"!! Mr. Soule thus ignores what he has himself said in the first pages, of the inevitableness of the later stage; he ignores, too, the significant rôle to be played by communists in the earlier stages. For example, the decisive rôle played by the revolutionists in preventing a successful counter-revolution (Bolsheviks and Kornilov); the rôle of revolutionists in propagandizing for a democratic revolution in Fascist countries; the rôle of revolutionists everywhere in heightening the class-struggle to the point where the stop-gap reformists are brought in.

It must now be more than clear that in its final sections Mr. Soule's book degenerates to the point where serious analysis is fruitless. I should like, however, to finish with a description of what Mr. Soule does to Ace No. 4, the "solid organizations" led by "highly intelligent men", which "seize authority at the end of a successful revolution". In applying this principle to previous revolutions, Mr. Soule points out the decisive rôle of the organized Puritans, the highly centralized Jacobins, the Bolshevik party. But the American revolution is apparently immune from this general principle. It is sufficiently characteristic of Mr. Soule's lack of understanding to point out that he not only fails to distinguish between the ills of Stalinist parties and the difficulties of genuinely revolutionary parties, but even says of a revolutionary movement, that "in so far as it grows in numbers it must lose its fighting edge". Who, then, is to make the American revolution? Mr. Soule, after many hints about the importance of the intellectuals, lists among the "reforms which strengthen new classes" the following: "There are now in the government machinery members of the professional and intellectual classes who are concerned with collecting and putting together the information necessary for social planning, and with making that information of use in the regulation of industry." There is much that is vague in the last chapters; there is something to the effect that "sooner or later, if not under the present administration, then in a succeeding one . . . a serious and informed attempt at social planning is to be made". Also, "probably by peaceful and possibly even by constitutional means, the control of production and exchange may easily pass to one of the more moderate movements opposed to the profit system". What kind of movement, he does not say. He warns, however, that "if all this does occur so painlessly, it will be the first time in history". But what stands out in my mind at the end is the repeated references to the importance of intellectuals as an independent entity, and particularly the reference to those "now in the government machinery". I wonder if, deep down, too deep to talk much about it, Mr. Soule believes that the American revolution will be made by his friends in the Brain Trust?

Felix MORROW.

The September issue of THE NEW INTERNATIONAL will print a critical review of Arthur Rosenberg's *History of Bolshevism*, which has just appeared in English.

## Honky-Tonk

OUR MASTER'S VOICE: Advertizing. By JAMES RORTY. x+394 pp. New York. The John Day Co. \$3.

To our finicky forefathers advertizing was a thing distressing but under some circumstances inevitable—like a belch. The least one expected of the advertizer was some restraint in the gustiness of his blast, and a deprecatory "Excuse me." As capitalism conquered, however, advertizing, its mate, grew more blatant and boorish, casting off entirely restraint and shame. Giant billboards sprang up like mushrooms over capitalist scenery, blocking all view of verdant green and rippling brook, and driving pastoral poets to drink and suicide. Circulars fell like snow. Megaphones bawled into the ears of passersby. Advertizing became as raucous, as obscene, as dishonest, as a small-town carnival.

And a honky-tonk racket it is to this day, despite the fact that it is the twelfth largest industry in the United States, doing several billion dollars worth of business annually that, so far as society is concerned, is pure economic waste, and subordinating to its purposes the press, the radio, the movies, art, literature, science and education—in brief, the whole of American bourgeois culture.

The newspapers in this country fought the originally feeble Tugwell Food and Drug Bill, and even the emasculated Copeland revisions, as if their very life depended upon the struggle—as, indeed, it did. They fought for the right of manufacturers to sell adulterated and poisoned products, and to palm off these products (in the pages of the press, at so much per line) as pure and health-giving. They fought for the right of the producer to lie and swindle, and rob and kill. Upon this right the entire advertizing business depends, and the daily press, which is no longer a medium but the organ of the advertizing business.

Legislators are bought, magazines are subsidized, public schools are utilized. Scientists gladly, for a proper fee, take part in the grand chorus which says "Buy! buy! buy!" Vitamins are discovered so that breakfast foods may be sold. Children are taught to brush their teeth every day so that the manufacturer can dispose of his poison-containing toothpaste. The health-giving properties of the sun are disclosed in order that ultra-violet lamps may find a proper place in the market. Fiction is written by authors with reputations in order to make the public car-conscious, yacht-conscious, clothes-conscious. An ounce of truth will be inserted only when it means a pound of profit. Advertizing has corrupted our entire civilization, has exalted sham, and glorified ostentation above all virtues.

All this James Rorty, himself an advertizing man, makes plain in his excellent and valuable book, *Our Master's Voice: Advertizing*. He does more. He takes us into the inner dives of the racket, and where he goes he plants bombs or scatters rat poison. Rorty is a poet: the vulgarity of advertizing offends his nostrils, its sway over literature and the arts drives him to a proper fury. He is a satirist of first order: he pounces down gleefully upon the chromium-plated pretenses of his confrères, and reveals them at their tawdriest and worst. He spares no one, but pursues his quarry re-

lently, and without regard for the rules of sportsmanship. Any and all weapons, dogs, razors, double-barreled shotguns, dum-dum bullets, trench mortars, arsenic, mustard-gas are legitimate for bringing down the prey, so far as Rorty is concerned. He uses all of his talents, in poetry, satire, fiction and good, sound logic, and he leaves of the science and art and social-service of the advertizers and their high-hat flunkies, a sorry spectacle indeed—corpses mutilated, battered, bruised beyond description, wounded in a thousand places.

For all of this he might yet be forgiven by the bourgeoisie if only he permitted them some substitute, some less evil-smelling beast that could still perform to suit their needs. But Rorty is the last man in the world to allow anyone to sprinkle perfume over the skunk and pass him off as a domesticated tabby. The battery is wheeled into position again, and in a few short chapters it is all over with the reformers, and with their substitutions.

"I have tried to show," he writes, "that this business perverts and stultifies our essential instruments of social communication; that its fantastic economic wastefulness is the least important aspect of its viciousness; that this leering, cajoling, bullying caricature of truth, decency, service, education, science, is something that a sane and vigorous people must reject in its totality, on pain not merely of economic chaos but of cultural death."

Nor will legislation reform or the disapprobation of right-minded men help in the least against the evils of advertizing, which are the evils of capitalism, which must somehow sell its surplus products, which in turn must be adulterated and faked to make the profit which becomes capital. For the process of robbing the worker of his just wages, and then cheating him again when he goes to buy is one and the same. And, as Rorty gleefully quotes Bruce Barton: "There is nothing the matter with advertizing that is not the matter with business in general."

Elsewhere, referring to the attempt at far-reaching reform contained in the Consumers' Research Bill, Rorty says: "The bill is well calculated to freeze the blood of the admen, drug men, vitamin men and cosmeticians. Incidentally, it constitutes an excellent *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole idea of progress by reform, capitalist planning, etc. Obviously, it would be much simpler to socialize pharmacy, medicine, and the production and distribution of foods, and also obviously, no such revolution could be achieved without a social revolution."

\* \* \* \*

As was to be expected, the book was greeted in the bourgeois press with "modified raptures". Some reviewers, who were distressed by his conclusions but nevertheless overwhelmed by his proof, sought refuge in the feeblest of liberal formulæ: "There is much in what he says, the condition is undoubtedly a sad one, but . . ." and then assailed him for his radicalism. His attacks upon the press itself were discreetly hushed up.

What was astonishing—to anyone who can be astounded by the Stalinists—was the treatment the book received in the official communist press. It was ignored by all publications excepting the *New Masses*, where the reviewer exceeded all previous masterpieces of spleen and venom, and

dirty back-biting, that have featured that magazine in the past.

The review begins with a sneer. "This book represents a prodigious effort by ex-comrade Rorty." The "ex-comrade" gives the trick away. Follows the usual abuse. "In the revolutionary movement, nothing short of a general's post could satisfy his all-consuming ego. No generalships being proffered, Rorty did not tarry long among the communists." "From the internal evidence contained in this volume, one is justified in the faint suspicion that James Rorty will be among them [the American versions of the Fascist Minister of Propaganda and Enlightenment, Goebbels]."

To all of which the proper answer is that the reviewer is a liar. Rorty sought no office in the communist movement, and accepted with reluctance the then supposedly important one that was forced upon him—the secretaryship of the League for Professional Groups. He resigned and quit the movement because of fundamental disagreements—right or wrong—with the policies of the C. P. and its related organizations. His hatred—his fighting hatred—of Fascism has been so apparent in his career, that to bring against him the faintest charge of Fascist tendencies requires rank impudence as well as dishonesty. But the Stalinists have both.

Rorty is not clear politically, and the fact that he has found his way into the ranks of the American Workers' Party has not added to his political clarity. Nevertheless, his book must be recognized by every honest revolutionary as a good and able piece of work, calculated to serve, in the long run, the cause of proletarian revolution, and no other cause.

Louis BERG

## A Legal Marxist

LENIN. By R. PALME DUTT. 96 pp. London. Hamish Hamilton. 50c.

Many biographies have been written of Lenin. The book under review, however, has a number of distinguishing traits. The author tells us in the introduction that "the study of Lenin's life and work is only of value, not as an idle exercise in worship or denigration, in academic history or subjective criticism, but as a direct assistance in understanding the objective historical movement and in relation to the urgent world problems and tasks confronting us today" (p. 8).

The careful reader approaches the book with a bit of caution; R. Palme Dutt is a leader of the British Stalinist Party! Yet the result is almost amazing. Lenin's teachings are presented in complete abstraction from the more immediate "world problems and tasks confronting us today"; not a line is devoted to the disputes and events which have wracked the world communist movement for the past eleven years and led to the destruction of the revolutionary Third International; the names of Stalin and Trotsky are completely omitted in a biography of Lenin! Such is the legal Marxism of R. Palme Dutt.

In succinct form the author presents a popular sketch of the main teachings of Lenin. The Epoch of Lenin, The Life of Lenin, The Teachings of Lenin and The Heir of Lenin—the Communist International. The first chapter is reminiscent of

the writings of Max Beer. Lenin is placed against the background of the development of Marxism. With broad strokes, the origin and teachings of Marx and Engels are excellently summarized in a few brief pages. The second chapter traces the struggle of Lenin for a Bolshevik party against the Russian "legal Marxists", the "Economists", and the Mensheviks. Discussing his defense of revolutionary internationalism during the World War and the Russian October, Dutt emphasizes Lenin's conception that "the victory of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia was the opening, the first stage, of the world socialist revolution" (p. 54).

No less popular is his chapter "The Teachings of Lenin". Here he again gives prominence to the internationalist character of Lenin's teachings. Indicating that dialectic materialism is at their foundation, the author presents Lenin's views on imperialism, on "The Chief Task of Our Times—The World Revolution", the dictatorship of the proletariat, the national and colonial problems, and the tactics and organization of the Revolution.

Nowhere does he openly defend the fundamental Stalinist conceptions. He presents Lenin's teachings as though nothing had happened to them in the past decade. Let us briefly examine several of these controversial problems.

What has Dutt to say on the theory of completing a socialist society in one country (Russia) alone? In his chapter on the teachings of Lenin, not a word! Yet this, according to Stalin, is a fundamental teaching of Lenin.

But Dutt covers himself in two ways: first, by stating that he cannot cover all the questions, as for example the problems of socialist construction in the Soviet Union and second, by this innocuous reference in his chapter on the life of Lenin:

"In the spring of 1923 came a second and heavier attack. In May 1923, he wrote his last article, on Coöperation, pointing the way forward to 'the establishment of a fully socialized society' for which 'we have all the means requisite'. 'Of course we have not yet established a socialist society, but we have all the means requisite for its establishment.' The unequal battle for life and consciousness dragged on over months. On January 21, 1924, he died" (p. 61).

Dutt correctly presents Lenin's article "On Coöperation" as an incidental writing. Stalin basis his entire revisionist theory on this article. Is Dutt unaware of the dispute and its import? Of course not! He prefers the rôle of a Legal Marxist in the camp of Stalinism!

In the section on "National and Colonial Liberation" Dutt does not even mention the Stalinists' slogan of "the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry", their conception of the alliance with the colonial bourgeoisie or their attitude towards workers' and peasants' parties. In a word, he closes his eyes to the experiences of China and India; he completely disregards the colonial theses of the Third International! For according to the Stalinists the slogan for a non-socialist "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" applies to all colonial and semi-colonial countries (China, India, Latin-America, etc), to capitalist nations like Spain, and to such an imperialist power as Japan. And Dutt claims to expound the views of Lenin "in relation to the urgent

world problems and tasks confronting us today!"

In order to avoid this paramount problem Dutt presents the disputes in the Russian social democracy in 1905 as merely between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks. How about Trotsky's theory of the permanent revolution, his slogan for a workers' government? The British Stalinist, Ralph Fox, in his recent biography of Lenin, fulminates against Trotsky on this and other scores. Dutt remains completely silent. Is this a "legal" protest against the historical abominations of Fox and other Stalinist scribblers?

Nor does Dutt fail to avoid the important problems of the trade unions and the united front. Surely such questions deserve at least a paragraph or so in even a brief sketch of Lenin. But to touch these problems would mean to state Lenin's conceptions as against the Stalinists' views or *openly* to avow Stalinism. Dutt preferred silence. Cowardly silence on the burning problems of the day.

The most important event since the Russian revolution and the founding of the Communist International, the victory of Fascism in Germany, is treated in an "optimistic" manner.

"Life will assert itself." In this basic understanding Lenin proclaimed his confidence in the final victory of the world socialist revolution, despite all reverses and temporary defeats, exemplified today in the temporary rule of Fascism in Germany, which can only pave the way for a new and deeper and finally victorious revolutionary upheaval" (p. 91.)

However, this historically true statement is meaningless unless its author offers a world workers' party based on revolutionary Marxism which can lead to final victory. Dutt offers the Communist International of today as the "heir of Lenin". On what grounds? We have seen how he avoids the fundamental disputes in the world communist movement of the last decade. We need but add that he does not quote a single document dated after 1923! Why should one accept the present Stalinist as the inheritor of the revolutionary Communist International of 1919-1923?

(In his bibliography Dutt includes Stalin's writings and the current periodicals of the Third International. Will this be the reply to the "omissions" in the text?)

R. Palme Dutt has been a "legal Marxist" since the epoch of Stalinism. He has deliberately attempted to avoid the burning questions of the day. Not with complete success. After the victory of Fascism in Germany he whitewashed the Stalinist party of Germany for its capitulation. Now, when efforts are being made to build a Fourth International, a world party of revolutionary Marxism, he distorts the views of the Internationalist-Communists in his *Labour Monthly* by demagogic blending of the Centrist and the revolutionary movements for a new international.

Dutt's legal Marxism is comparable to the position of Rizanov in Russia up to several years ago. The latter deliberately divorced himself from the burning political questions of the day in order to popularize the works and teachings of Marx and Engels. He abstained from the factional struggles in the Communist party of the Soviet Union and the Comintern but refused to become a mouth-piece for Stalinism or its cult. But even he could not last:

he was framed up and exiled to Siberia.

Dutt is in a more difficult position. He is active in the *political* movement. His doom as a legal Marxist is a matter of a few months or so. He will be compelled to become an open, consistent and vociferous spokesman of Stalinism or be expelled as . . . a counter-revolutionist.

Dutt's *Lenin* may well be put on the Stalinist *index expurgatorius*. Some aspiring Stalinist "theoretician" is sure to review it and find "deviations", "omissions" and "Trotskyist contraband" within it. Dutt will be compelled to repudiate or revise his writing.

In any case, a biography of Lenin not written in the spirit of the great revolutionist is not merely insufficient but dangerous. The legal Marxism of R. Palme Dutt is a scholarly cover for Stalinist revisionism and treachery.

Joseph CARTER

## American Capacity

AMERICA'S CAPACITY TO PRODUCE. By EDWIN G. NOURSE and Associates. xiii+608 pp. Washington, D. C. The Brookings Institution. \$3.50.

"America's Capacity to Produce"—a really stupendous undertaking. The book still has to be written.

The Brookings Institute, in bringing forth this volume, states that it is to be the first of a series. It is—the first of a series of apologies for capitalism.

Attempting to analyze America's capacity to produce commodities, the authors approach the entire problem from the viewpoint of a second-rate economics professor. Rather than distinguish between useful products of society (food, radios, automobiles, shelter) and the useless (warships, traveling salesmen, stock markets, etc.), the members of the Institute close their eyes and butt blindly into the entire mess. This book is the result. Not "America's capacity to produce", but "capitalism's capacity to produce" was the horizon of the authors.

The major shortcomings of the book could be listed as follows:

1) Far from attempting to analyze what American industry could produce in useful and needed articles, the authors have confined themselves to the attempt to analyze what American capitalism could produce under capitalist market conditions.

2) The analysis is carried up to the year 1930. This, of course, immediately chops off the depression years, four years that would give to the capitalist picture a far blacker framework than the authors desire. (Even W. C. Mitchell, long before the present crisis, was forced to admit that "normal" capitalism included both years of "prosperity" as well as those of depression.)

3) By ending with 1929, the Institute economists do not have to bother with the intense rationalization of the past four years, a rationalization so extreme that despite the shrinking market, or rather because of it, productivity has increased over 20% for the manufacturing industries.

The above factors would properly be classified as the major shortcomings of the book as a whole.

In addition to the above the book is so afflicted with "minor shortcomings" that one is forced to arrive at the conclusion

that Brookings' Incapacity to Produce far exceeds that of American industry.

After finishing the first chapter, "Agriculture", one begins to realize the type of "analysis" one is about to encounter. A whole series of statistics is brought forth (including appendices) to show how many cows, fences, farmers, barns, etc., existed in the U. S., and how they have increased since 1900. Not a word about capacity to produce (which we must admit is far from a simple subject). Suddenly, the reader is told that because of all the above (how? why?) "the writer is convinced that American agriculture could produce 20% more than it turned out in 1929." The author apologizes for his conclusion, admits it is but "an individual opinion"—and there you have it—"incapacity to produce".

Accompanying the above type of wild guess we have a wild pruning of figures in the attempt to whitewash capitalism. Taking cement as an example, the Bureau of Census, on the basis of a questionnaire sent to the different producers, estimates a total capacity of 259 million barrels. The estimate was based on the replies to the questionnaire calling for "total quantity of finished cement your plant could have produced during the year allowing for ordinary and usual interruptions". The authors immediately proceed to slice this figure by 17% "for seasonal effect" (i.e., the capitalist market variations). On this "seasonal capacity" the authors find that production (170,500,000) was 82% of capacity. Using the figure of the U. S. Bureau of Mines before the 17% had been chopped off, we observe that production was only 66%. In 1933 production was 63,000,000 barrels, or 24% of capacity. In other words, Nourse has given capitalism a whitewash of 58%, or of merely 16% if we consider only 1929.

This same toning down of production capacity is employed for every industry. In "steel", for example, the figures of the American Iron and Steel Institute are given the title of "theoretical capacity". And being against "theory", a damper is immediately applied, reducing capacity to what is termed "practical capacity". This leads to the ridiculous result of actual production for the entire year 1929 being higher than "practical capacity", whereas for the peak months actual production is much above the authors' "practical capacity".

This type of analysis comprises the entire book. Wild guesses, juggling of figures, anything to paint a rosy picture. However, despite all the manipulations, the authors cannot increase the figure of American production as compared to capacity to more than 80%. On this basis they assert that were industry running at full capacity an increase of 19% over 1929 production would be possible. This by itself is a damning indictment of our present system.

Far more damning, however, would be the results of a true analysis. Without much fear of being wrong, it could be shown that on the basis of useful articles, figures of production are only 50% or 60% of capacity. It would hardly be more than a conservative estimate to say that American industry could today easily double its 1929 output of useful articles, even if some useful labor power were diverted to the production of machine guns and bullets to defend a Soviet America.

W. E. G.



# At Home

THE first issue of THE NEW INTERNATIONAL met with a gratifying reception, to judge by the circulation reports and the letters received from all parts of the world. The demand for additional copies far exceeded the number printed and in several cases we were unable to fill the orders sent in. (We request comrades having unsold copies in good condition to forward them to us; they will be credited accordingly.)

The Los Angeles agent increased his order from 15 to 35 and then to 75 copies. Waukegan wrote: "Congratulations. The first issue of the magazine was excellent. It was received with great enthusiasm. It will fill a great need"—and raised the order from 10 to 15.

From St. Louis we are written by our agent: "Instead of 10 send 20. Foster's Bookstore sold out 10 in two days and is now ordering 25." Boston raised its order from 25 to 50 for the second issue and Cleveland took a jump from a bundle of 15 to 85. The comrade in Newcastle writes: "THE NEW INTERNATIONAL is far, far beyond our highest expectations. You may depend on me to do all I can to keep it going. Here is \$5.00 to help sustain it"—an excellent example to others, we hope, as is also the increased order from 10 to 15 copies. Pittsburgh, not far away, raises its order from 15 to 25.

Philadelphia, which calls the review "great" increases its order from 40 to 100 per month, and distant Salt Lake City from 10 to 20. New Haven writes: "Already sold 10 copies; please rush 10 more." And Youngstown, which is taking 40 of this issue says that the "demand for THE NEW INTERNATIONAL is greater than the supply. If at all possible please rush 10 more copies at once".

Chicago is handling a total of 225 copies and in New York some 600 have been sold of the first issue—the Manhattan Spartacus Youth Club alone having run up its sale from an original 25 to 50 copies.

The circulation in other English-speaking countries is also very promising. Two letters from Vancouver indicate it: "The bundle you sent was sold in a couple of hours. And those lucky enough to get a copy have nothing but praise to offer, not only for the tidy appearance, but for the brilliant material. The least one can say is THE NEW INTERNATIONAL is truly a magazine of revolutionary Marxism." Another: "Only yesterday I saw a copy of THE NEW INTERNATIONAL for the first time. Congratulations to you and Max! It's excellent, both in material and make-up. I was talking to some old-time Wobblies yesterday and they thought it was the best Marxian magazine they had ever seen."

From Toronto, Jack MacDonald writes: "Congratulations on your very creditable work—THE NEW INTERNATIONAL. It certainly is a first class job and should make its way deep into the heart of communist circles and find a first place in communist literature." Montreal and Winnipeg utter similar sentiments.

Glasgow, Scotland, which originally ordered 25 copies, writes: "THE NEW INTERNATIONAL was sold out in two days and I wish 10 additional copies of No. 1 and 50 of No. 2. The make-up is really splendid and as long as there is a good number of international articles in each issue it should

do good work among the English-speaking workers. I managed to raise enough cash to send \$10.00."

Remote South Africa is now receiving, without counting subscribers, bundles amounting to 46 copies. Australia is disposing of 65. In London we have started off with 55 copies. A bundle of 5 copies is now being sent even to little Panama. And from Czechoslovakian Prague we are told: "We have received THE NEW INTERNATIONAL and we thank you for it. I believe that it is now the best theoretical organ of the International Communists."

Other comments include the editorial observation in the New York Nation of August 1: "Among the theoretical revolutionary magazines, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL, published by the Trotskyists, is an impressive newcomer. When a small Left group can get out a fifteen-cent monthly magazine containing in its first issue some 70,000 words of rather well-thought-out and well-written prose, then the dollar value of such enterprises as the opulent and glistening Fortune becomes somewhat questionable."

It is certain, however, that we cannot even hope to vie with Fortune when it is a question of financial resources and support. That must come from our friends, who are, alas! not so opulent, however their enthusiasm may glisten. We want to put our review on a sound foundation. And none is sounder than a substantial subscription list. We have winked at more than one imperious point in putting the price per copy at 15 cents. We can keep it at that price if our circulation is raised and kept rising. One dollar fifty per year (12 numbers) is a modest sum for the magazine you are getting; or perhaps the price of one dollar for seven months may be more convenient for you.

Quick action in subscribing for yourself, or for a friend, will be appreciated by us. Or will you take a bundle to sell?

THE MANAGER

## An Apology

WE owe the readers of the review an apology for the delay in the appearance of the current issue. The arrest of the editor in Minneapolis during the truckers' strike, followed by an infernal combination of technical difficulties, caused the postponement of publication. Although it was suggested by some that the August issue of the review be skipped and that the current number be dated September 1934, we set ourselves resolutely against the proposal. We do not want to skip any issues regardless of the difficulties and we know we can count upon loyal support from our readers whenever the occasion demands it (and it always does). We are consequently getting this number out as the August issue, and in order to catch up with our regular monthly publication date, the September number will be out in less than a month from the appearance of the present issue. Once more, we beg the indulgence of our readers.

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It will not, nor does it attempt to, cover every single question of the day, nor to run after fleeting sensations. It selects those problems which have more than purely local or immediate significance and subjects them to the trenchant scrutiny of Marxian criticism. It copes with questions which others disdain or fear, and consequently ignore. It seeks to stimu-

late its readers to probe more deeply into the vital problems of the American and international labor movements.

With the hope of reaching the widest possible circle of readers, the price of the review has been set at an unusually low figure. It is only the conviction that increased circulation will compensate for the small price that persuaded us to set it at fifteen cents a copy. For the same reason, the subscription rate is being maintained at \$1.50 a year or \$1.00 for seven issues.

A recent issue of *The Nation* observed that "Among the theoretical revolutionary magazines, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL, published by the Trotskyists, is an impressive newcomer. When a small Left group can get out a fifteen-cent monthly magazine containing in its first issue some 70,000 words of rather well-thought-out and well-written prose, then the dollar value of such enterprises as the opulent and glistening *Fortune* becomes somewhat questionable."

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THE *Modern Monthly* is the most attacked periodical in America today. The right has shouted for its suppression; the left has often criticized it for its "formlessness" and the center liberals have challenged its definitely revolutionary position.

THIS is a natural consequence of the fact that *The Modern Monthly* is the only independent revolutionary critical review in the United States today. It is the organ of no specific radical group and it accepts no particular factional dogma. This is not to be misinterpreted as a criticism of any group periodical or radical organization. *The Modern Monthly* recognizes the vast importance of such organs and groups in the historic process. It desires to make clear, however,

that its own function is that of an independent radical journal affiliated with no group and free to publish the uncensored writings of all courageous and intelligent radical writers.

EACH month it publishes the most original and significant thought of many radicals representing different points of view. Whether or not you are a member of any group, you owe it to yourself and to the movement to read *The Modern Monthly*. No doubt, you will disagree with a great deal of the material contained in it; you will always find it, however, vital, outspoken and important. Send in your subscription now.

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